Adds an Express requireAuth middleware on /v1/* + the SPA shell and a
Vite/React login screen so anyone who reaches mp-buyers.* must authenticate
before driving the operator's wallet via /v1/submit-prompt or /v1/accept.
Why: the buyer-app sits on a public HTTP port and signs txs with a
server-held private key. Until now the only gate was network reachability.
Mechanics:
- BUYER_PASSWORD + SESSION_SECRET (>=32 chars) loaded by config.ts and
surfaced as createApp() deps. Production refuses to start without both.
- buyer/src/auth.ts: HMAC-SHA256 signed buyer_session cookie (HttpOnly,
SameSite=Lax, Path=/, optional Secure), 7-day rolling expiry,
timing-safe password compare, in-memory 5/15-min per-IP rate limiter.
- /v1/auth/{login,logout,whoami}. Login is rate-limited; 6th wrong
attempt returns 429 + Retry-After. Success resets the bucket.
- SPA boot block (__BUYER_BOOT__ injected by server.ts) is gated by the
same cookie so the buyer's address never reaches an unauthenticated
browser.
- New <AuthProvider>/<RequireAuth> in buyer/src/ui/state/AuthContext.tsx
probes /v1/auth/whoami on mount and a scoped window.fetch patch drops
to the login screen on any mid-session 401 from /v1/* (excluding
/v1/auth/* so wrong-password 401s stay local to <Login>).
- Tailwind login card at buyer/src/ui/pages/Login.tsx. App.tsx wraps in
<RequireAuth> and adds a "Sign out" button in the nav.
Tests: tests/unit/buyer-server-auth.test.ts covers sign/verify, rate
limiter, cookie helpers, login flow (400/401/204/429), whoami
(no-cookie/valid/tampered/expired), rolling renewal, logout, gated
/v1/*, /healthz still open, and the no-auth-deps construction shape.
Updated buyer-server-config + buyer-ui-smoke for the new required env
vars and the AuthProvider wrap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
328 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript
328 lines
13 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* buyer-server-auth.test.ts — coverage for the operator login gate.
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*
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* Two flavors:
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* 1. Pure-function tests for buyer/src/auth.ts (sign/verify, rate limit,
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* cookie header helpers).
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* 2. Supertest-driven integration over createApp({password, sessionSecret})
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* covering /v1/auth/{login,logout,whoami}, the /v1/* gate, and rolling
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* cookie renewal.
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
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import request from "supertest";
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import { createApp } from "../../buyer/src/server.js";
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import {
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SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
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SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS,
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buildClearCookieHeader,
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buildSessionCookieHeader,
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createRateLimiter,
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getCookie,
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signSession,
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timingSafeCompareStrings,
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verifySession,
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} from "../../buyer/src/auth.js";
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// ─── Pure helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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describe("auth: signSession / verifySession", () => {
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const SECRET = "0".repeat(64);
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it("round-trips a signed session", () => {
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const now = 1_700_000_000_000;
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const payload = { iat: now, exp: now + 1000 };
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const token = signSession(SECRET, payload);
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const r = verifySession(SECRET, token, now);
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expect(r.valid).toBe(true);
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expect(r.payload).toEqual(payload);
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});
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it("rejects an expired session", () => {
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const iat = 1_700_000_000_000;
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const exp = iat + 1000;
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const token = signSession(SECRET, { iat, exp });
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const r = verifySession(SECRET, token, exp); // now === exp ⇒ expired
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expect(r.valid).toBe(false);
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expect(r.reason).toBe("expired");
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});
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it("rejects a tampered signature", () => {
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const iat = 1_700_000_000_000;
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const token = signSession(SECRET, { iat, exp: iat + 1000 });
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// Flip the last char of the signature segment.
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const tampered = token.slice(0, -1) + (token.endsWith("A") ? "B" : "A");
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const r = verifySession(SECRET, tampered, iat);
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expect(r.valid).toBe(false);
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expect(r.reason).toBe("signature");
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});
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it("rejects a payload that doesn't parse", () => {
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const r = verifySession(SECRET, "not-a-session", 0);
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expect(r.valid).toBe(false);
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});
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it("rejects an empty string", () => {
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const r = verifySession(SECRET, "", 0);
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expect(r.valid).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe("auth: timingSafeCompareStrings", () => {
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it("returns true for equal strings", () => {
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expect(timingSafeCompareStrings("hunter2", "hunter2")).toBe(true);
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});
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it("returns false for different strings of equal length", () => {
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expect(timingSafeCompareStrings("hunter2", "hunter3")).toBe(false);
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});
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it("returns false for strings of different lengths", () => {
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expect(timingSafeCompareStrings("a", "ab")).toBe(false);
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expect(timingSafeCompareStrings("ab", "a")).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe("auth: createRateLimiter", () => {
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it("allows up to max attempts then denies until window elapses", () => {
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let t = 0;
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const limiter = createRateLimiter({ max: 3, windowMs: 1000, now: () => t });
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expect(limiter.attempt("ip").allowed).toBe(true);
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expect(limiter.attempt("ip").allowed).toBe(true);
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expect(limiter.attempt("ip").allowed).toBe(true);
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const denied = limiter.attempt("ip");
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expect(denied.allowed).toBe(false);
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expect(denied.retryAfterMs).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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// After the window slides past, the bucket resets.
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t += 1001;
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expect(limiter.attempt("ip").allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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it("reset() clears the bucket for a key", () => {
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let t = 0;
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const limiter = createRateLimiter({ max: 2, windowMs: 1000, now: () => t });
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limiter.attempt("a");
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limiter.attempt("a");
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expect(limiter.attempt("a").allowed).toBe(false);
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limiter.reset("a");
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expect(limiter.attempt("a").allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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it("buckets are per-key", () => {
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const limiter = createRateLimiter({ max: 1, windowMs: 1000 });
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expect(limiter.attempt("a").allowed).toBe(true);
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expect(limiter.attempt("b").allowed).toBe(true); // different key, fresh
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expect(limiter.attempt("a").allowed).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe("auth: cookie header helpers", () => {
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it("buildSessionCookieHeader sets HttpOnly/SameSite=Lax/Path=/", () => {
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const h = buildSessionCookieHeader({ value: "abc", maxAgeMs: 1000, secure: false });
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expect(h).toContain(`${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=abc`);
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expect(h).toContain("HttpOnly");
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expect(h).toContain("SameSite=Lax");
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expect(h).toContain("Path=/");
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expect(h).toContain("Max-Age=1");
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expect(h).not.toContain("Secure");
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});
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it("buildSessionCookieHeader appends Secure when requested", () => {
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const h = buildSessionCookieHeader({ value: "abc", maxAgeMs: 1000, secure: true });
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expect(h).toContain("Secure");
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});
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it("buildClearCookieHeader produces Max-Age=0", () => {
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const h = buildClearCookieHeader(false);
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expect(h).toContain("Max-Age=0");
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expect(h).toContain(`${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=`);
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});
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it("getCookie parses the named cookie out of a header", () => {
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expect(getCookie("a=1; buyer_session=xyz; b=2", "buyer_session")).toBe("xyz");
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expect(getCookie("buyer_session=xyz", "buyer_session")).toBe("xyz");
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expect(getCookie("a=1; b=2", "buyer_session")).toBeNull();
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expect(getCookie(undefined, "buyer_session")).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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// ─── Integration via supertest ────────────────────────────────────────────
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const PASSWORD = "hunter2";
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const SECRET = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef";
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function makeAuthApp(overrides: { nowMs?: () => number } = {}) {
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return createApp({
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password: PASSWORD,
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sessionSecret: SECRET,
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cookieSecure: false, // tests run over plain HTTP
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nowMs: overrides.nowMs,
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});
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}
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/** Pull the buyer_session value out of a Set-Cookie response header. */
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function extractSessionCookie(setCookieHeader: string | string[] | undefined): string | null {
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if (!setCookieHeader) return null;
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const headers = Array.isArray(setCookieHeader) ? setCookieHeader : [setCookieHeader];
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for (const h of headers) {
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const m = /buyer_session=([^;]*)/.exec(h);
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if (m && m[1].length > 0) return m[1];
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}
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return null;
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}
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describe("createApp({password, sessionSecret}): /v1/auth/login", () => {
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it("rejects a missing body field with 400", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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const res = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({});
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expect(res.status).toBe(400);
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expect(res.body.error).toBe("password_required");
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});
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it("rejects a wrong password with 401", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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const res = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: "wrong" });
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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expect(res.body.error).toBe("invalid_password");
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});
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it("accepts the right password with 204 + HttpOnly Set-Cookie", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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const res = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: PASSWORD });
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expect(res.status).toBe(204);
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const setCookie = res.headers["set-cookie"];
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expect(setCookie).toBeDefined();
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const cookieHeader = Array.isArray(setCookie) ? setCookie.join(";") : setCookie;
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expect(cookieHeader).toContain("HttpOnly");
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expect(cookieHeader).toContain("SameSite=Lax");
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expect(extractSessionCookie(setCookie)).toBeTruthy();
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});
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it("rate-limits after 5 wrong attempts with 429 + Retry-After", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
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const r = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: "wrong" });
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expect(r.status).toBe(401);
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}
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const sixth = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: "wrong" });
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expect(sixth.status).toBe(429);
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expect(sixth.headers["retry-after"]).toBeDefined();
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// Even the correct password is rejected while the bucket is full.
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const seventh = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: PASSWORD });
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expect(seventh.status).toBe(429);
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});
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it("a successful login resets the rate-limit bucket", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
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await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: "wrong" });
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}
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const ok = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: PASSWORD });
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expect(ok.status).toBe(204);
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// After reset, four more wrong attempts shouldn't trip the limit.
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for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
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const r = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: "wrong" });
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expect(r.status).toBe(401);
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}
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});
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});
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describe("createApp: /v1/auth/whoami + protected /v1/* gate", () => {
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it("whoami without cookie returns 401", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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const res = await request(app).get("/v1/auth/whoami");
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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expect(res.body.error).toBe("unauthenticated");
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});
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it("whoami with a valid session returns 200 and refreshes the cookie", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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const login = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: PASSWORD });
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const token = extractSessionCookie(login.headers["set-cookie"]);
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expect(token).not.toBeNull();
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const res = await request(app)
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.get("/v1/auth/whoami")
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.set("Cookie", `${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=${token}`);
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body.authenticated).toBe(true);
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// Rolling renewal: a fresh Set-Cookie should accompany the response.
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expect(res.headers["set-cookie"]).toBeDefined();
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});
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it("whoami with a tampered cookie returns 401", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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const login = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: PASSWORD });
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const token = extractSessionCookie(login.headers["set-cookie"])!;
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const tampered = token.slice(0, -1) + (token.endsWith("A") ? "B" : "A");
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const res = await request(app)
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.get("/v1/auth/whoami")
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.set("Cookie", `${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=${tampered}`);
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it("whoami with an expired cookie returns 401", async () => {
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// Issue a cookie at t=0, then probe at t=SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS+1 to exceed exp.
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const start = 1_700_000_000_000;
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let now = start;
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const app = makeAuthApp({ nowMs: () => now });
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const login = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: PASSWORD });
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const token = extractSessionCookie(login.headers["set-cookie"])!;
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now = start + SESSION_MAX_AGE_MS + 1;
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const res = await request(app)
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.get("/v1/auth/whoami")
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.set("Cookie", `${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=${token}`);
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it("a protected /v1/* route returns 401 without a cookie", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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const res = await request(app).get("/v1/pending-receipts");
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it("a protected /v1/* route is reachable with a valid cookie", async () => {
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// The route still 503s on missing chain deps, but it gets past the gate.
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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const login = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: PASSWORD });
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const token = extractSessionCookie(login.headers["set-cookie"])!;
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const res = await request(app)
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.get("/v1/pending-receipts")
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.set("Cookie", `${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=${token}`);
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expect(res.status).not.toBe(401);
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});
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it("GET /healthz is open even without a cookie", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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const res = await request(app).get("/healthz");
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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});
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describe("createApp: /v1/auth/logout", () => {
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it("logout clears the cookie (Max-Age=0) and is idempotent", async () => {
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const app = makeAuthApp();
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const login = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: PASSWORD });
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const token = extractSessionCookie(login.headers["set-cookie"])!;
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const out = await request(app)
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.post("/v1/auth/logout")
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.set("Cookie", `${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=${token}`);
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expect(out.status).toBe(204);
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const setCookie = out.headers["set-cookie"];
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const flat = Array.isArray(setCookie) ? setCookie.join(";") : setCookie;
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expect(flat).toContain("Max-Age=0");
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// Idempotent: same call without a session still 204s.
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const again = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/logout");
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expect(again.status).toBe(204);
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});
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});
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describe("createApp without auth deps (test/library shape)", () => {
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it("does not gate /v1/* and does not mount /v1/auth/* routes", async () => {
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const app = createApp({});
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// No /v1/auth/login route → 404.
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const login = await request(app).post("/v1/auth/login").send({ password: "any" });
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expect(login.status).toBe(404);
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// /healthz still works.
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const health = await request(app).get("/healthz");
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expect(health.status).toBe(200);
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});
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});
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