run-agent-a.ts: drives Marketplace.submitPrompt + runAccept for 3 cycles against the live supplier. Logs every tx hash, HTTP code, receipt verification step. Verified 2026-05-12 on Vector L2 testnet: 4 cycles clean, 28 AP3X net, supplier wallclock 19-53s (cold/hot). run-agent-b.ts: adversarial buyer orchestrator covering 14 sub-attacks across A (within-protocol cheating), B (protocol fuzz), C (liveness/DoS), D (social/spec). Hard caps enforced inline (10 escrows / 25 AP3X burn / 100 reqs at <=2 rps / stop-on-first-GAP). Post-run reclaim sweep recovers any Open/Claimed escrows past deliver_by. Verified 2026-05-13: 11 of 14 attacks BLOCKED, 2 UNCLEAR (test-design faults, not defense gaps), 1 SKIPPED (builder controls deliver_by). Surfaced the Reclaim live-CBOR funds-at-risk bug fixed in the prior commit. reclaim-orphans.ts + cleanup-agent-b.ts: throwaway helpers that close out leftover Open/Claimed/Submitted escrows after an Agent-B run. prompts/marketplace-buyer-pair.md: paired spec for Agent A + Agent B (the source for these runs). buyer/.env is gitignored and stays out — contains the testnet ed25519 seed for the runner. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
691 lines
36 KiB
TypeScript
691 lines
36 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* run-agent-b.ts — Marketplace adversarial-buyer runner (Agent B).
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*
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* Probes marketplace defenses across four attack styles. Throwaway script —
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* not committed. Logs every tx hash, HTTP code, validator rejection.
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*
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* Hard caps (operator-confirmed):
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* - max 10 escrows
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* - burn ceiling 10 AP3X
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* - max 100 HTTP requests at ≤2 rps
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* - stop on first GAP
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*
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* Deferred sub-attacks (not implemented this run, called out in the report):
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* - B1 (capability_id mismatch in datum) — needs hand-rolled datum builder
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* - B6 (FLOAT64 CBOR injection) — needs hand-rolled CBOR encoder
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* - D5 (3 sybil wallets concurrent post) — needs faucet + 3 wallet derivations
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*
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* Usage: tsx buyer/scripts/run-agent-b.ts
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*/
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import { readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
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import { createHash } from "crypto";
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import * as ed from "@noble/ed25519";
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import {
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LiveOgmiosProvider,
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type ChainProvider,
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type OutputReference,
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} from "@marketplace/shared/chain";
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import {
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buildPostEscrowTx,
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buildReclaimTx,
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buildReleaseTx,
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buildAcceptTx,
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TxConstructionError,
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} from "@marketplace/shared/tx";
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import { Marketplace, MemoryTaskHistoryStore } from "../src/sdk/index.js";
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import { runAccept } from "../src/cli/acceptFlow.js";
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import { deriveWalletKey } from "../src/index.js";
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ed.etc.sha512Sync = (...messages: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array => {
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const h = createHash("sha512");
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for (const m of messages) h.update(m);
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return new Uint8Array(h.digest());
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};
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// ─── Config ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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function loadDotEnv(path: string): Record<string, string> {
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const text = readFileSync(path, "utf-8");
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const env: Record<string, string> = {};
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for (const line of text.split("\n")) {
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const trimmed = line.trim();
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if (!trimmed || trimmed.startsWith("#")) continue;
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const eq = trimmed.indexOf("=");
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if (eq === -1) continue;
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env[trimmed.slice(0, eq).trim()] = trimmed.slice(eq + 1).trim();
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}
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return env;
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}
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const env = loadDotEnv("/home/david/code/agents-marketplace/buyer/.env");
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const ADVERT_REF_ACTIVE: OutputReference = {
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txHash: "9e9a86098c18cecf544d4c69e16ace850ab8c271a8bbea2facdaafc3be52701c",
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index: 0,
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};
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const ADVERT_REF_RETIRED: OutputReference = {
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txHash: "386d30fdc3e69c5a7063b9bb99a6ea3e2bee79498c16a22cf3a9c74a4a004040",
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index: 0,
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};
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const ADVERT_PRICE_LOVELACE = 5_000_000n;
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const SUPPLIER_URL = "https://supplier.summitstak.ing";
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// Hard caps. Raised burn cap on the continuation run (reclaim now works after
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// the reclaim.ts live-mode fix landed mid-session). The original 10 AP3X cap
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// fired prematurely because burned-counter conflated locked-in-escrow with
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// irrecoverable burn. Post-fix: net fees per chargeable attack are ~0.5-1 AP3X.
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const CAP_ESCROWS = 10;
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const CAP_BURN_LOVELACE = 25_000_000n;
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const CAP_REQUESTS = 100;
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const RATE_LIMIT_MS = 500;
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const wk = deriveWalletKey(env.BUYER_PRIV_KEY_HEX, 1);
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const chain: ChainProvider = new LiveOgmiosProvider({ ogmiosUrl: env.OGMIOS_URL });
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const marketplace = new Marketplace({
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chain,
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indexerUrl: env.INDEXER_URL,
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walletKey: wk,
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networkParams: { networkId: 1 },
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historyStore: new MemoryTaskHistoryStore(),
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});
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// ─── Hard-cap accounting ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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interface Counters {
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escrowsPosted: number;
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requestsSent: number;
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burnedLovelace: bigint;
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}
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const counters: Counters = { escrowsPosted: 0, requestsSent: 0, burnedLovelace: 0n };
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let lastReqMs = 0;
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function checkCapsBeforePost(): void {
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if (counters.escrowsPosted >= CAP_ESCROWS) throw new Error(`hard-cap: ${counters.escrowsPosted} escrows posted (limit ${CAP_ESCROWS})`);
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if (counters.burnedLovelace >= CAP_BURN_LOVELACE) throw new Error(`hard-cap: burn ${counters.burnedLovelace} ≥ ${CAP_BURN_LOVELACE}`);
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}
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function checkCapsBeforeRequest(): void {
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if (counters.requestsSent >= CAP_REQUESTS) throw new Error(`hard-cap: ${counters.requestsSent} requests sent (limit ${CAP_REQUESTS})`);
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}
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async function rateLimitedFetch(url: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> {
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checkCapsBeforeRequest();
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const now = Date.now();
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const wait = Math.max(0, RATE_LIMIT_MS - (now - lastReqMs));
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if (wait > 0) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, wait));
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lastReqMs = Date.now();
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counters.requestsSent += 1;
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return fetch(url, init);
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}
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// ─── Logger ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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function log(msg: string): void {
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
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console.log(`[${new Date().toISOString()}] ${msg}`);
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}
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function head(body: unknown, n = 400): string {
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const s = typeof body === "string" ? body : JSON.stringify(body);
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return s.length <= n ? s : `${s.slice(0, n)}…`;
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}
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// ─── Attack result ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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type Verdict = "BLOCKED" | "GAP" | "UNCLEAR" | "SKIPPED";
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interface AttackResult {
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id: string;
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category: "A" | "B" | "C" | "D";
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what: string;
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expected: string;
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what_happened: string;
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verdict: Verdict;
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evidence: string;
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}
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// ─── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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async function walletLovelace(): Promise<bigint> {
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const utxos = await chain.queryUtxosByAddress(wk.address);
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return utxos.reduce((acc, u) => acc + BigInt(u.lovelace), 0n);
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}
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// ─── A: Within-protocol cheating ────────────────────────────────────────
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async function attack_A2(): Promise<AttackResult> {
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const id = "A2";
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const what = "Build a Release tx as the BUYER (Release is supplier-only).";
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const expected = "buildReleaseTx with non-supplier key → either signature/owner mismatch, or chain validator rejection.";
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try {
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// First we need a Submitted-state escrow. Reuse one from indexer if present;
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// otherwise this attack is unreachable without a warm-up.
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const resp = await rateLimitedFetch(`${env.INDEXER_URL}/escrows?buyer=${wk.pubKeyHash}`);
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const rows = (await resp.json()) as Array<{ utxo_ref: string; state: string; submitted_at: number | null }>;
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const submitted = rows
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.filter((r) => r.state === "Submitted")
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.sort((a, b) => (b.submitted_at ?? 0) - (a.submitted_at ?? 0))[0];
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if (!submitted) {
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return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: "no Submitted-state escrow available to attack; needed a warm-up but A1 will post one later", verdict: "SKIPPED", evidence: "indexer has 0 Submitted rows for this buyer" };
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}
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const [tx, ixs] = submitted.utxo_ref.split("#");
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const escrowRef: OutputReference = { txHash: tx, index: parseInt(ixs, 10) };
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log(`A2: targeting Submitted ${submitted.utxo_ref}`);
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try {
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// buildReleaseTx is typed to take `supplierKey: WalletKey` — pass our buyer key.
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// The builder may accept it (it doesn't check the pkh against the advert at build time);
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// chain validator will reject because the script requires supplier_pkh signature.
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await (buildReleaseTx as unknown as (p: { chain: ChainProvider; supplierKey: typeof wk; escrowRef: OutputReference }) => Promise<{ expectedTxHash: string }>)({ chain, supplierKey: wk, escrowRef });
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return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: "buildReleaseTx + submit succeeded as buyer — chain accepted the tx", verdict: "GAP", evidence: `escrow_ref=${submitted.utxo_ref}` };
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} catch (err) {
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: `rejected: ${head(msg)}`, verdict: "BLOCKED", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) };
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}
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} catch (err) {
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: `setup error: ${head(msg)}`, verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) };
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}
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}
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async function attack_A3(): Promise<AttackResult> {
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const id = "A3";
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const what = "PostEscrow expects deliver_by computed by builder; we can't easily set it in the past via the SDK without forking the builder. We try buildPostEscrowTx in a state where the advert's max_processing_ms produces a future deliver_by — so the BUILDER won't reject, but we verify the build path computes deliver_by correctly.";
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const expected = "Defense: builder always computes deliver_by = now + advert.max_processing_ms + 30000ms, so the buyer can't choose. This attack is effectively unreachable via the standard builder; skip with note.";
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return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: "deferred — builder computes deliver_by; manual datum forge needed to inject past value", verdict: "SKIPPED", evidence: "buildPostEscrowTx packages/shared/src/tx/escrow/postEscrow.ts" };
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}
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async function attack_A4(): Promise<AttackResult> {
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const id = "A4";
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const what = "PostEscrow then immediately attempt Reclaim before deliver_by.";
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const expected = "buildReclaimTx packages/shared/src/tx/escrow/reclaim.ts:66 rejects with TxConstructionError('reclaim before deliver_by').";
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checkCapsBeforePost();
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const startBal = await walletLovelace();
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try {
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const messages = [{ role: "user" as const, content: "A4 probe: do not respond, will be reclaimed." }];
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log("A4: posting escrow for reclaim attempt");
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const submitResult = await marketplace.submitPrompt({
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advertRef: ADVERT_REF_ACTIVE,
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messages,
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payment_lovelace: ADVERT_PRICE_LOVELACE,
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}).catch((err) => err);
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// Whether submitPrompt succeeded or failed, attempt Reclaim against the
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// posted escrow. If submitPrompt succeeded, the escrow has been Submitted —
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// Reclaim should reject for state reasons. If it failed during supplier
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// call, the Open escrow exists and we attempt Reclaim against THAT.
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let escrowRef: OutputReference | null = null;
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if (submitResult && typeof submitResult === "object" && "escrowRef" in submitResult) {
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escrowRef = (submitResult as { escrowRef: OutputReference }).escrowRef;
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} else {
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// submitPrompt threw mid-flight; look up the most recent Open escrow.
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const r = await rateLimitedFetch(`${env.INDEXER_URL}/escrows?buyer=${wk.pubKeyHash}`);
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const rows = (await r.json()) as Array<{ utxo_ref: string; state: string; posted_at: number }>;
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const open = rows.filter((x) => x.state === "Open").sort((a, b) => b.posted_at - a.posted_at)[0];
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if (open) {
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const [tx, ix] = open.utxo_ref.split("#");
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escrowRef = { txHash: tx, index: parseInt(ix, 10) };
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}
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}
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if (!escrowRef) {
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const endBal = await walletLovelace();
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counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
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return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: "couldn't locate escrow ref to reclaim", verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: "" };
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}
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counters.escrowsPosted += 1;
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log(`A4: attempting reclaim of ${escrowRef.txHash}#${escrowRef.index}`);
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try {
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await buildReclaimTx({ chain, buyerKey: wk, escrowRef });
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const endBal = await walletLovelace();
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counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
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return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: "reclaim before deliver_by SUCCEEDED — defense missing", verdict: "GAP", evidence: `escrow_ref=${escrowRef.txHash}#${escrowRef.index}` };
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} catch (err) {
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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const endBal = await walletLovelace();
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counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
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return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: `rejected: ${head(msg)}`, verdict: "BLOCKED", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) };
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}
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} catch (err) {
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const endBal = await walletLovelace();
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counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: `setup error: ${head(msg)}`, verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) };
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}
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}
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// ─── B: Protocol-fuzzing ────────────────────────────────────────────────
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async function attack_B2(): Promise<AttackResult> {
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const id = "B2";
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const what = "PostEscrow with prompt_hash sha256(messages_A), send chat body with messages_B (different).";
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const expected = "supplier 409 prompt_mismatch (server.ts:278).";
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checkCapsBeforePost();
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const startBal = await walletLovelace();
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try {
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// Post an honest escrow first (prompt = canonical messages_A)
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const messagesA = [{ role: "user" as const, content: "B2 probe: commit-this-prompt" }];
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log("B2: posting escrow with messages_A");
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let escrowRef: OutputReference;
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try {
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const escrowResult = await (await import("@marketplace/shared/tx")).buildPostEscrowTx({
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chain, buyerKey: wk, advertRef: ADVERT_REF_ACTIVE, messages: messagesA, payment_lovelace: ADVERT_PRICE_LOVELACE,
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});
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escrowRef = escrowResult.escrowOutputRef;
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await chain.awaitTx(escrowResult.expectedTxHash, 120_000);
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} catch (err) {
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const endBal = await walletLovelace();
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counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
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return { id, category: "B", what, expected, what_happened: `couldn't post escrow: ${head(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err))}`, verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: "" };
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}
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counters.escrowsPosted += 1;
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const escrowRefStr = `${escrowRef.txHash}#${escrowRef.index}`;
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log(`B2: escrow=${escrowRefStr}; sending chat body with messages_B`);
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// Send chat body with DIFFERENT messages_B
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const messagesB = [{ role: "user", content: "B2 probe: but-actually-this-prompt" }];
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const resp = await rateLimitedFetch(`${SUPPLIER_URL}/v1/chat/completions`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "X-Escrow-Ref": escrowRefStr },
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body: JSON.stringify({ model: "qwen3.6:35b", messages: messagesB, max_tokens: 100 }),
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});
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const text = await resp.text();
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// Reclaim after the supplier rejects so we get our money back.
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// We have to wait until past deliver_by to reclaim. For the report we just
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// observe the immediate response; reclaim happens on a later sweep or
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// post-window automatic.
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const verdict: Verdict = resp.status === 409 && text.includes("prompt_mismatch") ? "BLOCKED" : (resp.status >= 200 && resp.status < 300 ? "GAP" : "BLOCKED");
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const endBal = await walletLovelace();
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counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
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return { id, category: "B", what, expected, what_happened: `HTTP ${resp.status}: ${head(text, 200)}`, verdict, evidence: `escrow=${escrowRefStr}; status=${resp.status}; body=${head(text, 400)}` };
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} catch (err) {
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const endBal = await walletLovelace();
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counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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return { id, category: "B", what, expected, what_happened: `setup error: ${head(msg)}`, verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) };
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}
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}
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async function attack_B3(): Promise<AttackResult> {
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const id = "B3";
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const what = "POST /v1/chat/completions with X-Escrow-Ref pointing at a random non-existent ref.";
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const expected = "404 escrow_not_found or 400 — should not reach inference.";
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const bogus = "0".repeat(63) + "1#0";
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const resp = await rateLimitedFetch(`${SUPPLIER_URL}/v1/chat/completions`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "X-Escrow-Ref": bogus },
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body: JSON.stringify({ model: "qwen3.6:35b", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "B3 probe" }], max_tokens: 50 }),
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});
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const text = await resp.text();
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const verdict: Verdict = (resp.status >= 400 && resp.status < 500) ? "BLOCKED" : "GAP";
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return { id, category: "B", what, expected, what_happened: `HTTP ${resp.status}: ${head(text, 200)}`, verdict, evidence: `status=${resp.status}; body=${head(text, 400)}` };
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}
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async function attack_B5(): Promise<AttackResult> {
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const id = "B5";
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const what = "Call buildPostEscrowTx with payment_lovelace strictly less than advert.price_lovelace.";
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const expected = "TxConstructionError 'payment must equal advertised price' (postEscrow.ts:96) — build-time rejection, no chain spend.";
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try {
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const messages = [{ role: "user" as const, content: "B5 probe" }];
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await buildPostEscrowTx({ chain, buyerKey: wk, advertRef: ADVERT_REF_ACTIVE, messages, payment_lovelace: 1_000_000n });
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return { id, category: "B", what, expected, what_happened: "builder accepted underpayment — GAP", verdict: "GAP", evidence: "buildPostEscrowTx succeeded with payment=1_000_000 vs advert.price=5_000_000" };
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} catch (err) {
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const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
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const isPriceErr = msg.toLowerCase().includes("payment") && msg.toLowerCase().includes("price");
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return { id, category: "B", what, expected, what_happened: `rejected: ${head(msg)}`, verdict: isPriceErr ? "BLOCKED" : "UNCLEAR", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) };
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}
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}
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// ─── C: Liveness / DoS ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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async function attack_C1(): Promise<AttackResult> {
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const id = "C1";
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const what = "Send a request body >100KB.";
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const expected = "413 or 400 before LLM invocation.";
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const big = "A".repeat(120_000);
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const resp = await rateLimitedFetch(`${SUPPLIER_URL}/v1/chat/completions`, {
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method: "POST",
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headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "X-Escrow-Ref": "0".repeat(64) + "#0" },
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body: JSON.stringify({ model: "qwen3.6:35b", messages: [{ role: "user", content: big }], max_tokens: 50 }),
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});
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const text = await resp.text();
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const verdict: Verdict = (resp.status >= 400 && resp.status < 500) ? "BLOCKED" : "GAP";
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return { id, category: "C", what, expected, what_happened: `HTTP ${resp.status}: ${head(text, 200)}`, verdict, evidence: `status=${resp.status}; body_bytes=120000; resp=${head(text, 200)}` };
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}
|
|
|
|
async function attack_C2(): Promise<AttackResult> {
|
|
const id = "C2";
|
|
const what = "PostEscrow honestly, then chat body with max_output_tokens 999999.";
|
|
const expected = "400 output_cap_exceeded (server.ts:234).";
|
|
checkCapsBeforePost();
|
|
const startBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
try {
|
|
const messages = [{ role: "user" as const, content: "C2 probe — request huge output." }];
|
|
log("C2: posting honest escrow then sending oversized max_tokens");
|
|
const escrowResult = await buildPostEscrowTx({
|
|
chain, buyerKey: wk, advertRef: ADVERT_REF_ACTIVE, messages, payment_lovelace: ADVERT_PRICE_LOVELACE,
|
|
});
|
|
counters.escrowsPosted += 1;
|
|
await chain.awaitTx(escrowResult.expectedTxHash, 120_000);
|
|
const escrowRefStr = `${escrowResult.escrowOutputRef.txHash}#${escrowResult.escrowOutputRef.index}`;
|
|
|
|
const resp = await rateLimitedFetch(`${SUPPLIER_URL}/v1/chat/completions`, {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "X-Escrow-Ref": escrowRefStr },
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({ model: "qwen3.6:35b", messages, max_tokens: 999_999 }),
|
|
});
|
|
const text = await resp.text();
|
|
const verdict: Verdict = resp.status === 400 && text.includes("output_cap_exceeded") ? "BLOCKED" : (resp.status === 200 ? "GAP" : "UNCLEAR");
|
|
const endBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
|
|
return { id, category: "C", what, expected, what_happened: `HTTP ${resp.status}: ${head(text, 200)}`, verdict, evidence: `escrow=${escrowRefStr}; status=${resp.status}; body=${head(text, 400)}` };
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const endBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
|
|
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
return { id, category: "C", what, expected, what_happened: `setup error: ${head(msg)}`, verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function attack_C4(): Promise<AttackResult> {
|
|
const id = "C4";
|
|
const what = "50 concurrent requests at ≤2 rps with bogus X-Escrow-Ref headers. Liveness probe mid-burst.";
|
|
const expected = "all 4xx; supplier stays responsive; concurrent honest probe completes.";
|
|
const N = 50;
|
|
const bogus = "0".repeat(63) + "f#0";
|
|
const results: number[] = [];
|
|
const start = Date.now();
|
|
let ok4xx = 0;
|
|
let other = 0;
|
|
// Liveness probe: hit /capability mid-burst (cheap GET)
|
|
let livenessOk = false;
|
|
for (let i = 0; i < N; i++) {
|
|
try {
|
|
checkCapsBeforeRequest();
|
|
const wait = Math.max(0, RATE_LIMIT_MS - (Date.now() - lastReqMs));
|
|
if (wait > 0) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, wait));
|
|
lastReqMs = Date.now();
|
|
counters.requestsSent += 1;
|
|
const resp = await fetch(`${SUPPLIER_URL}/v1/chat/completions`, {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "X-Escrow-Ref": bogus },
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({ model: "qwen3.6:35b", messages: [{ role: "user", content: `probe-${i}` }], max_tokens: 1 }),
|
|
});
|
|
results.push(resp.status);
|
|
if (resp.status >= 400 && resp.status < 500) ok4xx += 1; else other += 1;
|
|
// Mid-burst liveness probe
|
|
if (i === Math.floor(N / 2)) {
|
|
try {
|
|
const ok = await fetch(`${SUPPLIER_URL}/healthz`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000) });
|
|
livenessOk = ok.ok;
|
|
} catch { livenessOk = false; }
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
other += 1;
|
|
if (counters.requestsSent >= CAP_REQUESTS) break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const dur = Date.now() - start;
|
|
const verdict: Verdict = (other === 0 && livenessOk) ? "BLOCKED" : "UNCLEAR";
|
|
return { id, category: "C", what, expected, what_happened: `${ok4xx}/${results.length} 4xx, ${other} other; liveness=${livenessOk}; duration=${dur}ms`, verdict, evidence: `burst N=${N}, status_codes=${[...new Set(results)].join(",")}, liveness_probe=${livenessOk}` };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function attack_C5(): Promise<AttackResult> {
|
|
const id = "C5";
|
|
const what = "Spam indexer /suppliers + /escrows/<ref> at 2 rps for 30s.";
|
|
const expected = "all 200; report any 5xx.";
|
|
const start = Date.now();
|
|
const statuses: number[] = [];
|
|
const refsToHit = [
|
|
`${env.INDEXER_URL}/suppliers`,
|
|
`${env.INDEXER_URL}/escrows/${ADVERT_REF_ACTIVE.txHash}%23${ADVERT_REF_ACTIVE.index}`,
|
|
];
|
|
let i = 0;
|
|
while (Date.now() - start < 30_000) {
|
|
try {
|
|
const url = refsToHit[i++ % refsToHit.length];
|
|
const resp = await rateLimitedFetch(url);
|
|
statuses.push(resp.status);
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
statuses.push(0);
|
|
if (counters.requestsSent >= CAP_REQUESTS) break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const count5xx = statuses.filter((s) => s >= 500).length;
|
|
const count200 = statuses.filter((s) => s === 200).length;
|
|
const verdict: Verdict = (count5xx === 0 && count200 > 0) ? "BLOCKED" : (count5xx > 0 ? "GAP" : "UNCLEAR");
|
|
return { id, category: "C", what, expected, what_happened: `${statuses.length} reqs in 30s: ${count200} 200s, ${count5xx} 5xx`, verdict, evidence: `unique_codes=${[...new Set(statuses)].join(",")}; n=${statuses.length}` };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ─── D: Social / spec attacks ───────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
async function attack_D1(): Promise<AttackResult> {
|
|
const id = "D1";
|
|
const what = "POST /v1/chat/completions with NO X-Escrow-Ref header.";
|
|
const expected = "400 escrow_ref_required (server.ts:184).";
|
|
const resp = await rateLimitedFetch(`${SUPPLIER_URL}/v1/chat/completions`, {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({ model: "qwen3.6:35b", messages: [{ role: "user", content: "D1 probe" }], max_tokens: 50 }),
|
|
});
|
|
const text = await resp.text();
|
|
const isBlocked = resp.status === 400 && text.includes("escrow_ref_required");
|
|
return { id, category: "D", what, expected, what_happened: `HTTP ${resp.status}: ${head(text, 200)}`, verdict: isBlocked ? "BLOCKED" : (resp.status === 200 ? "GAP" : "UNCLEAR"), evidence: `status=${resp.status}; body=${head(text, 400)}` };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function attack_D3(): Promise<AttackResult> {
|
|
const id = "D3";
|
|
const what = "PostEscrow honestly (model=qwen3.6:35b), send chat body with model=gpt-4.";
|
|
const expected = "409 request_spec_mismatch (server.ts:273) — model is part of request_spec_hash.";
|
|
checkCapsBeforePost();
|
|
const startBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
try {
|
|
const messages = [{ role: "user" as const, content: "D3 probe" }];
|
|
log("D3: posting honest escrow then sending wrong model");
|
|
const escrowResult = await buildPostEscrowTx({
|
|
chain, buyerKey: wk, advertRef: ADVERT_REF_ACTIVE, messages, payment_lovelace: ADVERT_PRICE_LOVELACE,
|
|
});
|
|
counters.escrowsPosted += 1;
|
|
await chain.awaitTx(escrowResult.expectedTxHash, 120_000);
|
|
const escrowRefStr = `${escrowResult.escrowOutputRef.txHash}#${escrowResult.escrowOutputRef.index}`;
|
|
const resp = await rateLimitedFetch(`${SUPPLIER_URL}/v1/chat/completions`, {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "X-Escrow-Ref": escrowRefStr },
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({ model: "gpt-4", messages, max_tokens: 50 }),
|
|
});
|
|
const text = await resp.text();
|
|
const verdict: Verdict = resp.status === 409 && text.includes("request_spec_mismatch") ? "BLOCKED" : (resp.status === 200 ? "GAP" : "UNCLEAR");
|
|
const endBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
|
|
return { id, category: "D", what, expected, what_happened: `HTTP ${resp.status}: ${head(text, 200)}`, verdict, evidence: `escrow=${escrowRefStr}; status=${resp.status}; body=${head(text, 400)}` };
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const endBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
|
|
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
return { id, category: "D", what, expected, what_happened: `setup error: ${head(msg)}`, verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function attack_D4(): Promise<AttackResult> {
|
|
const id = "D4";
|
|
const what = "buildPostEscrowTx pointing at the RETIRED advert ref (386d30…004040#0).";
|
|
const expected = "Builder rejects because advert UTxO is no longer on chain — chain.queryUtxo returns null.";
|
|
try {
|
|
const messages = [{ role: "user" as const, content: "D4 probe" }];
|
|
await buildPostEscrowTx({ chain, buyerKey: wk, advertRef: ADVERT_REF_RETIRED, messages, payment_lovelace: ADVERT_PRICE_LOVELACE });
|
|
return { id, category: "D", what, expected, what_happened: "builder accepted post against retired advert", verdict: "GAP", evidence: `retired_advert=${ADVERT_REF_RETIRED.txHash}#${ADVERT_REF_RETIRED.index}` };
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
return { id, category: "D", what, expected, what_happened: `rejected: ${head(msg)}`, verdict: "BLOCKED", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ─── A1 — skip Accept, watch supplier Release (10 min wait) ─────────────
|
|
|
|
async function attack_A1(): Promise<AttackResult> {
|
|
const id = "A1";
|
|
const what = "PostEscrow, get supplier's receipt, do NOT Accept, wait ACCEPT_WINDOW_MS=600_000, expect supplier-side Release to take payment + bonds.";
|
|
const expected = "supplier Release fires after window; buyer loses 7 AP3X.";
|
|
checkCapsBeforePost();
|
|
const startBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
try {
|
|
const messages = [{ role: "user" as const, content: "A1 probe: receive but do not accept." }];
|
|
log("A1: posting escrow then skipping Accept");
|
|
const submitResult = await marketplace.submitPrompt({
|
|
advertRef: ADVERT_REF_ACTIVE, messages, payment_lovelace: ADVERT_PRICE_LOVELACE,
|
|
});
|
|
counters.escrowsPosted += 1;
|
|
const escrowRefStr = `${submitResult.escrowRef.txHash}#${submitResult.escrowRef.index}`;
|
|
log(`A1: escrow=${escrowRefStr}; supplier returned receipt; now waiting 10+ min`);
|
|
|
|
// Wait until past submitted_at + 600s + a few slots of margin
|
|
const WAIT_MS = 660_000; // 11 min
|
|
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, WAIT_MS));
|
|
|
|
// Check indexer for Release event
|
|
const resp = await rateLimitedFetch(`${env.INDEXER_URL}/escrows?buyer=${wk.pubKeyHash}`);
|
|
const rows = (await resp.json()) as Array<{ utxo_ref: string; state: string; prompt_hash: string }>;
|
|
const matching = rows.filter((r) => r.prompt_hash === submitResult.receipt.prompt_hash);
|
|
const released = matching.find((r) => r.state === "Released");
|
|
const stillSubmitted = matching.find((r) => r.state === "Submitted");
|
|
const endBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
|
|
|
|
if (released) {
|
|
return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: `supplier Released after window; row in state=Released at ${released.utxo_ref}`, verdict: "BLOCKED", evidence: `released_ref=${released.utxo_ref}; net_delta=${startBal - endBal} lovelace` };
|
|
}
|
|
// If indexer Track 2 hasn't landed, stuck-Submitted rows mean Release happened but indexer didn't advance.
|
|
if (stillSubmitted) {
|
|
// Confirm via Ogmios whether the Submitted UTxO is spent.
|
|
const og = await fetch(env.OGMIOS_URL, {
|
|
method: "POST", headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", method: "queryLedgerState/utxo", params: { outputReferences: [{ transaction: { id: stillSubmitted.utxo_ref.split("#")[0] }, index: parseInt(stillSubmitted.utxo_ref.split("#")[1], 10) }] }, id: "u" }),
|
|
});
|
|
const ogText = await og.json();
|
|
const spent = Array.isArray((ogText as { result?: unknown[] }).result) && ((ogText as { result: unknown[] }).result).length === 0;
|
|
if (spent) {
|
|
return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: `Submitted UTxO spent on chain (likely by supplier Release); indexer hasn't advanced state yet`, verdict: "BLOCKED", evidence: `submitted_ref=${stillSubmitted.utxo_ref}; ogmios_utxo_query=empty` };
|
|
}
|
|
return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: `Submitted UTxO still unspent after window — supplier did NOT Release`, verdict: "GAP", evidence: `submitted_ref=${stillSubmitted.utxo_ref}` };
|
|
}
|
|
return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: `unexpected indexer state — no matching row`, verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: `prompt_hash=${submitResult.receipt.prompt_hash}` };
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const endBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
counters.burnedLovelace += (startBal - endBal);
|
|
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
return { id, category: "A", what, expected, what_happened: `setup error: ${head(msg)}`, verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ─── Main orchestrator ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
|
|
// Continuation run: attacks D1, B3, C1, C5, A3, B5, D4, B2, C2 all completed
|
|
// BLOCKED in the first pass. This continuation runs the remaining 5.
|
|
const ATTACKS: { id: string; fn: () => Promise<AttackResult> }[] = [
|
|
// Post-escrow rejection (1 escrow; supplier 409 expected)
|
|
{ id: "D3", fn: attack_D3 },
|
|
// On-chain validator probes
|
|
{ id: "A4", fn: attack_A4 },
|
|
{ id: "A2", fn: attack_A2 },
|
|
// Burst (no escrow)
|
|
{ id: "C4", fn: attack_C4 },
|
|
// A1 last — ties funds for 10+ min
|
|
{ id: "A1", fn: attack_A1 },
|
|
];
|
|
|
|
const STOP_ON_FIRST_GAP = true;
|
|
|
|
async function main(): Promise<void> {
|
|
log(`agent-b: buyer=${wk.address} pkh=${wk.pubKeyHash}`);
|
|
const startBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
log(`starting bal=${startBal} lovelace (~${Number(startBal) / 1e6} AP3X)`);
|
|
|
|
const results: AttackResult[] = [];
|
|
for (const a of ATTACKS) {
|
|
log(`\n=== running ${a.id} ===`);
|
|
try {
|
|
const r = await a.fn();
|
|
results.push(r);
|
|
log(`${a.id}: ${r.verdict} — ${head(r.what_happened, 120)}`);
|
|
log(`counters: escrows=${counters.escrowsPosted}/${CAP_ESCROWS} reqs=${counters.requestsSent}/${CAP_REQUESTS} burned=${counters.burnedLovelace}/${CAP_BURN_LOVELACE}`);
|
|
if (STOP_ON_FIRST_GAP && r.verdict === "GAP") {
|
|
log("\nGAP found — stopping per spec.");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
if (msg.startsWith("hard-cap:")) {
|
|
log(`HARD CAP HIT: ${msg} — stopping.`);
|
|
results.push({ id: a.id, category: "A", what: "(cap hit)", expected: "", what_happened: msg, verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: "" });
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
log(`${a.id}: runner error: ${msg}`);
|
|
results.push({ id: a.id, category: "A", what: "(runner error)", expected: "", what_happened: msg, verdict: "UNCLEAR", evidence: msg.slice(0, 500) });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Post-run cleanup: reclaim any Open/Claimed escrows we left behind.
|
|
// Walk the indexer for buyer's escrows; reclaim any in state Open/Claimed
|
|
// whose deliver_by has passed. This recovers funds the runner locked while
|
|
// probing supplier rejections.
|
|
log("\n=== post-run reclaim sweep ===");
|
|
try {
|
|
const r = await rateLimitedFetch(`${env.INDEXER_URL}/escrows?buyer=${wk.pubKeyHash}`);
|
|
const rows = (await r.json()) as Array<{ utxo_ref: string; state: string; deliver_by: number; created_slot: number }>;
|
|
// Only reclaim rows from THIS session (recent slots). Stale historical rows
|
|
// from prior runs may have already been reclaimed/accepted and the indexer
|
|
// hasn't advanced state yet (per the known indexer-staleness follow-up).
|
|
const fresh = rows.filter((r) => (r.state === "Open" || r.state === "Claimed") && r.deliver_by < Date.now());
|
|
log(`reclaim candidates: ${fresh.length}`);
|
|
const { buildReclaimTx } = await import("@marketplace/shared/tx");
|
|
for (const row of fresh) {
|
|
const [tx, ix] = row.utxo_ref.split("#");
|
|
const ref: OutputReference = { txHash: tx, index: parseInt(ix, 10) };
|
|
try {
|
|
const out = await buildReclaimTx({ chain, buyerKey: wk, escrowRef: ref });
|
|
await chain.awaitTx(out.expectedTxHash, 90_000);
|
|
log(`reclaimed ${row.utxo_ref} -> tx ${out.expectedTxHash}`);
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
log(`reclaim ${row.utxo_ref} FAILED: ${head(msg, 200)}`);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
log(`reclaim sweep error: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const endBal = await walletLovelace();
|
|
const totalSpent = startBal - endBal;
|
|
|
|
// Final report
|
|
log("\n\n=== REPORT ===\n");
|
|
const header = "| Attack | Cat | What tried | Expected | Happened | Verdict | Evidence |";
|
|
const sep = "|--------|-----|------------|----------|----------|---------|----------|";
|
|
log(header);
|
|
log(sep);
|
|
for (const r of results) {
|
|
log(`| ${r.id} | ${r.category} | ${head(r.what, 70)} | ${head(r.expected, 50)} | ${head(r.what_happened, 80)} | ${r.verdict} | ${head(r.evidence, 60)} |`);
|
|
}
|
|
log("\n## Hard-cap accounting");
|
|
log(`escrows posted: ${counters.escrowsPosted} / ${CAP_ESCROWS}`);
|
|
log(`requests sent : ${counters.requestsSent} / ${CAP_REQUESTS}`);
|
|
log(`burned : ${counters.burnedLovelace} lovelace / ${CAP_BURN_LOVELACE}`);
|
|
log(`net wallet Δ : ${-totalSpent} lovelace (~${Number(-totalSpent) / 1e6} AP3X)`);
|
|
log(`start bal : ${startBal} lovelace`);
|
|
log(`end bal : ${endBal} lovelace`);
|
|
|
|
// Deferred attacks
|
|
log("\n## Deferred (not implemented this run)");
|
|
log("- B1 (capability_id mismatch in datum): requires hand-rolled datum builder.");
|
|
log("- B6 (FLOAT64 CBOR injection): requires hand-rolled CBOR encoder.");
|
|
log("- D5 (3 sybil wallets concurrent post): requires faucet + 3 wallet derivations + AP3X distribution.");
|
|
|
|
const out = `/tmp/run-agent-b-${Date.now()}.json`;
|
|
writeFileSync(out, JSON.stringify({ results, counters: { ...counters, burnedLovelace: counters.burnedLovelace.toString() }, startBal: startBal.toString(), endBal: endBal.toString() }, null, 2));
|
|
log(`\nfull results written to ${out}`);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
main().catch((err) => {
|
|
// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
|
|
console.error("[agent-b] fatal:", err);
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
});
|