## Summary
CI now proves the full Buzz shared-compute join story end to end: a
member can discover another member's served model **through the Buzz
relay alone** and run inference over the mesh, while a non-member gets
nothing — the relay rejects its auth, and the mesh refuses to route for
it even holding a leaked endpoint address.
This is deliberately different from mesh-llm's own CI smokes (which
bootstrap two nodes with a hand-carried invite token / mdns): here the
**relay is the control plane**, exactly like the desktop app:
1. **Membership** — identities A and B are added via `buzz-admin`
(kind:13534 NIP-43 roster); C is not.
2. **Advertise** — each member publishes a client-signed kind:30003
discovery note carrying its MeshLLM owner binding and (for the serve
node) `serveTargets[].endpointAddr`, covered by an endpoint-binding
signature — the exact payload shape the desktop coordinator publishes.
3. **Trust** — the serve node derives its admission allowlist from the
relay (statuses ∩ roster) and requires the **exact expected {A, B}
owner-id set** before starting with `TrustPolicy::Allowlist`.
4. **Join** — the client verifies owner + endpoint bindings and
membership, then dials the relay-discovered endpoint (the desktop
join-watcher's `dial_endpoint_addr` step). No out-of-band token.
5. **Infer** — a chat completion against the client's local OpenAI
endpoint routes over QUIC to the serve node's model (CPU, SmolLM2-135M,
~105MB).
6. **Deny (differential)** — the stranger's NIP-42 auth must fail with
the relay's own membership rejection (`restricted: not a relay member` —
successful auth or any unrelated connect error fails the run), and
dialing the leaked endpoint must not produce a routed inference —
**while the trusted client re-proves inference immediately afterwards**,
so a dead serve node can't masquerade as an admission denial.
## What's in the PR
- `crates/buzz-relay/examples/mesh_relay_lifecycle_smoke.rs` — the
harness. One process per node (mesh-llm keeps process-global state under
`~/.mesh-llm`), orchestrator + serve/client/stranger roles,
byte-identical binding payloads to
`desktop/src-tauri/src/mesh_llm/identity.rs` (called out with
keep-in-sync comments). Child stdout is pumped through a reader thread
so every wait has a hard deadline; timed-out children are killed; exit
statuses are checked.
- `scripts/ci-mesh-lifecycle-smoke.sh` — provisions a membership-gated
relay (throwaway owner + signing identities via `buzz-admin
generate-key`), runs the harness, cleans up. Fails fast if :3000 is
already occupied (a stale open relay would mask gating).
- `scripts/start-relay-for-tests.sh` — gains opt-in NIP-43 membership
env passthrough (`BUZZ_REQUIRE_RELAY_MEMBERSHIP` + `RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY`
+ `BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY`). Default behavior unchanged.
- `.github/workflows/mesh-lifecycle.yml` — separate, path-filtered,
non-required workflow (mesh paths, the harness's dependency crates,
`Cargo.lock`, dispatch), pinned to `ubuntu-24.04`. Caches the mesh
native runtime + HF model keyed on the lockfile hash, so a mesh pin bump
rolls the runtime cache. Uploads relay + harness logs on failure.
## Scope
This is an **independent protocol harness**: it speaks the same wire
protocol and payload shapes as the desktop but re-implements the
binding/verification logic (the desktop crate is outside the workspace).
Regressions inside the desktop's own discovery filtering are the desktop
unit tests' job; what this smoke proves is that the relay + mesh-llm SDK
+ admission stack support the lifecycle end to end.
## Relationship to mesh-llm's CI
Follows the shape mesh-llm's own CI proved stable (tiny CPU model, one
runner, multiple real mesh-llm processes over real QUIC — cf. their
`ci-two-node-client-serving-smoke.sh`), but swaps the token bootstrap
for the relay-driven lifecycle, which is the part only Buzz can test.
## Validation
Green on GitHub Actions (ubuntu-24.04) across three runs, including
after rebases onto the mesh v0.74 upgrade (#3467) and latest main:
```
PASS 1/6: relay-derived allowlist is exactly {A, B}
PASS 2/6: serve member ready + advertised model: jc-builds/SmolLM2-135M-Instruct-Q4_K_M-GGUF:Q4_K_M
PASS 3/6: client member discovered + joined via relay
PASS 4/6: inference routed over the mesh: "PONG"
PASS 5/6: relay rejected the stranger's NIP-42 auth (membership gate)
PASS 6/6: stranger denied (gossip visible, inference rejected: 503 all tunnels failed) while trusted inference still routes
PASS: full relay-driven mesh lifecycle verified
```
Also validated locally on macOS. `cargo fmt --all --check` and `cargo
clippy -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings` pass.
## Notes
- The harness follows the repo's mesh `[dev-dependencies]` pin
automatically, so it doubles as a canary for future mesh upgrades (it
already caught the v0.73.1 → v0.74.0 bump during development).
- The stranger "deny" accepts either shape mesh-llm exhibits: no model
visibility at all, or gossip visibility with inference refused —
mesh-llm applies the receiving node's owner policy after the gossip
handshake, so admission gates *routing*, not gossip. The differential
trusted-inference re-check (PASS 6/6) is what makes that a real denial
rather than a dead server.
- Model-visibility windows are tunable via `MESH_CLIENT_WINDOW_SECS` /
`MESH_STRANGER_WINDOW_SECS` if shared runners prove slow — pin a longer
window in the workflow env rather than re-running the job.
---------
Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com>
## Summary
This is **part 1 of 2** split out from #3467 (per Tyler's request),
carrying only the mesh-scoped changes. The agent/ACP response-behavior
changes and the new `send_message` tool stay in #3467 as part 2. All
commits are @michaelneale's work, cherry-picked with authorship
preserved.
- Upgrade embedded Mesh to v0.74.0 (tag-pinned instead of commit rev)
and use canonical Gemma model IDs.
- Keep shared compute serving through member joins, roster changes, app
recovery, and community switching.
- Wait for actual model readiness and avoid resuming incomplete
downloads after quit.
- Leave `BUZZ_AGENT_THINKING_EFFORT` unset by default so each model's
chat template picks its own thinking default (`none` suppressed Gemma
tool-calling entirely; pinning `low` made Qwen3 burn ~4x output budget).
Explicit agent/persona/global values still win.
## Relationship to #3467
Contains the mesh commits from #3467 (`2cd640b23`, `0ad81c341`,
`ad13ed841`) rebased onto current main, with one deliberate exclusion:
the `crates/buzz-agent/src/llm.rs` reasoning→text parser change from
`2cd640b23` is **not** here. That change unconditionally affects every
OpenAI-compat/Responses provider, so it belongs with the reply-behavior
work in part 2, where it can be reviewed as what it is.
Not included (remaining in #3467 / part 2):
- typed `send_message` tool in dev-mcp + `BUZZ_ACP_SEND_MESSAGE_TOOL`
gating
- plain-reply delivery fallback in buzz-acp
(`BUZZ_ACP_DELIVER_PLAIN_REPLIES`)
- the mesh_agent_e2e P5/P6 rewrite (exists to prove the reply path)
- the two `env.insert` preset opt-ins in `relay_mesh.rs` for the flags
above
- the llm.rs parser change
This PR is independently mergeable; part 2's flags are all off by
default so it can land before or after.
## Testing
- `cargo test -p buzz-relay --locked` — 780 passed (one telemetry test
is order-sensitive under parallel default settings; passes in the
pre-push suite and standalone, unrelated to this diff — files untouched
here).
- `just desktop-tauri-test` (default features) — 1877 passed.
- `cargo test --locked --features mesh-llm` in `desktop/src-tauri` —
1961 passed, including the new relay-mesh preset and
coordinator/recovery tests.
- Both `Cargo.lock`s resolve with `--locked` against the v0.74.0 tag.
- Full pre-push hook suite green (rust-tests, desktop-check/test, tauri
checks).
Live validation of the mesh v0.74 upgrade itself is documented on #3467
(two-Mac cross-version test).
---------
Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Configure a dedicated datastore tracing target on the OTLP layer while
preserving explicit logging filters and avoiding span overhead when OTLP
is disabled.
This is in preparation for adding trace spans for datastores used in
Buzz
## Update — 2026-07-27
- Export HTTP requests as `INFO` server spans under `buzz_relay`,
preserving request parentage for datastore spans.
- Configure OTEL span filtering independently with `BUZZ_OTEL_FILTER`,
so `RUST_LOG` changes cannot break trace topology.
- Verify exported HTTP and datastore spans share a trace ID and have the
expected parent/child relationship.
Co-authored-by: Amp <amp@ampcode.com>
