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codex/plugin-runtime-support
15 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Luke Tornquist
|
cd02b693aa |
refactor(relay): extract NIP-29 membership authorization (#7285)
## Why NIP-29 membership authorization for kinds 9000, 9001, and 9022 was embedded in a large async handler, requiring Postgres and Redis to test and repeating the last-owner rule across five call sites. This addresses [TheSentinel454/buzz#24](https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/24) without adding the broader state/repository abstraction suggested there because HTTP and WebSocket writes already share ingestion. ## What - Extract pure, typed membership authorization decisions while leaving database reads and mutations in `validate_admin_event`. - Preserve existing client-visible errors and independent database last-owner safeguards. - Collapse five last-owner policy restatements into one predicate and share the identical self-departure policy. - Include the relay decision modules in `just test-unit`, so these tests execute in CI. ## Risk Assessment Medium-low. This touches production relay authorization, but intentionally preserves wire behavior and database defense in depth; exhaustive decision tables and relay-backed tests cover the affected paths. ## Simplification This removes repeated policy from the orchestration path and makes the rule set directly testable without introducing a repository trait or second transport path. ## Verification Verified at `15255a090797f85874921120003c645962fefaed`: - `just test-unit` — all 10 package summaries passed. An initial run hit two unrelated timing-sensitive `buzz-acp` failures; the complete retry passed 905/905 in that package. - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` - `just file-size-check` — 10/10 policy tests passed. - `just security-review-check` — 13/13 tests passed. - Push preflight — `push-head-scope`, `branch-skew`, `file-size-check`, `rust-tests`, and `desktop-tauri-checks` passed. - Blox Postgres relay lane — 84/84 at the byte-identical source patch; full live `e2e_relay` behavior matched the clean base (45 pass and the same pre-existing kind:9002 failure on each). Generated with Claude Code --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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|
Will Pfleger
|
c6e3fe7dfa |
feat(workflows): reply in-thread from send_message action (#6178)
The `send_message` workflow action could only post new top-level channel
messages. This adds a `reply_in_thread` option so a `message_posted`
workflow can reply in the triggering message's thread, plus a
`trigger_is_reply` filter variable so a workflow can fire only on
top-level messages.
Every NIP-10 thread-marker reader in the tree now routes through one
shared parser and one collapse rule in `buzz-core`, deleting four
hand-rolled copies that had drifted on id-validity and marker semantics.
## What changed
- **Schema** (`crates/buzz-workflow/src/schema.rs`): new
`reply_in_thread: bool` (serde default `false`) on
`ActionDef::SendMessage`. `validate()` rejects `reply_in_thread: true`
on `schedule`/`webhook` triggers — they carry no message to reply to.
- **Executor** (`crates/buzz-workflow/src/executor.rs`): threads
`reply_to: Option<&str>` (the trigger `message_id`) through
`ActionSink::send_message` when `reply_in_thread` is set; errors clearly
if the trigger has no `message_id`. `resolve_step_templates` carries the
new field. Adds `trigger_is_reply` (boolean) to the eval context.
- **Relay sink** (`crates/buzz-relay/src/workflow_sink.rs`): when
`reply_to` is set, resolves parent/root/depth from the known trigger
event, persists real thread metadata instead of the hardcoded top-level
`depth: 0`, and pushes the live kind:39005 thread-summary overlay after
insert so subscribed desktops update the root's reply badge without
refetching — matching the human ingest path. Emits the same NIP-10
`e`-tag shape as `buzz_sdk::builders::thread_tags`: a single `["e", id,
"", "reply"]` tag for a direct reply (parent == root), and the `root` +
`reply` pair only when nested — so every writer produces one wire shape
per reply kind.
- **Ingest resolver** (`crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/ingest.rs`): new
`resolve_relay_reply_thread_meta` + `ReplyAncestry`. Unlike the
client-facing `resolve_nip10_thread_meta` (which validates
client-supplied tags), this computes root/depth from the known parent
and enforces the same same-channel and depth-limit invariants. When the
parent has no `thread_metadata` row, both resolvers share
`derive_ancestry_from_parent_tags`, which applies
`ThreadMarkers::resolve()`: a marked nested parent remains depth 2,
while a root-only, malformed, or unmarked parent is top-level and starts
its reply thread at itself. Both the client resolver and the
parent-ancestor fallback now read markers via the shared parser instead
of hand-scanning `e`-tags.
- **Shared NIP-10 parser** (`crates/buzz-core/src/nip10.rs`):
`parse_thread_markers` reads an event's `root`/`reply` markers, honoring
a marker only when its event id is exactly 64 ASCII-hex characters.
`ThreadMarkers::resolve()` is the single definition of the (root, reply)
→ (root_id, parent_id) collapse: `root`+`reply` as-is, `reply`-only →
`(reply, reply)`, a lone `root` or neither → top-level. A slice-based
`parse_thread_markers_from_parts` entry point serves consumers holding
raw JSON tag arrays. Relay ingest, the workflow `trigger_is_reply`
predicate, ACP anchoring, and the CLI reply resolver all call these, so
they cannot drift on marker, id-validity, or collapse semantics.
- **ACP** (`crates/buzz-acp/src/queue.rs`): `parse_thread_tags`
delegates marker parsing and collapse to `buzz_core::nip10`, keeping
only its local `p`-tag mention collection. This fixes a parity gap with
ingest: a malformed non-64-hex marker id is no longer counted as a
thread link, and a lone `root` marker is now top-level rather than being
treated as root == parent.
- **CLI** (`crates/buzz-cli/src/commands/messages.rs`):
`find_root_from_tags` routes its JSON tags through the shared slice
parser and collapse rule. CLI replies to root-only, malformed, or
unmarked parents now correctly start at that immediate parent;
reply-only and root+reply parent ancestry remain intact.
- **Trigger context** (`crates/buzz-workflow/src/lib.rs`):
`build_trigger_context` derives `is_reply` solely from a valid NIP-10
`reply` marker (no DB hit). A lone `root` marker is top-level to ingest,
so it does not count; neither does a `reply` marker whose event id is
malformed, nor a bare/unmarked `e`-tag (mentions, quotes).
- **Desktop** (`workflowFormTypes.ts`, `WorkflowStepCard.tsx`):
`replyInThread` form field with YAML round-trip, and a "Reply to
triggering message in thread" checkbox shown only for message-based
triggers. Switching to `schedule` or `webhook` clears the option on
every step before serialization, so a value hidden behind an action
change cannot resurrect when the action is switched back. The form
parser also requires `reply_in_thread` to be a boolean and refuses
`reply_in_thread: true` under an ineligible trigger, falling back to
YAML mode rather than silently normalizing a backend-invalid definition.
## Usage
```yaml
trigger:
on: message_posted
filter: trigger_is_reply == false
steps:
- id: auto_reply
action: send_message
text: "pre-written reply text"
reply_in_thread: true
```
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
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Taylor Ho
|
f7a01bda7b |
fix(workflows): preserve multi-channel listing semantics (#6009)
**Category:** fix **User Impact:** Workflow listings reliably include every accessible channel, including for users with more than 128 memberships and when connected to older relays. **Problem:** Multi-value `#h` filters could lose live delivery, apply channel scoping after SQL limits, mishandle partial authorization or revocation, and permit unbounded membership work. Desktop also submitted every channel in one request, exceeding the relay's new 128-value safety bound. **Solution:** Preserve NIP-01 OR semantics across relay query, count, and live-subscription paths while enforcing authorization and bounded explicit-channel work before database or Redis operations. Desktop keeps the older-relay-compatible one-channel-per-filter shape, sends filters in bounded batches, combines responses, and deduplicates signed events by event ID. <details> <summary>File changes</summary> **crates/buzz-db/src/event.rs** Distinguishes authorization channel scopes from explicit `#h` scopes in list and count SQL so requested channels are applied before limits without implicitly including global rows. **crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/req.rs** Shares explicit-channel scope extraction and limits, preserves valid OR siblings when malformed branches cannot match, repairs request-local membership misses, and registers authorized live subscriptions per channel. **crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/count.rs** Applies the same bounded explicit-channel authorization to COUNT and preserves channel scope when a multi-channel request narrows to one authorized channel. **crates/buzz-relay/src/api/bridge.rs** Brings HTTP query and count behavior in line with WebSocket semantics before SQL execution and rejects over-limit explicit-channel requests before membership I/O. **crates/buzz-relay/src/subscription.rs** Indexes multi-channel subscriptions by every authorized channel and shrinks, rather than destroys, their scope when one channel is revoked. **crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/side_effects.rs** Releases only revoked channel topics and sends terminal closure only when no authorized channel remains. **crates/buzz-test-client/tests/e2e_relay.rs** Adds ignored relay integration coverage for multi-channel delivery and valid historical/live behavior with malformed or empty OR siblings. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/workflows.rs** Builds one single-channel filter per membership, submits at most 128 per relay request, combines batches, and deduplicates by immutable signed event ID. **desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/workflows_tests.rs** Covers filter compatibility, malformed input, 129-channel batching, and cross-batch event-ID deduplication. </details> ## Reproduction steps 1. Join multiple channels containing workflows, open **Workflows**, and confirm workflows from every accessible channel appear. 2. Repeat with more than 128 memberships and confirm the listing remains complete rather than failing the relay request. 3. Send a multi-value `#h` query/count and confirm only requested authorized channels affect SQL limits and counts. 4. Subscribe to channels A and B, revoke A, and confirm B continues delivering live events. 5. Subscribe with a valid channel branch plus a malformed or empty `#h` sibling and confirm valid history, EOSE, and post-EOSE live delivery still occur. ## Validation At pushed head `c419a923f05e483ab26c006a0b3a80cfb3c73844`: - Relay request tests: 53 passed. - Desktop full Rust unit suite: 2,468 passed, 17 ignored. - Relay E2E target compiled with `--no-run`. - Strict relay clippy passed. - Desktop Tauri clippy/check passed. - Pre-push Rust tests and Desktop Tauri checks passed. - Rust formatting and `git diff --check` passed. --------- Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com> |
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Kalvin C
|
8a2c9af2db |
feat(deletion): add durable whole-community deletion (#4425)
## Summary Adds a durable, operator-controlled V1 for deleting an entire Buzz community without deleting another tenant's data. The workflow is exposed through `buzz-admin deletions`: - `sweep` records independent fleet storage-taxonomy observations - `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, and `approve` manage a deletion request - `unblock` resumes a fail-closed request after an operator records remediation identity and reason - `run` and `drain` execute bounded work Requests advance through a PostgreSQL-backed state machine and stop at `retention_pending` after logical deletion has been independently verified across PostgreSQL, object storage, and Redis. This PR ships the engine and CLI, not a continuously running worker or Kubernetes packaging. For V1, a cluster/VM administrator invokes `/usr/local/bin/buzz-admin` from the existing relay image, for example with `kubectl exec` or an equivalent container/VM exec path. ## What whole-community V1 removes For the target community, V1 removes: - rows from the allowlisted community-scoped PostgreSQL catalog, including members, profiles, authored events and bodies, DMs, reactions, mentions, memberships, tokens, workflows, moderation, audit, feedback, and rate-limit state - media sidecars and upload-attribution records under `_meta/<community>/` and `_uploads/<community>/` - Git repository pointers under `repos/<community>/` - Redis keys under `buzz:<community>:*` The community row survives as a permanent tombstone, and deletion control-plane records remain as evidence of the request, approval, execution, and result. ## Safety model Deletion is not a broad `DELETE CASCADE` followed by optimistic cleanup. The destructive boundaries are durable and fail closed. ### 1. Inventory and approval - `submit` resolves the target and freezes the schema plus summary-only storage inventory. - Approval is bound to the exact request, community, and frozen inventory digest. - Unsupported manifest versions, malformed keys inside the target's owned prefixes, live scoped-table/write-fence coverage drift, frozen-inventory mismatch, and approval mismatch block execution rather than guessing. Migration and catalog revision numbers are not authorization gates; the executor validates the live safety shape instead. - Storage inventory is server-side prefix scoped to exactly: - `_meta/<community>/` - `_uploads/<community>/` - `repos/<community>/` - The deletion path never lists the whole shared bucket and has no arbitrary per-community object cap. Its listing work is proportional to the target community's bindings, not total fleet storage. - Fleet-wide taxonomy sweeps remain independent observability. They report unknown writer shapes but do not gate deletion submission, fencing, or destructive progress. Maintainers must add deletion taxonomy coverage whenever a new community-owned object-key class is introduced; writer-coverage tests bind the current media and Git writers to that contract. ### 2. Quiesce, fence, and destructive freeze - Writes continue through submission, inventory, and approval. They stop when execution moves the target into `quiescing` and then establishes the durable fence. - Already-admitted external effects finish under heartbeated serving-write leases; the exact admitted lease may renew while the community is quiescing, but new lease acquisition is rejected. The executor drains admitted leases before destructive work. - Invite minting after quiescing begins fails as typed `AccessDenied` (HTTP 503 at the relay boundary) before an invite can be persisted. - Database triggers enforce the community write fence across the complete catalog of community-scoped tables. Startup/readiness and destructive execution validate that catalog so a newly added but unfenced table cannot silently escape. - **Named isolation assumption — fresh write snapshot.** Every writer transaction that can reach a community-fenced relation must use PostgreSQL `READ COMMITTED`; each guarded write therefore observes a statement snapshot no older than acquisition of the community deletion lock. `REPEATABLE READ` and `SERIALIZABLE` can retain a pre-fence snapshot and are unsupported for writers. The writer pool refuses non-`READ COMMITTED` sessions at connection setup, and both SQL fence functions reject an explicit per-transaction isolation override with SQLSTATE `25000`. Configuration-delivered bad isolation can surface through SQLx as a pool-acquire timeout because every `after_connect` attempt is rejected; the precise `community writes require READ COMMITTED isolation` reason remains observable when the SQL guard is reached. Read-only replica transactions are outside this assumption. - Holding the shared advisory lock until the guarded write executes is a separate liveness condition: under `READ COMMITTED`, releasing it early does not permit resurrection because the trigger rechecks the fence, but it can turn a fleet sweep into a statement-wide SQLSTATE `55000` abort. - After the fence closes writers, storage is re-enumerated into chunked side-table rows. Per-prefix counts and digests bind those concrete keys to the destructive manifest. - Manifest chunk insertion, update, and deletion are protected after freeze. This closes the race where an unbound key could otherwise appear after the manifest was committed. ### 3. Checkpointed destruction - Target-owned object bindings are deleted from the frozen destructive manifest in bounded batches with durable progress. - The concrete key list lives in chunked side-table rows rather than one request-row JSON value. It supports large communities, resumable execution, and terminal cleanup. - Missing objects are accepted as idempotent crash-window outcomes; malformed ownership, changed evidence, and unexplained target-prefix drift fail closed. - PostgreSQL purging remains scoped by `community_id`, including the guarded NIP-RS hard-delete path discovered with real Desktop kind `30078` read-state data. - Redis cleanup explicitly scans and `UNLINK`s only `buzz:<community_id>:*`. Natural expiry is insufficient because some keys, including tunnel generation counters used as fencing state, are deliberately persistent. ### 4. Independent verification - PostgreSQL logical absence is checked after purge. - The three target-owned storage prefixes are freshly inventoried again and must be empty. - Redis requires two complete empty namespace scans. - Only after all three stores pass does the request advance through `logically_verified` to `retention_pending`. ## What V1 deliberately does not erase ### Shared content-addressed storage Per-community deletion removes bindings, metadata, attribution records, and Git pointers. It does **not** physically delete fleet-shared CAS bytes that another community may still reference: - media blobs and thumbnails - Git manifests, packs, and indexes (`manifests/`, `packs/`, and `idx/`) Safe reclamation requires a separate fleet-wide reachability and retention GC. Unknown keys elsewhere in the shared bucket do not block one community's deletion; malformed or unrecognized keys inside that community's three owned prefixes still fail closed. ### External retained copies The online logical-deletion proof does not erase object versions/replicas, database backups/WAL, CDN copies, provider retention copies, or observability exports. Those require their own retention and purge controls. ### Member-only erasure This PR erases a whole community. It does not implement the different operation "erase one npub while preserving the community." Removing membership or accepting NIP-09 is not member erasure. A member-only workflow would need to find and selectively remove or redact authored event content and pubkeys, profile data, DMs, reactions, mentions, memberships/roles, tokens, workflows/subscriptions, upload attribution, moderation/audit history, repository attribution, and identity embedded in tags or JSON. It would also need explicit rules for ownership transfer, surviving replies and thread metadata, audit-chain integrity, immutable Git history, and shared-CAS reachability. That requires a pubkey-level fence and selective graph rewrite; it is a separate deletion product, not a safe extension of this whole-tenant worker. ## In scope - migration `0029_community_deletion.sql`: requests, approvals, leases, manifest chunks, checkpoints, tombstones, and the universal write-fence catalog - durable executor leases, generations, heartbeats, retry/block state, and resumable stage transitions - operator-driven `sweep`, `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, `approve`, `unblock`, `run`, and `drain` commands - serving-path fences for database writes and external effects across event ingest, media, Git, workflow, push, invites, mesh/tunnel, and related paths - target-prefix-only storage inventory, summary manifests, post-fence destructive chunks, and bounded batch deletion - exact community Redis namespace purge and two-pass absence verification - cross-community isolation, crash/resume, manifest-integrity, writer-taxonomy, and schema/migration regressions - desired-state `schema/schema.sql` support without requiring a SQLx migration ledger ## Deferred / not covered - dedicated Helm/chart worker Deployment, service account, secrets, probes, resources, and network policy - autonomous `buzz-admin deletions worker` poll loop and worker-only health server - least-privilege separation among migration, relay-serving, and destructive execution roles - fleet-wide shared-CAS physical GC - backup/provider/CDN/observability retention completion - member-only erasure - provider-native conditional-delete improvements - a general force-continue escape hatch; permanent safety failures remain fail closed unless an operator remediates the cause and records an audited `unblock` The removed continuous-worker implementation remains deferred; no remote follow-up branch is claimed by this PR. ## Validation ### Current PR head and repository state Current pushed head: `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`, rebased onto `cc9a2f783375e51a6e8d1f2f9d01d5f7e22813d1` (`origin/main` at push time). The complete PR diff is now 47 files, 9,834 additions, and 517 deletions. The bespoke source-scanner stack was removed to keep this PR scoped to community deletion. Tyler/team requested the underlying fenced-write safety behavior, not `ast-grep`, `crates/buzz-db/tests/community_fenced_writes.rs`, its 27 fixtures, or the new `scripts/lints/community_*.yml` rules. Those scanner-specific files, dependencies, Hermit links, and runner wiring are absent from the current tree. The production database write fence, startup/destructive live-catalog validation, and deletion behavior remain. Source validation on this exact SHA passed: - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `bash -n scripts/run-tests.sh` - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --all-targets`: 102 passed, 173 skipped, 0 failed - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-deletion --all-targets`: 10 passed, 9 skipped, 0 failed - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-admin --all-targets`: 1 passed, 0 failed - affected-package/all-target Clippy with warnings denied - lockfile consistency - Helm 3.16.4 lint and all 44 chart unit tests - Helm region controls using that fixture: default `BUZZ_S3_REGION=us-east-1`, explicit `eu-west-2` override, and blank-region schema rejection The prior Kubernetes battery below was run against `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04`. It remains useful evidence for the patch-equivalent production deletion implementation, but it is **not** claimed as exact-SHA evidence for current head `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`; the current cleanup removes only scanner/test/tooling infrastructure. CI restarted for the new head after the rebase and is pending. Human review remains `CHANGES_REQUESTED`. ### Prior-head live Kubernetes deletion and safety gates The full program used one immutable image, real PostgreSQL, Redis, MinIO, and a three-relay Kubernetes release: - source: `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04` (**prior head**) - image: `buzz-e2e:sha-928992237358` - immutable image digest: `sha256:a1a204f4618ac22d9e210be5e5290645a15d79831ae30b0e44379357c8e4a895` - evidence root: `/tmp/buzz-e2e/20260807T033025Z-928992237358-full-gates/` - evidence-manifest digest: `82875c5bc9bea7370b796a7aef3457b3a1c8306c84c59e0f7388bbb5ad30e865` Passed gates at that prior head: - **Chart/operator region:** default `us-east-1`, explicit nondefault propagation, blank-region schema rejection, live in-pod environment, and an in-pod taxonomy sweep over 18 objects with zero unknown. - **Fenced writers and lifecycle:** open-write/fence ordering; 100-attempt anti-starvation; invite, push matcher, and exhausted-reaper bystander isolation; non-`READ-COMMITTED` rejection; manifest/tombstone contracts; eight-failure stage block and audited `unblock`. - **Destructive lifecycle:** submit → approve → run → `retention_pending`; PostgreSQL tombstone and Redis/S3 verification true; zero retries/errors; terminal reruns rejected with exit 5. - **Fresh 10,001-object crash boundary:** exactly two chunks (10,000 + 1). The executor deleted chunk 0 from MinIO while its PostgreSQL stamp was row-lock-blocked, was killed with `SIGKILL`, left one object and both stamps absent, then resumed the same request under generation 2 to zero objects and terminal state. - **Independent dead-owner recovery:** a dedicated executor claimed generation 1, blocked before effects, and was killed through containerd with `SIGKILL` (no TERM cleanup). The request remained owned and unreclaimable before lease expiry; a successor claimed generation 2 after 60 seconds and completed with two attempts and zero retries. - **Three-pod socket isolation:** ordinary NIP-42 and joined huddle-audio target witnesses on every replica received exact `1008 / community deleted`; healthy-tenant witnesses on those pods remained live; deleted-host reconnect returned HTTP 404. - **Health/provenance:** all replicas independently returned ready and retained the exact image digest before/after destructive runs and an audio-enabled rolling restart; PostgreSQL, Redis, and MinIO were healthy at close. Instrument corrections were retained as evidence rather than counted as product failures: a foreground PostgreSQL forward caused an initial `PoolTimedOut`; Kubernetes pod deletion exercised graceful TERM rather than dead-owner recovery; shell-background socket witnesses died with their parent; and the first image build hit the corporate TLS proxy. Detached forwarding/witnesses, containerd `SIGKILL`, and the configured internal CA/Artifactory mirror produced the discriminating runs without weakening product security. ### Prior-head cleanup For the prior-head Kubernetes run, the Helm release was removed, namespace absence was verified, run-owned Screen sessions were absent, and that source worktree remained clean. The evidence manifest was independently recomputed and every indexed artifact passed `shasum -a 256 -c`. The current `359d8402` source worktree is also clean after the scanner-only cleanup and push. --------- Signed-off-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Wes
|
2777189d96 |
fix(channels): restore member invitations to private channels (#5493)
## Summary - restore private-channel invitations for every active member - keep owner/admin-only enforcement for elevated role grants, active role changes, and removals - preserve #4612's unrelated Desktop/mobile failure handling and hardening - add relay coverage for the ordinary actor/target role matrix (`member`, `guest`, `bot`) ## Validation - pre-push hook passed on `7de700e17642ad7e10155f9537033168d9249268`: branch skew, Desktop checks/typecheck/tests/Tauri checks, mobile tests, and Rust tests - `cargo test -p buzz-test-client --test e2e_relay --no-run` - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `git diff --check` - Donut and Mongo independently reviewed the cross-layer authorization behavior; Donut's role-matrix coverage finding is addressed in this revision --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Carl <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Jordan Mecom
|
efe1893dd3 |
fix(channels): restrict private-channel invitations (#4612)
This change requires an active owner or administrator for third-party additions to private channels. The relay validator and transactional database authority enforce the same rule, including removed-member reactivation and role-change paths. Idempotent self-target behavior remains available, while ordinary members can no longer extend private-channel access to another identity. ## Testing - `git diff --check origin/main...codex/security-private-channel-invite-authority` - Rebased onto `origin/main` at `5c98932` - Full CI pending Originating Buzz thread: `buzz://message?channel=3928fe05-df61-4b5d-b9c7-d623b9b10ea1&id=3c6c02312f763fbe0d2bfc33a6c1a362f91d0354f3d18b039cf7a0558c1439d1` --------- Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Eli Foster <efoster@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Eli Foster <efoster@squareup.com> |
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Tyler
|
00ecf2cac7 |
fix(security): authorize kind:9000 role changes in both directions (#3017)
## Summary
NIP-29 `kind:9000` (PUT_USER) role changes were only authorized when the
**new** role was elevated. Demotions were unauthorized, so any
authenticated user could strip a channel owner to `member` with a single
event — and the demotion was unrecoverable, since the ex-owner then
lacked the privilege to restore themselves.
Reported by @Tyler in `#buzz-security`. Verified true, plus two adjacent
defects the report flagged and one it did not.
## The defects
1. **Demotion unauthorized.** The actor check only fired when the
*requested* role was elevated. Lowering someone's role skipped it
entirely.
2. **Open channels skipped the actor check.** It was nested under
`visibility == "private"`.
3. **`add_member` had no last-owner guard** while `remove_member` did —
so a channel could be left with zero owners.
4. **(Not in the report.)** An absent `role` tag defaulted to `Member`,
so a bare self-targeted PUT_USER silently demoted the sender. No
attacker required.
## The fix
**`crates/buzz-db/src/channel.rs`** — the authority, because it also
covers the desktop/admin callers that bypass the relay validator:
- Changing an **active** member's role requires an elevated actor **in
both directions**. Re-adding at the same role stays unguarded and
idempotent (the huddle bot-add and `kind:9021` join paths depend on
this).
- Last-owner guard in `add_member`, mirroring `remove_member`.
- Keyed on the **active** role (`removed_at IS NULL`). A soft-removed
row's role is history, not live authority — otherwise soft-deleted
ownership becomes a resurrection token: a kicked owner self-rejoins via
`9021` and silently regains ownership.
- New `pg_advisory_xact_lock` on a channel-membership namespace, taken
as the first statement in both `add_member` and `remove_member`. Both
read an owner `COUNT` and then write a *different* row, so READ
COMMITTED alone lets two concurrent demotions each observe 2 owners and
together leave 0.
- `remove_member`'s `is_agent_owner` lookup moved before the transaction
opens — it borrows a second pool connection, and issuing it while
holding the lock could self-deadlock on a small pool. Safe because
`agent_owner_pubkey` is immutable (first-mint-wins).
**`crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/side_effects.rs`**:
- Role tag is now `Option` — absent means "no role change requested"
rather than defaulting to `Member`.
- Actor-role lookup hoisted out of the `visibility == "private"` block,
so open channels are covered.
- Role-change and last-owner guards on every visibility. Rejecting here
*as well as* in the DB means clients get a real error instead of an `OK`
whose side effect then fails silently.
## Verification
**Mutation tested — every guard stubbed individually to confirm a test
actually dies.** Three of eight guards were originally uncovered and
survived being disabled with the suite fully green:
| Guard | Dying test |
|---|---|
| DB actor-auth | *survived* → **new**
`unprivileged_member_cannot_demote_a_co_owner` |
| DB last-owner | `owner_can_still_manage_roles_after_demotion_guard` |
| DB active-role (soft-remove) |
`kicked_owner_rejoins_as_member_not_owner` + 3 |
| `add_member` advisory lock |
`membership_writes_serialize_on_the_shared_channel_lock` |
| `remove_member` advisory lock | +
`remove_member_rejects_an_actor_demoted_while_it_waited` |
| relay no-role-tag preservation |
`test_nip29_put_user_without_role_tag_preserves_role` |
| relay actor-auth | *survived* → **new**
`test_nip29_relay_rejects_role_change_by_unprivileged_actor` |
| relay last-owner | *survived* → **new**
`test_nip29_relay_rejects_last_owner_self_demotion` |
The three gaps shared one cause: every existing test asserts resulting
**state** ("the role did not change"), and the DB guards enforce that
state, masking every layer above them. With a relay guard stubbed the
relay answers `accepted:true` and logs `Side effect failed: access
denied: ...` while the state assertion still passes — the entire relay
validator could be deleted unnoticed. The new relay tests assert
`accepted == false` instead, the one observable only the validator
controls. Each new test is verified in both directions: green against
the real fix, failing with its intended message when its guard alone is
stubbed.
**Test runs** (at `9461eedb`):
- `buzz-db`, serial: **210 passed / 3 failed** — the same 3 failures as
clean `main` (202/3), which are pre-existing and unrelated
(`concurrent_same_owner_create…`,
`create_community_with_owner_is_atomic…`,
`test_usage_metrics_lock_has_single_owner…`). +8 = the new tests.
- `e2e_relay --ignored`: **40 passed / 3 failed**. Clean `main` on the
same relay is 35/6 — the same 3 infra failures
(`test_invite_mint_and_claim…`, `test_subscription_limit_enforced`,
`test_unarchive_emits_member_added_notification`) plus the 3 security
tests that fail unpatched and pass here.
- `cargo fmt`, `clippy`, `git diff --check` all clean.
**Live manual drive** against a locally running relay, using raw
`nak`-signed events (the `buzz` CLI refuses malformed `kind:9000`, so
the guards have to be exercised directly):
- *Rejected:* member demotes owner; member demotes admin; self-promote
to owner; self-promote to admin; admin demotes the last owner; sole
owner self-demote; demoted ex-owner demotes last owner; private-channel
member demotes owner; non-member demotes owner in private.
- *Allowed:* bare PUT_USER with no role tag (owner keeps role);
idempotent re-add at same role; owner promotes admin→owner, then owner2
legitimately demotes owner1.
- *Resurrection defeated:* owner promotes attacker to admin → kicks them
(`9001`) → attacker self-rejoins (`9021`) → returns as **member**, not
admin, and cannot demote the owner.
- Normal ops unaffected throughout: channel creation, messaging, member
listing, and legitimate governance all work.
## Behavior change to be aware of
Huddle bot-add sends `role="bot"`. If the target is **already an active
member at a different role**, that is now a role change and requires an
elevated actor. Previously it silently re-roled them — the same privesc
primitive through a different door, so narrowing it is intended.
This does not break the huddle flow in the path that matters: the
ephemeral channel add (the one that fails hard) is performed by the
host, who *created* that channel and is therefore its owner — verified
live. The parent-channel add is already explicitly best-effort,
capturing the error into `parent_error` with a comment anticipating "may
already be member"; adding a non-member agent there still works.
Flagging it rather than burying it.
## Notes
- Commit is **signoff-only, not cryptographically signed** — `-S` fails
in this environment (git tries to load the agent npub as an SSH key
file). DCO trailers are present and correct.
- Branch was merged with `origin/main` via `--no-ff` (not rebased).
Upstream had 17 commits, none touching these files, no migration
changes.
---------
Signed-off-by: tlongwell-block <109685178+tlongwell-block@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Dawn (sprout agent) <c6237ef84fa537c78dcee78efd2d4e59f728859c7f194da42ac51ededfa0be05@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
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Kalvin C
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ca384d082d |
fix: recover community access visibility (#2074)
Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Tyler
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648cbf3610 |
feat: add invite QR and mobile direct join (#1957)
Signed-off-by: npub1jh9wn95s0472h86ahapupaf7m6kx4v9sx2n0atj2hltcfer8k06s5n3pyf <95cae996907d7cab9f5dbf43c0f53edeac6ab0b032a6feae4abfd784e467b3f5@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Signed-off-by: npub1jmc9dt2lyvzu3h0kxlwxt5zg4fxp9476awyxw6gwxn72g6cw7exqs64whm <96f056ad5f2305c8ddf637dc65d048aa4c12d7daeb8867690e34fca46b0ef64c@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Signed-off-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1jh9wn95s0472h86ahapupaf7m6kx4v9sx2n0atj2hltcfer8k06s5n3pyf <95cae996907d7cab9f5dbf43c0f53edeac6ab0b032a6feae4abfd784e467b3f5@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1jmc9dt2lyvzu3h0kxlwxt5zg4fxp9476awyxw6gwxn72g6cw7exqs64whm <96f056ad5f2305c8ddf637dc65d048aa4c12d7daeb8867690e34fca46b0ef64c@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Tyler
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74a30c3de8 |
Live thread-summary push: badge counts update on reply ingest (#1521)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> |
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Tyler
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73cc31cc52 |
chore: remove LLM-slop comments across the codebase (#1277)
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Max <d8473ee32b973aa31a21a65adddcc4b69cc2a8a4dee8121ecd51926e0cddbc02@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Mari <95cae996907d7cab9f5dbf43c0f53edeac6ab0b032a6feae4abfd784e467b3f5@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Quinn <96f056ad5f2305c8ddf637dc65d048aa4c12d7daeb8867690e34fca46b0ef64c@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Sami <f4a42a97e594b77bdbd8ee35191c8b28a94a4cb871d96f32921558275421fb68@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Perci <5a968df9a7494b4e019b9ecf739e088ba61097b4312124e9a88ae5b42e3f5f3e@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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d256935c36 |
feat: publish personas, teams, and managed agents as relay events (#939)
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> |
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Wes
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38a9533439 | [codex] Make relay frame limit configurable (#1225) | ||
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Will Pfleger
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6780ea21e4 |
fix(relay): resubscribe agents when an archived channel is restored (#1187)
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> |
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Will Pfleger
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d99ad131f1 |
refactor: rename sprout backend to buzz (#958)
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger96@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1fgdl5qqnh3k3f2xkqrvt7cujalhm623x4s7fdjdj5yrtp5fzjl9qrjpucw <4a1bfa0013bc6d14a8d600d8bf6392efefbd2a26ac3c96c9b2a106b0d12297ca@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub16v54tttfqacx9ycvc3k0ut0npj564ahcuajzy6qjvh57ntmsf4uq4806j2 <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger96@gmail.com> |