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codex/agent-pool-startup
39 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
klopez4212
|
5dc693aeaf |
Extract shared Huddle audio client for desktop consumers (#8129)
Huddle audio was embedded in the v0 desktop client, forcing other clients to duplicate its protocol and codec behavior. This extracts `buzz-audio-client` so v1 can depend on a pinned library revision without building the v0 application. The crate owns the bounded v2 audio handshake, roster parsing, wire format, Opus sender, and per-peer NetEQ jitter buffer. The v0 human and agent senders use it, and the desktop retains room admission, identity/signing, TLS policy, device routing, mute, and teardown. Receive decoding preserves v1's support for 120 ms Opus packets. No relay protocol changes, speech models, or model downloads are included. Docker builder stages include CMake because cargo-chef compiles the workspace dependency graph. Dependency security: Opus 0.4 replaces the unmaintained `audiopus_sys` backend with `opusic-sys`. NetEQ is pinned exactly to 0.8.3 because its published Rust sources never reference its declared ringbuf dependency. RUSTSEC-2026-0293 is documented as unreachable for this audited source, and a wrapper restriction rejects every other consumer of vulnerable ringbuf versions. Independent review confirmed the scope; re-audit/remove the exception when changing NetEQ. NetEQ 0.9.1 still declares ringbuf 0.3, so a version bump alone does not remove it. Local `cargo deny check` passes with this constrained exception. Validation: - All 21 shared-crate tests pass, including real loopback WebSocket authentication/cancellation, real Opus-to-NetEQ playback, malformed input, and 120 ms decoding. These tests are included in `just test-unit`. - Shared-crate, root workspace, and desktop Tauri Clippy pass; `just desktop-tauri-check` passes. - The desktop Tauri test workspace passes; native two-person listening/device checks remain separate. - All mandatory push checks pass at `d06bac5dc`, including the complete Rust unit gate and desktop workspace checks. Existing agent timing and relay log-capture tests failed under concurrent load, passed separately, and passed in the full serial test run; no tests or hooks were skipped. - One test-only fixture change allows cold Perl startup before the escaped-process test's inner timeout (2 seconds instead of 300 ms). Its independent 5-second watchdog, 300-second surviving pipe writer, and all assertions remain intact. All eight process-helper tests pass; independent review confirmed this still tests bounded drain completion. - Dependency inspection confirms the library brings in no desktop application, Tauri, identity store, relay server, or speech-model crates. - Independent source review found no correctness blockers. Draft: a native two-person call, mute/leave/cancellation, and microphone/speaker switching still need a runtime tryout and human review. Full `just ci` was stopped during the unrelated mobile toolchain download because of disk pressure; it is not a passing gate. Consumer integration is tracked in block/buzz-app#489. --------- Signed-off-by: kenny lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com> |
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Alex Rosenzweig
|
4f51b9e101 |
fix(mcp): support Goose discovery handshake (#8037)
## Summary Goose 1.52 starts MCP connections with `server/discover`. `buzz-dev-mcp` rejects that request with `ExpectedInitializeRequest`, preventing Goose from loading its Buzz tools. Upgrade the tool server to rmcp 3.4.1 and adopt the renamed SDK types. Subprocess tests exercise discovery and legacy initialization, tool listing, file reads/edits, invalid arguments, connection survival, and EOF shutdown. Include the server in both Rust unit-test runners and make the cancellation regression approve its shell call before testing cancellation. The native agent retains its independent rmcp 1.x client. Cargo also unifies the existing 3.x dependency used by the mesh smoke harness. ## Validation - Normal `git push` passed all hooks, including Rust tests, Tauri checks, and repository policy checks. - `just ci` passed on the final stack: repository checks, Rust and Tauri tests/lint, desktop tests/build, web build, and mobile checks/tests. - MCP: 78 existing tests and two subprocess lifecycle tests passed; the discovery regression fails with the old SDK. - All 54 native-agent regressions passed on the final stack, including cancellation of a real MCP shell process. - Previously exercised unmodified Goose 1.52 and 1.47 with Sandpit and the real tool server. Allowed workspace operations and permitted network traffic succeeded; disallowed file and network operations were denied. - Live staging desktop check with Goose 1.52: the reply appeared in Buzz, an allowed request returned HTTP 200, and a disallowed request returned CONNECT 403. ## Stack 1. **#8042 → `main`**: deterministic handoff regression. 2. **This PR → #8042**: Goose MCP discovery compatibility. Merge the lower PR first, then retarget this PR to `main`. This diff contains only the compatibility change and its tests; the relay build repair is already on `main` in #8036. --------- Signed-off-by: Alex Rosenzweig <arosenzweig@squareup.com> |
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Alex Rosenzweig
|
2c270cf9d7 |
test(agent): synchronize handoff steering with tool approval (#8042)
## Summary `handoff_cap_binds_within_a_single_turn` can finish the turn before its steer is accepted. It also requests `test_tool`, which the fake MCP server does not expose, so the supposed tool round fails immediately. Call the real `cap_test__tool_0` fixture and hold its permission response until the steer is acknowledged. Assert that the next model request contains the steer and the handoff cap still prevents a second summary. This changes one regression test; production code is unchanged. ## Validation - Reproduced the exact CI failure on unchanged `main` with a temporary 250 ms reader delay; the repaired test passed with the same delay. The delay is not committed. - Temporarily reset the handoff counter when a steer is queued: the repaired test failed. Restored production code afterward. - All six handoff regressions passed: `cargo test -p buzz-agent --locked --test regressions handoff_`. - `just ci` passed on the combined stack: repository checks, Rust and Tauri tests/lint, desktop tests/build, web build, and mobile checks/tests. - All 54 native-agent regressions passed on the combined stack, including this test. ## Stack 1. **This PR → `main`**: deterministic handoff regression. 2. **#8037 → this branch**: Goose MCP discovery compatibility. Merge this PR first, then retarget #8037 to `main`. Signed-off-by: Alex Rosenzweig <arosenzweig@squareup.com> |
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Kalvin C
|
48884848f5 |
fix: route databricks claude fqns to anthropic messages (#7829)
Fix Databricks V2 Unity Catalog Claude service routing without erasing verified model capabilities. - preserve exact provider-qualified record precedence for `data_workflow_tools.goose.goose-claude-opus-5-5`, including adaptive thinking, explicit `output_config.effort` (default medium), and signed native tool continuation - route other boundary-matched `claude-*` service components to Anthropic Messages while preserving the full FQN and advertising no unverified effort controls - keep GPT-5+ service components on OpenAI Responses and other uncurated FQNs on MLflow Chat Completions; catalog/schema text does not affect routing - keep Rust and TypeScript resolver precedence aligned and regenerate the 168-vector normative corpus Validation at `1204f1eacff17ebe05eb2bba06b5eee210e21c25`: - `cargo test -p buzz-agent` - `pnpm -C desktop test` — 6,628 passed - `pnpm -C desktop typecheck` - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `cargo clippy -p buzz-agent --all-targets -- -D warnings` - `just test-unit` — passed on isolated rerun - pre-push file-size, desktop check, desktop typecheck, desktop tests, and Tauri checks passed; the repository-wide Rust lane exited without identifying a failing test in two concurrent hook runs, while its isolated `just test-unit` rerun passed --------- Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Wes
|
0cc63fe3e6 |
fix(agent): preserve Databricks Opus UC reasoning and tool continuation (#7840)
## Summary Fix `reasoning_effort: Extra inputs are not permitted` for Databricks v2 model `data_workflow_tools.goose.goose-claude-opus-5-5` without dropping explicit High. - Add one provider-qualified exact capability record: Anthropic Messages, adaptive thinking, `output_config.effort`, medium upstream default. Mirror exact-record precedence in Rust/TS; keep uncurated UC services neutral and existing GPT routing unchanged. - Preserve ordered native content, including signed/empty thinking and redacted blocks, across tool results. Do not cache-stamp thinking blocks or leak native state into Chat reasoning details. Discard truncated native state; reject more than 64 native calls before any tool executes instead of altering signed content. - Add production-dispatch/ACP regressions and six shared capability vectors. No relay/ACP protocol, schema, settings, inheritance, retries, or other harness changes. ## Validation At final head `82f43f8d07bfcc3f4af492afc0a58a02f8e549c4`, clean tree: - Rebuilt real `buzz-agent`, drove ACP with a harmless MCP fixture against the actual service. Two POSTs to `/ai-gateway/anthropic/v1/messages`, both HTTP 200, exact FQN, High via `output_config`, adaptive/summarized thinking, no `reasoning_effort`. First response contained signed thinking + tool use; second request preserved signature/content order and paired result; final ACP stop `end_turn`. No credentials, signature contents, or conversation data included here. - Mandatory pre-commit/pre-push checks passed: formatting/lint, file-size gate, Rust test lanes, desktop typechecking and full JS tests, Tauri clippy/tests. - Full `cargo test -p buzz-agent` passed on the pre-commit tree (only hook formatting followed), including the new native truncation/65-call ACP regressions, ordered interleaved signed/redacted two-tool capture, nearby-ID negatives, and existing provider regressions. - Independent API/replay, regression-boundary, and Rust/TS capability reviews cleared. Full `just ci`, packaging and manual desktop UI testing were not run locally; repository CI remains the merge gate. Cross-harness internals and other UC service contracts are outside scope. ## References - [Databricks model services](https://docs.databricks.com/aws/en/ai-gateway/query-model-services) - [Anthropic thinking preservation](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/build-with-claude/thinking#thinking-block-preservation-by-model) - [Anthropic effort](https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/build-with-claude/effort) - Originating Buzz channel: `fccdea96-0f31-4343-ba6a-324214dc8d73` - Originating thread: buzz://message?channel=fccdea96-0f31-4343-ba6a-324214dc8d73&id=33f242923a317e269c1ff7b960cacd6ec1f3371eff2f97592857804c50fb100c Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Wes
|
5511b56fcf |
fix(relay): exclude ephemeral activity from message quota (#7736)
## Summary Stop charging ephemeral WebSocket activity against the per-minute `Messages` quota. Presence, typing, and observer traffic should not consume the allowance intended for persistable event attempts. - Use the existing `buzz_core::kind::is_ephemeral` predicate (kinds `20000..=29999`) at the second admission gate. All authenticated EVENT/REQ/COUNT traffic still consumes the shared `WsEvents` budget first. Non-ephemeral EVENT attempts remain charged, including attempts later rejected by authorization or validation. - Add bounded `bucket` labels (`messages`, `ws_operations`, `api_calls`) to `buzz_admission_rejections_total`. HTTP changes are metric labeling only. Wire rejection text remains byte-for-byte unchanged, preserving existing client parsers. - Add real-Redis admission regressions and select them in the existing relay integration CI job. No quota increases, identity/keying changes, client changes, new limiter, or deployment. Downstream authorization and fail-closed Redis behavior are unchanged. ### Related issue Duplicate search found overlapping work: open #4912 and closed #4902. They propose the same ephemeral-accounting correction alongside broader wire/client/config changes. The relay fix is a deliberately narrower four-file implementation on the current admission module, with metrics-only diagnostics and real-Redis regression coverage. A separate test-only CI repair is documented below. It does not close or claim to supersede those PRs. Related symptom: #7411. This PR does **not** resolve subscription bursts exhausting the shared WS budget; that budget is intentionally preserved. It also does not establish or fix the cause of HTTP quota exhaustion. ### Testing Validation ran against base `779af8886caae1317b4de962082429867ab61503` plus the exact patch now committed as `70ea0528594e25e6dcb40cd74620bd5ef0177592` (binary diff SHA-256 `5064e1cbb87ecb9eff10336bae14b912cac442e1edc247aa4f093de30e4f9717`). Normal commit/push hooks subsequently passed on the committed head, without bypass. Passed: - Independent review and rerun: 11 rejection tests (including real Redis) plus 4 admission tests. Covers ephemeral range boundaries, human/agent budgets, persistable events, ephemeral admission after message exhaustion, mixed EVENT/REQ/COUNT flood exhaustion, Redis outage, exact wire payloads, and bucket metrics. Three mutations were caught: reintroducing ephemeral billing, exempting stored events, and bypassing WS rejection. - `just test-unit`: all 17 runner groups; `just test-integration`: all 3 runner groups. Auth integration reported no tests; ignored database integration tests are not claimed as executed. - Relay all-target Clippy, formatting, workflow actionlint, pre-commit/signoff hooks, and all applicable pre-push lanes (`push-head-scope`, `branch-skew`, `file-size-check`, `rust-tests`, `desktop-tauri-checks`). - Release relay/CLI/admin build and isolated release-binary workflow: channel creation, signed root/reply sends, exact-ID readback, and thread retrieval. Debug and release WS smoke admitted three presence events with a Messages limit of two, admitted two persistable events, rejected the third, still admitted presence afterward, and rejected author mismatch. Debug Prometheus confirmed `bucket="messages"`. **Outstanding validation gap:** the additional `cargo test -p buzz-relay --no-fail-fast` run was not green: library 1,055 passed / 2 failed / 100 ignored; binary 13 passed / 1 ignored; boot integration 9 passed. Failures were `api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` (504 instead of 200) and `telemetry::tests::trace_context_lookup_does_not_enable_callsites` (tracing assertion). Neither failure was diagnosed or repaired in this scope, and this PR does not claim a fully green package suite. `just ci` was not run locally; hosted CI remains to validate the PR. All runtime tests used isolated local services. Owned services have been stopped; nothing was deployed and no production data was touched. ### CI cancellation-test repair At the original relay head, hosted Rust unit tests failed on the pre-existing cancellation harness race tracked in #4945. With owner authorization, this PR now adapts the one-file repair from #5003 (original commit `cc8dc6124957acfd67fe2336396b58e0ff43ec60`), preserving author credit. #5003's old hosted workflows failed without starting jobs; their status is not used as validation evidence. Commit `55fe5f16618a51d03ad48d6f2f97b2f8b463607a` holds the fake provider response until a successful cancellation acknowledgement, then replays all pre-acknowledgement usage/prompt frames in order. It retains the cancellation and usage-before-response assertions and explicitly requires prompt completion. No production code changes in this follow-up. Validation on parent `70ea052859` plus this test patch, before the pre-commit-only assertion wrapping: full `cargo test -p buzz-agent --no-fail-fast` passed (715 tests, one ignored); 100 targeted repetitions passed with four concurrent workers; all-target buzz-agent Clippy passed. The unmodified parent also passed 50 local repetitions, so this is not claimed as a local reproduction of the intermittent CI failure. The synchronization defect was confirmed from the source, original CI log, and #4945. Hosted CI must validate the updated head. Independent source review cleared exact commit `55fe5f16618a51d03ad48d6f2f97b2f8b463607a`. Normal pre-commit/signoff and all applicable pre-push hooks passed without bypass. The original relay-package mesh-demo and telemetry failures remain disclosed above and were not modified by this test-only repair. --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: kiranmagic7 <262980978+kiranmagic7@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Wes
|
4cd82f5132 |
feat(buzz-agent): add opt-in workspace-scoped Databricks reuse (#7606)
Posted by Brain, Wes Billman’s AI assistant, on behalf of `wesbillman`. ## Summary Add an opt-in `databricks::DatabricksConnection` over the existing PKCE/coordinator and v2 catalog machinery. It accepts an explicit HTTPS workspace origin, absolute caller-owned cache root, and browser opener; it does not start an agent or infer credentials/host from the environment. - Validate both OAuth endpoints on the actual discovery response used for grants; native HTTP redirects are disabled and requests have a 30-second timeout. - Keep strict cache/single-flight state in a separate namespace. Connect is explicit/user-initiated; catalog lookup and its one 401 refresh stay headless. Tokens are not exposed by the connection API. - Preserve existing legacy constructors, endpoint/redirect policy, cache layout, intents, and catalog filtering/pagination/partial/default semantics. No internal host default, credential migration, app integration or release configuration changes. ### Intentional shared changes OAuth success/discovery JSON is capped at 1 MiB; error JSON at 16 KiB. Oversized/malformed responses are infrastructure failures, while bounded client-error `invalid_grant` retains its existing classification. OAuth diagnostics omit raw bodies/URLs/opener/callback details. Overflowing token expiry returns an infrastructure failure. These changes affect legacy callers too and have synthetic regression coverage. See [the reuse contract](crates/buzz-agent/DATABRICKS_REUSE.md) for API, compatibility and caller obligations. Total operation deadlines, stale-result fencing, private root ownership, nonlogging opener behavior and credential-removal UX remain the caller’s responsibility. ### Related issue Related discovery work: #6918. Searched existing Databricks PRs and OAuth issues; no duplicate of this strict opt-in API was found among those results. This is a new reuse boundary, not a claim of a live credential leak. ### Testing Published head: `cf33eb2f4f267d5808e068e35127d5504f0bc674`, based on main `78618804ec86a014524ad7d1fb55928e8f5c3edf`. Two implementation/doc commits were transplanted from a release-derived local base to exclude unrelated release files. `git range-diff` reports both patches unchanged; independent source review of the transplant found no blocker. **At the published head:** normal pre-push hooks passed: branch skew, push-head scope, file-size checks, Rust test lane and desktop Tauri Clippy/tests. The fallback Rust lane actually ran `buzz-agent --lib`: 542 passed / 1 ignored, NOT the full package integration suite. Hosted full package/repository CI remains pending. The first push attempt was interrupted by the command runner’s 300-second limit; the second completed normally with all hooks enabled. **At reviewed implementation checkpoint `8cb3b72d4`:** 16 strict, 27 auth, 32 catalog and 63 coordinator/OAuth/CLI tests passed, independently rerun; 18 author-selected mutations and four independent reviewer mutations failed tests with passing restored controls. The subsequent `539319411` delta changed only two doc-comment blocks. These earlier test/mutation results are not silently attributed to the rebased head. Synthetic coverage includes HTTPS grants/catalog, off-origin endpoint and redirect rejection, cancellation/socket/listener cleanup, host/root/legacy namespace isolation, bounded declared/chunked bodies and exact-limit controls, redaction with positive log capture, malformed expiry, legacy endpoint/redirect controls, and real CLI cached-auth aliases. Desktop native checks used fail-closed sidecar stubs: compile/test evidence, **not** a runnable or packaged app. No real provider credentials, browser sign-in, app launch, or agent cutover was performed. Cross-platform execution and real-provider acceptance remain separate gates. No merge or downstream adoption is requested by this PR. --------- Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Bradley Axen
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cd54e26823 |
fix(agent): route GPT-5+ model-service FQNs to Responses (#7358)
## Summary Route Databricks Unity Catalog model services to OpenAI Responses when their service name matches GPT-5 or newer. These models can reject tools plus reasoning on Chat Completions. Match only the service component, using the existing family-token boundaries and a numeric major version. Catalog and schema names cannot select the protocol. Keep neutral effort capabilities and the full model ID unchanged; other services still use MLflow Chat Completions. Keep the Rust and desktop resolvers in sync, add shared boundary cases and a captured-HTTP regression for completion and summarization, and update the documented FQN rule. ### Related issue No duplicate found in searches for “FQN responses” PRs or “astra” issues. Related: #6918 introduced Unity Catalog discovery. Originating conversation: buzz://message?channel=0b881928-a3a6-4c01-b981-8e64268f01ce&id=770949343bc96a9ed88acd90a1b37d358a0efc52c79237d0fdb491ce02b8d4ed ### Testing No live Databricks inference test. The gateway must accept the full model-service ID on its OpenAI Responses route; this remains the integration risk. The local `just ci` attempt exceeded its five-minute deadline during `mobile-check`, so the full repository gate was not completed. All push-hook checks passed. Generated with Codex Signed-off-by: Fizz <400e8babadcee6a7f420103f10a2849d84c4a9c71d5bd04f3948c814216648a3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Fizz <400e8babadcee6a7f420103f10a2849d84c4a9c71d5bd04f3948c814216648a3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Logan Johnson
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d5a73b9f35 |
fix(desktop): derive agent availability from relay presence (#7127)
🤖 ## Requested rebase published — |
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Will Pfleger
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5aed49b505 |
feat(buzz-agent): add DatabricksAuthCoordinator single-flight OAuth (#5545)
## What
Consolidates all Databricks OAuth acquisition behind one coordinator on
`PkceOAuthTokenSource`. Every entry point — the four `TokenSource`
methods (`bearer`, `bearer_no_browser`, `refresh_now`,
`interactive_login`) plus the public `acquire_with_intent` — routes
through a single `acquire()`/`acquire_locked()` core that owns browser
and cooldown policy.
Before this, acquisition logic was scattered across those methods with
no coordination: concurrent callers (Desktop discovery, the saved-agent
model picker, managed-runtime inference) could each pop their own
browser, and a just-denied attempt would immediately re-prompt on the
next passive read.
## How
- **Intent policy.** `AuthIntent::{Auto, UserInitiated, Headless}`
decides whether a caller may open a browser and whether it honors the
cooldown. `Headless` never browses; `Auto` browses but honors an
unexpired cooldown; `UserInitiated` browses and bypasses+clears the
cooldown.
- **Two-layer single-flight per cache key.** An in-process registry
(`INFLIGHT`) coalesces same-key, same-intent callers onto one leader's
attempt before the file lock. The slot key is `(lock_path, AuthIntent)`,
so a `UserInitiated` sign-in never inherits an `Auto` leader's result. A
joined result is revalidated against the waiter's own contract. Across
processes, callers serialize on a `flock`-based advisory lock and share
success through the on-disk cache. RAII `Drop` releases both lock and
leader slot.
- **Joiner credential-state reconciliation.** `SlotPublish` carries the
full `CachedToken` on success. Each joiner reconciles its own
independent `state` cell under `state.lock().await` before returning:
adopt when absent, expired, or matching the joiner's rejected
credential; preserve any distinct newer usable credential. On a matching
shared failure, neutralize the joiner's in-memory rejected entry under
lock via `expire_rejected_memory` — durable disk mutation is reserved
for `acquire_locked` under the cross-process file lock. Without this, a
joining source's state remains stale or empty and subsequent plain
`bearer()` calls resurface the rejected or absent credential.
- **Validate-before-persist boundary.** `finish()` is the
candidate-token persistence boundary for refresh and browser results.
Before a token is written to cache or the cooldown is cleared, a bearer
equal to the caller's rejected bytes yields a typed failure.
- **Token neutralization.** When `acquire_locked` enters with `rejected
= Some(bytes)`, it calls `expire_rejected()` under the state lock before
any cache check.
- **Cross-process failure single-flight.** An `AttemptRecord` sidecar
records a monotonically-increasing generation, intent, result code, and
SHA-256 digest of the completing caller's rejected token. Adoption is
temporal (pre-queue snapshot predates current generation) and
digest-matched.
- **Typed outcomes.** `AuthError` with stable `code()`/`from_code()`
replaces display-text matching.
- **Durable cooldown sidecar.** Every failed browser attempt is recorded
next to the cache key. 5-minute expiry.
- **Windows disk persistence disabled.** On non-Unix platforms,
`persist()` is a no-op. Lock, cooldown, and attempt sidecars are active
on all platforms. Tests that seed or assert on the on-disk token cache
are `#[cfg(unix)]`-gated.
- **Injected browser opener** invoked while the localhost callback
listener is live.
## Tests
- `crates/buzz-agent/tests/databricks_auth_coordinator.rs`:
browser/cooldown/classification acceptance matrix with a scripted
`BrowserOpener` and stub OIDC provider. P1 regressions exercise the full
`finish()` → `acquire_locked()` → `acquire_leader()` →
`LeaderGuard::complete()` → joiner wiring:
- `test_inprocess_joiner_reconciles_stale_state_after_shared_success`
(Unix): two real sources both loaded locally-fresh-but-rejected X; after
shared success Y, subsequent plain `bearer()` on both returns Y, not X.
-
`test_inprocess_joiner_neutralizes_rejected_on_matching_shared_failure`
(Unix): B's matching rejected X is force-expired in memory after shared
`RefreshRejected`; subsequent read cannot return X.
- `test_inprocess_joiner_populates_empty_state_no_second_acquisition`
(non-Unix): empty A/B join a browser success; B's subsequent headless
read returns Y without a second browser (no disk fallback on non-Unix
exposes the regression).
- `test_crossprocess_userinitiated_waiter_adopts_predecessor_denial`
(snapshot-marker barrier replacing an earlier sleep for deterministic
generation ordering).
- `auth.rs` in-crate tests: lock-primitive edges, disk-recheck on shared
failure (`#[cfg(unix)]`), and:
- `test_joiner_reconciliation_blocked_until_state_lock_released`:
deterministic direct-poll proof that awaited reconciliation requires
`state.lock().await`. The test task holds B's state mutex and manually
polls a pinned real `acquire()` future — Poll 2 (slot published, mutex
still held) must return `Pending` because `lock().await` blocks; with
`try_lock` instead, Poll 2 returns `Ready`, failing the assertion.
- `test_joiner_preserve_distinct_newer_credential`: deterministic direct
polling parks B at `slot.wait()`, then writes Z directly into B's state
in the same task, then publishes Y and awaits completion. B must return
Y but leave state == Z. Mutation check: unconditional adoption
overwrites Z with Y, failing the state assertion.
- `test_joiner_shared_failure_recovers_disk_replacement` (Unix): the
matching-failure joiner enters the recovery branch — after
`expire_rejected_memory` (in-memory, empty state no-op) it reads a
sibling-written disk replacement via `usable_from_disk` and returns it.
Mutation check: removing the `usable_from_disk` recovery branch returns
`Err(RefreshRejected)`.
- `test_joiner_failure_does_not_write_disk` (Unix): byte-for-byte
disk-invariance regression — a matching-failure joiner calls
`expire_rejected_memory` and must not touch the on-disk cache. An
independent process C may write a valid replacement between A's failure
and B's reconciliation; this guard ensures B's unfenced in-memory
neutralization cannot overwrite C's concurrent disk write. Mutation
check: reverting to `expire_rejected` rewrites the file (`expires_at =
0`), changing the bytes and failing the assertion.
- `test_lock_timeout_leaves_cooldown_sidecar_byte_for_byte_untouched`: a
waiter past its deadline returns `LockTimeout` before entering
`acquire_locked`; the cooldown sidecar bytes are unchanged. Documents a
pre-lock limitation: `LockTimeout` callers do not neutralize state or
sidecars.
## Scope / follow-ups
- **Runtime 401 handling is deferred.** This PR owns acquisition
single-flight and policy.
- **Desktop wiring is Phase 2** (not in this PR's boundary). Confined to
`crates/buzz-agent/`.
- **Windows DACL** is a follow-up once the `windows-sys` binding is
available.
## Stack
Built on [#5534](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/5534)
(`hayt/databricks-oauth-cache-hardening`), now merged. Retargeted to
`main`.
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
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|
Kalvin C
|
be8d7756d5 |
feat(agent): discover Databricks Unity Catalog models (#6918)
## Summary Add Unity Catalog model-service discovery to `buzz-agent` Databricks v2, preserve full Unity Catalog FQNs through ACP model discovery, route model services through MLflow chat, and add the optional `DATABRICKS_MODEL_FILTER` visibility filter. The resilience follow-up bounds each catalog attempt across headers, bounded body reads, and JSON parsing; retries transient 499/5xx, transport/body failures, malformed JSON, and attempt timeouts; and emits only safe catalog/status diagnostics. ## Validation The live validation and test gates below were run on the pre-rewrite tip `1cf6c66e7c5bf9a00c357bda24df48e3beeb310b`. The rewritten tip `0364cf44f3eb5cfbd5771b0a0dd7868ce0ad2c19` has identical trees for both commits, so the attribution rewrite changes no tested code. - 31 catalog tests passed - 19 Databricks OAuth/routing integration tests passed - `cargo check -p buzz-agent` passed - `cargo clippy -p buzz-agent --all-targets -- -D warnings` passed - `cargo fmt --check` passed - `git diff --check` passed - Desktop Tauri validation passed through the repository-supported setup path, including 2,777 library tests and auxiliary terminal suites The full `buzz-agent` package has one separately reproduced pre-existing failure: `regressions::cancel_kills_inflight_tool_via_mcp_notification`, failing on both baseline `eb8e97cfe` and the follow-up worktree. No Databricks path reaches that test. The live validation proves discovery and ACP exposure, not inference against every listed model. --------- Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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|
Will Pfleger
|
a1219070fa |
feat(buzz-agent): gate LLM tool calls on session/request_permission (#5712)
## Summary
buzz-agent now authorizes every LLM-issued MCP tool call through
`session/request_permission` before it executes, instead of running
tools unconditionally. The agent **always asks**; the client applies
`BUZZ_ACP_PERMISSION_POLICY` and answers. buzz-agent never reads the
policy — this keeps the policy decision on the client side, matching the
layering of the other ACP harnesses, and avoids duplicating policy logic
that would drift.
### Broker
A crate-local `PermissionBroker`
(`crates/buzz-agent/src/permission.rs`), owned by `App` for the
connection lifetime, owns the full request-correlation lifecycle:
- **Process-wide admission.** A global `Semaphore`
(`BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_PENDING_PERMISSIONS`, default 32, validated `>= 1`) is
acquired *before* any correlation entry is inserted. This is the
security bound: the per-turn tool semaphore is constructed fresh per
turn and `max_sessions` is unbounded by default, so neither bounds
simultaneously-outstanding asks process-wide.
- **Abort-safe cleanup.** A successful admission returns a
`PendingPermission` lease that owns the admission permit and the
correlation id. Its `Drop` synchronously removes the still-pending entry
and releases the slot, covering task abort/panic that bypasses the
normal `run_prompt` tail.
- **At-most-once resolution.** `deliver` claims (removes) the entry
*before* waking the waiter, so each id resolves once and a later lease
`Drop` is a no-op. Unknown/late ids are logged and dropped; only ids the
broker minted (`perm-<n>`) are recognized.
- **Single absolute deadline.** Admission, request enqueue, and response
wait all share one deadline (`BUZZ_AGENT_PERMISSION_TIMEOUT_SECS`,
default 330s, validated `>= 1`), so a saturated call cannot outlive one
timeout window even when a stalled writer blocks the enqueue.
Cancellation races inside every wait — resolution never depends on the
outer abort drain. A writer that dies mid-connection (stdout closed, or
a blocking write that only surfaces its error at flush) is
connection-fatal: it cancels all sessions, which resolves any ask
waiting on a reply that can never be written.
### Wire
`request_permission_params` (`crates/buzz-agent/src/wire.rs`) is
version-aware, keyed on the protocol version negotiated at `initialize`
and stored on `App` for the connection lifetime (never derived from a
later mutable session field). v2 nests the tool call under `subject:
{type: "tool_call", toolCall}` with top-level `title`/`options`; v1 uses
the legacy top-level `toolCall`. No hybrid shape. Both offered options
(`allow_once`, `reject_once`) carry `optionId == kind`, so the client's
`kind`-based selection and this side's `optionId`-based predicate agree
without a lookup table.
### Gate
In each spawned tool task (`crates/buzz-agent/src/agent.rs`) the
sequence is: acquire per-turn permit → argument-shape validation →
broker admission + request + wait → cancellation recheck →
`emit_in_progress` → `mcp.call`. Argument-shape validation is hoisted
out of `mcp.rs::do_call` into `validate_arg_shape` so a malformed
non-object argument is rejected locally without prompting for a call
that could never execute.
Authorization is fail-closed, stated once in `evaluate`: execute IFF
`outcome.outcome == "selected"` **and** the selected `optionId` equals
the offered allow option. Every other shape (reject, cancelled, JSON-RPC
error, malformed, unknown outcome, wrong/unknown option, timeout,
wire-channel closure) denies with a synthetic tool error, and the turn
continues.
### Scope
Only LLM-issued MCP calls are gated. The built-in `load_skill` tool and
`call_hooks` lifecycle calls (`_Stop`, `_PostCompact`) are exempt — they
are not model-issued. `readOnlyHint` is never treated as a security
boundary.
First cut ships `allow_once`/`reject_once` only; session-scoped grants
are deliberately out of scope.
### Related issue
Part of #4938. This PR and
[#5106](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/5106) jointly implement the
feature: #5106 is the client-side policy engine and permission cards;
this PR is buzz-agent's asking side (`session/request_permission`).
Neither closes #4938 alone.
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <41ea58f1e64c243627e8acde7c89be667052ee6e17d8f021c1195be4324ebf04@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
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|
Atish Patel
|
72d56e7bd3 |
fix(agent): raise output limit and allow 3 recoveries (#5475)
## Summary Raise the built-in output and recovery defaults so long-running agents have more room to finish useful work instead of terminating after repeated 32,768-token reasoning-only responses. - Raise `BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS` from 32,768 to 65,536 - Raise the finite output-truncation recovery allowance from 2 to 3 via `BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_TOKEN_RECOVERIES`; `0` still disables recovery - Strengthen the recovery prompt so the model stops prolonged reasoning, uses tools immediately, and builds scripts or artifacts in small verifiable steps - Preserve the safety invariant that incomplete truncated tool calls are discarded and never executed - Keep proactive handoff independently at 90% of `BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS` (180,000 tokens with the 200,000 default), regardless of the output allowance - Add request-loop and configuration regressions for exact-N recovery, disabled recovery, successful tool-first recovery, discarded truncated calls, and finite round bounds `BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS` remains an explicit per-agent deployment setting. Operators should configure it at or below the served model's output limit; this PR does not perform live provider capability discovery or automatic clamping. **Risk:** Medium — this increases the default request size and permits one additional recovery attempt by default. Recovery remains finite and bounded by `BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_ROUNDS`. Deployments whose served model rejects 65,536 output tokens must set a lower per-agent value. Current output limits - model - output token max - DeepSeek V4 Flash - 384,000 tokens - Qwen 3.8 (Max) - 131,072 tokens - GLM 5.2 - 131,072 tokens - GPT 5.6 - 128,000 tokens - Claude Opus 5 - 128,000 tokens - Gemini 3.6 Flash - 65,536 tokens - Kimi K3 (Moonshot)- 131,072 tokens ### Related issue None found. Originating benchmark analysis: `buzz://message?channel=c3252dd2-0142-4e01-88c7-a2183c3960a5&id=91e991aab5fd49094583c3937477f6c12db57a41d86edf7fd4745d0d57d10017` ### Testing - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `cargo test -p buzz-agent` — 595 passed, 0 failed, 0 ignored at `bd6de557b367850f50325bafdd3c046131942bef` - `cargo clippy -p buzz-agent --all-targets -- -D warnings` - Previously failing `cancelled_turn_with_usage_emits_notification_before_response` passed alone and in the full rerun - Push hooks passed: organization guard, branch skew, Rust tests, and Desktop Tauri checks ### Update — 2026-08-11 Per review feedback, the recovery default is 3. The OpenRouter live `/models` output-cap discovery, cache, request clamp, and related tests/documentation were removed. Per-agent output configuration is now the sole output-cap mechanism. Proactive handoff and its pre-usage byte fallback now depend only on 90% of `BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS`; with the 200,000 default, the handoff threshold is 180,000 regardless of `BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS`. Generated with Brainy Bumble ### Targeted validation — 2026-08-11 Ran the exact PR binary once on each of the 11 benchmark tasks causally affected by the previous 32,768-token ceiling, using OpenRouter with `deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash-0731` pinned to Fireworks and maximum reasoning effort. Relay-429 collection failures were excluded and rerun at concurrency 2. - **6/11 passed:** `circuit-fibsqrt`, `feal-linear-cryptanalysis`, `model-extraction-relu-logits`, `path-tracing`, `schemelike-metacircular-eval`, and `sqlite-db-truncate` - **5/11 reached the benchmark deadline:** `adaptive-rejection-sampler`, `dna-assembly`, `path-tracing-reverse`, `regex-chess`, and `write-compressor` - `regex-chess` reached exactly 65,536 output tokens, triggered one output-limit recovery, and then reached the deadline. This directly confirms that the larger ceiling and recovery path were active, but not that recovery guarantees completion. For context, ten of these tasks were 0/5 in the historical baseline; `sqlite-db-truncate`, the clean control, was 4/5. This is targeted one-attempt-per-task validation rather than a statistically powered comparison. The result should not be attributed solely to the recovery default of 3: this PR also raises the output ceiling and strengthens recovery behavior, and OpenRouter routing conditions may differ from the historical direct-Fireworks runs. Generated with Brainy Bumble --------- Signed-off-by: Atish Patel <atish@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Brainy Bumble <0ed7657b57c0e8a9f5288390dd6c8d5d0a3a06abe9b01b9006814f52077d6cdf@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Hardworking Honey <c5c455215c2506cb8ba776518cec804af62d3a0526e32d496a22072e395042b9@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Brainy Bumble <0ed7657b57c0e8a9f5288390dd6c8d5d0a3a06abe9b01b9006814f52077d6cdf@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hardworking Honey <c5c455215c2506cb8ba776518cec804af62d3a0526e32d496a22072e395042b9@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
||
|
Will Pfleger
|
5e4c05f90b |
feat(desktop): NIP-AM agent-usage backend — P2 emission/transport/archive + P4a aggregation/D6 (#4000)
## What Implements Phases 2 and 4a of the Usage v2 plan (plan events `d0268cd0`/`0e95b035`), extending the archive backend to emit, transport, archive, and aggregate both cache categories and billing identity fail-closed. ### P2 — emission, transport, archive **Tri-state accumulators** (`Unseen`/`Exact`/`Unknown`) for cache-read and cache-write in `buzz-agent` turn and session state. Absent field = Unknown (never zero) through the full pipeline. No `unwrap_or(0)` on the cache path. Both cache folds are gated on usage-bearing responses (same gate as the total-state and identity folds) — a response with no usage at all must not poison either accumulator. **Overflow-aware input token parsing and accumulation** — closed end-to-end from parse through wire to ACP: - `sum_usage()` returns `SumUsageResult` (`Exact(u64)` | `Overflow`) — checked arithmetic, never clamps. `anthropic_input_tokens()` returns `Option<SumUsageResult>` since it sums three fields (`input_tokens + cache_read_input_tokens + cache_creation_input_tokens`) that can collectively overflow. Single-field callers (`prompt_tokens`, `completion_tokens`, etc.) convert via `.into_exact()` — their single-field sums cannot overflow. - `LlmResponse.input_tokens_overflowed: bool` propagates the parse-layer signal into the run loop. When set, `input_tokens` is `None` (clamped value discarded), the context-gate baseline (`last_request_input_tokens`) is frozen at its prior reading, and `turn_input_tokens` is poisoned to `TurnIOState::Poisoned` before any emission — including mid-turn `emit_usage_update` calls. A dedicated enum on `LlmResponse.input_tokens` would ripple into ~20 existing test assertions on `r.input_tokens == Some(...)`; the bool flag confines the change to the two call sites that check it. - `TurnIOState` (`Unseen`/`Exact`/`Poisoned`) for input and output: per-round fold uses `checked_add`; overflow poisons permanently at turn and session level, no healing. Absence does not poison (pass-2-cleared contract unchanged). Wire emission omits `accumulatedInputTokens`/`accumulatedOutputTokens` when poisoned — never null, never `u64::MAX`. ACP treats absent = publisher-poisoned: `delta_reliable: false`, null turn fields, null cumulative for that category; session cumulative stays unknown for all subsequent turns once poisoned. **Conditional wire emission** for `accumulatedCachedInputTokens` and new `accumulatedCacheWriteTokens`: fields are omitted when the cumulative is Unseen or Unknown. ACP `_goose/unstable/session/update` contract documented next to the payload with tests for all absence/zero variants. **`PricingIdentity` stamping (publisher-side)**: - `pricing_authority()`: canonical parsed-URL endpoint comparison against the official allowlist — HTTPS only, exact allowlisted host (lookalike-safe), default port (omitted or explicit :443), required API base path, rejects userinfo/query/fragment/path-prefix lookalikes. - Model: the actually-requested `request_model` after mesh/auto resolution (not `effective_model_str`). - Turn discipline: identity retained only while ALL usage in the current turn carries one identical proven identity; any mismatch, unproven-usage-bearing response, or unpaired cumulative snapshot poisons to absent; a later matching notification does not heal a mixed turn. **ACP `UsageTracker` identity fold**: per-in-flight-turn tri-state identity accumulator replacing last-update-wins. Any absent identity on a token-advancing notification or exact mismatch poisons to absent; poison survives later updates; reset in `begin_turn()`/`take()`; reset also when a request fails (baseline cleared so preflight gate cannot stay frozen sub-threshold on retries). **M3 migration**: adds `turn_cache_write_tokens`, `cumulative_cache_write_tokens`, `pricing_authority`, `pricing_model`, `pricing_cache_class` to `agent_metric_index`. Additive, idempotent, guarded per-column by marker. M2 migration also guarded per-column (turn and cumulative cache-read columns checked and added independently; marker commits only after both are present). Fresh-DB schema includes all columns. **First-turn baselines**: `seed_zero_baseline` seeds `last_input: Some(0)`, `last_output: Some(0)`, `last_cached_input: Some(0)`, `last_cache_write: Some(0)`, and `last_total: Some(0)` — all have the known-zero-at-spawn argument. Absent fields from incoming snapshots still produce unknown (tri-state unchanged). Sessions buzz-acp did not spawn (no seed) remain fail-closed on turn one. **`ReportedUsage` TS mirror**: `cacheReadTokens`, `cacheWriteTokens`, `freshInputTokens` added to `tauriArchive.ts` as `UsageField` members, field-for-field with the Rust struct. ### P4a — aggregation layer **Extended S-1 ladder** to cache-read and cache-write via the same `ladder_token` path as the existing token fields. **`freshInputTokens` derivation**: checked arithmetic, fail-closed — absent cache fields produce Unknown (not zero), overflow and `cacheRead+cacheWrite > input` both produce `incomplete: true`. Aggregated as a `UsageField`. **D6 comparator**: `sort_value()` = provider total when known, else `input+output` when both known, else `None` (unknown-last). Replaces the prior total-only comparator for both agent-level and model-level sort. Ships a pinned test vector that the TS render layer (P5) must match. ## Test coverage - `buzz-agent`: 440 lib + 15 integration (golden_transcripts) — includes 13 new `cache_total_state_tests`; 14 new `turn_io_state_tests`; 3 new `sum_usage_*` tests (exact single-field, exact two-field, overflow signals correctly); 3 new `parse_anthropic_*` tests (overflow flag set + value cleared, normal sum no flag, absent usage no flag); end-to-end golden transcript drives real subprocess with Anthropic-shaped `input_tokens: u64::MAX, cache_read: 1` response and asserts `accumulatedInputTokens` absent from the emitted `usage_update` — no logic duplication; 3 wire pin tests; 4 `fold_pricing_identity_*` tests; `pricing_authority()` explicit-:443 acceptance - `buzz-acp`: 700 tests (691 lib + 9 integration) — 4 new usage tests (absent input → unreliable+null; absent output → unreliable+null; goose-shaped both present unchanged; poison mid-session); 3 ACP behavior tests; 7 pool lifecycle tests - Desktop (Rust): 2259+ tests — 14 new P4a pinned tests; 2 M3 round-trip tests; 1 serde key-shape test; 2 M2 partial-schema migration tests; first-turn cache round-trip test ## Related PRs - P1 NIP-AM spec: [#4632](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4632) - P3 pricing table: [#4629](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4629) - UI (P5): [#4001](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4001) --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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|
Tyler
|
2b873cf208 |
Recover from max-token response truncation (#5223)
## Summary - treat provider `max_tokens` as an interrupted assistant response and continue the same turn with actionable feedback - discard tool calls from truncated responses, including malformed partial arguments, so they are neither executed nor replayed with invalid tool-result pairing - bound recovery to two retries while preserving normal finite `max_rounds` accounting ## Verification - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `cargo test -p buzz-agent` (422 unit tests plus all package integration/doc suites passed) - `cargo clippy -p buzz-agent --all-targets -- -D warnings` ## Notes The pre-push repository-wide hook also ran. Its Rust tests passed (2,270 passed, 14 ignored), but its `buzz-db` unit-test build was blocked because local rustc 1.89 is below sqlx 0.9's rustc 1.94 requirement. The affected package suite above is green on the exact pushed commit. Originating Buzz channel: `c3252dd2-0142-4e01-88c7-a2183c3960a5` Signed-off-by: Wren <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Wren <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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|
Will Pfleger
|
742e8d1197 |
fix(buzz-agent): Responses reasoning summary, Anthropic display:summarized, ACP v2 messageId (#5195)
Three pre-existing gaps in the buzz-agent observer feed fixed together
per Will's ruling ("all 3 in the current PR"):
1. **OpenAI/DBv2-GPT route** — `responses_body` never requested
`reasoning.summary`; GPT-family models billed thinking tokens but
returned `summary: []`.
2. **Anthropic/DBv2-Claude route** — `anthropic_thinking_config()` never
sent `thinking.display`; newest Claude models (Opus 5, Sonnet 5, Fable
5, Mythos 5, Opus 4.7/4.8, Mythos Preview) default to
`display:"omitted"`, returning thinking blocks with an empty `thinking`
field — observer rendered nothing.
3. **ACP v2 compliance** — buzz-agent negotiates ACP v2 but emitted
`agent_thought_chunk` and `agent_message_chunk` without `messageId`,
which ACP v2's `ContentChunk` requires (`messageId` + `content` both
required at schema head `d13d1baa`).
## Changes
**`crates/buzz-agent/src/config.rs`**
- New `ThinkingSummary` enum (`Auto`/`Concise`/`Detailed`) with
`BUZZ_AGENT_THINKING_SUMMARY` env var (default `Auto`); mirrors
`BUZZ_AGENT_THINKING_EFFORT` pattern
- `anthropic_thinking_config()` now emits `"display": "summarized"` in
both the adaptive shape and the manual-budget shape whenever thinking is
enabled
- Rewrote `is_adaptive_thinking_model` and `anthropic_thinking_config`
doc comments to match Anthropic's exact three-way per-model terminology
(doc:
https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/build-with-claude/thinking-troubleshooting#supported-models):
- Opus 4.6/4.7/4.8, Sonnet 4.6: **Off** — thinking OFF by default;
`type:"adaptive"` required to enable
- Opus 5, Sonnet 5: **On** — thinking on by default, can be disabled; we
still send `type:"adaptive"` to activate `output_config.effort`
- Fable 5, Mythos 5, Mythos Preview: **Always on** — thinking cannot be
disabled; we still send `type:"adaptive"` to activate
`output_config.effort`
**`crates/buzz-agent/src/llm.rs`**
- `responses_body` emits `reasoning.summary` alongside
`reasoning.effort` when effort is set (gated — no bare
`reasoning:{summary}` without effort)
- Covers both the pure-OpenAI Responses path and the DBv2 GPT-family
Responses path
**`crates/buzz-agent/src/agent.rs`**
- `agent_thought_chunk` carries `"messageId":
format!("{run_id}-thought-{round}")`
- `agent_message_chunk` carries `"messageId":
format!("{run_id}-message-{round}")`
- The two IDs are distinct (thought and assistant are two logical
messages per the ACP v2 Message ID RFD)
- `run_id` is a fresh random token per `session/prompt` invocation so
IDs are session-unique across multiple prompts
**`crates/buzz-agent/src/lib.rs`**
- `run_id` plumbed into `RunCtx` (was already generated in `run_prompt`,
just not threaded through)
**`crates/buzz-agent/tests/golden_transcripts.rs`**
- `test_acp_v2_chunks_carry_message_id` — negotiates v2, drives two
consecutive `session/prompt` calls, asserts: both chunk types carry
non-empty `messageId`; thought and message IDs are **distinct**; IDs do
**not** recur across the two prompts in the same ACP session
**`desktop/src-tauri/src/managed_agents/env_vars.rs`**
- `BUZZ_AGENT_THINKING_SUMMARY` added to `is_safe_to_reveal` allowlist
**`desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/agent_config_tests.rs`**
- Tests for `BUZZ_AGENT_THINKING_SUMMARY` allowlist entry
(case-insensitive)
## Tests added
- `parse_thinking_summary_round_trips_all_values`
- `parse_thinking_summary_unset_and_empty_yield_auto`
- `parse_thinking_summary_is_case_insensitive`
- `parse_thinking_summary_rejects_unknown_value`
- `thinking_summary_as_str_mapping`
- `responses_body_summary_present_iff_effort_set`
- `responses_body_emits_configured_summary_mode`
- `responses_body_concise_summary_mode`
- `anthropic_thinking_config_adaptive_emits_display_summarized`
- `anthropic_thinking_config_manual_budget_emits_display_summarized`
- `test_acp_v2_chunks_carry_message_id` (integration test — two-prompt
cross-session case)
## Notes
- **DBv2 gateway parity for `display`**: unverified — the DBv2 Claude
route proxies Anthropic Messages shape, but whether the gateway passes
`thinking.display` through is not confirmed. Flagged here rather than
blocking on it.
- buzz-acp and Desktop TS are unchanged — they already parse `messageId`
as optional and will pick it up from the wire automatically.
- Chat Completions and OpenRouter paths: untouched.
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
||
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Will Pfleger
|
ed4b3e7afa |
fix(buzz-agent): recover from context-window 400s instead of sticking (#4946)
Provider `context_length_exceeded` 400s permanently wedged agent sessions: the turn errored, the oversized history persisted in the in-memory session, and the usage baseline stayed frozen at the last successful sub-threshold reading (failed requests report no usage), so the preflight handoff gate never fired again — every later prompt failed identically until an agent restart. The byte-truncation fallback never intervened because it is a request-body limiter (`estimated_bytes`), not a context-window defence; at context-window scale it is a measured no-op. This adds the reactive recovery path: - **Typed classification.** `AgentError::LlmContextExceeded` is classified at both non-success provider terminals — the shared `post()` (Anthropic, OpenAI, Databricks) and `openrouter_post()` — on `status == 400` plus a context-window body match, so ordinary 400s stay terminal. - **Forced handoff.** A context-400 forces a summarize-handoff that bypasses `should_handoff()` and `BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_HANDOFFS`, bounded by its own per-turn budget (`MAX_CONTEXT_RECOVERIES_PER_RUN = 3`). - **Shrink ladder.** The summarize prompt budget halves from the observed rejected history size — not from `max_context_tokens`, the number the provider just contradicted — rung to rung, with a 4096-byte floor. A summarize call rejected for the same reason takes the next rung instead of re-sticking. At the floor (overflow dominated by unshrinkable frame: system prompt, tool schemas, live prompt) recovery is refused and the provider error surfaces clearly instead of self-healing. - **Baseline reset.** The stale usage baseline is cleared when a request fails, so the preflight gate cannot stay frozen sub-threshold on retries. Named behavior changes: 1. **Anthropic and OpenRouter errors now carry the `(model)` stamp.** Provider arms return their `Result` into the central error mapper instead of early-returning past it, making the code match its documented single-convergence contract at that mapper. 2. **`max_rounds` now counts completions the loop acts on.** A request rejected with a context-400 that is then successfully recovered refunds its round before the retry, paired 1:1 with a consumed recovery rung, so the round cap is neither weakened nor able to drop a recovered turn unanswered. Related: #4805 — the complementary proactive fix (per-session handoff-cap kill switch that let sessions grow to the provider wall). #4805 prevents reaching the wall; this PR recovers at it. --------- Co-authored-by: npub17jjz49l9jjmhhk7cac63j8yt9z555n9cw8vk7v5jz4vzw4ppld5qgj57cc <f4a42a97e594b77bdbd8ee35191c8b28a94a4cb871d96f32921558275421fb68@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
||
|
Will Pfleger
|
6df7eba24d |
fix(buzz-agent): scope handoff cap per turn, not per session lifetime (#4805)
`BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_HANDOFFS` compared against the session-cumulative `handoff_count` (persisted across prompts). After N handoffs a long-lived session hit the cap permanently: `maybe_handoff()` returned `Skipped` on every subsequent prompt, the 16 MiB byte-truncation fallback never bound before a 1M-token provider wall, and the session wedged on the first 400 with no recovery path. Thufir's session log shows 8 days of cap-forced truncation before the first `context_length_exceeded` 400. The fix replaces the session-level cap comparison with a local `handoff_attempts` counter constructed at the start of `run()` and passed into `maybe_handoff()`. The counter resets on every `session/prompt` turn so `BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_HANDOFFS` caps compaction loops within a single turn while allowing unbounded compactions across a session's lifetime. The session-cumulative `handoff_count` is retained for log context only and is not reset. Steer-driven rounds share the per-turn budget automatically since steers inject into the running `run()` loop, not a new call. - Move `handoff_attempts` increment to before `summarize()` so failed, empty, and cancelled summarize calls each consume one budget slot — the cap cannot be bypassed by a repeatedly-failing summarizer - Upgrade cap-forced `Skipped` from `INFO` to `WARN`; add structured fields for `session_id`, attempt count, projected tokens, and threshold so the cap→wall pairing is attributable per session - Document `max_handoffs` in `config.rs` as a per-`session/prompt`-turn bound - Three new behavioral regression tests: per-turn reset proven across two separate turns; within-turn cap proven via multi-round tool-call turn; failed summarize proven to burn the attempt budget Note: this is the proactive half of the context-window fix. The reactive `context_length_exceeded` 400 recovery path is owned by Sami's branch (`buzz-ctxfix-sami`, Tyler's crew); this PR is intended to land after that one. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
||
|
Tyler
|
8a7eb8d3d7 |
fix(agent): recover from unsupported image input instead of poisoning the turn (#4896)
## Problem
`buzz-dev-mcp` advertises `view_image` to every agent regardless of
whether the session's model accepts images. When a text-only model (e.g.
DeepSeek V4 Flash) takes the bait, the image lands in session history
and every subsequent LLM request 404s with `No endpoints found that
support image input`. The error was classified as `LlmModelNotFound` and
propagated fatally out of the turn loop — history stays poisoned,
buzz-acp retries the batch with exponential backoff, and the session
burns its entire clock doing no work. In a recent trial run, **all 57
trials that called `view_image` on a text-only model died this way; none
recovered.**
## Fix
Capability-gating the advertised tool isn't reliable — there is no
image-capability metadata at the agent layer across providers. Instead,
recover at the turn loop:
- **Typed error**: new `AgentError::UnsupportedImageInput`, classified
narrowly on the exact provider phrase `No endpoints found that support
image input` on both the generic 404 path and OpenRouter's 404 path.
Unknown-model 404s and OpenRouter parameter-routing 404s keep their
existing classifications. No deterministic retry.
- **In-turn recovery**: on this error, `RunCtx::run` strips every image
block from history — keeping the tool result (and therefore
tool-call/result pairing) intact — marks the result `is_error`, appends
actionable model-facing guidance ("The current model does not support
image input. The image was removed from conversation history so this
turn can continue. Use a text-based inspection tool…"), and continues
the same turn. Base64 never replays again.
- **Loop guard**: recovery only fires when at least one image was
removed; if the provider says "image" and history has none, the error
propagates as before.
## Tests
- Unit: phrase classification (typed, not retried; unknown-model 404
unaffected), idempotent image-to-error history mutation preserving call
IDs and text.
- End-to-end (`fake_llm.rs` + `fake_mcp.rs`): tool call → MCP image
result → 404 unsupported-image → same-turn recovery. Captured requests
prove round 2 carried the image, round 3 replays no image, carries the
guidance text, preserves pairing, and ends `end_turn`.
- Loop guard: typed unsupported-image error with **no** image in history
fails after exactly one provider request instead of spinning —
mutation-testing showed deleting the `removed == 0` guard survived the
suite, and `max_rounds` defaults to unlimited in production, so this
branch needed direct coverage.
Verified at `a210305019b33d5f56677b4c82bab79e4ac52d24`: `cargo test -p
buzz-agent` (full package, 381 unit + all integration suites) green;
`clippy --all-targets -D warnings` green; `fmt --check` green; pre-push
hooks (rust-tests, desktop-tauri-checks, branch-skew) green.
**Scope of the classification guarantee**: the classifier runs in the
shared `post()` (which Anthropic and OpenAI paths route through) and in
`openrouter_post()` — i.e., every 404 path in `llm.rs`. It only runs on
404 responses; providers that reject images with a different status
(e.g. a 400) are out of scope for this PR — see the review-comment
discussion for why broadening the phrase list alone would not cover
them.
Authored by Wren, loop-guard test by Sami, reviewed by Eva.
---------
Signed-off-by: Wren <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Sami <f4a42a97e594b77bdbd8ee35191c8b28a94a4cb871d96f32921558275421fb68@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Wren <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Sami <f4a42a97e594b77bdbd8ee35191c8b28a94a4cb871d96f32921558275421fb68@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
||
|
Kalvin C
|
4a2305170e |
fix: reauthenticate databricks model discovery (#4008)
## Summary - preserve Databricks catalog 401 responses as authentication failures and retry discovery exactly once after silently refreshing the rejected bearer - preserve runtime OAuth recovery: when discovery has no usable OAuth credential, `session/new` succeeds with only the trimmed configured model so the first `session/prompt` can run the existing browser PKCE flow - reject a rejected configured `DATABRICKS_TOKEN` with actionable, non-interactive guidance; static credentials cannot recover through PKCE - use the configured-model fallback for non-auth discovery failures without caching failed or fallback catalogs, so later sessions retry discovery - keep known Databricks v2 models only for authenticated empty-catalog responses and mark their provenance - resolve discovery before MCP spawn or session registration, preventing failed discovery from leaking resources or consuming session capacity - permit serialized interactive PKCE only from the explicit saved-agent model picker; passive draft discovery never opens a browser ## Runtime flow 1. OAuth discovery attempts cached credentials and silent refresh without opening a browser. 2. If no usable OAuth bearer exists, `session/new` advertises only the configured model and succeeds. 3. The first `session/prompt` uses `TokenSource::bearer()`, which may launch browser PKCE. 4. A later session retries discovery and caches only the authenticated catalog. ## Regression coverage - rejected-but-locally-fresh OAuth bearer performs one refresh and one catalog retry - OAuth mode with no cached token allows `session/new` and returns exactly the trimmed configured model - the OAuth fallback is not cached; a later authenticated session retries discovery and caches the returned catalog - rejected static tokens still reject `session/new` - failed discovery does not consume the sole session slot or spawn the supplied MCP process - Desktop interactive/passive auth intent, static-token redaction, and authenticated empty-catalog provenance ## Verification - `cargo test -p buzz-agent` - `cargo test --manifest-path desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.toml --lib commands::agent_models` - `cargo clippy --manifest-path desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.toml --all-targets -- -D warnings` - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `git diff --check` - full pre-push hooks ## Review Adversarial review found and drove fixes for session/MCP resource leakage, duplicate concurrent PKCE flows, sensitive error propagation, incorrect 403 reauthentication, missing discovery-level coverage, passive browser launch, and the Desktop file-size ratchet. The final follow-up preserves the existing prompt-time OAuth flow while retaining static-token rejection and pre-allocation discovery ordering. --------- Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
||
|
Atish Patel
|
09c86c56e5 |
fix: report agent usage per provider round, not once per turn (#4545)
## The bug buzz-agent emitted its `usage_update` notification in exactly one place: after `ctx.run()` returned. Until that moment a turn's token counters lived only in the prompt task's stack frame. **A turn killed mid-flight reported nothing at all** — the provider had already billed every round it completed, and no consumer ever saw any of it. That is not a corner case for anything that ends a turn on a clock. It is the normal case for a long-horizon benchmark run that relaunches its agent between phases. ## How big Measured against a provider's own billing ledger over one run's window: | | provider ledger | what we recorded | |---|---|---| | the relaunched lead seat | $485 / 348M tok | $98.99 / 90.3M tok | | the two seats that were not relaunched | $29.90 / 856M | $25.81 / 765M — reconciles | 97% of that run's usage rows came back all zeros, against 1–4% for comparable runs that never relaunch. In one 450-phase trial exactly 7 phases recorded any usage — and each of those carries 177k–437k input tokens, a whole session's worth landing in the one phase that happened to end gracefully. Worth being precise about what was *not* wrong, since both were plausible and both were checked: - **Not pricing.** The rates were verified against the provider's endpoints API and match what we charge. - **Not a truncation bug.** The usage files were intact and internally consistent. The tokens were never captured in the first place. ## The fix The run loop now emits a session-cumulative `usage_update` after every usage-bearing provider response, so an interrupted turn has reported everything but its single in-flight request. - **Emitting more than once per turn is already part of the contract.** buzz-acp's `UsageTracker` advances its committed baseline only at publish time, and goose behaves the same way — which is why the tracker was written to tolerate it. - **The turn-start session baseline is snapshotted into `RunCtx`** so the mid-turn figure stays *session*-cumulative. A turn-local number would be discarded by a high-water-mark consumer and lose the turn entirely; there is a test for exactly that. - **Snapshot by value, not a session handle.** The loop reports once per round, and taking the sessions lock on each would serialise concurrent sessions behind one another's provider round-trips. Nothing else advances those counters while the turn holds `busy`, so it cannot go stale. - **One shared `wire::usage_update_payload`** for both call sites, so the mid-turn and end-of-turn shapes cannot drift. A drift there would present as tokens silently vanishing, which is the failure this reporting exists to prevent. ## Why not a SIGTERM handler That was the obvious shape and it does not work. At signal time the counters are not sitting anywhere a handler could reach — they are in the turn's stack frame, and the value the handler would need has not been folded into the session yet. Making usage durable *during* the turn is what actually fixes it; once it is, a handler adds nothing beyond the in-flight request, whose cost is unknown until its response lands. ## Tests - `usage_is_reported_after_each_round_not_only_at_turn_end` — two rounds; asserts the **first** notification carries round 1's counts alone, proving it went out before round 2 returned. - `mid_turn_usage_includes_earlier_turns` — a mid-turn report must be session-cumulative, not turn-local. buzz-agent 18/18 on the `fake_llm` suite, 382 unit. `cargo fmt` / `clippy` / `cargo check --workspace --all-targets` clean. ## Scope Agent-side only, against `main`. The matching harness change — settling usage on the timeout path, which was skipped on the reasoning that an incomplete turn has nothing to flush — is **#4553**, against the benchmark branch, since that harness does not exist on `main`. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: Atish Patel <atish@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Code <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
Tyler
|
081f805d5e |
feat(agent): optional reply guard reminds a silent turn to publish (#3763)
## Why
A Buzz agent's assistant text and reasoning are never shown to anyone —
only what it posts through the CLI. A turn that runs fifteen tool calls
and never publishes is a silent failure: the requester waits on a result
that was produced and thrown away.
This adds an optional reminder at the end-of-turn gate, off by default.
Tyler asked for it in buzz-mesh; plan iterated to **9.5/10 with @Wren**
(Minimalness 9.7, Elegance 9.5, Correctness 9.3).
## What
`BUZZ_AGENT_REQUIRE_REPLY=1` (default off, per-agent opt-in). A turn
about to end with no recognized attempt to post gets a reminder and is
rerolled. **At most two, then the turn ends regardless** — the guard
catches accidental omission, it does not compel speech. The reminder
text explicitly licenses silence so it cannot fight the base prompt's
"silence is usually correct."
**This is not a new MCP hook.** `RunCtx::run` *is* the turn, so the two
per-turn locals need no plumbing, and every tool call already passes
through it with arguments visible. The objection is appended at the
existing `_Stop` gate and rides `push_hook_outputs_as_tool_results`, so
the model receives it as a lower-trust tool result with `{hook, server,
text}` attribution. No new trust path, no new lifecycle event, no
dev-mcp or CLI protocol change.
Earlier revisions of this plan needed four crates (a `_UserPromptSubmit`
hook, a marker file, a `buzz-cli` change, dev-mcp state). Tyler pointed
out the agent already knows both facts; that deleted all of it. Net
runtime change is ~35 lines in `agent.rs` + ~4 in `config.rs`.
### Recognition contract
A registered non-hook tool whose qualified name ends in `__shell`, whose
`command` argument contains `messages send` or `reactions add`.
- **The `__` separator is exact, not approximate.** Given `has()` +
`!is_hook()`, `ends_with("__shell")` is *provably equivalent* to a bare
name of `shell`: registration forbids `__` in server and bare names
(`mcp.rs:227,268`) and qnames are `{server}__{bare}`, so a trailing
`__shell` could only straddle the separator if the bare name began with
`_` — which `is_hook` excludes. Without the separator, `powershell` and
`noshell` would match.
- **Reads the structured `command` field**, not serialized arguments, so
a `description` that quotes a send cannot disarm the guard, and a
non-string `command` is rejected rather than coerced.
- **Detects an attempt, not a successful publish.** A failed send
already returns non-zero exit and error JSON — louder than this
reminder. The variable is named `buzz_reply_call_seen` so the code can't
pretend otherwise.
- **Checked after the per-turn tool-call cap**, since a discarded call
never ran.
- `messages send` also covers `messages send-diff`. Reactions count
because the base prompt directs agents to react rather than post a bare
acknowledgement.
**Known limits, both deliberate and documented:** a command assembled at
runtime (`$CMD`) or hidden in a wrapper script is missed; text that
merely quotes a send (`echo "buzz messages send"`) matches. Missing a
real post is the expensive direction and substring matching is the
forgiving one there. Neither edge is pinned by a test, so the matcher
stays free to improve.
### Budget
Reminders share `BUZZ_AGENT_STOP_MAX_REJECTIONS`, the existing outer cap
on every end-turn objection. Default 3 fits both; at 1 only one fits; at
0 the guard is off with the hooks. A round carrying both a hook
objection and a reminder costs one rejection and delivers both texts. An
independent budget would either violate that bound or need a second
arbitration rule.
## Prior art
- **#3467** (closed) built the same detector one layer up in `buzz-acp`
for a different remedy. None of its symbols are on main — this borrows
its permission to be coarse, but reads structured data that ACP didn't
have.
- **#3648** (open) detects turns with *no output at all*; a turn with
fifteen tool calls and no post counts as output there, so it does not
cover this case.
- **#3741** (merged) is mesh-only.
## Testing
**14 new tests.** 4 unit tests on the matcher; 10 integration tests
through the ACP wire harness: off by default, `=0` still off, opted-in
silent → exactly 2 reminders then `end_turn`, registered `fake__shell`
send → 0 reminders, hallucinated `fake__shell` → still reminded, publish
call truncated past the 64-call cap → still reminded, budget 1 → 1
reminder, budget 0 → off, combined `_Stop` hook objection + reminder →
one round both texts and after 2 reminders the hook objection continues
alone, unparseable `=true` → startup error naming the key.
**10 mutation checks, each breaking a specific named test** — neutralize
the nag cap, stop sharing the budget, neutralize `buzz_reply_call_seen`,
drop `has`/`is_hook`, ignore the flag, drop the `__`, drop `reactions
add`, read serialized args, move detection before truncation.
`tests/bin/fake_mcp.rs` gains `FAKE_MCP_SHELL_TOOL=1`: it previously
exposed no tool with a bare name of `shell`, so the satisfied-guard path
was untestable.
Full `cargo test -p buzz-agent` green at 9e0ae1f04; clippy `-D warnings`
and `cargo fmt --check` clean.
**Unrelated flake found:**
`cancelled_turn_with_usage_emits_notification_before_response`
(`tests/fake_llm.rs`) is timing-sensitive. Under 10 loaded cores it
fails **2/20 on this branch and 1/20 at unmodified
`origin/main@02be413b8`** — pre-existing, not caused by this change
(which is inert without the env var). Flagging so it isn't misattributed
to the next PR that's open when CI hits it.
## Docs
`crates/buzz-agent/README.md` is the primary home (env var, recognition
contract, limits, budget interaction). `docs/MCP_DRIVEN_HOOKS.md` gets a
short cross-reference explaining this is *not* a hook — otherwise
readers hunt for a `_ReplyGuard` tool that doesn't exist.
---------
Signed-off-by: tlongwell-block <109685178+tlongwell-block@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: npub1mprnacetjua2xx3p5eddmhxyk6wv929ymm5py8kd2xfxurxahspqqlgyta <d8473ee32b973aa31a21a65adddcc4b69cc2a8a4dee8121ecd51926e0cddbc02@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Dawn (sprout agent) <c6237ef84fa537c78dcee78efd2d4e59f728859c7f194da42ac51ededfa0be05@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
Co-authored-by: npub1mprnacetjua2xx3p5eddmhxyk6wv929ymm5py8kd2xfxurxahspqqlgyta <d8473ee32b973aa31a21a65adddcc4b69cc2a8a4dee8121ecd51926e0cddbc02@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
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|
Will Pfleger
|
f95fdc1a10 |
feat(agent,acp): wire provider total_tokens through NIP-AM publish chain (#3593)
## What Wires genuine provider-reported `total_tokens` through the full buzz-agent → buzz-acp publish chain so kind-44200 events carry real per-turn and cumulative totals for OpenAI-backed models, while preserving all existing behaviour for Anthropic and external harnesses (goose, claude-code). ## Why Live prod data showed 0 of 1,934 archived reports carry `totalTokens`. Both hardcoded `total_tokens: None` in `pool.rs` and the absent field in `buzz-agent`'s parser are root causes. This is the backend half of a two-track fix; the display-fallback half lands in [#2035](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/2035). ## Changes **`crates/buzz-agent/src/types.rs`** - Added `total_tokens: Option<u64>` to `LlmResponse` with an explicit doc comment that NIP-AM forbids deriving it. - Added `TurnTotalState` enum (`Unseen | Exact(u64) | Unknown`) with `fold()` and `exact_value()` — the tri-state accumulator that distinguishes not-yet-observed from permanently poisoned. **`crates/buzz-agent/src/llm.rs`** - `parse_responses` and `parse_openai`: read `usage.total_tokens` from OpenAI Chat Completions (including Databricks routes) and the Responses API via `sum_usage`. - Anthropic: explicit `total_tokens: None` — no genuine total available; NIP-AM forbids summing categories. **`crates/buzz-agent/src/agent.rs`** - Added `turn_total_state: &'a mut TurnTotalState` to `RunCtx`. - Fold `response.total_tokens` into the accumulator after each usage-bearing response; non-usage-bearing responses (keepalive/stream frames) do not poison. **`crates/buzz-agent/src/lib.rs`** - Added `accumulated_total_state: TurnTotalState` to `Session` (default `Unseen`). - Per-turn state passed to `RunCtx`, folded into session cumulative after each turn. - Emits `accumulatedTotalTokens` in `usage_update` only when cumulative is `Exact(n)`. **`crates/buzz-acp/src/usage.rs`** - Added `accumulated_total_tokens: Option<u64>` (serde default) to `UsageUpdatePayload` — optional for goose compat. - Added `last_total: Option<u64>` to `SessionState`. - Added `turn_total_tokens` and `cumulative_total_tokens` to `TurnUsage` (field-local — never affect `delta_reliable`). - Derive turn-total delta only when prev and current are both `Some` and monotonic; absence, decrease, or no baseline leaves only the total delta null without touching input/output reliability. **`crates/buzz-acp/src/pool.rs`** - Replaced both hardcoded `total_tokens: None` in `publish_agent_turn_metric` with `usage.turn_total_tokens` and `usage.cumulative_total_tokens`. ## Tests 20 new tests across the four touched files: | File | Tests | |------|-------| | `types.rs` | `TurnTotalState` fold, accumulation, exact_value, default (7 tests) | | `llm.rs` | Chat present/absent, Responses present/absent, Anthropic always-None (5 tests) | | `usage.rs` | First turn no baseline, second-turn delta, cumulative decrease (field-local), current absent, goose-shaped deserialization, baseline absent (6 tests) | | `pool.rs` | Exact turn+cumulative mapping, null totals never derived (2 tests) | `cargo test -p buzz-acp -p buzz-agent` — all passing, 0 failures. ## Scope Boundary: `crates/buzz-agent/**` + `crates/buzz-acp/**` only. Desktop unchanged. `costUsd` explicitly out of scope. Related: [#2035](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/2035) --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1g8493u0xfsjrvflg4n08ezd7vec99mnwzlv0qgwpr9d7gvjwhuzqx59rhw <41ea58f1e64c243627e8acde7c89be667052ee6e17d8f021c1195be4324ebf04@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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|
thomaspblock
|
7f769b2439 |
fix(desktop): align inbox layout and draft details (#2143)
Approved |
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|
Tyler
|
ca8324d2cf |
Log handoff token counts (#1954)
Signed-off-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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|
Will Pfleger
|
71265ca361 |
feat(nips,relay,acp): NIP-AM durable encrypted agent turn metrics (kind 44200) (#1441)
Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1fgdl5qqnh3k3f2xkqrvt7cujalhm623x4s7fdjdj5yrtp5fzjl9qrjpucw <4a1bfa0013bc6d14a8d600d8bf6392efefbd2a26ac3c96c9b2a106b0d12297ca@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Wes
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4a09510429 |
fix(agent): make stop-hook rejection budget per-prompt, fix stale hook docs (#1503)
Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Brain <21994759fc7a6fa6b965551d35cfd7897d262f2495467f2d78694ddcfa6a5c7e@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Wes
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1c297d2f26 |
fix(agent): honor stop hook retry budget (#1501)
Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Pinky <44b8e82baa6e0e254e0208d68f335c283c94e7b78dd1fa10d5a49d3f13dd0435@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Will Pfleger
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3e282a2418 |
feat(buzz-agent): config parity — thinking effort, model switching, normalized token limits (#1470)
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Will Pfleger
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9f2a11b338 |
feat(buzz-agent): emit agent_thought_chunk for reasoning content (#1436)
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Kalvin C
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15a73aa27f | feat(buzz-agent): add databricks_v2 provider for AI Gateway v2 (#1311) | ||
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Tyler
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e567491a19 |
feat(buzz-acp): steering as the default mid-turn mention delivery (#1160)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub17jjz49l9jjmhhk7cac63j8yt9z555n9cw8vk7v5jz4vzw4ppld5qgj57cc <f4a42a97e594b77bdbd8ee35191c8b28a94a4cb871d96f32921558275421fb68@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1fgdl5qqnh3k3f2xkqrvt7cujalhm623x4s7fdjdj5yrtp5fzjl9qrjpucw <4a1bfa0013bc6d14a8d600d8bf6392efefbd2a26ac3c96c9b2a106b0d12297ca@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Will Pfleger
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8717ddf2eb |
fix(buzz-agent): follow symlinks when discovering skill directories (#1295)
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1fgdl5qqnh3k3f2xkqrvt7cujalhm623x4s7fdjdj5yrtp5fzjl9qrjpucw <4a1bfa0013bc6d14a8d600d8bf6392efefbd2a26ac3c96c9b2a106b0d12297ca@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Will Pfleger
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25396c06d6 |
feat(buzz-agent): lazy skill loading via load_skill tool (#1283)
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Tyler
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73cc31cc52 |
chore: remove LLM-slop comments across the codebase (#1277)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Max <d8473ee32b973aa31a21a65adddcc4b69cc2a8a4dee8121ecd51926e0cddbc02@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Mari <95cae996907d7cab9f5dbf43c0f53edeac6ab0b032a6feae4abfd784e467b3f5@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Quinn <96f056ad5f2305c8ddf637dc65d048aa4c12d7daeb8867690e34fca46b0ef64c@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Sami <f4a42a97e594b77bdbd8ee35191c8b28a94a4cb871d96f32921558275421fb68@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Perci <5a968df9a7494b4e019b9ecf739e088ba61097b4312124e9a88ae5b42e3f5f3e@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> |
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tlongwell-block
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fa1cade3ba |
handoff: pass full session history to summarizer (#1033)
Signed-off-by: npub1jh9wn95s0472h86ahapupaf7m6kx4v9sx2n0atj2hltcfer8k06s5n3pyf <95cae996907d7cab9f5dbf43c0f53edeac6ab0b032a6feae4abfd784e467b3f5@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1jh9wn95s0472h86ahapupaf7m6kx4v9sx2n0atj2hltcfer8k06s5n3pyf <95cae996907d7cab9f5dbf43c0f53edeac6ab0b032a6feae4abfd784e467b3f5@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Will Pfleger
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5a8cc79c6a |
feat(auth): force token refresh on rejected token (401/403), never the browser (#1015)
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Will Pfleger
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f085882454 |
feat(acp): implement systemPrompt with protocol version gating (#981)
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub16v54tttfqacx9ycvc3k0ut0npj564ahcuajzy6qjvh57ntmsf4uq4806j2 <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1fgdl5qqnh3k3f2xkqrvt7cujalhm623x4s7fdjdj5yrtp5fzjl9qrjpucw <4a1bfa0013bc6d14a8d600d8bf6392efefbd2a26ac3c96c9b2a106b0d12297ca@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Will Pfleger
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d99ad131f1 |
refactor: rename sprout backend to buzz (#958)
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger96@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1fgdl5qqnh3k3f2xkqrvt7cujalhm623x4s7fdjdj5yrtp5fzjl9qrjpucw <4a1bfa0013bc6d14a8d600d8bf6392efefbd2a26ac3c96c9b2a106b0d12297ca@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub16v54tttfqacx9ycvc3k0ut0npj564ahcuajzy6qjvh57ntmsf4uq4806j2 <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger96@gmail.com> |
