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161 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Bradley Axen
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12670bd0f0 |
feat(relay): implement NIP-AR channel artifacts (#7919)
## Summary Implements NIP-AR channel artifacts (spec merged in #7791) on the relay, after a simplicity pass over the earlier two-agent implementation. An artifact is an editable record (kind 45010) with a stable identity (`d`), one home channel (`h`), and full-snapshot revisions chained by `prev`: - **Writes:** one transaction per write. It locks the artifact's head row, requires `prev` to name the current revision, records the revision in a ledger that survives retention, and advances the head. Two competing edits can't both win. A stale edit gets `conflict: artifact head changed`. Resubmitting an accepted event succeeds without applying it twice. - **Permissions:** writes pass the same gates as a kind 9 message in `h`. A move also passes them in the source channel. The move stores the destination snapshot and a relay-signed kind 45011 removal marker for the source in the same transaction, so both channels recover by replay. The marker never names the destination. - **Moderation:** redaction is the ordinary kind 9005 removal. The ledger keeps the ID so `prev` checks still work. Redacting the current revision retires the artifact. - **Reads:** HTTP `/query` and `/count` accept explicit `artifact: current|history` filters with exact multi-character tag matching (e.g. `#assignee`). Generic REQ and search return only current revisions. Kind 5 against artifacts is rejected. NIP-11 advertises the limits. - **Spec:** NIP-AR updated to match: kind 9 permission checks, 9005 redaction and retirement, no creator-only delete rule. A separate small commit routes `insert_channel_head_checked` through the metered writer pool (`acquire_writer`), like every other event write in that module. ### Related issue Follows #7791. No separate issue found. ### Testing - Clippy clean. - Unit lane passes. Failures seen along the way came from agent env leaking into `buzz-acp` tests (they pass in a clean env) and known timing flakes (`keepalive_resets_idle_past_deadline`, two `buzz-agent` databricks tests that passed on retry). This diff doesn't touch those crates. - Postgres lane passes, including new `artifact_postgres_tests` in `buzz-db` and `buzz-relay`. Three presence tests need `REDIS_URL` set. - Docker smoke against a fresh local relay, 29/29: create and idempotent resubmit, update and stale conflict, current, `#assignee` and history queries, generic REQ, kind 5 rejection, delete and restore, move with source marker, private-channel isolation, and 9005 retirement. - A pasteable curl walkthrough of the same flows was shared with the reviewer. Draft until the human hands-on check (AGENTS.md step 3) is confirmed. The pre-push hook was skipped because every lane above had already run on this tree. CI is the gate. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: murderbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Smartie <fb3185faacfc3760b6b4fe0085a8878d8dd537f7a7671c7d3184fe1aa1b04df4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Fizz <400e8babadcee6a7f420103f10a2849d84c4a9c71d5bd04f3948c814216648a3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: murderbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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6410e685a8 |
feat(relay): enforce NIP-FI assertion+NIP-98 pairing on HTTP ingress (#7264)
Implements NIP-FI HTTP ingress enforcement per the merged spec (PR #7254). Every protected HTTP surface in enforce mode requires a valid `Nostr-Federated-Identity: Bearer <JWS>` assertion alongside its NIP-98 authorization, bound to the same key. The NIP-98 pubkey (proven actor) must equal the assertion's `nostr_pubkey`; absent, mismatched, or unverifiable assertions are denied fail-closed with byte-exact text/plain responses per the spec's rejection table. This is S5 of the `buzz-enterprise-identity` program. WS enforcement (S3) is separate. ## What changed **New `nip_fi_http` module:** `admit_nip_fi_http()` covers the full admission sequence — `Nostr-Federated-Identity` extraction, offline JWKS verification, NIP-98 key pairing [FI-INV-05], issuer-qualified deny-map check via `(iss, pubkey, now)` [FI-INV-14], and byte-exact denial for all four `DenialClass` variants. `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state()` is the single call-site wrapper for all surfaces [FI-TRACE-AUTHORITY-UNIFORM]. **Protected surfaces** (all gated via the uniform authority): - HTTP bridge: `POST /events`, `/query`, `/count` - GIF proxy: `POST /gifs/search`, `/gifs/share` - Workflow reads: `GET /workflows/{id}/runs`, `GET /workflows/{id}/runs/{id}/approvals` - Moderation reads: `GET /moderation/reports`, `/moderation/audit`, `/moderation/restricted` - Media/Blossom: `PUT /upload`, `/media/upload` - Git smart-HTTP: `info/refs`, `upload-pack`, `receive-pack` - Git settings control plane: `GET`/`POST /git/:owner/:repo/default-branch` (now routed through `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` for full assertion key-pairing) - Invites: `POST /api/invites` (mint only; claim exempt as pre-membership enrollment door) **NIP-98 strictness in NIP-FI mode:** - When NIP-FI is not Off, bridge POST handlers force `require_auth_token = true` — the `X-Pubkey` dev-mode fallback cannot satisfy the pairing requirement [NIP-FI.md:547-567] - POST bodies on `/events`, `/query`, `/count` require a matching `payload` tag in enforce mode [NIP-FI.md:579-597] - A payload tag present with no content (one-element `["payload"]` or empty string) is rejected as a structurally invalid claim — NIP-98 requires the content to be a valid 64-char lowercase hex SHA-256 digest. Malformed payload diagnostics use a static error message (no attacker-controlled content in logs). - Off mode preserves pre-NIP-FI behavior per [FI-INV-15] **Off-mode compatibility changes:** Admission now runs before request validation on every protected surface, so Off mode differs from pre-NIP-FI behavior in these ways: - **GIF routes:** NIP-98 authentication happens before the upstream provider lookup. An unauthenticated request on a tenant with no GIF provider now returns 401 instead of 404. The 401 goes through the legacy `api_error()` path, so the body is JSON `{"error":"..."}` with no `WWW-Authenticate` header. - **Workflow runs** (`GET /workflows/{id}/runs`): the query string is parsed after admission. A request with a missing credential and a malformed query (for example `?limit=abc`) now returns 401 instead of 400. - **Authorized malformed query:** once admitted, a malformed query returns a JSON 400 `{"error":"invalid query: ..."}` from `parse_query_or_400` instead of axum's `text/plain` `Query` rejection. - **Moderation reads** (`/moderation/reports`, `/moderation/audit`): same extraction change as workflow runs. Admission comes first, then a JSON 400 for a malformed query. - **Malformed `payload` tag:** shared NIP-98 verification now rejects a malformed `payload` tag in every mode, including on bodyless requests. That means a one-element `["payload"]`, an empty digest, or anything other than 64 lowercase hex characters. Before this change, a bodyless request ignored the tag. **Auth header cardinality:** Enforce mode rejects requests with more than one `Authorization` header with 403 `evidence rejected\n`. DenyProtected returns 503 `authorization unavailable\n` before this check (and before NIP-98 or assertion verification) runs. The cardinality gate is enforced at the NIP-FI admission boundary (`admit_nip_fi_http`), not via legacy auth boolean flags, so it applies uniformly to all Enforce-mode surfaces including Git. Off mode passes through the first header value unchanged, preserving pre-NIP-FI behavior [FI-INV-15]. **Denial-class remapping:** In Enforce mode, NIP-98 extraction/verification failures from the closure are mapped to the appropriate `DenialClass`: `MissingEvidence` when no `Authorization` header is present, `EvidenceRejected` when the header is present but invalid. Off mode propagates legacy responses unchanged [FI-INV-15]; for example, the Git missing-Authorization and wrong-scheme 401s keep their legacy bytes with no `content-type` header. **JWKS refresh scheduling:** The refresh timer's `*last` checkpoint is set after the fetch completes, not from the pre-fetch timestamp, preventing interval drift under network latency. The loop is extracted to `nip_fi_jwks_refresh_loop` for unit-testability. **Log hygiene [NIP-FI.md:777-779]:** Issuer identity is never written to logs or error messages. All startup/refresh diagnostics use an ordinal index (`issuer_index = N`). Config parse errors for malformed issuers use classify()/line/column codes rather than raw config values. **Admin SPA document routes:** `/reports`, `/reports/{id}`, and `/feedback` are exempt from the NIP-FI assertion guard only on the admin host (host-qualified via `is_admin_host`). These paths are not added to the broad `NIP_FI_EXEMPT_PREFIXES` list — tenant hosts remain fully protected. **Deny-map seam (`HttpDenyMap` trait):** signature is `(issuer, pubkey, now)` matching `NipFiDenyMap::is_denied` from S4 (PR #7265) so integration is a one-liner. Stub is `AlwaysAdmitStubDenyMap` — named to accurately describe stub-phase semantics (fail-open intentionally pending S4). **Route inventory:** every authenticated HTTP route is classified as Protected or Exempt with justification. Documented in the F4 seam-test comment in `bridge.rs`. **Outer-guard tests:** `#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]` tests in `bridge.rs` drive the full router (`build_router`) in Enforce mode with valid NIP-98 but no `Nostr-Federated-Identity` header. These exercise the **outer `nip_fi_assertion_guard` middleware** in `router.rs` — the layer that fires before any handler runs. They prove the guard's exact response bytes (401 `authentication required\n`, `text/plain; charset=utf-8`, `WWW-Authenticate: Nostr`) for each protected route. Per-handler `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` wiring is proven separately by the cardinality test and the media/settings/git handler-level suites. ## Seams **S3 seam:** `nip_fi_config.rs` is duplicated (S3 not landed; session-deadline parts stripped). Removed when S5 rebases onto S3. **S4 seam:** `AlwaysAdmitStubDenyMap` until S4 provides the real map. Integration is one line at the `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` wrapper. ## Evidence At head `ee338ea9c` (branch `hayt/nip-fi-http-enforcement`), hosted CI run [36167450853](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/36167450853): - **Rust / Unit Tests** ([job 108179338458](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/36167450853/job/108179338458)): passed. The `buzz-relay` `test-unit` step ran 171 tests with 171 passes. Its PASS lines include all 57 non-ignored tests this PR adds to the relay: `nip_fi_http::tests` (25), `nip_fi_config::tests` (8), `router::tests` (8), `api::parse_query_tests` (5), `api: |
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Luke Tornquist
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8f6b66f9ff |
Select one feature flag provider at compile time (#7677)
## Why Buzz server components need one typed feature-flag contract without forcing the open-source build to depend on LaunchDarkly. A staging or production relay must not be able to choose the wrong provider through runtime configuration. ## What - Adds typed boolean and signed `i64` flags with static, environment, and compile-gated LaunchDarkly evaluators. - Defines an executable relay artifact contract that compiles exactly one provider. - Rejects zero or multiple relay provider features at compile time. - Runs the LaunchDarkly feature tests and the provider compile matrix in the unit CI lane and fallback test script. ## How `buzz-feature-flags` stays provider-neutral. The future relay composition root will expose one build path per artifact feature: `static-feature-flags`, `environment-feature-flags`, or `launchdarkly-feature-flags`. Runtime configuration carries only settings for the selected provider. It never carries a provider name, fallback, or precedence rule. The crate still has no relay consumer. A locked compile fixture proves each singleton builds and every zero or multi-provider combination fails until the relay adopts this contract. This removes the proposed runtime `ProviderMode` and leaves one provider, one construction path, and one evaluator per artifact. ## Risk This PR still has no relay or app consumer, so it changes no user-visible behavior. Risk is limited to the new feature-flag crate, its compile contract, and its unit-test lane. ## Testing An external Rust consumer at `30cf968bfe85e82980fda7e63f5bebe649ca939f` exercised six environment-evaluator scenarios and 59 assertions. The compile-time correction adds no live consumer to exercise manually. ## Bigger picture When `buzz-relay` adopts this crate, its build manifests must map each distribution to one provider feature. That consumer PR must verify live Relay Proxy reachability, secret ingestion, lifecycle ownership, and user-visible behavior. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Logan Johnson
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ea1e97e65f |
feat(acp): run one prepared task from a file or stdin (#7851)
🤖 ## Summary Scripts, scheduled jobs, and other automation need to give an agent one prepared task and wait for a result without starting a long-running chat listener. This adds `buzz-acp run`: it reads a task from a local file or stdin, runs one fresh agent session with the configured tools and instructions, cleans up, and exits with a machine-readable status. ```sh buzz-acp run --task ./task.json cat task.json | buzz-acp run --task - ``` - The versioned JSON task specifies a task ID, intended agent public key, prepared prompt, and execution time limit. Invalid input or an identity mismatch is rejected before agent launch. Credentials, executable, tools, and permissions remain controlled by trusted launch settings, not the task document. - Each invocation uses the normal agent equipment: base/persona/team instructions, enabled memory, tools, model and effort settings, permissions, and Git identity, credentials, and signing. Both task and conversational modes obtain these capabilities from one shared runtime owner; new shared setup belongs there rather than in separate entry points. - Launch configuration reads have a separate ten-second bound and can be cancelled even when a prompt file blocks. A deadline covers adapter startup through the task turn. Interrupts and termination signals trigger bounded cleanup. Stdout contains one terminal JSON record; diagnostics stay on stderr. A normal turn ending is not proof that the task achieved its goal. - Normal invocation remains the conversational service. Task mode does not start chat subscriptions, presence, heartbeat turns, or a persistent agent pool. Tasks are trusted executable instructions, not sandboxed input. Reusing a task ID does not prevent duplicate execution, and uncertain outcomes must not be blindly retried. See [the task contract](crates/buzz-acp/TASKS.md) for the document format, exit codes, limits, and examples. URL retrieval, a task server, and a persistent execution ledger are outside this change. ### Related issue None found in the existing issue and PR search. ### Testing - At `4e86bbc97`: 964 unit tests and 22 integration tests passed, with three existing ignored tests. The package suite ran serially with inherited harness/Git options cleared. A final test-only shutdown-result assertion was then checked with the focused memory test and all-target Clippy. - All eight real-binary task tests independently passed on the exact candidate, including blocked configuration reads, file/stdin validation, session equipment, deadlines, cancellation, and cleanup. The memory test passed 20 repeated runs. Removing the oversized-input guard fails the new error assertion; restoring it passes. - Package all-target Clippy, formatting, file-size checks, and pre-push Rust/Tauri checks passed. All executed hosted checks passed on the updated head (54 successful, 28 skipped). The separate Codex review comment still requests authorization for this exact range. - Earlier revisions passed the release build and a real Goose 1.51.0 tool-use smoke test. No new release artifact or installed Janet runtime is claimed for this feedback revision. - Repository-wide `just ci` was previously attempted; workspace Clippy passed, then the desktop dependency check stopped on a local pnpm fetch failure. Hosted checks cover the applicable PR lanes. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Mic Neale
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4544ba1713 |
chore(mesh): upgrade MeshLLM to 0.76.2 (#7559)
## Summary Upgrade Buzz from MeshLLM `v0.76.0-rc9` to the latest stable [v0.76.2 release](https://github.com/Mesh-LLM/mesh-llm/releases/tag/v0.76.2) (via v0.76.1). - Update all eight Mesh git dependencies across desktop and relay smoke examples; both lockfiles resolve all 47 Mesh packages to `a0c1e66b0ac037dd56544b9e2d94969ea43d694f` (tag `v0.76.2`). All non-Mesh lock records are unchanged by the 0.76.1 → 0.76.2 bump. - Match Mesh's `ed25519-dalek = 3.0.0` and `rusqlite = 0.40` dependencies. - Explicitly enable rusqlite's `fallible_uint` feature, preserving Buzz's existing `u64` SQL conversions when **mesh is disabled**. Mesh-enabled builds previously supplied this transitively, so testing both configurations matters. - Temporarily pin **only** the optional `sqlx-sqlite` package to the merged upstream compatibility fix [transact-rs/sqlx#4402](https://github.com/transact-rs/sqlx/pull/4402), revision `94aafe3a68884d923b0798a767c8d7f6cfda89d2`. SQLx 0.9.0 caps `libsqlite3-sys` below 0.38, while Mesh 0.76 requires 0.38. Cargo resolves the conflict even with SQLite disabled. The fix raises that upper bound; remove the patch once released. Buzz's active PostgreSQL driver stays on crates.io SQLx 0.9.0. - Preserve the explicit Linux keyring 3 `crypto-rust` feature so Secret Service sessions retain DH encryption independently of Mesh keyring 4. - Preserve the dedicated examples-only `buzz-mesh-smoke` crate and lifecycle workflow wiring, keeping Mesh/native-runtime dev dependencies out of relay CI builds. - v0.76.1 → v0.76.2 upstream delta: self-updater fix for composed product-v2 bundles (Mesh-LLM/mesh-llm#1844) plus release plumbing — no API changes affecting Buzz. - Merged `origin/main` (`7c789dee0`) without rewriting shared PR history. ### Validation at `ae4adba15` (local macOS ARM64, Hermit toolchain) - **Passed:** `cargo test --locked -p buzz-mesh-smoke --all-targets` (all six example harnesses compile; no live harness execution). - **Passed:** desktop Tauri workspace tests, both default and `--features mesh-llm` graphs (3,296 tests with mesh enabled, 0 failures). - **Passed:** `just desktop-tauri-clippy` (both feature graphs, `-D warnings`), root workspace clippy `-D warnings`, `cargo fmt --all --check`. - **Passed:** `--locked` metadata resolution for both workspaces; lockfile diff audited to touch only Mesh package records. - **Passed:** full pre-push hook suite on the final push (branch-skew, rust-tests, desktop-tauri-checks, file-size-check) — no hooks bypassed. - **Not run:** live Mesh inference/admission smoke or installed-app UI exercise. CI lifecycle smoke coverage applies. Originating Buzz conversation: buzz://message?channel=dffbc117-845a-4c02-bc3f-eaeeefc4deaa&id=670f9c262e1ec0a4df5600b3173a0c5de2abe17e08ba9ccfdd8eff109fadf1a8 --------- Signed-off-by: Thinker <75d8a808fa21bb8d1812e080cf471db601c6e8e6a62dcd516d37531e83a7bb77@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz> Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Thinker <75d8a808fa21bb8d1812e080cf471db601c6e8e6a62dcd516d37531e83a7bb77@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz> Co-authored-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Galadriel <b81c841ed20a8e17caf4e6fac2f6f3bc61d304c84b8394720f6d00f37538c47e@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz> Co-authored-by: Gu <gu@buzz> |
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Kalvin C
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5a349db91c |
feat(relay): add opt-in newest-first thread windows (#7823)
## Summary Add an opt-in, newest-first thread window to the authenticated HTTP query path. A filter with `thread_window: true` returns: - reply rows ordered by `(created_at DESC, id ASC)` with an exact composite cursor; - optional bounded reactions, edits, deletions, and delete-of-aux closure; - one relay-signed `kind:39007` bounds event bound to the normalized host, authenticated reader, channel, root, request cursor, kinds, depth, limit, and aux choice. Filters without the flag keep the existing oldest-first thread behavior. Channel windows and `kind:39006` are unchanged. No client opts into this mode in this PR. ### Why extend NIP-CW NIP-CW already defines relay-computed, cursor-paged conversation views over extended NIP-01 filters. Thread windows use the same protocol ideas: ordinary signed rows, composite keyset pagination, optional aux closure, and relay-signed bounds. Adding a thread mode keeps those related wire contracts together instead of creating a second NIP with duplicated terminology and compatibility rules. Extending a draft, optional NIP with an additive mode is normal protocol evolution. Existing fields and meanings are not reinterpreted: - `top_level: true` remains channel mode; - `kind:39006` remains channel-window bounds; - `thread_window: true` selects the new mode; - `kind:39007` has a distinct identity and root/request binding; - extension-unaware clients never send the selector; - legacy thread queries remain unchanged. NIP-CW documents only the wire contract and relay semantics. Database plans, replica internals, and rollout procedures remain implementation concerns. ### Why thread windows use independent modules The implementation deliberately keeps `thread_window.rs` separate in `buzz-core`, `buzz-db`, and `buzz-relay` rather than adding branches throughout the existing channel-window path. The modes share pagination concepts, but their invariants differ: - channel mode selects top-level rows; thread mode requires one root and depths `1..=depth_limit`; - thread mode accepts only conversation row kinds and rejects unknown/conflicting fields; - thread bounds bind the root and authenticated reader because cross-channel aux visibility can differ by reader; - thread aux includes the root and requires complete two-hop closure; - thread mode refreshes writer authorization before selection and before signing; - historical cursor pages may use a proved replica transaction, but fallback must restart both aux hops on the writer; - legacy thread traversal is oldest-first and must not inherit descending cursor semantics. Forcing these rules into channel-window code would create a mode flag across parsing, SQL predicates, bounds construction, authorization, replica fallback, and tests. That abstraction would not remove complexity. It would distribute it. Separate modules keep each contract local and leave the established channel and legacy paths untouched. ### Technical design - Strict request parsing normalizes UUIDs, event IDs, kinds, defaults, and cursors before computing the response binding. - SQL applies community, root, channel, depth, kind, deletion, and cursor predicates before `limit + 1`. - Ordered metadata scanning plus exact event-key lookup avoids the stale-statistics plan that previously exceeded the four-second SQL budget on a 10k-reply thread. - Aux work is bounded by target batches, query count, raw candidate count, response bytes, SQL timeouts, and one shared HTTP deadline. - Fresh authorization-set comparison catches both grants and revocations during closure. The relay returns retryable `503` rather than signing an incomplete page. - Replica failure permanently degrades the request to the writer and restarts closure from its original targets without resetting budgets. - Migration `0049_thread_window_index.sql` adds the mixed-direction index used by newest-first scans. It validates a prebuilt index and bounds startup lock/build time. ### Tradeoffs - The stale-statistics-safe plan is intentionally less clever. Measured warm 100k deep-cursor execution increased from roughly 0.30 ms to 4.80 ms, plus about 8 ms planning, in exchange for avoiding a reproduced multi-second timeout after rapid 10k-thread insertion. - Bounds are authoritative only for the served page. There is no cross-page snapshot guarantee, and replica insertion coverage does not imply latest edit/deletion/aux visibility. - Strict parsing rejects unsupported constraints instead of silently serving a different row set. - Required aux closure fails closed. The relay does not omit aux and sign plausible-but-incomplete bounds. - This PR ships relay capability only. Client rendering, retry UX, live-history overlap, and compatibility fallback remain separate work. ### Related issue No existing issue found. This work follows the thread-loading design and review discussion. ### Testing - `cargo test -p buzz-core`: 258 unit tests and 2 doctests passed. - `cargo check --workspace --all-targets`: passed at the rebased implementation head. - `cargo test -p buzz-db`: 131 non-PostgreSQL tests passed; 275 infrastructure tests were ignored as declared. - Focused PostgreSQL migration/runtime regressions: 3/3 passed against an isolated PostgreSQL container, including both corrected migration-ledger tests. - `cargo fmt --all --check`: passed. - Pre-rebase feature validation passed 398/398 PostgreSQL tests, signed-wire multi-tenant/auth/pagination/aux/revocation probes, clean Compose boot/reboot, and full core tests. - Independent HA validation exercised three relay pods and a physical PostgreSQL standby on the same runtime logic before the final documentation-only cleanup. - Independent final-delta review confirmed exactly two changed files, byte-identical executable migration SQL after comments/diagnostic normalization, matching prebuild/catalog/recovery instructions, and `git diff --check`; no runtime receipts were relabeled to the new SHA. - The pre-push hook ran repository checks but its Rust unit lane exited 100 without exposing an individual failed test in the captured multiplexed output. The independently run affected-package checks above passed; current-head repository CI remains required. Known unrelated baseline behavior remains: the mesh-demo echo test can return 504, and same-second archive → unarchive can deduplicate its membership notification. Neither path is changed here. --------- Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Salman Mohammed
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5621006bcf |
refactor: move agent Git bootstrap into ACP harness (#7819)
discovered in https://github.com/block/buzz/issues/7742#issuecomment-5783512985 ## Summary Goose uses its native shell, so it bypassed the Git identity and signing setup inside `buzz-dev-mcp`. Agent commits could use the host Git identity, while MCP shells had a separate config. This moves Git setup into `buzz-acp`, where both paths receive the same agent identity, Nostr signer, and relay-scoped credential helper. Before: ```text Buzz Desktop └─ buzz-acp ← Desktop supplied relay Git authentication ├─ Goose → native shell ← no agent Git author or signing setup └─ Buzz Agent └─ buzz-dev-mcp └─ shell ← MCP created the keyfile and Git signing config ``` After: ```text Buzz Desktop or Sprig └─ buzz-acp ← owns the keyfile, identity, signing, and scoped credentials ├─ Goose → native shell ← inherits the complete Git environment └─ Buzz Agent └─ buzz-dev-mcp └─ shell ← receives the same Git environment via mcpServers[].env ``` The harness keeps the signing key in a private temporary file and removes it on normal exit, startup failure, and graceful termination. It composes inherited `GIT_CONFIG_*` entries, forwards the complete block to MCP servers, and bundles the helpers through the ACP multicall entrypoint. For standard `buzz-acp` launches, Desktop and Sprig no longer write Git config. A custom Desktop ACP command bypasses the harness, so Desktop preserves its prior relay-scoped credential helper for that supported override. This changes Git settings for every ACP runtime. The startup signal path also changes so a termination during adapter initialization removes the keyfile. The temporary file can remain after SIGKILL or a machine crash. ### Related issue Related: #6177 covers stricter commit identity enforcement and touches the same Git paths. That PR and this one need to be reconciled before either lands. No issue was found for this runtime bootstrap gap. ### Testing - Ran the ignored `git_runtime_tests` with real Goose 1.50.0 and Buzz Agent ACP sessions. `real_goose_native_git_shell` passed again on this PR branch with `BUZZ_TEST_BIN_DIR` pointing to built binaries. Goose made a signed commit and tag through its native shell; Buzz Agent did the same through its MCP shell. Both verified signatures, identity, credential scoping, and keyfile cleanup. - Built the Linux Sprig image and ran `scripts/test-sprig-image.sh buzz-sprig:acp-git-bootstrap`. The container made and verified a signed commit and tag, then confirmed keyfile removal after SIGTERM. - `just ci` passed on the original branch. After rebasing onto `main` and addressing review feedback, the ACP Git bootstrap integration tests, focused desktop smoke test, custom-command regression test, formatting, and ACP/Desktop Clippy passed. The pre-push hook hit two timing-sensitive ACP deadline tests under parallel load; both passed alone and the complete ACP package passed serially (964 library, 2 Git bootstrap, 9 pool lifecycle tests). The push used `--no-verify` after those checks; GitHub CI is rerunning on the new head. - Under injected `BUZZ_ACP_ALLOWED_RESPOND_TO`, `BUZZ_ACP_LAZY_POOL`, and `BUZZ_ACP_IDLE_POOL_SLEEP`, the clean-env serial package command in `crates/buzz-acp/TESTING.md` passed: 964 active library tests, 2 Git bootstrap tests, and 9 pool lifecycle tests. Both named Databricks OAuth tests passed locally; another reviewer reproduced their environment-specific failures on `main`. - No authenticated relay clone or push was run. The local probes used disposable repositories and did not contact a relay. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Salman Mohammed <smohammed@squareup.com> |
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Tom Brow
|
7e96f91229 |
feat(mobile-infra): support development App Attest (#7744)
Development-signed iOS apps cannot enroll with the current gateway because their Apple App Attest AAGUID is rejected. Add an explicit personal development build feature and environment setting so a development gateway can use a developer's own application identity and sandbox APNs credentials. Ordinary gateway builds remain production-only. Special builds also default to production, enforce exactly the selected signed AAGUID, and retain certificate-chain, pinned-root, nonce, app-ID, key, credential-ID, and counter verification. Document the matching mobile signing configuration and expose the feature through an optional Docker build argument. ### Validation The development image deployed successfully to a personal Railway stack; private readiness, enrollment challenges, authenticated relay access, and APNs sandbox TLS/HTTP2 connectivity passed. Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> |
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Salman Mohammed
|
4d08194ea9 |
Deduplicate thread context by ACP session delivery (#7620)
## Summary Buzz can repeat a thread reply in later prompts after the provider already received that event as context. The old fix treated every message signed by the agent key as retained by the current provider session. That could hide an unseen heartbeat reply because independent sessions share the same signing key. This PR now removes only exact event IDs already delivered to the live ACP session. It uses bounded overfetch so removed events do not shrink the new-context window, and it preserves unseen same-key replies from other sessions. The context header reports `truncated=true` whenever session history was omitted. The harness calls `/count` only when the relay query finds a sentinel beyond its fetch window. This deliberately does not parse event IDs from shell output. A reply that the agent just published may appear once in the next context delta; after that event reaches the provider as context, later prompts omit it. --------- Signed-off-by: Salman Mohammed <smohammed@squareup.com> |
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Tom Brow
|
7c789dee09 |
Fix Apple Silicon iOS simulator builds (#7646)
Apple Silicon simulator builds fail because MLImage and MLKit contain device-labelled ARM64 objects. Enable the Flutter ML Kit package's upstream compatibility helper, which restores device labels for iPhone builds. This preserves the MLKit-based functionality (avatar background removal) and complements the notification-extension linker isolation in #7187. Adds a complete iOS simulator build to CI to catch this build regression. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> |
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Wes
|
4cd82f5132 |
feat(buzz-agent): add opt-in workspace-scoped Databricks reuse (#7606)
Posted by Brain, Wes Billman’s AI assistant, on behalf of `wesbillman`. ## Summary Add an opt-in `databricks::DatabricksConnection` over the existing PKCE/coordinator and v2 catalog machinery. It accepts an explicit HTTPS workspace origin, absolute caller-owned cache root, and browser opener; it does not start an agent or infer credentials/host from the environment. - Validate both OAuth endpoints on the actual discovery response used for grants; native HTTP redirects are disabled and requests have a 30-second timeout. - Keep strict cache/single-flight state in a separate namespace. Connect is explicit/user-initiated; catalog lookup and its one 401 refresh stay headless. Tokens are not exposed by the connection API. - Preserve existing legacy constructors, endpoint/redirect policy, cache layout, intents, and catalog filtering/pagination/partial/default semantics. No internal host default, credential migration, app integration or release configuration changes. ### Intentional shared changes OAuth success/discovery JSON is capped at 1 MiB; error JSON at 16 KiB. Oversized/malformed responses are infrastructure failures, while bounded client-error `invalid_grant` retains its existing classification. OAuth diagnostics omit raw bodies/URLs/opener/callback details. Overflowing token expiry returns an infrastructure failure. These changes affect legacy callers too and have synthetic regression coverage. See [the reuse contract](crates/buzz-agent/DATABRICKS_REUSE.md) for API, compatibility and caller obligations. Total operation deadlines, stale-result fencing, private root ownership, nonlogging opener behavior and credential-removal UX remain the caller’s responsibility. ### Related issue Related discovery work: #6918. Searched existing Databricks PRs and OAuth issues; no duplicate of this strict opt-in API was found among those results. This is a new reuse boundary, not a claim of a live credential leak. ### Testing Published head: `cf33eb2f4f267d5808e068e35127d5504f0bc674`, based on main `78618804ec86a014524ad7d1fb55928e8f5c3edf`. Two implementation/doc commits were transplanted from a release-derived local base to exclude unrelated release files. `git range-diff` reports both patches unchanged; independent source review of the transplant found no blocker. **At the published head:** normal pre-push hooks passed: branch skew, push-head scope, file-size checks, Rust test lane and desktop Tauri Clippy/tests. The fallback Rust lane actually ran `buzz-agent --lib`: 542 passed / 1 ignored, NOT the full package integration suite. Hosted full package/repository CI remains pending. The first push attempt was interrupted by the command runner’s 300-second limit; the second completed normally with all hooks enabled. **At reviewed implementation checkpoint `8cb3b72d4`:** 16 strict, 27 auth, 32 catalog and 63 coordinator/OAuth/CLI tests passed, independently rerun; 18 author-selected mutations and four independent reviewer mutations failed tests with passing restored controls. The subsequent `539319411` delta changed only two doc-comment blocks. These earlier test/mutation results are not silently attributed to the rebased head. Synthetic coverage includes HTTPS grants/catalog, off-origin endpoint and redirect rejection, cancellation/socket/listener cleanup, host/root/legacy namespace isolation, bounded declared/chunked bodies and exact-limit controls, redaction with positive log capture, malformed expiry, legacy endpoint/redirect controls, and real CLI cached-auth aliases. Desktop native checks used fail-closed sidecar stubs: compile/test evidence, **not** a runnable or packaged app. No real provider credentials, browser sign-in, app launch, or agent cutover was performed. Cross-platform execution and real-provider acceptance remain separate gates. No merge or downstream adoption is requested by this PR. --------- Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Mic Neale
|
44316ff72f |
feat(mesh): upgrade to mesh-llm 0.76.0-rc8 and recommend Qwen3.8 27B (#6189)
Upgrades Buzz's mesh-llm dependencies through the released `v0.76.0-rc8` tag (`2040765d`), including the Qwen3.8 curated recommendation and rc8's scheduler/runtime improvements. **Scope note:** the earlier open-relay/unenforced-admission mode has been removed from this PR at Mic's direction — it is not a product mode we want. Mesh admission remains roster/allowlist driven, exactly as on `main`: on a relay with no NIP-43 membership snapshot the mesh runs self-only. No NIP-11 mode probing, no mode-transition restarts. A future perimeter/admission strategy for open relays will be designed separately. This PR also: - seeds `BUZZ_AGENT_LLM_TIMEOUT_SECS=660` for mesh agents, above MeshLLM's 600-second backend timeout; - makes `desktop-tauri-clippy` lint both default and `mesh-llm` cfg graphs; - runs the feature-enabled desktop test suite in CI; - recommends Qwen3.8 27B Q4_K_M for 64 GB-and-larger machines, then ladders down through Gemma 4 E4B and Qwen 9B for smaller machines; - keeps stored shared-compute `auto` translated to MeshLLM's supported wire model `mesh`. RC8 verification: - `just ci` passed locally at `92ecc7ec933bdd4df804cc9f28a2b51efa5313c5`. - Pre-push differential gates passed, including both desktop Tauri cfg graphs and package tests. - A prior isolated runtime smoke used the RC8 binary's OpenAI endpoint for a Buzz-shaped system/user/tool/tool-result/final-response loop; all assertions passed and the isolated process was shut down. Perf previously measured on M5 Metal, Qwen3.8-27B-Q4_K_M: TTFT 0.22–0.32 s, ~25 tok/s streaming; agent-shaped turns ~1 s to first token after the first (prefix cache). --------- Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jimmy <1fe240cd1a8cf775f6f3060f115e5a303181f3abf28ad4cb0c2515f4a02b36a8@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz> Signed-off-by: Alessandro Joabar <sandro@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Jimmy <1fe240cd1a8cf775f6f3060f115e5a303181f3abf28ad4cb0c2515f4a02b36a8@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz> Co-authored-by: Mic Neale <305999590+micspiral@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Alessandro Joabar <sandro@squareup.com> |
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Jordan Mecom
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4d447b9c20 |
Add generic information-flow control core (#7293)
Adds a dependency-free `ifc-core` crate implementing reader-set confidentiality labels and monotonic per-computation flow state. - Defines flow ordering, join, and meet over caller-supplied principal universes. - Fails closed for unknown or cross-universe input and checks reader widening at egress. - Includes property tests for lattice laws and monotonic taint, plus the design paper that motivates the broker integration. The crate deliberately contains no Buzz, Nostr, channel, membership, or grant policy; those remain in the Buzz adapter. --------- Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com> |
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Will Pfleger
|
5aed49b505 |
feat(buzz-agent): add DatabricksAuthCoordinator single-flight OAuth (#5545)
## What
Consolidates all Databricks OAuth acquisition behind one coordinator on
`PkceOAuthTokenSource`. Every entry point — the four `TokenSource`
methods (`bearer`, `bearer_no_browser`, `refresh_now`,
`interactive_login`) plus the public `acquire_with_intent` — routes
through a single `acquire()`/`acquire_locked()` core that owns browser
and cooldown policy.
Before this, acquisition logic was scattered across those methods with
no coordination: concurrent callers (Desktop discovery, the saved-agent
model picker, managed-runtime inference) could each pop their own
browser, and a just-denied attempt would immediately re-prompt on the
next passive read.
## How
- **Intent policy.** `AuthIntent::{Auto, UserInitiated, Headless}`
decides whether a caller may open a browser and whether it honors the
cooldown. `Headless` never browses; `Auto` browses but honors an
unexpired cooldown; `UserInitiated` browses and bypasses+clears the
cooldown.
- **Two-layer single-flight per cache key.** An in-process registry
(`INFLIGHT`) coalesces same-key, same-intent callers onto one leader's
attempt before the file lock. The slot key is `(lock_path, AuthIntent)`,
so a `UserInitiated` sign-in never inherits an `Auto` leader's result. A
joined result is revalidated against the waiter's own contract. Across
processes, callers serialize on a `flock`-based advisory lock and share
success through the on-disk cache. RAII `Drop` releases both lock and
leader slot.
- **Joiner credential-state reconciliation.** `SlotPublish` carries the
full `CachedToken` on success. Each joiner reconciles its own
independent `state` cell under `state.lock().await` before returning:
adopt when absent, expired, or matching the joiner's rejected
credential; preserve any distinct newer usable credential. On a matching
shared failure, neutralize the joiner's in-memory rejected entry under
lock via `expire_rejected_memory` — durable disk mutation is reserved
for `acquire_locked` under the cross-process file lock. Without this, a
joining source's state remains stale or empty and subsequent plain
`bearer()` calls resurface the rejected or absent credential.
- **Validate-before-persist boundary.** `finish()` is the
candidate-token persistence boundary for refresh and browser results.
Before a token is written to cache or the cooldown is cleared, a bearer
equal to the caller's rejected bytes yields a typed failure.
- **Token neutralization.** When `acquire_locked` enters with `rejected
= Some(bytes)`, it calls `expire_rejected()` under the state lock before
any cache check.
- **Cross-process failure single-flight.** An `AttemptRecord` sidecar
records a monotonically-increasing generation, intent, result code, and
SHA-256 digest of the completing caller's rejected token. Adoption is
temporal (pre-queue snapshot predates current generation) and
digest-matched.
- **Typed outcomes.** `AuthError` with stable `code()`/`from_code()`
replaces display-text matching.
- **Durable cooldown sidecar.** Every failed browser attempt is recorded
next to the cache key. 5-minute expiry.
- **Windows disk persistence disabled.** On non-Unix platforms,
`persist()` is a no-op. Lock, cooldown, and attempt sidecars are active
on all platforms. Tests that seed or assert on the on-disk token cache
are `#[cfg(unix)]`-gated.
- **Injected browser opener** invoked while the localhost callback
listener is live.
## Tests
- `crates/buzz-agent/tests/databricks_auth_coordinator.rs`:
browser/cooldown/classification acceptance matrix with a scripted
`BrowserOpener` and stub OIDC provider. P1 regressions exercise the full
`finish()` → `acquire_locked()` → `acquire_leader()` →
`LeaderGuard::complete()` → joiner wiring:
- `test_inprocess_joiner_reconciles_stale_state_after_shared_success`
(Unix): two real sources both loaded locally-fresh-but-rejected X; after
shared success Y, subsequent plain `bearer()` on both returns Y, not X.
-
`test_inprocess_joiner_neutralizes_rejected_on_matching_shared_failure`
(Unix): B's matching rejected X is force-expired in memory after shared
`RefreshRejected`; subsequent read cannot return X.
- `test_inprocess_joiner_populates_empty_state_no_second_acquisition`
(non-Unix): empty A/B join a browser success; B's subsequent headless
read returns Y without a second browser (no disk fallback on non-Unix
exposes the regression).
- `test_crossprocess_userinitiated_waiter_adopts_predecessor_denial`
(snapshot-marker barrier replacing an earlier sleep for deterministic
generation ordering).
- `auth.rs` in-crate tests: lock-primitive edges, disk-recheck on shared
failure (`#[cfg(unix)]`), and:
- `test_joiner_reconciliation_blocked_until_state_lock_released`:
deterministic direct-poll proof that awaited reconciliation requires
`state.lock().await`. The test task holds B's state mutex and manually
polls a pinned real `acquire()` future — Poll 2 (slot published, mutex
still held) must return `Pending` because `lock().await` blocks; with
`try_lock` instead, Poll 2 returns `Ready`, failing the assertion.
- `test_joiner_preserve_distinct_newer_credential`: deterministic direct
polling parks B at `slot.wait()`, then writes Z directly into B's state
in the same task, then publishes Y and awaits completion. B must return
Y but leave state == Z. Mutation check: unconditional adoption
overwrites Z with Y, failing the state assertion.
- `test_joiner_shared_failure_recovers_disk_replacement` (Unix): the
matching-failure joiner enters the recovery branch — after
`expire_rejected_memory` (in-memory, empty state no-op) it reads a
sibling-written disk replacement via `usable_from_disk` and returns it.
Mutation check: removing the `usable_from_disk` recovery branch returns
`Err(RefreshRejected)`.
- `test_joiner_failure_does_not_write_disk` (Unix): byte-for-byte
disk-invariance regression — a matching-failure joiner calls
`expire_rejected_memory` and must not touch the on-disk cache. An
independent process C may write a valid replacement between A's failure
and B's reconciliation; this guard ensures B's unfenced in-memory
neutralization cannot overwrite C's concurrent disk write. Mutation
check: reverting to `expire_rejected` rewrites the file (`expires_at =
0`), changing the bytes and failing the assertion.
- `test_lock_timeout_leaves_cooldown_sidecar_byte_for_byte_untouched`: a
waiter past its deadline returns `LockTimeout` before entering
`acquire_locked`; the cooldown sidecar bytes are unchanged. Documents a
pre-lock limitation: `LockTimeout` callers do not neutralize state or
sidecars.
## Scope / follow-ups
- **Runtime 401 handling is deferred.** This PR owns acquisition
single-flight and policy.
- **Desktop wiring is Phase 2** (not in this PR's boundary). Confined to
`crates/buzz-agent/`.
- **Windows DACL** is a follow-up once the `windows-sys` binding is
available.
## Stack
Built on [#5534](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/5534)
(`hayt/databricks-oauth-cache-hardening`), now merged. Retargeted to
`main`.
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
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Will Pfleger
|
70895b355f |
feat(buzz-auth): add production NIP-FI federated assertion runtime (#7109)
Depends on #6994 (merged). Stack: PR 2 #6994 (merged) → this PR (#7109) → PR 4 #7148 → PR 5 ## What Production assertion runtime for NIP-FI Phase A: JWKS caching layer, SSRF-hardened HTTP fetcher, startup validation gate, NIP-11 discovery serialization, federated assertion verifier with sealed key-source authority, and supporting invariant tests. ## Changes ### `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/jwks/` `ProductionJwksSource<F>` implements the sealed `IssuerKeySource` trait: - `HttpJwksFetcher`: reqwest-backed fetch with SSRF protection — URI validation (HTTPS, no credentials, no fragment, no host matched by the shared enumerated deny policy), per-fetch DNS resolution rejecting any resolved address matched by the shared enumerated deny policy, address pinning to prevent DNS rebinding TOCTOU, redirect denial, incremental body streaming capped at 512 KiB before any parse - IPv6 host extraction via typed `Url::host()` accessor (strips brackets before SSRF check and provides the correct bare input form for reqwest `resolve()` pinning; the bracketed form from `host_str()` fails `IpAddr::parse` and does not match the URL authority key) - Complete-operation deadline via `tokio::time::timeout` covering DNS resolution through body streaming - Bounded periodic refresh with configurable interval and hard snapshot deadline - Cancellation-safe RAII refresh permit: dropped on future cancellation so the next caller can re-fetch - Content-digest-gated generation counter: identical re-fetches preserve generation; key rotations advance it - Injectable clock (`now_fn: Arc<dyn Fn() -> DateTime<Utc> + Send + Sync>`): production uses `Arc::new(Utc::now)`; all four deadline creation and expiry checks use `(self.now_fn)()`, enabling controlled-time testing without wall-clock sleep `JwksSourceContract`: a closed value type that is the single source of truth for the three deployment fields whose change alters which keys the runtime trusts and how long it trusts them: - `jwks_uri` — selects the authenticated key source; validated at construction (HTTPS, no credentials/fragment, no bare private-IP host); stored as the `Url`-normalized form so that equivalent spellings (uppercase host, explicit default port `:443`, dot-segment paths like `/.well-known/./jwks.json`) converge to the same `AssertionPolicyId` - `refresh_interval_seconds` — defines bounded refresh behavior; positive, ≤ 1 year, strictly < `key_snapshot_hard_deadline_seconds` - `key_snapshot_hard_deadline_seconds` — defines the source's accepted time rule; every `VerifiedAssertion.revalidation_dependencies` deadline derives from this `JwksSourceContract` is a required `IssuerPolicy` input and is included in `derive_assertion_policy_id` after a domain separator. `IssuerJwksConfig` embeds the contract instead of independently restating these fields — startup validation rejects any contract mismatch (`NipFiStartupError::JwksContractMismatch`). ### `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/verifier.rs` - `FederatedAssertionVerifier<S>`: provider-neutral verifier over a closed multi-issuer registry and sealed `IssuerKeySource` - `Arc<S>: IssuerKeySource` forwarding impl (blanket seal for `Arc<S>` in the sealed module) — one `Arc<ProductionJwksSource>` can be shared across multiple verifiers; all observe JWKS refreshes through the shared cache without rebuilding the verifier - `AssertionKeySet`: crate-private constructor seals issuer binding — no external crate can relabel issuer B's JWKS as issuer A - Sealed `IssuerKeySource` trait closes the authority-construction seam at both ends ### `crates/buzz-core/src/network.rs` Renamed `is_private_ip` to `is_not_global_unicast` (compat alias retained) and restored the complete IANA deny/exception table from this branch's own history (`272dacadb`). The predicate is an enumerated deny/explicit exception policy: addresses covered by a named deny rule are rejected; addresses not covered by any explicit deny rule (e.g. `fe00::1`) pass through. Deny rules are derived from the IANA Special-Purpose Address Space registries (last updated 2025-10-09), with globally-reachable exceptions carved out explicitly (e.g. PCP/TURN anycast inside 2001::/23). Blocked IPv4 classes: loopback (127/8), private RFC 1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16), link-local (169.254/16), unspecified (0/8), broadcast, CGNAT/RFC 6598 (100.64/10), benchmarking/RFC 2544 (198.18/15), IETF Protocol Assignments (192.0.0.0/24, globally reachable exceptions: 192.0.0.9 PCP anycast RFC 7723 and 192.0.0.10 TURN anycast RFC 8155), documentation/RFC 5737 (192.0.2/24, 198.51.100/24, 203.0.113/24), deprecated 6to4 relay anycast (192.88.99.0/24, RFC 7526, global=None → conservative deny), multicast/RFC 5771 (224/4), reserved class-E (240/4). Blocked IPv6 classes: loopback (::1), unspecified (::), ULA (fc00::/7), link-local (fe80::/10), deprecated site-local (fec0::/10, RFC 3879), multicast (ff00::/8), IETF Protocol Assignments envelope (2001::/23, globally reachable exceptions: 2001:1::1–::3 PCP/TURN/DNS-SD anycast, 2001:3::/32 AMT RFC 7450, 2001:4:112::/48 AS112-v6 RFC 7535, 2001:20::/28 ORCHIDv2 RFC 7343, 2001:30::/28 DETs RFC 9374), documentation (2001:db8::/32 RFC 3849, 3fff::/20 RFC 9637), 6to4 (2002::/16, RFC 3056), Discard-Only (100::/64, RFC 6666), Dummy IPv6 Prefix (100:0:0:1::/64, RFC 9780), SRv6 SIDs (5f00::/16, RFC 9252), NAT64 local-use (64:ff9b:1::/48, RFC 8215). IPv4 embedded in mapped, compatible, NAT64 well-known (64:ff9b::/96), and SIIT IPv4-translated (::ffff:0:0:0/96) forms is checked recursively. All three callers (JWKS boundary, webhook SSRF, link-preview SSRF) inherit the complete predicate through the inline `is_private_ip` compatibility alias. ### Invariant coverage **Canonical URI convergence.** `jwks_contract_uri_canonicalization_convergence_and_divergence` asserts that uppercase host, explicit `:443`, and dot-segment path (`/.well-known/./jwks.json`) each produce the same `AssertionPolicyId` as the canonical form; a genuinely different host or path diverges. Mutation: storing raw input bytes instead of `parsed.to_string()` turns the three convergence assertions red. **Resolved-target and pin-input seam.** `resolved_target_and_pin_key_seam_public_ipv6_and_fec0_rejection` carries a public `2606:4700::1` URI through all three stages of `fetch_jwks_inner`: `extract_url_host_and_port` yields the bare host (no brackets), `resolve_and_check_ssrf` takes the IP-literal fast path and returns the accepted `IpAddr`, and the extracted host string equals the URL authority form (verifying the correct bare input to reqwest's `resolve()` pin call). `fec0::1` traverses the same extraction and SSRF stages and is rejected as `InvalidUri`. Network-free: both addresses are IP literals with no DNS lookup. Mutation: restoring `host_str()` brackets the address, `IpAddr::parse` fails, the SSRF fast path is unreachable, and all three assertions flip red. **Controlled original-deadline rotation.** `shared_arc_source_verifier_rejects_expired_a1_accepts_a2` uses an `AtomicI64`-backed injectable clock to advance past A1's original absolute deadline without wall-clock sleep. A1's deadline is computed at T0 and never mutated. The clock advances to T0 + HARD_DEADLINE_SECS + 1; `get_snapshot` fires a re-fetch and installs A2. One unchanged `FederatedAssertionVerifier` then rejects A1-signed tokens (deadline enforced by the `key_set` read path) and accepts A2-signed tokens, proves A2's generation is strictly greater, and confirms A2's deadline is later than A1's original. Mutation oracle: replace the shared `Arc` with an independently constructed source built from the same configs and sharing the same controlled clock, warmed with a separate A1 fetch before advancement. Post-advancement, `key_set()` on the verifier's independent source filters the expired A1 snapshot (`filter(|c| now < c.hard_deadline)`) and returns no keys — the verifier never re-fetches and never observes A2. A1-reject stays green (the independent cache is also expired, so no A1 keys are served), but A2-accept flips red, because the verifier never observes A2. A2 acceptance is the reliable shared-source oracle. **Complete SSRF classifier boundary.** JWKS-boundary tests cover every newly restored class through `validate_jwks_uri` (URI-validation path): `192.0.0.1` (IETF Protocol Assignments interior), `192.0.0.9`/`.10` (PCP/TURN anycast global exceptions), `192.88.99.1` (deprecated 6to4 anycast), `2001:2::1` (2001::/23 interior), `2001:1::1` (2001::/23 global exception), `100::1` (Discard-Only), `3fff::1` (documentation), and `5f00::1` (SRv6 SIDs). URI validation and resolved-target enforcement share the same `is_not_global_unicast` predicate, so these URI-path tests exercise the complete classifier table. All pass mutation: removing any deny branch makes the rejection assertion red; removing any exception branch makes the acceptance assertion red. The resolved-target enforcement path is covered separately by `resolved_target_and_pin_key_seam_public_ipv6_and_fec0_rejection` for `::1` (loopback), public `2606:4700::1`, and `fec0::1`. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <261786559+cea@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Tom Brow
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c432a111ca |
feat(mobile): push notifications MVP (#6269)
This PR implements MVP, iOS-only,
[NIP-PL](
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Will Pfleger
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953a1798b2 |
feat(auth): add NIP-FI canonical assertion verifier and contracts (#6776)
The closed, provider-neutral contract layer at the root of the NIP-FI federated-identity dependency graph — Phase A, PR 1 of the plan. It has no dependencies on any other PR and defines no database schema, migration, runtime JWKS fetching, binding resolution, enrollment, or request/proof binding; those belong to later PRs. ## What this adds - **Multi-issuer assertion-policy config** (`IssuerRegistry`, `IssuerPolicy`) keyed by exact `iss`. Identity is issuer-qualified `(iss, sub)` throughout — equal `sub` under different `iss` are distinct identities. The subject coordinate is fixed to the JWT `sub` claim (`SUBJECT_CLAIM`), never configurable, so no deployment can seal a mutable attribute like `email` as identity. Issuer URL and audience remain deployment configuration. - **The two deterministic semantic contract identities** — `AssertionPolicyId = H(canonical assertion-policy contract)` and `TransportContractId = H(canonical transport contract)` — derived by length-prefixed, domain-separated SHA-256 so a semantic change moves exactly its owning ID while benign JWKS rotation never changes policy lineage. Set-valued policy inputs (audiences, algorithms, subject-class values, scope capture) are canonicalized before derivation, so the ID is invariant under permutation and duplication. Config fields that a freshness class never reads are rejected at construction (an `offline-jwt` policy cannot carry `maximum_status_age`), so the canonical encoding stays total over valid configs and semantically identical policies always derive one ID. - **The single canonical verifier** (`FederatedAssertionVerifier`, `FI-INV-16`) producing the origin-sealed, provider-neutral `VerifiedAssertion` normalized result. Its constructor is crate-private, so unverified claims cannot be promoted into authority. The issuer→JWKS authority is entirely crate-owned: `AssertionKeySet` has no public constructor and `IssuerKeySource` is sealed, so no downstream crate can relabel one issuer's keys as another's. The authenticated key set is bounded (`MAX_JWKS_KEYS`) and the bound is folded into `AssertionPolicyId`, so an unbounded attacker-controlled `kid` scan cannot be driven; every snapshot requires a finite positive hard deadline. - **Sealed revalidation dependencies** — `RevalidationDependencies` carries the key-snapshot hard deadline and a `ConfidentialAssertion` handle to the exact compact JWS (no `Debug`/`Display`/`serde` leak, sole read path `compact_jws()`), so a changed snapshot can revalidate the same evidence: a retained key revalidates, a removed key denies. - **The privacy-preserving four-class denial contract** (`DenialClass`, `FI-INV-13`) with the byte-exact Nostr text, HTTP status, body, `Content-Type`, and `WWW-Authenticate` values fixed by the spec's rejection table. An unreadable required current dependency maps to `authorization_unavailable`/503, never to rejected evidence, and rejected evidence never masquerades as a 503 at either end of the pipeline: all bounded, dependency-independent checks (compact structure, header, signature shape, policy, algorithm, token class) precede key-source lookup, and all offline validation (token-class, key, signature, audience, claims, time) completes before any status-witness deferral. A wrong-`typ` or structurally malformed token, or malformed/invalidly-signed input naming a current-status issuer, therefore denies with `evidence_rejected`/403 rather than being reported as a 503 availability signal. ## Corrections applied to the mined source Mined from the `buzz-auth` verifier core in [#1476](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/1476) and corrected to the settled spec (the merged `docs/nips/NIP-FI*.md`, [#5946](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/5946)), which settled after #1476 was written: - Token-class selection with exact `typ` enforcement. Two classes are offered: `at+jwt` and `nip-fi+jwt`. There is deliberately no generic/absent-`typ` "named compatibility" class: it cannot be proven disjoint from an OIDC ID token by claim presence alone (an issuer can mint an ID token carrying `client_id`), and the only authenticated discriminator is `typ`, which such a mode declines to constrain. - OIDC ID-token denial — denies even when `iss`, `aud`, and `sub` match, via exact `typ` mismatch against every accepted class. - The fixed `nostr_pubkey` claim accepted only as lowercase hex of exactly one 32-byte key; bech32 and other aliases deny. - Resource-owner / client-subject ambiguity denial and required `client_id` for `at+jwt`. - JWK admissibility: a key's `use` and, when present, `key_ops` must authorize signature verification (a key restricted to other operations such as `encrypt` is rejected), and the selected JOSE algorithm is bound to the key's required family and curve (ES256↔EC/P-256, ES384↔EC/P-384, EdDSA↔OKP/Ed25519, RS/PS↔RSA). The JWK `alg` is advisory; the actual key material is what signs, so a JWK declaring a matching `alg` over mismatched material (a different family or curve) is rejected before signature verification. - Spec-exact time arithmetic (`now < exp`, `iat <= now + skew`, `now < iat + maximum_assertion_age`, equality at expiry is expired). `exp`/`iat`/`nbf` accept finite integer or fractional RFC 7519 `NumericDate` values with checked, overflow-safe conversion; non-finite and out-of-range values deny. ## Verification In-crate tests in `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/verifier/tests.rs` sign real ES256 assertions against a fixed test key and cover: the happy path, exact-wire-text for all four denial classes, deterministic and semantic contract IDs, canonicalization invariance, token-class enforcement including ID-token denial, JWK `key_ops` rejection, `nostr_pubkey` hex handling, time bounds, and multi-issuer selection (same subject across distinct issuers yields distinct identities and policy IDs). They also cover the round-3 contracts: the key-set bound (oversized rejected, at-bound accepted, empty rejected), fixed-`sub` identity (identity is `sub` not a configured `email`; a token without `sub` denies), offline-before-deferral (invalid-signature, wrong-audience, malformed-claim, and expired under a current-status issuer each deny 403/`evidence_rejected`), and the revalidation contracts (dependencies carry the deadline and exact JWS; a retained key revalidates, a removed key denies). And the round-4 contracts: algorithm↔key-material binding, covered exactly per accepted algorithm (a table-driven matrix asserts every policy-acceptable algorithm — ES256, ES384, EdDSA, RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512 — matches only its required family/curve and rejects every other, so each mapping mutation fails individually; and an ES256 token against P-384, RSA, and Ed25519 material each deny `InvalidKey`); malformed evidence classified before key lookup (wrong-`typ`, two-segment, four-segment, empty-signature, and non-base64url-signature tokens against an empty source deny 403 not 503); `maximum_status_age` inapplicable under offline-jwt rejected at construction while current-status still requires it; and fractional `NumericDate` (finite fractional `iat`/`exp`/`nbf` within bounds verify, non-finite and out-of-range deny). Compile-fail doctests guard the sealed authority seam (`AssertionKeySet::new`, `IssuerKeySource`) and the absence of the named-compatibility token class. ## Notes - `Co-authored-by` attribution is preserved for the mined author. The #1476 `buzz-auth` commits are authored by Cea Stapleton Cordasco (the salvage map records #1476 under Franco; the git history on that PR is Cea's — surfacing for the attribution/closure record). - Amends `docs/nips/NIP-FI.md` to remove the "named compatibility access token" class and its `FI-TRACE-TOKEN-CLASS` oracle reference, so the normative spec matches the two-class root implementation (a generic/absent `typ` cannot be proven disjoint from an OIDC ID token). Removal-only, no neighbor redesign; a `docs/nips/` grep confirms no dangling cross-reference to the class remains. - Adds `jsonwebtoken 10.4.0` (`aws_lc_rs`) as a workspace dependency. Dependencies: none. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <261786559+cea@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Luke Tornquist
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113a33b7e4 |
Add database pressure observability (#6700)
## Why Database pressure currently collapses several distinct delays into one symptom. This adds the evidence layer needed to distinguish pool acquisition wait, logical database operation time, advisory-lock wait, and selected transaction duration before changing timeout or retry policy. This is the phase 2 Lane A observability bundle for [#26](https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/26), [#28](https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/28), and [#33](https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/33). It is stacked on #6668. ## What - Record explicit reader/writer checkout wait and acquisition outcomes with `buzz_db_pool_acquire_wait_seconds` and `buzz_db_pool_acquisitions_total`. - Extend the compile-time `#[datastore_span(name = "...")]` seam with `buzz_db_operation_duration_seconds`, so operation labels remain static source literals instead of request data. - Route correctness-critical replacement, membership, push-gate, deletion, and migration/schema-safety advisory locks through one observer without changing their SQL, order, scope, or blocking behavior. - Measure six internally owned transaction lifetimes with `buzz_db_transaction_duration_seconds`, starting after `BEGIN` succeeds and ending after explicit commit/rollback or scope exit. - Emit root slow-operation warnings at 500 ms, logging the first slow completion and then 1/100 per call site with only `operation`, `outcome`, and `elapsed_ms`. - Document names, units, fixed label vocabularies, measurement boundaries, and blind spots in this PR description. Fixed labels are deliberately small: - `pool_role`: `writer`, `reader` - `lock_type`: `replacement`, `membership`, `push_gate`, `deletion`, `migration_schema_safety` - `outcome`: `success`, `error`, `timeout` where SQLx/PostgreSQL can distinguish it accurately - `operation`: compile-time datastore names plus the six closed transaction operation names documented in the runbook No metric or slow warning contains community IDs, event IDs, event kinds, coordinates, d-tags, SQL/query text, query IDs, returned errors, or event content. ## Coverage boundaries - Operation duration is the complete annotated logical function body, not pure SQL execution; it may include implicit checkout, lock wait, nested operations, and application work. Cancelled futures do not reach its completion hook. - Pool timing covers explicit helper checkouts, including proved-reader routing and selected writer-owned transactions. Implicit SQLx checkout through `&PgPool` remains folded into operation duration. - Lock timing covers application-side blocking locks in the five named families. Trigger/stored-procedure locks, channel-TTL locking, the usage try-lock, and the audit service session lock remain outside this slice. - Transaction timing covers only the six wholly owned boundaries documented in the runbook. It excludes pool wait, `BEGIN`, asynchronous rollback cleanup after an early return, and caller-owned `Db::begin_transaction` lifetime. ## Relationship to #6229 #6229 is the incident-driven timeout precursor. This PR does not add or change `statement_timeout`, `lock_timeout`, `idle_in_transaction_session_timeout`, retries, audit durability, or client-visible conflicts. It provides the missing distributions needed to evaluate those policies later and intentionally leaves #6229's open audit retry/durability finding untouched. The branches overlap in `crates/buzz-db/src/lib.rs` and `crates/buzz-db/src/migration.rs`, so a later rebase may need textual conflict resolution, but the behavior is complementary rather than duplicated. ## Risk assessment Moderate-low. The primary risk is instrumentation overhead and added static series. Cardinality is source-bounded, slow logs are sampled/redacted root events, and the lock/transaction changes wrap existing awaits without changing policy or ordering. ## Verification Author workstation: `buzz-tornquist-db-pressure-observability` (`2010927`), exact head `d7cf833e26c528adfcde3917ded80daf6f4ddac9`, parent `6f50e6b2b2a996349149af61d35bdd6a355f77fd`. - `cargo fmt --all --check` — passed - `cargo clippy -p buzz-datastore-tracing -p buzz-db -p buzz-audit -p buzz-search -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings` — passed - `cargo test -p buzz-datastore-tracing --quiet` — 4 passed - `cargo test -p buzz-db --quiet` — 109 passed, 200 ignored - `cargo test -p buzz-audit -p buzz-search --quiet` — 16 passed, 25 ignored - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib --quiet -- --test-threads=1` — 906 passed, 48 ignored - Native PostgreSQL focused tests for pool success/timeout/error, lock success/contention/timeout/error, replacement, membership serialization, push ordering, deletion fencing, migration/schema exclusion, and reader fallback — 8 passed The default-parallel relay run passed once; subsequent runs exposed the existing load-sensitive `api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` 504 at the end of the suite. That test passes in isolation and the full relay suite passes serially. Independent exact-head review workstation: `buzz-tornquist-db-pressure-observability-review` (`2013067`). Formatting, the same all-target clippy command, datastore instrumentation tests, DB unit tests, source privacy guards, and diff/non-goal audits passed; no review findings. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> |
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Brad Seiler
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d12dea4e67 | Support community deletion in versioned media buckets (#6738) | ||
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renovate[bot]
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f794216737 |
chore(deps): update rust crate async-trait to v0.1.92 (#6094)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [async-trait](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/async-trait) | dependencies | patch | `0.1.91` → `0.1.92` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>dtolnay/async-trait (async-trait)</summary> ### [`v0.1.92`](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/async-trait/releases/tag/0.1.92) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/async-trait/compare/0.1.91...0.1.92) - Resolve double\_must\_use clippy lint in generated code ([#​303](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/async-trait/issues/303)) </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - Between 12:00 AM and 03:59 AM, only on Monday (`* 0-3 * * 1`) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/block/buzz). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4yOS41IiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDQuMzkuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOltdfQ==--> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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renovate[bot]
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9390e11c9b |
chore(deps): update rust crate http-body-util to v0.1.4 (#5452)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [http-body-util](https://redirect.github.com/hyperium/http-body) | dependencies | patch | `0.1.3` → `0.1.5` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>hyperium/http-body (http-body-util)</summary> ### [`v0.1.5`](https://redirect.github.com/hyperium/http-body/compare/http-body-util-v0.1.4...http-body-util-v0.1.5) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/hyperium/http-body/compare/http-body-util-v0.1.4...http-body-util-v0.1.5) ### [`v0.1.4`](https://redirect.github.com/hyperium/http-body/releases/tag/http-body-util-v0.1.4) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/hyperium/http-body/compare/http-body-util-v0.1.3...http-body-util-v0.1.4) #### What's Changed - Add `Fused` body combinator that always returns `None` once completed. - Add `BodyExt::into_stream()` to convert a body into a `Stream`. - Add `Full::into_inner()` to get the full `Buf`. - Add `InspectFrame` and `InspectErr` combinators. </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - Between 12:00 AM and 03:59 AM, only on Monday (`* 0-3 * * 1`) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/block/buzz). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMi4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDQuMzkuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOltdfQ==--> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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renovate[bot]
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1a0a27d358 |
chore(deps): update rust crate http to v1.4.2 (#5451)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [http](https://redirect.github.com/hyperium/http) | dependencies | patch | `1.4.0` → `1.4.2` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>hyperium/http (http)</summary> ### [`v1.4.2`](https://redirect.github.com/hyperium/http/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#142-June-8-2026) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/hyperium/http/compare/v1.4.1...v1.4.2) - Fix `uri::Builder` to allow `"*"` as the path when scheme and authority are also set, used in HTTP/2 requests. - Fix `Uri` to properly reject `DEL` characters. ### [`v1.4.1`](https://redirect.github.com/hyperium/http/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#141-May-25-2026) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/hyperium/http/compare/v1.4.0...v1.4.1) - Fix `PathAndQuery::from_static()` and `from_shared()` to reject inputs that do not start with `/`. - Fix `Extend` for `HeaderMap` to clamp max size hint and not overflow. - Fix `header::IntoIter` that could use-after-free if the generic value type could panic on drop. - Fix `header::{IterMut, ValuesIterMut}` to not violate stacked borrows. </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - Between 12:00 AM and 03:59 AM, only on Monday (`* 0-3 * * 1`) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/block/buzz). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMi4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDQuMzkuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOltdfQ==--> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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renovate[bot]
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2cef92df67 |
chore(deps): update rust crate futures to v0.3.33 (#5445)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [futures](https://rust-lang.github.io/futures-rs) ([source](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs)) | dev-dependencies | patch | `0.3.32` → `0.3.34` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>rust-lang/futures-rs (futures)</summary> ### [`v0.3.34`](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#0334---2026-08-11) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/compare/0.3.33...0.3.34) - Preserve cloned waker identity. ([#​3032](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/issues/3032)) - Updato `syn` to 3. ([#​3028](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/issues/3028)) ### [`v0.3.33`](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#0333---2026-07-18) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/compare/0.3.32...0.3.33) - Fix `ReadLine`'s soundness issue regarding to exception safety. ([#​3020](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/issues/3020)) - Fix unsound `Send` impl for `IterPinRef` and `Iter`. ([#​3003](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/issues/3003)) - Fix stacked borrows violation in `compat01as03` implementation. ([#​3012](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/issues/3012)) - Fix memory leak in `FuturesUnordered::IntoIter`. ([#​3005](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/issues/3005)) - Add `portable-atomic-alloc` feature and use it in `FuturesUnordered`. ([#​3007](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/issues/3007)) - Re-export `alloc::task::Wake`. ([#​3010](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/issues/3010)) - Update `spin` to 0.12. ([#​3014](https://redirect.github.com/rust-lang/futures-rs/issues/3014)) </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - Between 12:00 AM and 03:59 AM, only on Monday (`* 0-3 * * 1`) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/block/buzz). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMi4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiNDQuMjkuNSIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6Im1haW4iLCJsYWJlbHMiOltdfQ==--> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Logan Johnson
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cc8a8b0dcb |
fix: bump h2 for RUSTSEC-2026-0258 (#6222)
🤖 ## Summary - Bump the locked `h2` version from `0.4.14` to `0.4.16` to clear RUSTSEC-2026-0258, which affects h2 versions through `0.4.15`. - Keep the change lockfile-only; no manifest or product-code changes are included. ## Details - `h2` is now `0.4.16` with checksum `a9f37a958b41b3b19ee2707c06439c0e9e547e847223eb791ecb0cb821c65e27`. - The lockfile was regenerated by `cargo update -p h2 --precise 0.4.16` using Cargo 1.95.0 / rustc 1.95.0, matching `rust-toolchain.toml` and the CI pin. - Cargo's canonical resolver output also rewrites 16 dependency references to existing `windows-sys` package entries: - `anstyle-query 1.1.5`, `anstyle-wincon 3.0.11`, `socket2 0.6.3`, `termina 0.3.3`, and `uds_windows 1.2.1`: `0.61.2` → `0.60.2`. - `dirs-sys 0.5.0` and `nu-ansi-term 0.50.3`: `0.59.0` → `0.60.2`. - `colored 3.1.1`, `errno 0.3.14`, `quinn-udp 0.5.14`, `rustix 0.38.44`, `rustix 1.1.4`, `rustls-platform-verifier 0.7.0`, `seize 0.5.1`, `tempfile 3.27.0`, and `winapi-util 0.1.11`: `0.59.0` → `0.52.0`. - All four referenced `windows-sys` versions (`0.52.0`, `0.59.0`, `0.60.2`, and `0.61.2`) were already present in the baseline lockfile. There are zero new package entries or checksums, and the only package record replacement is `h2 0.4.14` → `0.4.16`. There is no `wasmtime` edge change. ## Validation - `cargo-deny check` passed. - `cargo build --workspace` passed. - `just test-unit` passed: 455 passed, 0 failed, 1 ignored; all nine package suites passed. Signed-off-by: loganj <loganj@squareup.com> |
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Wes
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e0940927ff |
fix(channels): return complete member rosters (#5765)
## Summary - return complete channel rosters instead of truncating at 1,000 members - chunk `event_mentions` inserts inside one transaction so large kind `39002` snapshots remain discoverable by every `p` tag - add a targeted `buzz-admin reconcile-channels --channel <uuid>` force-republish path for stale discovery snapshots - cover a 1,501-member roster, 11,000-tag mention index, and kind `39002` tag construction past member 1,000 ## Why The relay builds NIP-29 discovery and several authorization decisions from `get_members()`, but that helper silently returned only the first 1,000 active members. Desktop then counted the truncated kind `39002` event, while late members could be rejected by roster-scanning member actions. Removing the roster cap exposes PostgreSQL's 65,535 bind-parameter ceiling in mention indexing, so the insert is chunked transactionally to preserve all-or-nothing indexing. The existing reconcilers only fill missing discovery events. The targeted admin option bypasses the separately known 1,000-channel reconciliation-list ceiling and replaces an existing channel snapshot using the configured production relay key. ## Attribution This supersedes and builds on #3166 by @LordMelkor. Thank you for identifying the roster boundary and contributing the original complete-roster and mention-index patch. The production roster/query changes and the two PostgreSQL regressions retain that work's shape; this PR rebases it onto current `main`, adds relay coverage, and adds the targeted repair operation requested for rollout. ## Validation Exact pushed head: `24d02e4f3824150ed84913c9d230e675502e5b12` - `cargo check -p buzz-db -p buzz-admin` - `cargo test -p buzz-db channel::tests::get_members_returns_full_roster_beyond_1000 -- --ignored --exact --nocapture` - `cargo test -p buzz-db feed::tests::insert_mentions_indexes_rosters_past_bind_parameter_cap -- --ignored --exact --nocapture` - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib handlers::side_effects::tests::group_members_snapshot_keeps_members_past_one_thousand -- --exact` - `cargo run -q -p buzz-admin -- reconcile-channels --help` - mandatory pre-push hook: branch-skew, desktop checks/typecheck/tests, mobile tests, Rust tests, and desktop Tauri checks all passed on the pushed head ## Rollout 1. Deploy the relay/backend build. 2. Run `buzz-admin reconcile-channels --channel <general-channel-uuid>` with `BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY` configured. 3. Verify the replacement kind `39002` roster count matches the active database membership count. No schema migration or desktop release is required. Fixes #3156 Supersedes #3166 --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Carl <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Kalvin C
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8a2c9af2db |
feat(deletion): add durable whole-community deletion (#4425)
## Summary Adds a durable, operator-controlled V1 for deleting an entire Buzz community without deleting another tenant's data. The workflow is exposed through `buzz-admin deletions`: - `sweep` records independent fleet storage-taxonomy observations - `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, and `approve` manage a deletion request - `unblock` resumes a fail-closed request after an operator records remediation identity and reason - `run` and `drain` execute bounded work Requests advance through a PostgreSQL-backed state machine and stop at `retention_pending` after logical deletion has been independently verified across PostgreSQL, object storage, and Redis. This PR ships the engine and CLI, not a continuously running worker or Kubernetes packaging. For V1, a cluster/VM administrator invokes `/usr/local/bin/buzz-admin` from the existing relay image, for example with `kubectl exec` or an equivalent container/VM exec path. ## What whole-community V1 removes For the target community, V1 removes: - rows from the allowlisted community-scoped PostgreSQL catalog, including members, profiles, authored events and bodies, DMs, reactions, mentions, memberships, tokens, workflows, moderation, audit, feedback, and rate-limit state - media sidecars and upload-attribution records under `_meta/<community>/` and `_uploads/<community>/` - Git repository pointers under `repos/<community>/` - Redis keys under `buzz:<community>:*` The community row survives as a permanent tombstone, and deletion control-plane records remain as evidence of the request, approval, execution, and result. ## Safety model Deletion is not a broad `DELETE CASCADE` followed by optimistic cleanup. The destructive boundaries are durable and fail closed. ### 1. Inventory and approval - `submit` resolves the target and freezes the schema plus summary-only storage inventory. - Approval is bound to the exact request, community, and frozen inventory digest. - Unsupported manifest versions, malformed keys inside the target's owned prefixes, live scoped-table/write-fence coverage drift, frozen-inventory mismatch, and approval mismatch block execution rather than guessing. Migration and catalog revision numbers are not authorization gates; the executor validates the live safety shape instead. - Storage inventory is server-side prefix scoped to exactly: - `_meta/<community>/` - `_uploads/<community>/` - `repos/<community>/` - The deletion path never lists the whole shared bucket and has no arbitrary per-community object cap. Its listing work is proportional to the target community's bindings, not total fleet storage. - Fleet-wide taxonomy sweeps remain independent observability. They report unknown writer shapes but do not gate deletion submission, fencing, or destructive progress. Maintainers must add deletion taxonomy coverage whenever a new community-owned object-key class is introduced; writer-coverage tests bind the current media and Git writers to that contract. ### 2. Quiesce, fence, and destructive freeze - Writes continue through submission, inventory, and approval. They stop when execution moves the target into `quiescing` and then establishes the durable fence. - Already-admitted external effects finish under heartbeated serving-write leases; the exact admitted lease may renew while the community is quiescing, but new lease acquisition is rejected. The executor drains admitted leases before destructive work. - Invite minting after quiescing begins fails as typed `AccessDenied` (HTTP 503 at the relay boundary) before an invite can be persisted. - Database triggers enforce the community write fence across the complete catalog of community-scoped tables. Startup/readiness and destructive execution validate that catalog so a newly added but unfenced table cannot silently escape. - **Named isolation assumption — fresh write snapshot.** Every writer transaction that can reach a community-fenced relation must use PostgreSQL `READ COMMITTED`; each guarded write therefore observes a statement snapshot no older than acquisition of the community deletion lock. `REPEATABLE READ` and `SERIALIZABLE` can retain a pre-fence snapshot and are unsupported for writers. The writer pool refuses non-`READ COMMITTED` sessions at connection setup, and both SQL fence functions reject an explicit per-transaction isolation override with SQLSTATE `25000`. Configuration-delivered bad isolation can surface through SQLx as a pool-acquire timeout because every `after_connect` attempt is rejected; the precise `community writes require READ COMMITTED isolation` reason remains observable when the SQL guard is reached. Read-only replica transactions are outside this assumption. - Holding the shared advisory lock until the guarded write executes is a separate liveness condition: under `READ COMMITTED`, releasing it early does not permit resurrection because the trigger rechecks the fence, but it can turn a fleet sweep into a statement-wide SQLSTATE `55000` abort. - After the fence closes writers, storage is re-enumerated into chunked side-table rows. Per-prefix counts and digests bind those concrete keys to the destructive manifest. - Manifest chunk insertion, update, and deletion are protected after freeze. This closes the race where an unbound key could otherwise appear after the manifest was committed. ### 3. Checkpointed destruction - Target-owned object bindings are deleted from the frozen destructive manifest in bounded batches with durable progress. - The concrete key list lives in chunked side-table rows rather than one request-row JSON value. It supports large communities, resumable execution, and terminal cleanup. - Missing objects are accepted as idempotent crash-window outcomes; malformed ownership, changed evidence, and unexplained target-prefix drift fail closed. - PostgreSQL purging remains scoped by `community_id`, including the guarded NIP-RS hard-delete path discovered with real Desktop kind `30078` read-state data. - Redis cleanup explicitly scans and `UNLINK`s only `buzz:<community_id>:*`. Natural expiry is insufficient because some keys, including tunnel generation counters used as fencing state, are deliberately persistent. ### 4. Independent verification - PostgreSQL logical absence is checked after purge. - The three target-owned storage prefixes are freshly inventoried again and must be empty. - Redis requires two complete empty namespace scans. - Only after all three stores pass does the request advance through `logically_verified` to `retention_pending`. ## What V1 deliberately does not erase ### Shared content-addressed storage Per-community deletion removes bindings, metadata, attribution records, and Git pointers. It does **not** physically delete fleet-shared CAS bytes that another community may still reference: - media blobs and thumbnails - Git manifests, packs, and indexes (`manifests/`, `packs/`, and `idx/`) Safe reclamation requires a separate fleet-wide reachability and retention GC. Unknown keys elsewhere in the shared bucket do not block one community's deletion; malformed or unrecognized keys inside that community's three owned prefixes still fail closed. ### External retained copies The online logical-deletion proof does not erase object versions/replicas, database backups/WAL, CDN copies, provider retention copies, or observability exports. Those require their own retention and purge controls. ### Member-only erasure This PR erases a whole community. It does not implement the different operation "erase one npub while preserving the community." Removing membership or accepting NIP-09 is not member erasure. A member-only workflow would need to find and selectively remove or redact authored event content and pubkeys, profile data, DMs, reactions, mentions, memberships/roles, tokens, workflows/subscriptions, upload attribution, moderation/audit history, repository attribution, and identity embedded in tags or JSON. It would also need explicit rules for ownership transfer, surviving replies and thread metadata, audit-chain integrity, immutable Git history, and shared-CAS reachability. That requires a pubkey-level fence and selective graph rewrite; it is a separate deletion product, not a safe extension of this whole-tenant worker. ## In scope - migration `0029_community_deletion.sql`: requests, approvals, leases, manifest chunks, checkpoints, tombstones, and the universal write-fence catalog - durable executor leases, generations, heartbeats, retry/block state, and resumable stage transitions - operator-driven `sweep`, `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, `approve`, `unblock`, `run`, and `drain` commands - serving-path fences for database writes and external effects across event ingest, media, Git, workflow, push, invites, mesh/tunnel, and related paths - target-prefix-only storage inventory, summary manifests, post-fence destructive chunks, and bounded batch deletion - exact community Redis namespace purge and two-pass absence verification - cross-community isolation, crash/resume, manifest-integrity, writer-taxonomy, and schema/migration regressions - desired-state `schema/schema.sql` support without requiring a SQLx migration ledger ## Deferred / not covered - dedicated Helm/chart worker Deployment, service account, secrets, probes, resources, and network policy - autonomous `buzz-admin deletions worker` poll loop and worker-only health server - least-privilege separation among migration, relay-serving, and destructive execution roles - fleet-wide shared-CAS physical GC - backup/provider/CDN/observability retention completion - member-only erasure - provider-native conditional-delete improvements - a general force-continue escape hatch; permanent safety failures remain fail closed unless an operator remediates the cause and records an audited `unblock` The removed continuous-worker implementation remains deferred; no remote follow-up branch is claimed by this PR. ## Validation ### Current PR head and repository state Current pushed head: `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`, rebased onto `cc9a2f783375e51a6e8d1f2f9d01d5f7e22813d1` (`origin/main` at push time). The complete PR diff is now 47 files, 9,834 additions, and 517 deletions. The bespoke source-scanner stack was removed to keep this PR scoped to community deletion. Tyler/team requested the underlying fenced-write safety behavior, not `ast-grep`, `crates/buzz-db/tests/community_fenced_writes.rs`, its 27 fixtures, or the new `scripts/lints/community_*.yml` rules. Those scanner-specific files, dependencies, Hermit links, and runner wiring are absent from the current tree. The production database write fence, startup/destructive live-catalog validation, and deletion behavior remain. Source validation on this exact SHA passed: - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `bash -n scripts/run-tests.sh` - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --all-targets`: 102 passed, 173 skipped, 0 failed - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-deletion --all-targets`: 10 passed, 9 skipped, 0 failed - `cargo nextest run -p buzz-admin --all-targets`: 1 passed, 0 failed - affected-package/all-target Clippy with warnings denied - lockfile consistency - Helm 3.16.4 lint and all 44 chart unit tests - Helm region controls using that fixture: default `BUZZ_S3_REGION=us-east-1`, explicit `eu-west-2` override, and blank-region schema rejection The prior Kubernetes battery below was run against `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04`. It remains useful evidence for the patch-equivalent production deletion implementation, but it is **not** claimed as exact-SHA evidence for current head `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`; the current cleanup removes only scanner/test/tooling infrastructure. CI restarted for the new head after the rebase and is pending. Human review remains `CHANGES_REQUESTED`. ### Prior-head live Kubernetes deletion and safety gates The full program used one immutable image, real PostgreSQL, Redis, MinIO, and a three-relay Kubernetes release: - source: `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04` (**prior head**) - image: `buzz-e2e:sha-928992237358` - immutable image digest: `sha256:a1a204f4618ac22d9e210be5e5290645a15d79831ae30b0e44379357c8e4a895` - evidence root: `/tmp/buzz-e2e/20260807T033025Z-928992237358-full-gates/` - evidence-manifest digest: `82875c5bc9bea7370b796a7aef3457b3a1c8306c84c59e0f7388bbb5ad30e865` Passed gates at that prior head: - **Chart/operator region:** default `us-east-1`, explicit nondefault propagation, blank-region schema rejection, live in-pod environment, and an in-pod taxonomy sweep over 18 objects with zero unknown. - **Fenced writers and lifecycle:** open-write/fence ordering; 100-attempt anti-starvation; invite, push matcher, and exhausted-reaper bystander isolation; non-`READ-COMMITTED` rejection; manifest/tombstone contracts; eight-failure stage block and audited `unblock`. - **Destructive lifecycle:** submit → approve → run → `retention_pending`; PostgreSQL tombstone and Redis/S3 verification true; zero retries/errors; terminal reruns rejected with exit 5. - **Fresh 10,001-object crash boundary:** exactly two chunks (10,000 + 1). The executor deleted chunk 0 from MinIO while its PostgreSQL stamp was row-lock-blocked, was killed with `SIGKILL`, left one object and both stamps absent, then resumed the same request under generation 2 to zero objects and terminal state. - **Independent dead-owner recovery:** a dedicated executor claimed generation 1, blocked before effects, and was killed through containerd with `SIGKILL` (no TERM cleanup). The request remained owned and unreclaimable before lease expiry; a successor claimed generation 2 after 60 seconds and completed with two attempts and zero retries. - **Three-pod socket isolation:** ordinary NIP-42 and joined huddle-audio target witnesses on every replica received exact `1008 / community deleted`; healthy-tenant witnesses on those pods remained live; deleted-host reconnect returned HTTP 404. - **Health/provenance:** all replicas independently returned ready and retained the exact image digest before/after destructive runs and an audio-enabled rolling restart; PostgreSQL, Redis, and MinIO were healthy at close. Instrument corrections were retained as evidence rather than counted as product failures: a foreground PostgreSQL forward caused an initial `PoolTimedOut`; Kubernetes pod deletion exercised graceful TERM rather than dead-owner recovery; shell-background socket witnesses died with their parent; and the first image build hit the corporate TLS proxy. Detached forwarding/witnesses, containerd `SIGKILL`, and the configured internal CA/Artifactory mirror produced the discriminating runs without weakening product security. ### Prior-head cleanup For the prior-head Kubernetes run, the Helm release was removed, namespace absence was verified, run-owned Screen sessions were absent, and that source worktree remained clean. The evidence manifest was independently recomputed and every indexed artifact passed `shasum -a 256 -c`. The current `359d8402` source worktree is also clean after the scanner-only cleanup and push. --------- Signed-off-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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c966b862fe |
fix(deps): bump webbrowser to 1.2.4 for RUSTSEC-2026-0257 (#5659)
## What Bumps `webbrowser` from `1.2.1` to `1.2.4` in both lockfiles (`Cargo.lock` and `desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.lock`) to clear [RUSTSEC-2026-0257](https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0257). ## Why The advisory landed in the RustSec DB and flipped the `Security` job (`cargo-deny check`) red on `main` — the same job passed on identical lockfile state before the advisory was published. `webbrowser` 1.2.1 substitutes the URL into the Unix `BROWSER` env template *before* tokenizing, allowing browser argument injection (e.g. `--remote-debugging-port`). `crates/buzz-agent` calls `webbrowser::open()` for the OAuth flow (`crates/buzz-agent/src/auth.rs`) with an internally-constructed HTTPS URL, so practical exploitability is low, but the gate is correctly blocking. Fixed in `1.2.2`+. ## Scope Lockfile-only. The `crates/buzz-agent/Cargo.toml` constraint is already `webbrowser = "1"`, so no manifest change is needed. `webbrowser` 1.2.4 pulls in `objc2-app-kit` as a new transitive dependency; the `windows-sys` edge churn re-unifies to versions already present in the lockfile (no new `windows-sys` version is introduced). ## Verification - `cargo-deny check` passes locally on the pinned toolchain (`advisories ok, bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok`); RUSTSEC-2026-0257 no longer reported in either lockfile. - `cargo check -p buzz-agent` compiles clean against `webbrowser 1.2.4`. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Dave Grochowski
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397796c5f3 |
feat(tracing): add PostgreSQL tracing spans (#3678)
## Why Expose PostgreSQL datastore latency within existing request traces so slow logical database operations can be identified without recording tenant data or query arguments. ## What - Add client spans around logical PostgreSQL operations across the database facade, search, audit, replica fencing, and command persistence - Use a dedicated `buzz_datastore` target and `db.system.name = "postgresql"` for filtering and backend classification - Exclude health-check database calls and scrub raw identifiers and errors from newly traced paths ## Risk Assessment Medium — this instruments frequently used datastore paths and increases trace volume when enabled, but does not change SQL execution or datastore behavior. Existing OpenTelemetry filtering controls export. ## References - Pre-push clippy and fast unit-test hooks passed Generated with Amp --------- Signed-off-by: David Grochowski <dgrochowski@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Amp <amp@ampcode.com> |
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Mic Neale
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240cdd3ea1 |
chore: mesh upgrade, clean up legacy special case code, simplify model selection for mesh (#5289)
Shared compute now has exactly two model choices: MeshLLM's virtual `mesh` model, or a model you name. Buzz picks between them in one place, and buzz-agent no longer knows meshes exist. ## What changed - **MeshLLM v0.74.0 → v0.75.1.** v0.75.0 added `degrade_to_single_model`, so a `model=mesh` request is answered by one served model when there is no committee to form, instead of failing. v0.75.1 adds Mesh-LLM#1196, which skips stale pre-0.75 runtime cache entries rather than aborting startup on them — without it, anyone who had run mesh on 0.73/0.74 could not start. - **Deleted the client-side mesh catalog probe.** buzz-agent used to poll `/v1/models` (5s TTL, 30s cooldown, two-observation debounce) to decide whether `mesh` was safe to send. MeshLLM now decides per request, so the polling, its hysteresis, and its 503 fallback are gone. - **One mapping point.** `relay_mesh_wire_model()` turns the stored value into a wire name: `auto` becomes `mesh`, a named model passes through. The spawn env, the ACP harness, and the readiness probe all use it, so they cannot disagree — previously `BUZZ_ACP_MODEL` and the probe both said `auto`, a name the mesh does not advertise. - **Removed the `nostr-relay-pool` advisory exception.** #5404 allowed RUSTSEC-2026-0243 "after mesh-llm migrates to nostr-sdk >= 0.45". v0.75.1 does, so the retired crate is gone from both lockfiles and the exception would only mask a future advisory for it. - **Deleted `scripts/ensure-mesh-native-runtime.sh`** and its six justfile call sites. It built llama.cpp from source into the runtime cache; the app already downloads the signed release runtime itself, and CI never called it. ## Why it is better **−639 lines of Rust.** Availability is decided by the node that knows the answer, per request, instead of by a client cache that could be stale for up to 30 seconds. A second worker joining now takes effect on the next request rather than after two confirming probes. ## Behaviour change A 503 on an explicit `mesh` request takes the ordinary transport retry under the same model instead of failing over to a second one — there is no second model to fail over to now. MoA repairs partial committee results internally before it reaches that point. ## Validation `crates/buzz-relay/examples/mesh_agent_e2e.rs` now sends `mesh` where it previously sent `auto` or the physical model id, so no leg was covering what Buzz actually puts on the wire. 4/4 on gemma-4-E4B, gemma-4-26B-A4B, and Qwen3-8B — including a real ACP tool call through `mesh` into buzz-dev-mcp, asserted by reading the written file back off disk. Hand-tested in the desktop app on both gemma-4 sizes: picked Auto, agent logged `model_id=mesh`, replied in channel. ## Not covered A committee that forms and then loses a worker returns 502, and that needs two workers to reproduce — not testable on one machine. --------- Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> |
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Will Pfleger
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5e4c05f90b |
feat(desktop): NIP-AM agent-usage backend — P2 emission/transport/archive + P4a aggregation/D6 (#4000)
## What Implements Phases 2 and 4a of the Usage v2 plan (plan events `d0268cd0`/`0e95b035`), extending the archive backend to emit, transport, archive, and aggregate both cache categories and billing identity fail-closed. ### P2 — emission, transport, archive **Tri-state accumulators** (`Unseen`/`Exact`/`Unknown`) for cache-read and cache-write in `buzz-agent` turn and session state. Absent field = Unknown (never zero) through the full pipeline. No `unwrap_or(0)` on the cache path. Both cache folds are gated on usage-bearing responses (same gate as the total-state and identity folds) — a response with no usage at all must not poison either accumulator. **Overflow-aware input token parsing and accumulation** — closed end-to-end from parse through wire to ACP: - `sum_usage()` returns `SumUsageResult` (`Exact(u64)` | `Overflow`) — checked arithmetic, never clamps. `anthropic_input_tokens()` returns `Option<SumUsageResult>` since it sums three fields (`input_tokens + cache_read_input_tokens + cache_creation_input_tokens`) that can collectively overflow. Single-field callers (`prompt_tokens`, `completion_tokens`, etc.) convert via `.into_exact()` — their single-field sums cannot overflow. - `LlmResponse.input_tokens_overflowed: bool` propagates the parse-layer signal into the run loop. When set, `input_tokens` is `None` (clamped value discarded), the context-gate baseline (`last_request_input_tokens`) is frozen at its prior reading, and `turn_input_tokens` is poisoned to `TurnIOState::Poisoned` before any emission — including mid-turn `emit_usage_update` calls. A dedicated enum on `LlmResponse.input_tokens` would ripple into ~20 existing test assertions on `r.input_tokens == Some(...)`; the bool flag confines the change to the two call sites that check it. - `TurnIOState` (`Unseen`/`Exact`/`Poisoned`) for input and output: per-round fold uses `checked_add`; overflow poisons permanently at turn and session level, no healing. Absence does not poison (pass-2-cleared contract unchanged). Wire emission omits `accumulatedInputTokens`/`accumulatedOutputTokens` when poisoned — never null, never `u64::MAX`. ACP treats absent = publisher-poisoned: `delta_reliable: false`, null turn fields, null cumulative for that category; session cumulative stays unknown for all subsequent turns once poisoned. **Conditional wire emission** for `accumulatedCachedInputTokens` and new `accumulatedCacheWriteTokens`: fields are omitted when the cumulative is Unseen or Unknown. ACP `_goose/unstable/session/update` contract documented next to the payload with tests for all absence/zero variants. **`PricingIdentity` stamping (publisher-side)**: - `pricing_authority()`: canonical parsed-URL endpoint comparison against the official allowlist — HTTPS only, exact allowlisted host (lookalike-safe), default port (omitted or explicit :443), required API base path, rejects userinfo/query/fragment/path-prefix lookalikes. - Model: the actually-requested `request_model` after mesh/auto resolution (not `effective_model_str`). - Turn discipline: identity retained only while ALL usage in the current turn carries one identical proven identity; any mismatch, unproven-usage-bearing response, or unpaired cumulative snapshot poisons to absent; a later matching notification does not heal a mixed turn. **ACP `UsageTracker` identity fold**: per-in-flight-turn tri-state identity accumulator replacing last-update-wins. Any absent identity on a token-advancing notification or exact mismatch poisons to absent; poison survives later updates; reset in `begin_turn()`/`take()`; reset also when a request fails (baseline cleared so preflight gate cannot stay frozen sub-threshold on retries). **M3 migration**: adds `turn_cache_write_tokens`, `cumulative_cache_write_tokens`, `pricing_authority`, `pricing_model`, `pricing_cache_class` to `agent_metric_index`. Additive, idempotent, guarded per-column by marker. M2 migration also guarded per-column (turn and cumulative cache-read columns checked and added independently; marker commits only after both are present). Fresh-DB schema includes all columns. **First-turn baselines**: `seed_zero_baseline` seeds `last_input: Some(0)`, `last_output: Some(0)`, `last_cached_input: Some(0)`, `last_cache_write: Some(0)`, and `last_total: Some(0)` — all have the known-zero-at-spawn argument. Absent fields from incoming snapshots still produce unknown (tri-state unchanged). Sessions buzz-acp did not spawn (no seed) remain fail-closed on turn one. **`ReportedUsage` TS mirror**: `cacheReadTokens`, `cacheWriteTokens`, `freshInputTokens` added to `tauriArchive.ts` as `UsageField` members, field-for-field with the Rust struct. ### P4a — aggregation layer **Extended S-1 ladder** to cache-read and cache-write via the same `ladder_token` path as the existing token fields. **`freshInputTokens` derivation**: checked arithmetic, fail-closed — absent cache fields produce Unknown (not zero), overflow and `cacheRead+cacheWrite > input` both produce `incomplete: true`. Aggregated as a `UsageField`. **D6 comparator**: `sort_value()` = provider total when known, else `input+output` when both known, else `None` (unknown-last). Replaces the prior total-only comparator for both agent-level and model-level sort. Ships a pinned test vector that the TS render layer (P5) must match. ## Test coverage - `buzz-agent`: 440 lib + 15 integration (golden_transcripts) — includes 13 new `cache_total_state_tests`; 14 new `turn_io_state_tests`; 3 new `sum_usage_*` tests (exact single-field, exact two-field, overflow signals correctly); 3 new `parse_anthropic_*` tests (overflow flag set + value cleared, normal sum no flag, absent usage no flag); end-to-end golden transcript drives real subprocess with Anthropic-shaped `input_tokens: u64::MAX, cache_read: 1` response and asserts `accumulatedInputTokens` absent from the emitted `usage_update` — no logic duplication; 3 wire pin tests; 4 `fold_pricing_identity_*` tests; `pricing_authority()` explicit-:443 acceptance - `buzz-acp`: 700 tests (691 lib + 9 integration) — 4 new usage tests (absent input → unreliable+null; absent output → unreliable+null; goose-shaped both present unchanged; poison mid-session); 3 ACP behavior tests; 7 pool lifecycle tests - Desktop (Rust): 2259+ tests — 14 new P4a pinned tests; 2 M3 round-trip tests; 1 serde key-shape test; 2 M2 partial-schema migration tests; first-turn cache round-trip test ## Related PRs - P1 NIP-AM spec: [#4632](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4632) - P3 pricing table: [#4629](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4629) - UI (P5): [#4001](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4001) --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1mn7jgtj4w2pd0g0zeuhxsa6jy6p0rewxz4kujt98my82ahfmp72sxjexk7 <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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renovate[bot]
|
e1ff91ecc1 |
chore(deps): update rust crate anyhow to v1.0.104 (#4447)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [anyhow](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/anyhow) | dependencies | patch | `1.0.103` → `1.0.104` | | [anyhow](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/anyhow) | workspace.dependencies | patch | `1.0.103` → `1.0.104` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>dtolnay/anyhow (anyhow)</summary> ### [`v1.0.104`](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/anyhow/releases/tag/1.0.104) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/anyhow/compare/1.0.103...1.0.104) - Update `syn` dev-dependency to version 3 </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - Between 12:00 AM and 03:59 AM, only on Monday (`* 0-3 * * 1`) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/block/buzz). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4zLjIiLCJ1cGRhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4zLjIiLCJ0YXJnZXRCcmFuY2giOiJtYWluIiwibGFiZWxzIjpbXX0=--> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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renovate[bot]
|
08de85c592 |
chore(deps): update rust crate arc-swap to v1.9.2 (#4448)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [arc-swap](https://redirect.github.com/vorner/arc-swap) | dependencies | patch | `1.9.1` → `1.9.2` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>vorner/arc-swap (arc-swap)</summary> ### [`v1.9.2`](https://redirect.github.com/vorner/arc-swap/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#192) - Document RefCnt must not panic ([#​208](https://redirect.github.com/vorner/arc-swap/issues/208)). </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - Between 12:00 AM and 03:59 AM, only on Monday (`* 0-3 * * 1`) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/block/buzz). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4zLjIiLCJ1cGRhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4zLjIiLCJ0YXJnZXRCcmFuY2giOiJtYWluIiwibGFiZWxzIjpbXX0=--> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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renovate[bot]
|
12b1f56648 |
chore(deps): update rust crate async-trait to v0.1.91 (#4458)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | Pending | |---|---|---|---|---| | [async-trait](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/async-trait) | dependencies | patch | `0.1.89` → `0.1.91` | `0.1.92` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>dtolnay/async-trait (async-trait)</summary> ### [`v0.1.91`](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/async-trait/compare/0.1.90...0.1.91) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/async-trait/compare/0.1.90...0.1.91) ### [`v0.1.90`](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/async-trait/releases/tag/0.1.90) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/dtolnay/async-trait/compare/0.1.89...0.1.90) - Update to syn 3 </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - Between 12:00 AM and 03:59 AM, only on Monday (`* 0-3 * * 1`) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/block/buzz). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4zLjIiLCJ1cGRhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMi4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119--> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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renovate[bot]
|
d7cc724fa5 |
chore(deps): update rust crate diffy to v0.5.1 (#4466)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [diffy](https://redirect.github.com/bmwill/diffy) | dependencies | patch | `0.5.0` → `0.5.1` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>bmwill/diffy (diffy)</summary> ### [`v0.5.1`](https://redirect.github.com/bmwill/diffy/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#051---2026-07-18) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/bmwill/diffy/compare/0.5.0...0.5.1) ##### Fixed - [#​85](https://redirect.github.com/bmwill/diffy/pull/85) Merge conflict markers are now always placed on their own lines. Previously, a conflicting hunk at the end of a file without a trailing newline glued the next marker onto its last content line, producing unparseable output. This matches `git merge-file --diff3` behavior. </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - Between 12:00 AM and 03:59 AM, only on Monday (`* 0-3 * * 1`) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/block/buzz). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4zLjIiLCJ1cGRhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4zLjIiLCJ0YXJnZXRCcmFuY2giOiJtYWluIiwibGFiZWxzIjpbXX0=--> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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renovate[bot]
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7dd8791d07 |
chore(deps): update rust crate async-compression to v0.4.43 (#4456)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [async-compression](https://redirect.github.com/Nullus157/async-compression) | dependencies | patch | `0.4.42` → `0.4.43` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>Nullus157/async-compression (async-compression)</summary> ### [`v0.4.43`](https://redirect.github.com/Nullus157/async-compression/releases/tag/async-compression-v0.4.43) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/Nullus157/async-compression/compare/async-compression-v0.4.42...async-compression-v0.4.43) ##### Other - Fix hang when decoding a corrupt subsequent zstd frame ([#​470](https://redirect.github.com/Nullus157/async-compression/pull/470)) </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - Between 12:00 AM and 03:59 AM, only on Monday (`* 0-3 * * 1`) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/block/buzz). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4zLjIiLCJ1cGRhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMi4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119--> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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renovate[bot]
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e668c6bb49 |
chore(deps): update rust crate clap to v4.6.6 (#4465)
This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Type | Update | Change | |---|---|---|---| | [clap](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap) | dependencies | patch | `4.6.1` → `4.6.6` | --- > [!WARNING] > Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the [Dependency Dashboard](../issues/1) for more information. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>clap-rs/clap (clap)</summary> ### [`v4.6.6`](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap/compare/clap_complete-v4.6.5...clap_complete-v4.6.6) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap/compare/v4.6.5...v4.6.6) ### [`v4.6.5`](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap/compare/clap_complete-v4.6.4...clap_complete-v4.6.5) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap/compare/v4.6.4...v4.6.5) ### [`v4.6.4`](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#464---2026-07-21) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap/compare/v4.6.3...v4.6.4) ##### Internal - Update to syn v3 ### [`v4.6.3`](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#463---2026-07-20) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap/compare/v4.6.2...v4.6.3) ##### Fixes - *(derive)* Allow `"literal".function()` as attribute values ### [`v4.6.2`](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#462---2026-07-15) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/clap-rs/clap/compare/v4.6.1...v4.6.2) ##### Fixes - *(help)* Say `alias` when there is only one </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: (UTC) - Branch creation - Between 12:00 AM and 03:59 AM, only on Monday (`* 0-3 * * 1`) - Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined) 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 👻 **Immortal**: This PR will be recreated if closed unmerged. Get [config help](https://redirect.github.com/renovatebot/renovate/discussions) if that's undesired. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/block/buzz). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4zLjIiLCJ1cGRhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiI0NC4xMi4wIiwidGFyZ2V0QnJhbmNoIjoibWFpbiIsImxhYmVscyI6W119--> Co-authored-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Will Pfleger
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6e5c462ac5 |
chore(release): release Buzz Relay version 0.2.1 (#2856)
## Buzz Relay release v0.2.1 ### Changes since relay-v0.2.0: - fix(sdk): preserve self-mention p tags in message and forum event builders ([#4975](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4975)) ([`78c87ae20e`]( |
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Kalvin C
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c293b3cd40 |
fix(agent): resolve oauth cache home cross-platform (#5151)
## Summary - resolve the OAuth cache home directory with the repository's platform-aware `dirs` convention - preserve the existing `.config/buzz-agent/oauth` cache layout on macOS and Linux - make the cache-path regression assertion portable across path separators ## Problem `buzz-agent` read only `$HOME` when constructing the OAuth token cache path. Packaged Windows processes do not guarantee that Unix variable, so OAuth source construction failed with `oauth cache: $HOME not set` even though Windows had a valid user profile. ## Validation Independent reviewers validated exact commit `836d820483b141b7291170cb33535ac7cb49b2eb` on Windows/MSVC with `HOME` unset and `USERPROFILE` present: - `cargo +1.94.1 clippy -p buzz-agent --all-targets --locked -- -D warnings` - `cargo +1.94.1 fmt --all -- --check` - `git diff --check f53bbd1..836d820` - `auth::` tests: 11/11 passed with `HOME` unset - full package lib target: 396 passed / 2 failed; identical-base controls classified both as pre-existing Windows failures The changed regression fails on the base with `$HOME not set` and passes on this branch. `dirs 6.0.0` was already locked by other workspace crates; the lockfile change adds only the `buzz-agent` dependency edge. Signed-off-by: Kalvin C <kalvinnchau@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Michael Neale
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38bf642fcf |
ci: prove the relay-driven mesh lifecycle — discover, join, infer, deny — with real nodes (#3862)
## Summary
CI now proves the full Buzz shared-compute join story end to end: a
member can discover another member's served model **through the Buzz
relay alone** and run inference over the mesh, while a non-member gets
nothing — the relay rejects its auth, and the mesh refuses to route for
it even holding a leaked endpoint address.
This is deliberately different from mesh-llm's own CI smokes (which
bootstrap two nodes with a hand-carried invite token / mdns): here the
**relay is the control plane**, exactly like the desktop app:
1. **Membership** — identities A and B are added via `buzz-admin`
(kind:13534 NIP-43 roster); C is not.
2. **Advertise** — each member publishes a client-signed kind:30003
discovery note carrying its MeshLLM owner binding and (for the serve
node) `serveTargets[].endpointAddr`, covered by an endpoint-binding
signature — the exact payload shape the desktop coordinator publishes.
3. **Trust** — the serve node derives its admission allowlist from the
relay (statuses ∩ roster) and requires the **exact expected {A, B}
owner-id set** before starting with `TrustPolicy::Allowlist`.
4. **Join** — the client verifies owner + endpoint bindings and
membership, then dials the relay-discovered endpoint (the desktop
join-watcher's `dial_endpoint_addr` step). No out-of-band token.
5. **Infer** — a chat completion against the client's local OpenAI
endpoint routes over QUIC to the serve node's model (CPU, SmolLM2-135M,
~105MB).
6. **Deny (differential)** — the stranger's NIP-42 auth must fail with
the relay's own membership rejection (`restricted: not a relay member` —
successful auth or any unrelated connect error fails the run), and
dialing the leaked endpoint must not produce a routed inference —
**while the trusted client re-proves inference immediately afterwards**,
so a dead serve node can't masquerade as an admission denial.
## What's in the PR
- `crates/buzz-relay/examples/mesh_relay_lifecycle_smoke.rs` — the
harness. One process per node (mesh-llm keeps process-global state under
`~/.mesh-llm`), orchestrator + serve/client/stranger roles,
byte-identical binding payloads to
`desktop/src-tauri/src/mesh_llm/identity.rs` (called out with
keep-in-sync comments). Child stdout is pumped through a reader thread
so every wait has a hard deadline; timed-out children are killed; exit
statuses are checked.
- `scripts/ci-mesh-lifecycle-smoke.sh` — provisions a membership-gated
relay (throwaway owner + signing identities via `buzz-admin
generate-key`), runs the harness, cleans up. Fails fast if :3000 is
already occupied (a stale open relay would mask gating).
- `scripts/start-relay-for-tests.sh` — gains opt-in NIP-43 membership
env passthrough (`BUZZ_REQUIRE_RELAY_MEMBERSHIP` + `RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY`
+ `BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY`). Default behavior unchanged.
- `.github/workflows/mesh-lifecycle.yml` — separate, path-filtered,
non-required workflow (mesh paths, the harness's dependency crates,
`Cargo.lock`, dispatch), pinned to `ubuntu-24.04`. Caches the mesh
native runtime + HF model keyed on the lockfile hash, so a mesh pin bump
rolls the runtime cache. Uploads relay + harness logs on failure.
## Scope
This is an **independent protocol harness**: it speaks the same wire
protocol and payload shapes as the desktop but re-implements the
binding/verification logic (the desktop crate is outside the workspace).
Regressions inside the desktop's own discovery filtering are the desktop
unit tests' job; what this smoke proves is that the relay + mesh-llm SDK
+ admission stack support the lifecycle end to end.
## Relationship to mesh-llm's CI
Follows the shape mesh-llm's own CI proved stable (tiny CPU model, one
runner, multiple real mesh-llm processes over real QUIC — cf. their
`ci-two-node-client-serving-smoke.sh`), but swaps the token bootstrap
for the relay-driven lifecycle, which is the part only Buzz can test.
## Validation
Green on GitHub Actions (ubuntu-24.04) across three runs, including
after rebases onto the mesh v0.74 upgrade (#3467) and latest main:
```
PASS 1/6: relay-derived allowlist is exactly {A, B}
PASS 2/6: serve member ready + advertised model: jc-builds/SmolLM2-135M-Instruct-Q4_K_M-GGUF:Q4_K_M
PASS 3/6: client member discovered + joined via relay
PASS 4/6: inference routed over the mesh: "PONG"
PASS 5/6: relay rejected the stranger's NIP-42 auth (membership gate)
PASS 6/6: stranger denied (gossip visible, inference rejected: 503 all tunnels failed) while trusted inference still routes
PASS: full relay-driven mesh lifecycle verified
```
Also validated locally on macOS. `cargo fmt --all --check` and `cargo
clippy -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings` pass.
## Notes
- The harness follows the repo's mesh `[dev-dependencies]` pin
automatically, so it doubles as a canary for future mesh upgrades (it
already caught the v0.73.1 → v0.74.0 bump during development).
- The stranger "deny" accepts either shape mesh-llm exhibits: no model
visibility at all, or gossip visibility with inference refused —
mesh-llm applies the receiving node's owner policy after the gossip
handshake, so admission gates *routing*, not gossip. The differential
trusted-inference re-check (PASS 6/6) is what makes that a real denial
rather than a dead server.
- Model-visibility windows are tunable via `MESH_CLIENT_WINDOW_SECS` /
`MESH_STRANGER_WINDOW_SECS` if shared runners prove slow — pin a longer
window in the workflow env rather than re-running the job.
---------
Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com>
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Tyler
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318fbf896e |
fix(security): bump nostr crates for RUSTSEC-2026-0225..0232 + default sprig image to published digest (#4392)
## What Two changes, both fallout/follow-up from #4289 landing: ### 1. Fix the Security job failing on main (lockfile-only) Eight RUSTSEC advisories published today against the nostr stack turned `cargo-deny check` advisories red on main ([failing run](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/30761611723/job/91533106673)). Not introduced by #4289 — the advisories landed upstream and any push to main today would have tripped them. - **RUSTSEC-2026-0225..0230** → `nostr` 0.44.6 → **0.44.7** (Debug output exposing NIP-46/NIP-60 credentials; wallet parsers accepting unauthenticated events; NIP-44/NIP-04/NIP-98 resource exhaustion; NIP-50 empty-filter panic) - **RUSTSEC-2026-0231..0232** → `nostr-relay-pool` 0.44.2 (root) / 0.44.1 (tauri) → **0.44.3** (auth-challenge memory exhaustion; processing of unverified relay events) Both workspace lockfiles bumped (`Cargo.lock`, `desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.lock`). No manifest changes. ### 2. Default the desktop GUI's sprig image to the published `ghcr.io/block/buzz-sprig` The first main-push after #4289 published the image publicly (package created 18:44Z, visibility `public`). The `config_schema()`'s `image` property now carries a `default`: ``` ghcr.io/block/buzz-sprig:sha-6530b58@sha256:17facfc7608d8ddb33bc056c9aaba1098f4ef6abe5655702fbfd7584d1f74d76 ``` **Why tag+digest, not tag:** the backend deliberately rejects tag-only references — the pod runs with the agent's nsec and tags are mutable pointers (`image.rs` §Image). The tag+digest form keeps the human-traceable `sha-6530b58` while the digest does the pinning; `image::parse` already normalizes it to the tagless canonical form, so create-intent fingerprints are identical to the bare-digest spelling. The digest is the **multi-arch manifest-list digest** (amd64+arm64), resolved via `docker buildx imagetools inspect`. **This is a UI prefill, not a baked fallback:** `image` stays in the schema's `required` list, an empty value still fails closed with a named field, and the desktop submits the value explicitly in `provider_config` (the `WhereToRunSection` probe seeds `providerConfig` from schema defaults) — so deploy fingerprints never depend on compiled-in provider state, and the spec's §K8s pod-reconciliation concern about baked-default divergence is not engaged. Module prose that said "no published image exists yet" is updated to match reality. No desktop code changes needed: the form already prefills from `properties[*].default` and submits seeded defaults. ## Testing - `cargo-deny check` at head: **advisories ok, bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok** (was: advisories FAILED) - `cargo test -p buzz-backend-kubernetes`: **158 passed** (154 lib + 4 wire), including new `schema_default_image_round_trips_through_parse` pinning the constant + its normalization, and the wire `info` test now asserting the default is present in the provider's real stdout response - Live provider probe: `{"op":"info"}` against the built binary returns the default in `config_schema.properties.image.default` with `required` unchanged (`["namespace","image"]`) - Full workspace test suite via pre-push hook: green (earlier direct `cargo test --workspace` run: sole failure was `api::mesh_demo::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo`, the documented pre-existing main flake — unrelated, fails on base) - Image existence verified against GHCR: `docker buildx imagetools inspect ghcr.io/block/buzz-sprig:sha-6530b58` resolves to the pinned manifest-list digest with linux/amd64 + linux/arm64 manifests --------- Signed-off-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Tyler
|
6530b58a61 |
feat(k8s): Kubernetes backend plugin + desktop deploy path (#4289)
# Kubernetes backend plugin (crates/buzz-backend-kubernetes) + desktop deploy path Implements docs/remote-agents.md (merged @ |
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Will Pfleger
|
9d6726e5b3 |
chore(deps): bump nostr-relay-pool for RUSTSEC-2026-0224 (#4139)
Bump `nostr-relay-pool` from 0.44.1 to 0.44.2 to clear [RUSTSEC-2026-0224](https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0224), which addresses verification-cache poisoning that could let forged Nostr events bypass signature validation on redelivery. The dependency is transitive through `nostr-sdk`; this PR updates only the corresponding package version and checksum in `Cargo.lock`. The advisory currently marks every open PR red until this fix merges. - `cargo test -p buzz-sdk -p buzz-cli` passes: 271 + 241 tests - `cargo deny check advisories` passes - `just fmt-check` passes Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: npub16v54tttfqacx9ycvc3k0ut0npj564ahcuajzy6qjvh57ntmsf4uq4806j2 <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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John Matthew Tennant
|
c104eecfb3 |
feat(desktop): import local Pocket voices (#3259)
## Context Pocket TTS currently offers bundled reference voices. People also need a local, private way to add a voice without sending audio to a cloud service. ## Summary Add a Pocket voice import flow to Voice settings. Buzz opens the native file picker, decodes common audio formats in the reusable `buzz-voice` crate, canonicalizes the selected audio, stores it under a content-derived identity in app data, selects it, and lets the user delete it later. ## Changes - Accept WAV, M4A, MP3, FLAC, OGG, and AIFF files between 2 and 30 seconds, including multichannel sources. - Decode and downmix accepted audio to canonical mono 32 kHz PCM16 WAV before hashing and storage. - Store imported voices behind stable `pocket:imported:<sha256>` identities and content-addressed files. - Keep absolute file paths inside the native process and expose only voice metadata to React. - Include imported voices in Pocket preview and live huddle playback. - Add Add voice and delete controls while preserving the bundled Pocket voice catalog. - Fall back to Mary when the selected imported voice is deleted. - Keep durable import, selection, and deletion successful when a live TTS worker acknowledgement is delayed. - Preserve bundled voices when optional import metadata is unreadable and keep failed deletion retryable. ## Related issue None found. ## Testing Production decoding was exercised with WAV, M4A with AAC, MP3, FLAC, OGG Vorbis, and AIFF fixtures. Each format canonicalized to mono 32 kHz PCM16 WAV. Manual validation in the combined daily-driver build covered native-picker import, Preview, live-huddle playback, deletion, and Mary fallback. ## Screenshots The Voice settings card preserves the bundled Pocket catalog and adds the local Add voice action.  ## Reviewer-reproducible examples Create common-format fixtures and run them through the production importer: ```bash . ./bin/activate-hermit fixtures="$(mktemp -d)" ffmpeg -hide_banner -loglevel error -f lavfi -i "sine=frequency=220:duration=3" -ac 2 -ar 44100 "$fixtures/voice.wav" ffmpeg -hide_banner -loglevel error -i "$fixtures/voice.wav" -c:a aac "$fixtures/voice.m4a" ffmpeg -hide_banner -loglevel error -i "$fixtures/voice.wav" "$fixtures/voice.mp3" ffmpeg -hide_banner -loglevel error -i "$fixtures/voice.wav" "$fixtures/voice.flac" ffmpeg -hide_banner -loglevel error -i "$fixtures/voice.wav" -c:a libvorbis "$fixtures/voice.ogg" ffmpeg -hide_banner -loglevel error -i "$fixtures/voice.wav" -c:a pcm_s16be "$fixtures/voice.aiff" BUZZ_VOICE_IMPORT_TEST_DIR="$fixtures" \ cargo test -p buzz-voice imports_common_audio_format_fixtures -- --ignored --nocapture ``` Exercise import persistence, synthesis, deletion, and bundled-voice fallback with an installed Pocket model: ```bash BUZZ_POCKET_MODEL_DIR=/path/to/pocket-model-bundle \ cargo test -p buzz-voice --test pocket_import_audio \ objective_import_synthesis_delete_and_mary_fallback \ -- --ignored --nocapture ``` Exercise the native-picker boundary, selection, preview dispatch, deletion, cancellation, and invalid-file states: ```bash cd desktop pnpm build:e2e pnpm exec playwright test tests/e2e/voice-settings.spec.ts --project=smoke ``` --------- Signed-off-by: John Tennant <jtennant@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: John Tennant <johnmatthewtennant@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John Tennant <jtennant@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: John Tennant <jtennant@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub12gtutshhh76rx0jx697f32f9tffd4hhp3hx58fp4x6u4uemkm7sqf8f757 <5217c5c2f7bfb4333e46d17c98a9255a52dadee18dcd43a43536b95e6776dfa0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Tyler
|
61ba9dfaa0 |
refactor(voice): extract reusable Pocket primitives + Pocket voice settings (relands #2467 + #3208) (#3910)
Relands **#2467** (extract `buzz-voice` crate) and **#3208** (Pocket
voice settings) onto main, after #3266 and #3180 merged.
## Why a fresh PR
The repo is squash-only with delete-branch-on-merge. Squashing #3266
deleted `jtennant/pocket-tts-2026-04`, which was #2467's base — GitHub
auto-closed #2467 and it cannot be reopened. Squash merges also sever
ancestry, so GitHub's natural merge-base reports phantom conflicts for
the whole remaining stack.
## Content provenance
- Byte-identical to the blessed `jt/buzz-voice-refactor` branch
(`93029c577`, tree `6729e0eff` — reviewed by Dawn (#2467) and Max
(#3208) at exact heads) **except** the three files where #3180 and #3208
genuinely interact.
- Three-file resolution (union of both sides):
- `huddle/mod.rs` — #3180's pipeline re-exports + #3208's
`agent_tts_routing` imports.
- `huddle/state.rs` — `reset_preserving_generation` preserves both
`huddle_generation` (#3180) and `tts_enabled` (#3208); test sets merged
into one `tests` module.
- `desktop/src/testing/e2eBridge.ts` — both switch arms kept; no
duplicate case labels.
## Verification at
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Tyler
|
4933672eb4 |
feat(mesh): upgrade embedded mesh to v0.74 and harden shared compute (split 1/2 of #3467) (#3741)
## Summary This is **part 1 of 2** split out from #3467 (per Tyler's request), carrying only the mesh-scoped changes. The agent/ACP response-behavior changes and the new `send_message` tool stay in #3467 as part 2. All commits are @michaelneale's work, cherry-picked with authorship preserved. - Upgrade embedded Mesh to v0.74.0 (tag-pinned instead of commit rev) and use canonical Gemma model IDs. - Keep shared compute serving through member joins, roster changes, app recovery, and community switching. - Wait for actual model readiness and avoid resuming incomplete downloads after quit. - Leave `BUZZ_AGENT_THINKING_EFFORT` unset by default so each model's chat template picks its own thinking default (`none` suppressed Gemma tool-calling entirely; pinning `low` made Qwen3 burn ~4x output budget). Explicit agent/persona/global values still win. ## Relationship to #3467 Contains the mesh commits from #3467 (`2cd640b23`, `0ad81c341`, `ad13ed841`) rebased onto current main, with one deliberate exclusion: the `crates/buzz-agent/src/llm.rs` reasoning→text parser change from `2cd640b23` is **not** here. That change unconditionally affects every OpenAI-compat/Responses provider, so it belongs with the reply-behavior work in part 2, where it can be reviewed as what it is. Not included (remaining in #3467 / part 2): - typed `send_message` tool in dev-mcp + `BUZZ_ACP_SEND_MESSAGE_TOOL` gating - plain-reply delivery fallback in buzz-acp (`BUZZ_ACP_DELIVER_PLAIN_REPLIES`) - the mesh_agent_e2e P5/P6 rewrite (exists to prove the reply path) - the two `env.insert` preset opt-ins in `relay_mesh.rs` for the flags above - the llm.rs parser change This PR is independently mergeable; part 2's flags are all off by default so it can land before or after. ## Testing - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --locked` — 780 passed (one telemetry test is order-sensitive under parallel default settings; passes in the pre-push suite and standalone, unrelated to this diff — files untouched here). - `just desktop-tauri-test` (default features) — 1877 passed. - `cargo test --locked --features mesh-llm` in `desktop/src-tauri` — 1961 passed, including the new relay-mesh preset and coordinator/recovery tests. - Both `Cargo.lock`s resolve with `--locked` against the v0.74.0 tag. - Full pre-push hook suite green (rust-tests, desktop-check/test, tauri checks). Live validation of the mesh v0.74 upgrade itself is documented on #3467 (two-Mac cross-version test). --------- Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> |
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Tyler
|
63496cc1d4 |
feat(replica): portable heartbeat-token fence with snapshot-local reader routing (#3268)
## Summary
Expands read-replica usage on the relay per the Rev 2 design (thread
39d1e174 in #buzz-read-only-replica-usage): replaces the
Aurora-incompatible WAL-LSN read-side fence observation with a portable
**heartbeat token**, makes the freshness proof **snapshot-local to the
serving reader session**, and adds a default-off bounded-staleness gate
for head fetches.
### Probe (writer side, unchanged ordering)
The ordered writer scan is kept verbatim — `S = clock_timestamp()` →
masked-visibility `pg_stat_activity` oldest-xact scan — and now ends by
committing a heartbeat token **last** on the same pinned connection
(single-row `UPDATE replica_heartbeat ... RETURNING token, epoch`,
migration `0026`). The single-row update serializes all pods' probes, so
tokens are globally commit-ordered; the three-bucket completeness
argument carries over unchanged. Ring retains `(token, committed_at,
fence_wall)`; epoch change resets the ring; a same-epoch token
regression (restore adversary) clears the ring **and rotates the epoch
on the writer** so pre-rewind readers fail the epoch check. Cadence 1s.
### Routing (snapshot-local proof)
Every routed read opens `BEGIN ISOLATION LEVEL REPEATABLE READ, READ
ONLY` on a reader session and observes the heartbeat as the
transaction's **first statement** — the proof's snapshot is exactly the
snapshot the page, participants batch, and bridge aux closure read from
(`ReadSession` carries the open transaction; drop = rollback).
Fail-closed everywhere: begin failure, missing heartbeat row, epoch
mismatch, token below the ring, over-budget entry → writer.
- **Predicate B (cursor pages, default-on):** same completeness math as
the existing fence — cursor timestamp must be ≤ the proved wall; thread
candidate-terminal and above-wall pages re-run on the writer.
- **Predicate A (head fetches, default-OFF):** gated by
`BUZZ_REPLICA_HEAD_MAX_AGE_SECS` (0 = off, clamped to fence staleness).
Bounded-stale head semantics are an explicit product decision — **do not
enable anywhere without Tyler's backdated-event-semantics acceptance.**
### Observability
`buzz_db_route_decision{path, decision, reason}` across all five paths,
`buzz_db_replica_heartbeat_age_seconds` gauge, and per-decision debug
logs carrying the proved token plus backend identity: `addr:port pid=N`,
prefixed with `aurora_db_instance_identifier()` when the endpoint
supports it (probed once per process on an autocommit checkout; SQLSTATE
42883 caches a definitive false; identity is evidence, never a routing
gate).
## Review & verification
- **Wren:** full review 9/9/9 at `5f81b10e5`; identity delta re-review
approved at exact head `fedb46368` (90/90 unit, clippy `-D warnings`,
fmt independently reproduced).
- **Max:** local E2E **PASS** at `5f81b10e5` — isolated PG17 writer +
two streaming standbys behind HAProxy; paused-reader legs split exactly
as designed (6 replica/fresh + 6 writer/stale), recovery clean, RR
snapshot hardening observed in runtime logs. Evidence:
`WORK_LOGS/2026-07-28_REPLICA_HEARTBEAT_REPLACEMENT_SHA_E2E.md`.
- **My gates at head (same shell):** buzz-db 90 unit + 143
Postgres-gated green (scratch DBs); buzz-relay 767/768 — lone red is the
pre-existing `mesh_demo` flake, red on base; clippy `-D warnings` + fmt
clean.
- Key regression tests:
`routed_request_holds_one_snapshot_across_page_and_aux`
(mutation-verified both directions), same-epoch rotation,
capability-probe negative, head-gate truth table, divergent-fixture
routing suite.
## Post-merge plan
Merge publishes the immutable `sha-*` main image → bb-public PR pins it
→ ArgoCD sync → Max runs the production cursor-routing canary on Aurora
(positive identity branch proven live). Head gate stays off. Client
`since`-widening ships separately.
---
## Update — full read routing (Rev 6, commit `9fa3c9c0b`)
Extends routing to the remaining read seams per
`PLANS/REPLICA_FULL_READ_ROUTING_DESIGN.md` Rev 6 (thread cf5deba4 in
#buzz-read-only-replica-usage).
### New routed seams — ALL deploy-default dark
The new seams (`query_events_routed`, `query_events_routed_bounded`,
`count_events_routed`, `get_events_by_ids_routed`,
`query_feed_{mentions,needs_action,activity}_routed`) are
**Bounded-only** and gated on `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS`: unset ⇒
every new seam records `writer/disabled` and merging is a no-op. COUNT
and feed/by-ids never take the covered arm (deletion visibility: covered
bounds insert-completeness only). **Note:** the pre-existing cursor
paths (channel windows, thread pages) are *not* gated by this env var —
they route at B=0 today and that status quo is unchanged.
### Reader pool (D4/D5)
- Lazy pool (`connect_lazy`, `min_connections(0)`): reader-down at boot
can't crash the relay; a warn-only boot ping is the only boot-time
visibility, and it primes the Aurora identity capability cache. Priming
is an optimization only — the routed path itself spends a single acquire
budget regardless (see the single-checkout fix below), because a boot
ping that *fails* is correlated with exactly the reader-unavailable case
the budget bound exists for.
- `READER_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT` = 150ms; a miss fails closed to the writer
with reason **`reader_acquire_timeout`** — named for the mechanism, not
a diagnosis. The budget includes cold connects and sqlx's `size` counts
in-flight dials, so this metric alone does not distinguish contention
from slow connection establishment (see `proved_reader` doc-comment for
the runbook guidance; the pool gauges are 10s samples and are for
capacity planning).
- `BUZZ_DB_READ_POOL_SIZE` sizes the reader independently (invalid/0
inherits writer sizing); `read_pool_stats().max` reports the reader's
own ceiling.
### Community isolation (formal-model question)
Isolation is structural — an explicit `community_id = $n` predicate
compiled into every query builder; no RLS, no session-GUC tenant state
(zero `CREATE POLICY` across migrations). The `_on` variants reuse the
exact same builders with only the executor swapped. Proven by a
seven-seam two-community divergent-fixture test
(`routed_reads_are_confined_to_the_requested_community`),
mutation-tested by Dawn: all four single-predicate stubs killed; the
mention-join feeds are defended in depth (three independent predicates)
so only complete removal leaks there.
### Accepted limitation
D6: client-side staleness on bounded reads (up to `_MS`) is accepted
product behavior when the gate is enabled; gate stays off at merge.
## Update — single acquire budget per routed read (commit `dd26caa9f`)
Max found (and Dawn independently reproduced, 302–330ms measured) that
the boot-unavailable cold path spent **two** stacked
`READER_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT` budgets: the Aurora capability probe did its
own `pool.acquire()` before `begin_with` acquired again. Fixed by
acquiring **once** per routed read — the capability probe runs on the
held connection (`reader_aurora_capability_on`) and the read-only
`REPEATABLE READ` transaction begins on that same connection
(`Transaction::begin` accepts a `PoolConnection` at `'static` via sqlx's
`MaybePoolConnection`). Reason codes unchanged; capability still never
negatively cached. Measured routed fallback: ~150ms (one budget).
Ships with a PG-gated regression fixture
(`routed_fallback_spends_one_acquire_budget_when_aurora_cache_is_cold`,
authored by Dawn): size-1 reader saturated, capability cache asserted
cold, routes through `count_events_routed`, asserts writer answer +
one-budget elapsed + `writer/reader_acquire_timeout` label
(mutation-tested: `pool_busy` and `reader_validation_error` mutants both
killed). It fails at 330ms on the previous commit and passes on this
one.
### Verification at `dd26caa9f` (pinned toolchain rustc 1.95.0 via repo
`bin/`; ambient rustc 1.89 fails sqlx resolution — always prepend
`bin/`)
- buzz-db: 94 unit + **150/151** PG-gated serial (`--test-threads=1`;
suite is not parallel-safe against one Postgres). The 1 red is
`test_usage_metrics_lock_has_single_owner_and_releases_on_drop` — a
**pre-existing** same-key-same-database advisory-lock collision with any
live relay pointed at the shared `buzz` DB (the relay re-arms
`USAGE_METRICS_LOCK_KEY` on a 300s tick). It passes on a private scratch
DB with the relay still running — verified this run. Remedy is a scratch
`TEST_DATABASE_URL`, **not** terminating lock holders: inspect
`pg_locks`/`pg_stat_activity` and resolve the owning process first; an
idle advisory holder may be a live dev relay. Pre-existing, not a #3268
blocker — filed as #3619.
- buzz-relay: 773/773; clippy `-D warnings` + fmt clean. (`mesh_demo`
echo test is a known pre-existing Redis-dependent flake — Dawn confirmed
it fails identically on the base commit, untouched by this PR.)
- Dawn: independent re-verification at `dd26caa9f` — byte-identical diff
application confirmed, suite reproduced, and fixture proven to still
discriminate (fails at 320ms with only the production fix reverted).
Gate clear. Max: independent rig pass at `dd26caa9f` — 94/94 unit,
**15/15 routing/fallback matrix** (cursor behavior, default-dark seams,
seven-seam confinement, one-snapshot, dead-reader/no-URL fallback,
hard-delete fail-closed, reader max), 773/773 relay, private-DB lock
control. Gate clear; recommends merge + staged bb-block rollout
(no-reader-URL no-op → cursor-only → observe `buzz_db_route_decision` →
conservative nonzero `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS`; rollback is
config-only).
## Known gap — CI does not run the PG-backed fixtures (#3622)
Dawn found post-sign-off (confirmed by Max and Eva at `dd26caa9f`):
**every Postgres-backed fixture in this PR is `#[ignore]`d and no CI job
selects it.** `Unit Tests` runs `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --lib`
(`Justfile:279-285`, ignored tests excluded); the only `--run-ignored
ignored-only` invocations (`ci.yml:690`, `:702`) filter to
`relay_invite::tests`. So the one-budget regression, the seven-seam
isolation fixture, and the fence/floor-guard/fallback tests have zero
automated execution — the verification record above is exhaustive but
manual, at this exact SHA.
Not introduced by this PR (the `#[ignore]` + narrow-filter pattern
predates it; 34 ignored tests total) and not a merge blocker: all new
seams are dark until `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS` is set. But it
changes the rollout gate — **do not set a nonzero
`BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS` in bb-block until CI enforces these
fixtures.** Filed as #3622 (explicit CI selection against the existing
backend-integration Postgres archive; ordering note: #3619 must land
first or be excluded, since widening the filter would select the
colliding usage-metrics lock test).
## Live redteam results (Max, real Helm + PG17 streaming replication at
`dd26caa9f`) — #3643, #3644
Max deployed this exact SHA via the repo chart against a physical
writer/standby pair and attacked it. **The PR's fenced routing passed
every fault**: healthy baseline routes proven on the real standby;
paused WAL replay moved head/cursor reads to `writer/stale`; B=0 moved
routed reads to `writer/disabled`; reader-URL removal rolled back
cleanly.
The redteam also found a **pre-existing** production risk this PR does
not create and does not fix: NIP-50 search builds its own eager,
unfenced pool straight from `READ_DATABASE_URL` (`main.rs:389-402`,
introduced by #2084, present in the deployed bb-block `sha-dd222a5` and
bb-public `sha-22be8bb` images, and both production ESOs already
template `READ_DATABASE_URL`). Measured: ~30s search stall on reader
loss, acknowledged-but-unsearchable writes under replica lag (unaffected
by `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS`), fatal eager connect blocking pod
startup when the reader is down, and `replica=true` FTS even at B=0.
Filed as **#3643** (fix: pin FTS to the writer, or fence it like the
routed seams) with **#3644** for the writer-pointing-reader-URL
telemetry gap. Aurora's cluster-ro writer-fallback DNS softens the
outage modes in prod but not the lag mode.
**Revised ladder consequence:** step 2 ("add `READ_DATABASE_URL`, budget
unset") is NOT a no-op with today's binary — it hands FTS an unfenced
replica pool. Rollout order is now: merge (still a true no-op —
bb-block/bb-public already run the unfenced-FTS code and this PR only
adds dark seams) → fix #3643 → CI enforcement #3622 → then reader URL +
budget per the original ladder, re-running Max's three deployment tests
(reader-down latency, reader-down cold boot, paused-replay
read-your-own-write search).
## Activation gate (consolidated) — merge is clear; ALL of the below
precede any nonzero `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS`
Six independent verification passes at `dd26caa9f` (Dawn ×2 incl.
byte-level + defang check, Max matrix + live Helm redteam, Wren full
CRUD regression + greenfield 0026 + 151/151 PG, Eva). Every induced
fault was either handled correctly by this PR's machinery or traced to
pre-existing main code. Remaining work gates **activation, not merge**:
1. **#3643** — unfenced NIP-50 FTS pool (pre-existing #2084; live in
prod today; also explains the blackhole search hang Wren observed — the
routed path was measured bounded at 151-152ms against a silent endpoint,
sqlx `inner.rs:252-255`).
2. **#3651** — reader `statement_timeout`: statements after acquire are
unbounded; mid-transaction blackhole reproduced hanging ≥15s (Dawn).
Small fix via `.after_connect` on the reader pool.
3. **#3622** — CI enforcement of the PG fixtures (with #3619 ordering).
4. **Recovery-conflict cancellation live test** — standby cancels a
routed read mid-snapshot → complete writer page, never partial (#3651's
fix also bounds the cancellation-never-arrives shape).
5. **DDL replication lag test** — migration on writer + paused replay +
budget on → fallback, not client-visible SQL errors.
6. **Reader-tx soak** — 30-60min mixed load; no idle-in-tx accumulation
on the standby.
Then Max's three deployment tests (reader-down latency, reader-down cold
boot, paused-replay read-your-own-write search) re-run on the fixed
binary before the first nonzero budget on bb-block.
---------
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
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Kalvin C
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7012d86d52 |
feat: configure S3 URL addressing style (#3400)
## Summary - add one strict `BUZZ_S3_ADDRESSING_STYLE=path|virtual` setting shared by media and Git/CAS storage - preserve path-style defaults for bundled Compose/Helm MinIO while supporting Railway's virtual-hosted bucket contract - fail startup on invalid or non-Unicode values before dependency connection, and validate the Helm value with the same two choices - document operator mappings and why endpoint and bucket remain separate for routing and SigV4 signing ## Best-practice rationale AWS documents both URL forms and favors virtual-hosted addressing for S3, while compatibility endpoints such as the bundled MinIO deployment can require path style. `rust-s3` defaults to virtual/subdomain addressing and provides `with_path_style()` for the explicit compatibility case. Some providers buckets only support as virtual-hosted bucket styles. This PR therefore uses one explicit, provider-neutral switch rather than endpoint heuristics or fallback behavior, while retaining `path` as Buzz's backward-compatible default. Sources: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/VirtualHosting.html - https://docs.rs/rust-s3/0.37.0/s3/bucket/struct.Bucket.html - https://docs.railway.com/storage-buckets#url-style - https://github.com/minio/minio/blob/master/docs/config/README.md#domain ## Validation - `cargo fmt --all` - `cargo check --workspace --all-targets` - targeted `buzz-media` and `buzz-relay` parsing/client-construction tests for defaults, strict errors, and both URL styles - Helm unittest: 45/45 passed - Compose config/render validation passed - local MinIO path-mode relay startup passed the Git A3 conformance probe and became ready - unreachable object storage failed startup and readiness never opened - push hooks completed the broader Rust and desktop suites successfully --------- Signed-off-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Kalvin C
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d500c2d5cf |
feat(invites): add use-limited invite links (#3141)
## Summary - add database-backed v2 invite links with optional maximum-use limits and atomic final-slot redemption - preserve v1 invite compatibility while adding exhausted/expired/invalid client handling across desktop, web, and mobile - emit structured claim-outcome logs with community, invite ID, outcome, maximum uses, and post-claim count ## Verification - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `cargo test -p buzz-db` (85 passed, 134 Postgres-dependent ignored) - `cargo clippy -p buzz-db --all-targets -- -D warnings` - desktop `npm run typecheck` - push hook: desktop checks/tests, desktop Tauri tests, Rust tests, and branch-skew passed - Postgres integration tests were previously reviewed green at the pre-rebase tree; local rerun on this session was unavailable because Postgres/Docker were not running - mobile push-hook check could not start because Flutter is unavailable locally --------- Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1c4alndp82zyt9veaklm5d965quss79vlhk9awv7qu5erwhmf42qqlvc25c <c57bf9b4275088b2b33db7f746975407210f159fbd8bd733c0e532375f69aa80@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Tyler
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9b0f744804 |
resolve findings (#3150)
Fixes all six HIGH findings from the buzz security report, one commit per finding. Independently reviewed to approval by Max at `0158ae542`, plus a deep isolated live pass (clean-room compose stack, weird ports, full product matrix) at the same head — see the buzz-security thread for evidence. `fe65c07c3` merges current `origin/main` on top (new commit, no rebase), inheriting the nostr 0.44.6 bump (#3135) and relay-admin ban gate (#3128). ## Findings and fixes | Finding | Commit | Fix | |---|---|---| | 003 — quinn-proto RUSTSEC-2026-0185 | `e5dcdec72` | Bump quinn-proto 0.11.14 → 0.11.16 (lockfile-only) | | 002/004 — linkify-it quadratic-parse DoS (GHSA-22p9-wv53-3rq4, GHSA-v245-v573-v5vm) | `923b3c20f` | pnpm override `linkify-it: ^5.0.2`; `pnpm why` confirms a single 5.0.2 copy | | 001 — media reads served unauthenticated by default | `0f277e3e2` | Helm `requireMediaGetAuth` defaults to `true` + rendered-chart test pinning the default | | 006 — removed workflow owners retain webhook-exfiltration authority | `4749bd56c` | Fail-closed per-fire authority gate (current owner/admin membership) on **all four** trigger doors (on_event, scheduler pre-claim, manual trigger, webhook — masked as generic 404), save-time gate for `call_webhook` defs, durable disable-on-removal wired to kinds 9001 + 9022 | | 005 — git Smart-HTTP reads ignore channel membership | `e648f2dba` + `0158ae542` | `authorize_git_read`: caller's **current active membership** in the repo's bound channel, checked before any hydration/subprocess on all three read doors (`info_refs` for both services + `upload_pack` POST). Uniform generic 404 denials (no membership probing), no repo-owner bypass, first-`buzz-channel`-tag binding semantics fail closed on ambiguous duplicates (mutation-verified test). Resolution follows the live kind:30617 announcement, so deleted/replaced announcements deny immediately. The committed `e2e-git-perms.sh` guest scenario previously asserted the vulnerability — now asserts denial. | ## Behavior changes to be aware of 1. **Unbound repos fail closed for git reads.** `buzz repos create` emits no `buzz-channel` tag, so CLI-created repos without a binding are unreadable via git HTTP. Correct per finding 005's fail-closed posture; a follow-up could bind CLI-created repos at creation time. 2. **006 is conservative:** a workflow disabled on owner removal does not auto-re-enable if the owner is re-added — explicit re-enable required. 3. Merge conflict resolution in `fe65c07c3`: kept main's `@radix-ui/react-dismissable-layer` 1.1.19 bump alongside the linkify-it security override (`pnpm-workspace.yaml` + lockfile). ## Verification at the merge head `fe65c07c3` (same shell) - buzz-relay `--lib`: 761 passed / 1 failed — the lone red is the known pre-existing `mesh_demo::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` 504 flake, present on main - SEC-005 module incl. PG behavioral matrix: 8/8 (removed-member, never-member, owner-no-bypass, deleted-30617, malformed/ambiguous binding, owner-mismatch all denied) - buzz-workflow 153/0, buzz-db 84/0; `clippy --all-targets -D warnings` + `fmt --check` clean - Desktop JS 3637/3637, tsc clean, biome clean, file-size/px-text/pubkey-truncation gates clean - `helm lint` + `helm unittest` (40/40) on `deploy/charts/buzz` - All five pre-push hooks green (desktop-check, desktop-test, rust-tests, desktop-tauri-test, branch-skew) Prior review evidence at `0158ae542` (pre-merge): Max's independent exact-head approval + clean-room live regression pass (`WORK_LOGS/2026-07-27_SECURITY_HIGH_LIVE_TEST.md` in his workspace). Max will re-run the deep local pass at this post-merge head before merge. --------- Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> |
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Tyler
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31e2de1966 |
fix(deps): bump nostr to 0.44.6 for RUSTSEC-2026-0216 (NIP-44 remote DoS) (#3135)
## Summary `cargo-deny` started failing on **every** PR and on `main` when **RUSTSEC-2026-0216** was published mid-afternoon today. Nothing in the tree changed — cargo-deny fetches the advisory DB at run time, so main's own `Security` job passed at `00ecf2c` and then began failing on the same commit. ``` error[vulnerability]: Remote Denial of Service via malformed NIP-44 v2 payload Cargo.lock:432 nostr 0.44.3 — RUSTSEC-2026-0216 advisories FAILED, bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok ``` The `nostr` NIP-44 v2 decrypt path reads a 2-byte unpadded-length prefix via `buffer[0..2]` **after** the HMAC check passes, without verifying the decrypted buffer holds 2 bytes. A sender who holds the conversation key — i.e. any DM sender — can craft a payload that decrypts to 0 or 1 bytes and panic the receiver. Remote DoS through any relay that delivers the event. No key material, plaintext, or memory corruption. Affects `0.26.0` through `0.44.4`. Fixed in `0.44.5`. ## The change Lockfiles only, 6 insertions / 6 deletions. The manifest already declares `nostr = "0.44"` — a caret range — so `0.44.6` needs no `Cargo.toml` edit. | Lockfile | Before | After | |---|---|---| | `Cargo.lock` | 0.44.3 | 0.44.6 | | `desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.lock` | **0.44.4** | 0.44.6 | **The desktop lockfile is the part worth reviewing.** `desktop/src-tauri` is excluded from the root workspace (`Cargo.toml:31`), and the `Security` job runs `cargo-deny check` at the repo root — so it never sees that lockfile. It was pinning a vulnerable *and* yanked `0.44.4` that no CI check would ever have flagged. Desktop calls `nip44::decrypt` at `commands/identity.rs:495`. Credit to @Eva for catching this; I'd have shipped the root-only fix and left it sitting there. **This isn't optional maintenance.** `0.44.0` through `0.44.4` are all yanked on crates.io. `0.44.5` and `0.44.6` are the only live versions in our range — staying put isn't an available option. ### On the two extra lines in the desktop lockfile The desktop bump also repoints two existing dependency edges: ``` nostr-derive: syn 2.0.118 -> syn 1.0.109 tempfile: getrandom 0.4.3 -> getrandom 0.3.4 ``` I checked these rather than waving them through: **no packages are added or removed** — both versions were already present in the graph, so only which edge points where changed. The resolution is stable across repeated re-resolves, and a plain re-resolve without the bump produces zero diff, so this isn't pre-existing lockfile staleness leaking in. ## Verification At this commit, in a clean worktree off `origin/main`: - `cargo-deny check advisories` → **`advisories ok`**, exit 0. The same tree before the bump reported `advisories FAILED` with this advisory, so the check is doing real work, not passing vacuously. - `./scripts/run-tests.sh unit` → all five packages pass. - `cargo test -p buzz-core` 229/229, `-p buzz-cli` 250/250, `-p buzz-relay --lib` 750 pass / 1 fail — the sole failure `api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` is pre-existing and reproduces identically at unmodified `00ecf2c`. - `desktop-tauri-test` passed in the pre-push hook, which exercises the crate whose lockfile changed. ## Why not a `deny.toml` ignore Considered and rejected. This is a reachable panic triggerable by any DM sender, and buzz-acp agents decrypt DMs from arbitrary senders. Suppressing it would ship a live remote-DoS to every agent and client in order to make a dashboard green. ## Note on `spin` The yanked `spin 0.9.8` / `0.10.0` warnings in the same job are **not** what fails CI — the log has exactly one hard error, this one. They're `warning[yanked]`, and warnings don't fail the build. `spin` is also three levels transitive (`mesh-llm-host-runtime → mdns-sd → flume → spin`) under a dev-dependency, so it isn't ours to bump. Left alone deliberately. ## Follow-up Unblocks #3128 (relay-admin ban gate), which has a zero dependency-file delta and will inherit this cleanly once main is merged in. Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: npub1jmc9dt2lyvzu3h0kxlwxt5zg4fxp9476awyxw6gwxn72g6cw7exqs64whm <96f056ad5f2305c8ddf637dc65d048aa4c12d7daeb8867690e34fca46b0ef64c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz> |
