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92 Commits
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22d96d94ef |
[buzz] Recover database pool capacity after stalled connections (#9267)
> **The pin is a temporary workaround for this week's public release.
The SQLx fix is still unmerged.**
>
> 1. We considered a maintained fork, but repository permissions blocked
it.
> 2. We will move to an official SQLx release once it includes the
required fixes and is verified with Buzz. Revisit the fork if needed.
## Bug
https://linear.app/squareup/issue/BUZZ-656/relay-writer-pool-connections-stranded-after-a-burst-bb-public-2026-11
A short database interruption can leave the relay unable to handle
database requests after traffic returns to normal. All connection slots
can remain occupied even though no request is using them and PostgreSQL
is idle. New requests then time out waiting for a slot.
## Cause
SQLx, our database library, returns connections to the pool in a
background task. If a socket stays open but stops answering, the final
health check has no timeout. That task keeps its slot, and
idle-connection cleanup cannot reclaim it
([#4349](https://github.com/transact-rs/sqlx/issues/4349)).
## Fix
Pin SQLx to
[`c3735abf`](
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96af488d96 |
fix(media): revoke private channel attachment reads (#9077)
## Summary Removed private-channel members can currently download attachments if they know the URL. With `BUZZ_MEDIA_READ_MODE=enforce`, fresh GET, HEAD and Range requests check current membership and readable references on the primary database. Removed members receive 404; remaining members retain access, and rejoining restores access. Thumbnail aliases use the parent attachment’s permissions. Publication checks also prevent copied private URLs from granting new access. They cover attachments, link previews, profile pictures, banners, group pictures and emoji. Persona creation and changed-avatar edits, plus team and individual snapshot imports, transfer animated posters and animations under the agent’s signer before profile publication. Failed persona transfers preserve existing local records; import failures appear in the results. Authorization uses bounded queries, a two-second statement deadline and transaction-local JIT suppression. An index on edit targets avoids broad scans. Publications have a 512-reference limit, and capacity waits up to 500 ms before refusal. Protection defaults off. Existing downloaded bytes cannot be recalled. All modes stop creating immutable HTTP cache entries. ### Related issue Related approaches: #7565, #5185, #8451 and #8444. This change evaluates live stored references directly. ### Testing Published head: `3d1aa7431cc495a001a0f13e95e2e422c5a77ab1`, rebased on main `2cd40badb85de059a6916206e133da7a0a88fb2e`. Push hooks were **SKIPPED** with explicit author approval. Current-head HTTP, full package, PostgreSQL migration/media and profile-filter mutation checks are pending; CI is pending. The earlier complete HTTP journey passed at `f20b449262` (identical source tree), with its evidence attributed separately. Earlier failing preview/report-fixture runs are preserved; they do not count as passes. The HTTP journey covers upload/publication, fresh GET/HEAD/Range revocation and rejoin, emoji replacement, edited previews, persona visibility and non-reference decoys. The migration regression forces an index timeout, verifies no 0086 history or media tables, then proves a migrator through the base's 0085 can restart. Human attachment removal/rejoin testing passed on the pinned `1f08a8e0fd2edf19dc94321f7258518149fe1bf6` trial. Native animated persona edits and team/individual import acceptance remain incomplete. That old-snapshot database stays intact and cannot run the reconciled binary; a new trial needs a separate fresh database. ### Rollout prerequisites - Build and verify the reference index before shadow mode. Small databases can auto-migrate through one atomic 0086 migration within the configured timeouts. It builds the index before creating the media tables, so failure records no new migration version. Large deployments must disable auto-migration and prebuild indexes concurrently. - **Enforce remains blocked unless the operator can rule out SDK/CLI attachment edits and the unverified agent-harness edit producer.** SDK/CLI edits still omit attachment metadata. That behavior is deferred, not fixed. Removing this blocker requires latest-effective attachment metadata across successive edits, no restoration of removed files, and an upload → successive edits → GET/HEAD regression. - Validate client signer compatibility and split emoji publications above 512 references before enforce mode. - Complete the human workflows above in an isolated community with enforce enabled. - Follow the [index deployment guide](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/honor/private-channel-media/docs/private-media-index-deployment.md) and [operator guidance](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/honor/private-channel-media/docs/operator-private-media.md) for rollout and rollback. The [prebuild timeout finding](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/9077#discussion_r4486221478) and [avatar-transfer finding](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/9077#discussion_r4486221458) are implemented and independently reviewed. ### Schema change checklist - [x] Additive expand and code deployment; no backfill or contract phase. Prebuild/verify before shadow under either schema deployment path. - [x] No SQL function, trigger, procedure, rule or foreign key added. Signed events are untouched. - [x] No migration mutates existing rows. - [x] Migration and desired-state schema match. Catalog parity, target parsing, future partition inheritance and upgrade refusal are covered. - [x] Old/new binaries coexist for serving. Suspend community deletion during expansion and while rolled back to a binary with the old deletion catalog. - [x] Keep auto-migration disabled on old binaries after schema expansion; sqlx rejects unknown versions. - [x] Migration lock timeout 1 s; statement timeout 5 s. Small populated databases build inline within those budgets; large deployments use concurrent child-index prebuild/attachment with auto-migration off. Missing, invalid or wrong indexes fail verification. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Brad Seiler <seiler@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Honor <e0bf479eeebe47dde1e35705212a4df70616a7bc834d907ddfb18cf0405f8b1b@seiler-test.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz> |
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2cd40badb8 |
Manage community NIP-FI policy with enable, disable and status (#9176)
## Summary Operators can enable, disable and inspect a community's stored NIP-FI requirement through signed POST/GET `/operator/communities/nip-fi-policy` and `buzz-admin nip-fi-policy`. This replaces the old enable-only endpoint and drops the `nip-fi-upgrade` command added earlier in this PR, along with obsolete compatibility code. Each saved intent binds its desired state and observed generation/state. Every accepted new intent advances the generation, including same-state changes. Committed retries recover history without reapplying policy; stale requests are refused. Current status exposes one pair of reusable `expected_*` preconditions. Historical receipts remain readable after policy changes or target deletion, including old rows with null preconditions. Their UUIDs cannot be reused for new requests. Migration 0085 stays additive; main’s default-channel recovery migration retains version 0084. It preserves old receipt rows and INSERT compatibility. Operator instructions cover use, recovery and client migration: [usage guide]( |
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39d5159caf |
[buzz] Recover interrupted default-channel auto-joins (#9045)
**Bug** Default channels are channels that new community members should join automatically. If the database could not list those channels—for example, because its connection pool was busy—an invite claim or an in-app admin add still admitted the member to the community. That member could then remain outside the default channels permanently. **Cause** Community admission was saved before channel joins started. If listing the channels failed, the relay logged the error and stopped. Retrying the invite or admin add did not help: the member already existed, so the relay skipped the joins. **Fix** Save a marker for unfinished channel joins in the same database transaction as admission. If listing or joining channels fails, keep that marker. Retry when the member next authenticates, claims the invite again, or is added again by an admin. One channel's failure does not stop attempts to join the others. Retries preserve the existing membership rules: - A member who leaves a channel during recovery stays out of it. - Work from an earlier admission cannot add channels or clear pending work after the member is removed and admitted again. Each admission has a unique marker, checked under a database lock. - A reconnect still checks whether the member allows the original admin to add them to channels. - Once recovery finishes, later connections do not enroll the member in newly designated default channels. The operator command `buzz-admin add-member` continues to add community membership only. **Limits and rollout risks** Recovery needs one of those later requests; there is no background retry timer. This change does not repair members missed before it was installed. Channel announcements and notifications keep their existing best-effort behavior. A failure after channel membership is saved can still lose an announcement; this change does not replay it. Migration 0084 adds an optional UUID column to `relay_members`. Apply it before running the new code. Older relays ignore the column. The migration has a five-second lock timeout, so it fails rather than waiting indefinitely for its table lock. It adds no triggers, functions, procedures, rules, foreign keys, or data backfill. --------- Signed-off-by: Helen Tian <htian@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Flipper <1ef64189596befbc8b93f9021bff35ae5d02b155d9e05fc124bca7349927d597@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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38795ada87 |
fix(db): keep retained fence proofs when a probe fails (#9200)
## Summary
A failed replica fence probe no longer drops the proofs already
retained, so one failed probe no longer sends every read to the writer.
**Why.** `run_probe` called `fence.close()` on any probe error, which
cleared the ring. Until the next successful probe 500 ms later,
`fence.newest()` was `None` and every routed read went to the writer
with `reason="uninitialized"`. Under load this showed up as a steady
share of `bridge_query` reads labelled `uninitialized` on every pod,
while `heartbeat_age` stayed small. The module already documents that a
retained entry's proof never decays: a failed probe proves nothing new,
but it doesn't make an earlier proof wrong. So clearing the ring only
cost reader capacity.
**What changes.** A failed probe logs and records nothing. The retained
entries stand. A probe that keeps failing still closes the fence through
the existing 30 s staleness gate (`FENCE_STALENESS`), and
`heartbeat_age` remains the liveness signal. Regression handling is
unchanged: an epoch change or a same-epoch token regression still clears
the ring in `record()`. `close()` has no production caller left and
becomes a test hook.
**Likely trigger.** The masked-activity check
(`ProbeError::MaskedActivity`) counts a client backend whose state is
`active` with a `NULL` `xact_start` as masked. A backend that has just
started a statement can briefly show as `active` before its `xact_start`
is set, so busy writers hit this transiently. Under pgbench on Postgres
17, between 0.3% and 1.3% of scans saw such a backend. This PR doesn't
change that classification. See the debt below.
No protocol, schema, metric or client change.
### Testing
- `replica_fence::postgres_tests::failed_probe_keeps_retained_proofs`
(new, no database needed, so it runs in the unit lane like its
neighbours): records an entry, runs a probe tick against a closed writer
pool (the probe fails), then asserts `newest()` and `resolve()` still
return the entry, and that a rewound token recorded under the same epoch
after the outage is a `TokenRegression`. Mutation-checked on Blox:
putting `fence.close()` back on the error path fails it, including when
only the regression assertion is left.
- On Blox: the full `buzz-db` Postgres lane, the `buzz-db` unit tests,
`cargo fmt`, clippy for `buzz-db` and `buzz-relay`, and a `buzz-relay`
build.
### Rollout
There's no flag. Rollback is a revert. After deploy, watch:
- `buzz_db_route_decision{decision="writer",reason="uninitialized"}`
should drop to about 0 once a pod has booted, and the
`decision="reader"` share should rise.
- `buzz_db_replica_heartbeat_age_seconds` should stay small. Staleness
is now the only thing that closes the fence on probe failure, so this is
the liveness signal.
- `reason="stale"` may rise a little. `newest()` returns `None` for an
empty ring and for one older than the staleness gate, and both are
labelled `uninitialized`. Bounded reads can also miss the budget for one
tick when a probe beat is missed and fall back as `stale`. Some of
today's `uninitialized` share is expected to move to `stale` rather than
disappear.
## What got simpler
`ReplicaFence::close()` leaves the production API. A probe error now has
one effect (log and keep proving from what's retained) instead of a
second path that discards valid state. The probe loop is split into a
one-tick function that the test calls directly.
Identified, out of scope:
- `buzz_db` warnings, including this probe's failure warning, are
dropped by the relay's default log filter (`buzz_relay=info`), so
operators can't see why a probe fails.
- `MaskedActivity` misclassifies the transient
`active`-without-`xact_start` state. Treating it as not-open looks
sound, because such a backend's transaction starts after the scan, but
it touches the proof and deserves its own review.
- The probe's exclusive advisory lock waits behind channel writers'
shared locks, so a slow writer delays the probe.
- Probe failures have no metric. With retained proofs a failed probe no
longer shows up as `uninitialized` routes, and its warning is filtered
out of the logs (above), so intermittent failures are now invisible. A
probe-failure counter would fix that.
- An epoch rotation that fails still leaves an opening for a restore
that keeps the epoch. `TokenRegression` clears the ring, so if the
rotation `UPDATE` then errors, the next sample stores the rewound token
under the old epoch against an empty ring. This PR doesn't change that
path. A writer-side high-water token kept outside the ring would close
it.
- `newest()` gives the same `uninitialized` label to an empty ring and a
stale one, which hides a dead probe in route metrics.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a17243d846 |
feat(relay): runtime-tunable history-read and AUTH concurrency caps via feature flags (#9170)
## Goal Give operators a way to relieve database pressure in seconds, without restarting relay pods. Today every concurrency limit is an environment variable, so changing one means a rollout. During an incident, that rollout's restart sets off a reconnect storm of its own. ## What changes **Two runtime-tunable caps.** Each is read from an integer feature flag in a new process-wide evaluation context, and re-read every 5 s: | Flag | Caps | Ceiling | |---|---|---| | `buzz.relay.concurrency.history-reads` | subscription-history reads holding a reader connection (the #9132 gate) | the existing `pool − pool/5` share, which keeps readers free for authorization | | `buzz.relay.concurrency.auth` | verified NIP-42 AUTH frames running their database checks | none (unbounded today) | - **Flags can only tighten.** A positive value is clamped to the ceiling. Zero, a negative value, no value, or a provider that never initialized leaves the gate at its ceiling, which is today's behavior. Once LaunchDarkly has delivered values, they stay in force through a later outage, so a cap tightened during an incident survives a provider blip. - **Lowering never cancels admitted work.** A lowered gate admits nothing new until the work in flight falls under the new limit. - **Visibility:** `buzz_concurrency_limit{gate}` reports the applied limit (`0` means no limit), and each change logs a line. **One resizable gate.** `HistoryReadGate` becomes `buzz_db::ConcurrencyGate`, a FIFO semaphore whose limit can move anywhere in `1..=ceiling`: - Lowering it forgets free permits and records any shortfall as debt. - A permit released while there is debt is retired instead of returned. - Raising it repays debt first, then adds permits. All of this, and admission itself, settles against the debt under one lock, so a newer limit always supersedes an older one; there is no background resize task to race. Tokio hands a released permit to a queued waiter before it runs; if that waiter is then cancelled, tokio returns the permit to the semaphore directly, so admission retires any permit it gets while debt is outstanding. The AUTH cap uses the same type. **AUTH shedding.** The permit is taken after signature verification, so only real logins queue for the database checks. The wait is bounded at 2 s. A shed login gets a bare close with no `OK`, exactly like an auth timeout. I chose this from what each client does on main today: - **`OK false`:** the desktop app retries on an unjittered 60 s ladder. Mobile parks the session until the app resumes. The agent harness fails at startup. - **Bare close:** the desktop app, mobile, the agent harness and the CLI all reconnect on their jittered, capped backoff. On the relay, the shed is visible as access line `denied/concurrency_limit` and as `buzz_auth_outcomes_total{outcome="concurrency_limit"}`. **The feature-flag provider is chosen at startup.** `BUZZ_FEATURE_FLAGS_PROVIDER` takes `static` (the default), `environment` or `launchdarkly`, with `BUZZ_LAUNCHDARKLY_SDK_KEY` and an optional `BUZZ_LAUNCHDARKLY_RELAY_PROXY_URL`: - **Exactly one provider.** The value is parsed into a single provider, so there is no stacking and no fallback, and the evaluator never changes for the life of the process. The variable sits outside the `BUZZ_FEATURE_FLAG_` namespace, so it can never be read as a flag. - **Startup failures.** Local misconfiguration fails startup: an unknown provider, a missing key, or a malformed proxy URL. LaunchDarkly being unreachable, or rejecting the key, does not. The relay starts on declared defaults, the SDK keeps connecting, and `buzz_feature_flags_ready{provider}` shows whether the provider has initialized. A revoked key must not crash-loop every pod over a tuning knob. - **Every build carries the LaunchDarkly adapter.** It stays inert unless selected, so one published image serves every deployment and each deployment's configuration pins its provider. ## Design-doc amendments (`crates/buzz-feature-flags/README.md`) - **Provider selection.** The compile-time "exactly one provider" contract becomes the startup selection above. The only-one guarantee now holds per process instead of per build. - **Startup.** Failing closed now covers local configuration only. - **Guardrails.** "Flags may choose between equivalent implementations only" gains one exception: a flag may set an operational limit as long as it can only tighten it, and shedding under that limit stays retryable. - **Evaluation context.** `EvaluationContext::for_process()` adds a process context, which LaunchDarkly sees as a single `relay`-kind context keyed `relay`. ## What got simpler - **Removed the compile-time provider contract:** the nested fixture crate (with its own 2.8k-line `Cargo.lock`), its 229-line contract test, and the exact-one `compile_error!` guards it required consumers to copy. One startup parse plus a unit test replaces them. - **One gate type serves both caps.** The history-read gate became that generic type instead of gaining a sibling. - **Net change:** about −2.3k lines. ## Review-Proven Rules applied - **#1:** shedding is retryable (`PoolTimedOut` → CLOSED for history, a bare close for AUTH) and never an empty success. Provider failures are logged and surfaced through a gauge. - **#2:** the gate settles every limit change and permit release under one lock. The table test covers lowering while idle, lowering below the count held, lowering then raising before holders leave, lowering then raising past the count held, and restoring the ceiling. - **#3:** the tests drive the production call sites: `Db::get_channel_window_with_session` under a lowered and raised cap (Postgres), and `handle_auth` under a full AUTH gate. The controller test runs the real refresh loop. - **#4:** values are clamped, waits are bounded, and the refresh runs on a fixed interval with skipped missed ticks. - **#9:** AUTH shedding sends clients down their jittered reconnect backoff rather than an unjittered or terminal path (see above). ## Review rework (`92a975c8`, `3f09cb33`) - **Keys renamed** to `buzz.relay.concurrency.*`: LaunchDarkly keys cannot be renamed later, and the flag project may be shared with other services. - **Shutdown:** LaunchDarkly's final flush has no deadline of its own, so `close()` now runs it on a detached thread and waits at most 2 s, after the audit drain. (The blocking pool would not bound it: the runtime waits for blocking tasks when it drops.) - **Refresh loop:** a panicking refresh is caught, logged and counted (`buzz_concurrency_limit_refresh_panics_total`), and the next tick retries, so the caps cannot freeze silently. - **Runbook:** `docs/operator-concurrency-caps.md`, covering how to tighten a cap and the cases in which a tightened cap returns to its ceiling (mistyped or deleted flag, pod started during a provider outage). - **AUTH test:** asserts the second login passes the gate and returns its permit; the gate permit is renamed so it no longer shares a name with the NIP-FI effect permit. Gated on a Linux workstation at `92a975c8` (`3f09cb33` is rustfmt only; `cargo fmt --check` passes there): clippy `-D warnings`, `buzz-feature-flags` (50), `buzz-relay --lib --bins` (1740), the new modules under parallel `cargo test`, and the Postgres AUTH tests (27). Each new test fails under its mutant: the refresh without `catch_unwind`, `close()` with no deadline (hangs until killed), and the AUTH handler with the gate skipped. ## Testing Re-run in full at `3c289134` after review rework, on a Linux workstation: - `cargo fmt --check`; `cargo clippy -p buzz-feature-flags -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --all-targets --all-features -D warnings`. - `buzz-feature-flags` with and without `launchdarkly` (50 and 24 tests), `buzz-db --lib` (209), and `buzz-relay --lib --bins` (1738), plus a plain parallel `cargo test` of the new relay modules. - Postgres: the `buzz-db` routed-read and history-gate tests (55), and the `buzz-relay` AUTH and connection tests (38). - `a_cancelled_waiter_cannot_reopen_a_lowered_gate` fails with the debt check in `admit` removed. - The new infra-free relay tests are added to the CI unit lane (`Justfile` and `scripts/run-tests.sh`). - E2E against a local relay at `06c39d64`: cap gauges, sequential logins and history under cap 1, a 20-login burst (19 shed with a bare close, all reconnected), and LaunchDarkly misconfiguration and unreachability. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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abb2586f8c |
Pin sqlx to the upstream fix for a cancelled BEGIN (#9192)
## Problem sqlx 0.9.0 counts a transaction only after Postgres acknowledges its `BEGIN`. If the future is dropped while `BEGIN` is still in flight (a cancelled REQ history read, a client that disconnects, a timeout), sqlx doesn't queue a `ROLLBACK`. The pool's release ping then reads the late `BEGIN` reply, and the writer pool hands the connection to the next borrower while it is still inside that transaction. The reader pool already closes such connections in its release check (`Db::read_pool_options`). The writer pool has no release check. Load tests showed what happens next: - `there is already a transaction in progress` (25001) on the next event read's `BEGIN`. - Sometimes a burst of `current transaction is aborted` (25P02). The leftover from the event read is `READ ONLY`, so the next write fails and aborts it, and every later statement on that connection fails until the connection is closed. During a burst, ban checks failed closed with 503 and window reads returned 500. - A read-write leftover would also leave autocommit writes uncommitted, and the next read's `ROLLBACK` would discard them. ## Change - Pin every sqlx crate to transact-rs/sqlx#4394 (merged, not yet released). That commit takes the transaction count before the `BEGIN` round trip, so a cancelled begin queues its `ROLLBACK`. The crates share types, so they have to move together. The pin also picks up the other 23 commits between v0.9.0 and that fix, including the libsqlite3-sys fix `sqlx-sqlite` was already pinned for. - Add a regression test, `writer_pool_postgres_tests::begin_cancelled_in_flight_leaves_no_writer_transaction_open`. It holds `BEGIN` in flight behind a paused proxy and times it out, for both the event read's `BEGIN ... READ ONLY` and a plain `begin()`. It then asserts that the next borrower's autocommit write commits and that its backend is `idle`, not inside a transaction. Other upstream changes in the pin that reach the Postgres path: `TCP_NODELAY` on sockets (transact-rs/sqlx#4336), reuse of the TLS connector across connection attempts (transact-rs/sqlx#4242), a fix for a memory leak when the statement cache is disabled (transact-rs/sqlx#4337), a describe-time generic-plan change used only by the macros (transact-rs/sqlx#4286), and the `whoami` default-user fix (transact-rs/sqlx#4303). The rest are SQLite, MySQL, CLI, or docs changes. Remove the pin once sqlx 0.9.1 ships. ## What got simpler The lockfile loses its second `sqlx-core` copy, which the sqlx-sqlite-only pin used to pull in. No runtime code changes. A pool-level release check would have fixed the same bug, but it costs a round trip on every writer release. Comments that described the 0.9.0 behavior as current are refreshed: the reader pool's release check (`Db::read_pool_options`) and the lease heartbeat (`EntityDeletionStore::heartbeat`). The reader test `proof_timeout_mid_begin_leaves_no_reader_transaction_open` asserted that the release check closed the connection left mid-`BEGIN`. With the pin, sqlx rolls that transaction back itself, so the test now asserts the check finds nothing to close. That also catches a sqlx regression the check would otherwise hide. Identified debt (not in this PR): the release check's open-transaction arm, and the reader-session `default_transaction_isolation` pin it depends on, are now only a backstop against a sqlx regression. They could be removed in a follow-up. ## Testing - Against sqlx 0.9.0 (main's `Cargo.toml`/`Cargo.lock` at |
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cec47c20a3 |
perf(db): hydrate search hits with exact event timestamps (#9126)
## Summary Keep each search hit's existing signed `created_at` alongside its event ID during canonical hydration. WebSocket search, HTTP search, and profile-name search now use a bounded exact-pair database lookup so PostgreSQL can prune unrelated event months. Also constrain channel-create replay detection by the timestamp of the already-available signed event. ## Scope / compatibility - Combined-tree verification also passed: repository-wide `just ci`, 220 unit/source-policy tests, and the full 722-test buzz-db/search PostgreSQL suite. All three temporary timestamp-constraint mutations were killed by functional/plan assertions and restored. - Independent of companion post-insert push and deletion PRs; based directly on `main`. - Deploy/code-only change. No schema/migrations/backfills, persistent or serialized formats, indexes, triggers, functions, procedures, rules, or foreign keys added. - Existing ID-only event APIs remain available for callers without timestamps. - Maximum 500 input pairs, validated before checkout; duplicate inputs do not multiply results; missing/deleted/wrong-community/wrong-timestamp hits are omitted. - Caller ordering, authorization, observability, bounded-only replica routing, proved connection use, non-cancel fallback, and cancellation propagation remain intact. A timestamp is not treated as a completeness proof. - Existing/new relays coexist against unchanged schema; no rollout/prebuild dependency. ## Verification - Compiled `buzz-db`, `buzz-search`, and `buzz-relay` library/tests. - 220 infrastructure-free unit/source-policy tests passed. - 35 focused PostgreSQL tests passed, including cross-month exact pairs, tenant/deleted/missing scope, same-second IDs, duplicate/empty/invalid/oversized/full batches, routing/fallback/cancellation, channel replay, and existing search regressions. - `EXPLAIN ANALYZE BUFFERS` of production hydration SQL verifies only requested event months execute under forced custom **and generic** plans, including the full **500-distinct-pair** shape. A wrong-timestamp decoy detects cross-product matching. - Targeted clippy with `-D warnings`, formatting, diff checks, PostgreSQL discovery, and differential file-size checks passed. - Live isolated relay smoke: exact channel-create replay, HTTP NIP-50 search hydration, profile-name search hydration, and authenticated WebSocket NIP-50 results/EOSE. All three hydration route labels observed in local metrics. - Independent review completed; optional maximum-batch plan coverage added and independently re-reviewed. Compile fixes for SQLx 0.9 API compatibility verified. No production latency improvement or workload-percentage claim is made. --------- Signed-off-by: Jemiah Westerman <jemiah@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Son of Anton <8e0ef2ab02d69a7ac089ef5eca90d1a3fbbdc546f6322dc34d0c4f3deecea7f4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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997ce3a2c9 |
perf(db): prune post-commit push enqueue by signed event timestamp (#9128)
## Summary Carry each inserted event's signed `created_at` through the existing in-memory, post-commit push enqueue path. The worker now looks up the source event by community, ID **and exact timestamp**, allowing PostgreSQL to prune unrelated monthly partitions. All seven direct insert-followup hooks forward the timestamp already bound into their INSERT. No receipt-time or causal-order inference is used. ## Scope / compatibility - Combined-tree verification also passed: repository-wide `just ci`, 220 unit/source-policy tests, and the full 722-test buzz-db/search PostgreSQL suite. All three temporary timestamp-constraint mutations were killed by functional/plan assertions and restored. - Independent of the companion search-hydration and deletion PRs; based directly on `main`. - Deploy/code-only change. No migrations, backfills, schema changes, new indexes, triggers, functions, rules, procedures, or foreign keys. - No persistent/serialized payload changes: `push_match_queue` and `push_wake_outbox` remain unchanged. Their later ID-only lookups are outside this PR. - Admission/gate ordering, commit-only submission, savepoint rollback behavior, duplicate suppression, bounded queues, best-effort drops, and existing lock/statement/client deadlines are retained. - Existing and new relay versions can coexist against the unchanged schema; no rollout ordering or operator prebuild is required. ## Verification - Compiled `buzz-db`, `buzz-search`, and `buzz-relay` library/tests. - 218 infrastructure-free unit/source-policy tests passed. - 12 focused PostgreSQL tests passed, including new timestamp propagation and savepoint tests plus existing follow-up/admission/gate regressions. - `EXPLAIN ANALYZE` of the exact production enqueue INSERT verifies a single event month executes under forced custom and generic prepared plans. - Targeted clippy with `-D warnings`, formatting, diff checks, PostgreSQL discovery, and differential file-size checks passed. - Live isolated relay smoke: channel creation/replay, signed message ingestion/readback, and completed post-commit enqueue worker metric. Test lease had empty subscriptions; no push gateway was contacted. - Independent local review completed: no remaining blockers. No production latency improvement or workload percentage is claimed; this establishes the pruning mechanism and behavior preservation. --------- Signed-off-by: Jemiah Westerman <jemiah@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Son of Anton <8e0ef2ab02d69a7ac089ef5eca90d1a3fbbdc546f6322dc34d0c4f3deecea7f4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a22ff133b4 |
test(relay,db): remove three timing races from Postgres and E2E tests (#9098)
## Summary Three tests asserted on outcomes that depended on how fast something unordered happened. The first depended on dial latency inside a 150 ms acquire budget, the second on whether two aux-page replies landed in one poll, and the third on whether NIP-42 admission auto-joined the joiner before the invite claim did. Each test now sets up the state it asserts before the racing actor can run: it fills the reader warm floor first, pauses the writer's proxy after the first aux page, or claims the invite before the joiner connects. Only tests change. No assertions are loosened, and no sleeps, retries or timeouts are added. ### test(db): fill the reader warm floor outside the acquire budget first #### Problem `reader_warm_at_production_budget_ends_partial_when_dials_stall` failed on main at reader_pool_postgres_tests.rs:177, "one partial wave, then one wave that opens nothing": left (15, 0, 5), right (15, 3, 7). Postgres lanes run with no retries. - main ( |
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47be2e2d3f |
fix(db): keep busy-reader history reads off the writer and cap them per pod (#9132)
## Problem
A routed read that misses the reader's 150ms acquire budget
(`reader_acquire_timeout`) falls back to the writer, whatever the read
is. Under a burst of subscription-history reads (REQ history, channel
and thread windows, feeds, search hydration, COUNT), the reader pool
fills, and every miss moves a heavy history query onto the writer. There
it competes with the authentication, tenant-resolution and moderation
lookups that only the writer serves, and their latency climbs with it.
Nothing bounds how many history reads a pod sends to the reader at once,
so the reader queue grows without limit as well.
Separately, the compatibility families
`buzz_db_pool_acquire_wait_seconds` and
`buzz_db_pool_acquisitions_total` have no `operation` label, so a
breakdown by operation reports every sample as unlabelled.
## Changes
1. **History reads no longer spill onto the writer when the reader is
busy** (`Db::route_read`). `route_read` now returns
`Result<RouteDecision>`. For `ReaderOperation::SubscriptionHistory`, a
`reader_acquire_timeout` on a saturated reader pool rejects the read
with `sqlx::Error::PoolTimedOut`. Saturated means every connection the
pool may hold exists and none is idle (`Db::reader_saturated`). The
check is needed because sqlx also reports a reader that refuses dials as
`PoolTimedOut`, and that reader is down, not busy. The relay already
answers that with its generic retryable `CLOSED` `error: database
error`, so there is no new client contract. A reader that is wrong
rather than busy (unreachable, validation failure, proof timeout, stale
token) and prechecks that never reach the reader still fall back to the
writer. Authorization reads (`is_relay_member`) keep the writer fallback
unchanged.
2. **Per-pod cap on reader-served history reads**
(`runtime/history_reads.rs`). A FIFO `tokio::sync::Semaphore` admits at
most the reader pool size less one fifth (at least one) history reads at
once. For example, the default pool of 20 admits 16. The remaining
connections are normally free for authorization reads. A read waits at
most 1s for a permit and is otherwise rejected the same way. The permit
is owned by the reader transaction (`ReaderTx`) and released when the
transaction is dropped; routed reads drop it before re-running a failed
replica read on the writer. That holds whether the transaction is a
per-call routed read or a `ReadSession` the relay keeps for follow-up
queries. The cap bounds history transactions, not connections: sqlx
returns a dropped transaction's connection asynchronously through the
reader release check. Released connections can therefore briefly occupy
the free slots, for one round trip normally and at most the 5s release
timeout when sockets stall. In that window, authorization reads fall
back to the writer as before, and history reads on the saturated pool
are rejected, not spilled.
3. **Rejections are observable**:
`buzz_db_route_decision{decision="rejected",reason="history_read_cap"|"reader_acquire_timeout"}`.
4. **Legacy pool families gain `operation`.** The population is
unchanged, and summing over `operation` gives the original series.
5. **HTTP reads answer 503 `database unavailable` when the database
can't be reached** (`api::db_read_error`). This covers a pool timeout,
closed pool or socket failure on `POST /query`, `/count` and every
bridge `/query` branch that serves a history read (channel window, the
three feeds, thread replies), including a shed history read. These used
to return a generic 500. The thread-window path already answered 503 for
pool timeouts; this applies the same mapping to the shared helper.
Pool sizes are unchanged on purpose. A larger pool adds lock contention
on the writer rather than relieving it.
Docs: `deploy/charts/buzz/README.md` (operator contract) and
`PLANS/REPLICA_FULL_READ_ROUTING_DESIGN.md` (fail-closed exceptions).
## What got simpler
The concept count is roughly flat. Instead of a caller-side permit, the
permit lives in the one type every replica transaction already flows
through (`RouteDecision::Replica` / `ReadSessionInner::Replica`). The 11
routed call sites change only by a `?`, and the compiler enforces that
change: a call site cannot silently fall through to the writer on a
rejection. No new error variant, CLOSED reason or env var.
## Tests
-
`postgres_tests::saturated_reader_spends_one_acquire_budget_and_rejects_history_reads`
(rewrites the former
`routed_fallback_spends_one_acquire_budget_when_aurora_cache_is_cold`).
A size-1 reader is held saturated with a cold Aurora cache. A history
read (`count_events_routed`) is rejected with `PoolTimedOut` within one
acquire budget, records `rejected/reader_acquire_timeout`, and releases
its permit. An authorization read on the same reader still falls back as
`writer/reader_acquire_timeout`.
- `postgres_tests::match_nothing_reads_take_no_connection` (unchanged):
its control still requires a history read against an unreachable reader
to fall back to the writer. It caught the first cut of this change,
which rejected that read.
-
`postgres_tests::history_permit_follows_the_read_session_and_a_full_gate_rejects`:
a held replica `ReadSession` keeps its permit. With the gate full, the
next history read waits the full permit budget and is then rejected as
`rejected/history_read_cap`, with no writer route recorded. Dropping the
session frees the permit and the next read routes to the replica.
- `history_reads::tests`: a cap sizing table, plus bounded-wait
rejection and reopen under paused time.
- `observability` label tests now require `operation` on both legacy
families.
-
`api::db_read_error_tests::unavailable_database_maps_to_retryable_503`:
pool timeout, closed pool and I/O map to 503 `database unavailable`.
Other errors stay 500.
-
`postgres_tests::shed_history_read_maps_to_503_on_every_bridge_branch`:
with the reader saturated, `/query` channel-window, mentions,
needs_action, activity and thread-reply requests each answer 503
`database unavailable` (each serves 200 beforehand).
- Mutation-checked on Blox: re-enabling the writer spill, forcing the
saturation check either way, skipping the gate, dropping the permit
early and removing the legacy label each fail a test.
## Residual
- During a reader failover whose old sockets stall, both slots sit in
the release check, so the pool reads as saturated. History reads are
shed as retryable for up to the release bound (5s) instead of loading
the writer.
`stalled_reader_sessions_release_their_slots_for_new_connections` now
retries through that window and still requires recovery onto the reader.
- A reader that accepts no TCP at all can fill the pool with in-flight
dials and look saturated. Its history reads are then rejected rather
than moved to the writer, which is the same outcome as a full gate.
- Shedding relies on clients backing off on a retryable `CLOSED` (RPR
#9). WebSocket clients already treat `error: database error` as
retryable.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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ff15c347c2 |
fix(db): auto-migrate prebuild-guarded indexes on small databases (#8802)
## Problem Migrations `0076`, `0078` and `0081` raise an exception on any table with at least one row unless its index was prebuilt with `CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY`. A relay that runs migrations at startup (`BUZZ_AUTO_MIGRATE`, on by default in the Helm chart) and has data in those tables therefore crash-loops on upgrade: ``` migration error: while executing migration 81: error returned from database: prebuild idx_nip_fi_profile_heads_names concurrently; see docs/profile-search.md ``` `0081` (#9019) hits every auto-migrating relay that has published NIP-FI verified profiles. `0076`/`0078` (#8523) hit any relay with artifact data or channel members. Each of these tables is small enough on such relays that a plain index build takes milliseconds. The root cause is `docs/database.md` Rule 6. It told authors that an index on a populated table MUST be built concurrently by an operator ahead of time, so migrations were written to refuse populated tables. With auto-migration that refusal is a crash loop, not a safe stop. ## Fix The migrations are already applied on some databases, so they can't be edited: sqlx would reject the changed checksums. Instead, `run_migrations_locked` builds their missing indexes first. For each entry in `INLINE_INDEX_BUILDS` (`0076`, `0078`, `0081`), it runs migrations through the version before it, then builds any missing index. Each build is a plain `CREATE INDEX` in its own transaction, under the same 1s `lock_timeout` and 5s `statement_timeout` the migrations use. That is the bounded inline build `0049` already does: - **Small populated databases** upgrade the same way empty ones do. - **Large databases** still fail closed. Only a lock or statement timeout (`55P03` / `57014`) gets the "prebuild concurrently" hint, pointing at that migration's own doc. Other errors pass through unchanged. The blocked migration is not recorded. - **Prebuilt indexes** are found with `to_regclass` and skipped before `CREATE INDEX`, so deployments that prebuilt concurrently never request the writer-conflicting lock. - **Invalid prebuilt indexes** are left for the migration to reject, as before. `CONCURRENTLY` is not used in this path. The runner holds the migration advisory lock, and another replica blocked on that lock holds a snapshot that a concurrent build would wait on. ### Rules - `docs/database.md` Rule 6: with `BUZZ_AUTO_MIGRATE` on, every migration must apply its own change on a populated database and must never refuse one because it has rows. A new index is built inline under the migration's budgets. Only deployments that apply migrations out of band (auto-migration off) prebuild concurrently. - Root `AGENTS.md` (step 4) and `migrations/AGENTS.md` repeat the never-refuse rule. - `docs/artifact-sync-deployment.md` and `docs/profile-search.md` describe the startup behavior first and the concurrent prebuild as the out-of-band path. ## Tests - `populated_database_auto_migrates_through_every_migration` (Postgres) migrates to `0075`, seeds artifact rows, and checks four phases: 1. **Lock held:** while a writer lock is held, the `0076` build fails closed. 2. **Index prebuilt:** with the `0076` index prebuilt, the build is skipped. 3. **Partial `0078`:** a blocked `0078` build keeps the builds before it committed. 4. **Verified profile seeded:** with a verified profile head inserted before `0081`, a final startup succeeds. It asserts that the applied versions equal every embedded migration and that all six indexes are valid, ready and live. - `frozen_prebuild_guards_have_inline_builds` (no database) scans `migrations/`. It fails if any migration refuses a populated table (`RAISE EXCEPTION 'prebuild …`) without an inline build, and if a new guard is added. - `migration_execution_cannot_bypass_schema_destruction_lock` allows exactly one production `run_to`, inside `run_migrations_locked`. ## What got simpler - Auto-migrating relays no longer need a manual, operator-only prebuild step for small deployments. That restores the chart README's contract that `helm upgrade` is the whole upgrade procedure. - Rule 6 no longer steers authors toward refusing populated tables, and a test enforces that. - The change adds one table-driven step for three frozen migrations and no new configuration. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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700e690193 |
feat(db): enforce unique listed channel names with an index (#8787)
## Summary Stacked on https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 (merged), which makes the relay refuse a second open channel with a name that another channel in the community already has. That check lives in relay code, so an older relay, a direct database write or a missed code path can still create a duplicate. This PR adds the same rule to the database: a unique index on channel name, ignoring case, for the channels that show in the channel list. With the index in place, a duplicate fails at the write, whatever wrote it. The relay's own name check from https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 is no longer needed, so this PR removes it. Clients still get the same refusal, `invalid: an open channel named "…" already exists`. The migration builds the index itself, also on a populated `channels` table, so an auto-migrating relay upgrades with no operator index step (the rule from https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8802). It still refuses to run while duplicate names remain, because the index cannot exist over them. `docs/channel-name-uniqueness-deployment.md` gives the full rollout. ## Details - **The index** (migration `0083_channels_listed_name_unique.sql`): ```sql CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_channels_listed_name ON public.channels (community_id, lower(name)) WHERE visibility = 'open' AND NOT unlisted AND channel_type IN ('stream', 'forum') AND deleted_at IS NULL; ``` It covers open, not unlisted streams and forums that are not deleted, archived ones included. Private channels, DMs and unlisted channels may still repeat names. - **The migration builds the index inline, as `0049` does.** When `to_regclass` finds no index, it runs a plain `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX` under `lock_timeout` 1s and `statement_timeout` 5s. On a busy or very large table it fails on those budgets, records nothing, and the relay retries at its next start. When the index already exists (a concurrent prebuild), it skips `CREATE` so it never requests the write-blocking lock. In both cases it then checks that the index is valid, ready and has the exact expected definition. - **One refusal stays: duplicate names.** The migration refuses to run while listed duplicates remain, and its error names the rename script. The renames must go through the relay so clients get the new kind:39000, and a migration must not change rows (`docs/database.md` Rule 3). This is the "fails closed until its repair has run" case in `migrations/AGENTS.md`, so the writer release from https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 and the rename are a required stop. - **Relay.** A write that takes the name of a concurrent, uncommitted write waits for it, and fails if that write commits. So the post-write check and the per-name lock from https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 are removed. The store already maps the index violation to the same "name taken" error. - **Desired-state schema.** `schema/tables/public/channels.sql` has the same index, and the schema parity test compares its live shape between the desired-state schema and the migrations. - **Rollout** (`docs/channel-name-uniqueness-deployment.md`), in order: 1. Deploy https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 and wait until no older relay pod serves. 2. Rename the existing duplicates in each community with that PR's script, while relays keep serving. The script needs `psql` and `python3`, and the operator key must be a member of each community. The doc covers archived communities and communities being deleted. 3. Confirm that no duplicate remains. 4. Only for a deployment that migrates out of band and is too large for the budgets: build the index with `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX CONCURRENTLY` and verify it. 5. Deploy this release. With auto-migration on, the relay applies 0083 at startup. With it off, run `buzz-admin migrate` first, never the file through `psql`. Rollback goes to the https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 release only. Keep the index, and keep auto-migration off. - **Test fixtures.** Tests that inserted two open channels with one name now use distinct names. Tests that migrate a populated database through 0083 no longer prebuild the index. ### Related issue None found. Follows https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782. ### Testing - Migration tests (`listed_channel_name_postgres_tests.rs`) start from a database migrated through 0082: - With duplicates, 0083 fails and changes nothing. - After the rename plan is applied, a channel writer that holds its lock makes the inline build fail on the 1s lock budget, with nothing recorded. - With no writer, the populated table migrates with no prebuild, and a raw duplicate insert fails on the index. - An index with a different definition, and an invalid one, are refused. A valid prebuilt index is accepted, and not replaced, while another transaction is writing to `channels`. - The store and relay name tests from https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 pass with the relay check removed: the index refuses the duplicate, and the client still gets `invalid:`. - The rename plan and script tests from https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 run on a database at 0082, the state the script runs in. - Local Postgres runs on `108737dc0`, one fresh database per test as the nextest wrapper does: 38 of 40 buzz-db migration-lane tests pass (both listed-name tests, the migration parity test, the thread-window and invite-upgrade tests that migrate populated databases through 0083). The 2 `event_follow_up` contract tests fail locally the same way on main. All 49 buzz-db channel and channel-member store tests pass. ### Database review checklist - [x] Phase: contract. Before it: https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 (writer release, required stop) and its rename script. Nothing after it. - [x] No trigger, function, procedure, rule or foreign key. - [x] No migration mutates rows. The renames happen before it, through the relay, with the script in https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782. - [x] Never refuses a table because it has rows. Fails closed only with duplicates (repair not run) or with an invalid or different index; then 0083 raises and the relay does not start. The release notes must name the release that contains https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 as a required stop. - [x] Rule 4: `migrations/`, `schema/tables/public/channels.sql` and the parity test. A live catalog comparison covers the index. - [x] Deployed relay: the https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 relay answers `invalid:` beside the index (its tests pass with the index present). A relay older than that still writes, but gets a database error, not `invalid:`, for a duplicate. That is why https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8782 is a required stop. - [x] Timeouts and index build: `lock_timeout` 1s, `statement_timeout` 5s. The migration builds the index inline (plain `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX`, skipped when `to_regclass` finds a prebuilt one). Only out-of-band deployments too large for the budgets prebuild it with `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX CONCURRENTLY` (doc step 4). 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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506a588f88 |
refactor(relay): remove database usage-metric queries (#9040)
## Summary The relay no longer runs database aggregate queries to emit usage gauges. Fleet and per-community counts of users, channels, relay members, workflows, git repos, communities, messages, and active users/channels are no longer relay metrics, and neither are the snapshot health gauges that came with them. ### Removed - **Gauges:** `buzz_total_users`, `buzz_total_channels`, `buzz_total_relay_members`, `buzz_total_workflows`, `buzz_total_git_repos`, `buzz_total_active_users`, `buzz_total_messages`, `buzz_total_active_channels`, `buzz_communities_estimated` / `buzz_communities_total`, and every DB-derived `buzz_community_*` series (users, channels, messages, relay members, workflows, git repos, active users, active channels). - **Per-community mode:** `BUZZ_USAGE_METRICS_PER_COMMUNITY=all` and everything it fed: the per-community in-memory gauges, `buzz_community_storage_bytes` / `buzz_community_storage_objects`, `buzz_storage_unmapped_community_bytes`, the community → host map query, and the emission-scope bookkeeping that cleared series for renamed or removed communities. No deployment set it. If one still does, the relay ignores it. - **Health signals:** `buzz_usage_snapshot_available`, `buzz_usage_snapshot_age_seconds`, `buzz_usage_query_skipped_total`, and the `usage_fleet_*` paths of `buzz_db_route_decision`. - **Code and config:** - `buzz-db/src/store/usage.rs`, including its aggregate queries. - The relay's `FleetUsageSchedule` and its cadence/deadline/retry machinery. - The replica-only telemetry route (`Db::route_usage_read`). - `BUZZ_USAGE_METRICS_REPLICA_MAX_AGE_MS` and `DbConfig::usage_metrics_replica_max_age_ms`. If a deployment still sets the env var, the relay now ignores it; startup doesn't fail. - **Reader maintenance pool operation:** `ReaderOperation::Maintenance` and its `close_on_drop` release path existed only for those telemetry reads, so they're removed too. The pool-acquire contract drops from twelve to eleven valid pairs, which lowers the per-pod series ceiling from 216 to 198. - **Dead code:** `Db::active_community_hosts` had no callers. ### Kept - **Leader:** the usage poller's leader lock, plus the leader's invite reaping and fleet storage-snapshot gauges. The session advisory lock (`SessionLeader`, `Db::try_lock_session_leader`) moves to `buzz-db/src/store/leader_lock.rs`, since storage-usage delivery uses it too and it has nothing to do with usage queries. - **In-memory gauges:** pod-local connection, subscription, and online-user gauges. They read process state, not the database. - **Writer maintenance pool operation:** `WriterOperation::Maintenance` stays. Dozens of writer-side maintenance paths across `buzz-db` use it (reapers, retention, the leader lock). The reader variant only ever served the telemetry reads. - **Storage-usage delivery:** unchanged. It reads the storage snapshot for billing, not for metrics. `docs/usage-metrics.md`, `docs/storage-accounting.md`, `.env.example`, and the Helm chart README are updated to match. ## What got simpler This is net deletion (~3.6k lines). One telemetry subsystem is gone: two collection families with independent cadences, availability and age semantics, relay-side deadlines, a dedicated replica routing policy, two config knobs, a per-community emission mode, and a pool-operation variant. Leader election now does only leader work, and it lives in its own module. ## Operational note Dashboards and monitors that read the removed series will go to no data once this rolls out. ## Testing - `cargo fmt --check`, workspace `cargo clippy --all-targets -D warnings`. - `buzz-db` lib, `observability_source`, and doc tests. - `buzz-relay` lib tests. - The Postgres lane for `buzz-db` (lib + tests) and `buzz-relay` (lib). All of these run on a remote workstation at the PR head. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a1f79e3aba |
feat(relay): persist NIP-FI upgrades (BUZZ-510) (#8985)
## Summary Record that a community requires NIP-FI and provide an idempotent operator API to enable it and recover the original receipt. Acceptance checks the current owner, host, lifecycle and existing issuer trust in one transaction. It never creates trust. Receipts survive community deletion so an operation UUID cannot be reused. New acceptances default to disabled through `BUZZ_NIP_FI_UPGRADES_ENABLED`. Disabled calls return HTTP 503 `upgrades_disabled`; identical retries and authenticated readback still recover existing receipts. Policy is permanent: stopping new calls or rolling back code does not clear it. Last-issuer removal is refused for required communities, and bulk backfill leaves missing bindings for explicit operator repair. Apply additive migration 0082 before code. Existing communities remain optional. This layer records acceptance and reports only `pending` or `unavailable`; deploy and verify [per-request enforcement](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8988) and [session activation](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8991) before enabling acceptance. The global enforce floor remains. See [the operator contract](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/seiler/BUZZ-510/relay-auth-upgrade/docs/community-auth-upgrades.md) for signing, recovery and containment. ### Related issue [BUZZ-510](https://linear.app/squareup/issue/BUZZ-510/relay-persist-community-nip-fi-requirements-and-expose-idempotent). Base of native stack `8989`; retains trunk's enforcement telemetry from [#8974](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8974). Includes a separate commit that repairs an observer timing flake in a desktop test required by the repository gate. ### Testing Controlled local regressions detect the old disabled error code and removal of the last issuer with `allow_last=true`; intended source is restored. Full PostgreSQL validation and the updated live relay/admin exercise remain pending. Human acceptance remains open. No deployment or production activation. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Brad Seiler <seiler@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Honor <e0bf479eeebe47dde1e35705212a4df70616a7bc834d907ddfb18cf0405f8b1b@seiler-test.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz> |
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3d26ed7dfd |
feat(relay): match verified names in profile search (#9019)
## Summary `POST /profiles/search` only matches kind:0 `name` and `display_name`. In communities that publish NIP-FI verified profiles, a person's surname or directory username often appears only in their relay-signed kind:30382, so typeahead cannot find them by it. - Where the community advertises verified profiles, the search also matches the `display_name`, `username` and `full_name` tags of each current kind:30382 head signed by the relay key. - Verified names need a trailing prefix of at least three characters, as in NIP-50, so a short prefix doesn't make the relay rank every verified head. kind:0 keeps one-character typeahead. Lookups from heads to `events` also match `created_at`, so Postgres prunes to one partition. - Results are paged by person. Each person returns their current kind:0, when they have one, then their current kind:30382, when they have one, whichever matched. A person is ranked by their best match across both sources, using the existing tiers. - NIP-11 `federated_identity.public_profile` gains `searchable: true`, so clients can rely on the response instead of a separate kind:30382 read. - Migration `0081` adds a GIN expression index over the head's name tags on `nip_fi_profile_heads` (built-in `jsonb_path_query_first` and `to_tsvector`, no new functions). The table holds one row per verified person. Like `0078`, the migration builds the index only while the table is empty; populated databases prebuild it with `CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY` (`docs/profile-search.md`), and the migration then checks it is valid and has the expected definition. Compatibility: the request schema is unchanged. Existing clients that keep only kind:0 events work as before and also find people who match only by verified name. Trust stays pinned to the relay `self` key; the event shape follows NIP-85 user assertions, but discovery is relay-advertised rather than kind:10040. ## Testing - `buzz-search` Postgres integration: new `profile_names_match_verified_names` covers forged-key heads, replaced heads, other communities, people without kind:0, per-person grouping, paging, and words split across sources; the existing profile-name tests pass unchanged. The test fails when the author filter is inverted. - `buzz-relay` end to end in enforce mode: `profile_search_matches_verified_names_where_advertised` publishes through the real writer and finds the person by surname only where verified profiles are advertised. - Desired-state and migration index definitions match. - `profile_names_use_verified_name_index` asserts the search scans the new index. Migration `0081` checked against an empty table, a rerun, a populated table without the index (raises), the documented concurrent prebuild, and an index with a different definition (raises). - Latency, 50k people each with a kind:0 and a verified head, release build, local Postgres, best of 5, 30 people per page: 11–22 ms with verified names versus 1–8 ms kind:0 only. `EXPLAIN` shows a bitmap scan on the new index. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d44031f418 |
perf(relay): cut writer-pool round trips past the 48k relay ceiling (#8846)
## Summary Five changes that take load off the writer pool and the relay's connection bookkeeping. On a single-relay load rig, the clean ceiling moves from 40k to about 48k WebSocket clients. In the A/B, connect p99 at 48k fell from 4.1 s (abort) to 1.65 s. 1. **Ban/mute restriction cache with a 1 s max age.** HTTP API requests, publishes and ephemeral writes read `(community, pubkey)` restriction state through one cache. An entry is served for 1 s from when its read began, matching the open-channel cache's bound. Socket admission, moderation-command actor checks and the `/buzz/v1` ban recheck still read fresh. An admitted socket outlives the 1 s window, so a banned client that reconnects inside it would otherwise keep a socket open indefinitely. A ban drops the target's entry, and each owned agent's entry, on every pod as part of the live-disconnect fan-out, best-effort. Timeouts, untimeouts and unbans drop it on the pod that handles them. 2. **Fewer round trips per event read.** Replica reads skip the per-read `statement_timeout` tighten, because the reader pool installs the deadline at connect. They keep the savepoint, so a failed or cancelled read leaves the session usable and releases its locks. That takes them from 4 round trips to 3. Writer reads send `BEGIN` and the tighten as one message, which also takes them from 4 to 3. 3. **Concurrent open-channel cache misses share one read.** The first miss in a community takes a per-community gate and reads; the others wait for it and use its result. A waiter whose leader failed reads once on its own and does not queue again. A waiter also stops waiting after the cache's 1 s max age and reads on its own, because the leader's set would be stale by then anyway. So a leader whose read hangs stalls only its own request. 4. **`has_admitted_connection` is one map lookup.** A `(community, pubkey) → admitted count` index is maintained under each socket's pubkey lock in `mark_admitted`, `set_authenticated_identity` and `deregister`. It replaces a scan of every connection on each disconnect. 5. **Host → community cache with a 1 s max age.** Only successful lookups are cached; unmapped hosts and errors go to the database every time. ## What got simpler - The ban handler's separate pod-local cache drop is gone; the disconnect every ban already runs covers it on every pod. - One write-restriction gate instead of two. `enforce_cached_write_restriction`, `enforce_relay_membership_ephemeral` and the `cached_ban` parameter chain through `enforce_membership` / `admit_member` / `deny_banned` are deleted. - The ephemeral path's separate 30 s ban cache is gone, so the relay has one staleness rule for restriction state instead of two. ## Notes - Bans reach the restriction cache on every pod. Every ban path (signed command, report action, relay admin) closes the target's and its agents' sockets clusterwide, and each pod drops those entries in the same step. A dropped Redis publish, or a restriction read already in flight when the drop lands (it can refill the old row), falls back to the 1 s bound. Timeouts on other pods also rely on the 1 s bound, and so do unbans and untimeouts, which fail closed. - On the load rig the restriction-cache hit rate was 28%, because HTTP agents poll every 5 s. A longer TTL with Redis invalidation would raise it, but that is a separate change. ## Load test Single relay pinned to 8 cores, native Postgres 16, a seeded fixture with 2,000 open channels, and a 6-shard generator. Steady ramp with 120 s holds; a step aborts at p99 > 3 s. Each step adds 10% HTTP agents. | clients | base connect p99 | this PR connect p99 | base relay cores | this PR relay cores | |---|---|---|---|---| | 32k | 34 ms | 31 ms | 1.71 | 1.66 | | 40k | 45 ms | 26 ms | 2.33 | 2.15 | | 48k | 4,107 ms (abort) | 1,652 ms | 4.7 | 3.0 | | 56k | n/a | 4,535 ms (abort) | n/a | 4.0 | Open-channel re-reads over the run fell from 72k to 1.6k. The tenant cache hit rate was 94%. 48k is this branch's knee. A later run of the same build aborted at 48k: connect p99 2.2 s, but 29% subscribe errors from the concurrent-handler cap. With a 10 s restriction max age, it passed 48k, at connect p99 1.56 s, 60% hit rate and 10% fewer relay cores, and both arms stopped at 56k. ## Testing - `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay -p buzz-db --all-targets -D warnings` - `cargo test -p buzz-db --lib` and `-p buzz-relay --lib`, run in parallel. The only failures were 8 DB-seeding tests that need a migrated default database; the Postgres lane covers them. Commits after that run changed the replica savepoint, the `/buzz/v1` recheck revert and some test edits. - Postgres lane at head: `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-relay -p buzz-db --lib --bins --tests`. All 1,183 tests passed. - Mutants. Each one must turn its new test red: - waiters skipping the gate - a no-op index removal - the tenant cache ignoring age - the restriction cache ignoring age - a waiter waiting on the gate with no limit - a disconnect that keeps the cached restriction row - replica reads dropping the savepoint buzz-review-completed 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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46da35810d | db: recycle pool connections after 5 minutes instead of 30 (#8951) | ||
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949f61dfab | fix(search): cancel abandoned searches and bound the search pool (#8954) | ||
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5f8d0aab98 |
fix(relay): refuse a second listed open channel with the same name (#8782)
## Summary
Two open channels in one community could have the same name, so the
channel list showed two `#square-ios` rows and people could not tell
them apart. Now the relay refuses to create, rename or open up a channel
when that would give it the same name as another channel in the channel
list, ignoring case. The client gets `invalid: an open channel named "…"
already exists`.
The rule follows Slack: an archived channel keeps its name until it is
deleted. Private channels, DMs and unlisted channels may still repeat
names. So a refusal never reveals that a private channel exists.
The PR also adds a script that renames the duplicates that exist today.
It sends each rename through the relay, so relays keep serving while it
runs. The stacked PR https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8787 then adds a
database index that enforces the rule. This PR is the release that must
be fully deployed before that index.
## Details
**Which channels the rule covers.** A *listed* channel: open, not
unlisted, a stream or forum, not deleted. Archived channels are
included. The check runs on create, rename, private → open and unlisted
→ listed.
**Relay check** (`crates/buzz-db/src/store/channel.rs`,
`crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/ingest.rs`):
- The check runs after the write, in the same transaction, under a
per-name lock. So two concurrent writers cannot both commit the same
name.
- A refused create or edit (kind:9007 or kind:9002) gets `OK false
"invalid: an open channel named … already exists"`. Nothing from it is
stored.
- The relay gives the same answer when the database index from
https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8787 refuses the write. That covers
the rollout, and a rollback from that release.
- A channel create with no `h` tag (the new channel's id) is now refused
before it is stored. Before, such a create ran after the event was
stored, so a refusal (for example, a taken name) still answered
"accepted". All first-party clients send `h`.
**Operator rename** (`crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/side_effects.rs`).
The rename script needs to rename channels it does not own, archived
ones included. So a relay operator may now send a channel edit that
changes only the name of a listed channel. Everything else still needs
the channel's owner or admin.
- "Operator" means `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS`, the owner fallback, or an
`operator` row in `relay_operators`. A moderator is not an operator.
- The rename also applies to an archived listed channel, whatever the
operator's role in that channel, and the channel stays archived. Other
edits of an archived channel are still refused.
- Private channels, unlisted channels and DMs still need the channel's
owner or admin. The relay decides "listed" under the channel row lock,
so a channel made private during the rename is not renamed.
- The rename takes the normal edit path: the name check, the stored
event, the channel metadata event and fan-out.
**Rename script**
(`scripts/maintenance/rename_duplicate_listed_channel_names.sh`, with
the read-only plan `plan_duplicate_listed_channel_renames.sql`):
- In each group of listed channels that share a name, the oldest
unarchived channel keeps the name. Each other channel becomes
`<name>-<first 8 chars of id>`, or `<name>-<id>` when that is also
taken. When all the channels in a group are archived, the oldest keeps
the name.
- **Starter channels.** Released desktop and mobile apps create
`#general` and `#welcome-everyone` when a community has no open,
unarchived stream with that name. Under the new rule, the relay refuses
that create while an archived channel has the name, and the apps' setup
fails. So the script also renames `general` and `welcome-everyone` when
every listed channel with that name is archived. That frees the name for
the apps.
- The apps create each starter at a fixed id, derived from the relay's
address. If a channel already has that id, the relay refuses the create
there whatever its name, so a rename cannot help. For that name the
script renames nothing, and an archived starter at its id keeps the
name. The script computes the ids from `BUZZ_RELAY_URL` (or
`BUZZ_STARTER_ORIGIN` when the apps use a different address) and prints
them, so the operator can check them against a client. A relay-side fix
for those clients is planned separately.
- The operator key goes in `BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY`. It must be a relay
operator and a member of the community. The script stops at the first
auth refusal and says so.
- The script stops before the plan for an unknown host, an archived
community and a community being deleted, and says what to do.
- A failed rename (the new name is now taken, or the relay can't be
reached) is reported, and the script goes on. At the end it reads the
plan again and exits 1 if any rename remains. `--dry-run` prints the
plan.
- The script replaces the earlier direct-SQL repair and `buzz-admin
reconcile-channels --metadata`, which needed every relay pod stopped.
**Duplicates that exist today** (read on 2026-10-30):
`ml-platform-public` (`d41a31f8…`, `7be55f5a…`) and `square-ios`
(`79f8e9d4…` archived, `fe246d3e…` live).
### Rollout
The full procedure, with exact SQL and recovery steps, is in
`docs/channel-name-uniqueness-deployment.md` in
https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8787.
1. **Deploy this PR.** Wait until no older relay pod serves; check the
image of every pod. An older relay can still create a duplicate, and it
refuses the operator rename.
2. **Rename the existing duplicates in each community**, with relays
serving. The key must be an `operator`, not a moderator, and a member of
the community (`RELAY_URL=wss://<host> buzz-admin add-member --pubkey
<npub>`).
```sh
DATABASE_URL=postgres://... BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY=<operator key> \
scripts/maintenance/rename_duplicate_listed_channel_names.sh --dry-run
<community host>
# review the plan, then run it again without --dry-run
```
For the duplicates known today, the newer `ml-platform-public` and the
archived `square-ios` (`79f8e9d4…`) get the `-<id8>` suffix.
3. **Confirm that no duplicate remains** in any community (query in the
doc).
4. **Build the index, then deploy
https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8787.**
Rollback from https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8787 goes to this
release only, keeping the index, with auto-migration off.
### Related issue
None found.
### Testing
- **Live local relay.** The script ran against a local relay built at
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cde6c1bf5b |
feat(relay): auto-join new community members to default channels (#8594)
## Summary Adds **default channels**: relay owners and admins can flag channels that every new community member is automatically joined into. **Setting (contract)** - New `channels.auto_join` column (migration `0080`, constant default `false`, so no table rewrite). - kind:9002 accepts `["auto_join", "true"|"false"]`. Authorization comes from the actor's **relay** roster role (owner/admin), not a channel role, so the actor doesn't need to be a channel member. API tokens need `AdminChannels`. - Only open, unarchived `stream` channels qualify. This is checked under the channel row lock, so one event can open and flag a channel in one step, and a concurrent archive can't slip past the check. - kind:39000 carries a bare `auto_join` tag only while the setting is effective (on, open and unarchived). Every change posts one `auto_join_changed` kind:40099 notice. - SDK `build_update_channel(.., auto_join)`, `buzz channels update --auto-join <true|false>`, a NOSTR.md "Default channels" section, and a NIP-CL tag-table row. **Behaviour** - kind:9021's body is pulled out into `join_channel_as_self`, so auto-join uses the same path as a self-join: the channel's `join_role` applies, and it emits `member_joined` 40099, 39000/39002 and 44100. - `auto_join_default_channels` runs inline right after a member is added at three sites: the v2 invite claim, the v1 invite claim, and kind:9030 add. It does not run on login or reconnect, so a later kind:9022 leave stands. - Best effort: each failure is logged and counted (`buzz_auto_join_failures_total`) but never retried, because the roster membership has already committed. This deliberately departs from Review-Proven Rule 1 and is documented in NOSTR.md. `buzz-admin add-member` writes the roster row only. **Communities without a membership roster** (`BUZZ_REQUIRE_RELAY_MEMBERSHIP=false`) - These have no invite claim or kind:9030 to hook, so the three sites above join nobody there. Instead, after the AUTH `OK`, the relay joins a person to every effective default channel they have **never had a membership row in** (`auto_join_never_joined_channels`, spawned so admission never waits on it). - The channel's own membership history is the once-only record, so this adds no new table, column or migration. A kind:9022 leave or a kind:9001 removal keeps the row with `removed_at`, so the person stays out. A new device or another relay pod finds the row and does nothing. `put_first_member` checks the row again under the `put_member` locks, so two admissions racing each other join once. - A channel flagged later is joined on each person's next admission. A failed membership write leaves no row, so the next admission retries it. - Each channel's join holds the session's NIP-FI effect permit, so once the socket closes or its admission expires, no further channels are joined. - Agents are skipped: any socket with an admitted owner (a NIP-OA tag, a NIP-FI agent token, or a stored `agent_owner_pubkey`). - The kind:9021 side effects moved into `announce_self_join`, so both join paths emit the same `member_joined`, 39000/39002 and 44100. **Review follow-ups** - `get_accessible_channels` now selects `auto_join`. Without it, every call failed with `ColumnNotFound`. - The final authorization branch of the 9002 validator now refuses by default. `list_auto_join_channels` filters to `stream` channels itself. ## Testing - Postgres-lane journeys: - `edit_metadata_postgres_tests`: who may set `auto_join`, the 40099 notice, the effective-state tag, and the refusals. - `claim_auto_joins_default_channels_once`: v2 and v1 claims, and leave then re-claim. - `adding_a_member_auto_joins_default_channels`: kind:9030 add. - Removing the auto-join call at any one of the three sites fails the matching test (checked by mutation). - `root_auth_joins_people_to_default_channels_without_a_roster`: through `handle_auth` on a roster-less community. A person is joined, a NIP-OA agent is not, and a leave holds when the person is admitted again. Mutations checked: removing the spawn, and dropping the agent check. Each check waits for that admission's own auto-join outcome (a skip reports through the same test hook as a finished task) and fails if none arrives. A third mutation drops the agent check and delays the task 3s; it still fails. - `admission_auto_join_stops_when_the_session_ends`: closing the socket before the first or second channel stops the remaining joins; a later admission joins what was skipped. Mutation checked: dropping the effect permit. - `first_member_put_joins_once_and_never_undoes_a_leave` (buzz-db): the person is joined once with the channel's `join_role` (`guest` on an announce channel), a second put does nothing, after a leave the channel is neither listed nor joined, and two racing puts write exactly once. Mutations checked: removing the row check, removing the channel lock, and removing the `NOT EXISTS`. - e2e `test_invite_claim_auto_joins_default_channel` against a local relay. - Unit coverage in the SDK and CLI builders and `group_metadata_tags`. ## What got simpler The roster-less path adds no schema and no new concept: it reuses the channel's membership history as its record. It also shares the kind:9021 join code. It replaces the per-device client workarounds, [buzz-app#2029](https://github.com/block/buzz-app/pull/2029) and [buzz#8795](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8795), which are now closed. ## Related - Client half (buzz-app): https://github.com/block/buzz-app/pull/1624 ## Demo Recorded against a local relay built from this branch with throwaway identities (Alice = owner, Bob = new member); no real accounts or hosted relays involved. Relay at 141aa01d4, client at buzz-app bb0d97d86 (browser dev build). **Owner turns on "Starter channel for new members" on two channels.** Alice creates `#general` and `#welcome`, then flips the switch on each (~0:25 and ~0:41). The switch greys out while the kind 9002 is in flight and only turns on once the republished 39000 carries the `auto_join` tag. https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e590d343-11d3-4385-af43-2cfaf19f8468 **A brand-new member joins and lands in a starter channel.** Bob claims Alice's invite with empty storage; from ~0:18 he is reading `#welcome` with both `#general` and `#welcome` in the sidebar, and at 0:27 opens `#general` as a member with no Join prompt. The relay logged one `auto-joined default channel` line per flagged channel. https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/037a0aaa-b25d-474d-a316-8d25e5e54f89 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com> Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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7d00c70805 |
feat(relay): publish NIP-FI verified profiles (BUZZ-433) (#8774)
## Summary Publish historical verified names from valid human NIP-FI assertions as relay-signed kind 30382 events. Keep profile publication optional and separate from access decisions. Disconnects and access changes initiate asynchronous cleanup without retracting profiles verified after the original trigger time. Publish `display_name` as the chosen short display handle and `username` as the account handle. Carry optional `full_name` in the signed assertion into a matching kind 30382 tag. Adding, changing, or removing the full name updates the profile immediately; retractions remove every name field. Older profiles without `full_name` remain valid. Adds opt-in issuer labels, discovery, and schema migration 0079. Deploy and drain all access writers before enabling publication; use a stable relay key and a shared publication-policy revision. Update clients before enabling assertions with `full_name`. ### Related issue Implements the Relay portion of [the verified-profile specification](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8745) at `500829a9` (BUZZ-433). This is the closest existing PR found. Companion client: https://github.com/block/buzz-app/pull/2005. Companion issuer: [KGoose/bb-identity #144773](https://github.com/squareup/cash-server/pull/144773), which includes `nostr_public_profile` in valid human assertions. ### Testing Passed the lifecycle test against a disposable local PostgreSQL database, including full-name addition, change, and removal: `cargo test -p buzz-db store::verified_profiles::postgres_tests::profile_lifecycle_retains_assertion_ordering --lib -- --ignored --exact` with `BUZZ_TEST_DATABASE_URL` set to that database. Independent agent review found no remaining blockers. No live Relay test or human verification yet. This remains a draft and does not attest the repository's human-testing checklist. For end-to-end testing, enable publication for a test issuer, admit a member with a signed profile claim, and query kind 30382. Verify short display handles, optional full names, changed names, missing-claim retraction, disconnect cleanup, and a later admission surviving delayed cleanup. Check the companion app against the same relay. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Franco Sola <fsola@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Bradley Axen <baxen@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Bradley Axen <baxen@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: mbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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b7b545f090 |
test(db): drop scratch databases and roles even when a test fails (#8747)
## Summary `buzz-db` tests that create their own databases or roles dropped them as the last line of the test body. A failed assertion or a timeout skipped that line and left the database or role on the shared Postgres server. Seven files carried their own copy of `create_scratch_db_through` and its drop helper. - Adds `ScratchDb` and `ScratchRole` guards to `crates/buzz-db/src/test_support.rs`. Their `Drop` runs `DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS ... WITH (FORCE)` or `DROP ROLE IF EXISTS` on a fresh admin connection, on a separate thread with its own runtime. `ScratchSchema` already works this way, so the guards work under both runtime flavours and while a panicking test unwinds. `WITH (FORCE)` ends any sessions still open on the database, so pools need not be closed first. - A failed drop prints a warning instead of panicking, because a panic during unwinding would abort the test binary. - The seven per-file helpers and every end-of-test `DROP DATABASE` in `buzz-db` now use the guard. The replica-fence masked-activity test's least-privilege role uses `ScratchRole`. Admin pools and `close()` calls that only served cleanup are removed. Test behaviour is otherwise unchanged. - `crates/buzz-db/TESTING.md` now points new tests at the guards. - The second commit fixes a comment in `armed_pool_rejects_old_channel_inserts_through_public_api` that still described the old end-of-test drop. **Existing leftovers need dropping by hand.** This change stops new leftovers but does not remove the ones earlier failed runs already left in dev `buzz-postgres` containers. There were 24 on the author's machine, named `stall_r_*`, `buzz_admin_*`, `floor_probe_*`, `fence_*` and `cxl_*`. List them, check the list, then drop each one: ```sql SELECT datname FROM pg_database WHERE datname ~ '^(stall_r|buzz_admin|floor_probe|fence|cxl)_'; DROP DATABASE "<name>" WITH (FORCE); ``` The guards are private to `buzz-db`. `buzz-push-gateway`, `buzz-admin` and `buzz-relay` tests still create and drop scratch databases by hand, which could get a shared copy of the guards in a follow-up. ### Related issue None found. This continues the test-cleanup work in #8727. ### Testing - Ran the 70 affected `buzz-db` tests against the local `buzz-postgres` container: 68 passed. Neither failure comes from this change. `cluster_global_probe_commits_tokens_and_sessions_prove_coverage` hit the known `MaskedActivity { masked: 1 }` flake under load and passed when run alone. Because it panicked while holding a `ScratchDb`, it also showed a panicking test leaves nothing behind. `serving_lease_statement_timeout_cancels_slow_statement` failed with `VersionMismatch(56)`, because the shared dev database already has another branch's migration 56 applied. - After the run, the server's database and role lists matched the snapshot taken before it. - A temporary test panicked while holding an open transaction, an exclusive table lock and a live session as the scratch role. It left no database or role behind under either runtime flavour and printed no drop warnings. That test is not part of this PR. - `cargo fmt --check` and `cargo clippy -p buzz-db --all-targets -- -D warnings` pass. The tests ran before the commits were cherry-picked onto current main. Only clippy was re-run afterwards. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a57349b237 |
feat(relay): add incremental artifact reads (#8523)
## Summary Buzz clients need to recover task changes after a disconnect. This adds incremental reads of changed artifacts with database modification timestamps and a 120-second overlap. Each result contains the current revision or an explicit removal. A separate read of known IDs confirms accepted edits and restores access state. Pages use a timestamp and a stable ID to handle equal timestamps. Access grants include older records. Access policy changes require discovery and revalidation of saved IDs. The reader does not load a list of all readable channels. Ordinary artifact writes update their own rows. ### Incremental reads and WebSocket Sync This HTTP protocol maintains an eventually consistent local store. It uses `artifacts.incremental` and `"artifact":"incremental"`. It does not prove a complete set at one database snapshot. Absence never proves deletion or loss of access. [WebSocket Sync](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8522) serves a separate use case: a complete set at `EOSE`, followed by live updates. It owns `artifacts.sync`. Both protocols can coexist. The second PR to merge must reuse the shared access helper in `artifact_query.rs` when it resolves the overlapping edits. The gate is `BUZZ_ARTIFACT_INCREMENTAL_ENABLED`. Errors use the `incremental_` prefix. Unlisted open channels require membership or an explicit `#h` scope. Listing changes reset incremental progress. Incremental reads exclude TTL artifacts. Known-ID reads return `remove` for them. The `#h` scope limits candidates before pagination. Initial reads omit deleted heads. Later reads retain deletion removals. ### Why the new timestamps are needed `created_at` comes from the event signer. `received_at` records event arrival. Neither advances when access changes or an event is redacted. Sync needs database timestamps for those changes: | Column | Why sync needs it | | --- | --- | | `artifact_heads.modified_at` | Finds current records that change through an edit, deletion, or redaction. | | `artifact_revisions.modified_at` | Dates retained move records. This lets sync remove a task from its former channel when the reader cannot access its new channel. | | `channel_members.sync_modified_at` | Finds grants, rejoins, and removals. A grant must include older tasks whose own timestamps do not change. | | `communities.artifact_policy_modified_at` | Requests recovery after a relevant channel visibility, TTL, or deletion change. Clients revalidate saved IDs. Ordinary task writes do not update it. | The database sets these timestamps with `clock_timestamp()`. The 120-second overlap covers the accepted delay between timestamp assignment and commit visibility. `BUZZ_ARTIFACT_INCREMENTAL_ENABLED` defaults to off. Apply migrations `0076`–`0078` and upgrade all writers before enablement. The 120-second delay bound is an operating assumption. [Deployment steps](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/drouleau/artifact-snapshots/docs/artifact-sync-deployment.md) cover index prebuilds and rollback. ### Related issue No duplicate found. Related work: [read permissions](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8338), [statement limits](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8461), and [atomic channel settings](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8516). ### Testing Signed HTTP E2E passes on `f3d6ac852e7ce4e2cc53bd891cef87832a868d72` after CI passes. It includes main through `ef4130da4`. A standalone local relay uses a fresh PostgreSQL 17 database, Redis, and signed NIP-98 HTTP requests. All 78 migrations apply through relay startup. All behavioral writes and reads use HTTP. The tests cover create, edit, delta reads, known-ID recovery, private moves, access grants, removals, rejoins, visibility resets, redaction, and deletion. Unlisted tests cover hidden broad discovery, named scope, known-ID reads, member access, and policy resets. They also cover bootstrap across two pages, overlap replay, and 101 move removals across pages. Decoded cursors contain no private revision IDs. With the incremental gate off, `artifacts.incremental` is absent and a signed incremental request returns `503 incremental_unavailable`. Unsigned requests are rejected. Signed tests also cover TTL exclusion, current-ID removals for TTL artifacts, moves into TTL channels, deleted initial heads, and scoped pages with exactly 100 and 3 upserts. A separate local scale test on `babcdb766` reads 10,050 tasks across 60,002 memberships. It uses seeded fixtures and a second relay state with the same signing key. The initial read takes 8.31 seconds over 101 pages with 4,923-byte events. A read with no changes takes 5.70 milliseconds. The candidate keeps the same database query. These are local measurements, not production limits. Cold pages repeat candidate scans and access checks. Writer load needs validation before fleet enablement. ```sh cargo test -p buzz-relay sync_downloads_ten_thousand_tasks_with_sixty_thousand_memberships -- --ignored --nocapture ``` The behavioral run uses `cargo build -p buzz-relay --bin buzz-relay`, then `cargo run -p buzz-relay --example artifact_incremental_final_oct30_f3`. The temporary harness drives the built relay and is removed after the run. The worktree is clean at the tested SHA. It does not exercise a native client. Git and S3 behavior are outside this validation. The [protocol](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/drouleau/artifact-snapshots/docs/nips/NIP-AR.md#incremental-reads) defines progress, removals, limits, and recovery. Relay verification covers the signed HTTP path. Native client verification belongs to [the client PR](https://github.com/block/buzz-app/pull/1507). Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Daniel Rouleau <drouleau@squareup.com> |
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ef4130da4b |
fix(db): keep lease releases durable and deflake PostgreSQL lane tests (#8676)
## Summary
When the user-deletion worker dropped a lease heartbeat, its pooled
connection could be left inside an open transaction. The worker's final
lease `release` then reported success but never committed, and a rerun
saw the request as "leased by another worker" for up to 60 s. The
heartbeat is now one autocommit `UPDATE`.
The PR also fixes six PostgreSQL-lane test flakes from the 21–28 Oct
2026 CI audit. It moves one relay test off the 100 ms-acquire test
helper before that test starts flaking the same way.
This is one of seven PRs split out of the `flakey-tests` branch
(siblings below). It touches only `buzz-db`, `buzz-deletion` and
`buzz-relay`. Every relay file except `connection.rs` and
`boot_lifecycle.rs` changes only for the helper rename in the last row.
### Related issue
None found. Nothing on `main` (
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4b21a10c4b |
fix: don't notify workflow owners through their attribution tag (#8694)
A workflow message names its owner in a marked p tag, ["p", owner, "", "owner"], for attribution. #p live, history and push matching, operator listeners, desktop, mobile and the iOS NSE treat that tag as attribution rather than a mention. A workflow that mentions its owner adds a plain p, so the owner is notified only when actually mentioned. NOSTR.md records the #p exception. Co-authored-by: studio <dc2fc481343672df31a689840c09299972e704dac592e0da6f18486646a7ee3e@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@squareup.com> |
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6d719c680a |
db: warm the relay read pool toward its ceiling at boot (#8651)
## Summary At boot the relay's read pool holds only its floor (`max/5`). A freshly started pod that meets a reconnect burst, such as the clients a rolling deploy just moved off an old pod, has to dial the rest of its reader connections inside the 150ms reader acquire budget. Cold dials (TCP + TLS + SCRAM) overrun that budget under load, so those reads fall back to the writer (`reader_acquire_timeout`). This PR warms the read pool toward its ceiling in the background, right after the existing boot ping succeeds: - **Off the startup path.** It runs in the boot-ping task that was already spawned and not awaited. Startup and readiness are unchanged. - **Bounded.** One pass, in waves of at most 5 concurrent dials. Each acquire, dial included, is bounded by the pool's own 150ms acquire timeout. A dial slower than that is dropped and counts as failed, just as it would on the request path. A wave that opens nothing ends the pass, and the pass runs at most twice the waves a clean pass needs. There is no sleep, backoff or second pass. - **Released idle, then reaped.** Warmed connections are dropped back into the pool, not closed. sqlx's existing `idle_timeout` reaps them back down to the floor, so there is no new reaping logic. - **Skipped if the reader is down.** If the boot ping finds the reader unreachable, the warm pass doesn't run. Today's all-writer warning is the only signal in that case. - **No alert noise.** Warm acquires use plain `acquire()`, not the instrumented reader acquire, so warm misses don't count toward the `buzz_db_reader_*` acquire-timeout metrics that fallback alerts watch. The existing `buzz_db_read_pool_*` gauges show the result. - **Logged.** The outcome is logged at info when the pool reaches its ceiling, and at warn when it falls short. Both lines carry `ceiling`, `held`, `failed` and `elapsed_ms`. The ceiling field isn't named `target`, because the relay's JSON formatter already emits the event target under that key. `held` counts the connections the pass dialed plus any idle floor connections it reused. - **Window.** Until the pass ends it holds every reader connection, the floor included. That is usually before the pod takes traffic. Boot-probe retries can delay the pass past the listener bind, though, so it can briefly overlap traffic, and a routed read that misses in that window falls back to the writer. **Cost.** Each pod holds up to `max_connections` reader connections, instead of the floor, for about `idle_timeout` after boot. Operators should size the reader's `max_connections` for pods × `BUZZ_DB_READ_POOL_SIZE` (falling back to `BUZZ_DB_POOL_SIZE`), counting the old and new pods that overlap during a rolling deploy. The configuration already permits that, and the `reader_min_connections` doc now gives the same advice. Booting pods can have up to the floor plus 5 dials in flight, because sqlx's floor maintenance dials alongside the first warm wave. **Simpler?** This adds one bounded helper and leaves the pool configuration alone: no new knob and no new metric. Separately, I identified some debt: a REQ with `limit: 0` still acquires a reader to run an empty query. A short-circuit straight to EOSE would remove that acquire, and a companion desktop change sends `limit: 0` live REQs. ### Related issue N/A. This is part of a set of reconnect-load reductions. The companion client changes (resume cursor, reconnect spreading) are in separate PRs. ### Testing - `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, plus `cargo clippy -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings`. - `cargo test -p buzz-db`, including 6 new `reader_warm_tests`: - a table test for wave sizing - an exact target - the bound when dials keep missing - a top-up after a partial wave - a dead reader ending the pass after one wave - an unreachable reader skipping the warm - The new Postgres test `reader_pool_postgres_tests::reader_boot_ping_warms_pool_to_max_in_background`: after `spawn_read_pool_boot_ping()`, the pool settles at size = idle = max. It runs through `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh` together with the existing reader-pool Postgres tests, and `scripts/test-postgres-test-discovery.sh` passes. - The new Postgres test `reader_pool_postgres_tests::reader_warm_at_production_budget_ends_partial_when_dials_stall`. It builds the pool with the production constructor, so it has the real 150ms budget, and puts it behind a proxy that relays 3 dials and stalls the rest mid-handshake. The pass must end with 3 held and 7 failed after exactly 10 dials, finish in under 2s, and not dial again afterward. - Mutation checks. Each of these failed a new test: - zero waves - targeting the floor instead of the ceiling - `close_on_drop` instead of releasing - no early abort - no wave bound - no top-up - no ping gate - no concurrency cap buzz-review-completed 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f6d31d13e4 |
db: answer match-nothing event reads without taking a connection (#8663)
## Summary A NIP-01 `limit: 0` REQ asks for no stored events: it is a live-only subscription. The relay still acquired a pool connection for it, then ran a `LIMIT 0` query. Desktop is moving live subscriptions to `limit: 0`, so these acquires add up during a reconnect burst. The existing match-nothing shortcuts in `query_events_on` (an empty `kinds`, `authors`, `ids` or `#e` list) had the same cost, because they ran after the caller had already acquired a connection. This PR moves the query validation and the match-nothing checks into one function, `answer_without_db`. It adds a zero page (`limit: 0`, after the page clamp) to those checks, and every entry point now calls the function before it acquires a connection: - `query_events_with_operation`, which covers `Db::query_events` and its writer variants - `Db::query_events_routed` - `Db::query_events_routed_bounded` - `query_events_on`, for the session (aux) path that already holds a connection Invalid queries still return the same errors, in the same order, and match-nothing queries still return an empty page. What changes besides the connection: - A routed match-nothing read now returns before `route_read`, so it emits no `buzz_db_route_decision` and runs no replica proof. As desktop moves live subscriptions to `limit: 0`, writer/replica route-decision ratios will shift. Fewer reads are routed; no read changes destination. - During a pool outage, an invalid query now returns its `InvalidData` error instead of the pool error. - A zero page skips checks that only SQL applies, such as rejecting a negative `offset`. Current callers only build non-negative offsets. **Simpler?** Yes. The four separate early returns become one predicate, and the page-limit clamp is computed in one place (`page_limit`), shared by the shortcut and the SQL builder. ### Related issue N/A. This is a follow-up from https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8651. ### Testing - New unit test, `runtime::postgres_tests::match_nothing_reads_take_no_connection`. Both pools point at a closed port, replica routing is on, and the fence is forced open, so a routed read that reached `route_read` would try the reader first. Each match-nothing shape (`limit: 0`, `max_limit: 0`, and an empty `kinds`, `authors`, `ids` or `#e` list) must return an empty page through the writer, routed and routed-bounded entry points. Invalid queries that would also match nothing must return `InvalidData` through each entry point. None of these may record a `buzz_db_pool_acquire_attempts_total`. A `limit: 1` routed control must fail after trying both the reader and the writer. The test runs in the `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --lib` unit lane. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d6196a16c1 | fix(relay): revoke invitations and restrict claims (#8237) | ||
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2c28e07133 |
BUZZ-413: Add user deletion fence storage (#8632)
## Summary Add storage and lock helpers for the first user-deletion fencing PR. No serving handler or deletion worker calls these helpers yet, so this does not block users or enable real deletion. The operator-global `user_deletion_fences` table stores global user restrictions and community-scoped agent restrictions. Community and profile deletion retain these rows unchanged. `scope_community_id` records a restriction's scope; it does not make the row community-owned. The helpers use the caller's transaction, stable identity lock keys, ordered shared/exclusive locks, and indexed lookups. Inserts preserve the original request and owner on retry and reject conflicting provenance. Inserts validate the current worker lease and approved inventory through the existing entity-deletion guards. Callers must still verify that the target identities and agent ownership belong to the request. This is an additive schema expansion with a five-second migration lock timeout. It adds no database triggers, functions, foreign keys, or backfills. Both schema sources and operator-global registrations are updated. The unused request-ID index was removed. The existing community-deletion catalog and purge logic are unchanged. Tests cover live schema parity, concurrency, rollback, and retention through the existing purge and verification functions. ### Related issue Part of [BUZZ-413](https://linear.app/squareup/issue/BUZZ-413/gate-user-and-owned-agent-activity). This is the storage foundation; serving checks and real workflow handlers follow separately. No duplicate fence-storage PR found. ### Testing No manual app testing: these utilities have no application callers yet. Local PostgreSQL validation uses an isolated test container and the repository's per-test database runner. Passed 84 selected PostgreSQL tests covering fence authorization, concurrent inserts, schema parity, retention, community deletion, entity-deletion storage, and user discovery. The authorization regression also failed as expected when the insertion guard was temporarily removed; the guard was restored before the final run. Command: `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-db --lib -E 'test(/user_deletion_fences/) | test(/admin_schema_parity_between/) | test(/^store::deletion::postgres_tests::/) | test(/^store::entity_deletion::postgres_tests::/) | test(/^store::user_deletion::/)'` with the local test PostgreSQL connection and `PG_BIN_DIR` configured. The full `just test` run had one failure: `composition_tests::composition_log_does_not_leak_issuer_url` missed an expected log message. The same compiled test passed when rerun alone. No relay logging code is changed by this PR. The full local `just ci` run and all normal pre-push hooks passed on the updated branch. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com> |
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646ef8abf9 |
Stop requiring the 0032 roster trigger at relay startup (#8611)
🤖 ## Summary When a relay starts, it checks that a database trigger from migration 0032 is installed and works. If the trigger is missing, the relay refuses to start. This PR removes that startup check, so a later migration can drop the trigger. The trigger blocks a stale channel member list from being saved. Since #8316, the relay runs the same check in Rust before every save of a member list. The trigger is now only a duplicate backstop. Removing it lets #8494 compute the `member`/`bot` label when it reads members, instead of storing `bot` in the database. This PR does not drop the trigger. The trigger stays installed and keeps working. Only the requirement that it exists at startup is removed. ### Related issue Prepares the trigger retirement that #8494 needs (review thread on #8494 about storing `bot`). No duplicate PRs found. ### Rollout `docs/database.md` requires this sequence for retiring a trigger: 1. Ship the replacement in the app. This was #8316. 2. Fully deploy a release in which no relay requires the trigger. **This PR.** 3. Drop the trigger in a separate migration, and name the step-2 release as a required stop in its release notes. A relay from before this PR refuses to start after the trigger is dropped. So every environment, staging included, must run this release before the drop ships. ## Details - Removed the startup step `channel_roster_fence`, which ran the catalog check and a behavior probe (a test insert that must be rejected, then rolled back). - Removed the catalog check that ran after migrations in `run_migrations_locked`. - The catalog check function stays, but only tests use it. - Removed four tests about the startup gate. Added `migrations_run_without_the_roster_trigger`: it drops the trigger in a scratch database and runs the migrations. If the post-migration check comes back, the test fails. - `observability_source` lists the event writers that may skip the guard. The probe was one of them, so it is removed from those lists, and the expected writer count goes from 9 to 8. - The Helm chart README now says that newer relays do not require the trigger. ### Testing - `cargo clippy -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --all-targets -D warnings` and `cargo fmt --check` pass. - `observability_source` (21) and `startup_steps` (6) pass. - `migrations_run_without_the_roster_trigger` passes. With the post-migration catalog check restored, it fails with "channel roster fence trigger missing". 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f33ebaafa1 |
refactor(schema): stop auto-fencing new tables in desired-state bootstrap (#8620)
### Why?
This is a cleanup that brings the schema bootstrap in line with how the
codebase works today, as asked for by
[`docs/database.md`](
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834dca26bf |
Generate user community inventory for the dummy deletion workflow (#8605)
## Summary User deletion can now discover current communities from a hex public key or npub, save that inventory, and run it through the existing approval and dummy workflow. `--pubkey demo` remains the default. Execution only prints messages; it does not fence users or delete data. Discovery combines explicit relay memberships with active channel memberships, including users who have no relay membership row. It deduplicates communities and preserves owner relationships. The saved manifest contains only community IDs, labels and relationships. Historical discovery and owned-community execution remain later work. Submission rejects owner inventories atomically with a specific unsupported-execution error; preview still includes owners. This is an expand-schema change after #8520. Migrations 0072–0073 replace the demo-only target check with a bounded identifier check, with 5-second lock and 30-second statement timeouts. The database keeps the user-only entity-type check while allowing different identity formats in the target field. Workflow-specific commands reject entity types they cannot execute. The application currently resolves demo and hex/npub inputs; account-ID lookup is future work. The desired-state constraint matches. No backfill, trigger, function, or foreign key is added. Existing demo rows remain valid. Old binaries fail closed on new manifests; use the new CLI for their approval and execution. Older auto-migrating binaries need the documented rollback procedure. Identity parsing and demo fixture selection stay in intake. Approval and resume use the saved target without reparsing its format. The user workflow defines its stage names and handlers; CLI stage validation reads those rules instead of a separate three-name list. Shared persistence accepts caller-defined stages. Permanent target uniqueness is unchanged. Dummy submissions and execution belong in isolated, disposable development databases; production preview uses read-only access. CLI operator names remain self-asserted. ### Related issue Follows #8520. Searched open PRs; no duplicate inventory change found. #8489 is earlier workflow scaffolding. ### Testing Built `buzz-admin` locally and applied all migrations to a fresh disposable PostgreSQL database. Ran the actual CLI through preview → submit → inspect → approve → `run --next-step` → resume → completed for both demo and a public key with a channel-only membership fixture. Demo completed five stages; the public-key run completed three. Injected `--fail-stage purge_db`, waited for the retry deadline, and resumed the same failed stage successfully. Membership data remained intact. Repeated the CLI workflow on October 26 for demo and an npub backed by a fresh production inventory. Production access used read-only credentials and the real `inventory --pubkey "$SUBJECT"` handler. Copied only the relevant discovery fields into an isolated local PostgreSQL database; local channel parent rows supplied placeholder fields for foreign keys. The inventory saved by local submission exactly matched the production result. All workflow writes stayed local. For each input, ran `submit --pubkey "$SUBJECT" --requested-by local-e2e-submitter`, inspected the saved inventory, and confirmed execution before approval was rejected. Approved its digest, then ran each handler with `run "$REQUEST_ID" --next-step --stage-delay-ms 2500` in a new process. Captured all three workflow tables during and after every stage. Demo completed five stages across two communities; the npub completed three stages for its discovered community. Each handler saved `dummy: true`. Both requests finished with no current stage, no worker lease, and no retries. Copied memberships remained intact. This additional run exercised orderly resume; it did not inject a failure. The reproducible command sequence and fixture setup are in [the inventory walkthrough](docs/operator-user-deletion-inventory.md). Production was not changed. The earlier full-workflow runs used synthetic local fixtures; the additional npub run used captured production discovery fields. Repository-wide `just ci` was not run; validation focused on the affected packages and PostgreSQL workflow. The pre-push desktop build failed with “Too many open files in system.” Stopped the broader hook run and bypassed it to publish the earlier commits; the affected-package Clippy and formatting checks had passed. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com> |
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0e36dbc823 |
fix(db): keep the reader pool warm and drop its pre-acquire ping (#8495)
## Summary
The reader pool's 150ms `acquire_timeout` covers the whole acquire: the
pre-acquire idle-connection ping **and** any new-connection dial (TCP +
TLS + SCRAM). When readers slow down for a moment, the timeout:
- abandons in-flight dials mid-handshake (Postgres logs `could not
accept SSL connection: EOF detected`),
- closes healthy idle connections whose ping overran instead of
returning them to the pool, and
- falls every miss back to the writer, which then exhausts its own pool.
Across a fleet of relay pods this shows up as a burst of abandoned
handshakes on the readers that starts on nearly every pod at once,
followed seconds later by writer pool-acquire timeouts. The database
itself reports no statement, lock, or connection-limit errors before the
burst: the client is tearing down its own reader connections.
This PR removes that amplifier. It does not change the request budget,
writer fallback, or the writer pool.
### Change (`crates/buzz-db/src/runtime/mod.rs`)
- **Warm floor:** reader `min_connections` is now `max / 5`, at least 1,
derived from the existing reader pool size (no new config knob). sqlx
re-dials the floor in background maintenance, outside the request
budget, from its reaper and whenever a connection is closed instead of
released. The floor is per relay process, so standing reader connections
are the floor times the number of relay processes; size the reader's
`max_connections` for it.
- **Floor fills at boot:** with `max_lifetime`/`idle_timeout` set, a
lazy sqlx 0.9 pool does not dial `min_connections` at construction. The
existing boot ping now closes its probe connection instead of returning
it, which triggers sqlx's floor maintenance. Probe acquires that overrun
150ms retry with bounded backoff (250ms, 500ms, 1s, 2s). The doc comment
that said sqlx dials the minimum eagerly was wrong for this config and
is corrected.
- **`test_before_acquire(false)` on the reader:** the routed read's
`BEGIN … READ ONLY` already proves the connection and fails closed to
the writer (`reader_validation_error`). This removes one round trip per
checkout and the warm-connection churn.
- **Bounded fence proof:** with no pre-acquire ping, the proof (Aurora
capability probe, `BEGIN`, heartbeat observation) is the first round
trip on a checkout. It now runs under `READER_PROOF_TIMEOUT` (1s), so a
reader that stops answering without closing its sockets (partition, host
loss, failover) fails closed to the writer as the new route reason
`reader_proof_timeout` instead of hanging the request until TCP gives
up. 1s is well above a normal round trip, so a brief reader stall waits
on the reader rather than flooding the writer.
- **Bounded release:** every connection returned to the reader pool
first passes a release check bounded at 5s (`Db::read_pool_options`).
sqlx's own release ping has no timeout, so without this a socket whose
reader went silent would hold its slot until the kernel gives up; with
every slot held that way, the pool cannot dial the reader that replaced
it, and all routed reads fall back to the writer. A check that times out
or errors closes the socket and frees the slot, and floor maintenance
dials a replacement. A connection still inside a transaction is closed
instead of returned: a checkout dropped while its `BEGIN` was in flight
(a timed-out proof, a cancelled caller) has no `ROLLBACK` queued,
because sqlx counts the transaction only once `BEGIN` is acknowledged.
Closing it ends the session, and the server rolls it back. An expired
proof is therefore simply dropped. Maintenance checkouts (fleet usage
collection) also keep their close-on-drop: when one is abandoned at its
deadline, its socket is closed under sqlx's 5s close bound rather than
going through the release path.
- **Pinned isolation default:** reader sessions set
`default_transaction_isolation=read committed` in the startup packet,
which takes precedence over database and role defaults. The release
check depends on this, because it detects an open routed-read
transaction by its `REPEATABLE READ` isolation.
- **Metric:** each close is counted in
`buzz_db_reader_release_closed_total{reason}` (`timeout`, `error`,
`open_transaction`). Operator notes for the floor,
`reader_proof_timeout`, and this counter are in
`deploy/charts/buzz/README.md`.
### What got simpler
- The reader checkout path does one less round trip and no longer closes
healthy connections on a slow ping.
- Boot warm-up reuses sqlx's own `min_connections` maintenance rather
than re-implementing it.
- One release rule now covers every reader checkout, so the
open-transaction leak on cancelled reads no longer needs special
handling per call site.
- No new config knob.
- The reader test proxy now lives once in `test_support` instead of
inside `store/usage.rs`.
- Tests build their reader pools from the production options rather than
hand-copied ones.
### Tradeoffs
- The reader is now dialed at boot (previously "no reader dial at
boot"). If the reader is down at boot, this only produces log noise, and
reads still fail closed to the writer.
- The release check is one trivial statement (`SELECT
current_setting(...)`) per released reader connection. It runs in sqlx's
release task, after the response, so request latency is unchanged.
- The check detects an open transaction by comparing the current
isolation level with the session default. That is only sound because the
reader session default is pinned to `READ COMMITTED` and routed reads
begin `REPEATABLE READ`.
- **Residual window:** after the release check passes, sqlx sends its
own release ping (one more round trip), and that ping has no timeout. A
serving-read connection whose endpoint goes silent between those two
round trips still holds its slot until TCP gives up. Only releases
already mid-ping at that instant are exposed: later releases fail the
bounded check first and are closed. sqlx behaves the same way for every
pool on `main`. Maintenance checkouts avoid it through close-on-drop.
Bounding it for serving reads would mean replacing sqlx's release path
or putting a pooler in front of the reader, so it is left as a
follow-up.
- Boot fill is best effort. Each boot-probe retry still uses the 150ms
serving acquire budget, so if cold handshakes consistently take longer
than that, all five attempts fail and the floor is not filled at boot.
It fills the first time any reader connection is closed, which the
reaper and the release check both do, and until then reads dial as
before.
- This also closes pre-existing debt: a caller that dropped a routed
read mid-`BEGIN` (client disconnect) could leave a connection `idle in
transaction`. The release check covers that path too.
### Related issue
N/A (production incident follow-up; none found).
### Testing
- Postgres tests (`runtime/tests/reader_pool_postgres_tests.rs`):
- the boot ping leaves the reader pool at exactly its floor, all idle
(base leaves one connection);
- a warm reader whose heartbeat read blocks (exclusive lock) falls back
to the writer as `reader_proof_timeout` within one proof budget;
- a warm reader connection terminated server-side falls back as
`reader_validation_error` with no client error;
- a proof that times out mid-`BEGIN` on a paused reader (a test proxy
that holds bytes, like `docker pause`) falls back as
`reader_proof_timeout`. The reader database default is set to
`REPEATABLE READ` for this test. Once the reader resumes, it leaves no
`idle in transaction` reader backend, and the close is counted as
`open_transaction`. The test fails if the release check is made blind to
open transactions, or if the isolation pin is removed.
- Failover: every established reader session is stalled while new
sessions get through. Each stalled warm connection costs one
`reader_proof_timeout`, then routed reads reach the reader again through
new connections within 8s, and the closes are counted as `timeout`. The
test fails with the release bound removed.
- `store/usage.rs`: a fleet collection abandoned at its deadline on a
paused reader frees its slot within 3s while the reader is still paused,
which is faster than the 5s release check. The test fails with
maintenance close-on-drop removed.
- Unit tests: the min-connections mapping, the reader pool options, and
that construction still dials nothing.
- Blox, at `f3e3bf158`: `just fmt-check` and `just clippy` are clean,
and `buzz-db` unit tests are 191/191.
- Blox, at `01745b21e`: fmt is clean, the targeted reader tests passed 3
of 3 runs, and the release-bound and transaction-blind mutations both
turn the targeted tests red.
- Blox, at `2f8e482fb` (before the rebase onto `main`): fmt and clippy
are clean, the targeted reader tests passed 3 of 3 runs, `buzz-db` unit
tests pass, and each of four mutations turns its targeted test red:
release bound, transaction-blind check, isolation pin, and maintenance
close-on-drop.
- Blox, at the rebased head `e80bc2bed`: the same four mutations each
turn their targeted test red, and fmt, clippy, the targeted reader tests
(3 of 3 runs) and `buzz-db` unit tests are clean.
- CI Postgres lane at `e80bc2bed`: 1130/1130 passed, including every new
reader-pool test.
- Live check at `e80bc2bed`: a relay with a two-slot reader pool behind
a proxy, which was then frozen for 18s. All 246 history reads succeeded,
and the slowest took 1.0s. During the freeze, 2 proof timeouts and 2
release-timeout closes were counted. Reads returned to the reader within
36ms of the resume, and no reader backend was left `idle in
transaction`.
- Rebase note: `main` added a reader `after_connect` hook that tightens
`statement_timeout`. It now lives in `Db::read_pool_options`, so the
tests' reader pools get it too.
---------
Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a3a47e6294 |
feat(relay): add an unlisted channel setting (#8579)
🤖 ## Summary Sharing a Solo chat with a large channel today means adding every person as a member, one at a time, and the app blocks the share past 100 people. The plan is to share it the way Google Docs does with "anyone at the company with the link". Buzz's `open` visibility already gives that kind of access: anyone in the community can read and join an open channel. The problem is that an open channel also shows up in everyone's channel list and search, and a private chat shouldn't appear there just because its link was posted somewhere. This PR adds a channel setting, `unlisted`. An **unlisted open channel** can be read and joined by anyone who names it by id (from a shared link). For non-members, it is left out of every read that does not name it. Members see it as before. This is the relay side only; the buzz-app change comes later. #8575 (batch adds) remains the path for small audiences. Unlisted is not an access control. Anyone who has the id can read the channel, and that is intended. ## Solo flows this supports Each user action is one event. The buzz-app side comes later; the relay supports all of these now. | Flow | Event | Result | | --- | --- | --- | | New Solo chat | kind:9007 `visibility private` + `["unlisted", "true"]` | The chat starts unlisted, so it stays unlisted when any client later opens it. | | Share | One kind:9002: `visibility open` + `unlisted true` + `join_role guest\|member`. Then post the link. | Anyone with the link can read the chat by id, both history and live. Nobody is added as a member, so the chat isn't in anyone's channel list. A non-member can't post; `join_role` decides whether someone who joins can. | | View | A REQ that names the chat by `#h`, or by `#d` for its metadata | A non-member can read it. It is never listed for them. | | Reply | kind:9021 join (the app sends it before a viewer's first reply) | Joining makes them a member with the role from `join_role`, so with `member` they can post. A kind:9022 leave makes them a viewer again; the chat stays readable by id. | | Unshare | kind:9002 `visibility private` | The existing open→private eviction closes non-members' live subscriptions. New reads by non-members are refused. | | Convert to a channel | One kind:9002: `["t", ""]` + `unlisted false`, plus `visibility` | Clears the Solo label. Non-members can now find it in discovery. | **Sidebar pins are not relay state.** Pin and unpin live in the app's existing kind:30078 sidebar preferences, which sync across devices and don't touch membership. Don't map them to join/leave: someone a chat was shared with by member add is already a member, so a leave would remove their access. Your own Solo chats keep showing up, because you're their owner member, and members see unlisted channels everywhere. Existing Solo chats aren't backfilled. They get the flag when they're shared, because the share event sets it. **Open question, not built here:** someone who only views a shared chat isn't a member. A mention of them doesn't reach their inbox (`#p:[me]` without `#h`) and sends them no push. ## Behavior | Reader | Reads that don't name the channel (kind:39000 without `#d`, `#P` creator queries, messages, COUNT, NIP-50 search, artifact queries, channel list) | Reads that name it (`#h`, or `#d` on 39000–39003) | kind:9021 join | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Member | Listed | Readable | n/a | | Non-member, unlisted open channel | **Not listed** | Readable | Works; `join_role` still decides the role | | Non-member, private channel (unlisted or not) | Not listed | Not readable | Refused | - **Setting it:** kind:9002 `["unlisted", "true"]` / `["unlisted", "false"]`. Owner or admin only, like `visibility`. A missing tag means no change. It can be sent in the same event as `["visibility", "open"]`, so a private chat becomes open and unlisted in one step. Any other value is refused before the event is stored. The relay posts an `unlisted_changed` system message and clears the accessible-channels cache across nodes. Nobody loses access when a channel is unlisted, so no subscriptions are evicted. - **At creation:** kind:9007 also takes `["unlisted", "true"|"false"]`. A missing tag means listed. Any other value is refused before the event is stored, as on kind:9002. It is stored with the channel row in the create's transaction, on both the client-UUID path and the relay-chosen-UUID path. - **kind:39000** carries a bare `["unlisted"]` flag while the setting is on. It does not add NIP-29 `hidden`, so the metadata stays readable by id. - **NIP-11** advertises `buzz-unlisted-channels` in `supported_extensions`. A relay without this PR would apply `["visibility", "open"]` and ignore `unlisted`, which would list the chat publicly. So buzz-app must check for the extension before it sends that pair. - **CLI:** `buzz channels update --channel <id> --unlisted true|false` and `buzz channels create ... --unlisted`. `buzz_sdk::build_update_channel` takes a new `unlisted: Option<bool>` argument, and `buzz_sdk::build_create_channel` takes `unlisted: bool`, which emits the tag only when true. ### Open question: does `unlisted` only mean something when the channel is open? **Decision: store it on its own; it only has an effect while the channel is open.** Private channels are already invisible to non-members, so on a private channel the flag does nothing. It is still stored and published, for three reasons: - a client can mark a Solo chat unlisted before opening it, or in the same event that opens it, so the chat is never listed even for a moment; - switching private → open → private → open keeps the setting; - there is no cross-field rule in kind:9002 to validate or keep in sync. kind:39000 publishes the flag as stored, whatever the visibility, so clients can show the setting. ## How The relay already has a "readable only when named" path for system channels (NIP-CL). Unlisted open channels reuse it: - **`get_accessible_channel_ids`**: the open half (the implicit scope of a REQ that doesn't name a channel) adds `AND NOT unlisted`. The member half is unchanged, so members still have the channel. - **`get_readable_named_only_channels`**: also returns unlisted open channels of the legacy types. Every reader of that set (REQ, COUNT, NIP-50 search, HTTP `/query` and `/count`, thread windows, workflow run reads) adds a named-only channel only to a filter that names it, through `filter_channel_scope`. An unlisted channel's type is `stream`/`forum`, so the `#t:["system"]`/`#P` system opt-in never adds it. - **`get_accessible_channels`** (the channel list): open channels are listed to non-members only when not unlisted. - **`query_artifacts`**: an artifact in an unlisted open channel reaches a non-member only when the query's `#h` names that channel. - **Live fan-out:** no change was needed. A global subscription never receives channel-scoped events, kind:39000 included (`fan_out_scoped`). A channel-scoped subscription has to name the channel, and that goes through the same named-only authorization. **Left alone on purpose:** access checks that read a named channel or event keep treating an unlisted channel as open. These are `handle_join_request` (kind:9021), the ingest write gate, operator-listener mention delivery (`load_deliverable_event`), personal read-state writes, and push matching. Push matching still requires membership, so non-members get no pushes from an unlisted channel. **Named reads checked:** these callers use the implicit channel set (`get_accessible_channel_ids`, its cache, `get_accessible_channels`). Every one that reads a channel the request names also adds the named-only set, so a non-member can still read an unlisted open chat by id. That covers WS REQ (history, live registration, NIP-50 search), WS COUNT, HTTP `/query` and `/count`, thread windows and workflow run reads. Other named reads don't use the implicit set: they check visibility or membership, so an unlisted open chat counts as open. Those are live fan-out, the ingest write gate, typing, kind:9021 join, huddle audio join, operator-listener delivery, the workflow sink and read-state writes. Feed queries (mentions, needs-action, activity) and the `/buzz/v1/me/sidebar` accessory API are lists, so leaving out chats you only view is intended. Media reads don't check channels. `buzz-auth`'s `ChannelAccessChecker` has no production implementation. ## Database (docs/database.md checklist) - **Phase:** expand only. The migration adds a column with a constant default, and the same release ships the code that reads and writes it. No backfill or contract step follows. - No trigger, function, procedure, rule or foreign key is added. - No migration changes existing rows. `ADD COLUMN ... BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE` stores the constant default in the catalog, so the table is not rewritten. - Every location in Rule 4 is updated: `migrations/0069_channel_unlisted.sql`, `schema/tables/public/channels.sql`, and the migration count. No seeds, types or reconcile changes are needed. `admin_schema_parity_between_desired_state_and_migrations` now compares `channels` columns between the pgschema desired state and the migrated database. I failed it once by removing the column from `channels.sql`. Only columns are compared for `channels`: on current `main`, pgschema already re-emits `idx_channels_id_live` without its `INCLUDE (community_id)`, an index drift that predates this PR and is noted in the test. - **Currently deployed relay against the new schema:** it never selects or writes `unlisted`, and every insert gets the default. All channel-record queries name their columns. Nobody can set the flag until this relay ships, because the old relay refuses a kind:9002 whose only tag is `unlisted`. - The migration starts with `SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '5s'`. No index is added: the new predicates ride the existing `(community_id, visibility)` index. ## Rollout 1. Deploy. Every channel stays listed, so nothing changes. 2. **Don't unlist any channel while an old relay is still running.** An old relay ignores the column and lists the channel to everyone. The NIP-11 extension lets clients gate on this. Unlisted isn't an access boundary, so a mixed fleet only exposes the channel in listings for a while. 3. **Rollback:** an older relay ignores the column, so unlisted channels show up as ordinary open channels again. Nothing breaks. ## Tests Postgres (`buzz-db`, discovered by the Postgres lane): - `unlisted_open_channel_is_named_only_for_non_members`: sets the flag through `update_channel`. Then checks that a non-member doesn't get it from `get_accessible_channel_ids` or `get_accessible_channels`, and does get it from `get_readable_named_only_channels`; that a member still lists it; that `put_member` (the kind:9021 path) lets the non-member join, after which they list it; and that listing it again shows it to a new reader. - `unlisted_private_channel_stays_private_and_opens_unlisted`: a private unlisted channel is not readable by name, and opening it keeps the flag. - `group_metadata_publishes_the_stored_unlisted_flag`, plus the unit test `publishes_the_unlisted_flag_as_stored`. - `unlisted_channel_artifacts_are_read_by_name_for_non_members`. - `channel_created_unlisted_is_never_listed`: creating through `create_channel_with_event` (the kind:9007 path) and `create_labeled_channel` stores the flag, and the channel is never listed to a non-member. - Mutation-checked: each of `NOT unlisted` in the implicit scope, `NOT c.unlisted` in the channel list, the unlisted branch of the named-only query, its `visibility = 'open'` guard, and the artifact condition was removed one at a time, and each removal failed at least one of these tests. Relay E2E (`test_nip29_unlisted_channel_wire`, added to the CI relay E2E step), against a local relay built from this branch: - A non-member or an unknown value is refused. - kind:39000 by `#d` carries `unlisted` and `public`, and not `hidden`. - kind:39000 discovery without `#d`: non-members don't see the channel, members do. - History and NIP-50 search: unnamed, a non-member doesn't see the channel's messages; with `#h`, they do; a member sees them unnamed. - A kind:9021 join works, and the joiner then lists the channel. - Listing it again shows it to everyone. - A reader whose channel set was cached before each change sees the change at once. I ran this against a relay with the cache invalidation removed, and it failed. Relay E2E (`test_nip29_solo_share_and_convert_wire`, added to the CI relay E2E step), each flow as a single event: - kind:9007 with an unknown `unlisted` value is refused. A chat created with `unlisted true` publishes the flag, and stays unlisted after a plain `visibility open`. - Share (open + unlisted + `join_role guest` in one kind:9002): a non-member doesn't list the chat. They read it by `#h`, both history and a live message, and can't post. A kind:9021 join lists it for them as a read-only guest. A kind:9022 leave unlists it again, and it stays readable by `#h`. - Unshare (`visibility private`): the viewer's live subscription gets CLOSED, and a new `#h` read is refused. - Convert (`["t", ""]` + `unlisted false`): the Solo label is cleared, and a non-member finds the chat in discovery. - I ran this against a relay that dropped the kind:9007 flag, and it failed. Also run: `cargo test` for buzz-db, buzz-sdk, buzz-cli, buzz-core, buzz-relay and buzz-test-client; the Postgres lane for buzz-db and buzz-relay (1045 tests); and the existing unlisted, announce, departure, guest, role-change and NIP-43 snapshot wire tests. In the lane, two tests failed on pool timeouts (`resend_validated_after_the_first_commit_is_a_duplicate`, `edit_replaces_and_clears_labels`) and passed when rerun alone. An earlier run had the same kind of flake: `routed_fallback_spends_one_acquire_budget_when_aurora_cache_is_cold` (a timing budget) and `resent_edit_is_a_duplicate` (a pool timeout). In a full local `e2e_relay` run, three tests outside CI's list also failed (`test_invite_*` twice, `test_unarchive_emits_member_added_notification`). They fail the same way on a relay built from `main`. ## Not in this PR - The buzz-app follow-up: support open Solo chats, the join-from-card view, the large-audience prompt, and gating on `buzz-unlisted-channels`. - A NIP-CL update. The behavior is documented in NOSTR.md ("Unlisted channels"). buzz-review-completed --------- Signed-off-by: Bradley Axen <baxen@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: ART <ea39c1c8acf57180161ef4ba4ed68abf8589f5291956b909a5aa991fc66664ca@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: mbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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4250014bae |
Run user deletion through saved stage transitions (#8520)
## Summary An operator can submit, approve, and run a synthetic user-deletion request through a durable workflow. The actions print messages; they do not gate real users or delete data. The inventory contains artificial participant and former-participant communities. The worker calls one transition function, `get_next_stage(lease, previous_stage_id)`. It receives a full stage row, passes it to the handler, then asks again. All branching, community tracking, initialization, and recovery live behind that function. Existing community-deletion execution is unchanged. ### Related issue Builds on merged #8496 and targets `main`. Inventory, separate approval records, and the dummy executor remain together in this PR. ### Execution design ```text approve → save approval; create no stages run → claim request get_next_stage(lease, None) → full stage row handler(lease, row) → persist status and result get_next_stage(lease, Some(row.id)) → next row / Finished / WaitUntil repeat, then release ownership ``` - **Approval:** bind an operator's decision to the saved inventory digest. Approval creates no execution rows. Operator names remain self-asserted demo input. - **Initialization:** claiming preserves the parent lifecycle. The first transition creates `gate_user` and changes `approved` to `running` atomically. A crash after claim but before initialization can safely restart. - **Handler:** read `metadata_json.inputs`, mark the row running, and save its result or failure. A successful action leaves its row `completed` and `is_current = true`. This is a durable transition waiting to be processed. - **Transition:** lock the parent, validate ownership, reload history and the handler's saved result, and choose an allowed destination. Clear the old current flag, save the decision, and insert the successor with its inputs in one transaction. Terminal transitions complete the parent instead. An insertion failure leaves the completed old row current. - **Recovery:** `previous_stage_id` identifies the handler that just returned; it must belong to the request. A restarted worker passes `None` and finds the saved current row. If that row is completed, transition it without repeating its action. If the switch already committed, return the saved successor. Repeated calls never apply the old transition twice. - **Progress:** reconstruct covered communities from saved decisions and the approved inventory. Each stage records its predecessor ID, so reconstruction does not depend on timestamp ordering. Missing current state in a started request, disconnected history, unknown stages, and malformed results fail without inventing progress. - **Ownership:** parent leases last 60 seconds and handlers renew them every ten seconds. Generation checks reject stale writes. Handler and renewal futures remain independently polled; renewal cannot prevent a handler holding the parent lock from committing. - **Step-by-step testing:** `run --next-step` executes one handler, commits its transition, and exits with the successor pending. Repeat the same command to advance again; the final step completes the request. The former `--max-stages` and `--pause-after-handler` flags are removed. - **Failure:** the handler saves the current row's error and a 30-second retry deadline. The transition returns `WaitUntil`; the worker exits and releases its lease. A later invocation retries the same row. No background scheduler or automatic retry daemon is added. The user workflow definition in `buzz-deletion/src/user/workflow.rs` declares allowed destinations and a decision function per stage. `gate_user` enters the first uncovered community. `purge_db` reads saved `has_agents`: true selects `purge_agents`; false completes the community immediately. Community completion selects the next uncovered community, or finishes the request when all are covered. No full stage plan is created upfront. The transition transaction contains no stage-name comparisons or fixed community count. Stage metadata stores `inputs`, `result`, `transition`, and `previous_stage_id`. The parent retains inventory, ownership, retry, and overall status. Approval evidence stays in `entity_deletion_approvals`. A completed-current row bridges the two transactions; real handlers will still need idempotent or reconciled actions if a process dies before saving its result. ### Code organization `buzz-deletion/src/user/worker.rs` runs the loop and heartbeat. Sibling `handlers.rs` executes dummy actions. `transition.rs` defines `UserDeletionTransition.get_next_stage()`, and `workflow.rs` owns the user stage rules and community-progress reconstruction. The CLI remains in `user.rs`. `buzz-db/src/store/entity_deletion/` contains shared workflow persistence: a small `mod.rs`, request reads/inspection in `requests.rs`, approval evidence in `approvals.rs`, ownership in `leases.rs`, and stage outcomes/atomic transitions in `stages.rs`. User-specific submission, demo inventory, and inventory validation live separately in `buzz-db/src/store/user_deletion/{requests,inventory}.rs`; its `mod.rs` only defines and exports the store. The worker calls the user transition object, which supplies a synchronous decision function to `EntityDeletionStore.transition_stage`. The store locks the parent, reads saved state, invokes that function, checks the returned operation, and commits its writes. The decision function performs no SQL or external calls. Reading, deciding, and writing remain in one transaction; there is no stale-state gap. Shared storage contains no user stage names or community-routing rules. User-specific approval validation also runs inside the shared approval transaction. This reorganization changes no tables, migrations, stage metadata, or CLI behavior. Requests using the existing saved-result format continue to work. `--next-step` still runs one handler and commits its transition before returning. ### Testing The walkthrough in [docs/operator-user-deletion-executor.md](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/rarora/user-deletion-approval/docs/operator-user-deletion-executor.md) includes commands, SQL inspection, expected rows, and recovery boundaries. Submitted and approved a fresh local request and verified zero stage rows. Ran `run --next-step` five times. Each call completed exactly one handler, released ownership, and left its successor pending: B DB, B agents, C DB, C agents, then request completed. A sixth call left saved state unchanged. Verified both removed flags are rejected. Ran `--demo-no-agents-in 00000000-0000-0000-0000-00000000000c` and verified four completed rows, with no C agents stage. Injected a DB-stage failure, verified immediate retry refusal, waited for the real deadline, and resumed the same stage row. Observed heartbeat renewal and rejection of a competing worker, killed the owned worker process, waited for its actual lease expiry, and resumed the same unfinished stage with a new generation. Re-running a completed request left its saved state unchanged. Repeated the CLI walkthrough after the file reorganization, including runtime branching and a retry after the real deadline; a completed request created before the reorganization remained unchanged. Mutation-tested the ownership and recovery guards against local PostgreSQL 17. Reclaiming with the same executor ID rejects old-generation operations. Independently disabling the ownership generation check, release generation check, saved-transition/result comparison, or heartbeat-failure handling made the corresponding test fail. Restored all four protections afterward. The heartbeat test takes over the request while its handler is already running. ### Schema and rollout Unmerged migrations 0069–0070 add inventory and execution fields, widen request lifecycle states, and create operator-global approval and stage-history tables. They set five-second lock and thirty-second statement timeouts; constraint validation has its own transaction. No triggers, functions, foreign keys, or data backfills are added. Desired-state and migration catalog parity cover all three tables. The transition redesign adds no further schema changes. The serving relay does not schedule these requests. Only the explicit operator CLI runs them, using PostgreSQL. Only `demo:` targets are accepted. Real account discovery, user-write fencing, owned-community handling, and actual deletion remain future work. Verify staging with a new demo label and the documented commands. Older draft requests do not have the new stage metadata contract. Preserve them and create a new demo request for this version; they are not a supported resume format. Use a fresh database if an earlier draft applied a different migration checksum. Never alter sqlx migration checksums. With Helm `migrate.autoMigrate=true` (the chart default), a relay binary that lacks 0069/0070 fails at boot with sqlx `VersionMissing` after those migrations are applied. Recovery for this rollout is a roll-forward: deploy a corrected binary that retains the migrations. Do not delete migration records or change checksums to force an older binary to boot. Rolling back with auto-migration disabled requires a separately verified schema-compatibility plan. Demo requests, stage history, and approvals are intentionally retained; this scaffold has no cleanup command or retention job. Recheck migration numbering before merge. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com> |
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20ba95ed89 |
fix(db): rebuild events_pkey in declared order after pgschema apply (#8525)
## Summary Re-applying `schema/schema.sql` to a database that `pgschema apply` and `scripts/reconcile-schema-after-pgschema.sql` already bootstrapped fails with `cannot drop inherited constraint "events_p2026_01_pkey" of relation "events_p2026_01" (SQLSTATE 42P16)`. Because of that, `scripts/start-relay-for-tests.sh` breaks against a reused database. **Cause:** pgschema 1.7.4 moves a partitioned table's partition key to the front of its primary key when it creates the table. A pgschema-bootstrapped `events` therefore gets `PRIMARY KEY (created_at, community_id, id)`. `schema/tables/public/events.sql` and `migrations/0001` both declare `(community_id, created_at, id)`. Every later plan drops and re-adds `events_pkey` and each declared child's key. This happens even on a database that was never reconciled. The plan only becomes unexecutable after the reconcile script attaches the children, because their keys are then inherited. As a side effect, pgschema-bootstrapped databases also had a differently ordered PK index than migration-managed ones. **Fix:** after the partition ATTACH block, the reconcile script now compares `events_pkey` with the declared `PRIMARY KEY (community_id, created_at, id)`. If they differ, it rebuilds the key on the parent. It then asserts that `events` and every partition carry the declared key, which is the "convergence plus live assertion" shape `docs/database.md` requires. PostgreSQL recreates each partition's key with the same `<child>_pkey` names, so a reconciled re-apply now plans nothing. The block does nothing when the key is already correct. `migrations/0001` is untouched. Only pgschema-bootstrapped dev and test databases run this script, so it does not touch the out-of-band partitioned-table procedure. `delivery_log` is not affected. Its key `(delivered_at, id)` already starts with the partition key. **Existing local databases:** a database reconciled before this change would still fail its next `pgschema apply`, because the reconcile script only runs after apply. The repair therefore also lives in `scripts/repair-events-pkey.sql`. That file does nothing when `events` doesn't exist yet, and `scripts/start-relay-for-tests.sh` runs it before apply; it's the only launcher that reuses its database. The reconcile script keeps a verbatim copy for fresh bootstraps, and a unit test keeps the two identical. The rebuild drops the key with `IF EXISTS`, so a database that has lost its key still converges. It also takes its locks with a 10s `lock_timeout`. If a relay still holds `events`, it fails with "Stop any relay using this database, then rerun" instead of hanging. `start-relay-for-tests.sh` now builds the relay's `DATABASE_URL` from the `PG*` variables it already exports. The secret scanner flags the literal URI once the file is touched. The value is unchanged. pgschema 1.13.3 keeps the declared order and creates children as native `PARTITION OF`. Upgrading would make this block and the ATTACH blocks unnecessary, but it changes behavior for every caller, so it is left for a separate change. ### Related issue Follow-up to block/buzz#8487, which added the probe test and `.pgschemaignore`. Now rebased onto `main` after that PR merged. ### Testing - `pgschema_reapply_keeps_runtime_partitions` now asserts the plan after the maintenance pass is **empty**, which replaces the `DROP TABLE` and per-monthly plan checks. It then applies and reconciles a second time. Without the new block it fails with `ALTER TABLE events DROP CONSTRAINT events_pkey; ...`. With the block it passes. - It also includes the optional notes from the #8487 review: - After maintenance, it checks that both catch-alls are still present and attached, not only that the zipped bounds differ. - The first runtime monthly comes from the declared catch-all's lower bound instead of a hard-coded `p2026_07`. - The doc comment now states only what the test pins: bounds are not compared, and the plan is empty. - I broke the rebuild on purpose by re-adding the key in the wrong order. The new assertion fails the reconcile script with `events and its partitions must have PRIMARY KEY (community_id, created_at, id)`. - CLI runs against local Postgres 17: - Fresh DB: apply → reconcile → apply → reconcile → plan. The second apply reports no changes and the plan is empty. - DB reconciled with the old script: the next apply fails with SQLSTATE 42P16. After running the new reconcile script once, apply reports no changes and the plan is empty. - `events_pkey_repair_runs_before_reused_apply_and_matches_reconcile` checks two things: the reconcile script carries the repair block verbatim, and `start-relay-for-tests.sh` runs the repair before `pgschema apply`. It fails if the two copies drift. - I ran the repair script and then the bootstrap against four local probe databases: one reconciled with main's script, an empty one, one applied but never reconciled, and one with no `events` key. All four end with an empty plan. With another session holding a lock on `events`, the repair fails after 10s with the hint and leaves the key untouched. It succeeds once the lock is released. - `admin_schema_parity_between_desired_state_and_migrations` and the `runtime::migration` unit tests pass. fmt and clippy are clean. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2d289f720d |
BUZZ-301: Add user deletion request intake (#8496)
## Summary
Add the first testable piece of user deletion: submit a synthetic
request, list requests, and inspect one by UUID. Operators can verify
that intake reaches PostgreSQL before we add inventory, approval, and
execution.
Add one operator-global `entity_deletion_requests` table with an
additive migration and matching desired-state schema. Identical
submissions return the same row. Conflicting submissions fail without
changing it. Only `demo:` targets are accepted, and requests stay
`submitted`.
Keep the commands in `buzz-deletion`, reached through a thin `buzz-admin
user-deletions` adapter. Reuse the existing database connection setup.
This change adds no worker, stage history, community gates, or deletion
operations.
### Rollout plan
This is an expand-only schema change plus an operator CLI. Existing
relay code does not use the new request table. No backfill or real
deletion is part of this release.
1. **Order the PRs.** Land #8496 first, using 0068; main now owns 0067
for channel join roles. Rework #8489 to build on this table with the
next available migration number. Renumbering its existing CREATE TABLE
migration alone is insufficient; both PRs currently create the same
request table.
2. **Apply on staging.** For deployments that manage schema separately,
apply the reviewed additive migration before using the new CLI. Where
auto-migration is enabled, the new relay binary applies it at startup.
Keep existing tables and records unchanged.
3. **Verify on staging.** Use the new `buzz-admin` binary with
`DATABASE_URL` pointing to staging. Submit a unique synthetic label,
list requests, and inspect the returned UUID:
```bash
buzz-admin user-deletions submit --target demo:staging-intake-1
--requested-by <operator>
buzz-admin user-deletions list --limit 5
buzz-admin user-deletions inspect <returned-uuid>
```
Verify one `entity_deletion_requests` row with status `submitted`.
Repeat the identical submission and verify the same UUID and timestamps.
Use a new label if this label was used by an earlier staging test.
4. **Apply beyond staging.** After verification, use the deployment's
reviewed schema/release workflow to add the table in the remaining
environments. Requests run only through the operator CLI; this release
starts no deletion worker. No feature flag is needed for this synthetic
intake: the database accepts only `demo:` targets, and real deletion is
absent.
5. **Rollback.** Keep the additive table and saved requests; stop using
the new commands and roll back the binary if needed. After 0068 is
applied, an older binary with auto-migration enabled can fail at startup
with sqlx `VersionMissing`. A binary rollback therefore requires
migration execution to be disabled on the older relay
(`BUZZ_AUTO_MIGRATE=false`, including the corresponding deployment
configuration).
### Related work
This is a smaller first slice of the full-workflow draft
[#8489](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8489), which is preserved for
later extraction. The two PRs overlap and should not both be merged as
written.
### Testing
The author submitted `demo:rarora-manual-1` to a separate local
PostgreSQL 17 database. Repeating the same submission returned its
original UUID and timestamps. List, inspect, and a direct SQL query all
returned the same saved request.
<details>
<summary>Actual command inputs and outputs</summary>
Commands ran from the new worktree with `DATABASE_URL` set to the local
`buzz_user_deletion_submit` database. Outputs below are stdout;
connection diagnostics on stderr are omitted.
**Submit again — returns the existing request without creating a
duplicate**
```bash
./target/debug/buzz-admin user-deletions submit \
--target demo:rarora-manual-1 --requested-by rarora
```
```json
{
"id": "2e5bcdec-ab68-44d2-9743-1dd9fa7d2f89",
"entity_type": "user",
"target": "demo:rarora-manual-1",
"status": "submitted",
"requested_by": "rarora",
"reason": null,
"created_at": "2026-10-20T19:57:44.516698Z",
"updated_at": "2026-10-20T19:57:44.516698Z"
}
```
**List saved requests**
```bash
./target/debug/buzz-admin user-deletions list --limit 5
```
```json
[
{
"id": "2e5bcdec-ab68-44d2-9743-1dd9fa7d2f89",
"entity_type": "user",
"target": "demo:rarora-manual-1",
"status": "submitted",
"requested_by": "rarora",
"reason": null,
"created_at": "2026-10-20T19:57:44.516698Z",
"updated_at": "2026-10-20T19:57:44.516698Z"
}
]
```
**Inspect one request**
```bash
./target/debug/buzz-admin user-deletions inspect 2e5bcdec-ab68-44d2-9743-1dd9fa7d2f89
```
```json
{
"id": "2e5bcdec-ab68-44d2-9743-1dd9fa7d2f89",
"entity_type": "user",
"target": "demo:rarora-manual-1",
"status": "submitted",
"requested_by": "rarora",
"reason": null,
"created_at": "2026-10-20T19:57:44.516698Z",
"updated_at": "2026-10-20T19:57:44.516698Z"
}
```
**Read the table directly**
```bash
docker exec buzz-user-deletion-dev-20261020 \
psql -X -U buzz -d buzz_user_deletion_submit -c \
"SELECT id, entity_type, target, status, requested_by
FROM entity_deletion_requests ORDER BY created_at DESC;"
```
```text
id | entity_type | target | status | requested_by
--------------------------------------+-------------+----------------------+-----------+--------------
2e5bcdec-ab68-44d2-9743-1dd9fa7d2f89 | user | demo:rarora-manual-1 | submitted | rarora
(1 row)
```
</details>
A separate CLI smoke test also verified that a conflicting operator and
a non-demo target fail without changing the saved request. The existing
community-deletion `list --limit 1` command passed against the smoke
database.
See [the intake
walkthrough](
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347ce88d5d |
fix(db): keep pgschema re-apply from dropping runtime partitions (#8487)
## Summary pgschema doesn't compare partition bounds. Re-applying `schema/schema.sql` to a database a relay has used therefore plans `DROP TABLE IF EXISTS ... CASCADE` for every `events` / `delivery_log` monthly the partition manager created at runtime, and those tables' rows are deleted with them. Since #8464 the manager advances the catch-all by default, so any local dev or test database a relay has started against now hits this. One example is the persistent `buzz` database that `scripts/start-relay-for-tests.sh` re-applies. This adds a root `.pgschemaignore` that hides dated monthlies (`events_p2*`, `delivery_log_p2*`) from pgschema. The monthlies declared in `schema/partitions/` are exempted with `!` patterns, so pgschema still manages them. pgschema reads the file from its working directory, and every caller already runs it from the repo root: the test-relay launchers, `postgres-test-setup.sh`, the desktop release smoke and `_ci-relay.yml`. Both partition files now carry a note pointing at it, and AGENTS.md gotcha #7 adds "run pgschema from the repo root" next to the reconcile rule. New-install layout is unchanged. **Why the drops haven't deleted data yet:** on a reconciled database a re-apply also plans to drop and re-add the `events` primary key on the parent and on each declared child. The apply then fails with `cannot drop inherited constraint "events_p2026_01_pkey"` (42P16). That happens with or without this PR. The planned drops run in the same single transaction, so they roll back, and the runtime monthlies have survived so far. Once that primary-key drift is fixed, re-applies will succeed and this ignore file is what keeps them from dropping the runtime monthlies. The primary-key fix is a separate follow-up. ### Related issue Follow-up to #8464. Salvaged from an earlier branch; no existing issue found. ### Testing - `pgschema_reapply_keeps_runtime_partitions` (Postgres) follows the real bootstrap path in a dedicated database: - `bin/pgschema apply` from the repo root, then `scripts/reconcile-schema-after-pgschema.sql`; - the relay's default maintenance pass (create plus advance); - asserts that both catch-alls were attached before the pass and that their bounds moved after it; - asserts that each parent's `p2026_07` monthly exists. The catch-all advanced past the declared bounds but kept its name. - asserts that `pgschema plan` contains no `DROP TABLE` and no line mentioning any runtime monthly. - Falsified both ways: - With `.pgschemaignore` removed, the test fails and prints the planned drops. - Without the reconcile step, it fails with `reconcile did not attach both catch-alls`. - `pgschemaignore_exempts_exactly_the_declared_monthlies` checks that the `!` exemptions exactly match the dated monthlies in `schema/partitions/`. - The admin parity test now shares the `pgschema` helper, so it also runs from the repo root like the real callers. - All `runtime::migration` and `store::partition` tests pass against local Postgres after merging current main, including the ignored ones: 104 passed, run with `--test-threads=1` because the full nextest Postgres lane needs local `dropdb`. `clippy -D warnings` and the pre-push lanes pass. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2f2f6e2774 |
fix(db): bound every statement and the #p mention scan (#8461)
## Problem An agent `#p` + `#h` + `since` REQ (the `require_mention` subscription in `buzz-acp`) ran for over 45 minutes on a production writer and held `AccessShare` on every `events` partition. There were two causes: 1. **The mention side of the `#p` join was unbounded.** `build_query_events_sql` joined `event_mentions` on `(community_id, event_id)` only. The planner picked a nested loop whose outer side was every mention of the pubkey, ever, and whose inner side range-scanned the channel index from `since` on each partition. Cost ≈ total mentions × channel rows since `since`. 2. **Nothing cancelled it.** The writer `statement_timeout` defaulted to `0`. Only `#e` reads had a deadline (the 20s cap from #7854), and read-replica sessions had none at all. `pg_stat_statements` shows this shape has a multi-thousand-second max going back months, so it is chronic and was not introduced by a recent change. ## Change **`#p` mention bound** (`store/event.rs`, `push_mention_join`, shared by the page SELECT and COUNT) - Join on the full event key, `AND e.created_at = m.event_created_at`. Mention rows copy the event's `created_at` at insert (migration 0007 already relies on this equality), so the join can prune `events` partitions by time. - Repeat `since`/`until` on `m.event_created_at`, so the outer scan is a range on the existing `idx_event_mentions_pubkey_created`. `until` is a superset bound for the keyset cursor; the exact `(created_at, id)` cursor test stays on `e`. - Repeat `kinds` on `m.event_kind` when the filter has kinds. Every production mention writer binds the event kind (`insert_mentions` in `store/runtime/mod.rs`, and the replaceable-event path in `store/replaceable.rs`, back to the first Postgres schema), and no migration inserts mention rows, so this drops no rows written by the relay. Rows imported out of band with a NULL `event_kind` would no longer match a kinds-filtered `#p` read; a read-only production count on 2026-10-20 found 0 such rows on both production reader databases. The pushdown makes `idx_event_mentions_pubkey_kind_created` available to the planner for the `require_mention` kind-9 shape; its use has not been observed (see below). An E2E fixture with a hand-set NULL `event_kind` row confirmed the caveat: base returns 8 events, head 7. - The feed's mentions and needs-action queries (`store/feed.rs`, `build_mentions_query` / `build_needs_action_query`) join `event_mentions` the same way, so each joined row probes one `events` partition instead of all of them. Their `ORDER BY m.event_created_at ... LIMIT` already kept them from running away; this removes the per-row cross-partition probe. - Observed plan (E2E at `9cb6638b1`, before the `kinds` pushdown; 60,000 historical mentions + 2,500 recent decoys, stock planner, `EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS)` of the captured production SQL): the mention side is a bounded range on `idx_event_mentions_pubkey_created` (13 rows), then a hash join with a scan of the recent `events` partition. Base scanned 2,509 recent events and probed `event_mentions_pkey` 2,509 times. Head: **1.1 ms / 319 shared hits**; base: **8.5 ms / 10,049 shared hits**. Not measured against the production replica. A fresh `EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS)` replay at `a7065c367`, after the pushdown, ran on a smaller fixture where the planner chose a sequential mention scan, so it neither confirms nor replaces these numbers. **Reads: 20s deadline on every generic event read** - `query_events_on` and `count_events_on` always run under the transaction-local 20s deadline that `#e` reads used (`fetch_with_read_deadline`, formerly `fetch_with_e_tag_deadline`). It only tightens: shorter operator or caller caps are kept. - Read-replica sessions get a 20s session default through `after_connect`, using the same tighten-only SQL. - Cost: every generic REQ history read and COUNT now pays BEGIN + `set_config` + ROLLBACK (three extra round trips; before, only `#e` reads did). In the local E2E the end-to-end history read was still faster at head (median 4.1 ms vs 10.2 ms at base, 9 samples each, warm cache), so the round trips are dominated by the bounded plan; this does not isolate them or establish production p99. The round trips also lengthen how long each such read holds its writer connection; that hold time has not been measured against production pool sizing. - A replica read cancelled at its deadline (57014) is returned, not re-run on the writer. Usually the cancel means expensive work the writer would only repeat. It can also mean the replica waited on a lock only it holds (a replayed `ACCESS EXCLUSIVE` from primary DDL), when the writer would have answered quickly; that miss is the accepted price of keeping runaway reads off the primary. The rationale now lives once on `DbError::is_statement_cancelled` instead of in a dozen copied comments. The generic routed reads and `ReadSession` already did this; the eight routed reads with their own SQL (feed mentions, needs-action and activity; thread replies; channel window; relay membership; thread window and its auxiliary scan) now do too. A cancelled auxiliary scan also keeps its replica session instead of degrading it to the writer for the rest of the request. Other replica failures (e.g. hot-standby recovery conflicts) still fall back to the writer. - Paths with their own tighter `SET LOCAL` (artifact 2–5s, thread window 4s, personal reads, usage 5–15s, serving lease 1.5s) are unchanged. **Writes: every writer session is bounded** - The default `statement_timeout` changes from `0` to 120s (`DEFAULT_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS`). - `BUZZ_DB_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS` still overrides it. `0` or any value above 300s installs 300s (`MAX_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS`), so a session can no longer disable it, and a clamped value logs a `warn!` when the pool is built. Only the operator-approved, fenced destruction paths below lift it, per transaction. **Long-running writer paths, audited** | Path | Behavior | |---|---| | Migrations / schema destruction (`with_exclusive_schema_destruction_lock`) | Unchanged: these lift lock and statement timeouts on their own detached connection | | Partition maintenance | Unchanged: own 5s `statement_timeout` | | Partition audit (`buzz-admin`) | Unchanged: 30s | | Community deletion inventory, purge and logical verification (`inventory_schema` whole-tenant counts, `purge_postgres` whole-community `DELETE` per table in one tx, `verify_postgres_logically_deleted` whole-tenant `EXISTS` per table right after the purge) | Lifted (`statement_timeout = 0`) transaction-locally by `lift_statement_timeout`, like migrations; lock and idle timeouts still bound them. Inventory counts each table in its own lifted transaction, so each table's lock and snapshot are released as soon as its count finishes, as the autocommit counts did. A cancelled purge would retry from scratch and eventually block, so a cap here would turn large-tenant deletion into an operator override | | Audit appends (`buzz-audit`, audit pool inherits the writer cap) | Waits on the audit-chain advisory lock. With `BUZZ_DB_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS=0` (or at least the statement cap), `statement_timeout` (57014) cancels the wait instead of `lock_timeout` (55P03). The relay's audit worker now retries both with the same backoff instead of dropping the entry on 57014; admission refusal stays terminal | On HTTP routes a statement timeout already maps to the distinct retryable 503 (`api/mod.rs`, `statement_timeout_maps_to_distinct_503`). A cancelled REQ fails its history read instead of hanging. ## Tests - `p_tag_query_bounds_mention_side_by_time` (unit): page and COUNT SQL carry the `created_at` join and the `since`/`until`/`kinds` mention bounds, and the bounds are absent when the filter has none. - `p_tag_read_with_mention_bounds_keeps_results` (Postgres): through the production mention insert, unbounded, `since`, window and keyset-cursor reads return exactly the mentioned rows, and COUNT matches. Every bound sits exactly on a mentioned row's second and the cursor page includes a same-second sibling after the cursor id, so an off-by-one on either mention-side bound fails it. - `plain_read_is_cancelled_at_deadline_when_timeout_disabled` / `count_events_cancels_at_read_deadline_when_timeout_disabled` (Postgres): the production `#p` + `#h` + `since` shape and a plain COUNT are cancelled at 20s with the session timeout disabled. Previously these covered `#e` only. - `writer_statement_timeout_is_always_bounded` (unit) and `session_statement_timeouts_bound_writer_and_reader_sessions` (Postgres): through `Db::new`, writer sessions install `2min` / `5min` (for `0` and for 600s) / `45s`, and replica sessions install `20s`. - `deletion_whole_tenant_stages_outlive_the_writer_statement_timeout` (Postgres): on a scratch desired-state database with a 500ms writer cap, the real `inventory_schema`, `purge_postgres` and `verify_postgres_logically_deleted` each wait behind a held `ACCESS EXCLUSIVE` lock on `events` for over 1s and still complete, a plain statement is cancelled (57014), and pooled sessions still read `500ms` afterwards. A lifted transaction reads `statement_timeout = 0`, so a bounded lift (e.g. `'300000'`) fails it, as does removing any of the three `lift_statement_timeout` calls. - `mentions_query_is_tenant_scoped_and_joins_mentions_by_composite_key` / `needs_action_query_is_tenant_scoped_and_joins_mentions_by_composite_key` (unit): both feed queries carry the `e.created_at = m.event_created_at` join. - `replica_statement_cancel_propagates_without_writer_rerun` (Postgres): with the replica locked past its cap, each of the six routed reads above returns 57014 instead of the writer's copy. Removing the cancel arm in any of them fails it. - `thread_window_statement_cancel_propagates_without_writer_rerun` (Postgres): a thread-window read parked behind a replica lock and cancelled (57014; the window's own 1s `lock_timeout` would otherwise fire first) returns the cancel instead of the unlocked writer's window, and an auxiliary scan timed out on a replica session returns 57014 and leaves the session on the replica. Removing either guard fails it. - `audit_worker_retries_statement_timeout_until_original_entry_is_appended_once` (Postgres, `buzz-relay`): the production audit worker, with `lock_timeout` disabled and a 100ms statement cap, keeps the entry through repeated 57014 cancels while the chain lock is held and appends it exactly once after release. Treating only 55P03 as retryable fails it. - The existing writer and audit-pool GUC tests now expect `5min` for a disabled statement timeout. ## After deploy, watch - `buzz_db_route_decision{decision="replica",reason="statement_cancelled"}`: replica reads that now fail instead of falling back to the writer, including the replica-only lock case above. - `buzz_db_pool_acquire_wait_seconds` and `buzz_db_pool_waiters` on the writer pool: every generic REQ history read and COUNT now holds its connection for three extra round trips. ## Database checklist (`docs/database.md` § Review checklist) This PR changes schema-dependent `buzz-db` queries (the `#p` join and its `m.event_kind` pushdown). It does not change the schema. - **Phase:** none. No schema change, so this is not an expand, backfill or contract step. Nothing before or after it is required. - **Triggers, functions, procedures, rules, foreign keys:** none added. - **Row mutations / backfill:** no migration, and no row is mutated or backfilled. The one data-shape dependency is mention rows with a NULL `event_kind`: a kinds-filtered `#p` read no longer matches them (see the `kinds` bullet under Change). Relay writers always bind `event_kind`, so only rows imported out of band are affected. A read-only production count on 2026-10-20 found 0 such rows on both production reader databases. - **Contract migration:** N/A. - **Rule 4 locations:** none touched. No table, index or desired-state file changes, so no parity test applies. The new bounds use the existing `idx_event_mentions_pubkey_created` and `idx_event_mentions_pubkey_kind_created`. - **Deployed relay vs. new schema:** there is no new schema. The currently deployed relay and this relay run against the same tables. - **Lock and statement timeouts:** this PR is about them. Generic reads get a 20s deadline, replica sessions a 20s default, and writer sessions a 120s default capped at 300s. Community-deletion transactions lift `statement_timeout` per transaction; migrations and schema destruction are unchanged (see "Long-running writer paths, audited"). No index builds and no operator prebuild step. ## What got simpler - One read-deadline path instead of an `#e`-only branch in `query_events_on` and `count_events_on`. - The `#p` join SQL that was duplicated between SELECT and COUNT now lives in one `push_mention_join`. - The deletion tests share one scratch desired-state database helper instead of an inline copy. - "Is this query bounded?" now has one answer: yes, unless it runs in a migration, schema destruction, or community-deletion transaction. ## Identified debt (not in this PR) - `buzz-acp` re-sends the same filter after a timeout `CLOSED` (no backoff or narrowing). With the `#p` bound the `require_mention` read should finish well inside 20s, so this is a follow-up, not a blocker. --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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d97f6b4c6e |
feat(relay): add announce channels with a join_role setting (#8143)
🤖 ## Summary Channels are Buzz's main way to control access, but today they cannot separate reading from writing. In an open channel, anyone who can read can also write. So there is no way to say "many people read, a few people write". Announcements, release feeds, plugin release records and shared configuration all need that. This PR adds **announce channels**: anyone can follow and read them, but only members can post. It does this with one new channel setting and without changing what any role means. - **Roles mean the same thing in every channel.** A *guest* can read and leave, but cannot write. A *member* (or *bot*) can write. *Admins* and *owners* also manage the channel. The relay already had the guest role, but no client used it until now. - **A new setting, `join_role` (`member` | `guest`), picks the role a new person gets** when nobody chooses one: when they join by themselves, or when someone adds them without a role. The default, `member`, keeps today's behavior for every existing channel. - **An open channel with `join_role = guest` is an announce channel.** Anyone can find, read and join it. People who join are guests, so they cannot write until someone makes them a member. The relay enforces these rules, so a client cannot get around them. What each role can do (the same in every channel): | Action | Guest | Member or bot | Admin / owner | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Read, leave | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | Post, reply, edit, delete own, react, artifacts, canvas, forum, pins, topic, typing, workflow messages, save or run workflows, huddles | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | | Add people | ❌ | ✅ as member, guest or bot | ✅ any role | | Make a guest a member (person or agent) | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | | Any other role change | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | | Change name, about, visibility, TTL, `join_role` | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | Other rules: - **Joining by yourself.** A person who joins (kind:9021), or adds themselves (kind:9000 with their own key), gets the channel's `join_role`. They may ask for `join_role` or a lower role, never a higher one. So in an announce channel nobody can join as a member by themselves. - **Non-members.** A non-member may write only where joining would let them write: an open channel with `join_role = member`. That is today's behavior for open channels. - **Agents.** Agents follow the same rules as people. Any member who can write may make a guest agent a member. Limits that only an agent's owner may lift belong to the later IFC work (its "restricted" agent level), not to this PR. That work only refuses more actions, so it can be added later without breaking anything here. - **Leaving always works.** A member may leave an archived channel too (kind:9022, or kind:9001 naming themselves). The last owner still cannot leave. - **Agent owners keep edit and delete.** Today the human owner of an agent can edit (kind:40003) and delete (kind:9005) that agent's messages without being a member. This PR keeps that existing behavior in announce channels too, and documents and tests it. It does not let the owner post. - **Changing the setting changes no roles.** Existing members can still write after a change to `guest`. Existing guests stay read-only after a change back to `member`. A refused write gets `restricted: only members can post in this channel`. ## Details - **One write rule.** The relay's channel write check decides from the actor's role and the channel's `join_role`. Some event types skip that check and run their own: message edit, deleting your own message (kind:9005), topic and purpose (kind:9002), add-member (kind:9000), workflow messages and joining a huddle. Each of these now uses the same rule. Membership changes (add, remove, leave) do not need write access, so a guest can always leave. If the relay finds a stored `join_role` value it does not know, it treats it as `guest`, so an unknown value can never give more access. - **Admission is decided in the database transaction.** The membership write (`put_member`) makes the whole admission decision inside its transaction, after it takes the channel's membership lock: `join_role` for a missing role tag, the self-join ceiling, guests cannot add people, who may grant admin or owner, and role changes (`MemberRole::may_change_role`). The relay's request check uses the same rules, but the database is the authority, so a write that skips the request check cannot get around them. A change to `visibility` or `join_role` takes the same lock, so an add and a setting change cannot interleave. - **No creator exception.** `put_member` used to give owner to a channel's creator who added themselves to a private channel without an active membership. A removed creator could use that: their join (kind:9021) passes the open-channel check, the channel becomes private before the join takes the membership lock, and the join restored them as owner. Channel creation already makes the creator owner in the same transaction, so the exception is removed. A removed creator is now admitted like anyone else. - **Huddles.** Joining a huddle needs write access in the huddle channel **and** in its parent channel. The relay checks both before the join. When it commits the join, it applies the same rule again while it holds both channels' membership locks: a member needs a role that can post, and a non-member needs an open channel whose `join_role` is `member`. A guest in either channel cannot join. A join is also refused when the joiner loses membership or the channel's `join_role` changes before the commit. - **One lock order.** Each writer that takes more than one of a channel's locks takes them in this order: membership lock, TTL lock, channel row. Settings changes, roster publication, TTL refresh and huddle joins all use this order. Before this change, a `join_role` change on an ephemeral channel at the same time as a roster publication could deadlock. - **Workflows.** Saving a workflow (kind:30620) skips the generic write check, so it now checks the sender's role itself and needs a writing role before anything is stored. Every path that starts a workflow run, including the manual trigger (kind:46020), needs the workflow's owner to hold a writing role now (and an elevated role for an elevated workflow). So a workflow saved while its owner was a member stops running after the owner is made a guest. - **Channel names are checked before storage.** kind:9002 and kind:9007 refuse a name longer than the `channels.name` column (255 characters) before the event is stored. Before this, the relay accepted the event, then the name update failed, and the rest of the update (for example `join_role`) was silently skipped. This PR only adds this check. Storing the event and applying the update in one transaction is a larger change, and it is not in this PR. - **Changing the setting.** Owners and admins send a channel-metadata update (kind:9002) with `["join_role", "guest"]` or `["join_role", "member"]`. Buzz applies these updates as partial updates; a missing tag means "no change". The relay posts a `join_role_changed` system message in the channel. - **What clients see.** The relay signs a channel description event (kind:39000) that clients read. One shared builder now writes it for both the relay and the `buzz-admin` backfill, which had a copy that had drifted from the relay's. It always publishes an explicit `["join_role", …]` tag, plus the standard NIP-29 group access flags: | `visibility` | `join_role` | `public` / `private` | `restricted` | `closed` | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | open | `member` | public | | | | open | `guest` | public | ✓ | | | private | either | private | ✓ | ✓ | This also fixes an old bug: `closed` ("join requests are ignored") was published for every channel, even open channels that accept joins. - **CLI and SDK.** `buzz channels update --join-role guest|member`. `buzz_sdk::build_update_channel` takes a new `join_role` argument and always writes it as an explicit tag. - **Docs.** `NOSTR.md` has an "Announce channels" section with the role table and the flag table. - **Tests.** Relay end-to-end tests, run in the CI relay E2E step: - `test_nip29_announce_channel_wire`: who can set `join_role`, the kind:39000 flags, joining as a guest, refused guest and non-member posts, reactions and adds, member posts, a member making a guest a member who then posts, changing the setting back without changing roles, and leaving. - `test_nip29_member_raises_guest_agent`: a member who is not the agent's owner can make a guest agent a member. - `test_nip29_announce_channel_wire_workflow_send_needs_write_role`: a guest's workflow message is refused; a member's is accepted. - `test_nip29_departure_wire_archived_channel_allows_self_leave`: guests and members can leave an archived channel. - `test_private_channel_any_member_can_invite` now expects a private-channel guest to be refused when it adds someone (it used to expect success). - `test_nip29_announce_channel_wire_workflow_commands_need_write_role`: saving and triggering a workflow, by a member and by a guest, in announce and normal channels; a guest cannot run a workflow saved while it was a member. - `test_nip29_announce_channel_wire_overlong_name_is_refused_before_storage`: a kind:9002 with an overlong name and `join_role` is refused, and kind:39000 still shows the old settings. - `test_nip29_announce_channel_wire_agent_owner_exception`: an agent's owner, as a guest and as a non-member, can edit and delete the agent's messages, while ordinary guests are still refused. - `test_nip29_guest_is_read_only_in_normal_channel`: a guest in an ordinary channel cannot write, and joining an ordinary channel still gives `member`. Unit tables cover the self-join rule for each `join_role`, and every actor, current role and requested role for the role-change rule. Database tests check the admission rules in `put_member` (`put_member_enforces_announce_admission`), that an add which waits on an uncommitted change to `guest` is decided on the new setting (`put_member_waits_for_a_concurrent_join_role_change`), and that a member can make a guest a member but not an admin. Unit tests cover the name limit and the workflow owner rule (`owner_authority_denies_roles_that_cannot_write`). A relay test covers huddle joins with different roles in the huddle and its parent, and a commit after a demotion, a `join_role` change or a lost membership (`huddle_join_needs_a_write_role_in_the_huddle_and_its_parent`). Lock-order tests: `join_role_change_waits_for_a_roster_publication_on_an_ephemeral_channel` reproduced a real deadlock (`40P01`) against the old order. `f2d_join_lock_order_serializes_membership_and_settings_writers` checks that membership and settings writers wait for a join and then succeed. `removed_creator_cannot_rejoin_a_private_channel` checks that `put_member` refuses a removed creator on a private channel, and `removed_creator_join_racing_a_private_switch_is_refused` holds the membership lock so a removed creator's kind:9021 passes the open-channel check, then makes the channel private before the join continues. Each new test was run against the old code and failed. ## Rollout 1. **Before the deploy, count guest rows** (`SELECT count(*) FROM channel_members WHERE role = 'guest' AND removed_at IS NULL`). We expect none. Any guest that exists loses the ability to post, change the topic and add people when this ships. If some exist, decide first whether to make them members. 2. Deploy. Every channel stays `join_role = member`, so nothing else changes. 3. **Do not set any channel to `join_role = guest` until no old relay is running.** Old relays ignore the column, so they would let guests and non-members write in that channel. 4. Rerun the `buzz-admin` channel reconcile so open channels drop the wrong `closed` flag. ## Migration and rollback - Migration `0067` adds `channels.join_role TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'member'` with a CHECK constraint. Postgres stores a constant default in table metadata, so existing rows are not rewritten and there is no backfill. The relay runs the migration at startup. - Existing channels keep the old `closed` flag until their next change, or until the reconcile in Rollout step 4. - **Before rolling back the relay**, set every announce channel back to `join_role = member`. An older relay ignores the column and does not stop guests from writing, so those channels would accept posts from their guests and give `member` to new joiners again. ## Not in this PR Client UI: a Follow button, hiding the composer for guests, and an admin toggle. Clients that ignore the new tag keep working. A guest who tries to post sees the `restricted` error. ## Stack 1. #8143 (this PR): announce channels 2. #8494: store the bot role only for keys with a recorded agent owner --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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039e1c8d59 |
feat(relay): write the NIP-43 member list in the membership transaction (#8482)
## Summary The relay-signed NIP-43 member list (kind:13534) was published after each membership change had already committed. If that publish failed, or if a change never republished at all (startup `bootstrap_owner`), the list stayed wrong until the background reconcile sweep found and fixed it. #8467 moved that sweep off the startup path. This PR removes the reason the sweep exists. Now every `buzz-db` function that changes `relay_members` writes the new list **in the same transaction**, as its last statement before commit: - It takes the per-community list lock last, reads the members, signs the list, retires the old one and inserts the new one. - If the list write fails, the membership change rolls back and the caller gets an error. - A call that changes nothing (already a member, role mismatch, host exists, limit reached) writes no list. The functions return `MembershipWrite<T> { outcome, snapshot }`. Callers push `snapshot` to live subscribers after commit. That push is the only thing left outside the transaction; if it fails, live clients see the change on their next fetch, and the stored list is already correct. Write paths covered (RPR #2, every write path): `add_relay_member`, `claim_relay_membership`, `claim_relay_invite`, `remove_relay_member`, `remove_relay_member_if_role`, `update_relay_member_role`, `bootstrap_owner` / `provision_owner`, `transfer_ownership`, `backfill_from_allowlist`, and the owner insert in `create_community_with_owner[_and_nip_fi_issuers]`. Community deletion removes the members together with the community, so it writes no list. The relay keypair is passed in explicitly instead of being stored on `Db`, so the compiler finds every caller. ### Behavior changes - **Open relays get an accurate list too.** Provisioning and ownership transfer used to publish only when `require_relay_membership` was on. The write is now unconditional. - **Same-second changes can't reuse an id.** The list's `created_at` is one second past the newest earlier list for that community, including retired ones, or the current time if that is later. Before, adding and then removing a member in the same second could produce an event with the same id as an earlier list. The insert then failed, and the stale list stayed live. A burst of changes can push `created_at` ahead of the clock by up to one second per change; it returns to the clock once the burst ends. - **`buzz-admin add-member` / `remove-member`** no longer build their own list (`publish_membership_list_with_bump` is deleted). They push the list the database wrote. Concurrent CLI runs now serialize on the database lock rather than depending on `run.sh` running one at a time. - **Owner mutations lock the community row `FOR NO KEY UPDATE`.** `transfer_ownership` and `bootstrap_owner` used `FOR UPDATE`. The list insert takes `FOR KEY SHARE` on that row through `events.community_id`'s foreign key, so a repair holding the list lock, or a removal or role update holding a member row, deadlocked with a concurrent owner change. `FOR NO KEY UPDATE` still conflicts with archive, unarchive and deletion admission, so the lifecycle ordering is unchanged. - **Startup delivers its list to other replicas.** When backfill or `bootstrap_owner` changes members at startup, the relay fans the newest list out through pub/sub once its state is ready, so clients connected to other replicas during a rolling deploy see an owner rotation without a refetch. - **New `buzz-admin republish-members`.** Rewrites the community's list from the stored members in one community-write transaction and pushes it live. This replaces the sweep as the repair for a list that is missing or stale: a `relay_members` change made directly in SQL, a restore, or a deployment that turns on `BUZZ_REQUIRE_RELAY_MEMBERSHIP` after running without it. ## Rollout Nothing rewrites a list automatically once the sweep is gone. A community whose list drifted before this deploys stays wrong until its next membership change or until an operator runs `buzz-admin republish-members`. Either deploy #8467 and let its sweep complete one pass first, or run `republish-members` for each community after this deploys. The command repairs only the community that `RELAY_URL` maps to, so on a relay hosting many communities, run it once per community host. ## What got simpler Deleted: - `reconcile_nip43_membership_snapshots`, `spawn_nip43_membership_reconciler`, its leader lock key and #8467's standby retry - the three `nip43_membership_snapshot_needs_reconciliation*` drift reads (one already deprecated) - `publish_nip43_membership_list` / `publish_nip43_membership_locked`, the separate after-commit republish at every call site, and `buzz-admin`'s duplicate publisher - the reconcile metrics `buzz_nip43_membership_reconciliations_total` and `buzz_nip43_membership_reconciliation_failures_total` - the after-commit publish metrics `buzz_nip43_membership_publications_total` and `buzz_nip43_membership_publication_seconds`, and the `publish_nip43_membership_locked` transaction metric label. A failed list write is now a failed membership write and shows up in the caller's existing error handling and the transaction metrics of its write path. - the `BUZZ_NIP43_RECONCILE_INTERVAL_SECS` setting There is now one way the list gets written, and it can't disagree with `relay_members` after commit. **Unused deploy config (outside this repo):** hosted deployments that set `BUZZ_NIP43_RECONCILE_INTERVAL_SECS` can drop it. It is now ignored. Dashboards or alerts on the four deleted metrics will stop receiving data. ## Testing New Postgres tests (`buzz-db`): - `relay_members::every_membership_write_commits_its_list`: for each write path, the returned list is the single live kind:13534 and names exactly the committed members. No-op calls return no list and leave the live list alone. - `relay_members::a_failed_list_write_rolls_back_the_membership_change`: holds the list lock, waits for the join to block on it, cancels that statement, and checks that the member was not added and the previous list is still live. - `relay_members::concurrent_joins_all_land_in_the_list`: 8 concurrent joins; the final list names all 8. - `relay_members::same_second_return_to_an_earlier_membership_writes_a_new_list`: add, remove, add, remove within a second; every list is newer than the last and no id repeats. - `relay_members::owner_transfer_and_list_repair_both_commit` and `relay_members::owner_transfer_and_member_removal_both_commit`: hold a repair (list lock) or removal (member row) open, wait until a transfer blocks behind it, then finish it. Both transactions commit; with `FOR UPDATE` back in place, one of them fails. - `community::create_community_with_owner_is_atomic_and_create_only` and `relay_invite::bounded_claim_exhausts_and_existing_member_retry_does_not_consume` now also check the list. Each new test was checked to fail against a mutation of the new code that brings back the old behavior (details in the thread). Stacked on #8467. Merge order: #8467, then #8468, then this. --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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6e6173acd5 |
test(buzz-db): fix two PostgreSQL-lane timing flakes (#8472)
## Summary Two timing flakes in the PostgreSQL lane, one fix each. ### Deletion lock order `abort_serializes_before_fence_without_deadlock` failed on main ([run 39330176879](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/39330176879)): `post-lock lease verification rejects aborted request: 1`. The test slept 50ms and assumed `abort` had queued on the community advisory lock by then. On a slow runner, `fence` queued first, won the lock, and succeeded. The test now waits until `pg_locks` shows each contender waiting on that community's lock, `abort` first and then `fence`. Postgres grants queued advisory locks in arrival order, so `abort` always wins. The sleeps and their timing guess are gone. ### Saturated-reader fixture `routed_fallback_spends_one_acquire_budget_when_aurora_cache_is_cold` failed this PR's first run ([run 39335038111](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/39335038111)): `establish the reader's sole connection: PoolTimedOut`. Setup opens the reader's only connection through the production lazy pool, which has a 150ms acquire timeout. On a loaded runner that first connect took longer, so the test failed before reaching the budget it measures. Setup now retries on `PoolTimedOut` within 5s. The pool and its 150ms budget are unchanged for the routed read under test. Test-only. Production code is unchanged. ## Validation - Deletion test against an isolated local Postgres 17 database: 40/40 passes. Saturated-reader test: 15/15. - `cargo fmt --check`, `cargo clippy -p buzz-db --tests -D warnings`, pre-push Rust unit tests: pass. - Three other `store::deletion::postgres_tests` fail locally on unmodified `main` as well (local environment). CI's PostgreSQL lane is the authoritative check for them. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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6286a54321 |
feat(relay): store per-community NIP-FI issuer bindings (#8372)
Stack: this PR → #8377 → #8399 → #8401 bb-public creates communities all the time, so a hand-edited `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES` map can't list them. This PR stores an explicit NIP-FI issuer allowlist for each community in the database and writes it when the community is created. Login checks don't read the table yet; that comes in #8377 together with the database-backed resolver. Operator steps are in [`docs/operator-nip-fi-bindings.md`](docs/operator-nip-fi-bindings.md). **Storage.** Migration `0066_community_nip_fi_issuers` adds `community_nip_fi_issuers (community_id, issuer, created_at)`, with primary key `(community_id, issuer)` and the community write fence attached. The assertion audience is `https://<communities.host>`, so the table has no `aud` column. Zero rows means no binding. The table is included in whole-community deletion and purge. **One bindable rule.** `BUZZ_NIP_FI_PROVISION_BINDING` (`{"host_suffix": ..., "authorized_issuers": [...]}`) is parsed in `buzz-auth` with `BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS`, whatever `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE` is set to, and both the relay and `buzz-admin` use the same parser. Each authorized issuer must be a configured issuer (1 to 2048 bytes), and the suffix must not cover any host declared in `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES`; an unreadable declaration refuses startup even in mode `off`. `ProvisionBindingPolicy::is_bindable(host)` is true for a host exactly one label under the suffix that is not reserved. It decides creation-time binding, explicit `bind`, and what the lookup route reports. **Binding on creation.** Rows are written in the same transaction as the community insert on all three creation paths (`POST /operator/communities` `create_only`, its legacy convergence branch, and startup bootstrap), and only when the call actually created the community, so existing rows are never rewritten. **Reserved host.** A host whose `https://<host>` equals a configured `command_audiences` value never holds a binding. Operator provisioning of it is rejected with a 400 and the `reserved_host` error code, bootstrap creates it unbound, and the availability route reports it unavailable with an error code. `main.rs` calls `verify_reserved_hosts_unbound` at startup; if a reserved host has rows the relay refuses to start and names the fix (`buzz-admin nip-fi unbind --host <h> --issuer <i>`, or revert the command audience). A database failure during that check is a separate `Check` error. **Operator commands.** - `buzz-admin nip-fi backfill` pages unbound communities by host (1000 per page) and binds each page with one `INSERT ... SELECT` limited to active communities. It skips communities being deleted, always prints `{rows_bound, unbound, unbound_hosts, truncated}`, and exits non-zero while any bindable community is still unbound. Archived communities are bound on purpose. Both bind paths take the shared deletion lock and then lock the community row (`FOR NO KEY UPDATE`, in id order for a batch), the same order deletion uses, and the backfill insert also requires the community to still have no binding, so an operator `bind` that lands after the backfill listed a community wins and the default issuer is not added beside it. - `buzz-admin nip-fi bind --host --issuer` refuses a reserved host, a host outside the suffix, or an unconfigured issuer. - `buzz-admin nip-fi unbind --host --issuer` refuses to remove a community's last issuer (archive or delete the community instead), with one exception: when a valid provisioning policy shows that backfill can't bind the host (it's reserved, or outside the suffix), the last issuer can be removed. That is the reserved-host recovery path in the runbook. A missing or malformed policy doesn't block `unbind`; it just means the exception never applies. **Lookup route.** `GET /operator/communities/nip-fi-binding?host=` (NIP-98, `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS`) reads the database and returns `{host, active, issuers[]}`. `host` is the stored host. It returns 404 for an unknown host, 200 with `active:false` for an archived or quiescing community, and `issuers:[]` when no provisioning policy is set. It lists only issuers that are configured and on a bindable host. kgoose depends on this contract; it is also documented in the runbook. **NIP-FA.** The `relay_url` bullet now also says: "An adapter MAY obtain its exact relay list from a configured, authenticated source; it MUST still compare `relay_url` exactly." **Deployment dependency.** The kgoose config side is already handled by [cash-server#137671](https://github.com/squareup/cash-server/pull/137671). In public-community mode it requires the command audience not to be a community audience. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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60de1db0b8 |
fix(db): admit fleet sweeps per tenant instead of in-SQL fence predicate (#8318)
## What Removes every production call to the SQL fence predicate `community_write_allowed()` from application SQL, so no application mutation depends on the boolean predicate anymore. This is one prerequisite for BUZZ-315 part B; #8322 (tolerating absent fence objects) is a separate one. The triggers and SQL functions stay in this PR because mixed-version pods still depend on them. The predicate isn't inlined. It's a VOLATILE plpgsql function that takes the deletion lock and *then* reads lifecycle state on a fresh snapshot, and an inline expression would read state from the statement's start snapshot. A separate earlier check would race deletion. So each sweep now: 1. reads its candidate community IDs with a plain read, bounded the same way the original statement was, 2. opens one `AdmittedTx` per community (`begin_community_sweep_transaction`, a thin wrapper over `begin_community_write_transaction` that turns an admission refusal into "skip this tenant"; the four periodic sweeps go through `sweep_admitted_communities`, which also owns their error handling), 3. runs the original mutation scoped to `community_id = $1` and commits. | Site | Change | | --- | --- | | `runtime/push_enqueue.rs` | Deleted the redundant predicate. This transaction already calls `guard_transaction`. | | `store/relay_invite.rs` `reap_expired_relay_invites` | Keeps the global expiry order and the 1,000-row ceiling. Candidates are pre-filtered to active tenants so fenced invites can't fill the batch. Admission is still what authorizes the write. | | `store/workflow.rs` `prune_scheduled_workflow_fires_before` | Prunes per admitted community and sums the row counts. | | `store/channel.rs` `reap_expired_ephemeral_channels` | Archives per admitted community and returns the committed rows, so the relay still runs their system and discovery follow-ups. The candidate read has no lifecycle pre-filter (it has no `LIMIT`, so admission alone decides). | | `store/event.rs` `backfill_d_tags` | Backfills per admitted community at startup. | | `store/push.rs` `claim_due_match_batch_with_loader` | Picks the earliest due active community, admits it, and claims under the same `FOR UPDATE OF q SKIP LOCKED` and batch limit. It skips at most 16 tenants that fence between the read and admission. | | `store/push.rs` `reap_exhausted_matches` | Reaps per admitted community. | **Tenant failures.** The four periodic sweeps (invite reap, workflow fire prune, channel reap, exhausted match reap) log a warning and continue when one tenant fails. That tenant's rows are left unmodified and stay eligible, so the next tick retries them. A tenant error doesn't abort processing of the other tenants already in the selected candidate page. Invite cleanup keeps its oldest-first 1,000-row selection, so if one tenant owns that entire page and its delete keeps failing, tenants outside the page wait. No persistent tenant-local failure for that delete is known in the current schema, and base aborted the whole page on any error. The returned count or rows cover the tenants that committed. Claim, enqueue and the startup backfill still return the error to the caller. **Database outages.** A connection-level error (pool acquire timeout, closed pool, socket I/O; `DbError::is_connection_unavailable`) isn't tenant-local, so it stops the periodic sweep at that tenant instead of moving on. Without this, an outage that began after the candidate read cost one writer acquire timeout and one warning per remaining tenant, and invite cleanup runs inside the usage-metrics leader tick. Rows already committed are still returned, so reaped channels keep their follow-ups. Remaining tenants retry next tick. **Known limit (pre-existing, tracked separately):** - *Claim at a locked head.* `claim_due_match_batch_with_loader` returns `None` once an admitted tenant claims zero rows. If every due row in the oldest active tenant is row-locked, younger tenants aren't tried on that call. Base behaved the same way. This PR doesn't change it. ## Tests All tests use a one-session fixture (`test_support::admission_fixture`) with `session_replication_role = replica`, so the trigger backstop is off and only application admission protects the fenced tenants. The fixture shadows `community_write_allowed` with a function that raises, in a per-call `admission_test_<uuid>` schema. - One test per site: a quiescing tenant's rows are untouched while an active tenant in the same sweep still progresses. - Race tests for invite reap, channel reap and claim. These are the sites where the candidate read already filters out fenced tenants. Each test holds the tenant's deletion lock, waits until the sweep is blocked in admission, fences the tenant in that transaction, and asserts its rows are untouched. The claim test also asserts that a second active tenant is claimed in the same call. - `channel_reap_returns_committed_rows_after_earlier_tenant_error` and `periodic_reaps_continue_after_tenant_error_and_retry_retained_rows` inject a per-tenant failure. They check that later tenants commit, that the failed tenant's rows are retained, and that the next call processes them. - `fleet_sweep_stops_at_first_unavailable_connection` runs the sweep helper against a closed pool with three candidates and asserts only the first is attempted. `fleet_sweep_returns_committed_results_when_database_drops_mid_page` (PostgreSQL) commits the first tenant, closes the pool, and asserts the first tenant's result is returned and the sweep stops at the second of three candidates. `connection_unavailable_covers_only_pool_and_io_failures` pins the classification; the per-tenant failure tests above confirm a database-raised error still continues. Falsification, each with the tests failing as expected: | Mutation | Result | | --- | --- | | Original SQL restored at invite sweep, push claim, d-tag backfill | 0/3 pass (`legacy SQL fence predicate called`) | | `guard_community_write` returns `Ok(())` after taking the lock | race tests + channel reap test 0/4 pass | | Per-tenant errors abort the sweep again | 0/2 pass | | Sweep helper `continue`s instead of stopping on a connection-level error | `fleet_sweep_stops_at_first_unavailable_connection` and `fleet_sweep_returns_committed_results_when_database_drops_mid_page` fail | | Sweep helper drops already-committed results when it stops (`return Vec::new()`) | `fleet_sweep_returns_committed_results_when_database_drops_mid_page` fails | | Sweep helper removed from the source-policy chokepoint check | `serving_table_writes_expose_syntactic_chokepoint_or_guarded_tx_routes` fails | The PostgreSQL tests are under `postgres_tests` modules with `#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]`, which puts them in the `.config/nextest.toml` PostgreSQL filter. CI evidence is under Verification. ## Verification CI at head `5d37fbda` ([run 38925996275](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38925996275)) is green. The PostgreSQL job ([job 117062895683](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38925996275/job/117062895683)) passed 1017/1017. That includes named PASS lines for all 30 `admission_postgres_tests`, `fleet_sweep_returns_committed_results_when_database_drops_mid_page`, and both writer-pool tests listed below. Unit Tests ([job 117058136482](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38925996275/job/117058136482)) has PASS lines for `connection_unavailable_covers_only_pool_and_io_failures` and `fleet_sweep_stops_at_first_unavailable_connection`. Local gates ran on a Linux cloud workstation against private PostgreSQL 16 and Redis. The tree was `735170df`, which is this head rebased on `main` `c0ab789`, so the gates built the merge result. | Gate | Result | | --- | --- | | `cargo fmt --all -- --check` | pass | | `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` | pass | | `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --lib --tests` | 185 passed | | `scripts/test-postgres-test-discovery.sh` | pass | | PostgreSQL lane for buzz-db (excluding the two writer-pool tests below) | 530 passed | | PostgreSQL lanes for buzz-admin, buzz-audit, buzz-deletion, buzz-push-gateway, buzz-search, buzz-workflow | all pass | | PostgreSQL lane for buzz-relay | 413/426. The 13 `group_state_postgres_tests` fail with `PoolTimedOut` on unmodified `main` `c0ab789` too (see below) | | The three mutations in the falsification table above (`continue` ×2, `return Vec::new()`) | each fails its target test | These failures happen only on the workstation, and each one passes in CI's PostgreSQL job at this head: - `writer_pool_metrics_stop_after_session_timeout_setup_failure` stalls. It's an unchanged writer-pool configuration test, and it stalled the same way at earlier heads. - The 13 relay `group_state_postgres_tests` fail at the same point, `ensure community: Sqlx(PoolTimedOut)`, on unmodified `main` `c0ab789`. This PR doesn't touch `buzz-relay`. ## What got simpler - No application mutation calls the boolean predicate `community_write_allowed()` anymore. Dropping the fence objects still has other dependencies: serving-write lease acquisition calls `assert_community_write_allowed()` (`store/deletion.rs:3068`), catalog validation requires both functions (`store/deletion.rs:1195-1198`), and the triggers and compatibility SQL still use them. Those belong to #8322 and part B, not this PR. - The claim's `target` CTE is gone, and every sweep uses the same admission-and-skip helper. - The four periodic sweeps share one loop (`sweep_admitted_communities`) for admission, skip, continue-on-tenant-error and stop-on-outage, instead of four copies of it. - The source policy treats that helper as a tenant-local chokepoint, so `backfill_d_tags` no longer needs a reviewed exception. - The per-tenant loops add code, because each community now gets its own admitted transaction. --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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2745a419a8 |
buzz-db: tolerate absent universal write-fence objects (expand) (#8322)
## What This is the expand step for retiring the 32 universal `community_write_fence_*` triggers and their SQL functions (BUZZ-315). Relay pods auto-migrate at boot (`BUZZ_AUTO_MIGRATE`). The drop migration therefore runs while the previous release is still serving, and that release must not depend on the objects it drops. Today the app depends on them in four places, and this PR removes all four from its own code paths. Seven in-SQL `community_write_allowed` predicates in fleet sweeps and push (`push_enqueue.rs`, `channel.rs`, `event.rs`, `push.rs`, `relay_invite.rs`, `workflow.rs`) are #8318's scope. The release is independent of the fence functions only with both this PR and #8318. **It changes no schema.** The objects stay and keep working until the follow-up drop PR. | Old dependency | Now | |---|---| | Startup and readiness (`validate_serving_catalog_on`) require `community_write_allowed`, `assert_community_write_allowed`, `enforce_community_write_fence` and all 32 triggers | No longer required. Still required: the tenant tables, `community_deletion_lock_key` and the enabled community tombstone trigger. | | Serving-lease admission runs `SELECT assert_community_write_allowed($1)` | Uses `guard_community_write`, the same shared lock and state check as ordinary serving writes, in the same transaction as the lease `INSERT`. Fenced or missing communities still map to `AccessDenied`. | | Live scoped-table discovery calls `community_write_fence_excluded_table()` | Uses a Rust `EXCLUDED_SCOPED_TABLES` list. A unit test pins it equal to the SQL list while both exist. | | The deletion executor compares the live `fenced_tables` against the frozen inventory | Only tenant-table equality is compared. Inventories **still record** live fences, so an older executor that validates an inventory frozen by this release still matches. The digest still covers the full frozen manifest. | `lock_community_deletion_shared` now refuses transactions that are not READ COMMITTED, so every lock-then-read admission gets the check: `guard_community_write`, serving-lease finalization (`guard_transaction_with_serving_lease`), lease renewal/verification, owner preparation and owner-mutation admission. The old SQL assertion did this check for the lease path, and the trigger backed up the rest. The isolation level comes back from the existing `pg_advisory_xact_lock_shared` statement, so the hot path makes no extra round trip. The refusal comes before any lifecycle-state read. ## Mixed versions | Combination | Why it is safe | |---|---| | Previous release, this DB | No schema change, so all old checks still see the 32 fences. | | This release, DB with fence objects | Extra objects are tolerated, and the trigger backstop still applies. | | This release **plus #8318**, DB without fence objects | Serving, readiness, lease admission and deletion proven by `migration_schema_fence_objects_are_optional_for_serving_and_deletion`, which drops them inline. Without #8318, serving and deletion still work, but the push matcher, exhausted-job reaper, invite retention, ephemeral reaper and startup d_tag backfill fail with `42883 community_write_allowed(uuid) does not exist` (seen in deploy-stack E2E). | | Older executor, inventory frozen by this release | `fenced_tables` is still populated from the live catalog (32). | This PR does not depend on #8318 to merge and can ship alongside it, but it is not drop-safe alone. The drop PR (#8323) needs #8219, #8318 and this PR deployed on every pod, and every rollback image after the drop must include #8318. ## Tests - `store::deletion::postgres_tests::migration_schema_fence_objects_are_optional_for_serving_and_deletion` migrates to 0060. It then runs the following with the fence objects present, then again after dropping them inline: - serving startup - readiness - the deletion catalog check - `inventory_schema` - lease acquire/release - `AccessDenied` for quiescing, fenced, tombstoned and missing communities - `store::deletion::postgres_tests::deletion_lock_admission_rejects_pinned_snapshot_isolation` checks that REPEATABLE READ and SERIALIZABLE are refused by both `guard_community_write` and `guard_transaction_with_serving_lease`. The lease case uses a never-acquired lease, so if the isolation check is skipped it fails as stale instead. - `buzz-deletion` `postgres_tests::approved_legacy_fence_inventory_accepts_current_catalog` checks that a legacy digest with 32 fences validates against a live catalog with none, and that an unknown tenant table is still rejected. - `store::deletion::tests::scoped_table_exclusions_match_sql_during_transition` checks exclusion-list parity. - `store::deletion::postgres_tests::serving_lease_acquire_waits_for_fence_lock_then_refuses` holds the exclusive deletion lock and checks that lease acquisition stays pending. It then commits `fenced` and requires `AccessDenied` with no lease row persisted. Removing the lease path's `guard_community_write` call fails this test, while the other four lease/admission tests above still pass. - `buzz-deletion` `serving_guard_heartbeats_long_operation_through_quiescing` now requires `AccessDenied` for a lease acquired during quiescing, rather than any error. Each test was confirmed to fail when its fix is removed (rc 100, 0/1): the isolation refusal, the three validators restored to the base version, the fence-list comparison restored, and one name dropped from the Rust list. ## What got simpler The lease path loses its special SQL assertion and its error-code translation and reuses the ordinary app guard. The serving and deletion catalog checks each lose one requirement. No new abstraction. The `fenced_tables` reader stays only for mixed-version executors; the drop PR deletes it. **Identified debt (pre-existing, outside this diff):** `runtime::postgres_tests::writer_pool_rejects_non_read_committed_database_default` hangs on clean `177551dda` too. ## Verification (Blox, tree identical to this commit) | Gate | Result | |---|---| | `cargo fmt --all -- --check` | pass | | `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` | pass | | `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --lib` | 167/167 | | `scripts/test-postgres-test-discovery.sh` | pass | | `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p` buzz-admin / audit / deletion / push-gateway / relay / search / workflow | all rc 0 (4, 7, 12, 11, 402, 20, 2) | | `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-db` | 510 pass, 1 fail: the pre-existing hang above, interrupted | | Round 2 (this head): `-p buzz-db` / `-p buzz-deletion` | 511 pass + the same pre-existing hang interrupted / 12/12 | The new PG tests are selected by the `postgres-ci` filter `(test(/postgres_tests::/) or binary(/^postgres_/)) and not test(/(^|::)external_infra[^:]*::/)`. buzz-review-completed --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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c0ab789499 |
feat(buzz-db): retire the channel-TTL trigger (#8210)
## Summary This drops the channel-TTL event trigger. The application already refreshes ephemeral-channel deadlines in the event transaction (`event_follow_up::refresh_channel_ttls`, from #8135), so the trigger only repeats that work. This PR originally retired both follow-up triggers. #8352 has since retired the push-match trigger in migration 0063, so after the rebase this PR covers only the TTL half. Migration `0065_retire_channel_ttl_trigger.sql`: - `SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '5s'` (the same bound as 0063) - drops `events_refresh_channel_ttl` and `refresh_channel_ttl_after_event_insert()` Dropping the trigger on the partitioned parent also drops its partition clones. Published migrations, including 0022 and 0024, stay checksum-frozen. The same objects are removed from `schema/` (`schema/functions/…`, `schema/triggers/events.sql`, `schema/schema.sql`) and from the pgschema reconcile script. After this, migrated and desired-state databases have no event follow-up triggers. Tests: - `follow_up_retirement_tests.rs` (renamed from `push_retirement_tests.rs`): the push-retirement upgrade test now stops at 0063. A new test upgrades 0064 → 0065 and checks that the TTL trigger is gone from the parent and every partition, that the function is gone, and that the published checksums haven't changed. - `event_follow_up_postgres_tests.rs`: the contract now has two arms. `AppOnly` is the shipped schema, where both triggers are absent. `Dual` reconstructs the historical overlap of both triggers. The `PushRetired` arm (the push trigger dropped, the TTL trigger kept) was the shipped state before this PR. Its tests are removed because `Dual` and `AppOnly` together cover it. - `embedded_migrator_contains_consolidated_initial_schema` pins the 0065 statements and checks that both objects are absent from the desired schema. **Deploy gate:** do not run 0065 against a database still served by a relay older than #8135. After 0065, raw SQL writers no longer refresh TTL deadlines. `docs/push-gateway-deployment.md` is updated to match. ### What got simpler The trigger and the app no longer both refresh TTL deadlines; the app is now the only producer. One plpgsql function and one trigger are gone from both schema paths, and 8 per-partition drops are gone from the reconcile script. The follow-up contract drops from three arms to two. ### Related issue BUZZ-313 (Linear), part of the trigger-retirement work. ### Testing Head is `4f7d0baf0`. Results below are at `678927730` unless noted. `678927730..4f7d0baf0` changes only one test in `crates/buzz-db/src/store/event.rs`, described in the first bullet. - **Fixed test, `permanent_channel_event_commits_do_not_lock_the_channel_row`** (`4f7d0baf0`). - **Why it changed:** after 0065, its raw-pool inserts no longer ran any TTL refresh, so the test passed whatever `refresh_channel_ttls` did. This was raised in review. - **What it does now:** it inserts through the production `AdmittedTx` path and keeps the barrier and the tuple-lock probe. It commits all N transactions while an external transaction holds `FOR SHARE` on the channel row. It also asserts that no `buzz_db_channel_ttl_refresh_failures_total` is counted. - **Mutation check:** with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE` injected into `refresh_channel_ttl`, the new test fails (`must not wait on the channel row`, timeout at 10s). The old test passes under the same mutation. - **Blox:** fmt and `buzz-db` clippy pass. - **GitHub CI at `4f7d0baf0`:** every required check passes (56 pass, 0 fail). CI builds the merge ref with `main` `93ffc37cb`. - **New and renamed tests, checked by name in the CI logs at `4f7d0baf0`.** These pass in PostgreSQL Domain / PostgreSQL Tests ([117033725006](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38915998692/job/117033725006)): - `permanent_channel_event_commits_do_not_lock_the_channel_row` - `migration_schema_ttl_retirement_drops_every_partition_trigger_and_keeps_checksums` - `migration_schema_push_retirement_preserves_ttl_and_published_checksums` - `event_insert_ttl_refresh_handles_permanent_ephemeral_duplicate_and_activation_race` - `{desired,migration_schema}_event_follow_up_contract_{dual,app_only}` (four tests) `embedded_migrator_contains_consolidated_initial_schema` passes in Rust / Unit Tests ([117024125423](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38915998692/job/117024125423)). No `*_push_retired` test runs anywhere. - **Blox gates at `678927730`** (private PG16 + Redis, on a workstation shared with other sessions): - `cargo fmt --check`, workspace `clippy -D warnings` and `buzz-db --lib` all pass. - The `buzz-admin`, `buzz-audit`, `buzz-deletion`, `buzz-push-gateway`, `buzz-search` and `buzz-workflow` Postgres packages pass. - `buzz-db`: 517 of 519 tests passed. The 2 that hung, both `writer_pool_*` tests, were killed. `buzz-relay`: 413 of 426 passed. The 13 failures are covered below. - **Uncontended reruns at `4f7d0baf0`** on a fresh, idle workstation (PG16.15, `competing=0` for every arm): - **`writer_pool_rejects_non_read_committed_database_default` predates this PR.** It timed out 3/3 at head and 3/3 at `main` `93ffc37cb`, with a 300s timeout per run. - **`writer_pool_metrics_stop_after_session_timeout_setup_failure` also predates this PR.** It timed out 2/3 at head and 2/3 at `main`, and passed in the remaining run on each side. - Both tests pass in CI. The gate accepts them as a named exception for this PR, as a pre-existing hang on the PG16 test environment. - **`buzz-db`:** 518 of 519 tests passed. The single failure is `writer_pool_rejects_non_read_committed_database_default`, killed after it hung (the exception above). - **`buzz-relay`: still open.** 413 of 426 tests passed. The same 13 `handlers::group_state_postgres_tests` failed as on the shared box, each panicking at once in its fixture's `ensure community` step with `Sqlx(PoolTimedOut)`. Contention does not explain them. The fixture's community setup is in `buzz-db`, which this PR changes. A head/`main` comparison of the full `buzz-relay` package on the same idle box is running to find out whether this predates the PR. All 13 pass in CI at this head. - **E2E (Gimli, Blox)** at `050e593af`. `050e593af..678927730` changes only tests and docs; the migration, schema and runtime code are byte-identical. Gimli's audited verdict: **EXERCISED AND WORKS**, for DB and relay runtime only. Gimli ran it at `050e593af`; this head's runtime is byte-identical but was not freshly executed. - **Upgrade:** a real relay startup took the schema from 0064 to 0065. That removed the TTL function and the trigger from the parent table and from all 8 partitions. Checksums for migrations 1–64 are unchanged. - **Lock-timeout rollback:** with a real lock held, the migration failed with `55P03` at 5.0007s and the schema rolled back fully to 64. Once the lock was released, a retry applied 65. - **Fresh desired schema:** after pgschema plus reconcile, the retired objects are absent. - **Real signed kind-9 sends:** on both schema paths, these refreshed ephemeral-channel deadlines to about +600s. Permanent channels stayed NULL. - **Raw SQL insert:** at 64 it refreshed the deadline. After 65 it left the deadline unchanged, on both the upgraded and the fresh schema. - **Not covered:** native or device testing, and deploy. - **Review:** Legolas found 0 P0 and 0 P1. His three optional P2s are fixed in `678927730`. - **No human app test:** this is a DB-only change. - **Migration numbering:** #8237 and #8372 also add a `0065_*` migration. Whichever PR merges second must renumber. --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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f148c0f22c |
feat(relay): add profile search over name and display_name only (#8301)
🤖 > **Review as a pair with block/buzz-app#1084** (the app change that uses this endpoint). Either can merge first: the app falls back to the old search on relays without this endpoint. ## Summary Searching for a person by name over the relay's general search returns profiles that only *mention* the text somewhere else: in an avatar image embedded as text, in the bio, or in the verification address. A search for "wes" could fill every result page with profiles whose avatar data happens to contain "Wes", and never return the person actually named Wes. This adds a relay endpoint, `POST /profiles/search`, that looks only at a profile's **name** and **display name**. Every other profile field is ignored. **Matching and paging are the same as the relay's existing full-text profile search** (NIP-50 search over kind:0 profiles with `search_mode: "prefix"`). A client can switch to this endpoint without a visible change in which people a query finds: - Each query word must match a whole word of the name; the last word can be a prefix. Words can be in any order, so "johnson wes" finds "Wes Johnson". Case is ignored. - Pages work the same way: up to 100 results per page, up to page 1000. - The results are exactly the old results minus profiles that match only outside their names. The order is better for people search: exact name first, then names that start with the query, then names with a later word that starts with it, then other matches. Ties are ordered by `ts_rank_cd` over the two name fields only (not the whole profile, as in NIP-50), then newest first, then event id. The response is a JSON array of the original signed profile events (Nostr kind:0), so clients can verify them as they do today. The buzz-app client change is block/buzz-app#1084. ## Details - Request: `{"query": "wes", "limit": 20, "page": 1}`. `query` is 1–100 characters after trimming; `limit` is 1–100 (default 20); `page` is 1–1000 (default 1); unknown fields are rejected with 400. - The search reuses the full-text search's own query builder (`buzz-search`), so the word rule cannot drift from it. The existing full-text index on events stays the access path; the name check runs only on rows the index already matched. There is no new index. One small migration (`0061`) adds the function `profile_name_fields()`; it reads no table data, so it runs instantly. - Only current profiles count: a replaced profile stops matching. Profiles that are not a JSON object, or whose name fields are not strings, never match. Content that PostgreSQL cannot read as `jsonb` (for example a `\^@` escape or very deep nesting) also never matches, and it cannot make the search fail for everyone else. - The handler loads the matched events through the normal routed event read and applies the same reader visibility check as other reads, in search order. - Access uses the same checks as the relay's GIF search endpoint: a signed HTTP request (NIP-98), identity admission (NIP-FI), rate limit, replay protection, and relay membership. That code moved out of `gifs.rs` into one shared helper in `bridge.rs`; GIF behavior is unchanged. - The route is added to the existing protected-route and NIP-FI shadow/enforce route tables. Docs: `docs/profile-search.md`. - Two test-only lines get `sadscan:disable` comments, as other fixtures already do: an existing public ES256 test key in `router.rs`, and the local Postgres test URL in the search integration test. ### Related issue None found. ### Testing - Postgres test for the search query (`profile_names_match_name_words_only`): only name fields match (avatar data URL, `about`, `nip05`, `banner`, non-string names and non-object content are excluded); words in any order and across both name fields; whole words only for completed words; ranking order; pages split without overlap or gaps; replaced profile; other community; `%` literal. - Postgres end-to-end test through the router: an admitted member gets only the name-matching signed event, and the returned event still verifies. - Request validation unit tests; existing GIF admission tests and router route-table tests pass. - Local end-to-end run with buzz-app#1084 against a relay built from this head, with about 195 seeded profiles. For every query tried, the endpoint's results were a subset of the full-text search's results; the only profiles missing were avatar-only matches. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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6766174673 |
chore(push): retire push notification database trigger (#8352)
Buzz must schedule mobile push notifications when it saves an eligible message. The relay, the server that receives and stores messages, now does this in application code. An older database trigger still exists. This trigger is a rule that runs automatically when a message is saved. This PR removes the old trigger and its supporting database function. The relay remains responsible for scheduling notifications. Migration 0063 makes this change in existing databases; updated setup scripts apply it to new databases. The change does not turn on push notifications. Production migration and deployment need separate approval. Before deployment, verify the release images and all pending database migrations. If push needs to be stopped after release, disable it with the feature flag and keep the qualified application version and database schema. Do not downgrade the application image. ### Validation - Local checks passed: 519 isolated database integration tests, 166 database unit tests, 17 source-policy tests, and the relay push-runtime tests. - Tests verify that the migration removes the old trigger, preserves earlier migration records, and lets the application schedule push work correctly. A concurrency test exercises the real application path; deliberately removing its lock makes the test fail. - [Current-head CI passed on retry](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38752849383/attempts/2). The first attempt had one database-connection timeout during test setup; the failed jobs passed when rerun on the unchanged commit. - Initial local CI and push checks hit unrelated ACP test failures, which passed when run separately. Only the Rust-test push hook was skipped under the repository's local-check exception; other applicable hooks passed. ### Before merge - [x] Migration 0063 is available and the push trigger remains on [main at |
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71d7aa0436 |
feat(relay): add the system channel type (#8180)
🤖 ## Summary Buzz uses channel membership to decide who can read what, and every channel a person belongs to shows up in their client as a chat. So there is no way to make a group that exists only for access control, for example "only this agent and its owner can read the agent's config". Such a channel would appear in both people's sidebars, search results and unread counts. This stack adds a **system channel**: an ordinary channel that queries leave out unless they ask for it. This first PR adds the type itself. - `kind:9007` (create channel) with `["channel_type", "system"]` creates a system channel. - It is private unless the creator sends `["visibility", "open"]`. - While it is private, its channel metadata event (kind:39000) carries the NIP-29 `hidden` marker, which means "hide this group's metadata from non-members". Until now the relay set `hidden` only for DMs. On its own this PR does not yet hide system channels from queries. Part 2 does that. Part 1 of 3, stacked on #8176 (the channel labels and creator lookup stack, which this feature uses). ### Related issue None found. ### Details - Migration 0062 adds `system` to the `channel_type` Postgres enum. No new columns. - `buzz_core::channel::ChannelType::System`, and `system` is now a reserved label name (labels cannot equal a channel type name). - `buzz-admin` reconcile writes `hidden` with the same rule as the relay. Usage metrics count system channels. - **Rollback.** A relay older than this change cannot read `channel_type = 'system'`. Do not roll back past it while system channels exist. - **Spec.** NIP-CL gets a "System channels" section. `ARCHITECTURE.md` lists the `System` type. ### Testing - Relay test: a system channel is private and `hidden` by default; opening it removes `hidden`; its first `t` tag is `system`. - Migration embed and usage-metrics tests. ### Stack These are two stacks. Merge them in this order. Client support (creating, labeling and finding these channels) will be in block/buzz-app, not the buzz SDK and CLI. **Stack 1: channel labels and creator lookup (#8174–#8176)** 1. #8174 channel type and creator tags, and the channel creation time 2. #8175 channel labels 3. #8176 database-side label and creator match, and the rule for choosing one channel **Stack 2: system channels (#8180–#8182)**, stacked on stack 1 because it uses labels and the creator tag 4. #8180 the system channel type ← this PR 5. #8181 leave system channels out of reads that do not name them 6. #8182 channel-state filters opt in to system channels --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |