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docs: document MCP_AUTH_TOKENS and the two new chain-operation tools

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Covers what Task 1 actually enforces: auth is only on when MCP_AUTH_TOKENS
is set (otherwise every caller is one anonymous, shared-bucket identity),
rate limits are per identity, and the token parser rejects empty tokens,
whitespace, duplicates, and all-blank values at startup rather than
degrading silently. Notes that vector_submit_transaction and
vector_await_transaction take no mnemonic and sign nothing. Updates the
tool count from 23 to 25 everywhere it appears in the README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
FilipBl4gojevic
2026-07-29 07:23:27 +02:00
parent ede813bd74
commit 104f08a691
2 changed files with 26 additions and 4 deletions
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5
.env.example
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@@ -13,3 +13,8 @@ VECTOR_SPEND_LIMIT_DAILY=500000000 # 500 ADA daily limit
# Audit Log
VECTOR_AUDIT_LOG_PATH=./vector-audit-log.json # Path for persistent audit log (default: ./vector-audit-log.json)
# Auth - when set, every request must carry `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
# Comma-separated; each entry is `label:token` or a bare token.
# Leave unset for localhost use. Set it on any instance reachable by others.
# MCP_AUTH_TOKENS=alice:replace-me,bob:replace-me-too

25
README.md
View File

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Built on [Ogmios](https://ogmios.dev/) + [Koios](https://www.koios.rest/) - no B
## Hosted servers - no install
Hosted instances run on both networks, exposing all 23 tools:
Hosted instances run on both networks, exposing all 25 tools:
| Network | Endpoint |
|---------|----------|
@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ claude mcp add --transport sse vector-mcp https://mcp.vector.mainnet.apexfusion.
> tool-call parameter. It therefore passes through your MCP client, your model provider,
> and the hosted server's memory — it is not written to disk, but it is exposed. Use only
> a hot wallet holding funds you can afford to lose, and prefer self-hosting until the
> non-custodial migration lands. See
> [docs/architecture/non-custodial-split.md](docs/architecture/non-custodial-split.md).
> non-custodial migration lands. `vector_submit_transaction` and `vector_await_transaction`
> are the exception — they take no mnemonic and sign nothing; they only broadcast a
> transaction signed elsewhere (for example by a local signer) and poll for confirmation.
> See [docs/architecture/non-custodial-split.md](docs/architecture/non-custodial-split.md).
Self-hosting instructions are below.
@@ -41,7 +43,7 @@ Self-hosting instructions are below.
- **Safety controls** - per-transaction and daily spend limits, persistent audit log, rate limiting
- **SSE transport** - HTTP server with Server-Sent Events for MCP client connectivity
## MCP Tools (23)
## MCP Tools (25)
### Wallet & Queries
@@ -61,6 +63,8 @@ Self-hosting instructions are below.
| `vector_send_tokens` | Send native tokens with optional AP3X |
| `vector_build_transaction` | Build multi-output transactions (sign+submit or return unsigned CBOR) |
| `vector_dry_run` | Simulate a transaction without submitting - estimate fees and validate |
| `vector_submit_transaction` | Broadcast an already-signed transaction (for example one signed by the local signer) |
| `vector_await_transaction` | Wait for a submitted transaction to be confirmed on-chain |
### Smart Contracts
@@ -163,6 +167,19 @@ docker run -p 3000:3000 vector-mcp
| `VECTOR_SPEND_LIMIT_DAILY` | Max lovelace per day | `500000000` (500 AP3X) |
| `VECTOR_AUDIT_LOG_PATH` | Persistent audit log file path | `./vector-audit-log.json` |
| `VECTOR_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | Max tool calls per minute | `60` |
| `MCP_AUTH_TOKENS` | Bearer tokens that may call this server. Comma-separated; each entry is `label:token` or a bare token. **When unset, the server is open to anyone who can reach it.** | _(unset — auth disabled)_ |
> **Running a public instance?** Set `MCP_AUTH_TOKENS`. Without it every caller
> is treated as one anonymous identity and shares a single rate-limit bucket, so
> one busy client throttles everyone. Rate limits are applied per identity, so
> give each client its own token.
> **Malformed values fail loudly, not silently.** The server refuses to start if
> `MCP_AUTH_TOKENS` contains an empty token, a token with embedded whitespace, a
> duplicate token, or a value where every comma-separated entry is blank (e.g. a
> stray `,,,`) — each raises a startup error that names the problem but never
> echoes a token value. Commas delimit entries and cannot be escaped, so generate
> tokens from a comma-free charset (hex / base64url / alphanumeric).
### Mainnet endpoints