Commit Graph

185 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Mic Neale
4544ba1713 chore(mesh): upgrade MeshLLM to 0.76.2 (#7559)
## Summary

Upgrade Buzz from MeshLLM `v0.76.0-rc9` to the latest stable [v0.76.2
release](https://github.com/Mesh-LLM/mesh-llm/releases/tag/v0.76.2) (via
v0.76.1).

- Update all eight Mesh git dependencies across desktop and relay smoke
examples; both lockfiles resolve all 47 Mesh packages to
`a0c1e66b0ac037dd56544b9e2d94969ea43d694f` (tag `v0.76.2`). All non-Mesh
lock records are unchanged by the 0.76.1 → 0.76.2 bump.
- Match Mesh's `ed25519-dalek = 3.0.0` and `rusqlite = 0.40`
dependencies.
- Explicitly enable rusqlite's `fallible_uint` feature, preserving
Buzz's existing `u64` SQL conversions when **mesh is disabled**.
Mesh-enabled builds previously supplied this transitively, so testing
both configurations matters.
- Temporarily pin **only** the optional `sqlx-sqlite` package to the
merged upstream compatibility fix
[transact-rs/sqlx#4402](https://github.com/transact-rs/sqlx/pull/4402),
revision `94aafe3a68884d923b0798a767c8d7f6cfda89d2`. SQLx 0.9.0 caps
`libsqlite3-sys` below 0.38, while Mesh 0.76 requires 0.38. Cargo
resolves the conflict even with SQLite disabled. The fix raises that
upper bound; remove the patch once released. Buzz's active PostgreSQL
driver stays on crates.io SQLx 0.9.0.
- Preserve the explicit Linux keyring 3 `crypto-rust` feature so Secret
Service sessions retain DH encryption independently of Mesh keyring 4.
- Preserve the dedicated examples-only `buzz-mesh-smoke` crate and
lifecycle workflow wiring, keeping Mesh/native-runtime dev dependencies
out of relay CI builds.
- v0.76.1 → v0.76.2 upstream delta: self-updater fix for composed
product-v2 bundles (Mesh-LLM/mesh-llm#1844) plus release plumbing — no
API changes affecting Buzz.
- Merged `origin/main` (`7c789dee0`) without rewriting shared PR
history.

### Validation at `ae4adba15` (local macOS ARM64, Hermit toolchain)

- **Passed:** `cargo test --locked -p buzz-mesh-smoke --all-targets`
(all six example harnesses compile; no live harness execution).
- **Passed:** desktop Tauri workspace tests, both default and
`--features mesh-llm` graphs (3,296 tests with mesh enabled, 0
failures).
- **Passed:** `just desktop-tauri-clippy` (both feature graphs, `-D
warnings`), root workspace clippy `-D warnings`, `cargo fmt --all
--check`.
- **Passed:** `--locked` metadata resolution for both workspaces;
lockfile diff audited to touch only Mesh package records.
- **Passed:** full pre-push hook suite on the final push (branch-skew,
rust-tests, desktop-tauri-checks, file-size-check) — no hooks bypassed.
- **Not run:** live Mesh inference/admission smoke or installed-app UI
exercise. CI lifecycle smoke coverage applies.

Originating Buzz conversation:
buzz://message?channel=dffbc117-845a-4c02-bc3f-eaeeefc4deaa&id=670f9c262e1ec0a4df5600b3173a0c5de2abe17e08ba9ccfdd8eff109fadf1a8

---------

Signed-off-by: Thinker <75d8a808fa21bb8d1812e080cf471db601c6e8e6a62dcd516d37531e83a7bb77@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Thinker <75d8a808fa21bb8d1812e080cf471db601c6e8e6a62dcd516d37531e83a7bb77@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Galadriel <b81c841ed20a8e17caf4e6fac2f6f3bc61d304c84b8394720f6d00f37538c47e@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Gu <gu@buzz>
2026-09-24 07:32:07 -06:00
Kalvin C
5a349db91c feat(relay): add opt-in newest-first thread windows (#7823)
## Summary

Add an opt-in, newest-first thread window to the authenticated HTTP
query path.

A filter with `thread_window: true` returns:

- reply rows ordered by `(created_at DESC, id ASC)` with an exact
composite cursor;
- optional bounded reactions, edits, deletions, and delete-of-aux
closure;
- one relay-signed `kind:39007` bounds event bound to the normalized
host, authenticated reader, channel, root, request cursor, kinds, depth,
limit, and aux choice.

Filters without the flag keep the existing oldest-first thread behavior.
Channel windows and `kind:39006` are unchanged. No client opts into this
mode in this PR.

### Why extend NIP-CW

NIP-CW already defines relay-computed, cursor-paged conversation views
over extended NIP-01 filters. Thread windows use the same protocol
ideas: ordinary signed rows, composite keyset pagination, optional aux
closure, and relay-signed bounds. Adding a thread mode keeps those
related wire contracts together instead of creating a second NIP with
duplicated terminology and compatibility rules.

Extending a draft, optional NIP with an additive mode is normal protocol
evolution. Existing fields and meanings are not reinterpreted:

- `top_level: true` remains channel mode;
- `kind:39006` remains channel-window bounds;
- `thread_window: true` selects the new mode;
- `kind:39007` has a distinct identity and root/request binding;
- extension-unaware clients never send the selector;
- legacy thread queries remain unchanged.

NIP-CW documents only the wire contract and relay semantics. Database
plans, replica internals, and rollout procedures remain implementation
concerns.

### Why thread windows use independent modules

The implementation deliberately keeps `thread_window.rs` separate in
`buzz-core`, `buzz-db`, and `buzz-relay` rather than adding branches
throughout the existing channel-window path.

The modes share pagination concepts, but their invariants differ:

- channel mode selects top-level rows; thread mode requires one root and
depths `1..=depth_limit`;
- thread mode accepts only conversation row kinds and rejects
unknown/conflicting fields;
- thread bounds bind the root and authenticated reader because
cross-channel aux visibility can differ by reader;
- thread aux includes the root and requires complete two-hop closure;
- thread mode refreshes writer authorization before selection and before
signing;
- historical cursor pages may use a proved replica transaction, but
fallback must restart both aux hops on the writer;
- legacy thread traversal is oldest-first and must not inherit
descending cursor semantics.

Forcing these rules into channel-window code would create a mode flag
across parsing, SQL predicates, bounds construction, authorization,
replica fallback, and tests. That abstraction would not remove
complexity. It would distribute it. Separate modules keep each contract
local and leave the established channel and legacy paths untouched.

### Technical design

- Strict request parsing normalizes UUIDs, event IDs, kinds, defaults,
and cursors before computing the response binding.
- SQL applies community, root, channel, depth, kind, deletion, and
cursor predicates before `limit + 1`.
- Ordered metadata scanning plus exact event-key lookup avoids the
stale-statistics plan that previously exceeded the four-second SQL
budget on a 10k-reply thread.
- Aux work is bounded by target batches, query count, raw candidate
count, response bytes, SQL timeouts, and one shared HTTP deadline.
- Fresh authorization-set comparison catches both grants and revocations
during closure. The relay returns retryable `503` rather than signing an
incomplete page.
- Replica failure permanently degrades the request to the writer and
restarts closure from its original targets without resetting budgets.
- Migration `0049_thread_window_index.sql` adds the mixed-direction
index used by newest-first scans. It validates a prebuilt index and
bounds startup lock/build time.

### Tradeoffs

- The stale-statistics-safe plan is intentionally less clever. Measured
warm 100k deep-cursor execution increased from roughly 0.30 ms to 4.80
ms, plus about 8 ms planning, in exchange for avoiding a reproduced
multi-second timeout after rapid 10k-thread insertion.
- Bounds are authoritative only for the served page. There is no
cross-page snapshot guarantee, and replica insertion coverage does not
imply latest edit/deletion/aux visibility.
- Strict parsing rejects unsupported constraints instead of silently
serving a different row set.
- Required aux closure fails closed. The relay does not omit aux and
sign plausible-but-incomplete bounds.
- This PR ships relay capability only. Client rendering, retry UX,
live-history overlap, and compatibility fallback remain separate work.

### Related issue

No existing issue found. This work follows the thread-loading design and
review discussion.

### Testing

- `cargo test -p buzz-core`: 258 unit tests and 2 doctests passed.
- `cargo check --workspace --all-targets`: passed at the rebased
implementation head.
- `cargo test -p buzz-db`: 131 non-PostgreSQL tests passed; 275
infrastructure tests were ignored as declared.
- Focused PostgreSQL migration/runtime regressions: 3/3 passed against
an isolated PostgreSQL container, including both corrected
migration-ledger tests.
- `cargo fmt --all --check`: passed.
- Pre-rebase feature validation passed 398/398 PostgreSQL tests,
signed-wire multi-tenant/auth/pagination/aux/revocation probes, clean
Compose boot/reboot, and full core tests.
- Independent HA validation exercised three relay pods and a physical
PostgreSQL standby on the same runtime logic before the final
documentation-only cleanup.
- Independent final-delta review confirmed exactly two changed files,
byte-identical executable migration SQL after comments/diagnostic
normalization, matching prebuild/catalog/recovery instructions, and `git
diff --check`; no runtime receipts were relabeled to the new SHA.
- The pre-push hook ran repository checks but its Rust unit lane exited
100 without exposing an individual failed test in the captured
multiplexed output. The independently run affected-package checks above
passed; current-head repository CI remains required.

Known unrelated baseline behavior remains: the mesh-demo echo test can
return 504, and same-second archive → unarchive can deduplicate its
membership notification. Neither path is changed here.

---------

Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-23 12:01:45 -07:00
ravarora2
4142d2b84e Use worker snapshots for relay storage metrics (#7845)
## Summary

Make the relay read completed storage-accounting snapshots from
PostgreSQL by default. An environment with no snapshot emits no storage
metrics. When a worker publishes its first result, the relay picks it up
on the next successful leader usage tick, without a restart or
configuration change.

This changes how storage usage is measured and reported. **S3 remains
the object store. PostgreSQL stores the completed counts, byte totals,
community breakdown, and calculation metadata—not the objects
themselves.**

### Why move relay storage accounting entirely to database reads?

Today the relay supports two sources: its own S3 scan (`inline`, the
default) and the worker's saved snapshot (`external`). That requires
operators to deploy a worker and then coordinate a separate relay-mode
change in each environment.

The worker already owns the S3 listing and calculation. It runs in a
separate process with its own object cap, memory limit, and deadline.
Keeping a second scan inside the serving relay retains the resource
pressure and failure modes that this isolation is meant to remove.

PostgreSQL provides a durable handoff. The worker replaces one completed
snapshot atomically after a successful calculation. The relay reads that
row and exposes its values through the existing metrics endpoint. A
relay restart or leadership change can load the last completed result
without scanning the bucket again.

There is deliberately no S3 fallback when a snapshot is absent or a read
fails. Such a fallback would put the expensive scan back in the relay
precisely when a worker is absent or unhealthy. It would also leave two
calculation paths with different resource limits and freshness behavior.

### What happens if no worker exists?

**A worker that has never published is a normal, successful inactive
state.** The snapshot table must exist through the normal database
schema, but it may contain zero rows. The reader returns success, emits
no storage totals or failed-load gauge, and checks again on the next
usage tick. It does not exit the relay, start a worker, or list S3.

The relay checks for a completed database row; it does not inspect
Kubernetes Jobs or CronJobs. Worker presence and snapshot presence are
therefore different:

| Situation | Storage-reader behavior |
|---|---|
| No worker and no snapshot row | Return success, emit no storage
metrics, and query again next tick. |
| Worker starts later and publishes its first row | Read and emit it on
the next successful leader usage tick; no restart or mode change. |
| Worker is removed or fails, but its last valid row remains | Continue
reporting the last completed totals with their increasing age. |
| Query succeeds but a previously present row has been removed | Clear
the cache and stop refreshing storage series; existing exporter series
expire through the idle timeout. |
| Database read fails, times out, or returns an invalid snapshot | Log a
warning, set `buzz_storage_snapshot_load_ok=0`, retain any last-good
cached totals, and retry next tick. |
| Snapshot table is missing | Treat this as a schema error, not normal
worker absence; follow the failed-read behavior above. |
| `BUZZ_STORAGE_METRICS=off` | Skip the snapshot query and all storage
metric emission. |

No row means “not measured,” not zero bytes. A valid completed snapshot
of an empty bucket can report zero. If a read fails before any good
snapshot has been cached, only failed-load health is emitted.

These reads happen in the existing background metrics task, not the
relay startup path. A storage-read failure does not request process exit
or change readiness directly. A wider database outage can still affect
the relay's existing database-dependent operations and readiness.

### Read, parse, and emit path

```text
Worker: S3 listing -> BucketSnapshot -> JSON -> PostgreSQL
Relay: PostgreSQL -> JSON -> BucketSnapshot -> existing metric gauges
Collector: relay /metrics endpoint -> Datadog
```

1. `main.rs::run_storage_sweep_tick` calls the reader from the existing
leader-only usage task. The default interval remains 300 seconds.
2. `storage_sweep.rs::run_storage_metrics_tick` coordinates the read,
cache update, failure health, and metric emission.
3. `refresh_persisted_snapshot` calls the existing
`Db::load_storage_accounting_snapshot()` method. A five-second timeout
covers pool acquisition and the query. It uses the relay's existing
pool.
4. The existing query in `buzz-db/src/store/storage_accounting.rs` reads
`snapshot`, `completed_at`, `duration_ms`, `max_objects`, and `code_sha`
from the singleton row.
5. `serde_json::from_value(stored.snapshot)` decodes the JSON into the
existing `buzz_media::BucketSnapshot` type. Rust infers that type from
`cache_persisted_snapshot`'s argument. The generated `Deserialize`
implementation handles all fields, including the UUID-keyed
`per_community` map.
6. `emit_cached_storage_metrics` sets the existing physical/logical
totals and community byte/object gauges. The existing Prometheus
exporter exposes them for Datadog collection; this code does not send
snapshot JSON to Datadog.

The worker's `BucketSnapshot`/`CommunityStorage` structures, JSON field
names, SQL publication method, and database schema are unchanged. The
old external-mode JSON conversion moves out of `main.rs` into the reader
helper. No new format or hand-written field parser is needed. Duration
and object-cap metadata are validated before replacing the cache.

The five-second relay read timeout is separate from the worker's
30-second startup acquisition budget introduced in #7770. This PR does
not change the worker's pool or startup logic.

### Configuration and code changes

| Configuration | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Unset, `inline`, or `on` | Relay-local S3 scan | Read completed
database snapshots. `inline` logs one migration warning. |
| `external` or `snapshot` | Read completed database snapshots |
Continue reading snapshots. |
| `off` | Disabled | Disabled. |
| Unknown or empty value | Disabled with a configuration error | Same. |

Existing `inline` settings intentionally become reader aliases. Merely
changing the default would leave older deployments on their explicit
`inline` setting and preserve the need for coordinated configuration
PRs.

Remove relay-local scan scheduling, in-flight scan state, scan
configuration, and obsolete scan-attempt tests and health metrics.
Preserve the physical/logical total and per-community metric names,
leader-only emission, community scope filtering, and cleanup of old
community labels.

The shared relay-state field remains in place; its comment now describes
a cached worker result. The Helm chart defaults to `relayMode: external`
while leaving `storageAccounting.enabled: false`. Its rendering test
verifies that the reader is configured even when no worker is created.
The reader regression tests cover missing rows, later publication,
updates, invalid data, timeout, removal, reactivation, and the explicit
off switch. `docs/storage-accounting.md` describes this operating model.

### Freshness and rollout impact

`buzz_storage_snapshot_age_seconds` uses the worker's original
completion timestamp. Re-reading an old row never makes it fresh.
`buzz_storage_snapshot_load_ok=1` means the row was read and decoded; it
does not prove that the worker's latest attempt succeeded.

Monitor snapshot age against the worker's schedule and allowed runtime,
and monitor Job failures separately. The old relay scan-attempt health
gauges are retired because the relay no longer runs those scans.

Deploy this relay version through the usual release process. Once it
reaches an environment, workers can be enabled independently.
Already-released charts that still set `inline` work with the new
binary; future chart releases default explicitly to `external`. An
intentional `off` override still requires an operator to enable the
reader.

**Environments with no completed snapshot lose relay-calculated storage
totals after this upgrade.** That is the intended tradeoff for removing
scans from the serving process. Environments with a prior snapshot
continue showing its last completed totals and age. This PR does not
install workers in additional environments or deploy the new relay
image.

### Related issue

Related to #4601. Follows the worker startup fix in #7770. The separate
fleet-usage collector work in #7176 overlaps this code and may need
reconciliation when it merges.

### Testing

Built and ran the relay locally against isolated PostgreSQL and Redis
with the legacy `inline` setting, five-second usage ticks, and a
15-second metric idle timeout. The same process was exercised through
these steps:

1. Start with an empty snapshot table: relay becomes ready and exposes
no storage series.
2. Publish a snapshot containing 123 bytes: the community gauge becomes
123.
3. Replace it with 456 bytes: the gauge becomes 456.
4. Remove the row: storage series expire without fabricating a zero-byte
measurement.
5. Publish 789 bytes: metrics reactivate without restarting the relay;
readiness remains healthy.

The local S3 endpoint recorded zero requests. The unrelated Git
conformance startup probe was disabled for this isolated reader check;
the test covers storage accounting, not every other use of S3 in the
relay. No new relay image was deployed to staging or production during
this test.

The broad local integration run also hit an existing
`p0_pool_acquisitions_use_typed_operation_pairs_without_other` failure
in `buzz-db/tests/observability_source.rs`. The same source-only test
fails on unmodified `main` at `0ef7a2222`; this PR changes neither the
test nor its failing source.

The full local `just ci` run stopped at mobile native-asset setup: the
`objective_c` build hook received no SDK path from `xcrun`. Mobile tests
did not run.

Generated with Codex

Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com>
2026-09-23 14:39:39 -04:00
Will Pfleger
b6a26556ec feat(canvas): add version history with atomic restore (#6780)
🤖 Adds append-only channel canvas history, restore, and
relay-authoritative optimistic concurrency so stale edits cannot
silently replace a newer canvas.

## What this adds

- **Desktop history and restore** — browse revisions with author,
timestamp, preview, and diff; restore an older revision as a new signed
head after explicit confirmation. Persisted empty canvases remain
reachable, mutation outcomes are announced accessibly, and focus moves
to a stable destination after save or restore.
- **CLI history and restore** — `buzz canvas history --channel …`, `buzz
canvas get --channel … --revision <id>`, and `buzz canvas restore
--channel … --revision <id>` use keyset pagination over the retained
revision stream.
- **SDK canvas builders** — optional `expected-revision` tags, bounded
ancestry classification, and shared timestamp discipline keep
first-party writes ahead of the head they read without propagating
poisoned future timestamps.

## Authoritative concurrency contract

Tagged canvas writes use compare-and-swap semantics in the relay and
database:

- `expected-revision=none` succeeds only when no live canvas exists.
- An event ID succeeds only when it names the canonical live head.
- A byte-identical replay succeeds only when that event is already the
canonical live head.
- A successful candidate must sort strictly ahead of the current head
under `created_at DESC, id ASC`.
- Malformed preconditions and stale or non-advancing writes are rejected
before event rows, mentions, or fan-out are committed.

The database serializes tagged writes, unconditional kind `40100`
writes, and canvas soft deletion on the same `(community, kind,
channel)` advisory key. Untagged `buzz canvas set` remains an
unconditional write, but participates in that serialization boundary so
it cannot race a tagged save or deletion. Deletion classification is
derived inside the datastore transaction; unrelated event kinds do not
take the canvas lock.

## Read and timestamp consistency

Precondition and post-write ancestry reads request strong consistency
from `/query`, pinning them to the writer when replica routing is
enabled. Display-only history remains replica-eligible.

First-party canvas writers stamp `created_at = max(now, head + 1)` with
a conservative client skew limit. The relay applies a canvas-specific
future-timestamp ceiling before persistence, preventing an accepted
boundary head from making subsequent first-party writes invalid while
preserving the broader ingest limit for other event kinds.

## Durable outcomes and recovery

After an accepted publish, a failed verification read is reported as
durable success with `verified: false` rather than a failed save.
Desktop and CLI preserve the new event ID and direct users to History
when verification is unavailable. A successful read walks the bounded,
cycle-guarded `expected-revision` ancestry chain so transitive
descendants are not misclassified as supersession. Canvas caches
invalidate for every settled mutation outcome, including a retained but
superseded revision.

The 409 reconciliation path in `cmd_restore_canvas` now separately
establishes persistence evidence from ancestry classification.
`canvas_write_survived` checks reachability only; a secondary
writer-pinned IDs lookup distinguishes "A absent" from "A present but
superseded by a legacy write." The four-way outcome (survived /
persisted-but-superseded / genuinely-absent / read-fail) is now correct
for all lost-response shapes including unconditional legacy writes.

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-23 11:03:54 -04:00
Will Pfleger
77729abfb6 feat(relay): add admin HTTP routes for member restriction management (#7302)
## What

Three admin HTTP routes under `GET|DELETE /api/admin/v1/members/...`:

- `GET
/members/restrictions?communityId=<uuid>[&limit={1-200}][&cursor=<token>]`
— lists active bans and timeouts with stable keyset pagination
- `DELETE /members/{pubkey}/ban?communityId=<uuid>` — lifts an active
ban; 409 if no active restriction
- `DELETE /members/{pubkey}/timeout?communityId=<uuid>` — lifts an
active timeout; 409 if no active restriction

## Auth

All three routes pass through the existing NIP-98 authorization gate.
Both DELETEs call `require_mutation_principal`; GET follows the
established read-authorization pattern.

## Atomicity

Both DELETE routes use transactional DB helpers
(`unban_member_with_audit` / `untimeout_member_with_audit`) that perform
the conditional lift UPDATE and the `moderation_actions` INSERT in one
SQL transaction. If the audit INSERT fails the lift rolls back; the
restriction stays active.

## Expired-ban predicate

`unban_member` WHERE clause requires `banned AND (ban_expires_at IS NULL
OR ban_expires_at > now())` — matches all read paths. An already-expired
ban returns `false` → 409.

## Pagination (GET /members/restrictions)

`GET /members/restrictions` returns `{ "items": [...], "nextCursor":
"<token>"|null }`.

- `limit` — page size 1–200 (default 200), enforced as a SQL `LIMIT`.
Returns 400 for values outside range.
- `cursor` — opaque continuation token from a prior page's `nextCursor`.
Omit for the first page.
- Order: `ORDER BY updated_at DESC, pubkey DESC`. The `pubkey`
tie-breaker ensures a deterministic cursor even when multiple rows share
the same `updated_at`.
- Cursor encoding: base64url of `{updated_at_micros}_{pubkey_hex}`.
Treat as opaque.
- `nextCursor` is `null` only when the returned page is smaller than
`limit`. An exactly-full final page emits a non-null cursor; the
subsequent request returns an empty page with `null`.
- The existing `list_community_restrictions` DB method (unbounded) is
kept intact for the embedded dashboard bridge consumer (`GET
/moderation/restricted`), whose bare-array response contract must not
change.

## Tests

All Postgres-gated tests are in the `postgres_tests` module
(`api/admin/mod.rs`):

- `list_restrictions_returns_active_bans_and_timeouts` — seeds a ban +
timeout, GET returns both; `nextCursor` is null when all records fit in
one page
- `list_restrictions_pagination_exhaustive` — seeds 201 rows: 199 with
distinct timestamps (1s apart, newest first) plus a tied pair sharing an
identical older timestamp (`now()-1000s`), pinned to sort positions
200/201 so the default-200 page boundary splits the tie. Asserts: (1)
`limit=201` → 400; (2) a no-`limit` request returns exactly 200 items +
non-null `nextCursor` (falsifiable binding of default=200 and SQL cap —
reverting the route default to the shared helper's 50 fails this
assertion); (3) continuation walk to exhaustion with exactly-once
coverage over all 201 pubkeys, exercising the tie-breaker at the page
boundary.
- `unban_member_returns_204_clears_ban_and_inserts_audit` — 204, ban
cleared, timeout survives (restriction independence), audit row
verified, tenant isolation confirmed
- `untimeout_member_returns_204_clears_timeout_and_inserts_audit` — 204,
timeout cleared, ban survives (restriction independence),
second-community timeout survives (community_id predicate), audit row
verified
- `unban_member_returns_409_for_expired_ban` — expired ban → 409, no
audit row
- `unban_with_audit_rolls_back_lift_when_audit_insert_fails` (buzz-db) —
forced CHECK constraint failure proves Err + ban still active (rollback
proof)

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-21 14:53:04 -04:00
Will Pfleger
ce41be9c4b fix(relay): fire kick live side effects at convergence; persist target; fence re-add race with held lock (#7298)
## What

Ensures admin kick live side effects (subscription eviction + workflow
disable) fire correctly on every path — fresh HTTP, crash recovery, and
upgrade recovery from pre-migration rows — without a race window where a
concurrent legitimate re-add can be revoked.

### Finding 1 — Lock held through effects

Replace `verify_member_still_removed` (which acquired + released the
advisory lock before returning) with `membership_removal_fence`, a RAII
guard that keeps the `pg_advisory_xact_lock` alive until the caller
drops it.

Update `apply_kick_live_side_effects` to use the fence on every path
(fresh and recovery), holding it through eviction and workflow-disable.
Remove the `is_recovery` parameter entirely.

**The bug:** the old code released the lock before returning a bool; a
concurrent `add_member` could commit between the check and the effects,
silently evicting a re-added member.

**New guarantee:** any `add_member` either serializes before the fence
(fence observes `removed_at IS NULL`, skips effects) or waits until
after effects complete.

### Finding 2 — Persisted-context path scoped to kick only

Gate the persisted-context branch in `admin_action_worker.rs` on `action
== "kick"`. Non-kick actions (ban, timeout, delete) always re-derive
from the report.

**The bug:** any action with `enforcement_target_pubkey` set took the
persisted-context branch, which hard-coded `target_event_id = None`. A
stranded delete either failed pre-marker recovery ("delete requires
target_event_id") or finalized post-marker without the tombstone outbox
row.

### Finding 3 — Legacy kick row upgrade recovery (Carl's
CHANGES_REQUESTED)

Migration 0047 (renumbered from 0045 to avoid collision with two main
merges: 0045_retain_push_revocation_tombstones and
0046_storage_accounting_snapshots) adds
`enforcement_target_pubkey`/`enforcement_channel_id` without
backfilling.

**The bug:** the convergence gate read only the persisted columns and
rejected NULL/NULL rows as corrupt, causing every recovery retry to fail
forever. A cancellation cannot release a post-mutation action, so these
rows remain permanently stuck.

**Fix:** when persisted columns are absent, fall back to the function
parameters (which the recovery worker re-derives from the report row).
Error only when both sources are absent (genuinely unresolvable). This
preserves new-writer safety while allowing pre-migration rows to
converge.

An old writer in a rolling deployment can also create NULL rows after
the DDL applies; the same fallback handles these.

### Finding 4 — Test moved to PG lane


`kick_live_side_effects_clears_membership_cache_and_evicts_subscription`
was in the infra-free unit lane but called `membership_removal_fence`,
which requires a real Postgres connection. Moved to the PG fixture lane
(`#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]`) with a real member row so the fence
query sees the expected `removed_at` state.

## Tests

- **`crash_recovery_redrive_fires_kick_live_side_effects`** (existing):
re-drive via real recovery worker path, asserts all three side effects.
-
**`crash_recovery_after_readd_preserves_membership_subscriptions_and_workflows`**
(updated): uses real `add_member` (not direct SQL) — re-add completes
before fence is acquired.
- **`membership_removal_fence_blocks_concurrent_add_member`**
(existing): holds the fence explicitly, spawns `add_member`, asserts it
blocks until the fence is dropped.
- **`stranded_delete_pre_marker_recovers_via_worker`** (existing):
stranded delete (crash before mutation) converges via `recover_one` to
succeeded.
- **`legacy_kick_row_pre_marker_recovers_via_worker`** (new): old-writer
shaped row (NULL columns, no step_marker) converges through the full
state machine via recovery worker. Falsifiable: reverting the
convergence-gate fallback leaves the action stuck in enforcing.
- **`legacy_kick_row_post_marker_recovers_via_worker`** (new): same but
with step_marker set (post-marker crash). Falsifiable: same revert.
-
**`kick_live_side_effects_clears_membership_cache_and_evicts_subscription`**
(moved to PG lane): verifies cache eviction and subscription removal
against a real member row.

## CI

`Rust / Rust Lint` and `Windows Rust` failures in the prior run were
main-inherited (same lanes fail on main at the prior base). The branch
is now at main's current head.

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-21 14:52:54 -04:00
Wes
6a86531ac9 feat(relay): add atomic complete read-state snapshots (#7572)
Opened by Brain on behalf of Wes (GitHub: wesbillman).

## Summary

Add an opt-in, host-scoped completeness primitive for NIP-RS read-state
clients. Ordinary query arrays and WebSocket behavior remain unchanged.

- Advertise a version-1 `read_state_snapshot` capability in NIP-11 only
when the request resolves a community.
- Accept exactly one self-author kind-30078 snapshot filter on
authenticated `POST /query`, after the existing admission, replay and
membership gates.
- Read all retained, nondeleted self-author kind-30078 coordinates from
the writer at one SQL-statement MVCC cut—including unrelated application
coordinates and events without a read-state tag.
- Return a complete versioned envelope bound to community, signer and a
content-identity hash. Reject malformed contracts,
reconstruction/signature/storage failures and whole-request overflow;
never return a truncated complete response.
- Bound snapshots at 4,096 events and 8 MiB of compact encoded
event-array bytes, advertised as `max_event_array_bytes`; envelope
metadata is additional. Retain the separate stored-payload preflight
budget.

## Safety and scope

This is point-in-time enumeration, **not** a live freshness guarantee,
cursor, CAS token, cross-relay transaction, or unread total. NIP-RS now
explicitly requires fresh complete enumeration from every write relay
before each override action, canonical publication, carry-forward or
deletion. It does not enable synchronized manual-unread overrides in any
client. No schema migration or deployment is included.

## Validation

Executed against the source committed as
`1fd5a5e0c0d893c1259386885517c0c44ae7630f`:

- Four real-router/PostgreSQL snapshot cases: beyond-page-cap
enumeration and overflow; corruption/storage failure; production
payload-bound NIP-98, Redis replay guard and membership enforcement;
host discovery/scope/strict request shape.
- Two database cases: replacement during preflight preserves a single
statement cut; encoded-byte overflow and writer-not-replica routing. The
cluster-wide probe uses the required `cluster_global_` serialization
prefix.
- Production-call-site mutations killed for dispatch, strict filter
validation, discovery tenant, snapshot tenant, encoded-byte guard,
membership enforcement and replay enforcement; isolated mutation tree
restored.
- Both affected crates pass all-target Clippy; formatting, differential
file-size and repository PostgreSQL test-discovery checks pass.
- Normal pre-push gates pass without bypass: branch skew, push-head
scope, file size, Rust unit lanes and desktop Tauri checks.
- Independent read-only review by Pinky found no remaining relay blocker
at this commit. The execution/mutation results above were run by Brain,
not duplicated by the reviewer.

Hosted CI and maintainer review remain separate gates. No production
traffic or deployment was used for these fixture tests.

Originating Buzz channel: `a394ecdb-9c67-4c4e-a3c6-4a95f69e8cc8`
(unread-but-good), thread
`2413d0ba7fa5b2ac5c777df6b3754e2099b042ec8fb96ca64302a0919a0550b3`.

## Review repair (2026-09-21)

Carl updated this existing branch to
`2f9c9b11266c24947412cf28cefae4e96e7167b7`, merging main
`5079c770fe30bb3d8204822ce6c2431eacac6d4b` without rewriting published
history.

- Resolved the DB export conflict, preserving both snapshot and
storage-accounting exports.
- Addressed the blocking review using its accepted alternative: rename
`max_bytes` to `max_event_array_bytes` and explicitly document that
success-envelope metadata is outside the array budget. No auth, query,
runtime-limit, or client-behavior redesign.
- Added a PostgreSQL/router regression proving discovery, exact
8,388,608-byte array success with a larger envelope, and one-byte-over
rejection (413, no partial complete response).

Exact-head validation: all seven snapshot PostgreSQL/router tests passed
in an isolated local database; both affected crates passed all-target
Clippy; mandatory pre-commit/pre-push gates passed without bypass (Rust
unit lanes, Tauri default/mesh Clippy and tests, differential file size,
branch-skew/ref checks). Reverting only the descriptor rename made the
new regression fail before the final commit. Independent bounded
source-delta review by Mordecai found no blockers; execution was Carl's.

A broader `cargo test -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --all-targets` run on the
merged candidate passed 131 DB tests and 1,057 relay tests, then
encountered the same unrelated
`mesh_demo::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` 504 recorded in
the prior review. Full repository `just ci` / `just test` were not rerun
locally; hosted CI remains a separate gate. No deployment or production
traffic was exercised.

---------

Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-21 12:30:03 -06:00
Tom Brow
a61239f0d8 fix(mobile): avoid opening empty threads on message tap (#7756)
Tapping a mobile channel message with no replies currently opens an
empty thread. Only enable message-row thread navigation when the
existing thread summary reports replies, including replies known to the
relay but not loaded locally. Long-press → Reply still starts a new
thread.

Added widget tests for zero replies, loaded replies, relay-only replies,
and starting a thread through Reply. The zero-reply test failed before
the fix and passes afterward.

Validation: all 227 channel-page tests, the full mobile pre-push checks,
and all PR CI checks passed. The full repository gate failed in
unchanged Rust ACP timing tests (idle reset, keepalive, and steering
deadlines); this PR changes only mobile Dart files.

No duplicate open PR or issue found.

---------

Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
2026-09-21 08:51:05 -07:00
Wes
5079c770fe fix(workflows): make deletion persistent and retryable (#7735)
## Summary

Fix workflow deletion leaving its definition queryable, and make public
deletion acceptance agree atomically with executable/definition state.

- Delete the executable workflow and soft-delete its definition under
the existing coordinate lock, in the same transaction as kind-5
acceptance and mention indexing. Failed deletion leaves no public
accepted event; identical retries can succeed. Legacy already-stored
failed requests still repair.
- Choose one committed dispatch/audit owner for concurrent identical
requests. Completed duplicates remain silent. Preserve owner/community
isolation, newer revisions, orphan cleanup, and intentional backdated
recreation.
- Align Desktop confirmation and architecture documentation with
recreation semantics. Add deterministic PostgreSQL, live WebSocket, and
Desktop regressions. No schema migration or new retry/delivery
subsystem.

## Current validation

Head: `40d86ddab0853ffb292316653b22c3fd4f983f0c`.

- **Exact clean head:** live relay workflow-deletion E2E **4/4 passed**.
All applicable normal pre-push hooks passed: Rust unit suites, full
Desktop unit suite, Desktop lint/typecheck, Tauri clippy/tests, and
file-size/branch checks. No hook bypass.
- **Pre-commit implementation tree, then committed at this head:** full
discovered DB/relay PostgreSQL lane **351/351 passed**; built Desktop
deletion Playwright smoke **3/3 passed** (success, failure preserving
editor/draft, corrected confirmation copy).
- **Deterministic mutation evidence:** unchanged previous relay
`659b79282` fails both new regressions: concurrent identical requests
produce two normal/dispatch-owner responses, and rejected deletion
leaves one public event. Both controls pass. Fixed relay passes all
four.
- **Independent source review:** transaction/authorization/lock-order
and regression/cleanup lanes clear. Reviewers did not run tests
independently.

## Honest limits / merge gates

The broad pre-commit DB/relay/test-client selection passed
**1,215/1,216**; the untouched mesh-demo echo test returned HTTP 504
instead of 200. It remains outside this repair and is not counted green.
Initial hook attempts also exposed an untouched Desktop inventory
ordering assertion and unidentified ACP/agent test failures; standalone
package reruns and the final complete hooks passed without changing
those packages. Causes are not established.

The previous Desktop CI shard failed before tests on a Hermit `just`
download (HTTP 500). New-head CI/security review and reviewer
disposition remain required. No deployment, fresh interactive Desktop
session, full local `just ci`, or multi-replica runtime validation
claimed. Postgres/Redis validation used task-owned local containers,
fresh identities, and disposable fixtures.

## Compatibility

No automatic cleanup of existing workflows: repeating deletion repairs
definitions left by the old path. Canonical UUID coordinates and legacy
name fallback (`LIMIT 1` for duplicate names) are unchanged. Backdated
recreation remains intentional per [Tyler’s
decision](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7735#issuecomment-5729881295),
not an irreversible tombstone. Mention-index failure now rolls back the
complete deletion rather than best-effort accepting partial work.

Detailed reviewer disposition and evidence:
https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7735#issuecomment-5737367825

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Mordecai <f314b6033b6e13df94c8e9e1187d3666b6b9ce54e66ee986e31cdaa909e8dcbc@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-21 08:37:14 -06:00
Wes
5511b56fcf fix(relay): exclude ephemeral activity from message quota (#7736)
## Summary

Stop charging ephemeral WebSocket activity against the per-minute
`Messages` quota. Presence, typing, and observer traffic should not
consume the allowance intended for persistable event attempts.

- Use the existing `buzz_core::kind::is_ephemeral` predicate (kinds
`20000..=29999`) at the second admission gate. All authenticated
EVENT/REQ/COUNT traffic still consumes the shared `WsEvents` budget
first. Non-ephemeral EVENT attempts remain charged, including attempts
later rejected by authorization or validation.
- Add bounded `bucket` labels (`messages`, `ws_operations`, `api_calls`)
to `buzz_admission_rejections_total`. HTTP changes are metric labeling
only. Wire rejection text remains byte-for-byte unchanged, preserving
existing client parsers.
- Add real-Redis admission regressions and select them in the existing
relay integration CI job. No quota increases, identity/keying changes,
client changes, new limiter, or deployment. Downstream authorization and
fail-closed Redis behavior are unchanged.

### Related issue

Duplicate search found overlapping work: open #4912 and closed #4902.
They propose the same ephemeral-accounting correction alongside broader
wire/client/config changes. The relay fix is a deliberately narrower
four-file implementation on the current admission module, with
metrics-only diagnostics and real-Redis regression coverage. A separate
test-only CI repair is documented below. It does not close or claim to
supersede those PRs.

Related symptom: #7411. This PR does **not** resolve subscription bursts
exhausting the shared WS budget; that budget is intentionally preserved.
It also does not establish or fix the cause of HTTP quota exhaustion.

### Testing

Validation ran against base `779af8886caae1317b4de962082429867ab61503`
plus the exact patch now committed as
`70ea0528594e25e6dcb40cd74620bd5ef0177592` (binary diff SHA-256
`5064e1cbb87ecb9eff10336bae14b912cac442e1edc247aa4f093de30e4f9717`).
Normal commit/push hooks subsequently passed on the committed head,
without bypass.

Passed:
- Independent review and rerun: 11 rejection tests (including real
Redis) plus 4 admission tests. Covers ephemeral range boundaries,
human/agent budgets, persistable events, ephemeral admission after
message exhaustion, mixed EVENT/REQ/COUNT flood exhaustion, Redis
outage, exact wire payloads, and bucket metrics. Three mutations were
caught: reintroducing ephemeral billing, exempting stored events, and
bypassing WS rejection.
- `just test-unit`: all 17 runner groups; `just test-integration`: all 3
runner groups. Auth integration reported no tests; ignored database
integration tests are not claimed as executed.
- Relay all-target Clippy, formatting, workflow actionlint,
pre-commit/signoff hooks, and all applicable pre-push lanes
(`push-head-scope`, `branch-skew`, `file-size-check`, `rust-tests`,
`desktop-tauri-checks`).
- Release relay/CLI/admin build and isolated release-binary workflow:
channel creation, signed root/reply sends, exact-ID readback, and thread
retrieval. Debug and release WS smoke admitted three presence events
with a Messages limit of two, admitted two persistable events, rejected
the third, still admitted presence afterward, and rejected author
mismatch. Debug Prometheus confirmed `bucket="messages"`.

**Outstanding validation gap:** the additional `cargo test -p buzz-relay
--no-fail-fast` run was not green: library 1,055 passed / 2 failed / 100
ignored; binary 13 passed / 1 ignored; boot integration 9 passed.
Failures were
`api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` (504
instead of 200) and
`telemetry::tests::trace_context_lookup_does_not_enable_callsites`
(tracing assertion). Neither failure was diagnosed or repaired in this
scope, and this PR does not claim a fully green package suite. `just ci`
was not run locally; hosted CI remains to validate the PR.

All runtime tests used isolated local services. Owned services have been
stopped; nothing was deployed and no production data was touched.


### CI cancellation-test repair

At the original relay head, hosted Rust unit tests failed on the
pre-existing cancellation harness race tracked in #4945. With owner
authorization, this PR now adapts the one-file repair from #5003
(original commit `cc8dc6124957acfd67fe2336396b58e0ff43ec60`), preserving
author credit. #5003's old hosted workflows failed without starting
jobs; their status is not used as validation evidence.

Commit `55fe5f16618a51d03ad48d6f2f97b2f8b463607a` holds the fake
provider response until a successful cancellation acknowledgement, then
replays all pre-acknowledgement usage/prompt frames in order. It retains
the cancellation and usage-before-response assertions and explicitly
requires prompt completion. No production code changes in this
follow-up.

Validation on parent `70ea052859` plus this test patch, before the
pre-commit-only assertion wrapping: full `cargo test -p buzz-agent
--no-fail-fast` passed (715 tests, one ignored); 100 targeted
repetitions passed with four concurrent workers; all-target buzz-agent
Clippy passed. The unmodified parent also passed 50 local repetitions,
so this is not claimed as a local reproduction of the intermittent CI
failure. The synchronization defect was confirmed from the source,
original CI log, and #4945. Hosted CI must validate the updated head.

Independent source review cleared exact commit
`55fe5f16618a51d03ad48d6f2f97b2f8b463607a`. Normal pre-commit/signoff
and all applicable pre-push hooks passed without bypass. The original
relay-package mesh-demo and telemetry failures remain disclosed above
and were not modified by this test-only repair.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: kiranmagic7 <262980978+kiranmagic7@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-19 02:39:37 -06:00
ravarora2
4c2086c084 feat(db): expose connection setup metrics (#7286)
## Why

Current pool metrics show checkout outcomes and pool state after the
fact. They do not show when a checkout began or which writer-connection
setup step failed. During startup and pool growth, operators need to
distinguish pool saturation from a slow or unsafe connection setup.

## What

- Count every instrumented database checkout when it starts, with a
fixed operation label.
- Measure writer-pool creation and every physical writer connection
across `physical_connect`, `created_at_floor`, `session_timeouts`,
`isolation`, and `ready`.
- Publish fixed-cardinality start, terminal-outcome, duration, and
waiter metrics without database URLs, SQL, raw errors, connection
ordinals, or per-connection lifecycle logs.
- Document how to identify the active setup bottleneck during a rollout
or incident.

## How

The existing typed checkout wrapper records starts and current waiters.
The huddle-history path uses that wrapper instead of a raw pool
checkout.

The production SQLx `after_connect` hook records start, terminal
outcome, and duration for each sequential safety step. A drop guard
records cancellation once if setup exits before a terminal result. Fixed
enums keep every label bounded.

For a phase, `started_total - sum(attempts_total)` is the number of
in-progress attempts on that pod. Because setup is sequential, a later
phase starting also proves the earlier phases succeeded.

The database path emits metrics only. This PR intentionally does not add
per-connection lifecycle receipts or direct `stderr` writes.

## Risk

Medium. This changes the production writer-pool `after_connect` hook and
adds one counter update to instrumented checkout paths. It does not
change the database safety statements or their failure behavior. The
telemetry has fixed labels and no per-connection identifiers.

## Testing

At exact head `ffb5fcb114a9c986ffd0cb2cfc9d413a32d5b1aa`, a release
relay was started against isolated local PostgreSQL, Redis, and MinIO
services. The main health endpoint returned `ok`, readiness returned
`{"status":"ready"}`, the connection-step metrics were exported, and no
database lifecycle receipts were emitted. A release CLI then created a
channel, sent a message, and read the same event back successfully.

The earlier staging deployment used pre-rebase head
`f58e9480a4f068db0c591f604fd6800fdd4bfc45`. The deployed
multi-architecture image came from [GitHub Actions run
33780888255](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33780888255),
manifest
`sha256:b9351fa644e08376cbe1999f9bee311d33d1799a68eadef7929c4f862a832fec`.

The [staging
deployment](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/317)
brought both pods in ReplicaSet `buzz-6c8758bd7d` to Ready with zero
restarts, and the connection metrics produced data in the [rollout
dashboard](https://app.datadoghq.com/dashboard/tm7-qxr-wt2/buzz-startup--rollout-safety).
That staging image predates the cleanup that removed per-connection
lifecycle logs; the metric schema and database safety statements are
unchanged.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p buzz-db -- --test-threads=1`: 128 tests passed across
the package and integration target; 255 opt-in tests remained ignored.
- Four opt-in production-path PostgreSQL regressions passed: initial
minimum connections, post-startup pool growth, isolation failure, and
session-timeout setup failure.
- All 35 relay media tests passed against the isolated PostgreSQL
database.
- Rust formatting, workspace clippy, desktop/Tauri clippy, web checks,
mobile analysis, security checks, and file-size policy checks passed.
- The repository-wide unit stage also exposed three unrelated existing
`buzz-acp` failures: one timing-sensitive keepalive test and two
environment-default tests.

## Bigger picture

This is the database-metrics part of the startup and rollout
observability work. The early-startup lifecycle foundation merged in
#7258, so the rebase removed that duplicate commit from this PR.

Originating discussion:
buzz://message?channel=6ac85131-70cd-4bda-a031-38d34114934e&id=fa2bed181c092697210a60bb6eedc55a665d5c1c6cabc1413a04686647011f71

Generated with Codex

---------

Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com>
2026-09-17 11:26:22 -04:00
ravarora2
6b1e45d2f6 Isolate S3 storage metrics from the relay (#7543)
## Why

**This PR moves the S3 storage scan out of the serving relay and into a
separate batch job.** The job saves a complete result in PostgreSQL. The
relay reads that result, exports the existing storage totals, and
reports the snapshot's freshness and database-read health.

```text
Today:         relay -> scan S3 -> calculate totals -> Datadog metrics
After rollout: CronJob -> scan S3 -> PostgreSQL snapshot -> relay -> Datadog metrics
```

The code in this PR is the new pipeline. It adds the worker, database
snapshot, relay read mode, and Helm CronJob template. It does **not**
enable the pipeline in production. The chart keeps the CronJob disabled,
and the relay keeps its current inline mode by default.
[squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure#244](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/244)
will set the production limits, enable the job, and switch the relay to
the saved snapshot after this PR merges.

The relay currently lists the media bucket once an hour and calculates
storage totals inside the serving process. The production bucket now
exceeds the relay's one million object cap, so each sweep fails and the
last good per-community values remain stale. The Datadog dashboard can
no longer show current storage use by community.

Raising that cap inside the serving relay would move a larger,
memory-heavy scan into the process that owns live WebSocket connections.
The scan retains state for unique blob hashes and community bindings, so
its memory use grows with the bucket. A large scan could raise relay
memory use, trigger restarts, and drop user connections.

The goal is to restore current metrics without putting a
production-scale bucket scan in the relay's failure domain. No media
objects move or change. Only the process that calculates the totals and
the handoff to the relay change.

## What

- Add `buzz-admin storage-snapshot`, a run-once worker that scans S3 and
saves one complete accounting snapshot in PostgreSQL.
- Add `external` relay mode to read the saved snapshot. Keep the current
`inline` mode as the default, and add `off` as a fail-closed option.
- Add an opt-in Helm CronJob for the worker. The 10 million object cap
exists only on this Job.
- Keep the current fleet and per-community gauges, and add snapshot age,
generation duration, configured cap, cap utilization, and database-load
health gauges.
- Add an additive migration for the latest complete snapshot and its run
metadata.

## Overall plan

1. Merge this PR to add the worker, database handoff, relay modes, and
disabled-by-default chart support. This step does not change production
behavior.
2. Publish the relay image and Helm chart `0.1.9` from `main`.
3. Update
[squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure#244](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/244)
to pin those final artifacts and rerender its manifests.
4. Use the infrastructure PR to deploy the CronJob with a 10 million
object cap, a one-hour deadline, and a 20 GiB memory limit.
5. Start one manual Job during a staffed window and verify its snapshot,
duration, memory use, relay stability, and Datadog output.
6. Keep the daily schedule and `external` relay mode only after that
gate passes, then add alerts for stale snapshots, snapshot-load failure,
failed jobs, cap pressure, duration, and worker memory.

The code and infrastructure remain separate so this PR can ship the
mechanism without silently enabling a production-scale scan. The
infrastructure PR owns the production settings and rollout gate.

## How

### Complete snapshot handoff

The worker takes a deployment-wide PostgreSQL advisory lock before it
lists S3. This prevents scheduled and manual workers from overlapping,
even if Kubernetes starts both.

The final database replacement runs through that same lock-owning
session. If the session dies during the scan, publication fails instead
of letting the stale worker overwrite its successor. A worker that no
longer owns the lock cannot publish through another pooled connection.

The worker reads S3 in pages of 1,000 objects and folds each page into
physical totals, logical per-community usage, and anomaly counts. It
stops before folding a page that would exceed `--max-objects` and emits
structured progress every 100,000 objects.

The worker replaces the singleton database row only after the full scan
succeeds. A listing error, malformed page, cap breach, serialization
error, lost lock session, or database error cannot publish a partial
snapshot. The last completed snapshot stays available. Each stored
result includes its completion time, duration, cap, and image or source
revision.

PostgreSQL is the handoff between the batch worker and the relay. The
worker writes one complete deployment-wide snapshot, and the relay reads
that snapshot on its normal leader metrics tick. No new network service
or worker endpoint is required.

### Relay behavior

`BUZZ_STORAGE_METRICS=inline` keeps the existing in-process sweep and
its one million object default. `external` loads the newest completed
worker snapshot on each leader metrics tick. `off` emits no
storage-family metrics. An unknown value fails closed to `off`.

External mode republishes the existing fleet, per-community, and anomaly
metric names, so those current queries remain valid. Snapshot handoff
health uses a separate family: `buzz_storage_snapshot_age_seconds`,
`buzz_storage_snapshot_duration_seconds`,
`buzz_storage_snapshot_max_objects`,
`buzz_storage_snapshot_cap_utilization`, and
`buzz_storage_snapshot_load_ok`.

The `buzz_storage_sweep_*` gauges remain inline-only because they
describe a scan attempted by the relay process. External mode does not
synthesize `sweep_ok=1` from the last successful database row: an old
row proves only that an earlier worker completed. Kubernetes CronJob/Job
status is authoritative for the latest worker result, including non-zero
exit, deadline expiry, and OOM termination.

The relay keeps the last complete snapshot available when a worker run
fails. Snapshot age shows that no replacement arrived on schedule, while
`buzz_storage_snapshot_load_ok` distinguishes staleness from a missing
row, database read failure, or invalid payload. If a community
disappears, changes host, or leaves the configured emission scope, the
relay zeroes the old labeled series instead of leaving stale values
behind.

Per-community bytes are logical referenced media usage. If two
communities reference the same blob, each community receives the blob's
bytes. Fleet physical totals still count each S3 object once. This PR
preserves those existing metric semantics.

### Deployment boundary

The CronJob is disabled by default. When enabled, it uses
`concurrencyPolicy: Forbid`, no retry, a configurable active deadline,
bounded history, explicit CPU and memory resources, a read-only root
filesystem, and no Istio sidecar by default.

The worker receives only `DATABASE_URL`, S3 settings, optional S3
credential references, and the code revision. It does not receive the
relay private key, Git hook HMAC secret, Redis URL, or the full relay
secret as environment variables. Operators may reuse the Buzz service
account or select a dedicated one.

### Non-goals

- This PR does not enable the worker or `external` mode in production.
- This PR does not change media uploads, object ownership, retention, or
deletion.
- This PR does not change the names or meaning of the existing fleet,
per-community, or anomaly storage gauges.
- This PR does not add a lease service or allow multiple workers to
publish concurrently.

## Risk

The application and chart defaults do not enable the new worker or raise
the serving relay's cap. The database change is an additive
deployment-global singleton table. The relay's default remains `inline`,
so merging this PR alone does not change the active metrics path.

The main rollout risk is worker memory use because the fold retains
state for distinct blob hashes and community bindings. The first
production-sized run must confirm peak memory and duration before the
schedule is trusted. The 10 million cap and one-hour deadline bound the
first deployment, but they do not replace measurement.

External mode also needs stale-snapshot, snapshot-load, and job-failure
monitors because the relay intentionally keeps publishing the last
complete result after a failed job or read error. This behavior avoids
gaps and partial data, while snapshot age and load health tell operators
when the result or PostgreSQL handoff needs attention. Job status
remains necessary for immediate failures and termination reasons that a
killed process cannot record itself.

## Testing

No production S3 scan was run from this PR.

Automated regressions verify that external mode keeps stale last-good
totals visible without emitting inline attempt-health gauges, reports
database-load failure while retaining the cache, and leaves inline
telemetry unchanged. Mutation checks also prove those tests fail if
external mode is routed through inline emission or a failed load is
reported as healthy.

After deployment, create one manual Job from the CronJob during a
staffed window. Require a completed Job, exactly one new snapshot, fewer
objects than the configured cap, acceptable duration and peak memory, no
relay restart regression, restored Datadog points, and no OpenMetrics
sample truncation.

## Next steps

1. Complete review and merge this PR.
2. Publish chart `0.1.9` and the final main-branch relay image.
3. Replace the provisional pins in
[squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure#244](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/244),
rerender, and require clean CI.
4. Run the staffed manual Job gate and record object count, peak memory,
duration, snapshot revision, and relay stability.
5. Confirm the relay reads the new snapshot in `external` mode and the
existing `block.buzz_relay.*` storage series update again.
6. Enable the daily 03:17 UTC schedule and add dashboard panels and
monitors for snapshot age, snapshot-load health, Job failures, cap
pressure, duration, and worker memory.

If production must roll back to an older relay image, set
`BUZZ_STORAGE_METRICS=off` first. Older images do not understand
`external` and would resume the failing inline scan.

## Bigger picture

This is the application half of the storage-metrics repair. The paired
infrastructure PR owns the production resource limits, schedule,
artifact pins, secret boundary, and monitored rollout. Keeping those
changes separate lets this PR remain safe by default while still
providing a complete path to current per-community S3 totals.

Related issue: N/A. No matching issue or pull request exists in
`block/buzz`.

Generated with Codex

---------

Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-09-17 10:34:31 -04:00
Tom Brow
b36600fc44 feat(mobile): show build number with version in settings (#7697)
Mobile Settings now identifies the installed build as e.g. `v0.16.0
(432)` rather than just `v0.16.0`. If the platform supplies no build
number, the footer keeps the existing version-only display.

| Before | After |
| --- | --- |
| Marketing version only | Version and native build number |
| ![Before:
v0.16.0](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/e8449f63d1fabe80ff86d395ac1177912c5d1bc5/pr-7697--before.png)
| ![After: v0.16.0
(432)](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/e8449f63d1fabe80ff86d395ac1177912c5d1bc5/pr-7697--after.png)
|

---------

Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
2026-09-16 20:29:42 -07:00
ravarora2
891208914e Add authenticated WebSocket recovery telemetry (#7546)
## Summary

Argo rollout recovery needs to distinguish an open WebSocket from a
connection that completed NIP-42 authentication and is usable. The relay
currently exposes total WebSocket connections, but it cannot answer
whether authenticated clients recovered after a pod drain or why
authentication failed.

This change adds a bounded recovery contract:

- `buzz_auth_attempts_total{method="nip42"}`
- `buzz_auth_outcomes_total{method="nip42",outcome}`
- `buzz_auth_duration_seconds{method="nip42",outcome}`
- `buzz_ws_authenticated_connections_active`
- `buzz_auth_post_terminal_frames_total{state}`

`buzz_auth_attempts_total` now has one consistent recovery-oriented
unit: a challenge lifecycle successfully queued to the connection
writer. This intentionally replaces the historical unit of AUTH frames
that reached the pending handler. AUTH frames received after a lifecycle
is already authenticated or failed are protocol noise; they use the
separate bounded post-terminal counter and cannot inflate rollout-gating
attempts or outcomes.

Each issued challenge reaches exactly one terminal outcome.
Authentication transitions and active-gauge changes share one short
synchronous state lock, cancellation can claim a pending database-backed
AUTH before a late handler result, and a drop guard reconciles aborted
or panicked connection futures. Accounting is terminalized before writer
joins, while terminal socket delivery has a one-second best-effort bound
so a stalled sink cannot retain the authenticated gauge or connection
permit indefinitely.

Dependency failures are distinct from policy verdicts: allowlist and
relay-membership lookup errors now emit `allowlist_check_error` and
`relay_membership_check_error`, never `allowlist_denied` or
`not_relay_member`. The fail-closed allow/deny policy is unchanged. All
rollout-facing labels come from fixed enums; identities, challenges,
URLs, and raw error strings are never exported.

All fixed counter and histogram label sets, including zero histogram
buckets, counts, and sums, are present on the first real exporter
scrape. This is the first implementation slice of the
rollout-reliability plan. A later PR will consume these metrics from
opt-in Argo Rollout analysis; merging this PR alone does not change
deployment behavior.

### Related issue

None found.

### Testing

Validated at final head `f9992cac835284c25ee0f99e17ddba0b932d7c69`,
which contains current `origin/main`:

- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- compiled every `buzz-relay` test target
- release builds for `buzz-relay`, `buzz`, `buzz-admin`, and
`buzz-test-cli`
- 16/16 connection lifecycle/writer/production-dispatch tests
- 7/7 AUTH handler tests
- bounded metric-contract exporter test
- 13/13 relay main-target tests (1 PostgreSQL-only test ignored)
- 9/9 real boot-lifecycle tests, including a production install and
first Prometheus scrape

Mutation checks proved that the production regressions fail when any of
these are removed or reintroduced:

- challenge attempt start in `handle_active_connection`
- authentication series initialization in the real metric installer
- separation of post-terminal AUTH floods from authoritative attempts

The exact-head release binaries were also exercised against the isolated
review database:

1. Started the release relay and verified health/readiness.
2. Created a channel with the regular CLI.
3. Held one authenticated WebSocket subscription open and authenticated
a second WebSocket publisher.
4. Published a message and read it back through the regular CLI.
5. Observed `attempt_delta=2`, `success_delta=2`,
`active_while_subscribed=1`, and `active_after_disconnect=0`.
6. Sent SIGTERM and waited for graceful relay shutdown.

### Local caveat

The full relay library target consistently reached 1,049 passes with 89
intentionally ignored tests, but the untouched
`api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo`
intermittently returned HTTP 504 instead of 200. One isolated rerun
passed; later isolated and full reruns reproduced the 504. No mesh files
are changed by this PR, and all changed-path, main-target,
boot-lifecycle, lint, build, mutation, and live-local checks above
passed at the final head.

Generated with Codex

---------

Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com>
2026-09-16 16:06:33 -04:00
Luke Tornquist
213092074c Instrument database pool roles (#7356)
## What

Name the relay's four Postgres pool roles—writer, reader, audit, and
search—and export one fixed-cardinality utilization metric contract for
all of them. Existing writer and reader gauges remain unchanged.

## Why

Audit and search already use separate pools, but they are missing from
pool pressure telemetry. Operators cannot see all process-level
connection demand before setting a deployment-wide connection budget.

## How

A closed `DbPoolRole` vocabulary now labels
`buzz_db_pool_connections{pool_role,state}` and
`buzz_db_pool_configured{pool_role}`. The relay retains cheap pool
clones for statistics only; ownership, capacities, timeouts, query
routing, and failure behavior do not change. The docs also replace the
stale async search-index description with the generated-column behavior
used today.

This simplifies four ad hoc observability states into one bounded model
without adding a pool manager or changing service boundaries.

## Risk

Low to moderate. This changes relay metrics and pool construction
plumbing, but not SQL execution or routing. Legacy metric names remain
available for current dashboards.

## Testing

- Push gate at `3f5468a0463bdfc5879bcdd3878fa06b42ca84c2`: all 14 Rust
test lanes passed; desktop Tauri checks passed.
- Blox: `cargo test --workspace --all-targets` with repository-declared
Postgres services.
- Blox: `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`.
- Blox: `cargo fmt --all -- --check`.

## Bigger picture

Aggregate deployment budget enforcement remains deferred. This PR
exposes the per-role facts that a later deployment-policy change can
consume.

Generated with Claude Code

---------

Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:37:12 +00:00
Tom Brow
76f7e5ef0c feat(push): make gateway origin configurable (#7261)
Make the push gateway origin configurable across the relay, gateway,
mobile client, and deployment chart.

This is a fresh deployment. The gateway has only run on personal
development infrastructure, and push has no existing enabled users.
Legacy migration, configured-to-unconfigured mobile transitions, and
rolling upgrades from pre-launch gateway binaries are not supported.

Populated pre-launch databases are rejected with an informative error
before migrations run; their data is untouched. Mobile builds may omit
the gateway URL, leaving push unavailable. Once push is enabled,
subsequent builds must retain that configuration.

### Validation

- All applicable CI checks pass at
`5f546cfaf403f0386f146d213adfb4392f4ec29c`, including Rust,
mobile/Swift, desktop/integration, security, image builds, and Helm
checks. An unrelated agent cancellation test passed on retry.
- PostgreSQL CI passed 384 tests, including the production-entry-point
regression for refusing populated pre-launch databases before
migrations, fresh initialization, and subsequent initialized
deployments.
- Focused local validation passed all 10 gateway PostgreSQL tests under
the CI discovery filter and all 3 unconfigured-mobile tests.
Repository-wide PostgreSQL discovery validation and the complete
pre-push hooks passed.
- Physical-device APNs/App Attest behavior and deployment to a live
cluster were not verified in this work.

---------

Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-09-15 14:56:45 -07:00
Wes
6146c4fd16 feat(git): add default-branch management to relay and CLI (#7562)
Authored by Brain and opened on behalf of Wes (`wesbillman`).

## Summary

Add `buzz repos default-branch get/set` and the relay operation it
needs. Git push changes branch tips but cannot select the server's
symbolic HEAD. This selects an existing branch without deleting
branches, moving refs, or changing packs.

- Reuse immutable Git manifests and captured-ETag CAS; concurrent
pushes/default changes conflict, including stale no-ops.
- Require request-specific NIP-98, body binding, fail-closed replay
protection, host tenancy, current channel membership and
repository-management authority. Push/project roles alone are
insufficient.
- Send the CLI mutation once, without redirects; ambiguous delivery
retains the observed digest and is non-retryable.
- Document the narrow HTTP exception to Nostr-first, delegation scope
and admission-time ACL revocation. Kind:30618 remains derived; the
manifest CAS is authoritative.
- Register the Postgres/Redis/MinIO route and fresh-clone tests in the
existing Backend Integration lane.

## Review fixes — `7457bda50afa6b52e36315572fa96928b2e21db6`

- Reject signed valueless `payload` tags when verifying a body; preserve
the shared verifier's intentional absent-payload compatibility. The real
settings route now proves 401, unchanged manifest pointer, and unchanged
kind:30618 event IDs for malformed and other invalid credentials.
- Require a nonempty returned branch and `head == refs/heads/{branch}`;
SET additionally requires the returned branch to equal the attempted
branch. Malformed/mismatched mutation responses remain non-retryable
`DeliveryUnknown`, retaining the attempted branch and original digest.
Invalid reads fail before any POST.
- Strengthen the later-push/fresh-clone regression to select
`release/v1` while `main` exists.

## Verification

At `7457bda50afa6b52e36315572fa96928b2e21db6`:
- Full pre-push passed (all 14 Rust test groups, serialized Tauri
tests/clippy, file-size and branch-skew gates; 522 seconds). No hooks
disabled.
- All four isolated Postgres/Redis/MinIO settings tests pass, including
real Smart HTTP `ls-remote --symref` and fresh clone on `release/v1`.
- All 15 focused NIP-98 verifier tests and three default-branch CLI
tests pass; malformed credentials and missing-branch responses were
reproduced failing before the fixes.
- Five targeted mutants are killed: restoring the valueless-payload
bypass, weakening canonical HEAD validation, accepting an empty branch,
dropping requested-branch confirmation, and omitting hydrated HEAD for
the selected non-main branch. Mutations ran in a separate worktree and
target directory; original patch bytes were verified restored.
- `cargo clippy -p buzz-auth -p buzz-cli -p buzz-relay --all-targets --
-D warnings`, formatting, diff and file-size checks pass on the fixed
tree.

Earlier validation at `bb195b140`: seven Git authorization database
regressions and 28 existing transport tests passed (three infrastructure
cases in that module not selected); four mutations killed
management/replay/CAS/redirect regressions. Full pre-push passed with
`RUST_TEST_THREADS=1` (all 14 Rust groups, Tauri clippy and 3,173 tests,
size/branch-skew gates). Serial execution avoids an unrelated
process-global Desktop discovery counter flake; no hooks disabled or
Desktop changes.

Carl and Jude's review findings are addressed in the new head; **fresh
reviewer and exact-head security confirmation remain required**. The
earlier source review is not approval of this revision. No claim of
green new-head CI.

## Rollout

Merge and **deploy the relay support first**, then build/use the updated
CLI and explicitly set/verify the desired default. No schema migration.
This PR does not deploy anything or change a live repository.

Originating conversation (channel
`8e2fda80-9142-4df8-8e14-da288bea6471`):

buzz://message?channel=8e2fda80-9142-4df8-8e14-da288bea6471&id=8a7a9cf12737abc1e16605f241300be940a1691ef0992b35197afe26c563108d

---------

Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-11 09:10:43 -06:00
Logan Johnson
00209076c7 fix(relay): reject presence updates when Redis storage fails (#7532)
## Summary
- Reject kind:20001 presence events with `OK false` / `error: presence
storage unavailable` when Redis SET or DEL fails, before publishing,
local fan-out, or local-event marking.
- Preserve the producer contract needed by snapshot-confirming
consumers: delivered live presence must follow successful mutation of
the Redis state read by snapshots.
- Classify those backend rejections with the existing `IngestError`
taxonomy so a presence storage outage counts as
`buzz_events_rejected_total{transport="ws",reason="error"}`, not client
`reason="invalid"`; genuine client-input refusals (verification failure,
membership gates) stay `invalid`, and every wire message is an unchanged
fixed sanitized string (review follow-up, no protocol wording change).
- Add actual `handle_event` integration coverage for rejected
online/offline transitions, healthy online→offline
accepted/stored/fanned-out behavior, and the rejection-counter routing
on storage failure with an invalid-signature control.

This is standalone on main; it does not depend on the mobile
implementation. Deploy this relay prerequisite before relying on #7526's
snapshot-confirmation policy. Existing
pubsub-failure-after-successful-storage behavior and disconnect TTL
cleanup are deliberately unchanged. A storage error may be an ambiguous
write outcome, not a rollback guarantee; the rejected event is not
published by this handler. Clients may retry the generic `error:`
rejection. Desktop's 60s heartbeat retries non-offline presence, not
every explicit offline transition.

### Related issue
Addresses the relay prerequisite identified in [#7526 review
5157607827](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7526#pullrequestreview-5157607827).
Searched open presence/storage PRs; no duplicate relay storage-error
rejection fix found. #7382/#7383/#7526 heads and bases are unchanged.

### Testing
Exact head: `389174df29cc02d0f885c03209eff661d8bb2ec0` (+380/-13; 393
total), one commit `389174df2` on top of the reviewed `c031d6eb1`
(DCO-signed; base `bfc384855889432df4a333a0edf3080f332ee169` unchanged).

- PASS: `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay
--all-targets -- -D warnings`, `git diff --check`, `just
file-size-check`, PostgreSQL discovery validation — all run at the exact
final head with a clean tree before and after.
- PASS: documented native `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-relay
--lib --tests`: **89/89** actual integration tests, including the four
presence cases (online/offline storage rejection, healthy
online→offline, and the new rejection-classification case). Owned
PostgreSQL 17/Redis on isolated loopback ports, schema plus
reconciliation applied; no shared development database.
- PASS: explicit `cargo test -p buzz-relay presence_storage -- --ignored
--nocapture`: **4/4**, not skipped.
- Full isolated relay crate suite at the final head (`cargo nextest run
-p buzz-relay --lib --tests`): **1062 run: 1062 passed, 94 skipped**.
The previously failing
`api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` passed
in this run (1.5s); it is a known timing-sensitive main baseline failure
tracked open in #7140 and untouched by this PR, so this single passing
run is reported as-is and does not claim environmental clearance or
close #7140. No full-suite-green claim is made beyond this run.
- Mobile is untouched; #7526's existing 2090-test/format/analyze
evidence remains scoped to its unchanged head. Its separate Desktop
Smoke E2E (2) failure remains red; no CI retries requested.

[Production-seam regression
coverage](389174df29/crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/event.rs (L1491-L1803)):
the metric case drives real `handle_event` traffic against a genuinely
dead Redis endpoint with a seeded active PostgreSQL community and a
registered presence watcher, asserts the storage rejection counts
`reason="error"` while a tampered-signature control through the same
dispatcher arm stays `reason="invalid"`, and re-asserts the rejected
ACK, no fan-out, and no local-event marker. Counter assertions use a
thread-local recorder guard held across `.await` points (the buzz-db
counter-test convention) inside the per-process nextest postgres-ci
lane, so no parallel test can race the counter snapshot.

No UI change or screenshot. Local logs and reproducible service/gate
scripts are retained under
`WORK_LOGS/MOBILE_FEEDBACK_PRESENCE_20260909/relay_prerequisite/metric_correction/`
in the engineering workspace. This PR is a review candidate, not merge
clearance.

Causal checks: restoring only the pre-fix production mutation block
makes both original rejection tests fail (`OK true` instead of `false`);
healthy success still passes. Reverting only the typed classification
(mapping the ephemeral `Internal` arm back to `invalid`) makes the new
metric regression fail with the outage counted as `[("ws","invalid",2)]`
instead of `[("ws","error",1),("ws","invalid",1)]`. The unchanged mesh
echo case also failed 504/200 with the main-production block restored in
the prior run, supporting its separation from this change without
claiming environmental clearance. Candidate source restored
byte-for-byte after each mutation. Repository-wide `just ci` was not
rerun; the scoped relay gates above are the new evidence.

---------

Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com>
2026-09-10 14:20:56 -04:00
Mic Neale
44316ff72f feat(mesh): upgrade to mesh-llm 0.76.0-rc8 and recommend Qwen3.8 27B (#6189)
Upgrades Buzz's mesh-llm dependencies through the released `v0.76.0-rc8`
tag (`2040765d`), including the Qwen3.8 curated recommendation and rc8's
scheduler/runtime improvements.

**Scope note:** the earlier open-relay/unenforced-admission mode has
been removed from this PR at Mic's direction — it is not a product mode
we want. Mesh admission remains roster/allowlist driven, exactly as on
`main`: on a relay with no NIP-43 membership snapshot the mesh runs
self-only. No NIP-11 mode probing, no mode-transition restarts. A future
perimeter/admission strategy for open relays will be designed
separately.

This PR also:
- seeds `BUZZ_AGENT_LLM_TIMEOUT_SECS=660` for mesh agents, above
MeshLLM's 600-second backend timeout;
- makes `desktop-tauri-clippy` lint both default and `mesh-llm` cfg
graphs;
- runs the feature-enabled desktop test suite in CI;
- recommends Qwen3.8 27B Q4_K_M for 64 GB-and-larger machines, then
ladders down through Gemma 4 E4B and Qwen 9B for smaller machines;
- keeps stored shared-compute `auto` translated to MeshLLM's supported
wire model `mesh`.

RC8 verification:
- `just ci` passed locally at
`92ecc7ec933bdd4df804cc9f28a2b51efa5313c5`.
- Pre-push differential gates passed, including both desktop Tauri cfg
graphs and package tests.
- A prior isolated runtime smoke used the RC8 binary's OpenAI endpoint
for a Buzz-shaped system/user/tool/tool-result/final-response loop; all
assertions passed and the isolated process was shut down.

Perf previously measured on M5 Metal, Qwen3.8-27B-Q4_K_M: TTFT 0.22–0.32
s, ~25 tok/s streaming; agent-shaped turns ~1 s to first token after the
first (prefix cache).

---------

Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jimmy <1fe240cd1a8cf775f6f3060f115e5a303181f3abf28ad4cb0c2515f4a02b36a8@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Alessandro Joabar <sandro@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jimmy <1fe240cd1a8cf775f6f3060f115e5a303181f3abf28ad4cb0c2515f4a02b36a8@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Mic Neale <305999590+micspiral@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alessandro Joabar <sandro@squareup.com>
2026-09-08 07:30:45 -07:00
Luke Tornquist
cd02b693aa refactor(relay): extract NIP-29 membership authorization (#7285)
## Why

NIP-29 membership authorization for kinds 9000, 9001, and 9022 was
embedded in a large async handler, requiring Postgres and Redis to test
and repeating the last-owner rule across five call sites. This addresses
[TheSentinel454/buzz#24](https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/24)
without adding the broader state/repository abstraction suggested there
because HTTP and WebSocket writes already share ingestion.

## What

- Extract pure, typed membership authorization decisions while leaving
database reads and mutations in `validate_admin_event`.
- Preserve existing client-visible errors and independent database
last-owner safeguards.
- Collapse five last-owner policy restatements into one predicate and
share the identical self-departure policy.
- Include the relay decision modules in `just test-unit`, so these tests
execute in CI.

## Risk Assessment

Medium-low. This touches production relay authorization, but
intentionally preserves wire behavior and database defense in depth;
exhaustive decision tables and relay-backed tests cover the affected
paths.

## Simplification

This removes repeated policy from the orchestration path and makes the
rule set directly testable without introducing a repository trait or
second transport path.

## Verification

Verified at `15255a090797f85874921120003c645962fefaed`:

- `just test-unit` — all 10 package summaries passed. An initial run hit
two unrelated timing-sensitive `buzz-acp` failures; the complete retry
passed 905/905 in that package.
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- `just file-size-check` — 10/10 policy tests passed.
- `just security-review-check` — 13/13 tests passed.
- Push preflight — `push-head-scope`, `branch-skew`, `file-size-check`,
`rust-tests`, and `desktop-tauri-checks` passed.
- Blox Postgres relay lane — 84/84 at the byte-identical source patch;
full live `e2e_relay` behavior matched the clean base (45 pass and the
same pre-existing kind:9002 failure on each).

Generated with Claude Code

---------

Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-09-04 10:46:55 -04:00
ravarora2
88687876f7 feat(relay): add early startup lifecycle logs (#7258)
## Why

Early relay failures can currently appear as a container restart without
a trustworthy in-process account of whether crypto, structured logging,
configuration, relay identity, or the metrics listener failed. Most of
those steps happen before the Prometheus exporter exists, so their
chronology belongs in logs rather than metrics.

Implements the logs-only early-startup slice of #7238. Post-bind
Prometheus exporter supervision is tracked separately in #7284.

## What changed

- create a process lifecycle recorder before the Tokio runtime and emit
a fixed, versioned JSON schema directly to stderr;
- record started and exactly one terminal event for `crypto_init`,
`tracing_init`, `config_load`, `key_load`, `metrics_bind`, and the
aggregate `process_telemetry` phase;
- keep every status and reason bounded and suppress raw errors that
could contain credentials, keys, URLs, or other secrets;
- return typed metrics-install errors so `metrics_bind` can be
classified without logging raw values, while preserving the existing
public `metrics::install` API;
- document the logs-only evidence contract and add real child-process
regressions for success and failure paths.

This PR adds **no startup metric families** and no dashboard contract.
Existing application metrics remain unchanged.

## Verification

Exact head: `8faf7526822a119efa035e58b2b3c59aa67fc81d`

- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- relay binary target: 13 passed, 1 PostgreSQL-only test ignored
- real relay child-process lifecycle target: 9 passed
- full relay package library target: 1,023 passed, 89 ignored; the same
six media tests failed at `crates/buzz-relay/src/api/media.rs:1145` with
`Sqlx(PoolTimedOut)` because local PostgreSQL is unavailable
- three independent exact-head reviews found no correctness, security,
compatibility, lifecycle-accounting, logs-only-scope, or test-adequacy
finding

All exact-head GitHub CI gates are green, including lint, unit tests,
PostgreSQL, relay/backend/desktop integration, both Linux server
cross-compiles, Windows/macOS builds, and security checks.

## Staging verification

- exact multi-architecture image:
`dev-sha-8faf7526822a119efa035e58b2b3c59aa67fc81d-run-33708188952-1`
- immutable manifest:
`sha256:26cad28266a6bb0b0e7081eb6091d374e5489f8bb78c475a4a65737dee86cc67`
- image workflow: https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33708188952
- focused staging deployment:
https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/314
- replacement ReplicaSet `buzz-d68764bc7` has two Ready pods with zero
restarts
- Datadog received one complete, contiguous sequence 1-12 from each pod;
both end with `process_telemetry/terminal/succeeded` at 3 ms
- queries scoped to the replacement ReplicaSet return no data for the
removed `buzz_startup_phase_terminal` or
`buzz_startup_phase_duration_seconds` families

The experimental Row 7 was removed from the Buzz Startup & Rollout
Safety dashboard. This logs-only PR deliberately adds no replacement
dashboard row.

---

**Update Sep 3, 12:26 ET:** Clarified the review boundary: this PR does
not close the broader #7238. Later exporter-task termination is
pre-existing runtime behavior and is now explicitly tracked in #7284; no
production code or staged image changed in this update.

Generated with Codex

Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com>
2026-09-03 13:37:51 -04:00
klopez4212
c6ca9d94d9 Show status and huddle indicators beside names (#7112)
## Summary

- show status and huddle emoji beside names in DMs and message rows
- provide accessible tooltips, fallback status emoji, and profile-menu
icon replacement
- add the desktop status editor with preset durations, a ShadCN
calendar, and a capped half-hour time menu

## Validation

- desktop checks, typecheck, and file-size guard
- 5,802 desktop tests
- focused Playwright coverage (3 passed)
- E2E build and native Builderlab staging verification

Updated visual snapshots are attached in the PR comments.

---------

Signed-off-by: kenny lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Princess Donut <b238ea756dee4d98afa5883fc7f1de61eeabe65bf700e3a5a5a80db5e42e2c2b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Princess Donut <b238ea756dee4d98afa5883fc7f1de61eeabe65bf700e3a5a5a80db5e42e2c2b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-03 09:39:37 +00:00
ravarora2
91ab9d31b8 Add operation-aware database pool acquisition metrics (#7195)
## Why

Buzz already reports coarse writer/reader database checkout waits, but
those
signals cannot explain which startup or serving operation is blocked by
pool
pressure. That makes rollout diagnosis and postmortems ambiguous: a
readiness
probe, NIP-42 authentication, authorization check, reconnect history
repair,
event write, and background maintenance can all wait on the same pool
while
appearing identical.

This PR implements Package 2A of the pod-handoff plan: operation-aware
pool
borrow causality. It is observability-only; it does not change
configured pool
sizes, SQL semantics, transaction ordering, or timeout policy. Physical
DNS/TCP/TLS/Postgres authentication and session initialization remain
the
separate Package 2B boundary.

## Metric contract

The final contract separates three questions:

| Question | Metric |
|---|---|
| How long did checkout wait? |
`buzz_db_pool_acquire_duration_seconds{pool_role,operation}` |
| How did the attempt end? |
`buzz_db_pool_acquire_attempts_total{pool_role,operation,outcome}` |
| Who is waiting now for a tracked operation? |
`buzz_db_pool_waiters{pool_role,operation}` |

Outcomes are `success`, `timeout`, `error`, and `cancelled`. Operations
are
`bootstrap`, `readiness`, `tenant_resolution`, `authentication`,
`authorization`, `subscription_history`, `event_write`, and
`maintenance`.

Only these eleven pool/operation pairs are constructible:

```text
writer/bootstrap                 reader/bootstrap
writer/readiness
writer/tenant_resolution
writer/authentication
writer/authorization             reader/authorization
writer/subscription_history      reader/subscription_history
writer/event_write
writer/maintenance
```

The duration histogram intentionally does not carry `outcome`. Result
data
remains available on the terminal counter for historical counts and
rates,
without multiplying the expensive histogram family. Nine finite buckets
plus
`+Inf`, sum, and count produce 12 duration series per valid pair.
Together with
four outcome counters and one waiter gauge, the new-family ceiling is
exactly
187 raw Prometheus series per pod, asserted from the production
exporter.

The existing coarse acquisition families remain temporarily for
dashboard
compatibility while the new series are validated in staging.

The operation-specific waiter family covers the explicitly routed,
deployment-critical operations above; it is not a census of every
possible
SQLx checkout in the process. The dashboard pairs it with SQLx pool
active/idle/max gauges for whole-pool capacity context, and treats a
missing
operation series as unknown rather than healthy zero.

## What changed

### Cancellation-safe acquisition ownership

- Add writer- and reader-specific typed operation APIs so invalid label
pairs
  cannot be constructed and store modules cannot emit reader labels.
- Own every polled acquisition with one RAII terminal guard.
- Record exactly one duration and terminal outcome for success, timeout,
error,
  or cancellation.
- Emit nothing for a future that is created but never polled.
- Balance the operation-specific waiter count exactly once on every
terminal or
  dropped future.
- Periodically refresh every expected waiter pair, including healthy
zero, so
missing telemetry is not presented as zero. Reader pairs are emitted
only
when a distinct read pool is configured; a writer-only pod cannot
fabricate
  healthy reader-zero state.

### Production attribution

Route the deployment-critical acquisition paths through caller-owned
semantic
entry points, including:

- writer and reader bootstrap;
- the real post-#7149 readiness acquisition and deletion-catalog
validation;
- tenant resolution and community lifecycle checks;
- NIP-42 allowlist authentication;
- membership, moderation, invite, operator, Git, agent-owner, and policy
  authorization;
- operator community create/list/archive/unarchive, reverse host/channel
tenant
  resolution, and REQ row-community conformance lookups;
- writer/reader subscription history, feed, thread, and routed fallback
paths;
- primary and command event writes, replaceable events, mention
indexing,
  reaction/channel/member/archive side effects, and thread metadata;
- push matching, usage rollups/leadership, replica-fence startup and
recurring
probes, periodic reconciliation, channel/deletion reapers, partitions,
and
  other bounded maintenance/bootstrap paths.

Shared helpers now accept caller-owned intent or expose named semantic
variants
instead of assigning one misleading operation to every caller. No known
P0 path
uses `other`.

### Readiness and size-one-pool correctness

- Rebase on the post-#7149 readiness implementation and instrument the
actual
`Db::readiness_check` acquisition rather than the superseded ping-only
seam.
- Acquire once for deletion-catalog validation and run its queries on
that
  connection, preserving the shared readiness deadline.
- Scope the channel-roster catalog checkout before the behavior probe so
a
  size-one writer pool cannot self-deadlock during startup verification.

### Exporter, documentation, and CI

- Register metric HELP/type/unit metadata through the production
Prometheus
  builder.
- Configure dedicated checkout buckets at 1ms, 5ms, 10ms, 25ms, 50ms,
150ms,
  500ms, 1s, and 3s.
- Add a production scrape-contract test for exact names, labels,
buckets,
  valid pairs, sensitive-label exclusion, and the 187-series ceiling.
- Add source mutation guards for the P0 semantic entry points and
raw-checkout
  bypasses.
- Add an exact backend-integration CI selector for the production
attribution,
  cancellation, readiness, and size-one-pool PostgreSQL tests.
- Document the frozen label vocabulary, valid combinations, semantics,
and
  cardinality budget in the Helm chart README.

## Dashboard intent

The new Stage 2 row in **Buzz Startup & Rollout Safety** is
deployment-first:

- baseline-versus-candidate attempts, failure rates, cancellation rates,
and
  maximum wait by operation;
- outcome counts and percentages over time by SHA/ReplicaSet;
- acquisition wait heatmap, average, and maximum through the rollout;
- historical waiter pressure beside writer active/idle/max context;
- per-pod postmortem drilldown, including terminated pods;
- a smaller current-waiter table with explicit stale/missing semantics.

Percentile widgets remain disabled until Datadog metadata confirms
percentile
support for the new distribution. Current gauges use no fill,
interpolation, or
`default_zero`; missing means unknown.

## Risk assessment

Moderate. The patch touches many database acquisition call sites, but
preserves
the selected physical pool and executes the same SQL on the acquired
connection. The main risks are incorrect semantic attribution,
cancellation
double-counting, and a helper accidentally acquiring twice. Typed APIs,
production-method PostgreSQL tests, source guards, the raw scrape
contract, and
the size-one-pool regression cover those risks.

No tenant, community, user, pubkey, event, channel, SQL, URL, pod,
version,
ReplicaSet, or request-controlled value is emitted as an application
metric
label. Deployment identity is supplied by infrastructure enrichment.

## Verification

- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` — passed.
- `cargo clippy -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --all-targets --all-features --
-D warnings`
  — passed.
- `cargo test -p buzz-db` — 122 passed, 0 failed, 263 ignored;
  source-contract integration test: 3 passed, 0 failed.
- Focused relay compatibility, metric-contract, and readiness tests —
passed.
- `scripts/test-postgres-test-discovery.sh` — passed.
- Full `buzz-relay` package run from the identical tree reached 1,015
passes;
the six media-test failures all stopped in their shared local PostgreSQL
setup with `Sqlx(PoolTimedOut)` because Docker/PostgreSQL was
unavailable.
The same six failed in isolation, while every changed exact test passed.
- Exact implementation head:
  `f92910b353086e9edf85918ca5f72190edbbe22f`.
- Exact multi-architecture staging image:
  `dev-sha-f92910b353086e9edf85918ca5f72190edbbe22f-run-33607968668-1`

(`sha256:161712c8ed2e265a15df9b63e02248d5973481f875ff129d7d2ae78a09d487a2`).
- Focused staging GitOps PR:

<https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/299>
— merged after renderer, inventory, infrastructure test, Kargo, Semgrep,
and
Intersect gates passed; the source/generated-artifact diff was exactly
two
  image lines.
- Exact GitHub head reports 47 terminal checks: 35 successful and 12
  intentionally skipped. PostgreSQL, unit, lint, security, both server
cross-compiles, backend integration, relay E2E, desktop, mobile, image,
  Helm, Semgrep, zizmor, and DCO gates are green.
- Datadog readback identifies two exact-image pods,
  `buzz-d79c8d8f7-ckv2l` and `buzz-d79c8d8f7-qzqdp`, in ReplicaSet
  `buzz-d79c8d8f7`; both report the full source SHA above.
- Both pods report all eleven allowed pool/operation waiter pairs at
current
zero, with no invalid pair. The acceptance window observed nonzero
success
  receipts for readiness, tenant resolution, authorization, subscription
history, event write, and maintenance, and no timeout, error, or
cancelled
outcome. Maximum observed wait was about 101 ms for maintenance and 50
ms
  for reader subscription history.

The main **Buzz Startup & Rollout Safety** dashboard now has a live
Stage 2
database row with eight widgets and nineteen fully scoped queries. Final
readback preserved all seven top-level groups, found zero under-scoped
Row 6
queries, and confirmed the tracked-operation waiter boundary in the
panel
descriptions.

Generated with Codex.

---------

Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com>
2026-09-02 17:04:34 -04:00
ravarora2
beb76406c1 feat(relay): add detailed readiness metrics (#7149)
## Summary

This PR makes relay readiness failures diagnosable without weakening the
existing fail-closed readiness contract. It distinguishes Postgres pool
acquisition from query execution, Redis pool acquisition,
deletion-catalog validation, and the overall two-second deadline;
exports a bounded Prometheus contract for rollout dashboards; and fixes
the concurrency, shutdown, and listener-boundary semantics needed for
those signals to be trustworthy.

## Why

The previous `/_readiness` implementation exposed only an aggregate
ready/not-ready result. During a rollout, operators could not tell
whether a pod was blocked on:

- acquiring a Postgres connection;
- executing the Postgres readiness query;
- acquiring a Redis connection;
- validating the deletion catalog; or
- the shared readiness deadline.

Adding metrics to the existing handler also exposed three correctness
hazards that this PR resolves:

1. the same handler is mounted on both the public application listener
and the private Kubernetes health listener, so public requests could
otherwise distort rollout telemetry;
2. concurrent probes can finish out of order, allowing an older result
to overwrite newer current-state gauges; and
3. a probe started before SIGTERM can finish afterward, incorrectly
return `200 ready`, and resurrect ready gauges while the process is
draining.

## Behavior

### Readiness evaluation

- Postgres, Redis, and deletion-catalog checks still run under one
shared two-second deadline.
- Postgres distinguishes pool acquisition timeout/error from query
timeout/error.
- Redis distinguishes pool acquisition timeout/error. This does not
claim a Redis command round trip.
- The deletion catalog distinguishes operation timeout/error.
- Multiple failures are reported as `multiple_dependencies_failed`;
exhaustion of the shared deadline is reported as `overall_timeout` when
no more specific completed outcome wins.
- Readiness remains fail-closed: every dependency must succeed for `200
{"status":"ready"}`.

### Ordered publication and shutdown

`ReadinessCoordinator` is process-owned and uses one mutex as the
linearization point for probe generations, current-state publication,
and terminal shutdown.

- Every completed dependency attempt may contribute its truthful counter
and duration observation.
- Only the newest admissible probe generation may publish current-state
gauges.
- An older, slower probe cannot overwrite a newer probe's gauges.
- `begin_shutdown()` and probe commit serialize through the same
coordinator.
- Once shutdown commits, an in-flight probe cannot return ready or
publish ready/current dependency gauges, even if its dependency work
later succeeds.

Shutdown without dependency evaluation records only:

- `buzz_readiness_checks_total{reason="shutting_down"}`; and
- `buzz_readiness_state{check="overall"} = 0`.

It does **not** fabricate dependency failures, dependency state changes,
or zero-duration latency samples. If shutdown wins after an in-flight
evaluation actually ran, those completed dependency attempts may remain
as attempt telemetry, but they cannot overwrite shutdown-dominant
current state.

### Listener and response contract

- The private health listener's `/_readiness` route is the sole
authority for rollout readiness telemetry.
- The public application listener retains `/_readiness` for
compatibility, evaluates the same dependencies, and preserves the
existing response shape, but it emits no `buzz_readiness_*` metrics.
- Ready responses remain `200 {"status":"ready"}`.
- Shutdown responses remain `503 {"status":"shutting_down"}`.
- Failed private-health responses include the bounded `reason` plus
`postgres`, `redis`, and `deletion_catalog` booleans.
- Failed public compatibility responses retain the dependency booleans
but omit the new detailed reason.
- No header, query parameter, path value, or other request-controlled
value becomes a metric label.

## Prometheus contract

The final schema is intentionally capped at **99 raw Prometheus series
per pod**.

| Metric | Type | Labels | Raw series/pod |
|---|---|---|---:|
| `buzz_readiness_checks_total` | counter | `reason` | 12 |
| `buzz_readiness_dependency_checks_total` | counter | `dependency`,
typed `outcome` | 11 |
| `buzz_readiness_check_duration_seconds` | histogram | `check` | 72 |
| `buzz_readiness_state` | gauge | `check` | 4 |
| **Total** |  |  | **99** |

### Closed label sets

`reason`:

```text
ready
shutting_down
postgres_pool_timeout
postgres_pool_error
postgres_query_timeout
postgres_query_error
redis_pool_timeout
redis_pool_error
deletion_catalog_timeout
deletion_catalog_error
overall_timeout
multiple_dependencies_failed
```

Valid `dependency` / `outcome` pairs are enforced by typed enums:

- `postgres`: `success | pool_timeout | pool_error | operation_timeout |
operation_error`
- `redis`: `success | pool_timeout | pool_error`
- `deletion_catalog`: `success | operation_timeout | operation_error`

`check` is `overall | postgres | redis | deletion_catalog`.

The readiness histogram has 15 configured buckets concentrated around
the two-second deadline:

```text
0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5,
0.75, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2.0, 2.5, +Inf
```

The contract deliberately removes the redundant overall `result` label
and the histogram `outcome` label. Pod, ReplicaSet, version, rollout,
raw error, SQL, URL, tenant, user, community, pubkey, and
request-controlled values are prohibited application labels;
infrastructure enrichment can supply deployment identity outside the
application metric.

## Postgres production seam and CI

The real `Db::readiness_check` path now supports deterministic
production-seam testing while preserving the same acquisition/query
implementation used by the relay. The isolated PostgreSQL lane
automatically discovers and executes three ignored integration tests
covering:

- a held sole connection causing pool timeout, followed by recovery
after release;
- closed-pool acquisition error;
- acquisition success followed by query timeout;
- classified query error;
- cancellation while waiting for a connection;
- cancellation during an in-flight query; and
- eventual pool recovery with waiter/in-flight state balanced.

This prevents the central SQLx/Postgres behavior from being merely
compiled but never executed in CI.

## Tests and verification

- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `./scripts/test-postgres-test-discovery.sh`
- complete `cargo test -p buzz-db`
- focused `cargo test -p buzz-relay readiness`
- real-router `cargo test -p buzz-relay real_health_route_`
- controlled PostgreSQL execution of all three ignored readiness tests
- production health router -> real `GET /_readiness` -> Prometheus
render assertions
- public-router requests proving zero rollout telemetry
- deterministic out-of-order A/B probe tests
- SIGTERM-during-probe tests proving shutdown dominance
- exported metric name/type/exact-label/bucket assertions
- exported raw-series allowlist and 99-series ceiling assertion

The route-to-scrape regression test uses the production Prometheus
builder and verifies the `2`, `2.5`, and `+Inf` readiness buckets. It
fails if the health recording call, health route, public/health
boundary, generation fence, shutdown fence, or bucket override is
removed.

## Risk assessment

**Medium.** This changes the live readiness publication path and adds
synchronization around probe commit/shutdown. The risk is bounded by:

- preserving the existing dependencies and shared two-second deadline;
- keeping readiness fail-closed;
- using a short, process-local mutex only at begin/commit linearization
points, not across dependency awaits;
- retaining the public compatibility endpoint while isolating its
telemetry;
- enforcing typed, low-cardinality labels and an exported series
ceiling; and
- covering the production router, Prometheus exposition, real PostgreSQL
seam, concurrency ordering, and shutdown races.

## Operational notes

- Dashboards should treat `buzz_readiness_state` as the latest sampled
current state, not as an event stream.
- `shutting_down` should be excluded from dependency-failure alerts
because no dependency failure is implied.
- Do not use `default_zero()` for missing current-state data;
missing/stale is unknown, not healthy.
- Use histogram buckets, heatmaps, max, or average until the Datadog
distribution metadata confirms percentiles are enabled; do not title a
widget p95 before that live readback.

## Non-goals

This PR does not add the broader process-startup lifecycle,
worker/listener supervision, shutdown coordinator, WebSocket/huddle
handoff, client recovery telemetry, dashboard mutations, Datadog
configuration changes, or deployment changes. Those remain separate
follow-up work.

## References

- [Staging dev relay image
runbook](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/main/docs/staging-dev-relay-images.md)
- Readiness telemetry contract: `deploy/charts/buzz/README.md`

---------

Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com>
2026-09-01 18:31:30 -04:00
Luke Tornquist
bd73490418 ci: run PostgreSQL tests in isolated lane (#6730)
## Why

PR #6660 introduced four PostgreSQL-backed persistence tests and a
focused CI selector, but an exact test-name list does not automatically
cover future database tests. Broad ignored-test execution also exposed
shared-schema races and ambiguity between desired-state and
migration-applied schema expectations.

## What

- Establish a discoverable convention: PostgreSQL unit modules use
`postgres_tests`, PostgreSQL integration binaries use a `postgres_`
prefix, and unrelated external-infrastructure tests use an
`external_infra_` prefix.
- Add a dedicated nextest PostgreSQL profile and archive-backed CI job
covering the relevant crates without enumerating test names.
- Create a run-scoped desired-state source database and a unique
PostgreSQL database per test process for parallel-safe isolation, with
cleanup on success, failure, or interruption.
- Route destructive migration and migration-parity tests to clean
`template0` databases while desired-state tests clone the desired-state
database.
- Document discovery, schema modes, required role privileges, and a
bounded portable local runner.
- Keep the existing infrastructure-free unit-test jobs unchanged.

This is intentionally limited to test and CI harness behavior. It does
not move production database code, change persistence semantics, or
implement issue #20's broader shared test-utility refactor.

## Risk

Low production risk because all changes are confined to tests, CI
configuration, documentation, and test harness scripts.

Remaining operational risks:

- Cleanup retries `dropdb --force` five times across roughly four
seconds. Exhaustion warns with the database name but deliberately does
not mask the test result; individual PostgreSQL diagnostics are
suppressed.
- The seven-package boundary is duplicated between the runner and CI
archive and must remain synchronized if PostgreSQL tests move to a new
crate.
- Portable SHA fallback branches were exercised on Linux; no macOS Blox
workstation was needed for this Linux CI artifact.
- GitHub's unchanged generic Unit Tests job currently fails while
cold-linking `buzz-voice` because `sherpa-onnx-c-api` is absent. The
branch changes no voice/build/toolchain inputs; the exact parent
previously passed that job, and Blox passes the same infrastructure-free
suite (1,450/1,450). A prior-head one-job retry and the final-head run
both reproduced the hosted-runner failure.

## Verification

Author Blox workstation `2020088`:

- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `just clippy`
- `just test-unit`: 1,450 passed; PostgreSQL tests remain skipped in
fast jobs
- PR #6660 focused tests: 4/4 passed through the final runner
- Full lane: 282/282 passed in 10.087s with a non-superuser role limited
to `CREATEDB`, `CREATEROLE`, and `pg_read_all_stats`
  - 272 desired-state tests
  - 10 migration-applied tests
  - 6 explicitly filtered external-infrastructure tests
- Cleanup fault injection: a deliberately underprivileged 282-test run
produced the expected 277 passes and 5 failures, and the post-run
catalog audit found zero lane databases after retry cleanup. The
restored successful run also left zero lane databases.

GitHub exact final head `92c231e48f299ea2af23817763f5ae80ac013d68`:

- [PostgreSQL
Tests](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/32789030203/job/97630827823):
282/282 passed across 10 binaries in 98.886s; 1,240 skipped, including 6
via the profile filter
- The shared relay/PostgreSQL archive predecessor completed successfully
- [Unit
Tests](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/32789030203/job/97626930420):
unrelated `sherpa-onnx-c-api` native-link failure described above
- Independent exact-head review on separate Blox workstation `2022762`:
no substantive findings after all initial findings were addressed. The
reviewer independently verified cleanup retry behavior, exit-status
preservation, shell portability, syntax, and a clean exact-head
worktree.

## References

- Stacked on #6660 at exact head
`561de54be4d9c2b622b7c2aa5b61bc3068f47e2a`
- https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/20
-
https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/20#issuecomment-5398526792

Generated with Codex.

## Update — August 24, 2026 review follow-up

- Centralized the repeated PostgreSQL test URL resolution in
crate-local, test-only helpers without introducing the broader shared
utility refactor from issue #20.
- Restored descriptive hybrid/Redis test function names. Structural
`external_infra_*_tests` modules now own exclusion, and the nextest
filter only recognizes module path segments.
- Added a three-second source guard that scans every Rust file and fails
CI when an ignored PostgreSQL test would be omitted or an
external-infrastructure test would be included. Fixture tests cover
accepted modules/binaries and both failure modes.
- Removed the two implementation-plan documents.

Performance profiling on Blox workstation `2027352` (same prebuilt
archive and cargo-nextest 0.9.143 for every comparison):

- Current per-test database model, 8 workers: 10.15–10.40s across three
runs. The 283 `createdb` calls and 284 `dropdb` calls consumed
28.85–29.46 aggregate seconds, about 39–40% of aggregate test-process
duration.
- Reusing one database per worker without cleanup: 6.55–6.84s, about 35%
faster, but all three runs failed because global matcher-queue tests
inherited a quiesced community from an earlier test; the failing test
varied with scheduling.
- Reusing workers with `TRUNCATE … RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE`: all 282
tests passed, but total time regressed to 10.47–10.67s. The 265 truncate
calls consumed 24.34–25.45 aggregate seconds, so truncation merely
replaced most clone/drop cost.
- Raising concurrency to 16 workers reduced one isolated-database run to
8.79s, but 24 workers exposed a cluster-global `pg_stat_activity` race.
The profile remains at the proven-safe 8 workers.

Decision: retain unique per-test databases. Harness cleanup uses `dropdb
--if-exists --force`; it drops the database rather than truncating
tables or deleting rows.

Verification at local branch head
`60086c1f6ee34a193c342255a5e8e6293b60e988`:

- Discovery inventory: exactly 282 intended tests; all 6 hybrid/Redis
tests present and structurally excluded.
- PR #6660 focused persistence tests: 4/4 passed.
- Full PostgreSQL lane: 282/282 passed three times; 1,240 skipped each
run; wall time 9.72–9.96s without profiling shims.
- Non-ignored tests with a desired-state database: 1,234/1,234 passed;
one mesh-demo timeout from the first run passed immediately in
isolation.
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and all-target/all-feature clippy for
`buzz-db`, `buzz-deletion`, and `buzz-relay` passed.

Final independent re-review at exact head
`42097c0136ab3fa8f0efe5720ae829c04575b9b6` on separate Blox workstation
`2028455`: no substantive residual findings. The reviewer independently
exercised ordinary strings, zero/one/three-hash raw strings, line/block
comments, and string-contained lookalikes, then reran the full 353-file
scan, shell syntax, Python AST parsing, and diff check.

Independent review found that the source guard's initial regular
expression could miss raw-string ignore reasons and treat a commented
attribute as real. Final head `42097c0136ab3fa8f0efe5720ae829c04575b9b6`
parses valid ordinary/raw Rust string literals only at attributes found
in comment-sanitized source; regression fixtures cover both cases. The
fixture suite, Python compilation, shell syntax, diff check, and full
353-file repository scan pass on Blox.

## Update — August 25, 2026 restack

PR #6660 merged, so this follow-up was rebased from its former exact
parent onto current `origin/main`
(`8d2d0ff5ad42733e9949442c4b6358d0ba87f9a8`). The final candidate head
is `05dcc2ab28948e3ab79bb44839a69f2ba44648a2`; the PR no longer carries
#6660's pre-squash history.

Fresh exact-head verification on Blox workstation `2028572`:

- Discovery guard passed across 353 Rust files; inventory remained
exactly 282 intended PostgreSQL tests.
- PR #6660 focused persistence tests: 4/4 passed.
- Full PostgreSQL lane: 282/282 passed three times; 1,243 skipped each
run; wall time 9.70–9.87s.
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and all-target/all-feature clippy for
`buzz-db`, `buzz-deletion`, and `buzz-relay` passed.

## Update — August 25, 2026 final hosted verification

- [GitHub PostgreSQL
Tests](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/32801679226/job/97667835080):
282/282 passed in 53.787s; 1,243 skipped.
- The final guard scanned all 353 Rust files successfully before the
hosted lane ran.
- The shared relay/archive prerequisite and infrastructure-free Unit
Tests job both passed at exact final head
`42097c0136ab3fa8f0efe5720ae829c04575b9b6`.

---------

Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
2026-09-01 12:07:28 -04:00
Wes
2f3dd850db fix(relay): reject a frame on its own acknowledgement channel (#6961)
Pinky, an AI agent, updated this description on Wes's behalf after
taking over the startup investigation.

**Category:** fix

**User Impact:** An EVENT refused by WebSocket admission or handler
saturation receives a correlated `OK(event_id, false, reason)` instead
of an uncorrelated NOTICE, so the client can settle that refusal without
waiting for its publish timeout. Rate-limited refusals also arm client
backoff. This fixes a protocol failure mechanism; it does not establish
that every startup send will succeed or that the reported Desktop
startup incident is fully resolved.

**Problem:** Startup opens several live subscriptions and publishes at
once, and the relay's WebSocket admission gate is a fixed 5-second
window (`ws_admission_budget` = `human_ws_events_per_sec * 5`). If that
shared per-principal quota is exhausted, `enforce_ws_admission`
previously rejected an EVENT with a bare `["NOTICE", reason]`. Quota
pressure is a possible trigger, not proof of the original incident's
complete cause.

A NOTICE carries no event id. Both clients settle a pending publish
*only* from an `OK` keyed by event id (desktop `pendingEvents`, mobile
`_pendingEvents`), so nothing settled — and `handle_text_message`
returns early, so no `OK` ever followed either. The send **could not
fail**; it could only time out at `PUBLISH_TIMEOUT_MS` = 25s. That
explains how this rejection mechanism can produce a roughly 25-second
timeout; attributing the original report to it still requires the actual
startup/send workflow.

The handler-semaphore saturation path had the identical defect, and that
one needs no quota burst to fire.

**Solution:** NIP-01 gives each request type its own acknowledgement
channel, and a rejection is only actionable on the same one. Reject a
REQ with `CLOSED`, an EVENT with `OK(id, false, reason)`, and fall back
to `NOTICE` only where no per-request correlation exists. COUNT refusals
now also use `CLOSED(query_id, reason)` per NIP-45, covering both quota
admission and handler saturation (added in
`cd12c93804b87a24b61075dfd171dc471a0a527f`).

Reason strings are unchanged, so the `rate-limited:` prefix and `retry
in {N}s` hint that existing client gates parse keep working (desktop
`parseRateLimitHint`, mobile `RelayRateLimitGate`, buzz-acp
`set_rate_limit_gate`). Only the frame *type* changes, so
`docs/multi-tenant-relay.md` L7 stays satisfied.

Two notes on how this landed, both worth a reviewer's attention:

1. **A survived mutation became a design change.**
`send_admission_result` originally took a `RejectionTarget` parameter,
and reverting the *second* call site (the per-minute message quota)
survived the whole suite — with Redis unreachable the first quota check
short-circuits, so that line is unreachable in test. Rather than test
around it, the parameter is gone: the target is derived from the frame,
so no call site can name the wrong channel.

2. **The relay fix would have caused a client regression on its own.**
Gate arming lived only in the NOTICE branch. Once rejections arrive as
`OK:false`, `handleOk` failed the send without ever backing off — the
client would retry straight into the same quota. Desktop and Mobile now
arm on a `rate-limited:` OK rejection. ACP was subsequently fixed in
`3b06dd32493596ec650f20abf8805791c50fdc24`: it arms the gate and
re-parks only the refused observer frame, preserving other in-flight
frames. Desktop gets `activateRateLimitIfSignalled` as the single owner
of that prefix test, called from both `handleOk` and the NOTICE branch.

<details>
<summary>File changes</summary>

**crates/buzz-relay/src/rejection.rs** (new)
Owns the admission-rejection concern: `RejectionTarget`,
`rejection_target_for`, `request_rejection_message`,
`send_admission_result`, and `enforce_ws_admission`, moved out of
`connection.rs`. Six tests, two of which drive the real
`enforce_ws_admission` against a real `AppState`.

**crates/buzz-relay/src/connection.rs**
Fix the EVENT handler-semaphore rejection to correlate to the event id;
delegate admission to the new module. Add two tests that drive the real
`handle_text_message` with every handler permit held. Down from 1319 to
1116 lines.

**crates/buzz-relay/src/state.rs**
Widen the existing `test_state` helper to `pub(crate)` so the rejection
tests reuse it rather than adding a ninth copy of `AppState`
construction.

**desktop/src/shared/api/relayRateLimitGate.ts**
Add `activateRateLimitIfSignalled` — one owner for the `rate-limited:`
prefix test, since three inbound frame types now carry it.

**desktop/src/shared/api/relayClientSession.ts**
Arm the gate on a rate-limited OK rejection; route the NOTICE branch
through the same helper. Net zero lines, which keeps this
already-oversized file within the differential ratchet.

**desktop/src/shared/api/relayClientPublishRejection.test.mjs** (new)
Four tests against the real `RelayClient`: a rate-limited OK settles the
pending publish and arms the gate; an ordinary rejection does not arm
it; an accepted OK still resolves.

**mobile/lib/shared/relay/relay_session.dart**
Arm the gate in `_handleOk` for a rate-limited rejection.

**mobile/test/shared/relay/relay_session_test.dart**
Two tests driving the real `publish` + `debugHandleMessage` path.

</details>

<details>
<summary>Validation</summary>

**Mutation-tested — 5 mutations, all now killed.** Each production call
site was reverted to the defective behaviour to confirm a test fails.
This caught two false-negative tests:

| # | Mutation | Result |
|---|----------|--------|
| 1 | `rejection_target_for`: EVENT → `Connection` | 4 tests fail |
| 2 | EVENT handler-semaphore call site → bare NOTICE | **survived at
first** |
| 3 | per-minute quota call site → `Connection` | **survived**; fixed by
removing the parameter |
| 4 | desktop `handleOk` gate arming removed | 1 test fails |
| 5 | mobile `_handleOk` gate arming removed | 1 test fails |

Mutation 2 is the lesson: my first saturation test called
`request_rejection_message` directly, so reverting the real call site
inside the `match` arm left it green. It now drives
`handle_text_message` itself and dies on that mutation.

- `cargo test -p buzz-relay` — 928 passed, 1 failed:
`api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo`,
**pre-existing**, reproduced with all changes stashed at `4dd4d73de`.
- `cd desktop && npm test` — 5721 passed, 0 failed (full suite).
- `cd mobile && flutter test` — 1876 passed, 0 failed (full suite).
- `just fmt-check`, `just clippy`, `just desktop-check`, `just
mobile-check`, `just file-size-check` — clean. Desktop's 5 biome
warnings are pre-existing (reproduced with changes stashed).
- All 9 pre-push lanes green, including `rust-tests` and
`desktop-tauri-checks`.

**Not verified:** not reproduced end-to-end against a live relay under a
forced quota burst. The causal chain is source-proven and
mutation-proven at the frame level; the ~25s attribution follows from
`PUBLISH_TIMEOUT_MS` but is not directly measured. A packaged-build
click-through would close that gap.

</details>

Related work: #6957 bounds Desktop HTTP event submission, but safe
retained-operation recovery after exhausted/ambiguous outcomes remains
unfinished. #6998 is the separately reviewable Desktop
readiness/duplicate-subscription slice. Neither is claimed to complete
native before/after startup-send validation.

Diagnosis note: `RESEARCH/DESKTOP_STARTUP_SEND_STALL_2026_08_27.md`
(Brain's workspace).

## Current review disposition (2026-08-28)

The [review on
`cd12c938`](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6961#pullrequestreview-5052902510)
identified ACP's missing rate-limited-OK handling. Commit
`3b06dd32493596ec650f20abf8805791c50fdc24` fixes gate arming, re-parking
the specifically refused observer frame, and the stale NOTICE comment.
Two regressions drive the real frame dispatcher. See [the implementation
and validation
response](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6961#issuecomment-5455032054).

The Mobile generation-check inline thread is resolved: its `async
publish` returns a failed Future when superseded; it does not throw
synchronously at invocation. No further production change was indicated
by that comment.

The validation counts above describe the original slice, not a new
rerun. At `3b06dd324`, the current GitHub check rollup has successful
completed test/build checks (non-applicable jobs skipped). The
security-review comment still requires review for the current base/head
range; do not read a green authorization job as a completed security
review. Approval and merge remain human decisions.

---------

Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Carl <9d00794d3df50972eb8b615511783cab12a77a8fd5dd5edd58073ec73b54bd8b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-31 14:43:31 -06:00
Wes
93237b4a74 fix(acp): wake agents from workflow messages (#6953)
> Pinky, an AI agent, is opening this PR on Wes's behalf.

## Summary

Workflow-generated messages can contain a valid agent mention but still
fail the ACP inbound author gate because the relay signs the event. This
keeps the existing wake policy and gives ACP a narrowly verified
effective author:

- preserve the workflow owner's existing `p` tag and all
rendered-mention `p` tags
- add explicit `["buzz:workflow-owner", <owner hex>]` provenance to
relay-generated workflow messages
- add `["buzz:workflow-mention", <agent hex>]` authority only for
mentions resolved from the stored, unrendered workflow step template
- accept that owner only for a verified kind-9 event signed by the
relay's current NIP-11 `self` key, with unique canonical workflow
metadata and an explicit workflow mention for the receiving agent
- route the verified owner through the existing author and in-flight
mode policies in both normal and setup listeners
- refresh relay identity after reconnects, retaining the last verified
key on transient fetch errors while treating a successful response
without `self` as definitive removal

Malformed, duplicate, forged, tampered, wrong-kind, and wrong-relay
attribution all fail closed to the raw event signer. `respond-to=nobody`
remains absolute. Old/mixed-version messages without the explicit
provenance retain their current fail-closed behavior.

## Trust boundary

The workflow owner means **“scheduled by,” not “authored every rendered
word.”** Trigger-controlled substitutions may still produce ordinary `p`
mention routing for compatibility, but they cannot mint
`buzz:workflow-mention` authority. Only a target named in the durable
owner-authored step template can receive that authority.

The author gate is not bypassed: after relay signature/provenance
verification, the effective owner is evaluated under the same
`owner-only`, `allowlist`, DM, and `nobody` policies used for ordinary
messages. Owner control commands continue to use the raw event signer.

## Why this PR

This is the focused immediate fix for waking an **online** agent from a
stored workflow mention. Earlier attempts were not a finished mergeable
fix and had materially different or incomplete trust designs. Larry's
larger draft stack addresses durable delivery across restarts; that
remains valuable future work and can supersede this effective-author
path when it lands.

## Validation

At exact clean commit `fe5b55619fe44176343eefb4cb7fe180df45a7d8`:

- `buzz-relay workflow_sink`: 25/25 passed, including all four ignored
PostgreSQL cases
- `buzz-acp --lib`: 845/845 passed
- `buzz-workflow --lib`: 169/169 passed (2 unrelated PostgreSQL tests
ignored)
- warnings-denied Clippy passed for the changed Rust packages
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed
- `git diff --check` passed
- repository pre-push gates passed, including branch-scoped Rust tests
- CI now selects the ACP library tests and the relay's pure + PostgreSQL
workflow-sink tests so these guards cannot silently remain unexecuted

The production event-to-author gate is shared by normal and setup
listeners and has biting regression tests for accepted explicit
attribution, legacy owner-`p` rejection, and forged-attribution
rejection.

## Exact-head local relay + ACP proof

Following the release-binary/local-relay shape in `TESTING.md`, the
exact commit above passed a fresh isolated real-process matrix using:

- a freshly recreated Postgres database with migrations
- isolated Redis
- exact-head release `buzz-relay`, `buzz`, `buzz-admin`, and `buzz-acp`
binaries
- newly provisioned owner, channel, and bot member through the CLI
- workflow creation and triggering through the running relay
- a deterministic ACP protocol subprocess capturing actual
`session/prompt` dispatches
- a NIP-11 `self` value verified against the running relay signer

Cases:

1. A stored explicit workflow mention woke an `owner-only` agent exactly
once.
2. A workflow message without an agent mention did not wake it.
3. A non-relay signer forging every workflow authority tag did not wake
it.
4. Trigger-controlled `{{trigger.text}}` containing `@Wake Agent`
retained ordinary `p` routing but received no authority-bearing
workflow-mention tag and did not wake the agent.
5. `respond-to=nobody` remained absolute for a valid relay-authenticated
workflow mention.

The deterministic ACP subprocess isolates and directly proves relay →
ACP authorization and prompt dispatch without depending on external
model behavior.

## Deployment and residual risk

Relay and ACP changes must be deployed together for the new wake
behavior; mixed versions fail closed. Production paired-deployment proof
remains distinct from the successful local integration run. Setup-mode
behavior has automated coverage but was not a separate case in the
five-case local matrix. Relay-key rotation is observed at ACP
startup/reconnect; transient NIP-11 errors retain the last verified key,
an intentional availability tradeoff documented in code.

---------

Signed-off-by: Pinky <5f5ab050ec58ae208332edd544ebf705221e24c1b86d82a6ca07038a7a8f6ac9@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Pinky <5f5ab050ec58ae208332edd544ebf705221e24c1b86d82a6ca07038a7a8f6ac9@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: LioLionel <62820906+LioLionel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Carl <9d00794d3df50972eb8b615511783cab12a77a8fd5dd5edd58073ec73b54bd8b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-31 16:24:09 -04:00
Jordan Mecom
e47690c21b Enforce NIP-OA authorization time bounds (#7004)
NIP-OA relay admission now evaluates signed `created_at<` and
`created_at>` conditions against the already verified authentication
event timestamp. An owner-signed credential such as `created_at<1` no
longer upgrades its holder to relay membership.

The verified timestamp now flows from NIP-42, NIP-98, and Blossom
authentication through the shared membership gate used by WebSocket,
HTTP, Git, media, huddles, GIF, and workflow requests. Owner-attested
access fails closed when no signed authentication timestamp is
available. Direct relay members keep their existing admission behavior,
and `kind=` remains connection-level metadata as specified by NIP-AA.

Tests cover strict time-bound evaluation, missing timestamp rejection,
and HTTP authentication timestamp propagation.

Testing:

- `cargo test -p buzz-sdk nip_oa::tests -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p buzz-relay api::relay_members::tests -- --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p buzz-relay api::bridge::tests -- --nocapture`
- `just ci`

---------

Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com>
2026-08-31 10:18:05 -07:00
Luke Tornquist
3ed623bb21 feat(db): configurable writer session timeouts (lock, idle-txn, statement) (#6229)
## Why

A wedged relay boot pod holding a relation lock can park every other
writer in the fleet behind it: DB load pins at pool capacity in
`Lock:relation` waits while CPU stays flat, and nothing server-side
releases the lock until the holder dies. We hit exactly this in
production — ~1,400 sessions queued behind one crash-looping pod's boot
transaction for ~20 minutes until kubelet killed the container.

## What

Applies session-level Postgres timeouts to every **writer** connection
inside the existing single `after_connect` hook in `buzz-db`, all
env-tunable through the same `Config::from_env → DbConfig` path as the
existing pool-size knobs:

| Env var | GUC | Default | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| `BUZZ_DB_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS` | `lock_timeout` | 5000 | statements waiting
on any lock fail fast instead of parking behind a wedged holder |
| `BUZZ_DB_IDLE_TXN_TIMEOUT_MS` | `idle_in_transaction_session_timeout`
| 60000 | reaps wedged clients idling inside an open transaction while
holding locks |
| `BUZZ_DB_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS` | `statement_timeout` | 0 (off) |
opt-in runaway-statement cap; off by default because startup
migrations/backfills legitimately run long statements |

`0` disables a timeout (Postgres semantics) and deliberately passes
through the env parsing — unlike the pool-size knobs where `0` falls
back to the default. The reader pool is untouched: replica sessions
never take contended locks and already fail acquire in 150 ms.

Deployers tune these via plain env vars (`.env`, or `relay.extraEnv` in
the Helm chart) — no code changes needed.

## Behavior change to note

With the 5 s default `lock_timeout`, a boot-time migration or backfill
that waits >5 s on a lock now errors (surfacing in logs / crash-looping
the pod) instead of stalling silently. That is the intended
visible-failure-over-fleet-stall tradeoff; deployers with slow contended
migrations can set `BUZZ_DB_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS=0`.

## Testing

- `cargo test -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay` — buzz-db green; buzz-relay has
9 failures that also fail on clean `main` in this environment
(api::admin/api::media/mesh_demo — unrelated, pre-existing).
- New config test covers override / `0`-passthrough / invalid-fallback
for all three env vars.
- Extended the existing `writer_pool_safety_hook_is_single_and_composed`
source-shape test so the timeouts can't drift out of the single
`after_connect` hook (SQLx replaces hooks — a second hook would silently
disarm the floor guard).
- `cargo fmt --check` and `cargo clippy --all-targets` clean for the
touched crates.

Closest existing PR/issue: none found.

---
**Update Aug 28, 17:06 EDT:** Rebased onto `main` at `a3730784fc` and
addressed the latest correctness review.

- Ported the timeout policy onto the refactored `buzz-db::runtime` pool
constructor and kept the shared env overlay for relay, admin, deletion,
and audit writers.
- Migration/schema-destruction connections now disable `lock_timeout`
and `statement_timeout` for their intentional long wait/DDL path. This
supersedes the earlier “Behavior change to note”: contended boot
migrations wait for the current migration owner rather than
crash-looping after five seconds.
- The audit worker now preserves and retries the same entry on
PostgreSQL `55P03` lock timeouts, using exponential backoff capped at
one second. Other database errors retain the existing terminal error
behavior, and retries emit `buzz_audit_log_lock_retries_total`.
- Added CI-backed PostgreSQL regressions for writer GUC
installation/migration exemption, audit-pool lock timeouts, and worker
recovery. The worker regression holds the real audit advisory lock past
`lock_timeout`, observes a retry, releases the lock, and proves the
original entry is appended exactly once.

Current verification supersedes the earlier testing notes: workspace
Rust clippy passed with warnings denied; all nine infrastructure-free
backend unit-test lanes passed; all three focused PostgreSQL regressions
passed against PostgreSQL 17; formatting, diff checks, file-size guards,
and desktop frontend checks passed. The Linux Blox workstation could not
run the unrelated Tauri native lane because `glib-2.0` is absent, so
that platform check is left to PR CI.


---
**Update Aug 31, 11:09 EDT:** Rebased onto current `main` at
`c3132c3ee9` and reran the requested audit-lock contention scenario on
Blox at head `896c3fe9ed`.

- `git range-diff` reports both PR commits unchanged by the rebase; the
branch remains two commits and the worktree is clean.
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and clippy with warnings denied passed
for `buzz-db`, `buzz-relay`, `buzz-admin`, and `buzz-deletion`.
- All three focused PostgreSQL 17 regressions passed: writer session
timeout/migration exemption, audit writer timeout bounds, and audit
worker recovery of the original entry exactly once.
- Live protocol verification used a head-built relay and CLI, native
PostgreSQL 17/Redis, `BUZZ_DB_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS=300`, and an eight-second
hold on the community audit advisory lock. The real message was accepted
and persisted once while the lock was held; its audit-row count remained
zero during contention while retries accumulated. After release, exactly
one `event_created` audit row appeared and remained exactly one after an
additional two-second duplicate check. The run recorded nine
lock-timeout retries, zero audit failures, and event ID
`7f8c4ffae28e78555fcf2d56396d6e6c01b3712e5411288dc79e9a54af9d9444`.

Generated with Codex

---------

Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
2026-08-31 11:59:13 -04:00
Tom Brow
c432a111ca feat(mobile): push notifications MVP (#6269)
This PR implements MVP, iOS-only,
[NIP-PL](8d2d0ff5ad/docs/nips/NIP-PL.md)-compliant
push notifications.

A relay with `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED` will send a push notification for any
message that appears in the in-app Notifications tab.

## Enrollment flow
The first time the client first connects to a relay with
`BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED`:
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant App as Buzz iOS app
    participant iOS
    participant Relay as Buzz relay
    participant Attest as Apple App Attest
    participant Gateway as Push gateway

    App->>Relay: Fetch NIP-11 push capability
    Relay-->>App: Push profile, current relay public key, and limits

    par
        App->>iOS: Request notification permission
        iOS-->>App: Permission result
    and
        App->>iOS: Register for remote notifications
        iOS-->>App: Device token
    end

    App->>Gateway: Request installation challenge
    Gateway-->>App: Single-use challenge
    App->>Attest: Attest installation transcript
    Attest-->>App: Attestation proof
    App->>Gateway: Enroll device token and proof
    Gateway-->>App: Installation handle

    App->>Gateway: Request delegation challenge
    Gateway-->>App: Single-use challenge
    App->>Attest: Assert relay-key delegation
    Attest-->>App: Assertion
    App->>Gateway: Create delegation
    Gateway-->>App: Opaque endpoint grant

    App->>Relay: Publish encrypted push lease and filters
    Relay-->>App: Lease acknowledged
```

## Push-time flow

When a notification-eligible event is received by the relay:

```mermaid
%%{init: {
  "sequence": {
    "actorMargin": 20,
    "width": 110,
    "messageMargin": 18,
    "diagramMarginX": 8,
    "wrap": true
  }
}}%%
sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant Relay as Buzz relay
    participant Gateway as Push gateway
    participant APNs as Apple Push<br/>Notification service
    participant iOS
    participant NSE as Notification service<br/>extension

    Relay->>Gateway: POST /v1/deliveries/apns<br/>opaque endpoint grant, request ID, expiry, NIP-98 authorization

    Gateway->>APNs: POST /3/device/{device-token}<br/>topic, request ID, expiry, constant mutable-content payload
    APNs-->>Gateway: 200 OK: request accepted
    Gateway-->>Relay: 200 OK: accepted status

    APNs-->>iOS: Notification: constant reconnect alert<br/>mutable-content = 1
    iOS->>NSE: Invoke extension<br/>original notification content

    NSE->>Relay: POST /query: subscription filters, limit 10<br/>NIP-98 authorization
    Relay-->>NSE: 200 OK: signed Nostr events<br/>kinds 9, 40002, 45001, or 45003

    NSE->>iOS: Complete notification: title, body, subtitle<br/>thread ID, exact-message target
```

relay → push gateway → APNs -> NSE -> Notification Center

## Known limitations

The APNs wake payload is intentionally constant and opaque: it contains
no originating community or message identifier, in keeping with the
implemented NIP-PL privacy design.

The Notification Service Extension must therefore reconnect to the relay
and resolve eligible messages after each wake. Around overlapping wakes,
timing boundaries, or resolution windows, notification presentation may
occasionally omit an expected message or display a message more than
once.

This best-effort behavior is deliberately accepted for the current
implementation and will be measured during the internal rollout to
determine whether the user experience is acceptable before any broader
deployment; the implementation does not claim exactly-once presentation.

## Validation

Live end-to-end hardware validation used an internal remotely hosted
development relay and push gateway, the APNs sandbox, and a physical
iPhone 12 mini:

- A second real Buzz client published a uniquely marked message through
the hosted relay.
- The relay matched the message and sent the constant opaque wake
through the hosted gateway. The gateway made an actual APNs request; no
`simctl push` or simulated notification was used.
- The iPhone received the notification on its lock screen. The
Notification Service Extension reconnected to the relay, fetched the
event, verified its ID and signature, and replaced the placeholder
content with the real notification title and body.
- After the app populated its shared presentation cache, a final marked
notification visibly showed the sender display name, sender avatar, and
hashtag-prefixed channel name.
- Tapping a lock-screen notification opened Buzz and exercised the
notification-response path and navigated to the corresponding message.

Final validation with a dogfood-signed artifact and production App
Attest/APNs configuration remains a release step.

## Independent pre-reviews

- **First pass:**
[Carl](buzz://message?channel=18882f4c-289f-41db-942f-81f6f8066da1&id=74ab9a93bb227f3e762568f1cf9fee66d7495b0edc3918735ff787238b9cc585)
found missing transient retries, executor-key rotation suppression,
duplicate installation renewal, and an unauthenticated challenge write
amplifier. These were resolved by [retry-safe
bootstrap](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/12c66ea62)
and [authenticated renewal plus a cross-replica
quota](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/8e5ece0bd).
[sol-max](buzz://message?channel=ad83385f-8e9e-4461-9a35-c1bf2e208532&id=d26d53daa4684669e2ed354638241f13f36c3a97027fe8b4dd738aff09038962)
found delegation generation burning and an edited applied migration,
resolved by [exact-generation
revocation](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/c26d2159d)
and a [forward-only
migration](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/956c1d099).
[k3-max](buzz://message?channel=5e46055d-a766-4065-ae25-05d1e4aaa6b2&id=d43139138a0b15f806cbdbeeedd8f69d992cadf2e805876db6fdde6a34c7eda1)
found no blockers.
- **Exact-head re-review:**
[Carl](buzz://message?channel=18882f4c-289f-41db-942f-81f6f8066da1&id=a897721673459301b0cf26e8b85a1478d7ebbb56a4621f93d774c98d395b8f68),
[sol-max](buzz://message?channel=ad83385f-8e9e-4461-9a35-c1bf2e208532&id=fb2159f709ec68f74f7b21459acd76da0e8a7c5c0f3d469f99826b0cc2380849),
and
[k3-max](buzz://message?channel=5e46055d-a766-4065-ae25-05d1e4aaa6b2&id=2ce2842910435f562e9d9cc718595848f281b122c94605e523a4b964254b8bfb)
independently returned **NO BLOCKERS** at `7eb3a650b`; k3-max also
revalidated every remediation and the endpoint-specific App Attest
enrollment bound.

---------

Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@squareup.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Tom Brow <tomb@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com>
2026-08-28 15:15:09 -06:00
Will Pfleger
86b9142a09 refactor(relay): NIP-98 admin auth with Operator/Moderator roles and NIP-11 discovery (#3777)
Adds authenticated, role-based moderation to the relay admin API. On
`main` the admin API is read-only and gated only by `Host`/`Origin`
matching; this branch adds NIP-98 authentication, a two-tier
Operator/Moderator principal model, mutation and staffing endpoints, and
NIP-11 auto-discovery so clients never type the admin URL by hand.

## Authentication (`BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH`)

`BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` accepts `nip98` or `disabled`. Leaving it unset
defaults to `nip98` (fail-secure). Configuration fails closed: any other
value aborts startup, while a lingering `BUZZ_ADMIN_TOKEN` is ignored
with a startup warning — token (bearer) authentication is not supported.
`Host`/`Origin` matching is retained in every mode as defense-in-depth.

- **`nip98`** (default) — per-request signed NIP-98 (kind 27235) events,
resolved to an Operator or Moderator principal with per-person
attribution and individual revocability. Read-write per resolved
principal.
- **`disabled`** — no credential; relies entirely on network-layer
controls (reverse proxy, VPN, firewall) and logs a `WARN` on every boot.
Always read-only: `authorize()` resolves no principal, so mutation and
staffing routes always `403`.

## Roles

Buzz has two independent authority axes after this change.
**Relay-level** roles (new here) are deployment-global: they act across
every community on the relay, through the admin API. **Community-level**
roles (pre-existing, unchanged by this PR) are tenant-scoped: they act
inside one community, through signed Nostr moderation commands.

### Relay level (new)

| Role | Description |
|---|---|
| **Operator** | Full control of the deployment's moderation surface:
read all reports, feedback, and attachments across every community;
resolve reports with enforcement (`delete`/`kick`/`ban`/`timeout`) or
decisions (`dismiss`/`escalate`); reopen and cancel; update feedback
status; and manage the Operator/Moderator roster via the staffing
endpoints. |
| **Moderator** | Day-to-day triage: everything an Operator can do
except staffing — cannot view or change the roster. |

How a pubkey acquires a relay role (resolution order; config always
outranks DB):

1. Listed in `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` → **Operator** (source `config`)
2. Equals `RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY` while `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` is empty →
**Operator** (source `owner_fallback`, a break-glass grant for
self-hosters that deactivates once any operator is configured)
3. Row in the `relay_operators` table → **Operator** or **Moderator**
(source `db`, managed via the staffing endpoints)
4. No match → `403`

### Community level (pre-existing, unchanged)

| Role | Description |
|---|---|
| **Owner** (community) | Full authority within their community: every
moderation action (delete, kick, ban/unban, timeout/untimeout, resolve
reports, view queue) plus member, role, and invite management. No guard
rails. |
| **Admin** (community) | Same community-wide moderation capabilities as
owner, except an admin cannot ban or time out the owner or a fellow
admin — only the owner may action an admin. Manages members and invites;
only the owner grants the admin role. |
| **Member** (community) | Standard participant; no moderation
capability. |
| **Owner / Admin** (channel) | Channel-local authority only: delete
messages and kick users within their own channel. |
| **Member / Guest / Bot** (channel) | No moderation authority. |

There is no community-level Moderator tier in v1; relay-level Moderator
is the only role by that name.

## Escalation scoping

The operator report queue is an escalation backstop, not the community's
day-to-day triage surface (per `VISION_MODERATION`, the severe class is
the platform's to review rather than the community's). Two rules enforce
that:

- **Escalated-by-default listing.** `GET /reports` with no `status`
parameter returns only `escalated` reports. An explicit
`status=<open|resolved|dismissed|escalated>` filter is always honored as
given, and full visibility across every status stays available for
platform-safety and legal review via `scope=all` (which lists reports
regardless of status). `scope` accepts only `all` and is ignored when an
explicit `status` is present.
- **Auto-escalated `illegal` reports.** Member reports whose category is
`illegal` are ingested with `status=escalated` rather than `open`, so
the severe class reaches the operator backstop without waiting for a
community admin to forward it. Every other category still lands `open`.
Auto-escalation only sets the queue status — it records no moderator
decision and stamps no resolver, so an auto-escalated report is
indistinguishable downstream from an admin-escalated one: the reopen
route returns it to `open` on the same terms, keyed only on status,
never on how the report became escalated.

## Principal resolution and NIP-98 admission

`resolve_admin_principal()` returns `AdminPrincipal { pubkey, role,
source }` per the resolution order above; `None` never falls through as
a role. Admission is ordered so the replay guard is a privilege, not a
public surface: signature/URL/method/payload-hash verification first,
roster check second, and only then is the deployment-scoped replay id
atomically consumed — a validly-signing but unrostered key never
allocates a replay slot. Redis failure fails closed.

## Report resolution, recovery, and enforcement provenance

`POST /reports/{id}/resolve` is a crash-safe enforcement state machine:
decision-only outcomes (`dismiss`/`escalate`) are a single
CAS-plus-audit transaction; enforcement
(`delete`/`kick`/`ban`/`timeout`) claims the report
(`open`→`processing`), runs the durable mutation, then finalizes — a
re-drive resumes at the step marker and converges to exactly-one
enforcement, fenced by a lease and an outbox claim token.

Person-directed enforcement on an `event`-kind report derives its target
from the stored event's author (server-owned truth, never the reporter's
`p` tag) via a single `derive_enforcement_target` shared by the HTTP
driver and the recovery worker. If the reported event was purged before
its author could be read, person-directed actions are rejected pre-claim
and the report stays `open`; `delete` needs only the event id and is
exempt.

`GET /reports/{id}` and the resolve response carry an `activeAction`
field surfacing the enforcement that actually executed — a report
dismissed after a reopen still reports the ban that ran. `POST
/reports/{id}/reopen` returns a terminal report to `open` (idempotent on
`requestId`). `POST /reports/{id}/cancel` is the sole recovery path for
a pre-mutation `failed` action, attributed via
`relay_admin_actions.cancelled_by`.

## Feedback

`GET /feedback` and `/feedback/{id}` survive a tenant purge: provenance
columns are severed to `NULL` rather than cascade-deleted, and the
attachment path fails closed to `404` on a severed row. `PATCH
/feedback/{id}` updates lifecycle `status`
(`new`/`reviewed`/`archived`).

## Staffing and probe

`GET/PUT/DELETE /operators/{pubkey}` are Operator-only; mutating a
config-backed pubkey returns `409 Conflict`. `GET /operators` returns
the union of config and DB principals with per-entry `source`. `GET
/probe` reports auth mode, role, source, `canAct`, and `canStaff` for
the desktop console.

## NIP-11 auto-discovery

The NIP-11 relay-information document gains an optional `admin_api`
field carrying the canonical admin origin (`scheme://host[:port]`, no
path), present iff `BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` is set and omitted otherwise. The
scheme follows the same loopback rule as NIP-98 `u`-tag verification via
a shared `scheme_for_host` helper, so the advertised origin and the
origin the relay verifies against can never diverge.

## Operator API origin decoupling

`RELAY_OPERATOR_API_ORIGIN` is no longer required at boot when
`RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` is set — it is used only by the
community-provisioning endpoints, which fail closed at request time
(with a boot-time `WARN`) until it is set. The admin console needs no
origin.

## Admin-web adaptation

The standalone `admin-web` dashboard signs each request as a NIP-98
event via a NIP-07 browser extension, discovers the auth mode with a
single unauthenticated probe (`200` → `disabled`, anything else →
`nip98`, fail-secure), and carries no token entry surface. Playwright
coverage exercises the NIP-98 and CSP paths.

## Security hardening

Three findings from security review are folded in:

- **Append-only roster audit.** `PUT`/`DELETE /operators/{pubkey}`
mutate the deployment-wide root of trust, but the upsert overwrites
`role`/`added_by` in place and the delete removes the only row — so a
grant→revoke sequence left no trace of who was ever granted or by whom.
Each mutation now writes an `relay_operator_audit` row (actor, target,
`grant`/`revoke`, pre-image `prev_role`, `new_role`, timestamp) inside
the same transaction as the mutation. A per-target transaction-scoped
advisory lock serializes concurrent mutations of the same pubkey before
the pre-image read, so the recorded `prev_role` is always the true
predecessor even under a concurrent-grant race. Chronology is keyed on a
`BIGINT GENERATED ALWAYS AS IDENTITY` `seq` column, not the wall clock:
the serializing lock guarantees insertion order and `seq` captures it,
so ordered reads (`ORDER BY seq`) follow the true privilege chain even
across a backward NTP step that a `clock_timestamp()` ordering would
invert. `created_at` (`clock_timestamp()`) is retained as informational
occurrence time only. Append-only by construction — no `UPDATE`/`DELETE`
path and no API surface. A no-op delete writes nothing.
- **`expirationSecs` overflow.** The timeout path built `Utc::now() +
Duration::seconds(secs as i64)` from an attacker-controlled `u64`:
`i64::MAX` panicked the handler, and a wrapped-negative magnitude minted
a *past* expiry that still passed validation. `compute_timeout_until`
now rejects zero, rejects magnitudes above a documented
`MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS` (365 days), and uses checked
`try_seconds`/`checked_add_signed` so no input can panic or produce a
past expiry — over-cap, zero, `i64::MAX`, and wrapping-negative inputs
all return a clean `4xx`.
- **Uppercase-hex config-backed bypass.** Config pubkeys are lowercased
at parse, but the `409` immutability check raw-string-compared the path
param while `decode_hex_pubkey` accepted uppercase — so `PUT
/operators/{UPPERCASE}` skipped the guard and wrote a shadow row for the
same 32 bytes. The validated param is now canonicalized (lowercased)
before the `409` check, DB write, `DELETE`, and response body.

## Migrations

- `0035_relay_operators.sql` — `relay_operators` roster table
(deployment-global), `actor_authority` on `moderation_actions`,
`processing` status plus `active_action_id` on `moderation_reports`,
`status` on `product_feedback`.
- `0036_relay_admin_actions.sql` — enforcement-action table with a
`request_id` idempotency key, a `step_marker` for crash recovery, and a
`cancelled_by` attribution column.
- `0037_relay_admin_action_lease.sql` — lease fencing for the action
worker.
- `0038_relay_admin_outbox_claim_token.sql` — fenced claim token on the
outbox worker.
- `0039_relay_operator_audit.sql` — append-only `relay_operator_audit`
trail for roster mutations (see Security hardening).

`docs/admin/README.md` documents the full principal model, NIP-98 event
requirements, capabilities by role, the startup error matrix, and the
discovery field.

## Production blast radius

A relay without `BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` is completely unaffected — the admin
surface stays disabled and `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` is ignored; a lingering
`BUZZ_ADMIN_TOKEN` logs a startup warning and must be removed. Where
`BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` **is** set, unset `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` defaults to
`nip98` (per-person signed auth); `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=disabled` reproduces
`main`'s prior `Host`/`Origin`-only gating but is read-only (mutation
routes `403`). The five migrations add tables and columns without
touching existing data.

---

Related: [block/buzz#4768](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4768)
(desktop admin console consuming the `admin_api` field),
[squareup/bb-public#339](https://github.com/squareup/bb-public/pull/339)
(Phase 4 rollout config)

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-28 11:43:05 -04:00
Will Pfleger
0808ab485c fix(cli): enrich template cardinality error with per-candidate presence and profile hints (#4825)
## Problem

`buzz channels create --template` fails with a bare-pubkey
duplicate-instance error when a persona has more than one live instance.
When duplicate instances share the same display name and avatar, the
error gives the operator no signal to identify which instance is stale.

## What changed

**`crates/buzz-cli/src/commands/channels.rs`** (boundary) + one
visibility line in **`crates/buzz-cli/src/commands/users.rs`** (`fn
presence_subject` → `pub(crate)`), plus a relay behavior change in
**`crates/buzz-relay/src/api/bridge.rs`** and a supporting test in
**`crates/buzz-pubsub/src/presence.rs`**.

### Relay: presence-lookup failure is now surfaced as a failure

`synthesize_presence` previously collapsed a Redis `get_presence_bulk`
error into `unwrap_or_default()` → HTTP 200 `[]`, making a backend
outage indistinguishable from an authoritative all-offline snapshot. It
now returns `Option<Result<Vec<Value>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)>>`:
`None` means the request is not a presence query (fall through),
`Some(Ok)` is a real snapshot (an empty vec is an authoritative
all-offline result), and `Some(Err)` is a backend failure surfaced as a
non-2xx response. The event tag-parse and sign paths were converted from
`.ok()?` fall-throughs to explicit `Some(Err(...))` for the same reason
— a silent fall-through would have reintroduced the fake-empty-success
anti-pattern. The function takes `pubsub` and `relay_keypair` directly
rather than the whole `AppState`, which keeps the Redis-error seam
unit-testable without live infrastructure; its single production caller
was updated accordingly, and no other caller consumes
`synthesize_presence`.

### Hint fetch architecture

**`assemble_roster_resolution<F, Fut>`** — post-fetch stage extracted
from `build_roster_resolution` as an injectable-fetcher async generic.
It contains: archive-filter-based duplicate detection, the conditional
`fetch_hints` call, and `finalize_roster_resolution` delegation.
Accepting the fetcher as a closure makes the wiring directly testable
without a relay.

`build_roster_resolution` reduces to: gather slugs → `tokio::join!(scan,
archive)` → delegate with the real `fetch_candidate_hints` closure.

**Zero hint queries on the happy path**: `assemble_roster_resolution`
only invokes the fetcher when duplicate live instances exist after
archive filtering. Untrusted archive snapshot (`Err`) conservatively
treats all found instances as live.

When duplicates exist, `fetch_candidate_hints` runs the presence
(kind:40902) and profile (kind:0) queries concurrently, bounding **each
independently** through `join_bounded_queries`: a per-query 3-second
timeout maps to `Err`, so a lookup that completes is never discarded
because its sibling hung. On total failure or timeout, bare pubkeys are
printed promptly.

### Trusted-snapshot boundary — `hints_from_results`

The relay drops the Redis presence key when an identity goes offline, so
the bulk presence snapshot never returns an event for an offline
instance — precisely the stale duplicate an operator needs flagged.
`hints_from_results` therefore treats a *trusted* presence snapshot as a
**complete snapshot** for the requested pubkeys: it seeds all of them
`offline`, then overlays returned statuses.

A response is trusted only when `trusted_presence_snapshot` validates
**every** array element as the actual snapshot contract: each must parse
as a complete signed `nostr::Event` of the presence-update kind carrying
exactly one `p` tag whose subject is one of the requested pubkeys.
Requiring the *sole* `p`-tag subject — the exact value `build_hint_map`
later reads via `presence_subject` — is what stops a mixed-tag event
(`[["p","<unrequested>"],["p","<requested>"]]`) from passing the gate
yet overlaying a different subject downstream. Any element that is not
such an event — a vacuous object like
`{"pubkey":"…","content":"online"}`, `[{}]`, `[null]`, an event of the
wrong kind, one for an unrequested subject, or one carrying more than
one `p` tag — makes presence enrichment untrusted: nothing is seeded
`offline`, so absence is never falsely inferred as offline. A failed,
timed-out, or non-array presence response is likewise untrusted. In
every untrusted case the successful profile sibling still contributes
its hints.

### Response-to-map conversion — `build_hint_map`

Sync production function taking the offline seed plus raw
presence/profile event slices. Relay-signed presence events carry the
agent pubkey in the `p` tag (not the event author); `build_hint_map`
calls `presence_subject` from `users.rs` (now `pub(crate)`) to resolve
the correct key.

### Hint display — `format_candidate`

Appends `[online/offline, profile updated YYYY-MM-DD]` (or subset) to
each candidate pubkey in the error. `profile_updated_at` names the field
correctly: kind:0 is replaceable state that desktop republishes on
rename and profile reconciliation, so `created_at` reflects the last
profile update, not provisioning time. Date formatted via
`chrono::DateTime::from_timestamp`; out-of-range timestamps omit the
date. Missing entries fall back to bare pubkeys.

### Cardinality rule

`apply_cardinality_rule` remains pure and relay-free; zero/one/many
semantics unchanged.

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carl <9d00794d3df50972eb8b615511783cab12a77a8fd5dd5edd58073ec73b54bd8b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub1g8493u0xfsjrvflg4n08ezd7vec99mnwzlv0qgwpr9d7gvjwhuzqx59rhw <41ea58f1e64c243627e8acde7c89be667052ee6e17d8f021c1195be4324ebf04@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-27 14:40:53 -04:00
thomaspblock
de188ebf06 feat(projects): add agent and CLI project-home support (#6590)
## Summary
- inject bounded project-home identity and repository context into
managed agent sessions
- add project-aware CLI flows for creating projects, repositories,
issues, and related channels
- match project homes through the existing relay query surface, then
filter channel metadata client-side

This is Part 1 of the channel-first Projects stack. Part 2 contains
project creation and model foundations.

## Testing
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `cargo clippy -p buzz-cli -p buzz-acp --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- `cargo test -p buzz-cli -p buzz-acp` — 1,184 tests passed, 1 doc test
ignored
- full pre-push gate passed

## Post-Deploy Monitoring & Validation
- validate project-home agent context and project-aware CLI commands
against a staging relay
- healthy signals: project context matches the active channel, explicit
repo coordinates remain stable, and normal channels receive no project
block
- failure signals: cross-channel project context, duplicate project
creation, or commands targeting an unrelated repository; mitigate by
reverting this PR

---------

Signed-off-by: Thomas Petersen <thomasp@squareup.com>
Signed-off-by: Wrench <0eabe6ea5758c1e4c5b68cea4ac42b32c479072883cb28da8110b4a47c32b9a1@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Wrench <0eabe6ea5758c1e4c5b68cea4ac42b32c479072883cb28da8110b4a47c32b9a1@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-26 12:09:06 -07:00
klopez4212
8471049c43 feat(desktop): add KLIPY GIF search to composers (#5554)
## Summary

- Supersedes #1913 with a KLIPY-hosted URL implementation.
- Adds KLIPY GIF search and trending results to desktop message and
forum composers.
- Keeps selected GIFs hosted by KLIPY; Buzz stores only the external URL
and media metadata (no imeta tag, since relays only accept hash-backed
local `/media/` entries).
- Aligns the Emoji/GIF picker with Buzz's standard segmented control,
theme surfaces, and motion behavior.

## Relay-to-provider boundary

- The relay proxies KLIPY search/share so the `BUZZ_KLIPY_API_KEY` never
reaches the desktop; the key stays server-side behind a redacted `Debug`
impl.
- The dedicated GIF `reqwest` client sets `redirect::Policy::none()`.
Because the API key rides in the request path, following a provider
`3xx` could replay a key-bearing URL to an attacker-chosen host (an
SSRF/key-disclosure primitive). With redirects disabled, a `3xx` returns
as a non-success status that the handlers map to a generic `502`; the
`Location` target is never read or forwarded.
- Admission reuses the established NIP-98, membership, replay, and
per-pubkey rate-limit gates, with an upstream response-size cap and
allowlisting so KLIPY error bodies never cross the relay boundary.

## Accessibility

- Under `prefers-reduced-motion: reduce`, the picker grid renders a
static provider poster (a normalized `jpg` asset) instead of the
animated preview, or a named static placeholder when no poster is
available. It reacts to preference changes while mounted.
`no-preference` keeps the animated preview.
- Selected GIFs carry their title through `ImetaMedia`'s `displayLabel`,
so the composer thumbnail, preview dialog, editor, lightbox, and remove
control all derive one non-empty accessible name instead of an empty
`Attachment ` label. Ordinary hashed uploads keep their existing
hash-derived names.

---------

Signed-off-by: kenny lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kenny Lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Princess Donut <b238ea756dee4d98afa5883fc7f1de61eeabe65bf700e3a5a5a80db5e42e2c2b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-25 19:09:55 -04:00
Jordan Mecom
ee6ca5fa28 Remove public relay signing key fallback (#6729)
Require `BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY` on every relay startup and remove the
shared public fallback key completely.

For local development, `just bootstrap` now generates a random key once
in the gitignored `.env` file. Re-running bootstrap preserves that key,
so relay-authored events retain the same identity across restarts. The
local relay recipes reload `.env`, while isolated CI and E2E launchers
pass explicit per-run keys.

Startup fails immediately when the key is missing or invalid, before
connecting to Postgres or Redis. Deployed relays continue to receive
their stable key from the existing chart-managed secret.

Validated with:

- `./scripts/test-ensure-local-relay-key.sh`
- `cargo test -p buzz-relay --bin buzz-relay`
- `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay --bin buzz-relay -- -D warnings`
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `shellcheck scripts/ensure-local-relay-key.sh
scripts/test-ensure-local-relay-key.sh`

Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com>
2026-08-25 13:57:23 -07:00
Luke Tornquist
f249710331 Qualify canonical relay images for staged delivery (#6781)
## Why

Phase 1 of progressive delivery needs an explicit eligibility boundary
before deployment automation can safely consume relay artifacts. Today
the canonical Docker workflow can publish independently of the same-SHA
CI result, the relay does not expose its source/build identity, and the
Helm chart only renders mutable tags.

The existing `ghcr.io/block/buzz-staging-dev` workflow in #6709 remains
a manual pre-merge preview lane. It is deliberately not a canonical
promotion input.

## What changed

- Compile the full source SHA and GitHub Actions build identity into
canonical relay binaries and expose it at `/_status`.
- Gate creation of tagged multi-architecture manifests on the latest
exact-SHA `CI` push run succeeding on `main` or `release`.
- Preserve the signed SLSA provenance and add a signed, release-only
deployment-eligibility predicate with source, build run, qualifying CI
run, and exact compatible Buzz chart version.
- Keep failed or pending builds untagged and without an eligibility
predicate; preview-package artifacts are excluded by package and signer
contract.
- Add optional `image.digest` support to Buzz chart `0.1.8`, retaining
the existing tag fallback.
- Document verification and the intentional boundary between image/chart
compatibility and backwards-compatible database migrations.

## Risk and rollout

Canonical tag publication now waits for same-SHA CI and fails closed
when the newest matching run fails. Per-architecture blobs may remain
untagged after a failed qualification; they are not promotion inputs.
Debug manifests are also CI-gated but do not receive the release
eligibility predicate.

There are no migration or schema-orchestration changes. The companion
BuilderBot infrastructure PR will pin a separately verified canonical
main digest and expose a read-only running-deployment inspection
command. Signed eligibility is available only for artifacts published
after this workflow lands.

## Verification

- Blox: workflow contract fixtures, including stale-green rejection and
predicate structure
- Blox: `actionlint` for `ci.yml` and `docker.yml`
- Blox: 46 Helm unit tests, chart lint, and production/quickstart render
fixtures
- Blox: relay status unit test, workspace Rust formatting, and workspace
all-target clippy
- Live evidence: exact-SHA CI selector chose successful run
`32857345153` for source `9d1e4b257657f382d3111ce748f3da8d063b7671`
- Existing canonical digest provenance verified with `gh attestation
verify`

## References

- #6709 — developer-preview precursor; intentionally separate from
canonical eligibility
- `docs/deployment-identity.md`

*Generated with Codex*

---------

Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
2026-08-25 14:44:49 -04:00
Brad Seiler
d12dea4e67 Support community deletion in versioned media buckets (#6738) 2026-08-25 09:02:18 -07:00
Luke Tornquist
8d2d0ff5ad Centralize replaceable event persistence (#6660)
## Why
Command persistence duplicated NIP-33 replacement SQL in the relay and
obscured the boundary between database runtime concerns and domain-store
behavior. This proving slice establishes that boundary inside the
existing `buzz-db` crate.

## What
- Centralize parameterized-replaceable coordinate locking, ordering,
replacement, watermark, and mention-indexing behavior in `buzz-db`
- Expose transaction-required replacement and ordinary-insertion seams
while keeping transaction ownership and workflow conflict messages in
the relay
- Cover concurrency, same-second ties, stale writes, replay, caller
rollback, nested rollback recovery, and mention-index atomicity with
focused PostgreSQL tests

## Risk Assessment
Medium — this changes core event persistence and command idempotency
paths, while intentionally preserving NIP-33, NIP-RS, mesh, and workflow
conflict semantics.

## References
- Architecture guardrail:
https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/34
- Proving slice: https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/3,
https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/4,
https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/6

Generated with Codex

---------

Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
2026-08-24 20:42:15 -04:00
Tyler
2d280376ad perf(desktop): persist channel heads, collapse thread reads and reply sends (#6572)
## Summary

Lands the build-now items from the desktop latency plan
(#ui-performance-deep-dive) as one change. Every perceived-latency hot
path a user hits on launch, channel open, thread open, and reply send
drops one or more round trips.

**A1 — persisted channel heads (the big one).** Native WAL SQLite cache
(`desktop/src-tauri/src/channel_head_cache.rs`) keyed by `{pubkey,
relayUrl}` scope, 32 rows/scope LRU, 1 MiB per-row drop cap,
schema-version reset, corrupt-row tolerance, checkpointed on shutdown.
Three blocking-pool commands: `channel_head_cache_load` / `_store` /
`_clear`. On the renderer side, `CommunityQueryProvider` kicks off
hydration of up to 12 heads when it constructs the query client — the
app, splash and relay preconnect mount immediately; only
`useChannelMessagesQuery` awaits the seed (`channelHeadHydration`), then
consumes a one-shot hydrated gate so a hydrated channel pays **zero**
`get_channel_window` calls on mount and exactly **one** on the
post-subscription refresh, whose response replaces page zero wholesale.
That refresh fires whether live-subscription setup succeeds or fails,
and is sequenced behind hydration so it is always a distinct
authoritative fetch (see Review follow-ups). Bounds-only persisted heads
(zero rows) are not hydrated and take the cold loading path. The
timeline loading latch recognizes native-hydrated rows as restart-safe
so they paint immediately instead of holding a skeleton. The cache is a
paint accelerator only — the relay response is always authoritative.
Replaces the legacy localStorage `messageSnapshot.ts` (removed, -401
lines).

Kill switch: `VITE_BUZZ_CHANNEL_HEAD_CACHE=off` at build time or
`localStorage["buzz-channel-head-cache"] = "off"` at runtime. Cache is
cleared on community removal and scoped per identity, so a replaced
signer never sees the previous identity's rows.

**B1 — thread aux in one response.** Relay thread filters accept
`include_aux`; the bridge appends the same authorized two-hop
reactions/edits/deletions closure a channel window gets
(`build_aux_query` shared with the window path). Renderer
`useThreadReplies` drops its two follow-up aux fetches. `next_cursor` is
computed from reply-kind rows only since aux rows are unpaged.
Documented in `docs/bridge-channel-window.md`. Thread queries keep
`staleTime: 0` (`bcfe04e2f`): an earlier revision raised it to 30s,
which CI's `thread-unread.spec.ts` caught — once the user leaves a
channel, the live subscription stops feeding that thread's cache, so a
reopen must always take the (now single) authoritative read.

**B2 — cached root on reply send.** `send_channel_message` gains
`root_event_id`; when the renderer already holds the parent (channel or
thread cache) it passes the NIP-10 root, and native signs without the
relay round trip that `resolve_thread_ref` used to make. Strict hex
parse; `root_event_id` requires `parent_event_id`; absent root falls
back to the existing relay resolution. The renderer never sends a
guessed root.

**B4** general HTTP pool idle 10s→300s, max idle per host 1→2. **B5**
relay preconnect fires as soon as identity is ready instead of waiting
for `requestIdleCallback`. One e2e test (`relay-reconnect.spec.ts`
"service restart close resets accumulated backoff") had been relying on
the idle-callback batching to skip past its own seeded dial failures
before the channel list painted; `8133d70bb` makes it wait for the
connected state instead (test-only, still fails with the 1012 backoff
reset disabled). **B6** profile freshness 60s→10 min (both the in-memory
entry check and the query `staleTime`). Tradeoff: another user's
display-name/avatar edit can take up to 10 min to propagate to a client
that already holds their profile (relay reconnect refetches
`users-batch` but resolves from the still-fresh per-pubkey entry); your
own edits still evict the entry immediately (`evictUsersBatchEntries` in
`useUpdateProfileMutation`).

### Related issue
Follows #6456/#6457/#6459/#6460 (already merged). #6455 is the
measurement instrument and is intentionally not folded in. No duplicate
PR found.

### Review follow-ups
Addressing Carl's reviews
[5001114109](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6572#pullrequestreview-5001114109)
and
[5002596542](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6572#pullrequestreview-5002596542),
each pushed as new commits (no rebase):

- `4f06b7770` fix(desktop): mount app while channel heads hydrate;
always revalidate — provider no longer gates children on the cache load;
`refreshAfterSubscribe` runs on subscribe failure too; bounds-only heads
skipped at seed; seed merges into an existing window store. +3 tests.
- `35834cb31` fix(relay): drain aux closure hops across the page clamp —
`query_all_pages` walks the `(created_at, id)` keyset via
`until`/`before_id` until a short page (`AUX_PAGE_LIMIT` =
`DEFAULT_MAX_PAGE_LIMIT`, `AUX_MAX_PAGES` = 64 warn+truncate) so
one-shot `limit: 1000` newest-first no longer drops the oldest
edits/deletions. +3 tests; `docs/bridge-channel-window.md` updated.
- `db21b0531` merge of `origin/main` `e23632941` (#6558, #6312 — no
overlap).
- `5a5566c0f` fix(desktop): sequence post-subscribe refresh behind
channel head hydration — `refreshChannelWindowMessages` awaits
`channelHeadHydration()` and, for a hydration-seeded query (`data !==
undefined && dataUpdatedAt === 0`), the in-flight snapshot fetch before
invalidating. Without this, a subscription that settles before the
SQLite load invalidated a data-less in-flight query; TanStack dedupes
that onto the existing fetch (`query-core` `fetch()` only cancels when
`state.data` exists), which returned the seeded snapshot — 0
authoritative fetches. Regression test reproduces Carl's exact ordering
(fails at `35834cb31` with 0 calls), plus a cold-channel guard that the
fix does not double-fetch.
- `b129231c8` fix(desktop): let concurrent post-hydration refreshes
share one window fetch — found independently by Max and Wren reviewing
`5a5566c0f`: subscribe settlement + reconnect both wake on the same
snapshot promise and both invalidate; the second (default
`cancelRefetch: true`) cancelled and replaced the first authoritative
fetch (3 queryFn calls, not 2, and the cancelled Tauri invoke still hits
the relay). The seeded branch now invalidates with `cancelRefetch:
false` so a second waker joins the in-flight fetch; cold/warm keep the
default (`test_canceled_stale_fetch_cannot_overwrite_catch_up_window`
relies on it). Concurrent regression test fails at `5a5566c0f` with 3.

### Testing
At `b129231c8` (PR head; verified in one shell with `git rev-parse HEAD`
= `b129231c8`): `pnpm check`, `tsc --noEmit`, desktop unit 5,393 / 0,
Playwright `boot-splash` + `channel-head-restart` + `relay-reconnect` +
`relay-reconnect-affordance` + `thread-unread` 34 / 34 on a fresh
`build:e2e`, pre-push hooks green.

At `5a5566c0f`: `pnpm check`, `tsc --noEmit`, desktop unit 5,392 / 0,
Playwright `boot-splash` + `channel-head-restart` + `relay-reconnect` +
`relay-reconnect-affordance` + `thread-unread` 34 / 34 on a fresh
`build:e2e`, pre-push hooks green.

At `35834cb31`: desktop unit 5,390 / 0; `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib`
910 / 0; fmt + clippy `-D warnings` clean; Playwright 32 / 32 (same
specs minus affordance); GitHub CI green on every job except Smoke (3)
(unrelated project-review row-count + messaging timing flake, per Carl)
and Unit Tests (sherpa cache skeleton, below).

Earlier, all at `8133d70bb` (this PR head is `0c492366d` = 8133d70bb + a
comments-only commit correcting two `profile/hooks.ts` freshness
comments from 60s to 10 min; pre-push desktop check/typecheck/test
5,387/0 re-ran at 0c492366d) in one shell; `origin/main` = `040b203f7`
at PR open, since moved to `4baccd539` (#6558, mobile only — zero file
overlap, `git merge-tree` clean):

- `just desktop-test` — 5,387 passed / 0 failed (includes new hook-level
call-count test: cold = 1, stale-prefetched = 1, hydrated = 0 on mount
then 1 on invalidate with wholesale replacement)
- Playwright smoke `relay-reconnect.spec.ts` + `thread-unread.spec.ts` +
`channel-head-restart.spec.ts` — 30/30 (thread-unread was 8/13 at
`7acbf951b`; relay-reconnect was 15/16 at `bcfe04e2f`). The restart spec
persists a head, reloads into a fresh mock relay with the head fetch
held 5s, asserts the persisted row paints within 2s, exactly one
`get_channel_window` after open, and the stale row is removed when the
authoritative page lands.
- `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm check` — clean

At `7acbf951b` (everything except the two-line `useThreadReplies.ts`
staleTime revert and the test-only `relay-reconnect.spec.ts` change),
also green in one shell:
- `just desktop-tauri-test` — 2,859 passed / 0 failed across the
workspace (channel_head_cache: wire shape, LRU+caps, schema reset,
corrupt-row skip)
- `just test-unit` — 632 passed (buzz-core/auth); `cargo test -p
buzz-relay --lib` — 908 passed / 0 failed
- `just check` components: fmt-check, clippy, desktop-check,
desktop-typecheck, desktop-tauri-fmt-check, desktop-tauri-clippy,
web-check, mobile-check, file-size-check — all green
- `just desktop-build`, `web-build`, `desktop-tauri-check`,
`mobile-test` (1,661 passed) — all green

CI note: the "Unit Tests" job goes red on this PR and on `main` whenever
it hits a poisoned `rust-cache` entry (an empty-directory skeleton of
`target/sherpa-onnx-prebuilt` that `sherpa-onnx-sys` build.rs trusts),
surfacing as `could not find native static library sherpa-onnx-c-api` in
`buzz-voice` — a crate this PR doesn't touch. Deleting the cache entry
and rerunning turned the job green at `0c492366d` (28/28); it re-poisons
on the next `main` push until the workflow clears that directory after
cache restore.

Reviewed in-channel by Wren (9 / 9 / 9.5) and Eva (9 / 9 / 9), and
line-by-line by me before opening; the staleTime fix re-verified by Wren
and me independently; the relay-reconnect test fix bisected and verified
by me.

---------

Signed-off-by: Perci <5a968df9a7494b4e019b9ecf739e088ba61097b4312124e9a88ae5b42e3f5f3e@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Max <d8473ee32b973aa31a21a65adddcc4b69cc2a8a4dee8121ecd51926e0cddbc02@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Wren <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Meli <5aaa86bce934fc3445fc254aab560a40923f10252f92107e665073dede0e04d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Perci <5a968df9a7494b4e019b9ecf739e088ba61097b4312124e9a88ae5b42e3f5f3e@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Max <d8473ee32b973aa31a21a65adddcc4b69cc2a8a4dee8121ecd51926e0cddbc02@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Wren <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Meli <5aaa86bce934fc3445fc254aab560a40923f10252f92107e665073dede0e04d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-24 10:11:07 -04:00
klopez4212
8c0f42e187 Add mobile Huddles voice MVP (#6056)
## Summary
- add foreground mobile Huddles on Android and iOS with native Opus
capture/playback, mute, speaker routing, participants, lifecycle, and
minimized drawer UI
- keep mobile Huddle cards and roster state live, including ended rooms,
relay-resolved profiles, and agents
- broadcast desktop agent TTS through the existing Huddle audio protocol

## Scope
Foreground human-to-human voice MVP only. Agent setup/transcripts,
background calling, recording, and advanced device controls remain out
of scope.

## Validation
- `just mobile-check`
- `just mobile-test` — 1,500 passed
- `just desktop-check` and `just desktop-test` — 4,957 passed
- desktop typecheck, strict Clippy, and Tauri tests — 2,445 passed, 15
ignored
- mobile worktree identity contract checks
- physical Pixel/iPhone behavior reviewed during development

---------

Signed-off-by: kenny lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kenny Lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Princess Donut <b238ea756dee4d98afa5883fc7f1de61eeabe65bf700e3a5a5a80db5e42e2c2b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Carl <3c4caeafb646d23867f1c4832e68211d77e2561946171625f75c3ce1a3f2670f@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Princess Donut <b238ea756dee4d98afa5883fc7f1de61eeabe65bf700e3a5a5a80db5e42e2c2b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: leader <71e9f2c44a6932b6772caaaccda1911d010463c3e2c6c40410b8329956046801@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Mongo <9cfd347903944d5b85aa6c93d2ab67381b978a92a31914bca69998968752a1d7@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-22 05:28:16 -07:00
Wes
24ec6a468e Repair stale large channel roster snapshots (#6251)
## Summary

- detect relay-authored NIP-29 kind 39002 roster snapshots truncated by
the former 1,000-member query cap and repair stale large rosters during
relay startup
- serialize canonical roster capture and replacement with membership
writes, preserving tenant, channel, signer, pubkey, and role boundaries
through mixed-version deployments
- install migration 0032's fail-closed roster fence on the partitioned
events table and verify its catalog shape plus behavior before opening
relay listeners

## Rollout

Migration 0032 is a hard schema-before-code compatibility boundary.
Apply migrations before rolling this relay version. Startup refuses to
open listeners when the parent/partition triggers are missing, disabled,
mis-shaped, or behaviorally inert. For large installations, prefer
`buzz-admin migrate` and monitor lock acquisition as documented in the
chart README.

## Validation

Exact head: `bcbba271f54bc0046a6683007e5a2b70403a11d5`

- rebased onto `569308c23c9c2bf620dd3a9a5e4baecbcfa22e16`; the nine-file
feature patch is byte-identical to pre-rebase head
`be8ea0084f4d4c78c7c2550baad4399e4df8ce73`
- pre-push hook passed at exact head: branch-skew, file-size, full Rust
unit suite, Desktop Tauri clippy, and Desktop Tauri tests
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `cargo test -p buzz-relay
group_members_snapshot_keeps_members_past_one_thousand -- --nocapture`
- focused CI-mode Playwright regression: `selected relay agents revoked
after the invite prompt cause no side effects` passed at exact head
- prior exact-patch validation:
`large_roster_reconciliation_candidates_respect_snapshot_count_and_signer`,
mixed-writer locking/rollback, migration admission, partition trigger
coverage, and desired-schema parity regressions

## Review

Independent DB/relay review found no blocking issues in the exact
feature patch. The concurrency fence holds the established replacement
and membership locks on one transaction/connection through replacement;
failures roll back both soft-delete and insert. Reconciliation remains
tenant/channel/signer scoped and validates exact normalized
pubkey-plus-role membership.

The prior red Desktop shard was unrelated to this backend-only diff: its
mocked mention test exercises no relay, database, or migration path. It
reproduced as a timing flake on the old head, passed on retry/base, and
now passes locally after rebasing onto current main.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-20 21:22:41 -06:00
Will Pfleger
c6e3fe7dfa feat(workflows): reply in-thread from send_message action (#6178)
The `send_message` workflow action could only post new top-level channel
messages. This adds a `reply_in_thread` option so a `message_posted`
workflow can reply in the triggering message's thread, plus a
`trigger_is_reply` filter variable so a workflow can fire only on
top-level messages.

Every NIP-10 thread-marker reader in the tree now routes through one
shared parser and one collapse rule in `buzz-core`, deleting four
hand-rolled copies that had drifted on id-validity and marker semantics.

## What changed

- **Schema** (`crates/buzz-workflow/src/schema.rs`): new
`reply_in_thread: bool` (serde default `false`) on
`ActionDef::SendMessage`. `validate()` rejects `reply_in_thread: true`
on `schedule`/`webhook` triggers — they carry no message to reply to.
- **Executor** (`crates/buzz-workflow/src/executor.rs`): threads
`reply_to: Option<&str>` (the trigger `message_id`) through
`ActionSink::send_message` when `reply_in_thread` is set; errors clearly
if the trigger has no `message_id`. `resolve_step_templates` carries the
new field. Adds `trigger_is_reply` (boolean) to the eval context.
- **Relay sink** (`crates/buzz-relay/src/workflow_sink.rs`): when
`reply_to` is set, resolves parent/root/depth from the known trigger
event, persists real thread metadata instead of the hardcoded top-level
`depth: 0`, and pushes the live kind:39005 thread-summary overlay after
insert so subscribed desktops update the root's reply badge without
refetching — matching the human ingest path. Emits the same NIP-10
`e`-tag shape as `buzz_sdk::builders::thread_tags`: a single `["e", id,
"", "reply"]` tag for a direct reply (parent == root), and the `root` +
`reply` pair only when nested — so every writer produces one wire shape
per reply kind.
- **Ingest resolver** (`crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/ingest.rs`): new
`resolve_relay_reply_thread_meta` + `ReplyAncestry`. Unlike the
client-facing `resolve_nip10_thread_meta` (which validates
client-supplied tags), this computes root/depth from the known parent
and enforces the same same-channel and depth-limit invariants. When the
parent has no `thread_metadata` row, both resolvers share
`derive_ancestry_from_parent_tags`, which applies
`ThreadMarkers::resolve()`: a marked nested parent remains depth 2,
while a root-only, malformed, or unmarked parent is top-level and starts
its reply thread at itself. Both the client resolver and the
parent-ancestor fallback now read markers via the shared parser instead
of hand-scanning `e`-tags.
- **Shared NIP-10 parser** (`crates/buzz-core/src/nip10.rs`):
`parse_thread_markers` reads an event's `root`/`reply` markers, honoring
a marker only when its event id is exactly 64 ASCII-hex characters.
`ThreadMarkers::resolve()` is the single definition of the (root, reply)
→ (root_id, parent_id) collapse: `root`+`reply` as-is, `reply`-only →
`(reply, reply)`, a lone `root` or neither → top-level. A slice-based
`parse_thread_markers_from_parts` entry point serves consumers holding
raw JSON tag arrays. Relay ingest, the workflow `trigger_is_reply`
predicate, ACP anchoring, and the CLI reply resolver all call these, so
they cannot drift on marker, id-validity, or collapse semantics.
- **ACP** (`crates/buzz-acp/src/queue.rs`): `parse_thread_tags`
delegates marker parsing and collapse to `buzz_core::nip10`, keeping
only its local `p`-tag mention collection. This fixes a parity gap with
ingest: a malformed non-64-hex marker id is no longer counted as a
thread link, and a lone `root` marker is now top-level rather than being
treated as root == parent.
- **CLI** (`crates/buzz-cli/src/commands/messages.rs`):
`find_root_from_tags` routes its JSON tags through the shared slice
parser and collapse rule. CLI replies to root-only, malformed, or
unmarked parents now correctly start at that immediate parent;
reply-only and root+reply parent ancestry remain intact.
- **Trigger context** (`crates/buzz-workflow/src/lib.rs`):
`build_trigger_context` derives `is_reply` solely from a valid NIP-10
`reply` marker (no DB hit). A lone `root` marker is top-level to ingest,
so it does not count; neither does a `reply` marker whose event id is
malformed, nor a bare/unmarked `e`-tag (mentions, quotes).
- **Desktop** (`workflowFormTypes.ts`, `WorkflowStepCard.tsx`):
`replyInThread` form field with YAML round-trip, and a "Reply to
triggering message in thread" checkbox shown only for message-based
triggers. Switching to `schedule` or `webhook` clears the option on
every step before serialization, so a value hidden behind an action
change cannot resurrect when the action is switched back. The form
parser also requires `reply_in_thread` to be a boolean and refuses
`reply_in_thread: true` under an ineligible trigger, falling back to
YAML mode rather than silently normalizing a backend-invalid definition.

## Usage

```yaml
trigger:
  on: message_posted
  filter: trigger_is_reply == false
steps:
  - id: auto_reply
    action: send_message
    text: "pre-written reply text"
    reply_in_thread: true
```

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-20 19:44:21 -04:00
Luke Tornquist
08eb46ef3c Revert "fix(acp): gate relay-signed workflow messages on their attributed author" (#6311)
Reverts block/buzz#6129
2026-08-19 15:28:04 +00:00
Will Pfleger
121e4b3ce7 fix(desktop): exclude archived agents from nest, order regeneration (#5905)
The managed "Active Agents" table in `~/.buzz/AGENTS.md` was rendered
from every managed-agent record with no filtering, so archived duplicate
instances kept appearing under the active relay's header. This scopes
the roster to identity-active agents and makes regeneration safe under
concurrency.

## Roster filter: identity-archive only

`render_dynamic_section` now drops only records whose pubkey is present
in the relay's `kind:13535` archive snapshot. Local records can't tell
they're archived — they all carry `is_active: true` (that flag is a
*definition*-archive, not an identity-archive), so archive truth lives
only relay-side. The read **fails open**: an unreachable relay yields an
empty set and hides no one.

There is deliberately **no** relay-scope filter. `relay_url` is a legacy
creation-era field that `effective_agent_relay_url()` ignores — every
agent is eligible on every community, and snapshot-imported records
store `relay_url: ""` by design. Filtering on it would hide valid,
runnable agents after a workspace switch or import. Foreign-relay relic
records leave the table via record deletion, not code.

## Regeneration on archive / unarchive

`archive_identity` and `unarchive_identity` submitted the relay event
and returned without refreshing `AGENTS.md`, unlike the ~20 other
mutation sites that call `try_regenerate_nest`. A just-archived agent
therefore lingered on the roster until an unrelated edit or the next
launch. Both commands now trigger a regeneration after a successful
submit.

Regeneration is bound through a `NestRegenTrigger` trait rather than
constructing the `try_regenerate_nest` callback at the Tauri-command
delegation site. The command cores take `regen: &impl NestRegenTrigger`
and own the `|| regen.trigger()` binding; the thin wrappers only pass
`&app` (whose `impl` calls `try_regenerate_nest`). This puts the regen
wiring inside the unit-tested core — a `CountingRegen` double proves
each core fires exactly one regeneration — instead of an untestable seam
where a wrapper could silently lose the refresh while the suite stayed
green. The regen races the relay's `kind:13535` snapshot update, so it's
best-effort and fail-open — a stale render self-heals on the next cycle.

## Ordered regeneration

`try_regenerate_nest` previously spawned unconstrained tasks that each
snapshotted state, awaited two relay requests, then wrote — so a slow
pre-edit generation could overwrite a newer one. Boot made this
deterministic: the boot regen races the `apply_workspace` regen, and the
fallback-relay render could finish last.

`NestRegenGate` fixes this with a single `highest_requested` watermark.
A monotonic generation is claimed *synchronously* at request time
(encoding call order) and advances the watermark under one lock; the
spawned task carries its generation and, at commit, reads the watermark
under that same lock — the compare-and-write is atomic with no await
held across it. A generation whose number is below the current watermark
drops its result instead of rolling the file back.

Gating on highest-*requested* rather than highest-*written* is the
load-bearing choice: if a newer generation is requested but then fails
its relay reads, an older in-flight generation must **not** publish its
now-obsolete roster. Behavior delta: once a newer regeneration has been
requested, no older generation will ever write; if that newer generation
fails, the file is left as-is and self-heals on the next trigger rather
than regressing to a stale snapshot. This is an ordered,
latest-request-wins gate — not a work coalescer: superseded generations
still perform their relay reads and drop the result at commit time.

The gate's commit lock is acquired with a poison-to-`io::Error` mapping
rather than `expect()`, so a poisoned lock degrades to the same
warn-and-continue path as any other commit failure instead of panicking
the desktop process (a best-effort housekeeping write must never take
down the app).

## One relay target per regeneration

A regeneration read the workspace relay override three times — the
NIP-11 signer in `fetch_relay_self`, the snapshot query in
`query_relay`, and the rendered footer — so a workspace switch
mid-flight could pair one relay's advertised signer with another relay's
snapshot, fail open, and render archived agents as active.
`capture_relay_target` now resolves the effective relay (WebSocket +
HTTP API base) once, before any network work, and
`fetch_archived_pubkeys_at` threads that single target through both the
NIP-11 fetch and the `/query`; the footer renders the same target.
Signer, snapshot, and footer always belong to one relay.

## Monotonic archival snapshot publishing

`publish_nipia_archival_list` stamped its `kind:13535` snapshot with a
whole-second `created_at`. A rapid archive→unarchive within the same
second produced two events whose NIP-16 replaceable-event tie-break
(higher event id wins) could strand the older, stale archive state as
canonical. Publishing now uses a bounded retry that re-reads current
archive state and rebuilds the snapshot each attempt, so the published
list reflects the latest intended state rather than a fixed same-second
race loser. After the attempt budget (8) is exhausted the publisher
`bail!`s; the sole caller treats that as a `warn!` side effect and
continues, matching the surrounding best-effort submit path.

## Test-file split

The renderer, `upsert_managed_section`, and the regeneration-gate tests
moved to `nest/render_tests.rs` so each test file stays under the
repository's 1000-line ratchet.

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mongo <5c25403eab7271f9f94ddd4f2b270e8cac2c92e2c830c51877cca6ec974ffb3f@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-18 18:26:35 -04:00
Taylor Ho
f7a01bda7b fix(workflows): preserve multi-channel listing semantics (#6009)
**Category:** fix
**User Impact:** Workflow listings reliably include every accessible
channel, including for users with more than 128 memberships and when
connected to older relays.
**Problem:** Multi-value `#h` filters could lose live delivery, apply
channel scoping after SQL limits, mishandle partial authorization or
revocation, and permit unbounded membership work. Desktop also submitted
every channel in one request, exceeding the relay's new 128-value safety
bound.
**Solution:** Preserve NIP-01 OR semantics across relay query, count,
and live-subscription paths while enforcing authorization and bounded
explicit-channel work before database or Redis operations. Desktop keeps
the older-relay-compatible one-channel-per-filter shape, sends filters
in bounded batches, combines responses, and deduplicates signed events
by event ID.

<details>
<summary>File changes</summary>

**crates/buzz-db/src/event.rs**
Distinguishes authorization channel scopes from explicit `#h` scopes in
list and count SQL so requested channels are applied before limits
without implicitly including global rows.

**crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/req.rs**
Shares explicit-channel scope extraction and limits, preserves valid OR
siblings when malformed branches cannot match, repairs request-local
membership misses, and registers authorized live subscriptions per
channel.

**crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/count.rs**
Applies the same bounded explicit-channel authorization to COUNT and
preserves channel scope when a multi-channel request narrows to one
authorized channel.

**crates/buzz-relay/src/api/bridge.rs**
Brings HTTP query and count behavior in line with WebSocket semantics
before SQL execution and rejects over-limit explicit-channel requests
before membership I/O.

**crates/buzz-relay/src/subscription.rs**
Indexes multi-channel subscriptions by every authorized channel and
shrinks, rather than destroys, their scope when one channel is revoked.

**crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/side_effects.rs**
Releases only revoked channel topics and sends terminal closure only
when no authorized channel remains.

**crates/buzz-test-client/tests/e2e_relay.rs**
Adds ignored relay integration coverage for multi-channel delivery and
valid historical/live behavior with malformed or empty OR siblings.

**desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/workflows.rs**
Builds one single-channel filter per membership, submits at most 128 per
relay request, combines batches, and deduplicates by immutable signed
event ID.

**desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/workflows_tests.rs**
Covers filter compatibility, malformed input, 129-channel batching, and
cross-batch event-ID deduplication.

</details>

## Reproduction steps

1. Join multiple channels containing workflows, open **Workflows**, and
confirm workflows from every accessible channel appear.
2. Repeat with more than 128 memberships and confirm the listing remains
complete rather than failing the relay request.
3. Send a multi-value `#h` query/count and confirm only requested
authorized channels affect SQL limits and counts.
4. Subscribe to channels A and B, revoke A, and confirm B continues
delivering live events.
5. Subscribe with a valid channel branch plus a malformed or empty `#h`
sibling and confirm valid history, EOSE, and post-EOSE live delivery
still occur.

## Validation

At pushed head `c419a923f05e483ab26c006a0b3a80cfb3c73844`:

- Relay request tests: 53 passed.
- Desktop full Rust unit suite: 2,468 passed, 17 ignored.
- Relay E2E target compiled with `--no-run`.
- Strict relay clippy passed.
- Desktop Tauri clippy/check passed.
- Pre-push Rust tests and Desktop Tauri checks passed.
- Rust formatting and `git diff --check` passed.

---------

Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
2026-08-17 15:16:14 -07:00
Luke Tornquist
54f11219ef fix(acp): gate relay-signed workflow messages on their attributed author (#6129)
## Problem

Scheduled workflow `send_message` actions fire and land in the channel
with correct `p` tags for the mentioned agents — but the agents never
wake. The wake-up is silently dropped.

**Root cause:** workflow messages are signed by the **relay keypair**
(`workflow_sink.rs` signs with `state.relay_keypair`), so `event.pubkey`
is the relay's pubkey, not the workflow owner. In `buzz-acp`, the
inbound author gate (`author_allowed`) runs **before** the `p`-tag
mention check. Under the default `respond_to = owner-only`, the relay
pubkey is neither the owner nor a sibling, so every workflow wake-up
dies at the gate with a debug-level `"inbound author gate — dropping
event"`.

The relay-side comment even says the mention `p` tags exist *"so
mentioned agents are woken (wake is p-tag gated)"* — but wake is also
author-gated, and that path was missed.

## Fix

Gate relay-signed workflow messages on their **attributed author** — the
pubkey that created the workflow — instead of the relay pubkey:

- **Relay:** `workflow_sink.rs` now emits an explicit
`buzz:workflow-owner` tag carrying `workflow.owner_pubkey` (the workflow
creator, which the executor already passes as `author_pubkey` and whose
channel access the relay verifies before emitting). Ownership is never
inferred from `p`-tag order; mention `p` tags play no role in
attribution.
- **Harness:** at startup, `buzz-acp` fetches the relay's NIP-11 `self`
pubkey (new `RestClient::fetch_relay_self`, public `/info` endpoint).
Best-effort: fetch failure just logs a warning and preserves pre-fix
behavior.
- **Gate:** an event that is (a) authored by the relay `self` key, (b)
tagged `buzz:workflow`, and (c) carries a well-formed
`buzz:workflow-owner` pubkey is gated on that owner, through the exact
same owner/sibling/allowlist policy as a direct author.

## Security notes (all fail closed)

- No NIP-11 `self` pubkey → no exemption.
- `buzz:workflow` / `buzz:workflow-owner` tags on a non-relay-signed
event → ignored (a member cannot forge the exemption; the relay verifies
signatures on submission and only the relay holds its key).
- Relay-signed event without the tags, or with a malformed owner value
(not 64-hex) → plain author gate.
- Who is @mentioned in the message has no bearing on whose authority is
evaluated.
- A workflow owned by a random channel member still cannot wake an
owner-only agent — the owner's pubkey must pass the same policy.

## Testing

- 7 unit tests (`workflow_attributed_author_tests`) covering
attribution, fail-closed paths, p-tag independence, malformed owner
values, and the forgery case.
- Extended the PG-gated `workflow_send_message_p_tags_mentioned_member`
integration test to assert the `buzz:workflow-owner` tag.
- `cargo test -p buzz-acp`: 785 passed, 0 failed. `cargo test -p
buzz-relay --lib workflow_sink`: 17 passed. Clippy + fmt clean. (9
pre-existing `buzz-relay` failures in unrelated
`api::media`/`api::admin` tests fail identically on the base commit
without this change.)

Found while debugging scheduled automations in a Buzz review-pipeline
channel: two cron workflows fired daily @mentions at agents that never
responded, while direct human @mentions woke them instantly.

---------

Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Fizz <3a9f8a30fbb462abec1e2977b2280a7ae50c7ff794433790be15bd48bfd52d0b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-17 13:29:20 -04:00
Taylor Ho
edc4a09aaa feat(workflows): add responsive library card actions (#6008)
**Category:** improvement
**User Impact:** Users can scan what each workflow does and trigger,
edit, duplicate, enable, disable, or delete it directly from the
library.
**Problem:** The workflow list buried common actions and did not expose
each automation's trigger-to-action shape at a glance.
**Solution:** Add a responsive workflow library with a persistent create
tile, compact trigger/action diagrams, prominent workflow titles with
supporting descriptions, and shared card actions while preserving
existing detail, editor, and run-history entry points. Card toggles
refresh both list and open-detail caches so status and definition stay
consistent.

<details>
<summary>File changes</summary>

**desktop/src/features/workflows/ui/WorkflowActionsMenu.tsx**
Adds a shared card menu for trigger, edit, duplicate, enable/disable,
and delete actions.

**desktop/src/features/workflows/ui/WorkflowCard.tsx**
Reworks cards around the prototype's visual hierarchy: color-coded
trigger, action flow, sentence-case eyebrow, prominent title, supporting
description, status, channel, and update date without a footer clock
icon.

**desktop/src/features/workflows/ui/WorkflowsView.tsx**
Adds the responsive grid, create tile, mutation wiring, and list/detail
cache invalidation. Container breakpoints keep cards two-across at
medium widths and three-across in the 1280px desktop layout.

**desktop/src/features/workflows/ui/workflowDefinition.ts**
Adds immutable enabled-state updates plus narrow trigger and
first-action readers used only to select card icons.

**desktop/src/features/workflows/ui/workflowDefinition.test.mjs**
Covers neutral icon selection, enabled-state immutability, and status
presentation.

**desktop/tests/e2e/workflows.spec.ts**
Covers the create tile, title/description hierarchy, selected-card
enable/disable consistency, and deterministic narrow/medium/wide
captures while retaining existing action coverage.

</details>

## Reproduction steps

1. Open **Workflows** and confirm the create tile stays first as cards
flow from one to three columns with available width.
2. Confirm each card shows a sentence-case trigger eyebrow, prominent
workflow title, supporting description when present, status, channel,
and update date without a clock icon.
3. Open a card's overflow menu and trigger, edit, duplicate,
enable/disable, or delete the workflow.
4. Leave the detail panel open while toggling and confirm its badge and
JSON definition update with the card.

## Screenshots

Real built E2E UI with representative workflow data at three viewport
sizes.

### Narrow — 800 × 720

![Workflow library at 800 by
720](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/6008/workflow-library-narrow-482d1b4c8.png)

### Medium — 1024 × 720

![Workflow library at 1024 by
720](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/6008/workflow-library-medium-482d1b4c8.png)

### Wide — 1280 × 720

![Workflow library at 1280 by
720](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/6008/workflow-library-wide-482d1b4c8.png)

### Card actions

![Workflow library actions at 1280 by
720](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/6008/workflow-library-wide-actions-482d1b4c8.png)

---------

Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
2026-08-17 16:56:34 +00:00
Wes
e0940927ff fix(channels): return complete member rosters (#5765)
## Summary

- return complete channel rosters instead of truncating at 1,000 members
- chunk `event_mentions` inserts inside one transaction so large kind
`39002` snapshots remain discoverable by every `p` tag
- add a targeted `buzz-admin reconcile-channels --channel <uuid>`
force-republish path for stale discovery snapshots
- cover a 1,501-member roster, 11,000-tag mention index, and kind
`39002` tag construction past member 1,000

## Why

The relay builds NIP-29 discovery and several authorization decisions
from `get_members()`, but that helper silently returned only the first
1,000 active members. Desktop then counted the truncated kind `39002`
event, while late members could be rejected by roster-scanning member
actions.

Removing the roster cap exposes PostgreSQL's 65,535 bind-parameter
ceiling in mention indexing, so the insert is chunked transactionally to
preserve all-or-nothing indexing.

The existing reconcilers only fill missing discovery events. The
targeted admin option bypasses the separately known 1,000-channel
reconciliation-list ceiling and replaces an existing channel snapshot
using the configured production relay key.

## Attribution

This supersedes and builds on #3166 by @LordMelkor. Thank you for
identifying the roster boundary and contributing the original
complete-roster and mention-index patch. The production roster/query
changes and the two PostgreSQL regressions retain that work's shape;
this PR rebases it onto current `main`, adds relay coverage, and adds
the targeted repair operation requested for rollout.

## Validation

Exact pushed head: `24d02e4f3824150ed84913c9d230e675502e5b12`

- `cargo check -p buzz-db -p buzz-admin`
- `cargo test -p buzz-db
channel::tests::get_members_returns_full_roster_beyond_1000 -- --ignored
--exact --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p buzz-db
feed::tests::insert_mentions_indexes_rosters_past_bind_parameter_cap --
--ignored --exact --nocapture`
- `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib
handlers::side_effects::tests::group_members_snapshot_keeps_members_past_one_thousand
-- --exact`
- `cargo run -q -p buzz-admin -- reconcile-channels --help`
- mandatory pre-push hook: branch-skew, desktop checks/typecheck/tests,
mobile tests, Rust tests, and desktop Tauri checks all passed on the
pushed head

## Rollout

1. Deploy the relay/backend build.
2. Run `buzz-admin reconcile-channels --channel <general-channel-uuid>`
with `BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY` configured.
3. Verify the replacement kind `39002` roster count matches the active
database membership count.

No schema migration or desktop release is required.

Fixes #3156
Supersedes #3166

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Carl <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-13 14:48:04 -07:00
Wes
2693e0db1f Make workflow run history authoritative in Desktop (#5780)
## Summary

- persist stable workflow run `error_code` values separately from human
diagnostics
- expose NIP-98 authenticated, channel-authorized run history and
approval reads with stable keyset pagination
- connect Desktop to those authoritative reads and return the
relay-created run ID on trigger
- show truthful loading, failure, and pending-trace states, and do not
render approval actions from non-actionable stored hashes

## Validation

- pre-push `branch-skew`, `desktop-typecheck`, `desktop-test`,
`rust-tests`, `desktop-tauri-checks`, and `desktop-check` all passed on
`a097dbe5f`
- Desktop tests: 4,761 passed, 0 failed
- `cargo check -p buzz-relay`
- `git diff --check`

## Remaining gate

This does not claim a relay-backed Playwright workflow journey. The
browser relay bridge still routes workflow invokes through in-memory
handlers; that production-shaped acceptance gate remains follow-up work
before Workflows can leave preview.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Carl <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Mongo <5c25403eab7271f9f94ddd4f2b270e8cac2c92e2c830c51877cca6ec974ffb3f@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Princess Donut <68157ebd23b3897c1991015c3038658ea916200c67d3a54620b0754d1b92f6e0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-13 12:56:37 -07:00
Kalvin C
8a2c9af2db feat(deletion): add durable whole-community deletion (#4425)
## Summary

Adds a durable, operator-controlled V1 for deleting an entire Buzz
community without deleting another tenant's data.

The workflow is exposed through `buzz-admin deletions`:

- `sweep` records independent fleet storage-taxonomy observations
- `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, and `approve` manage a deletion request
- `unblock` resumes a fail-closed request after an operator records
remediation identity and reason
- `run` and `drain` execute bounded work

Requests advance through a PostgreSQL-backed state machine and stop at
`retention_pending` after logical deletion has been independently
verified across PostgreSQL, object storage, and Redis.

This PR ships the engine and CLI, not a continuously running worker or
Kubernetes packaging. For V1, a cluster/VM administrator invokes
`/usr/local/bin/buzz-admin` from the existing relay image, for example
with `kubectl exec` or an equivalent container/VM exec path.

## What whole-community V1 removes

For the target community, V1 removes:

- rows from the allowlisted community-scoped PostgreSQL catalog,
including members, profiles, authored events and bodies, DMs, reactions,
mentions, memberships, tokens, workflows, moderation, audit, feedback,
and rate-limit state
- media sidecars and upload-attribution records under
`_meta/<community>/` and `_uploads/<community>/`
- Git repository pointers under `repos/<community>/`
- Redis keys under `buzz:<community>:*`

The community row survives as a permanent tombstone, and deletion
control-plane records remain as evidence of the request, approval,
execution, and result.

## Safety model

Deletion is not a broad `DELETE CASCADE` followed by optimistic cleanup.
The destructive boundaries are durable and fail closed.

### 1. Inventory and approval

- `submit` resolves the target and freezes the schema plus summary-only
storage inventory.
- Approval is bound to the exact request, community, and frozen
inventory digest.
- Unsupported manifest versions, malformed keys inside the target's
owned prefixes, live scoped-table/write-fence coverage drift,
frozen-inventory mismatch, and approval mismatch block execution rather
than guessing. Migration and catalog revision numbers are not
authorization gates; the executor validates the live safety shape
instead.
- Storage inventory is server-side prefix scoped to exactly:
  - `_meta/<community>/`
  - `_uploads/<community>/`
  - `repos/<community>/`
- The deletion path never lists the whole shared bucket and has no
arbitrary per-community object cap. Its listing work is proportional to
the target community's bindings, not total fleet storage.
- Fleet-wide taxonomy sweeps remain independent observability. They
report unknown writer shapes but do not gate deletion submission,
fencing, or destructive progress. Maintainers must add deletion taxonomy
coverage whenever a new community-owned object-key class is introduced;
writer-coverage tests bind the current media and Git writers to that
contract.

### 2. Quiesce, fence, and destructive freeze

- Writes continue through submission, inventory, and approval. They stop
when execution moves the target into `quiescing` and then establishes
the durable fence.
- Already-admitted external effects finish under heartbeated
serving-write leases; the exact admitted lease may renew while the
community is quiescing, but new lease acquisition is rejected. The
executor drains admitted leases before destructive work.
- Invite minting after quiescing begins fails as typed `AccessDenied`
(HTTP 503 at the relay boundary) before an invite can be persisted.
- Database triggers enforce the community write fence across the
complete catalog of community-scoped tables. Startup/readiness and
destructive execution validate that catalog so a newly added but
unfenced table cannot silently escape.
- **Named isolation assumption — fresh write snapshot.** Every writer
transaction that can reach a community-fenced relation must use
PostgreSQL `READ COMMITTED`; each guarded write therefore observes a
statement snapshot no older than acquisition of the community deletion
lock. `REPEATABLE READ` and `SERIALIZABLE` can retain a pre-fence
snapshot and are unsupported for writers. The writer pool refuses
non-`READ COMMITTED` sessions at connection setup, and both SQL fence
functions reject an explicit per-transaction isolation override with
SQLSTATE `25000`. Configuration-delivered bad isolation can surface
through SQLx as a pool-acquire timeout because every `after_connect`
attempt is rejected; the precise `community writes require READ
COMMITTED isolation` reason remains observable when the SQL guard is
reached. Read-only replica transactions are outside this assumption.
- Holding the shared advisory lock until the guarded write executes is a
separate liveness condition: under `READ COMMITTED`, releasing it early
does not permit resurrection because the trigger rechecks the fence, but
it can turn a fleet sweep into a statement-wide SQLSTATE `55000` abort.
- After the fence closes writers, storage is re-enumerated into chunked
side-table rows. Per-prefix counts and digests bind those concrete keys
to the destructive manifest.
- Manifest chunk insertion, update, and deletion are protected after
freeze. This closes the race where an unbound key could otherwise appear
after the manifest was committed.

### 3. Checkpointed destruction

- Target-owned object bindings are deleted from the frozen destructive
manifest in bounded batches with durable progress.
- The concrete key list lives in chunked side-table rows rather than one
request-row JSON value. It supports large communities, resumable
execution, and terminal cleanup.
- Missing objects are accepted as idempotent crash-window outcomes;
malformed ownership, changed evidence, and unexplained target-prefix
drift fail closed.
- PostgreSQL purging remains scoped by `community_id`, including the
guarded NIP-RS hard-delete path discovered with real Desktop kind
`30078` read-state data.
- Redis cleanup explicitly scans and `UNLINK`s only
`buzz:<community_id>:*`. Natural expiry is insufficient because some
keys, including tunnel generation counters used as fencing state, are
deliberately persistent.

### 4. Independent verification

- PostgreSQL logical absence is checked after purge.
- The three target-owned storage prefixes are freshly inventoried again
and must be empty.
- Redis requires two complete empty namespace scans.
- Only after all three stores pass does the request advance through
`logically_verified` to `retention_pending`.

## What V1 deliberately does not erase

### Shared content-addressed storage

Per-community deletion removes bindings, metadata, attribution records,
and Git pointers. It does **not** physically delete fleet-shared CAS
bytes that another community may still reference:

- media blobs and thumbnails
- Git manifests, packs, and indexes (`manifests/`, `packs/`, and `idx/`)

Safe reclamation requires a separate fleet-wide reachability and
retention GC. Unknown keys elsewhere in the shared bucket do not block
one community's deletion; malformed or unrecognized keys inside that
community's three owned prefixes still fail closed.

### External retained copies

The online logical-deletion proof does not erase object
versions/replicas, database backups/WAL, CDN copies, provider retention
copies, or observability exports. Those require their own retention and
purge controls.

### Member-only erasure

This PR erases a whole community. It does not implement the different
operation "erase one npub while preserving the community."

Removing membership or accepting NIP-09 is not member erasure. A
member-only workflow would need to find and selectively remove or redact
authored event content and pubkeys, profile data, DMs, reactions,
mentions, memberships/roles, tokens, workflows/subscriptions, upload
attribution, moderation/audit history, repository attribution, and
identity embedded in tags or JSON. It would also need explicit rules for
ownership transfer, surviving replies and thread metadata, audit-chain
integrity, immutable Git history, and shared-CAS reachability. That
requires a pubkey-level fence and selective graph rewrite; it is a
separate deletion product, not a safe extension of this whole-tenant
worker.

## In scope

- migration `0029_community_deletion.sql`: requests, approvals, leases,
manifest chunks, checkpoints, tombstones, and the universal write-fence
catalog
- durable executor leases, generations, heartbeats, retry/block state,
and resumable stage transitions
- operator-driven `sweep`, `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, `approve`,
`unblock`, `run`, and `drain` commands
- serving-path fences for database writes and external effects across
event ingest, media, Git, workflow, push, invites, mesh/tunnel, and
related paths
- target-prefix-only storage inventory, summary manifests, post-fence
destructive chunks, and bounded batch deletion
- exact community Redis namespace purge and two-pass absence
verification
- cross-community isolation, crash/resume, manifest-integrity,
writer-taxonomy, and schema/migration regressions
- desired-state `schema/schema.sql` support without requiring a SQLx
migration ledger

## Deferred / not covered

- dedicated Helm/chart worker Deployment, service account, secrets,
probes, resources, and network policy
- autonomous `buzz-admin deletions worker` poll loop and worker-only
health server
- least-privilege separation among migration, relay-serving, and
destructive execution roles
- fleet-wide shared-CAS physical GC
- backup/provider/CDN/observability retention completion
- member-only erasure
- provider-native conditional-delete improvements
- a general force-continue escape hatch; permanent safety failures
remain fail closed unless an operator remediates the cause and records
an audited `unblock`

The removed continuous-worker implementation remains deferred; no remote
follow-up branch is claimed by this PR.

## Validation

### Current PR head and repository state

Current pushed head: `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`, rebased
onto `cc9a2f783375e51a6e8d1f2f9d01d5f7e22813d1` (`origin/main` at push
time). The complete PR diff is now 47 files, 9,834 additions, and 517
deletions.

The bespoke source-scanner stack was removed to keep this PR scoped to
community deletion. Tyler/team requested the underlying fenced-write
safety behavior, not `ast-grep`,
`crates/buzz-db/tests/community_fenced_writes.rs`, its 27 fixtures, or
the new `scripts/lints/community_*.yml` rules. Those scanner-specific
files, dependencies, Hermit links, and runner wiring are absent from the
current tree. The production database write fence, startup/destructive
live-catalog validation, and deletion behavior remain.

Source validation on this exact SHA passed:

- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `bash -n scripts/run-tests.sh`
- `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --all-targets`: 102 passed, 173 skipped,
0 failed
- `cargo nextest run -p buzz-deletion --all-targets`: 10 passed, 9
skipped, 0 failed
- `cargo nextest run -p buzz-admin --all-targets`: 1 passed, 0 failed
- affected-package/all-target Clippy with warnings denied
- lockfile consistency
- Helm 3.16.4 lint and all 44 chart unit tests
- Helm region controls using that fixture: default
`BUZZ_S3_REGION=us-east-1`, explicit `eu-west-2` override, and
blank-region schema rejection

The prior Kubernetes battery below was run against
`928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04`. It remains useful evidence
for the patch-equivalent production deletion implementation, but it is
**not** claimed as exact-SHA evidence for current head
`359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`; the current cleanup removes
only scanner/test/tooling infrastructure. CI restarted for the new head
after the rebase and is pending. Human review remains
`CHANGES_REQUESTED`.

### Prior-head live Kubernetes deletion and safety gates

The full program used one immutable image, real PostgreSQL, Redis,
MinIO, and a three-relay Kubernetes release:

- source: `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04` (**prior head**)
- image: `buzz-e2e:sha-928992237358`
- immutable image digest:
`sha256:a1a204f4618ac22d9e210be5e5290645a15d79831ae30b0e44379357c8e4a895`
- evidence root:
`/tmp/buzz-e2e/20260807T033025Z-928992237358-full-gates/`
- evidence-manifest digest:
`82875c5bc9bea7370b796a7aef3457b3a1c8306c84c59e0f7388bbb5ad30e865`

Passed gates at that prior head:

- **Chart/operator region:** default `us-east-1`, explicit nondefault
propagation, blank-region schema rejection, live in-pod environment, and
an in-pod taxonomy sweep over 18 objects with zero unknown.
- **Fenced writers and lifecycle:** open-write/fence ordering;
100-attempt anti-starvation; invite, push matcher, and exhausted-reaper
bystander isolation; non-`READ-COMMITTED` rejection; manifest/tombstone
contracts; eight-failure stage block and audited `unblock`.
- **Destructive lifecycle:** submit → approve → run →
`retention_pending`; PostgreSQL tombstone and Redis/S3 verification
true; zero retries/errors; terminal reruns rejected with exit 5.
- **Fresh 10,001-object crash boundary:** exactly two chunks (10,000 +
1). The executor deleted chunk 0 from MinIO while its PostgreSQL stamp
was row-lock-blocked, was killed with `SIGKILL`, left one object and
both stamps absent, then resumed the same request under generation 2 to
zero objects and terminal state.
- **Independent dead-owner recovery:** a dedicated executor claimed
generation 1, blocked before effects, and was killed through containerd
with `SIGKILL` (no TERM cleanup). The request remained owned and
unreclaimable before lease expiry; a successor claimed generation 2
after 60 seconds and completed with two attempts and zero retries.
- **Three-pod socket isolation:** ordinary NIP-42 and joined
huddle-audio target witnesses on every replica received exact `1008 /
community deleted`; healthy-tenant witnesses on those pods remained
live; deleted-host reconnect returned HTTP 404.
- **Health/provenance:** all replicas independently returned ready and
retained the exact image digest before/after destructive runs and an
audio-enabled rolling restart; PostgreSQL, Redis, and MinIO were healthy
at close.

Instrument corrections were retained as evidence rather than counted as
product failures: a foreground PostgreSQL forward caused an initial
`PoolTimedOut`; Kubernetes pod deletion exercised graceful TERM rather
than dead-owner recovery; shell-background socket witnesses died with
their parent; and the first image build hit the corporate TLS proxy.
Detached forwarding/witnesses, containerd `SIGKILL`, and the configured
internal CA/Artifactory mirror produced the discriminating runs without
weakening product security.

### Prior-head cleanup

For the prior-head Kubernetes run, the Helm release was removed,
namespace absence was verified, run-owned Screen sessions were absent,
and that source worktree remained clean. The evidence manifest was
independently recomputed and every indexed artifact passed `shasum -a
256 -c`. The current `359d8402` source worktree is also clean after the
scanner-only cleanup and push.

---------

Signed-off-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-12 09:25:58 -07:00