Release was the one escrow spend path still hardwired to the synthetic
testTxBody backend, so suppliers had no way to resolve Submitted escrows
past the accept window on mainnet (the sweeper parks them 'for supplier
Release'). Adds buildLiveTxForRelease mirroring the Reclaim builder
(supplier payout, Constr4/tag 125 redeemer, Ogmios UPLC eval) and the
detectCborBackend dispatch in buildReleaseTx, reclaim.ts-style.
validFrom clamps to submitted_at + ACCEPT_WINDOW rather than tip-60s
alone: the back-pad by itself violates the validator whenever the tip is
less than 60s past the window.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two opt-in envs preparing the openclaw supplier on inference-proxy:
OPENAI_SESSION_PASSTHROUGH=1 — chat-session turns speak the stateful-
upstream contract: the escrow ref is sent as the OpenAI `user` field
(OpenClaw keys one persistent agent session per `user`, so browser/
tool state survives across turns) and only the current turn's delta
goes upstream — the upstream session carries history, and re-sending
the full transcript would duplicate it into the upstream context every
turn (OpenClaw renders ALL request messages into the new agent turn).
The local transcript still accumulates fully for the receipt. Without
`user`, OpenClaw creates an ephemeral session per request (uuid key),
so default-off stays safe for stateless providers.
OPENAI_MODEL_OVERRIDE — fixed upstream model id sent instead of the
advert's buyer-facing model. OpenClaw's chat-completions endpoint 400s
on anything but "openclaw" / "openclaw/<agentId>", while the advert
must carry a unique fleet-routable id (openclaw-web-agent).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes 2 critical, 2 important, and 5 minor findings from review of 069edcb:
- C1: add a happy-path test that reaches postOcrEscrow.ts's escrowLockFloor
call and asserts the locked amount; verified it fails against a bare
economicTotal and passes against the real code.
- C2: gate /v1/ocr/extract (auth + rate limits) before the 16mb body parser
so an unauthenticated caller can no longer force a full buffer/JSON.parse.
- I2: hoist result/used/escrowRef in the OCR one-shot handler so the failure
path records escrow_ref/supplier/cost when an escrow was actually posted,
and emit an ocr_failed structured log line mirroring ocr_settled.
- I3: export venueAttribution and cover its sanitization directly; add a
stubbed happy-path route test asserting the first-party-brokered
disclosure label reaches the response.
- Minor: drop unused hfWeightsSource end to end, rename a misleading test,
make the OCR capability template's pinning language conditional on the
self-hosted upstream, tighten the /v1/ocr path-prefix guard, and make
preflight's required_lovelace use the same escrowLockFloor the builder
locks (exported from the shared tx barrel for gateway use).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the ocr.page.extract.chandra-ocr-2.v1 capability end to end: the
postOcrEscrow builder (locking the min-ada floor for the Submitted-state
datum, required since the min-ada fix), the gateway OCR route that selects
an OCR supplier by capability, posts a per-page escrow, calls the supplier,
verifies and settles, and returns content plus the signed receipt labelled
first-party-brokered. Supplier OCR handler with a hosted document-API
upstream and buyer-SDK OCR support included.
Squashed from the 2026-08-06 working subset; the deploy pack is
intentionally excluded (it lives in a private operator repo).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
OpenAI-compatible compute-backend preset (config only, reuses LLM_BACKEND=openai) for pointing a supplier node at the HuggingFace Inference Providers router. Adds a boot guard that rejects the OpenRouter-only reasoning param against the HF router, unit tests, and an operator runbook.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The escrow locks payment + both bonds and the validator requires exact
value preservation (value_equal) on Claim and Submit. Submit grows the
inline datum ~43 bytes (submitted_at None->Some, result_receipt_hash
None->Some 32 bytes). When capability_id is long enough, the
Submitted-state output's min-ada exceeds the locked total; lucid bumps
the continuing output, value_equal fails, and the validator errors with
no traces (opaque evaluateTransaction 3010/3012). Measured on mainnet at
utxoCostPerByte 4310: a 20-byte chat capability clears a 2.2M lock by
49,310, a 33-byte OCR capability is over by 11,030 - so short-capability
escrows settle and long ones never can, and because Claim's datum is
smaller it always passes, making a Submit-only failure look chain-side.
escrowLockFloor() computes min-ada for the Submitted state plus a margin
and locks max(economic total, that floor) in the post builders. Buyer-
side only, no contract or supplier changes; lucid never bumps once the
lock is sufficient, and the surplus returns through the >= terminal
distribution. postOcrEscrow's identical change ships with the OCR
feature branch. New unit test covers the floor across capability lengths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
planConsolidate returned already-healthy only for wallets with EXACTLY
2 UTxOs, but buildConsolidateWalletTx lands 3 (collateral + working +
the fee-reserve remainder as change). The shape consolidation produces
can never satisfy its own health check, so every wallet-health tick
re-consolidates and pays the ~0.5 AP3X min fee again. Measured in a
production deployment: a 45s ticker submitted 232 consolidations and
burned ~116 AP3X in about 2.5 idle hours; at the default 600s interval
the same loop leaks ~3 AP3X per hour whenever the wallet is not exactly
2 UTxOs.
Healthy is now structural: a pure-lovelace UTxO >= collateralLovelace
exists, at least 1 AP3X sits outside it, and fragmentation is bounded
(<= 6 UTxOs, new optional maxUtxos param). The health check also runs
BEFORE the low-balance guard, so a wallet that can already run script
transactions is never reshaped or refused. walletHealth gains two
independent circuit breakers - halt after 3 consecutive consolidations
that never reach healthy, halt past 6 consolidations per 24h - so any
future non-convergence costs at most ~1.5 AP3X instead of the whole
wallet, plus a docstring that matches reality.
Tests: the exact post-consolidation-shape regression, one-step
idempotence against the builder output model, candidate boundaries
(native assets, 1,628-lovelace-short), healthy-below-reshape-threshold,
and breaker behavior including error and reset paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI has been red since the pnpm 10 migration. Four independent causes:
- better-sqlite3: pnpm 10 blocks dependency build scripts by default, so the
native binding was never compiled on CI. Allowlist it via
onlyBuiltDependencies in pnpm-workspace.yaml.
- libsodium-wrappers-sumo 0.7.16: the published ESM wrapper does
`import "./libsodium-sumo.mjs"` but the tarball does not ship that file
(it lives in the libsodium-sumo package). Patch the import to the bare
specifier; local runs only worked because of a hand-copied file in
node_modules.
- tx-accept/claim [live] tests: the live path checks deadlines against
Date.now(), and the fixed fixture timestamps expired in June. Freeze the
clock inside the fixture windows with vi.useFakeTimers.
- CML set_exunits panic ("RuntimeError: unreachable"): with
localUPLCEval: false the provider asks Ogmios for ex-units; the test mocks
answered `{}`, so the provider fell back to a spend redeemer at index 0
while the escrow input sorts to index 1 — CML panics on the unknown
redeemer key. Mock evaluateTransaction with the true index like real
Ogmios.
Also regenerate the advert-datum golden: the fixture builders passed plain JS
numbers to cbor-x (minimal ints, float64 for the timestamp) while the
production codec — whose output is live on mainnet — emits full-width uint64.
Builders now encode integer fields as BigInt so builders, codec, and golden
agree byte-for-byte.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two structural fixes for demo concurrency (3 single-slot suppliers thrashed
under Open WebUI's ~3 conversations per message):
Multi-slot suppliers (MAX_CHAT_SESSIONS, default 1):
- SupplierState is now capacity-aware: a Set of active escrow refs with
free-until-full status semantics, ref-scoped release(ref) (also fixes the
latent bug where handler catch-alls released another request's slot), and
a walletMutex serializing every wallet-spending chain op — Claim, Submit,
and wallet-health consolidation queue instead of racing the single
working/collateral UTxO. /status gains active_sessions/max_sessions.
Entry-ticket settle mode (CHAT_SETTLE_MODE=ticket, default full, both sides):
- The buyer's escrow post at session open is the ONLY chain op. The supplier
verifies the Open escrow as an entry ticket but never Claims/Submits
(/v1/chat/start → {status:"ticket"}; /v1/chat/end → receipt-less
{status:"ended"}); no hard-cap timer, so sessions may outlive deliver_by.
Used tickets can't reopen sessions (records retained; 409 session_exists).
- Buyer SDK: startChat/endChat are settle-mode aware, driven by the
supplier's response — mixed-mode rollout windows settle correctly.
- Gateway: ticket closes bill cost 0; the sweeper Reclaims Open tickets
after deliver_by WITHOUT closing live sessions (the conversation and its
affinity mirror survive their reclaimed ticket), gates reclaims on
deliver_by, and keeps an in-process settled-refs memory so terminal
indexer rows aren't retried every sweep forever.
Deployment (kimi-chat trio + gateway): ticket mode, 8 slots per supplier,
idle policy gateway 10 min / supplier 15 min (fixes the inversion where the
supplier idle-closed before the gateway janitor).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The demo endpoint lost its session on nearly every second message: affinity
required clients to re-echo the assistant reply byte-identically, so clients
that strip <think> blocks or reshape whitespace (Open WebUI, litellm) missed
every turn, opened a fresh escrow session on the next free single-slot
supplier, and left the old one pinned. Open WebUI's background title/tag-gen
requests each pinned another supplier — one message could exhaust all three
kimi replicas ("no available chat supplier").
- affinity: lenient assistant-content matching (think-strip + whitespace
collapse); user/system/tool messages and tool_calls stay byte-strict;
strict prefixes outrank lenient ones. The mirror is never rewritten with
client text, so receipt hashes stay valid.
- demoChat: trim trailing assistant/system messages (regenerate semantics)
instead of 400 "the last message must have role user or tool".
- supplier: roll the transcript back when the LLM call fails so retries
don't duplicate the delta (ChatSessionStore.truncateTranscript).
- demoChat: LRU-evict a demo session when no supplier is available (supplier
/v1/chat/end frees the slot, sweeper Accepts the escrow) and retry the
open with selectCandidates ignoreStatusFor to bypass the ~20s-stale
indexer status poll. Max 2 evictions per request.
- sweeper: idle janitor closes demo sessions unused for DEMO_SESSION_IDLE_MS
(default 3 min, below the supplier's 5 min CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS) so
abandoned one-off sessions release their suppliers quickly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
MVP demo: one operator-funded API key anyone can plug into an IDE/harness,
running real escrow-per-session marketplace conversations (llm.chat.v1)
behind the standard OpenAI /chat/completions wire shape.
- shared: ChatMessage gains tool role + tool_calls; normalizeChatMessage/
chatMessagesEquivalent keep supplier transcript and gateway mirror
hash-identical for receipts (field presence is part of the identity)
- supplier: /v1/chat/message accepts {messages,tools,tool_choice} alongside
legacy {content}; callOpenAiStream forwards tools, accumulates fragmented
delta.tool_calls, allows content-less tool turns; done frame carries the
assistant message verbatim + finish_reason + usage
- gateway: demo flag on api_keys (additive migration), create-demo-key CLI,
withdraw 403 + hidden deposit address for demo keys, per-IP demo rate
limit (demo keys skip the shared per-key limit), models filtered to chat
capability
- gateway executor (demoChat.ts): transcript-prefix affinity maps stateless
calls onto open sessions, forwards only unseen deltas, transparently
reopens on supplier idle-close; never falls back to one-shot (its settle
path assumes <=1 in-flight escrow per wallet)
- mutex scope: key mutex held only for chain work (open/close); off-chain
turns serialize on per-session locks so replicas serve users concurrently
- sweeper: chat-aware reclaim guard (35min vs 11min) and abandoned-session
cleanup; terminal state confirmed via on-chain queryUtxo (indexer keeps
lineage rows at their old state forever)
- deploy: kimi-chat replicas 2+3 compose files; chat idle timeout 2.5min
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a conversational supplier capability and a free demo, both streaming.
New paid `llm.chat.v1` type: one escrow per conversation (flat fee). "Start
chat" posts the escrow with a session-init placeholder prompt_hash and the
supplier Claims (reserving its single slot); turns then stream off-chain via
SSE with zero chain interaction; "End chat" has the supplier Submit a receipt
over the full transcript and the buyer Accept — the moment the user is charged.
The on-chain validator is content-agnostic (pins but never verifies the
hashes), so this reuses the existing contract unchanged. A supplier-side idle
watchdog auto-ends abandoned sessions before deliver_by.
Free Kimi K2.6 chat demo: a synthetic "demo:kimi-chat" tile that uses the same
chat UI but proxies straight to OpenRouter (no escrow, no payment), mirroring
the existing Piper demo.
Shared:
- postChatEscrow.ts + chatSessionPromptHash() (session-init prompt_hash helper
shared by the buyer builder and the supplier start gate).
Supplier:
- CAPABILITY_KIND="chat-session" (+ CHAT_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS); callOpenAiStream()
streaming client; ChatSessionStore + endChatSession(); /v1/chat/{start,
message,end} handlers with idle + hard-cap watchdog timers.
Buyer:
- Marketplace.startChat()/endChat() with relaxed (session-init) receipt
verification + crypto verifyReceipt; /v1/chat/{start,message,end} routes
(SSE passthrough) and a free /v1/chat-demo/message OpenRouter proxy;
OPENROUTER_API_KEY/OPENROUTER_BASE_URL config; ChatForm.tsx + Dashboard
KIMI_DEMO_SUPPLIER tile and llm.chat.v1 dispatch.
Deploy:
- docker-compose.supplier-kimi-chat.yml + supplier/.env.kimi-chat.example.
Typecheck passes across all workspaces; full vitest suite green except 15
pre-existing time-bomb/RED failures (tx-claim/accept/post-advert live-CBOR
fixtures with hardcoded past deadlines + the M0-C golden-datum test), confirmed
identical on a clean tree.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The summarization runs server-side, but the SPA held the job only in
component state and jobs lived only in memory — so navigating away from
the Book Summarizer reset the UI (losing the handle to a still-running
job) and past summaries vanished on restart.
- PdfJobDb: SQLite store (its own file under ARCHIVE_DIR) persisting
every job on each progress update.
- JobStore: createdAt, persist-on-update, viewOf()/list() that serve
live jobs first then fall back to the durable record; non-live jobs
whose worker died surface as a new "interrupted" status.
- routes: GET /v1/pdf-jobs (newest-first list); GET /:id + summary.md
serve past jobs via viewOf; /:id/events sends a single terminal frame
for a finished/past job (no hang) and live frames otherwise.
- SPA: RecentJobs list (open any job → reconnect to live progress or
show result), localStorage resume of the active job on return, and a
"back to list (keeps running)" affordance.
- mainnet buyer compose: persistent named volume + ARCHIVE_DIR so the
archive + pdf-jobs.db survive container recreation/redeploys.
Tests: persistence-across-restart, interrupted detection, list, and
past-job serving (incl. terminal SSE). Full buyer suite green (185).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an authenticated upload flow to the buyer web app: an operator
uploads a PDF, the server extracts + paragraph-aligned-chunks it
(~2.2k tokens), then runs a hierarchical map-reduce summarization by
paying marketplace suppliers per chunk — one on-chain escrow per map
call and per reduce node. One book upload fans out into dozens of real
mainnet escrows (the intended marketplace traffic) while producing a
genuine full-book summary.
Server module (buyer/src/pdf/): PDF extraction (text-only, rejects
scanned), token-aware chunker, supplier discovery/round-robin filtered
to capable models (kimi/deepseek/gpt; excludes qwen2.5:0.5b), pre-spend
cost estimate + wallet-floor guard, and a JobStore orchestrator that
reuses submitPrompt → findSubmittedEscrowRef → runAccept per call.
v1 serializes PostEscrow under a mutex (the shared tx builder can't pin
wallet inputs, so parallel escrows would double-spend); retries failed
calls on a different supplier then continues with gaps. 6 /v1/pdf-*
routes (multipart upload, estimate, confirm-gated start, SSE progress,
result, .md download) behind the existing session auth + page/chunk/
balance caps. SPA adds a 4-step BookSummarizer wizard.
Tests: chunk/estimate/supplier-pool/extract unit tests + orchestrator
(happy/gap/failover) + routes integration. Full buyer suite green
(181 tests); SPA build + typecheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Periodic setInterval ticker + on-failure backstop from the buildClaimTx
catch in server.ts. Both reuse the existing single-slot lock and call
runConsolidateWallet under the hood — planConsolidate short-circuits to
already-healthy in the steady state so no tx, no fee on a clean wallet.
Driven by deepseek-lane outage 2026-05-28 (supplier wallet drifted to 14
UTxOs with 9 dust 2-AP3X outputs; Claim tx coin-selector picked dust as
working input → chain_submit_failed; lane stalled until manual
tx:consolidate-wallet).
buyer/scripts/monitor-wallets: surface deepseek + kimi as operator wallets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an optional OPENAI_API_KEY env var that supplier/src/openai.ts forwards as
`Authorization: Bearer <key>`. Empty/unset preserves the ChatMock behaviour
(no auth header). Unlocks pointing the openai backend at DeepSeek directly
(https://api.deepseek.com) — no local proxy needed.
New compose: deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier-deepseek.yml (third mainnet
supplier, model deepseek-v4-pro, mp-suppliers-deepseek.vector.apexfusion.org).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a one-shot operational tx that re-shapes any operator wallet to
{5 AP3X collateral candidate, working remainder} so subsequent Plutus
script-spends (Claim/Submit/Accept/Reclaim/RetireAdvert) find a UTxO
that satisfies lucid's setCollateral=5_000_000n default coin selector.
Symptom this addresses: open-webui mainnet supplier wallet held 8 UTxOs
max 2.40 AP3X, every Accept tx failed at lucid .complete() with the
"wallet must hold a pure-ADA UTxO ≥ 5 ADA" error path. Same fragmentation
risk on the other 4 mainnet operator wallets (one big UTxO surrounded by
dust — first script-spend consumes the big one and leaves nothing usable
as collateral).
Phase 1 — new tx:consolidate-wallet CLI (supplier + buyer):
- planConsolidate.ts — pure planner; supports consolidate (N>1 → 2),
split (1 → 2), and already-healthy skip.
- consolidateWallet.ts — live builder; presetWalletInputs pins all
UTxOs, two pay.ToAddress outputs (collateral + working).
- runConsolidateWallet.ts — orchestration (build + submit + awaitTx).
- supplier/src/cli/consolidate-wallet.ts + buyer mirror.
- monitor-wallets.ts — add supplier-tts@vector-marketplace (was
misclassified as 3rd-party).
Phase 2 — defensive pre-check in the 5 script-spend builders:
- assertCollateralCandidate(utxos) fires at the top of
buildSpendOpenOrClaimedTx (Claim/Submit), buildLiveTxForAccept,
buildLiveTxForReclaim, buildLiveTxForRetireAdvert. Throws a
TxConstructionError("collateral_required") pointing at
tx:consolidate-wallet instead of waiting for lucid's deep failure.
Tests: 12 new passing (planConsolidate edge cases + assert helper).
Pre-existing lucid 0.4.30 WASM "unreachable" failures in tx-*-live.test.ts
fixtures are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mainnet marketplace-indexer was stuck in an event-replay loop since
2026-05-14. Diagnosis: OgmiosSource.intersectAt is captured ONCE in
start() from the cursor at process startup. On every WebSocket reconnect
(Cloudflare-fronted WS times out at ~100s idle, plus periodic Ogmios
server restarts), scheduleReconnect calls sendFindIntersection with the
stale start-time intersect, never the latest persisted cursor. Ogmios
seeks to that old point, sends nextBlock forward from there, the worker
re-processes the same blocks and writes saveCursor over the advanced
cursor with the old slot — DB cursor effectively never moves past the
startup point, and events get duplicated each iteration.
Fix:
- Add ChainSyncSource.updateIntersect({ slot, id }) to the interface.
- OgmiosSource.updateIntersect mutates this.intersectAt, so the next
reconnect's findIntersection picks up from the latest saved cursor.
- worker.handleBlock calls source.updateIntersect after every saveCursor.
- worker.handleRollback also calls it so a WS drop right after a rollback
doesn't resume past the rollback point.
- MockChainSyncSource implements as no-op (no reconnect path in tests).
Verified: same shape as the testnet projection-gap bug (memory 95fe6946),
manifesting differently. After this fix the cursor will only ever advance,
and reconnects resume from the freshest persisted point.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a Codex/ChatGPT backend path for the supplier alongside the
existing Ollama one. The mainnet supplier is repointed at a localhost
ChatMock proxy (RayBytes/ChatMock, pinned :v1.35) that authenticates
against a ChatGPT Pro subscription via OAuth.
- supplier/src/openai.ts: HTTP client for OpenAI-compatible
/v1/chat/completions. Same return shape as ollama.callOllama so
jobRunner can branch cleanly.
- supplier/src/jobRunner.ts: branch on config.llmBackend.
- supplier/src/config.ts: LLM_BACKEND ("ollama" default | "openai"),
OPENAI_BASE_URL, OPENAI_TIMEOUT_MS (default 180_000 — GPT first-token
latency).
- supplier/src/cli/gen-keypair.ts: standalone Ed25519 keypair generator
+ bech32 address derivation. Used to bootstrap a fresh supplier
wallet without round-tripping through tx:post-advert --dry-run.
- deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.chatmock.yml: long-running chatmock
serve + one-shot --profile login flow.
- deploy/mainnet/docker-compose.supplier.yml: rewritten for openai
backend; Traefik routes at mp-suppliers-gpt.vector.apexfusion.org so
the unsuffixed slot stays free for a future supplier with a
different backend.
- tests/unit/supplier-openai.test.ts: unit coverage for callOpenAi.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an Express requireAuth middleware on /v1/* + the SPA shell and a
Vite/React login screen so anyone who reaches mp-buyers.* must authenticate
before driving the operator's wallet via /v1/submit-prompt or /v1/accept.
Why: the buyer-app sits on a public HTTP port and signs txs with a
server-held private key. Until now the only gate was network reachability.
Mechanics:
- BUYER_PASSWORD + SESSION_SECRET (>=32 chars) loaded by config.ts and
surfaced as createApp() deps. Production refuses to start without both.
- buyer/src/auth.ts: HMAC-SHA256 signed buyer_session cookie (HttpOnly,
SameSite=Lax, Path=/, optional Secure), 7-day rolling expiry,
timing-safe password compare, in-memory 5/15-min per-IP rate limiter.
- /v1/auth/{login,logout,whoami}. Login is rate-limited; 6th wrong
attempt returns 429 + Retry-After. Success resets the bucket.
- SPA boot block (__BUYER_BOOT__ injected by server.ts) is gated by the
same cookie so the buyer's address never reaches an unauthenticated
browser.
- New <AuthProvider>/<RequireAuth> in buyer/src/ui/state/AuthContext.tsx
probes /v1/auth/whoami on mount and a scoped window.fetch patch drops
to the login screen on any mid-session 401 from /v1/* (excluding
/v1/auth/* so wrong-password 401s stay local to <Login>).
- Tailwind login card at buyer/src/ui/pages/Login.tsx. App.tsx wraps in
<RequireAuth> and adds a "Sign out" button in the nav.
Tests: tests/unit/buyer-server-auth.test.ts covers sign/verify, rate
limiter, cookie helpers, login flow (400/401/204/429), whoami
(no-cookie/valid/tampered/expired), rolling renewal, logout, gated
/v1/*, /healthz still open, and the no-auth-deps construction shape.
Updated buyer-server-config + buyer-ui-smoke for the new required env
vars and the AuthProvider wrap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
While checking whether last night's localUPLCEval: false fix unblocks
the 5 tx-submit-live tests skipped under TODO(M1-F-D-defer), found
that those tests still crash — but at a DIFFERENT spot than before.
Original UPLC issue (now fixed in production via 7ea7328 + fd24598):
- lucid's CML WASM UPLC interpreter falsely rejected our Plutus V3
Submit/Claim/Accept txs. End-to-end chat + TTS lifecycle now works
on Vector testnet by routing eval to Ogmios.
New / remaining test-side issue:
- Even with a proper evaluateTransaction mock response, lucid's
applyUPLCEvalProvider → CML TransactionBuilder.set_exunits still
panics with wasm "unreachable" inside the test fixture. The
production path doesn't hit this (real Ogmios + real wallet UTxOs).
Whatever the test-mock + CML interaction trips, it's separate from
the original UPLC bug.
Refinements landed
- liveCbor.ts: opt-in LIVECBOR_DEBUG=1 env that prints the full inner
err + WASM stack from rethrowAsTxError, so the next investigation
doesn't need to re-add this scaffolding.
- tx-submit-live.test.ts:
- setupSubmitHappyPath() now mocks "evaluateTransaction" with a
proper EvalRedeemer-shaped response (useful baseline for any
future un-skip attempt; not enough on its own to make the tests
pass).
- The first skipped test's TODO comment updated to record what's
fixed in production vs. what remains as a test-infra bug.
Test counts unchanged (3 pass, 5 still skipped); production path
still verified end-to-end on testnet. Task M1-F-D-defer stays pending
but the original UPLC-interpreter blocker is gone.
The on-chain Submit tx anchors sha256(canonicalize(receipt)) so the
receipt's signature is provably tied to a specific Cardano block — but
without persisting the receipt content + the actual response bytes
nowhere can buyer or supplier produce the artefacts a dispute would
need to argue about. This commit closes that gap on the buyer side.
What's new
- buyer/src/db/schema.ts (new):
`responses` table keyed by escrow_ref, indexes on completed_at /
capability_id / supplier_pkh. Stores metadata + receipt JSON +
Ed25519 signature; large blobs (request envelope, response bytes)
live on disk per-escrow.
- buyer/src/db/archive.ts (new):
ResponseArchive class — persistChat / persistTts / list / get /
readRequest / readResponse. Filesystem layout under ARCHIVE_DIR:
<txhash>_<index>/request.json (always JSON)
<txhash>_<index>/response.{ext} (txt/json for chat, mp3/wav/… for TTS)
Synchronous (better-sqlite3 + fs.writeFileSync) — volume is low and
the simplicity is worth more than async overhead.
- buyer/src/server.ts:
- AppDeps.archive plumbed through createApp.
- /v1/submit-prompt + /v1/submit-tts persist BEFORE returning to
the SPA, using canonicalize() for chat (same bytes the supplier
hashed; JSON.stringify produced different bytes → wrong sha256).
Persist failures are logged but never abort the response — the
on-chain receipt is still authoritative.
- New read-only endpoints:
GET /v1/responses?limit=… list metadata + parsed receipts
GET /v1/responses/:ref single-row detail
GET /v1/responses/:ref/request request artefact (application/json)
GET /v1/responses/:ref/response response artefact (verbatim bytes)
- URL path uses "<txhash>_<index>" (the dir-safe form) since "#"
can't appear unencoded in URLs (fragment delimiter); server
normalises back to canonical "<txhash>#<index>" for SQLite lookup.
- 503 service_unavailable on /v1/responses* when boot has no
archive (ARCHIVE_DIR unset or DB unopenable) — the rest of
the buyer-app still works.
- buyer/src/ui/pages/TaskHistory.tsx:
Joins indexer escrows (chain state) + /v1/responses (archived
artefacts) by escrow_ref. Each completed lifecycle gets an
archive panel showing:
- Request panel (above, chronological order): human-readable
summary — first user message for chat, `text + voice + format +
speed` for TTS, raw JSON fallback otherwise.
- Response panel: assistant text inline for chat, <audio controls>
for TTS; Download response / Download request anchors.
- "Verify hash" button — fetches the response bytes, computes
sha256 via crypto.subtle, compares to receipt.response_hash;
green ✓ on match, red ✗ with truncated computed/expected on
mismatch.
- Collapsible "Receipt + signature" with the full canonical
receipt JSON + the supplier's Ed25519 hex sig.
- buyer/src/config.ts: + ARCHIVE_DIR env (default "./data/archive").
- buyer/Dockerfile: builder gains python3/make/g++ + the
better-sqlite3 native-binding fetch step (mirrors indexer/Dockerfile);
runtime image stays toolchain-free.
- deploy/testnet/docker-compose.buyer.yml: bind-mounts
../../data/buyer/archive (repo-root-relative, not file-relative)
into /data/archive. ARCHIVE_DIR env points at that path.
Tests
- tests/unit/buyer-archive.test.ts (new, 14 tests): persistChat /
persistTts unit coverage (filesystem layout, INSERT-OR-REPLACE
semantics, content-type → extension mapping for mp3/wav/opus/aac/
flac, list ordering + limit, single-row get/read miss-vs-hit) +
HTTP integration (503 when disabled, happy paths returning
metadata / request / response artefact bytes with correct
content-types, 404 on unknown ref).
- tests/unit/buyer-ui-smoke.test.tsx: TaskHistory fetch mock now
also handles /v1/responses (returns empty list — same code path as
"archive disabled" production case).
45 buyer tests passing; chat + TTS lifecycle verified end-to-end on
Vector testnet; "Verify hash" button confirms sha256(response bytes)
matches receipt.response_hash for both capabilities.
Three buyer-app changes that all landed during the same browser-debug
session and were verified end-to-end on Vector testnet:
UX-3-history — /tasks page is now indexer-driven (M1-F-5 followup)
- TaskHistory.tsx fetches /v1/indexer/escrows?buyer=<pkh> from the
buyer-app proxy, groups rows by (posted_at, supplier_pkh) into
lifecycle cards, and renders newest-first with state pill,
capability/model/price, and the tx-hash chain
- main.tsx drops the LocalStorageTaskHistoryStore (chain is the source
of truth; SDK uses MemoryTaskHistoryStore for in-flight only)
Path-B PiperTTS demo — capability-routed UI without escrow yet
- buyer/src/server.ts: POST /v1/synth-speech proxies to the openedai-
speech-min host; validates {text, voice, format, speed} and returns
audio bytes with the upstream Content-Type
- buyer/src/config.ts: TTS_PIPER_BASE_URL env (optional; absence keeps
/v1/synth-speech disabled with a clean 503)
- buyer/src/ui/components/PiperTTSForm.tsx: capability-specific form
(text + voice + format + speed slider) with inline <audio controls>
and a Download .mp3 anchor; blob URLs revoked on each submit + unmount
- buyer/src/ui/pages/Dashboard.tsx: capability registry — switch on
selected.capability_id to PromptForm vs PiperTTSForm; appends a
synthetic "PiperTTS (apex-simulation)" demo card so the capability
routing is exercisable before the on-chain TTS supplier ships
- deploy/testnet/docker-compose.buyer.yml: TTS_PIPER_BASE_URL points
at https://tts-piper.vector.testnet.apexfusion.org
Server-side error logging on /v1/submit-prompt
- buyer/src/server.ts: catch block now logs reason + message + stack
(the demo session lost ~30 minutes to a "<!DOCTYPE..." JSON-parse
error caused by Cloudflare replacing origin's clean 502+JSON with
its own HTML page; the actual upstream cause was a "wallet must
hold a pure-ADA UTxO >=5 ADA" lucid-evolution error that was
invisible because the Express handler had no logger)
Tests: 10 new for /v1/synth-speech (validation, defaults, success
shape, upstream 5xx, fetch-throw); existing buyer-ui-smoke supplier
count expectation updated for the synthetic Piper card (N+1)
