diff --git a/packages/signer/src/policy.ts b/packages/signer/src/policy.ts
index 837e8f1..948f2ef 100644
--- a/packages/signer/src/policy.ts
+++ b/packages/signer/src/policy.ts
@@ -24,6 +24,16 @@ function ada(lovelace: bigint): string {
   return (Number(lovelace) / 1_000_000).toFixed(6);
 }
 
+// A blank entry is not a usable address. `''.split(',')` on an empty string
+// yields `['']`, not `[]` — a realistic way an upstream config/env-parsing bug
+// could hand this module a non-empty array that names no real address. Left
+// unfiltered, `ownAddresses.length === 0` would miss that case (the array
+// isn't empty), the blank entry would never match a real output, and the
+// module would proceed as if it knew an own address when it does not.
+function knownAddresses(ownAddresses: string[]): string[] {
+  return ownAddresses.filter((address) => address.trim().length > 0);
+}
+
 /**
  * Net outflow = every output that does NOT return to us, plus the fee.
  *
@@ -35,7 +45,7 @@ export function computeOutflow(
   tx: DecodedTx,
   ownAddresses: string[]
 ): { netOutflowLovelace: bigint; assetMovements: AssetMovement[] } {
-  const own = new Set(ownAddresses);
+  const own = new Set(knownAddresses(ownAddresses));
   let leaving = 0n;
   const assetMovements: AssetMovement[] = [];
 
@@ -59,8 +69,10 @@ export function evaluate(
   const { netOutflowLovelace, assetMovements } = computeOutflow(tx, ownAddresses);
 
   // Fail closed: with no own address, every output looks foreign and change
-  // cannot be identified, so any decision would be meaningless.
-  if (ownAddresses.length === 0) {
+  // cannot be identified, so any decision would be meaningless. A list
+  // containing only blank entries counts as no own address too — see
+  // knownAddresses().
+  if (knownAddresses(ownAddresses).length === 0) {
     return {
       allowed: false,
       reason: 'No own address available, so change cannot be distinguished from outflow. Refusing.',
diff --git a/packages/signer/test/policy.test.ts b/packages/signer/test/policy.test.ts
index 16caa0d..f246945 100644
--- a/packages/signer/test/policy.test.ts
+++ b/packages/signer/test/policy.test.ts
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import type { DecodedTx } from '../src/decode.ts';
 const OWN = 'addr1own';
 const OTHER_OWN = 'addr1own_second_index';
 const FOREIGN = 'addr1foreign';
+const FOREIGN2 = 'addr1foreign_second';
 
 const LIMITS: SpendLimits = { perTxLovelace: 100_000_000n, dailyLovelace: 500_000_000n };
 
@@ -126,3 +127,252 @@ describe('evaluate — adversarial', () => {
     assert.equal(d.netOutflowLovelace, 250_200_000n);
   });
 });
+
+// --- Adversarial pass (beyond the brief) -----------------------------------
+//
+// The brief's 13 tests are a floor. Everything below was added after they
+// passed, specifically hunting for the failure shape this module is uniquely
+// exposed to: a wrong comparison or a missed exclusion that does not throw,
+// it just quietly returns `allowed: true` when it should not.
+
+describe('evaluate — ownAddresses containing only blank entries', () => {
+  // A realistic real-world source of this: `''.split(',')` in JS yields `['']`,
+  // not `[]`. If whatever populates ownAddresses from config/env ever hits that
+  // empty-string case, the array is non-empty but contains no usable address.
+  // `ownAddresses.length === 0` alone does not catch this: the array has
+  // length 1. Every real output then fails to match the blank entry, so it is
+  // over-counted as outflow rather than silently permitted — the safe
+  // direction — but the explicit, intentional fail-closed path (and its
+  // message) is bypassed, and if the (over-counted) outflow happens to still
+  // land under the configured limits, the transaction is signed even though
+  // no real own address was ever known. That is the same condition the
+  // empty-array check exists to refuse; it should refuse here too.
+  test('a single blank entry is treated as no known own address (fails closed)', () => {
+    const d = evaluate(
+      tx({ outputs: [{ address: OWN, lovelace: 5_000_000n, assets: [] }] }),
+      [''], LIMITS, 0n
+    );
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, false);
+    assert.match(d.reason!, /own address/i);
+  });
+
+  test('a blank entry alongside a real own address does not weaken matching', () => {
+    // Regression guard for the fix above: filtering blanks must not touch a
+    // list that also contains a genuine address.
+    const r = computeOutflow(
+      tx({ outputs: [{ address: OWN, lovelace: 5_000_000n, assets: [] }] }),
+      ['', OWN]
+    );
+    assert.equal(r.netOutflowLovelace, 200_000n, 'OWN must still be recognised as change');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('evaluate — exact limit boundaries, one lovelace either side', () => {
+  test('one lovelace under the per-transaction limit is allowed', () => {
+    const d = evaluate(
+      tx({ fee: 0n, outputs: [{ address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 99_999_999n, assets: [] }] }),
+      [OWN], LIMITS, 0n
+    );
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, true);
+  });
+
+  test('one lovelace over the per-transaction limit is refused', () => {
+    const d = evaluate(
+      tx({ fee: 0n, outputs: [{ address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 100_000_001n, assets: [] }] }),
+      [OWN], LIMITS, 0n
+    );
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, false);
+    assert.match(d.reason!, /per-transaction limit/i);
+  });
+
+  test('a daily total landing exactly on the limit is allowed', () => {
+    const d = evaluate(
+      tx({ fee: 0n, outputs: [{ address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 50_000_000n, assets: [] }] }),
+      [OWN], LIMITS, 450_000_000n // 450M + 50M == 500M dailyLovelace, exactly
+    );
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, true);
+  });
+
+  test('one lovelace over the daily limit is refused', () => {
+    const d = evaluate(
+      tx({ fee: 0n, outputs: [{ address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 50_000_000n, assets: [] }] }),
+      [OWN], LIMITS, 450_000_001n // sum == dailyLovelace + 1
+    );
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, false);
+    assert.match(d.reason!, /daily/i);
+  });
+
+  test('one lovelace under the daily limit is allowed', () => {
+    const d = evaluate(
+      tx({ fee: 0n, outputs: [{ address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 50_000_000n, assets: [] }] }),
+      [OWN], LIMITS, 449_999_999n // sum == dailyLovelace - 1
+    );
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('evaluate — many small foreign outputs must sum, not spot-check', () => {
+  test('34 outputs of 3 AP3X each breach a 100 AP3X per-transaction limit on their sum', () => {
+    // No single output is anywhere near the limit (3_000_000n each); only the
+    // total is. A check that inspected outputs individually rather than
+    // summing would wrongly allow this.
+    const outputs = Array.from({ length: 34 }, () => ({ address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 3_000_000n, assets: [] }));
+    const d = evaluate(tx({ outputs }), [OWN], LIMITS, 0n);
+    assert.equal(d.netOutflowLovelace, 102_200_000n); // 34 * 3,000,000 + 200,000 fee
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, false);
+    assert.match(d.reason!, /per-transaction limit/i);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('computeOutflow — aggregation correctness', () => {
+  test('sums repeated outputs to the same foreign address rather than deduplicating', () => {
+    const r = computeOutflow(
+      tx({ outputs: [
+        { address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 1_000_000n, assets: [] },
+        { address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 2_000_000n, assets: [] }, // same address again
+        { address: OWN, lovelace: 50_000_000n, assets: [] },     // change, excluded
+        { address: FOREIGN2, lovelace: 3_000_000n, assets: [] }, // a different foreign address
+      ] }),
+      [OWN]
+    );
+    assert.equal(r.netOutflowLovelace, 6_200_000n); // 1M + 2M + 3M + 200K fee; 50M change excluded
+  });
+
+  test('duplicate entries in ownAddresses do not change classification', () => {
+    const r = computeOutflow(
+      tx({ outputs: [
+        { address: OWN, lovelace: 5_000_000n, assets: [] },
+        { address: OTHER_OWN, lovelace: 3_000_000n, assets: [] },
+        { address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 2_000_000n, assets: [] },
+      ] }),
+      [OWN, OWN, OTHER_OWN, OTHER_OWN]
+    );
+    assert.equal(r.netOutflowLovelace, 2_200_000n); // only the foreign output + fee
+  });
+
+  test('an own address supplied in a different case does not match — over-counts as outflow, the safe direction', () => {
+    // Bech32 addresses are canonically lowercase and decode.ts only ever emits
+    // that canonical form, so this should not arise in practice. Pinning it
+    // anyway: a mismatch here fails toward refusing too much, never toward
+    // missing real outflow, which is the direction that matters.
+    const r = computeOutflow(
+      tx({ outputs: [{ address: OWN, lovelace: 5_000_000n, assets: [] }] }),
+      ['ADDR1OWN']
+    );
+    assert.equal(r.netOutflowLovelace, 5_200_000n, 'differently-cased own address must not be recognised as change');
+  });
+
+  test('records every distinct asset on a single foreign output, not just the first', () => {
+    const r = computeOutflow(
+      tx({ outputs: [{
+        address: FOREIGN,
+        lovelace: 2_000_000n,
+        assets: [
+          { unit: 'policy1nft', quantity: 1n },
+          { unit: 'policy2token', quantity: 500n },
+        ],
+      }] }),
+      [OWN]
+    );
+    assert.deepStrictEqual(r.assetMovements, [
+      { unit: 'policy1nft', quantity: 1n, toAddress: FOREIGN },
+      { unit: 'policy2token', quantity: 500n, toAddress: FOREIGN },
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  test('aggregates assets across multiple foreign outputs rather than keeping only the last', () => {
+    const r = computeOutflow(
+      tx({ outputs: [
+        { address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 2_000_000n, assets: [{ unit: 'nftA', quantity: 1n }] },
+        { address: FOREIGN2, lovelace: 3_000_000n, assets: [{ unit: 'nftB', quantity: 1n }] },
+      ] }),
+      [OWN]
+    );
+    assert.deepStrictEqual(r.assetMovements, [
+      { unit: 'nftA', quantity: 1n, toAddress: FOREIGN },
+      { unit: 'nftB', quantity: 1n, toAddress: FOREIGN2 },
+    ]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('evaluate — check ordering is pinned, not incidental', () => {
+  test('a transaction breaching both limits at once reports the per-transaction reason first', () => {
+    const d = evaluate(
+      tx({ fee: 0n, outputs: [{ address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 250_000_000n, assets: [] }] }),
+      [OWN], LIMITS, 400_000_000n // also breaches the daily limit (250M + 400M > 500M)
+    );
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, false);
+    assert.match(d.reason!, /per-transaction limit/i);
+    assert.doesNotMatch(d.reason!, /daily/i);
+  });
+
+  test('an empty ownAddresses list reports the own-address reason before any limit is even considered', () => {
+    const d = evaluate(
+      tx({ fee: 0n, outputs: [{ address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 250_000_000n, assets: [] }] }),
+      [], LIMITS, 400_000_000n // this transaction would also fail both limit checks
+    );
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, false);
+    assert.match(d.reason!, /own address/i);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('evaluate — zero limits and an already-over-budget day', () => {
+  test('zero limits still allow a genuinely zero-value transaction', () => {
+    const zeroLimits: SpendLimits = { perTxLovelace: 0n, dailyLovelace: 0n };
+    const d = evaluate(tx({ fee: 0n, outputs: [] }), [OWN], zeroLimits, 0n);
+    assert.equal(d.netOutflowLovelace, 0n);
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, true);
+  });
+
+  test('zero limits refuse even the smallest positive outflow', () => {
+    const zeroLimits: SpendLimits = { perTxLovelace: 0n, dailyLovelace: 0n };
+    const d = evaluate(tx({ fee: 1n, outputs: [] }), [OWN], zeroLimits, 0n);
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, false);
+    assert.match(d.reason!, /per-transaction limit/i);
+  });
+
+  test('an already over-budget day clamps the reported remaining budget to zero, not negative', () => {
+    // alreadySpentTodayLovelace (600M) already exceeds dailyLovelace (500M) —
+    // should not happen if the audit log is accounted correctly, but the
+    // module must still behave sanely (and keep refusing) if it ever does.
+    const d = evaluate(tx({ outputs: [] }), [OWN], LIMITS, 600_000_000n);
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, false);
+    assert.match(d.reason!, /daily/i);
+    assert.match(d.reason!, /remaining daily budget of 0\.000000 AP3X/);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('policy — known gap: SpendLimits governs lovelace only, not native asset value', () => {
+  test('a transaction moving a native asset to a foreign address is allowed if lovelace stays under both limits', () => {
+    // computeOutflow tracks assetMovements, but evaluate() only compares
+    // netOutflowLovelace against limits — it never inspects assetMovements.
+    // A transaction that sends an NFT or a large token balance out while
+    // keeping the lovelace side minimal (e.g. just the ~2 AP3X min-UTxO
+    // deposit) passes both limit checks untouched. SpendLimits has no
+    // asset-value dimension to check against, so this is not a coding
+    // mistake relative to the given interface — it is a scope boundary of
+    // this policy, pinned here so it is visible rather than silently assumed.
+    const d = evaluate(
+      tx({ outputs: [{ address: FOREIGN, lovelace: 2_000_000n, assets: [{ unit: 'preciousNFT', quantity: 1n }] }] }),
+      [OWN], LIMITS, 0n
+    );
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, true);
+    assert.deepStrictEqual(d.assetMovements, [{ unit: 'preciousNFT', quantity: 1n, toAddress: FOREIGN }]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('evaluate — bigint precision at magnitudes beyond float safety', () => {
+  test('the bigint outflow figure stays exact past Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER, even though the human-readable message may round', () => {
+    // ada() formats via Number() for the reason string only; the allow/deny
+    // decision itself is decided entirely in bigint arithmetic and must never
+    // lose precision, no matter how large the values get. Not reachable at
+    // this system's real scale (limits and balances run to hundreds of AP3X,
+    // far below 2^53 lovelace) — tested anyway because the decision-critical
+    // field must hold regardless of realistic bounds.
+    const HUGE_FEE = 9_007_199_254_740_993n; // Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER + 2
+    const zeroLimits: SpendLimits = { perTxLovelace: 0n, dailyLovelace: 0n };
+    const d = evaluate(tx({ fee: HUGE_FEE, outputs: [] }), [OWN], zeroLimits, 0n);
+    assert.equal(d.allowed, false);
+    assert.equal(d.netOutflowLovelace, HUGE_FEE, 'the bigint decision figure must never lose precision');
+  });
+});