Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Taylor Ho
01c80aa9b3 fix(desktop): save key backups to authorized path (#4022)
**Category:** fix
**User Impact:** Users can save password-protected identity backups
directly to protected macOS folders such as Downloads.

**Problem:** Signed macOS builds could not save a portable `.ncryptsec`
backup to Downloads because the atomic writer created an unauthorized
sibling temporary file. This surfaced as an “Operation not permitted”
error after the user completed backup creation.

**Solution:** Portable exports now write only to the exact path
authorized by the native Save panel, sync and verify the saved bytes,
and refuse to truncate an existing backup. Buzz’s app-managed backup
retains its atomic writer and durability guarantees.

<details>
<summary>File changes</summary>

**desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/export_util.rs**
Clarifies that secret exports use a dedicated writer compatible with
native Save-panel authorization.

**desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/identity.rs**
Routes portable NIP-49 exports through the Save-panel-compatible writer
while preserving canonical app state.

**desktop/src-tauri/src/key_backup.rs**
Adds an exclusive-create portable writer with owner-only permissions,
disk sync, byte verification, and cleanup on failure. Keeps the existing
atomic writer for app-managed backups.

**desktop/src-tauri/src/key_backup_tests.rs**
Covers portable export permissions, absence of sibling files, and
preservation of existing backups.

</details>

## Reproduction steps

1. Install a signed macOS build containing this change.
2. Open **Settings → Profile → Private key → Create backup** and
complete backup creation.
3. Save a fresh `identity.ncryptsec` file into `~/Downloads` and confirm
Buzz reports success.
4. Open and verify the saved backup with its password.
5. Repeat the save using an existing filename and confirm Buzz preserves
the existing file and asks for a new filename.

## Verification

- Full desktop Tauri suite: 2,049 passed, 14 ignored
- Diagnostic suite: 3 passed
- Focused backup coverage: 30 passed
- Tauri clippy (`--all-targets -D warnings`), Rust formatting, and `git
diff --check`: passed
- Push hooks: org safety, branch skew, and desktop Tauri checks passed

Signed-production Downloads smoke remains required after merge because
the signing workflow is restricted to `main`.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: npub1223z34hd7vtwc6qj4s7flsxkj644nlre2nthu7lrrmkumhu3xddsrx9r6w <52a228d6edf316ec6812ac3c9fc0d696ab59fc7954d77e7be31eedcddf91335b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-03 09:29:40 -07:00
Tyler
468647a51f feat(desktop): locally stored NIP-49 encrypted key backup (#2937)
## Summary

Adds a locally stored **NIP-49 encrypted key backup** (`ncryptsec`) to
the desktop app, per the plan reviewed in buzz-development (Rev 3,
approved 9/10 by Wren; implementation also reviewed and approved 9/10).

**Two-artifact design — canonical bytes originate entirely in Rust:**
- `create_ncryptsec_backup` runs under the `identity_mutation` lock:
encrypt → decrypt-verify against the live pubkey → atomic `0o600` write
to `{app_data_dir}/identity.ncryptsec` → reread/byte-compare → return
the exact persisted bytes. The frontend never re-derives or re-encrypts.
- `save_ncryptsec_copy` writes a portable copy via the save dialog
(parse-gated, secret-file semantics) and never mutates canonical state.
- `generate_backup_passphrase`: 6 words from the EFF short wordlist via
`OsRng` (custom passphrases min 12 chars).
- Import accepts `ncryptsec1` with optional password; the raw-`nsec`
path is untouched. Different-pubkey import and sign-out wipe the
app-managed backup (post-commit, best-effort — a failed import can never
destroy the still-live identity's backup; regression-tested).

**Never-relay guarantee (egress guard + tripwires):**
- `egress_guard.rs` fail-closed at all 8 `/events` submission boundaries
(relay submit funnel, 3× `relay.rs`, huddle STT, both engram submitters,
native WS choke point), rejecting `ncryptsec1`/`NCRYPTSEC1` in text and
binary frames. Scope is deliberately ncryptsec-only: pairing
intentionally carries raw nsec inside its encrypted session.
- Site-granular `/events` inventory tripwire: per-file (`/events` count,
guard-call count) pairs; unlisted files expect zero. Mutation-style
tests prove a ninth site in an existing file, a removed guard, and a new
unlisted file all fail the scan.
- ncryptsec source-allowlist scans in **both** trees (Rust + TS).

**Frontend:** onboarding `BackupStep` is encrypted-by-default — the
default path never invokes `get_nsec` (e2e asserts the command log).
Raw-nsec export stays behind an explicit click with prior semantics.
Shared `EncryptedBackupCreator` powers onboarding + a new settings row;
the import form auto-switches to encrypted mode on `ncryptsec1` paste
(case-insensitive HRP).

**Open product call for @tlongwell-block:** onboarding default is
*encrypted* in this PR; flipping to raw-default is a small change either
way (documented in the plan).

Review history: plan Rev 3 and the implementation were both iterated
with Wren to 9/10 (two blockers from round 1 — import ordering,
inventory granularity — plus an uppercase-bech32 hardening gap, all
fixed in `dde37183e`). Thread: buzz-development.

### Related issue

Follow-up to the direction explored in #385 (NIP-PB, closed) — this
ships local NIP-49 (the standard) instead of a new NIP. No open
duplicate found.

### Testing

All at exactly `dde37183e` (same shell, HEAD verified):

- `cargo test` — 1680 passed / 0 failed / 14 ignored (includes a
deliberate ~70s log_n-18 NIP-49 round trip, spec vector, wrong-password,
NFKC, uppercase-vector decrypt, injection test per egress boundary,
inventory mutation tests, import-ordering regression tests)
- `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` — clean; `cargo fmt
--check` — clean
- `pnpm typecheck` — clean; JS unit suite 3529/3529; biome (repo-pinned
2.4.16) clean
- Playwright `onboarding-backup` / `onboarding` /
`onboarding-agent-defaults` / `profile-nsec-reveal` — 86 passed, 1 known
avatar-reservation flake (passed on rerun; untouched by this diff).
`passThroughBackupStep` now exercises the encrypted default, so every
downstream onboarding spec covers the new path.
- Note: browser e2e fakes the crypto via the mock bridge (fixed
spec-vector blob); decryption correctness is proven in the Rust tests.

## Latest onboarding integration

The current head adds an additive `IdentityInfo.storage` field
(`ephemeral`, `system-keyring`, `local-file`, or `environment`) so
onboarding can accurately explain where the active identity is
protected. It surfaces storage metadata only—never key material—and
leaves the existing lost/keyring-locked recovery behavior intact.

---------

Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: npub1223z34hd7vtwc6qj4s7flsxkj644nlre2nthu7lrrmkumhu3xddsrx9r6w <52a228d6edf316ec6812ac3c9fc0d696ab59fc7954d77e7be31eedcddf91335b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-07-30 20:58:03 -04:00
Taylor Ho
bd0bff24bf feat(desktop): add password-protected backups in settings (#3701)
**Category:** new-feature
**User Impact:** Users can create, download, and verify a
password-protected backup of their private identity from desktop
Settings.

**Problem:** Buzz does not currently give signed-in users a
Settings-based path to protect or validate their private identity
independently of onboarding. **Solution:** Add a focused backup menu to
the private-key row, keep encryption and verification local in Rust, and
preserve completed encrypted backups briefly so native saves can be
retried without repeating encryption.

<details>
<summary>File changes</summary>

**desktop/src/features/settings/**
Adds the background backup lifecycle, create and test dialogs,
private-key menu integration, password handling, and focused unit
coverage.

**desktop/src/features/onboarding/ui/NsecMaskedDisplay.tsx**
Extends the masked private-key display with reusable overflow-menu
actions used by Settings.

**desktop/src/app/App.tsx**
Mounts the backup provider at app scope so encryption and save work
survive closing Settings or the modal.

**desktop/src/shared/api/tauriIdentity.ts**
Adds typed desktop bindings for local backup creation, save, selection,
and verification.

**desktop/src-tauri/src/key_backup.rs and
desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/identity.rs**
Implements local NIP-49 encryption, password generation, file handling,
and public-identity-only verification results.

**desktop/src-tauri/src/egress_guard.rs and guarded call sites**
Blocks encrypted secret material from relay, websocket, snapshot,
sharing, and huddle egress paths.

**desktop/src-tauri tests and fixtures**
Covers encryption, verification, file behavior, and fail-closed
no-egress protections.

**desktop/src/testing/e2eBridge.ts, desktop/tests/, and
desktop/playwright.config.ts**
Expands the mock native bridge and browser coverage across create,
retry, expiry, and current/different-identity verification states.

**desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.toml, Cargo.lock, and assets**
Adds the local cryptography/password-generation dependencies and
embedded short-word list.

</details>

## Reproduction steps

1. Run the desktop app and open **Settings → Profile → Identity**.
2. Open the private-key overflow menu and choose **Create backup**.
3. Enter or generate a valid password, submit, and confirm progress
continues if the dialog or Settings is closed.
4. Save the resulting `.ncryptsec` file; cancel and retry to confirm the
temporary download remains available.
5. Choose **Test backup**, select the file, enter a wrong password, then
retry with the correct password.
6. Confirm success identifies whether the backup matches the current
identity and displays only the public `npub`.

## Screenshots

| Settings identity | Private-key menu | Create backup |
|---|---|---|
| <img width="1280" height="720" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/981e391b-6829-4081-95ca-ca75a369de71"
/> | <img width="1280" height="720" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7972c68e-7635-47d8-b0ad-9639390d3e6c"
/> | <img width="1280" height="720" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4709c8f7-cf02-46f1-bec9-b3f98fe56fb2"
/> |

| Encrypting | Download available | Test success |
|---|---|---|
| <img width="1280" height="720" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1ac3e934-2b4b-4135-bae6-126c715c8c59"
/> | <img width="1280" height="720" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cb6f07ee-a16f-44a5-b9a0-6b9fe0e4d40d"
/> | <img width="1280" height="720" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ea58b1b1-966c-46aa-8d59-92c9f06a25bd"
/> |

Visual review and additional states: [Buzz
thread](buzz://message?channel=50ca7ef1-201e-4159-9499-40de3964b7c3&id=87eceb5f0f82fd50c32e560de3d35be48e293760f6620718aafdcef289d475fe)

---------

Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: npub1223z34hd7vtwc6qj4s7flsxkj644nlre2nthu7lrrmkumhu3xddsrx9r6w <52a228d6edf316ec6812ac3c9fc0d696ab59fc7954d77e7be31eedcddf91335b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-07-30 11:15:39 -07:00