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87 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Logan Johnson
|
a3909acc67 |
feat(relay): match label and creator filters before the page limit (#8176)
🤖 ## Summary After parts 1 and 2, a client can ask for "channels with label X" or "channels created by key K". But the relay applied these tag filters after it read one page of the newest channel events. So a request such as `{kinds:[39000], #t:["workspace"], limit:10}` could return fewer than 10 channels, or none, while matching channels existed. This PR moves the label and creator match into the database query, before the page limit. Part 3 of 3, stacked on part 2. ### Related issue None found. ### Details - Applies only when every kind in the filter is a relay-signed channel-state kind (39000–39003). Other kinds keep today's behavior. - The database match uses JSONB containment on `tags`, which is GIN-indexed. Containment can match a little too much (for example, a tag that contains both strings in another position), never too little. So the relay still checks each returned event with the normal Nostr filter rules, and `COUNT` requests keep that check too. - The same match is applied to the query path and the count path. - **Spec.** NIP-CL now says that `#t` and `#P` match before `limit`. - **Choosing one channel.** The relay does not make labels unique, so two creates for one label can both succeed, for example when two processes of one agent start at the same time. NIP-CL gets a "Choosing one channel" section: a client that needs one channel per creator and label looks it up with `#P` + `#t`, creates it only if none exists, and otherwise uses the oldest one (the lowest `created_at` tag, then the lowest channel ID). Every reader that follows this rule picks the same channel, even after an edit. ### Testing - Relay test: many channels, one match, small `limit`. The request returns the match for both `#t` and `#P`. This test fails without the change. - Unit test: `#t` and `#P` reach the database query only for channel-state kinds. - Relay test: one creator sends two creates for the same label at once. Both channels exist, a `#P` + `#t` lookup finds both, and the oldest-channel rule picks the same one in either order, even after the older channel's metadata is re-published by an edit. ### Stack These are two stacks. Merge them in this order. Client support (creating, labeling and finding these channels) will be in block/buzz-app, not the buzz SDK and CLI. **Stack 1: channel labels and creator lookup (#8174–#8176)** 1. #8174 channel type and creator tags, and the channel creation time 2. #8175 channel labels 3. #8176 database-side label and creator match, and the rule for choosing one channel ← this PR **Stack 2: system channels (#8180–#8182)**, stacked on stack 1 because it uses labels and the creator tag 4. #8180 the system channel type 5. #8181 leave system channels out of reads that do not name them 6. #8182 channel-state filters opt in to system channels --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Jarrod Sibbison
|
8599efb6a3 |
feat(relay): allow HTTP operator listener delivery URLs (#8287)
## Summary Operator listener configuration currently rejects HTTP URLs, preventing delivery to sibling services over internal HTTP connections. Accept HTTP and HTTPS delivery URLs while retaining the existing pubkey, duplicate-route, and URL restrictions. Add configuration coverage for internal hostnames and custom ports, verify signed delivery through the real HTTP client, and include the listener suite in both unit-test runners. Shared NIP-98 signing and push gateway code are unchanged. ### Related issue Related: #7934 refactors operator listener delivery tests. No matching open issue found. ### Testing - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --lib operator_listener`: 13 passed, including signed HTTP delivery and redirect rejection. - `cargo fmt --all -- --check`, shell syntax, Justfile parsing, and diff whitespace checks passed. - `just test`: passed. - `just ci`: stopped at mobile analysis with an existing undefined `buzzDevPushAppProfile` in `mobile/test/features/settings/notification_toggle_test.dart:81`. Workspace and native desktop formatting/Clippy, desktop frontend checks, and web checks passed. The mobile file is unchanged by this PR. Locally verified with a spiked listener client Signed-off-by: jsibbison-square <jsibbison@squareup.com> |
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Ian Oberst
|
85b7331784 |
fix(relay): partition audit observability follow-ups (#7994)
> [!IMPORTANT]
> **The alert rules changed in c3a314e71.** If you reviewed the alert
guidance earlier, please look again.
> - **The two range-based rules now apply only to live pods.** A range
selector such as `[30m]` keeps reading a terminated pod's samples until
they leave the window. So `BuzzPartitionAuditNotRunning` could fire for
about 10 minutes after normal pod turnover, and
`BuzzPartitionAuditFailing` could keep firing for up to an hour after
the pod was gone. Each rule now adds `and <counter>`, which requires the
counter to be exported right now:
> ```yaml
> expr: |
> sum without (outcome) (increase(buzz_partition_audit_runs_total[30m]))
== 0
> and sum without (outcome) (buzz_partition_audit_runs_total)
> ```
> ```yaml
> expr: |
> increase(buzz_partition_audit_failures_total[1h]) >= 2
> and buzz_partition_audit_failures_total
> ```
> - **The audit counters start at 0.** When the relay starts, it exports
every `buzz_partition_audit_runs_total{table, outcome}` series and
`buzz_partition_audit_failures_total` at 0, before the first audit.
`increase()` ignores a new series' first sample. Before this change, it
could miss the first periodic failure, or read a table's first
`degraded` run as a stopped loop. This change is also what makes the
`and <counter>` gate work: the counters now exist for a relay's whole
life.
>
> The doc's old claim that pod turnover can't leave an alert firing was
true only of the instant-selector stale rule. The doc now explains the
difference.
## Why
These are the observability follow-ups deferred from #6515 ("fix(db):
audit partition catalog before creation"):
- **Timestamp-age alerts go silent** ([review
comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6515#discussion_r4127212141)).
Partition gauges are set only when a table audits successfully, and the
exporter evicts idle gauges after 2,700 s by default. After sustained
failures, `buzz_partition_audit_last_success_timestamp_seconds`
disappears. A table that has never audited successfully never has it. An
alert on `time() - last_success` then has no input.
- **Startup fallback failures are not counted** ([review
comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6515#discussion_r4127212158)).
When the startup fallback audit fails, it logs an error but does not
increment `buzz_partition_audit_failures_total`. Periodic failures do.
- **Repaired environments are always `degraded`**.
`PartitionTableAudit::degraded()` counts every legacy leaf, even one
wholly in the past. The `bb-block-staging` audit of the repaired catalog
reports `degraded` only because of `events_p2026_07_08_legacy`
`[2026-07-01, 2026-09-01)`. With this rule, every repaired environment
stays `degraded`, so nobody can alert on the outcome.
- **Partition config tests can see a poisoned env** ([review
comment](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6515#discussion_r4137416297)).
Two partition config tests take only `ENV_MUTEX`. A NIP-FI test running
in the same process can make them see its deliberately invalid
environment.
Partition health is still diagnostic only, through
`/_status.partition_catalog` and metrics. Nothing here affects
`/_readiness`. Handling concurrent creation (#6515 item 4) is out of
scope and stays with the catch-all advancement work.
## What
- **Success timestamp survives failures.** Each failed table audit
refreshes `buzz_partition_audit_last_success_timestamp_seconds` with
`increment(0.0)`, which leaves the value unchanged. It still resets the
exporter's idle tracking, the same mechanism as
`refresh_legacy_active_gauge_recency`. Sustained failures therefore keep
the last success exported and its age rising. A table that has never
succeeded exports `0`. A failed audit still never makes the last success
look fresh.
- **Alert guidance.** New `docs/partition-catalog-monitoring.md` covers
the metrics, how long each series lives, and the audit outcomes. It
notes that `runs_total` has no `unsafe` outcome. It gives three alert
rules:
- timestamp age, which also covers never-successful tables and sustained
failures;
- `sum without (outcome)
(increase(buzz_partition_audit_runs_total[30m])) == 0` for a stopped
audit loop. Counters are never idle-evicted, and this rule fires before
the stopped loop's timestamp is evicted, so there is no false resolve;
- an aggregate failure-counter rule.
Both range-based rules also require their counter to be exported right
now (`and <counter>`), so a terminated pod's leftover samples can't
raise or hold an alert.
- **Zero counter baselines.** `try_install` exports each
`buzz_partition_audit_runs_total{table, outcome}` series (`ok`,
`degraded`, and `error` for both tables) and
`buzz_partition_audit_failures_total` at 0 before the startup audit, the
same way the auth series already start at 0. A failure in the startup
audit itself can still happen before the first scrape. The doc says so;
the stale rule covers that case.
- **Failure counter.** `buzz_partition_audit_failures_total` now counts
failed explicit audit attempts: the startup fallback audit and each
periodic audit. Both paths go through one helper,
`counted_partition_audit`. A failed `ensure_future_partitions` call,
such as a DDL error that the fallback then recovers, is not counted by
itself. A single attempt never counts twice.
- **Historical legacy leaves.** A legacy leaf is historical when its
finite upper bound is at or before the current month start. It is still
reported under `children` as `legacy_leaf`, but it no longer degrades
the table. A legacy leaf that still covers the current month or any
lookahead month stays degraded. All other degradation causes are
unchanged. The verdict now lives in `PartitionAuditReport::outcome()`,
which `buzz-admin partition-audit` uses. The JSON outcome names and exit
codes are the same as before.
- **Test hygiene.** Both partition config tests now use `env_guards()`.
## How it was tested
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and `cargo clippy -p buzz-db -p
buzz-relay -p buzz-admin --all-targets -- -D warnings`.
- New unit tests:
- The repaired incident layout with an injected clock: `degraded` in
August 2026 and `ok` on 2026-09-01T00:00Z, when the upper bound equals
the current month start, and on 2026-09-15. The legacy leaf is still in
the serialized report. The `outcome` label on the run counter follows
the verdict.
- A table test of the legacy-leaf predicate: the upper bound before, at,
and one second after the month start; lookahead and beyond-horizon
leaves; historical leaves with trigger drift; anomalous and `DEFAULT`
children; no audited month.
- Outcome precedence (error, then unsafe, then degraded) and the
`buzz-admin` exit-code mapping.
- Startup: a failed fallback counts once, a successful fallback after a
DDL failure counts nothing, and a successful ensure never runs the
fallback. Each periodic failure counts once. Against an unreachable
database, startup counts one aggregate failure while each table still
records two `error` runs.
- On the production exporter, never-successful audits leave run counters
and a `0` success timestamp for both tables.
- On the production exporter, all six run-counter series and the failure
counter read 0 before any audit. After one failed audit, `error` reads 1
and `ok`/`degraded` stay at 0. Removing the initialization fails this
test.
- PostgreSQL lane (`scripts/postgres-test-run.sh`) with new or extended
tests:
- The repaired layout is not degraded in September. The same catalog is
degraded in August.
- With a 1 s idle timeout, a failed audit leaves the success timestamp
unchanged, and sustained failures keep it exported past the idle
timeout. When audits stop, the timestamp is evicted but the run counters
remain. The next success exports a fresh timestamp.
- Mutation check: removing the failure-path refresh fails both alert
fixtures.
- These fixtures check the emitted series. They do not evaluate the
rules themselves, including the `and <counter>` gate. `promtool` isn't
available locally or in CI, and the doc points to `promtool test rules`
for that.
- `scripts/test-postgres-test-discovery.sh`.
- `config::` and `nip_fi_config::` tests run together in one process
five times.
## Related
This PR conflicts textually with #7993 (catch-all advancement) in
`crates/buzz-db/src/store/partition.rs` and
`crates/buzz-relay/src/main.rs`. Whichever PR merges second will be
rebased onto the other.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
---------
Signed-off-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Ian Oberst <ioberst@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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klopez4212
|
5dc693aeaf |
Extract shared Huddle audio client for desktop consumers (#8129)
Huddle audio was embedded in the v0 desktop client, forcing other clients to duplicate its protocol and codec behavior. This extracts `buzz-audio-client` so v1 can depend on a pinned library revision without building the v0 application. The crate owns the bounded v2 audio handshake, roster parsing, wire format, Opus sender, and per-peer NetEQ jitter buffer. The v0 human and agent senders use it, and the desktop retains room admission, identity/signing, TLS policy, device routing, mute, and teardown. Receive decoding preserves v1's support for 120 ms Opus packets. No relay protocol changes, speech models, or model downloads are included. Docker builder stages include CMake because cargo-chef compiles the workspace dependency graph. Dependency security: Opus 0.4 replaces the unmaintained `audiopus_sys` backend with `opusic-sys`. NetEQ is pinned exactly to 0.8.3 because its published Rust sources never reference its declared ringbuf dependency. RUSTSEC-2026-0293 is documented as unreachable for this audited source, and a wrapper restriction rejects every other consumer of vulnerable ringbuf versions. Independent review confirmed the scope; re-audit/remove the exception when changing NetEQ. NetEQ 0.9.1 still declares ringbuf 0.3, so a version bump alone does not remove it. Local `cargo deny check` passes with this constrained exception. Validation: - All 21 shared-crate tests pass, including real loopback WebSocket authentication/cancellation, real Opus-to-NetEQ playback, malformed input, and 120 ms decoding. These tests are included in `just test-unit`. - Shared-crate, root workspace, and desktop Tauri Clippy pass; `just desktop-tauri-check` passes. - The desktop Tauri test workspace passes; native two-person listening/device checks remain separate. - All mandatory push checks pass at `d06bac5dc`, including the complete Rust unit gate and desktop workspace checks. Existing agent timing and relay log-capture tests failed under concurrent load, passed separately, and passed in the full serial test run; no tests or hooks were skipped. - One test-only fixture change allows cold Perl startup before the escaped-process test's inner timeout (2 seconds instead of 300 ms). Its independent 5-second watchdog, 300-second surviving pipe writer, and all assertions remain intact. All eight process-helper tests pass; independent review confirmed this still tests bounded drain completion. - Dependency inspection confirms the library brings in no desktop application, Tauri, identity store, relay server, or speech-model crates. - Independent source review found no correctness blockers. Draft: a native two-person call, mute/leave/cancellation, and microphone/speaker switching still need a runtime tryout and human review. Full `just ci` was stopped during the unrelated mobile toolchain download because of disk pressure; it is not a passing gate. Consumer integration is tracked in block/buzz-app#489. --------- Signed-off-by: kenny lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com> |
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|
Will Pfleger
|
40c1c474e7 |
fix(relay): hide deletions of author-only events from other readers (#8197)
🤖 Opened by an agent (Hayt) for Will Pfleger. The relay keeps `AUTHOR_ONLY_KINDS` (event reminders `30300`, push leases `30350`, private managed agents `30179`) readable only by their author, but a NIP-09 deletion request (`kind:5`) for one of those events was readable by any community reader. The deletion carries no `h` tag, so ingest stores it with its target's channel (none), and every read gate classified it by its own kind, `5`. Another reader could read and count it by author, by id, live, or over HTTP, learning the deleted ids, how many, and when. A deletion is now exactly as private as the event it deletes: - **Classification by the deletion's own `k` tag.** `buzz_core::kind::is_author_only_event_kind` treats a `kind:5` that names an author-only kind in a `k` tag as author-only. Only the canonical decimal spelling counts (`"30300"`, not `"030300"` or `"+30300"`), so Rust classification, ingest and the admin SQL (which matches the tag text) always agree. Because it reads the deletion, not a target lookup, the deletion stays private after its target is soft-deleted or gone. It is generic over `AUTHOR_ONLY_KINDS`, so a kind added to the list later (for example `44300`) is covered automatically. - **Every read surface.** The shared per-event gate (`is_author_only_event`, used by WS REQ historical and lookup by id, COUNT fallbacks, HTTP `/query`, `/count`, search hydration and the thread window), live fan-out in `handlers/event.rs`, the COUNT fast-path guard (`filter_can_match_author_only_kinds` now treats any filter that can match `kind:5`, including unfiltered and id-only filters, as needing per-event filtering), the channel-window aux closure in the bridge, and admin event preview plus report list and detail (SQL suppression of `kind:5` rows with a tag whose first two elements are `k` and an author-only kind, matching the Rust classifier; soft-deleted rows included). - **Enforcement still reaches the author.** The admin report query takes the private-deletion `k` list from its caller next to the hidden kinds. HTTP-facing reads pass both; `admin_get_report_for_enforcement` passes neither, so report-directed bans, timeouts and action recovery still resolve the stored author of a reported private deletion. - **Ingest agreement.** `validate_standard_deletion_event` rejects a deletion of a stored (including soft-deleted) author-only event, by `e` or by `a` coordinate, unless it carries the matching canonical `["k","<kind>"]`. It also rejects an author-only `k` on a deletion of any other kind, so a public deletion can't hide itself from the readers who need it. A deletion whose target is itself a private deletion is rejected with `invalid: cannot delete a private deletion request`: it would otherwise be stored as a public event revealing the private deletion's id and timing, and NIP-09 gives a deletion of a deletion no effect. A deletion of a public deletion is unchanged. The `k` tag only narrows who can read the request; it grants no one new deletion authority. - **Unauthorized deletions learn nothing about the target.** On every delete-by-id path, no target-dependent error (its kind, the artifact and `k`-marker errors, the artifact-removal-marker error, or where it lives) is returned until every access check that could block the deletion has passed. A sender who fails any of them gets `invalid: deletion target not found or not deletable by you`, the same text and status as for a missing target. Errors that depend only on the request, never on the target, are unchanged: for example a `kind:9005` whose own `h` channel is archived still gets `channel is archived`, for a missing target and a real one alike. "May not delete" includes an author who has since been removed from the target's private channel, an author whose token is scoped to a different channel, and anyone deleting in an archived channel. The single-target rule (exactly one `e` or `a` tag) now runs before any target lookup, so every target faces the gates. For `kind:5` with an `e` target, ingest decides authority (effective author or the owning human of the authoring agent) first, then takes the channel from that same lookup, soft-deleted targets included, so tombstones face the same gates; an authorized re-deletion of a soft-deleted target now keeps the target's stored channel instead of being treated as global, so historical access checks, `#h` filtering and live routing all use that channel: readers outside a private channel no longer see it, and that channel's members and subscribers do. The token channel scope, scoped-token global-event, membership and archived checks then reject with the shared denial, all before `validate_standard_deletion_event` returns its artifact and `k`-marker errors. Other kinds, and `kind:5` with only `a` coordinates, keep their existing errors. For NIP-29 `kind:9005`, a target outside the `h` channel is denied like a missing one, so the relay no longer returns "different channel" or "no channel"; `may_delete_channel_event` (the author while still a member or the channel is open, a channel owner/admin, or the owning human of the author agent) is then checked in the `h` channel before the artifact-removal-marker error. No access restriction is removed and nothing becomes newly deletable. An authorized sender who names the wrong `h` channel for a `kind:9005` now gets the shared denial. Whether kind:5 content is full-text indexed depends on how the database was built. The desired-state schema (`schema/schema.sql`, which CI applies) and databases created before migration `0008` index it; an empty database initialized through `0008` gets a positive allowlist that doesn't. Where it is indexed, the per-event gate on search hydration is what keeps a private deletion out of other readers' search results. No current client is affected by the new rejection. `buzz-app`'s signer only allows `kind:5` for channel messages (with `h`) and managed-agent `30177` coordinates, and neither `buzz-app` nor this repo's desktop or CLI publishes deletions for `30300`, `30350` or `30179` today. NIP-ER already requires `k=30300` on reminder deletions. Coverage: - `crates/buzz-test-client/tests/e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` (Backend Integration job): a non-author gets nothing from WS REQ, WS COUNT, HTTP `/query` and `/count` (by author, mixed kinds, and id), search, or live delivery, while the author gets the deletion. Search runs WS and HTTP against a private deletion and a public control deletion sharing a reason word; with `BUZZ_TEST_SEARCH_INDEXES_DELETIONS=1` (set by the CI step) the author must get exactly both and another reader exactly the control; ingest rejects a missing, wrong, non-canonical, or public-target marker, and an untagged deletion of an already soft-deleted target. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` also sends one non-owner's deletions over HTTP and WS for a missing, live, soft-deleted, private-channel and global target, plus the `kind:9005` equivalents including a target in another channel and one with no channel, and requires the identical rejection text and HTTP status in every case; another member's deletion of a private event never names its kind. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` `removed_author_deletion_does_not_reveal_target`: an author removed from a private channel gets the missing-target rejection over HTTP and WS for `kind:5` and `kind:9005` (with `h` set to a channel they can write to) against their retained message; the channel owner can still delete the removed author's message, and the author can still delete in a channel they can write to. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` `archived_target_deletion_does_not_reveal_target`: over HTTP and WS, `kind:5` against a message, the same message with a wrong `k`, and an artifact in an archived channel, and `kind:9005` against the archived-channel message with `h` set to an active channel, all match the missing-target rejection; a `kind:9005` for an artifact-removal marker in the archived channel matches a missing target with the same `h`; in an active channel the owner still gets the `k`-mismatch and artifact errors. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` `deletion_of_private_deletion_rejected`: over HTTP and WS, the author's deletion of their private deletion, with no `k` and with `k=5`, gets the rejection and stores nothing; a non-author's gets the missing-target rejection; a `kind:9005` against it gets the missing-target rejection; the private deletion stays hidden from another reader in WS REQ and COUNT, HTTP `/query` and `/count`, and live delivery; a deletion of a public deletion is still accepted. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` `soft_deleted_target_keeps_its_channel`: an author removed from a private channel, and an author in an archived channel, re-deleting their own soft-deleted message get the missing-target rejection; a distinct successful re-deletion is readable by a channel member and not by an outsider, by id and by `#h`, and is delivered live to the member's `#h` subscription but not to the outsider's. - `e2e_author_only_deletion.rs` `multi_target_deletion_error_ignores_targets`: deletions with two `e` tags, or an `e` and an `a` tag, get the identical single-target error whether the first target is missing, live, in another private channel, a private reminder or an artifact. - `handlers::ingest::postgres_tests::scoped_token_deletion_rejection_does_not_reveal_target`: a non-owner and the target's author, each with a token scoped to another channel, get the same rejection for a missing, live, soft-deleted and global target, and the author's `kind:9005` naming the token's channel gets it for a missing target, a live target in another channel and a global target; a token scoped to the target's channel still deletes, and its re-deletion of the soft-deleted target is stored with that target's channel. - `thread_window::postgres_tests`: stored private deletions never reach a non-signer through the thread-window or channel-window aux closures, or by id once their target is gone. - `api::admin::postgres_tests`: ban and stranded-ban recovery on a reported private deletion reach the stored author while report detail hides it; `admin_moderation` tests treat non-canonical markers as public. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Tom Brow
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5b907b838a |
fix(push): isolate push enqueue and stop workers on rollback (#8216)
Push enqueueing previously ran inside the message transaction, so a push lock or database error could block or reject a message. Configured relay writers now submit bounded best-effort work only after commit. A dedicated connection and bounded queue isolate enqueue waits and failures from message-write connections. Overload, errors, process loss, or shutdown may drop a notification; the committed message remains authoritative. `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED=false` disables the application producer and workers. Updated writer connections always bypass any surviving enqueue trigger. The overlap migration updates an existing function without resurrecting retired objects. Apply it before relying on isolation with a surviving trigger, and replace every old enabled process and writer connection: missing settings preserve legacy behavior during overlap. SIGTERM/Ctrl-C cancels enqueue, matcher, and delivery work before listener drain. Durable queues, claims, leases, preferences, and delivery configuration remain intact. Claims expire normally; gateway requests already accepted may still deliver. Reactivation requires an explicit operator decision about retained work. There is no automatic purge, startup interlock, or backfill of messages written while disabled. Built on merged [#8135](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8135), including [#8178](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8178). Trigger retirement [#8210](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8210) remains open; this change is tested with the trigger present and after removal. Operational details are in [the rollback and reactivation guide](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/relay-push-rollback/docs/push-gateway-deployment.md#relay-rollback-and-reactivation). ### Validation [ |
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Luke Tornquist
|
d34c9c2c9b |
ci: shorten the PR critical path (desktop lanes, smoke shards, parallel relay artifacts) (#8156)
## Summary The PR critical path on main push [run 37635224099](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/37635224099) (`e097c4299`) was about 42 minutes: - **Desktop Core** took 41 min. It ran frontend checks, two clippy graphs, the Tauri suite, the mesh-llm suite and every compiled-flag state one after another. The compiled-flag step alone took 16m51. - **Relay artifact producer → Desktop E2E Integration** took about 31 min. The producer built the relay binaries (5m07), the backend integration archive (4m41) and the PostgreSQL archive (8m18) one after another. - **Desktop Smoke E2E** took 19–24 min per shard across 4 shards, with 82 min of tests in total. This PR attacks all three. ### 1. Run each compiled-flag state once (`Justfile`) | Previous step | Cost | Why it's redundant | |---|---|---| | Clean state: full `buzz_lib` suite (`--lib`) | 3m27 run | `desktop-tauri-test` runs the same suite in the same compile state one step earlier. When `BUZZ_TEST_EXPECTED_AGENT_ACCESS_OWNER_ONLY` is unset, the expected value already defaults to `false` in non-owner-only builds (`runtime/test_fixtures.rs`, `agents_tests.rs`). | | Internal state: auto-connect and owner-only built separately | 1m22 + 1m06 + 56s across three recompiles | Internal release packaging always sets both capabilities together, so building owner-only without auto-connect tests a configuration that never ships. The extra 56s happens because a bare `cargo test <filter>` builds every target, not just the `--lib` harness. | | Demo state: `cargo test --workspace` | ~30s more than `--lib` | `buzz-terminal` and the `tests/*.rs` integration tests don't read any `BUZZ_BUILD_*` variable or `buzz_lib`, so they ran the same binaries a second time. | A fourth cost was hidden: every recipe invocation spent ~1m20 recompiling `buzz-desktop` to the *same* unit hash `desktop-tauri-test` had just built. `_ensure-sidecar-stubs` ran `touch` on every sidecar stub on each run. `tauri-build` emits `rerun-if-changed` for each `externalBin`, so the new mtimes reran `build.rs` and recompiled the crate. Stubs are now created only when they're missing. This also speeds up any local `desktop-tauri-*` recipe run back-to-back. After this change: - **Clean state:** runs only the two compiled-flag assertions (`compiled_flag_matches_expected`, `compiled_policy_matches_expected`) with `expected=false`. No recompile. - **Internal state:** one compile with `BUZZ_BUILD_AUTO_CONNECT_DEFAULT_RELAY=1` and `BUZZ_BUILD_AGENT_ACCESS_OWNER_ONLY=1`. It runs both assertions with `expected=true`, then the full `buzz_lib` suite. The suite now runs with auto-connect enabled as well, which matches the shipped internal build more closely than before. - **Auto-connect-only state (assertions only):** auto-connect `true`, owner-only `false`. The two capabilities are documented as independent. Without this state, a `build.rs` block that read the other capability's variable would pass, because every other state sets both or neither. - **Demo state:** one compile with only `BUZZ_BUILD_DEMO_SLUG`. It asserts the slug and asserts both capabilities stay `false`, then runs the full `buzz_lib` suite. - The recipe clears the three toggled `BUZZ_BUILD_*` capability variables and any caller `BUZZ_TEST_EXPECTED_*` values up front. Each state exports its own values in a subshell. Every invocation uses `--lib`, so each state compiles one test harness. - Each ignored-assertion run requires exactly one passing test per name filter. Previously, a renamed or un-ignored assertion matched nothing and passed silently. - The 32-character demo-name rejection check is unchanged. The full-suite reruns in the internal and demo states are kept on purpose. They are the only coverage that the whole suite holds up in those two shipped build shapes. Estimate: the compiled-flag work goes from about 17 min to about 11. ### 2. Split Desktop Core into parallel, path-gated lanes (`_ci-desktop.yml`) - **Desktop JS:** `desktop-check`, `desktop-test` and `desktop-build`. These compile no Rust, but some node:test cases read relay and DB crate sources to pin shared constants (for example `relayReconnectReplay.test.mjs`). So the job runs on desktop *and* Rust changes, in parallel with the Tauri lanes. `lefthook.yml` notes this as a deliberate local deviation. - **Desktop Tauri (core | mesh | compiled-flags):** a matrix of parallel Rust lanes. - `core` and `compiled-flags` share the existing `desktop-core` Rust cache key, so they start warm. `compiled-flags` restores it read-only. - `mesh` keeps its own cache because `mesh-llm` pulls a different dependency graph. - **Smoke E2E and the Windows frontend build** compile no Rust and read no crate sources, so they no longer run for Rust-only changes. - **Smoke E2E goes from 4 to 10 shards.** Playwright shards by test count, not duration. A simulation from the per-test durations in run 37635224099 reproduces the observed 4-shard split exactly. With 10 shards, the slowest shard runs about 11 min of tests. - **The `Desktop` gate is stricter.** Each selected job must succeed and each unselected job must be skipped, so a mis-gated job can't pass silently. The required check context (`Desktop`) is unchanged. `scripts/ci-required-gates.test.mjs` pins each job's `if:` to the gate's selection expression, and checks which jobs a Rust-only, desktop-only, Tauri, push, and empty selection pick. - **Path-filter fixes:** - The `desktop` filter now includes `_ci-desktop.yml`, `ci.yml` and `Justfile` (which holds the desktop recipes), so edits to them run the frontend lanes. - The `rust` filter now matches `Justfile`. It still named the pre-rename `justfile`, so a `Justfile`-only change selected no Rust suites. - `scripts/ci-selection.test.mjs` gains `Justfile` and desktop-workflow scenarios, and the shared-workflow scenario now expects `desktop`. - **Dead step removed:** the failure-only Playwright artifact upload in the old Core job never had anything to upload, because that job never ran Playwright. ### 3. Build relay artifacts in parallel (`_ci-relay.yml`) - **The producer is now a 3-way matrix** (`relay-binaries`, `backend-integration-tests`, `postgres-tests`). - Each lane has its own exact-source cache entry and uploads `desktop-e2e-relay-<artifact>`. - Consumers download `desktop-e2e-relay-*` into `target/ci`, so their paths are unchanged. - The required `Desktop E2E Relay` context still reads the producer job's aggregate result. - **Rust cache saving:** all lanes restore the existing Rust cache key, but only the widest lane (`postgres-tests`) saves it. Otherwise the fastest lane could overwrite it with a narrower target dir. - **Desktop E2E Integration goes from 2 to 3 shards.** Shard labels now use `strategy.job-total`. ### 4. Bound degraded apt steps (`scripts/ci-apt-retry.sh`) - With more shards, more runs hit the occasional degraded Ubuntu mirror. On this PR, a Tauri lane ran `apt-get install` for 27 minutes: apt's `Acquire` timeouts kept firing, but apt kept re-queuing the requests and never failed. Separately, three Smoke shards stalled silently in `playwright install-deps` (no output after `InRelease`) until the job timeout. Healthy apt steps across four recent runs finished in at most 238s. - Every apt-backed step in Desktop and Integration now runs through `scripts/ci-apt-retry.sh`. The script writes the apt options to `apt.conf.d`, so Playwright's own apt-get calls get them too. It kills each attempt after 7 minutes (90s for `apt-get update`). Between attempts it stops any `apt-get` or `dpkg` the attempt left running, repairs dpkg under its own 60s deadline, and retries up to 3 times. The stop matters for `playwright install-deps`, which runs `sudo sh -c "apt-get update && apt-get install ..."`: sudo puts its command in a new process group, so the deadline's signal stops `sh` and apt-get survives holding the dpkg lock (seen on Smoke shard 8 of run 37696815557, and reproduced with real sudo). - Downloaded `.deb`s are kept between attempts, so a retry resumes where the last one stopped. Against a mirror that stays degraded, this bounds each wrapped command at about 25 minutes rather than recovering it. The Tauri lanes wrap two commands, `apt-get update` (about 8.5 minutes worst case) and `apt-get install` (about 25), so about 34 minutes together. Job timeouts are sized to fit that bound plus the job's own work: Tauri 55m (lanes take up to ~15m), Integration 40m, and Smoke 45m. A degraded mirror therefore ends with the wrapper's error instead of a silent job timeout. - **The retry has already fired on this PR.** In [run 37703795342](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/37703795342), `playwright install-deps` on Integration shard 1/3 hit the 420s attempt deadline. The second attempt started about 1.4s later, downloaded and configured the real packages, and succeeded. The step took 526s (8m46), and that shard took 17m24 while the other two took about 5m. Healthy installs have taken at most 238s, so 420s leaves headroom, and a slow mirror costs one attempt instead of the job. - Between attempts the script stops **every** `apt-get`/`dpkg` on the machine, not only the ones it started. That's intentional: on a hosted runner any other one would hold the same dpkg lock. It assumes an ephemeral runner, and the script says not to use it on a self-hosted runner or a developer machine. - `scripts/ci-apt-retry.test.mjs` covers the following with a fake `sudo`: success, retry, the attempt budget, a stalled attempt, a stalled dpkg repair, an apt-get that escapes the attempt's process group (on a retry and on the final attempt), and usage. It needs Linux (GNU `timeout`, `flock`, `setsid`, procps), so it skips on other platforms. CI runs it on Ubuntu. ### What got simpler - **Compiled-flag recipe:** two full-suite runs instead of three, six cargo invocations instead of eight, and sidecar stubs no longer invalidate the desktop build cache. - **Path selection:** each desktop job declares only the paths that actually affect it. The stale `justfile` filter and a dead artifact step are gone. - **Apt options:** set once in `apt.conf.d` by one script, instead of as repeated `-o Acquire...` flags on each apt call. - **Shard counts:** the shard count is written once per matrix, not repeated in names and commands. ### Cost - **More runners:** a full run uses more runner jobs. Smoke E2E goes from 4 to 10 jobs, Desktop Core from 1 to 4, the relay producer from 1 to 3, and Integration from 2 to 3. - **Fewer runners on single-area PRs:** desktop-only PRs skip the Rust lanes, and Rust-only PRs skip Smoke E2E and the Windows build. - **One extra Rust cache entry:** `desktop-mesh`. ### Related issue None found. ### Testing Blox, compiled-flag recipe at `77b9874b`: - [x] Recipe passes with output redirected to a file. The log keeps all 4 state headers, the ignored assertions ran 2/2/2/3, and both full suites passed (`3423 passed`). - [x] A second back-to-back run shows no clean-state `Compiling buzz-desktop`. - [x] Mutation tests all fail as required: - `build.rs` auto-connect reads the owner-only var: rc=101. - The reverse swap: rc=101. - Rename `compiled_policy_matches_expected`: rc=1. - Wrong owner-only expectation: rc=101. - [ ] `just ci` Workflows: - [x] `actionlint` on `_ci-desktop.yml`, `_ci-relay.yml` and `ci.yml`: clean. - [x] `scripts/test-ci-required-context-isolation.sh`: passes. - [x] GitHub Actions: runs [37701003713](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/37701003713) and [37703795342](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/37703795342) took 27m09 and 28m51. Before this PR, PR runs had a median of 40.0m (n=21) and main pushes took about 42m. These are observations across mixed runner images, not a measured causal speedup. - [x] Selection, gate and apt suites (74/74 on Linux), `actionlint` and `bash -n` on Blox at tree `db9725fe`. --------- Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
||
|
Luke Tornquist
|
f8bf2c529c | refactor(db): type-level admitted event-write transactions (AdmittedTx) (#8130) | ||
|
Luke Tornquist
|
1972b7d256 | feat(admin): add community archive commands (#7107) | ||
|
Will Pfleger
|
032198ce43 |
feat(relay): add community reads to the admin API (#8011)
The in-app Admin Console needs to work on any community the relay
serves, not only the one the desktop is connected to. This adds four
read-only routes under `/api/admin/v1` that the stacked desktop PR
builds on, puts every admin route under one explicit access rule, and
binds every admin request's signature to its real method, which fixes
signed `HEAD` on reads.
## Access rule
| Mode | Moderation reads | Writes | Staffing (`/operators`) |
|---|---|---|---|
| `nip98` (default) | signed, any staff role | signed, role-checked |
signed Operator |
| `disabled` | served to anyone who can reach the relay | `403` | `403`
|
"Moderation reads" means every read: reports, feedback and attachments,
restrictions, and the four community routes below. `nip98` behavior is
unchanged, and the Operator API (`/operator/*`) is untouched.
**Existing `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=disabled` deployments start serving the four
new reads** (community directory, member search, member lookup without
staff status, and stored events by ID) with no config change. The
startup `WARN`, `docs/admin/README.md`, `.env.example`,
`deploy/compose/.env.example` and the `just admin` comment list exactly
what disabled mode exposes, say it should be reachable only by people
allowed to see all moderation data in every community, and say the whole
relay port must be private: the admin API is on the relay's main
listener and its hostname check uses the caller's `Host` header. `just
admin` binds the relay to `127.0.0.1` unless `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` is
exactly `nip98`, so an unset, padded or misspelled value stays local.
In code, `authorize()` returns `AdminAccess`, either `NetworkTrusted`
(disabled mode, no identity) or `Staff(AdminPrincipal)` (`nip98`, any
rostered Operator or Moderator). Each route makes one check: **view**
(`authorize()` succeeding), **act** (`AdminAccess::act()`, must be
`Staff`, then the existing role checks) or **operator**
(`AdminAccess::operator()`, must be an Operator). Act and operator
refuse `NetworkTrusted` with `403 this endpoint requires
BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=nip98`; no principal is ever created for an anonymous
caller. `every_route_makes_its_check_in_both_auth_modes` lists every
mounted admin route with its check and asserts the result in both modes,
and `every_route_is_listed` fails when `router()` mounts a route that
list does not name.
## Routes
All four live in `api/admin/reads.rs`; `mod.rs` only registers them.
Their queries reject unknown fields, like `ReportQuery`. The three
`?communityHost=` routes share `CommunityQuery`, which now rejects
unknown fields too, so the existing unban, untimeout and direct-action
routes that use it do the same; their desktop callers send only
`communityHost`. Every admin route that takes `limit` validates it with
the module's shared `limit()` helper, so an out-of-range value is `400
invalid_limit`.
| Route | Returns |
|---|---|
| `GET /communities?q=&cursor=&limit=` | `{items: [{id, host,
icon\|null}], nextCursor\|null}` |
| `GET /members/search?communityHost=&q=&limit=` | `{items: [{pubkey,
displayName\|null, nip05\|null, avatarUrl\|null}]}` |
| `GET /members/{pubkey}?communityHost=` | `{pubkey, profile:
{displayName, nip05, avatarUrl, about}\|null, role:
"owner"\|"admin"\|"member"\|null, banned, mutedUntil\|null, isStaff:
bool\|null}` |
| `GET /events/{id}?communityHost=` | `{id, authorPubkey, kind, content,
createdAt, deletedAt\|null, channelId\|null}` |
- **One community per read.** Community-scoped routes bind
`communityHost` through the tenant binder (`400 unknown_community_host`)
and read only that community's `users`, `relay_members`,
`community_bans` and `events` rows.
- **Directory.** It uses the binder's liveness rule (not archived, not
deleted, `deletion_state = 'active'`), so every listed host can be
opened. `q` is an escaped, case-insensitive host prefix of at most 255
characters (`400 invalid_query`). Results are ordered and paged by
`lower(host)`, which is unique, so the opaque base64url cursor carries
only the last host; a malformed cursor is `400 invalid_cursor`. `limit`
is 1 to 100 with a default of 50.
- **Member search.** It reuses `search_users`, which already escapes,
binds and scopes, with no second escaping layer. `q` is trimmed and must
be 1 to 100 characters (`400 invalid_query`), and `limit` is 1 to 50
(default 20). It searches community profiles, so former members appear.
- **Member lookup.** `isStaff` uses the same roster lookup as the
direct-action staff guard and is returned to signed staff only: it is
`null` in disabled mode, where the roster is never read. A roster lookup
failure is a 500, never "not staff".
- **Event preview.** It reads the event by `(community_id, id)` and
never returns a private kind (see below). A malformed id, an id stored
only in another community and a private kind are all `404
event_not_found`, the same answer as an absent event.
## Private events
Admin reads never reveal events the relay keeps private.
`admin_hidden_kinds()` combines the four private kind sets in
`buzz_core::kind`: `AUTHOR_ONLY_KINDS`, `RESULT_GATED_KINDS`,
`P_GATED_KINDS` and `SHARED_GATED_KINDS`. The whole shared-gated set is
hidden, including events tagged `["shared","true"]`; the shared tag is
never evaluated. Every HTTP response applies it the way it treats a
missing event: event preview is `404 event_not_found`, report detail
returns the report with `message: null` and `targetAuthorPubkey: null`,
and the report list returns a null target author.
Moderators can still act on these events, they just cannot read them.
Report detail is one query with the hidden-kind list as a parameter,
exposed two ways: `admin_get_report` hides private kinds and backs every
HTTP response (GET detail, the resolve response, reopen, cancel and the
reporter-notice worker), while `admin_get_report_for_enforcement` reads
the target unfiltered and is used only by the resolve handler's
enforcement load (the staff-target check and ban, timeout and kick
target derivation) and by the recovery worker for interrupted actions.
Its result is never serialized, so a ban from a report on a private
persona bans the real author while GET still shows nothing.
## Method binding
Axum serves `HEAD` through `GET` handlers, but the read handlers
authorized with a literal `"GET"`, so a correctly signed `HEAD` was
rejected. Admin reads now authorize through `authorize_read` and writes
through `authorize_write`, both of which use the request's real method
and full target, so no handler hardcodes a method string. A database
error behind any admin route is now logged before it becomes a 500.
## Directory query plan
`idx_communities_host` is on `lower(host)` in the default collation, so
the prefix `LIKE` is a filter, not an index condition. The plan walks
the index in order and stops once it has `limit` matches. A common
prefix is cheap (on local Postgres 16 with 21,359 communities, a first
page skipped 2,728 index rows in 3.9 ms), but a prefix with few or no
matches walks every index entry, so its cost grows with the number of
communities. A `COLLATE "C"` index would turn the prefix into an index
range; it is left out because the admin directory is low-traffic and the
cost is small at current scale.
The cursor condition is `lower(host) > COALESCE($2, '')`, with no `OR`,
so it remains an index condition under a generic plan:
```text
-> Bitmap Index Scan on idx_communities_host
Index Cond: (lower((host)::text) > COALESCE($2, ''::text))
```
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
||
|
Luke Tornquist
|
e097c42996 |
feat(relay): time post-metrics-bind startup steps (#8132)
## Summary
Relay pods on large deployments can take over 5 minutes to open their
health port, and right now nothing shows which startup step is slow.
Startup timing ends at `metrics_bind`, and the slow work all happens
after it.
This PR times every startup step from Postgres connect through public
listener bind. It does not change startup behavior.
- Each step logs `Startup phase started` and `Startup phase finished`,
with `phase`, `elapsed_ms`, and `status` (`succeeded` / `degraded` /
`failed`, the same values `buzz_process_lifecycle` records use).
- Gauge `buzz_startup_phase_current{phase}` is `1` while a step runs and
`0` after it ends. A pod that is still starting shows exactly which step
it is on.
- Gauge `buzz_startup_phase_seconds{phase}` records each finished step's
duration.
- The startup NIP-43 membership reconcile logs `NIP-43 startup
reconciliation progress` every 5,000 communities, with `done`, `total`,
`republished`, `failed`, and `elapsed_ms`.
These are gauges rather than counters on purpose. Each value is written
once per boot, and a monotonic-counter scrape drops a series' first
sample, so a one-shot counter never shows up.
## Contract change
`deploy/charts/buzz/README.md` ("Early-startup telemetry contract") said
the early lifecycle phases are log-only. That still holds: `crypto_init`
through `metrics_bind` are unchanged and emit no metrics.
The README now also documents the post-bind steps. The guard in
`boot_lifecycle.rs` now allows exactly the two `buzz_startup_phase_*`
families. It still rejects any other startup, boot, or lifecycle family,
and it also rejects any exported label value that names an early phase.
## Design
- `crates/buzz-relay/src/startup_steps.rs` adds a closed `StartupStep`
vocabulary (18 steps) and a `StepTimer` guard.
- A step ends exactly once:
- `finish()` → `succeeded`
- `degrade()` then `finish()` → `degraded` (a non-fatal error branch)
- dropped without finishing → `failed` (covers `?` early returns and
panics)
- The NIP-43 and large-roster reconciles now return `ReconcileSummary {
repaired, failed }`. A sweep where any item fails ends its step
`degraded`, and the final log line includes the `failed` count. NIP-FI
warm ends `degraded` when any issuer did not warm. The deprecated
`reconcile_nip43_membership_snapshots` wrapper still returns `repaired`.
- Steps that are disabled by config (migrate, audit connect, NIP-FI
warm, git probe, NIP-43 reconcile) are not timed, so their series never
appear.
- The gauges are set once, so they age out after the existing gauge idle
timeout (2700 s with default intervals; logged as `idle_timeout_secs`).
A step that runs longer than that loses its `_current` series. The
README says so.
- Progress logging runs only for the `Bootstrap` reconcile. The 60 s
maintenance sweep stays quiet.
## What got simpler
Little got simpler in the code: this mostly adds instrumentation. One CI
gap closed along the way: the 54 `config` tests and the 9 non-ignored
`boot_lifecycle` tests, which ran in no CI lane, now run in `test-unit`.
The instrumentation is scoped as small as I could make it, and it is the
evidence needed for the follow-up that should delete code: moving the
per-community NIP-43 reconcile off the pre-bind path, after which the
900 s startup-probe override can go back to the chart default.
## Testing
- `startup_steps` unit tests (`DebuggingRecorder`):
- a running step is current and has no duration
- a finished step clears current and records its elapsed time
- dropped and degraded steps clear current and record a duration
- log capture: `finish`, `degrade`+`finish`, drop, and panic each emit
exactly one `Startup phase finished` record with the right `status`.
Mutating `degrade()` to a no-op and removing the ends-once guard makes
these tests fail.
- the vocabulary is unique and shares no names with the early lifecycle
phases
- Tests that capture logs or check callsite interest now share
`test_support::tracing_dispatch_lock()`. These are the `startup_steps`
helpers, two `telemetry` tests, and the `config` and `bridge`
log-capture helpers. tracing-core caches each callsite's interest across
the whole process. Without the lock, the new panic test lost its record
in 60 of 150 parallel runs of `telemetry:: startup_steps:: config::`.
With the lock it failed 0 of 300. Removing the lock from `gauges()`
brings the failures back (53 of 100 runs).
- `nip43_progress_logs_every_interval_inside_the_startup_sweep_only`
checks the cadence at 79,942 communities (15 progress lines, none at the
start or end) and table-tests that the maintenance sweep never logs
progress.
-
`boot_lifecycle::successful_main_emits_complete_lifecycle_and_reports_current_startup_step`
boots the real relay binary against a TCP peer that never speaks
Postgres. It asserts that `/metrics` shows
`buzz_startup_phase_current{phase="db_connect"} 1` and no finished-step
durations, and that no early phase leaks into metrics.
- **CI routing.** `just test-unit` picks relay tests by hand-maintained
filter. Before this PR, CI's filters selected none of the
`startup_steps`, `telemetry`, `config` or non-ignored `boot_lifecycle`
tests above; the NIP-43 cadence test is picked up by the existing
`handlers::side_effects::tests::` clause. Its infra-free relay stanza
now selects `startup_steps::tests::`, `telemetry::tests::` and
`config::tests::` (anchored so `nip_fi_config` is not selected twice),
and a new `cargo nextest run -p buzz-relay --test boot_lifecycle` line
runs the non-ignored `boot_lifecycle` tests (they spawn the real binary
and need no Postgres or Redis; the Postgres cases stay `#[ignore]`d).
`scripts/run-tests.sh` mirrors both, running `telemetry` and `config`
single-threaded because they mutate process env.
### Manual check
1. `just relay` (or run `buzz-relay` against local Postgres and Redis).
2. Once the relay is up: `curl -s localhost:9102/metrics | grep
buzz_startup_phase`. Every step that ran has a `_seconds` value, and
every `_current` value is 0.
3. In the relay logs, `"Startup phase finished"` lines show each step's
`elapsed_ms`.
---------
Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
||
|
Luke Tornquist
|
d0fd96fca6 |
BUZZ-175: Route serving event writes through the tenant lock (#7828)
## Summary
Route every serving event write through one community-admitted
transaction entry point. `Db::begin_event_write_transaction(community)`
is now the only `Db` constructor for event-write transactions: it takes
the shared community admission lock before returning, so callers that
use it cannot take domain or row locks ahead of tenant admission, and a
quiescing community rejects the write at entry. Database triggers and
commit-time fences remain the authoritative backstop.
This migrates normal, replaceable, roster, relay membership, reaction,
reminder, admin-delete, push-owned, artifact-accept, huddle-join
(48101), workflow-deletion, and command-executor event writes. Coupled
mention writes stay in the same transaction; pool-level
`insert_mentions` now opens its own admitted transaction.
**Review fixes (since `950d5f6`):**
- The unguarded event-write constructor is gone. Removed with it: the
deprecated `begin_transaction` alias, the test-only replica-floor
constructor, and `begin_community_write_transaction` (now identical to
the single constructor). Artifact accept, the huddle join, and both
workflow-deletion paths now admit before any domain or row lock;
`persist_command_event` no longer hand-rolls `guard_transaction`;
read-only `query_artifacts` no longer opens an event-write transaction.
- `insert_channel_head_checked` is now `insert_canvas_head_checked`: it
rejects non-canvas kinds before opening a transaction and always takes
the coordinate lock.
- Source policy now also scans `buzz-relay`: any function that hands a
transaction to an event-write helper must have opened it through the
admitted constructor. The scan drops each `#[cfg(test)]` item instead of
stopping at the first one: it tracks brace depth and ends the item on a
line ending in `;` or `}` (ignoring a trailing `//` comment, even after
a string that contains `//`), with a column-0 `}` as fallback. Fixtures
pin a unit struct, a multi-line static, a `const { … }` block, a struct
with fields, a module, and one-line items with trailing comments,
including after `"https://…"` and `"ws://…"` strings; a raw opener after
each must still be flagged. Known limit: braces inside string or char
literals or comments are still counted, and only `//` trailing comments
are recognized, so a test-only item with unbalanced braces in a literal
or comment, or with a trailing `/* */`, would hide what follows; none
exists today. The scan checks that admission is present; the per-path
PostgreSQL tests pin that it comes before domain locks.
- `just test-unit` (and the non-nextest fallback in
`scripts/run-tests.sh`) now runs `buzz-db --test observability_source`.
Before this, no CI job ran these source-policy tests: the unit lane ran
`buzz-db --lib` only and the PostgreSQL lane runs only ignored tests.
- Renamed or removed since `950d5f6`: `begin_transaction`,
`begin_community_write_transaction`, and the replica-floor test
constructor are gone; `insert_channel_head_checked` →
`insert_canvas_head_checked`; test helper `quiesce_community_for_tests`
now delegates to `main`'s `set_deletion_state`, which reads the real
`deletion_fence_generation` instead of hard-coding `'0'`;
`runtime::insert_mentions` is pinned to the admitted constructor by
`pool_level_insert_mentions_opens_the_tenant_local_chokepoint`.
**What got simpler:** four transaction constructors collapse to one, and
the hand-rolled admission guard is deleted. The compiler rejects callers
of the removed constructors, but a transaction opened from `Db::pool()`
can still reach the public `*_in_transaction` helpers; only the
source-policy scan and the database fences catch that until BUZZ-254.
**Behavior note:** #7932 made `insert_event` skip the transaction for
kinds that are not listener mentions. Every serving event write now has
to run in a transaction that holds the community admission lock, so
`insert_event` always opens the admitted transaction again. `main`'s
`soft_delete_event_and_update_thread` / `_in_tx` split and its
removal-marker guard are kept; the outer function now opens the admitted
transaction.
### Related issue
[BUZZ-175](https://linear.app/squareup/issue/BUZZ-175). Caller-migration
stage following #7706 (merged); rebased onto `main` at `5173fad66`.
Follow-up: [BUZZ-254](https://linear.app/squareup/issue/BUZZ-254) makes
event-write helpers require a type-level admitted transaction.
**Known debt, out of scope:** `create_channel`, `update_channel`, and
`insert_thread_metadata` write channel and thread rows (not events)
outside the admitted constructor.
### Testing
At `efe4a94623dd69973780a3c39f16dd972cf7cb76` on a cloud workstation:
fmt; `buzz-db` clippy (all targets, `-D warnings`);
`observability_source` 14/14; `just --dry-run test-unit` includes the
new step. Reverting just the end-of-item check to an earlier rule makes
a trailing-comment fixture fail.
At `eaf190ae59d1595741c3d19dc4c23ce492b5f4d4` (the commit after it only
changes this test file, `Justfile`, and `scripts/run-tests.sh`): full
GitHub CI green; on the workstation, clippy for `buzz-db` and
`buzz-relay`, ordinary `buzz-db` 154/154, `just test-unit` green, and
the PostgreSQL lane 805 of 806 (exception below). An end-to-end run
against a local relay and the built desktop app covered artifact accept,
huddle join, and workflow deletion for both a healthy and a quiescing
community, plus p-tag reaction rollback and replay of the same signed
event.
New tests: one fenced-community test per migrated path (artifact accept,
huddle join, both workflow deletions) puts the community into
`quiescing`, holds the lock the path takes next, and asserts rejection
at entry with nothing stored; a DB-free test pins the non-canvas
rejection.
Exceptions:
-
`runtime::postgres_tests::writer_pool_rejects_non_read_committed_database_default`
hangs on that workstation's local Postgres 16 at both this head and an
earlier `main` base, `f0eb5575f` (2/2 runs each). The test, `Db::new`,
and the pool setup are unchanged by this PR, and the test passes in
GitHub CI. Live traces put the hang in the client, not the database: the
1 s acquire timeout stops firing after sqlx's `after_connect` rejection
path under tokio's `current_thread` runtime. No database lock waits were
observed.
- Two `observability_source` assertions were already failing on `main`,
unnoticed because no CI job ran that test binary: a stale
`fetch_optional` pin after #8005, and lease-seam attribution that now
lives in the `bounded_serving_lease_sql` helper. Both are corrected
here, and the binary now runs in `just test-unit`.
Generated with Codex
---------
Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>
Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
||
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Will Pfleger
|
df3f28a2c4 |
feat(relay): add NIP-FI shadow mode for HTTP, WebSocket and admin (#8034)
Stack: this PR → #8062 🤖 Follows #8028 (merged). Adds `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=shadow`. The relay loads and validates the full enforce configuration (issuers, communities, lifetimes, command issuers), evaluates NIP-FI evidence wherever enforce would decide, and records what enforce would have done, while every request, upgrade and session behaves exactly as in `off`. The one approved exception is admin disconnect: shadow verifies the command and returns `200`, where Off has no verifier and returns `503`. It lets an operator measure the would-deny rate, including Hosts missing from `BUZZ_NIP_FI_COMMUNITIES`, before switching to `enforce`. - **Mode predicates.** `NipFiMode` gains `is_off`, `restricts`, `evaluates`, `enforces`, `denies_unconditionally` and `observes_only`, built on two exhaustive `match` bases (`restricts`, `evaluates`); `is_off` is a `matches!` and the rest derive from the bases, so a new mode cannot silently fall into one side. Every call site uses them, including the Git membership-lookup failure from #8005, which uses `restricts()` so shadow keeps Off's body. A test scans each crate's `src/` and fails on any `NipFiMode::<variant>` in production code outside the predicate definitions and the env parser, which catches `==`, `matches!` on any number of lines, `if let` and or-patterns. - **Startup.** Shadow goes through enforce's path, so every enforce startup refusal applies, including the required connection lifetime. Missing-setting errors name the configured mode through one formatter (`mode_requires`); the enforce text is byte-identical. Shadow builds the assertion verifier and claims command replays under its own Redis prefix, both through the production `AppState::new`. - **HTTP and Blossom.** `admit_nip_fi_http` keeps Off's result in shadow and additionally replays enforce in enforce's order: first the router guard's steps (community, then assertion), then the handler's steps (NIP-98, pairing, deny set) on the same NIP-98 proof, through `evaluate_enforce_steps`, which enforce shares. A Host mapped in config but missing from the communities table, with a valid assertion, records an admit, because enforce's guard passes and its 404 is not a NIP-FI denial. A dev-mode `X-Pubkey` identity is marked unsigned and is never an enforce proof, so shadow records it as a `nip98` would-deny. On bridge and Blossom routes, the strict proof check (payload tag, Blossom `Strict`) runs as a separate pure check that consumes no replay entry and records on its own series, so it never counts as an admission verdict. Shadow records exactly one verdict for every identity, community or credential refusal enforce would make, with Off's status, body and challenge unchanged: bridge, workflows, Blossom, Git transport and settings, GIF search and share, and invite minting record the `community` would-deny when the Host is unmapped. Git's missing or malformed credentials still reject before any database work, and shadow records the enforce verdict for that failed proof. The router guard stays transparent in shadow. - **WebSocket, root and audio.** The upgrade check evaluates the attached assertion once. An upgrade enforce would refuse records that would-deny; otherwise the assertion goes into a shadow-only session object and the upgrade returns as in Off. The assertion never reaches the connection, the identity registries, the admission gate, terminal frames or cancellation. Each session records at most one admission verdict. **Pairing** is recorded on both ingresses right after a valid NIP-42 proof, before ordinary relay policy, where enforce pairs: a key mismatch or claimless assertion is a `pairing` denial. **The deny-set check** runs where enforce runs it, after registration: a hit is a `deny_set` denial, and a clean read keeps the session pending and registered. **The admit** is recorded only when the connection is actually admitted: on root at the AUTH commit, after ordinary policy; on audio when the participant join transaction commits, after relay membership, channel membership, the final ban and membership decision, mesh routing and the join's own checks, and before publication. A NIP-42 failure, which comes before pairing, and any refusal between pairing and the admit (ordinary policy, mesh, or a join refusal inside the join transaction) retires the observer when the refusal is decided, before any refusal frame, rollback or cleanup is awaited, so it leaves no record even if the deadline passes during that cleanup. A record-only deadline task, armed at upgrade with enforce's `compute_session_deadline`, records `expired` when enforce would have closed an admitted session. If the deadline passes while the session is still pending, that is its single admission verdict, a denial with `stage=deadline`, and a later AUTH records nothing. A deny for the key (admin or cross-pod) records `revoked` on an admitted session; if it arrives after the deny-set check but before the admit, including a deny refused for capacity, the session keeps a pending-revocation mark and records the admit followed by exactly one `revoked` end, matching enforce's phase-independent close, and the deadline cannot take that end. The phase, the mark and retirement change together under one session lock. Each session records at most one end. The session holds the socket's cancellation token for recording only: once the socket is cancelled, no transition records anything, even while connection references remain (a cancel fence; the token never feeds a close action). Upgrade would-denies carry the ingress route, `ws` or `audio`. - **Admin disconnect.** Shadow verifies the command and records the deny entry, so later admissions record would-denies, but closes no session; the response stays `{"disconnected": true}`. Shadow publishes cross-pod on its own channel, `buzz:nip-fi:shadow-disconnect`, which only shadow pods subscribe to, so no enforce pod (including older builds that know only `buzz:nip-fi:disconnect`) acts on a shadow command. Shadow pods also keep listening on `buzz:nip-fi:disconnect`, so their deny record includes enforce's real disconnects. Shadow claims command replays under `buzz:nip-fi:shadow-command:{hash}`: replays are still rejected within shadow, and a shadow accept never uses up the enforce claim. Enforce and Off keep the same channel, keys and close behavior. - **NIP-11.** Shadow serves the same document as enforce, including `limitation.federated_identity`, because clients only attach evidence to a relay that advertises it. ## Recording | Series | Labels | One increment per | |---|---|---| | `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_total` | `route` (`http`, `ws`, `audio`), `stage`, `outcome`, `community` | decision enforce would make: an HTTP admission, a refused upgrade, a session's NIP-FI AUTH decision, or its deadline passing before AUTH (`stage=deadline`) | | `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_strict_proof_total` | `route` (`bridge`, `blossom`), `outcome` (`pass`, `rejected`), `community` | strict NIP-98 side check | | `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_session_end_total` | `route` (`ws`, `audio`), `reason` (`expired`, `revoked`), `community` | admitted session enforce would have ended (admitted sessions only) | | `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_disconnect_total` | `route` (`admin`, `cross_pod`), `outcome` | disconnect-path event, in place of the real disconnect, lag, capacity and poison counters | `community` is the configured canonical URI or `unmapped`, never the raw `Host`; an unmapped or empty Host records `stage=community, outcome=unavailable`. A shadow pod never moves an enforce disconnect or failure counter. Strict-proof rates use their own `pass + rejected` total, and session-end rates divide by the `admit` count for the same route. There is no per-verdict `info` log; a would-deny writes a `debug` line with no token, claim or issuer. The pre-existing enforce `debug` line for the proven NIP-98 key is shared and also fires in shadow. Admin commands rejected for a bad header, body or proof, a replay, or a dependency error record no shadow verdict; only capacity rejection is counted. ## Not observed - Handler-side path-validation exits: an invalid Git owner or repo name on default-branch, a media path that is not a valid hash, and a Git pack URL with a query string record nothing from the handler. The router guard still records what enforce would refuse at the guard (for example a missing assertion), because enforce refuses those requests before it validates the path. - A refusal that is not a NIP-FI decision, such as a tenant-binding 404 behind a passing guard, or an ordinary WebSocket refusal after pairing (a ban, membership or join refusal before admission). ## Follow-ups - A bounded `route` label per HTTP surface (bridge, Blossom, Git, …) on `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_total`; today every HTTP verdict carries `route=http`. - One shared helper for the ten copied `observe_unbound` recording hooks, stacked on this PR. The shadow recorder and session suites and the root pairing witness run in `just test-unit` and the `scripts/run-tests.sh` fallback; the `AppState::new` shadow witness, which exercises the command verifier against real Redis, runs in the `external_infra_redis` lane. NIP-FI env tests recover a poisoned env lock so one panic cannot cascade. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
||
|
Alex Rosenzweig
|
4f51b9e101 |
fix(mcp): support Goose discovery handshake (#8037)
## Summary Goose 1.52 starts MCP connections with `server/discover`. `buzz-dev-mcp` rejects that request with `ExpectedInitializeRequest`, preventing Goose from loading its Buzz tools. Upgrade the tool server to rmcp 3.4.1 and adopt the renamed SDK types. Subprocess tests exercise discovery and legacy initialization, tool listing, file reads/edits, invalid arguments, connection survival, and EOF shutdown. Include the server in both Rust unit-test runners and make the cancellation regression approve its shell call before testing cancellation. The native agent retains its independent rmcp 1.x client. Cargo also unifies the existing 3.x dependency used by the mesh smoke harness. ## Validation - Normal `git push` passed all hooks, including Rust tests, Tauri checks, and repository policy checks. - `just ci` passed on the final stack: repository checks, Rust and Tauri tests/lint, desktop tests/build, web build, and mobile checks/tests. - MCP: 78 existing tests and two subprocess lifecycle tests passed; the discovery regression fails with the old SDK. - All 54 native-agent regressions passed on the final stack, including cancellation of a real MCP shell process. - Previously exercised unmodified Goose 1.52 and 1.47 with Sandpit and the real tool server. Allowed workspace operations and permitted network traffic succeeded; disallowed file and network operations were denied. - Live staging desktop check with Goose 1.52: the reply appeared in Buzz, an allowed request returned HTTP 200, and a disallowed request returned CONNECT 403. ## Stack 1. **#8042 → `main`**: deterministic handoff regression. 2. **This PR → #8042**: Goose MCP discovery compatibility. Merge the lower PR first, then retarget this PR to `main`. This diff contains only the compatibility change and its tests; the relay build repair is already on `main` in #8036. --------- Signed-off-by: Alex Rosenzweig <arosenzweig@squareup.com> |
||
|
Will Pfleger
|
a38707d35c |
fix(relay): close community ban gaps across audio, agents and HTTP (#8005)
🤖 Community bans had gaps. Audio sockets never checked them: the audio join path didn't look up ban state, and a ban closed only the member's root sockets, so a banned member could join a huddle or stay in one. An agent's access comes from its owner, but the ban and timeout checks only looked at the pubkey that signed the event. Several write paths returned before those checks ran, admission could miss a ban that landed mid-AUTH, and removing or losing a member left live sockets open. This PR closes those gaps. ## Audio - `handlers/auth.rs`: the root socket's ban lookup, including the NIP-OA owner cascade and fail-closed DB handling, is `community_ban_outcome`. Root auth and audio join both call it, so the two checks can't drift apart. - `audio/handler.rs`: audio join runs the ban check after the write-free channel membership check and before any huddle lease or durable write. A ban is refused with `AuthorizationDenied` and a DB error with `AuthorizationUnavailable`. With no FI assertion, the refusal is the root route's text (`blocked: you are banned from this community` / `error: internal error checking restriction state`). - `state.rs`: `CommunityConnectionControl` holds the authenticated pubkey. `CommunityConnectionRegistry::disconnect_pubkey` closes bound audio sockets for one pubkey in one community with a 1008 `access revoked` close. `AppState::disconnect_pubkey_local` closes everything a pubkey has open in a community on this pod (root and audio); the clusterwide disconnect and the conn-control Redis subscriber in `main.rs` both use it, so remote pods close audio sockets too. Root sockets are still closed through `ConnectionManager`, so nothing is closed twice. A socket that proved a NIP-FI identity instead gets the standard NIP-FI denial (the restricted frame, then 1008 `authorization denied`), and a ban never overwrites a close reason already chosen. ## Behavior - **Owner restrictions carry to agents.** `restriction_state` folds in the restriction row of the agent's owner (`users.agent_owner_pubkey`) at read time. Nothing is copied onto the agent, so unbanning or un-timing-out the owner restores the agent immediately. Every hot-path caller (AUTH, ingest, audio, HTTP) picks this up. - **Admission is fenced against a concurrent ban.** Root AUTH and audio admission bind the proven pubkey to the socket first, then make the final ban and relay-membership decision (`handlers::auth::final_admission_denial`), then refuse if a disconnect already cancelled the socket. A ban or removal whose disconnect ran before the bind is visible to those fresh reads; one that runs after it finds and closes the bound socket. Both reads come from the writer, never the bounded-stale replica, so a removal that committed before the bind cannot be undone by a lagging replica. Both fail closed, and the check covers a delegated agent's owner. Each admitted socket records the agent's owner, from the NIP-OA tag or the stored link. - **Agents are always linked to their owner before admission.** Root AUTH and audio both record `users.agent_owner_pubkey` for a NIP-OA agent before admitting it, and refuse admission (`error: internal error recording agent owner`) if that write fails, because revoking the owner finds the agent's sockets through that link. - **Revoking live access covers agents without a database read.** `AppState::revoke_live_access` sends one clusterwide disconnect that closes, on every pod, each root and audio socket in the community whose principal **or recorded owner** is the target. An agent socket admitted before its owner link existed carries no recorded owner, so recording an owner for the first time (`materialize_nip_oa_owner`, the single writer used by root AUTH, audio admission and HTTP NIP-OA) closes that agent's ownerless root and audio sockets clusterwide; they reconnect with the owner attached. That disconnect skips owner-bound sockets. Admission with a NIP-OA owner records it on the socket before binding the pubkey, so the socket survives its own link; admission without one binds the pubkey first and then reads the stored owner, so a concurrent link either closes the socket or is seen by the read. A `users.agent_owner_pubkey` sweep still runs as a secondary path; if its lookup fails, the error is returned and there is no retry task. The kind-9040 ban, the report-action ban (left non-terminal so recovery re-runs it), relay-admin removal (9031), and NIP-43 self-leave all use it and report an incomplete revoke instead of claiming success. Each revokes right after its change commits; the ban no longer waits on its audit insert, whose error is still returned. - **NIP-43 self-leave works over WebSocket.** Kind 28936 is in the ephemeral range, so `handle_event` used to fan it out and answer `OK true` without removing membership. It is now routed to ingest; no other ephemeral kind changes. - **The write gate runs before every kind-specific branch.** `enforce_write_restriction` runs ahead of command routing (DM open, DM add member, DM hide, workflow definitions and triggers, approvals), product feedback, reports, and moderation or relay-admin commands. Ephemeral events and agent observer frames return before ingest in `handle_event`, so they go through the same gate there. - A ban exempts nothing. - A timeout admits only reports (kind 1984), unban (9041) and untimeout (9043). A timed-out admin cannot send relay-admin commands (9030–9033) until the timeout ends. - **HTTP refuses banned principals.** `enforce_relay_membership` runs a ban check after the membership decision, including on open relays: 403 `blocked: you are banned from this community` for a ban, 503 for a failed lookup. Media upload, media GET/HEAD and Git transport keep that 503 instead of reporting it as "not a relay member": in NIP-FI Enforce mode they send the canonical `AuthorizationUnavailable` response (`text/plain; charset=utf-8`, `authorization unavailable\n`), and in Off mode each keeps its legacy unavailable response. Media storage failures are not reclassified. Git transport checks membership and then runs its own ban check once per request. The NIP-OA owner is resolved from `x-auth-tag` when present. HTTP checks **bans only**: a timeout blocks writes, HTTP writes already reach the ingest gate, and reading stays allowed under a timeout. Unchanged by design: a lost Redis fan-out can leave another pod's socket open until it reconnects, and there is no recurring ban recheck on open sockets. ## Path table | Path | Category | Ban check | |---|---|---| | Root WebSocket AUTH and audio admission, including NIP-OA owner binding | community admission | final fenced check after bind; owner link required | | `POST /events`, `/query`, `/count` (`bridge.rs`) | community HTTP | existing `enforce_relay_membership` caller | | GIF search and `POST /gifs/share` (`gifs.rs`), media upload and fetch (`media.rs`), workflows (`workflows.rs`) | community HTTP | existing caller; media keeps 503 on lookup failure | | Git transport (`git/transport.rs`), git settings (`git/settings.rs`) | community HTTP | existing caller; transport keeps 503 on lookup failure | | `GET /moderation/reports`, `/moderation/audit`, `/moderation/restricted` | community HTTP | **newly covered** | | `POST /api/invites` (invite mint) | community HTTP | **newly covered** | | NIP-43 self-leave (WebSocket and `POST /events`, both via ingest) | roster change | revokes live access like admin removal | | Invite claim, accept-policy, `/api/join-policy*` | pre-membership invite and policy flows | none; ban state is checked when the caller authenticates | | `/`, `/info`, `/.well-known/nostr.json`, `/health`, `/_liveness`, `/_readiness` | public metadata and health | none | | `/hooks/{id}` | secret-authenticated webhooks | none; no community pubkey | | `/operator/*`, `/api/admin/v1`, `/internal/git/policy` | operator, admin and internal routes | none; separate auth plane | | `/_mesh/demo/echo` | demo only (mesh plus `mesh_demo_echo`) | none | ## Known limits - Cross-pod closure depends on the Redis fan-out; the tests prove the pod-local close by principal and recorded owner. - Live delivery to existing subscriptions depends on the disconnect. Events are not rechecked one by one. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
||
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Will Pfleger
|
9b083957f6 |
refactor(buzz-relay): share NIP-FI assertion evaluation across adapters (#7990)
🤖 Stack: #7990 → #8028 The three production NIP-FI assertion-verification sites (the HTTP assertion guard in `router.rs`, `check_nip_fi_at_upgrade` in `nip_fi_upgrade.rs`, and `admit_nip_fi_http` in `nip_fi_http.rs`) each carried their own extract → verify → map-to-denial sequence, and HTTP admission and `enforce_nip_fi_key_pairing` each carried their own key-equality check. The admin disconnect route (`POST /api/nip-fi/disconnect`) kept a second copy of the header parser and hand-typed its denial bodies. Community binding and shadow mode both need to change exactly those decisions, so they now live in one place. **No behavior change.** Every denial class, status code, body, header and log line is preserved, including `deny_protected` (503), the startup-race 503, transport-before-verifier precedence, NIP-98-before-assertion ordering, and guard + handler double verification. - New relay-private `nip_fi_core` owns `extract_bearer_token` and `http_denial` (moved from `nip_fi_http`), `evaluate_attached_assertion` (the single `verify_assertion` call for all three adapters, returning a typed `AssertionRejection`), and `asserted_key_matches` (the pairing predicate; a claimless assertion never matches). `http_denial` and the disconnect route's plain-text renderer fall back to the bare denial status instead of panicking or answering an empty 200; both fallbacks are unreachable because every status and header value is a constant. - Adapters keep their own mode short-circuits, exemptions, ordering, metrics and `code()` debug logs; the guard still logs nothing. - The disconnect route parses its header with `extract_bearer_token`, renders header failures with `http_denial`, and renders every other rejection (malformed body, bad pubkey, no command verifier, every `CommandError`) through `CommandError::http_status()`/`response_body()`. Its check order (header → body → pubkey → verifier present → verify), `DenySetFull` warning and metric, success body and cross-pod publish are unchanged. The old Unicode whitespace check and the shared ASCII one agree on every reachable input, because `HeaderValue::to_str` only admits visible ASCII and tab. - The 12 HTTP admission callers, 3 WS upgrade placements, deny-map checks, expected-URL constructors and the command/admin proof path are untouched. - Characterization tests land before each refactor, green against the unmodified code, and pass unchanged after it. A routed test counts both verifications on one request (guard, then handler admission) and shows admission's own failure decides the response. Disconnect-route tests pin exact status, content type, challenge and body for every rejection, the observable check order, and that only `DenySetFull` increments `buzz_nip_fi_disconnect_capacity_rejections_total`. The test modules share one counting `ScriptedVerifier` from `nip_fi_core::tests`, and the session tests build connections through `connection::tests::test_conn`. `nip_fi_core::tests::` is added to the unit selectors in `Justfile` and `scripts/run-tests.sh`. 🤖 Implemented by Hayt. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
||
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Will Pfleger
|
24c1e702a6 |
fix(relay): gate owner-only kinds in shared fan-out access filter (#8006)
DM visibility snapshots (kind:30622) and agent turn metrics (kind:44200) must reach only their owner, meaning the pubkey in their `p` tag. History reads and same-pod live delivery already enforced this. Events arriving from another pod over Redis went only through `filter_fanout_by_access`, which had no owner check. So a subscription on another pod could still match one of these events, for example a subscription that names only event IDs and no kind. The owner check now lives in `filter_fanout_by_access` (`crates/buzz-relay/src/handlers/event.rs`), which both same-pod dispatch and Redis delivery go through. It reuses the read path's predicate, `buzz_core::filter::reader_authorized_for_event`. The separate copy inside same-pod dispatch is removed, so there is one check instead of two. Behavior changes: - An owner-only event with no `p` tag now reaches no one live. Before, on the same pod, it reached every matching subscriber. - Any `p` tag now counts as the owner, matching history reads. The old same-pod check used only the first `p` tag. Tests: - `owner_only_kinds_keep_only_the_owner` covers the shared filter. - `pubsub_owner_only_kinds_reach_only_the_owner` covers Redis delivery end to end, for both kinds. It uses subscriptions that name only event IDs, and includes an event with no `p` tag. - `dispatch_owner_only_kinds_reach_only_the_owner` covers same-pod dispatch the same way, checking the `EVENT` frames actually queued. - Each test fails with its filter call removed and passes with it. Hook note: this branch was pushed with `LEFTHOOK=0`, so the pre-push hook did not run on it. Earlier push attempts failed under heavy machine load, in crates this diff doesn't touch: the `buzz-acp` timing tests `idle_resets_on_stdout_activity` and `keepalive_resets_idle_past_deadline`, then `rust-tests` and `desktop-tauri-test` (`buzz-desktop`). CI is the gate for the full suite. Also fixes a timing flake in #7977's `deny_set_full_leaves_command_retryable` test: its filler deny entry could expire before the full-set request, so the test now gives it an `until` offset of 2 seconds. 🤖 Implemented by Duncan (agent). --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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16839a0773 |
feat(nip-fi): admin disconnect/deny API with in-memory deny-until-TTL map (S4) (#7977)
This adds the NIP-FI S4 admin command surface. An authorized issuer principal can deny an `(issuer, pubkey)` pair until a TTL expires. When that happens, the relay records the entry in a bounded in-memory deny map, closes matching live sockets on every pod, and refuses new admissions while the entry is live. Supersedes #7265 ## Breaking In `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=enforce`, every entry in `BUZZ_NIP_FI_ISSUERS` now has to carry `maximum_command_age_seconds` (1–60) and a non-empty `authorized_principals` list, and startup fails if any issuer is missing either one. That means an S3-only enforce config that boots on `main` won't boot with this change. No deployment sets `BUZZ_NIP_FI_*` yet. The per-issuer field table and a working example are in the `nip_fi_config.rs` module docs. ## What changes - **`buzz-auth`**: - `nip_fi/command.rs` verifies signed admin commands. It checks issuer policy, command age, the authorized principal (exact, case-sensitive `sub` match), and a `jti` of at most 512 bytes. - `nip_fi/deny_map.rs` is a per-issuer, capacity-bounded deny-until-TTL map on top of `DashMap`. Expired entries and `jti` reservations are only swept when a write would otherwise hit capacity. The sweep is O(n) and holds the lock every admission check takes, so this keeps it off the admission path. Reads compare against `now`, so an expired entry that hasn't been swept yet never counts as live. - **Cross-pod command replay fence**: `nip_fi/command_replay.rs` adds a `CommandReplayGuard` trait, and `buzz-pubsub` implements it in Redis (`RedisCommandReplayGuard`), following the NIP-98 replay guard. Once a command is authenticated, the verifier takes an atomic `SET buzz:nip-fi:command:{sha256(len(iss)‖iss‖len(jti)‖jti)} 1 NX EX <ttl>` claim, with the TTL set to the command's remaining validity rounded up to whole seconds plus skew, clamped like NIP-98, so the claim outlives acceptance by a verifier whose clock trails by the full skew. Before the claim, the verifier reserves a pending `jti` and deny-entry slot in this pod's deny map under the issuer lock, so a full deny set returns `503 deny set full` without touching Redis and the same signed command can be retried. The claim is taken only after the signature and claims verify, so a forged token cannot burn a real `jti`. A `jti` already claimed on any pod returns `403`. A Redis error fails closed with `503 authorization unavailable`: no deny entry, no session close, no publish. A replayed claim, a Redis error, or a cancelled request drops the reservation. After a successful claim the reservation commits to the `jti` record and deny entry, which cannot fail on capacity. A claim can still remain with no deny entry if Redis applied `SET` but the reply was lost, or the pod stops between claim and commit; that fails closed, and a retry gets `403` until the TTL expires. - **`api/nip_fi.rs`**: the admin disconnect/deny endpoint. It verifies the command, inserts the deny entry, disconnects locally, and publishes over `buzz-pubsub` `conn_control` so every other pod runs the same disconnect. A receiving pod clamps `until` to its own ceiling instead of rejecting it. Otherwise a pod whose clock trails the origin would drop a command the origin already answered with 200, and the target's sockets on that pod would stay open. Malformed pubkeys, unknown issuers, and unrepresentable timestamps are still rejected. - **Admission and live enforcement**: - WS upgrade (`router.rs`) and HTTP (`nip_fi_http.rs`) refuse keys that have a live entry with `403 authorization_denied`. - Root NIP-42 auth and audio auth register the proven identity (pubkey + admitting issuer) first, and only then check the deny map. With that order, a concurrent disconnect either finds the socket in its close scan or the check finds the entry. `OK(true)` isn't sent if a concurrent disconnect already cancelled the session. - `ConnectionManager::disconnect_nip_fi` and `CommunityConnectionRegistry::disconnect_nip_fi` are scoped to the issuer. - **One wire form for `authorization_denied`** (FI-TRACE-DENIAL-ORACLE): every root and audio WebSocket `authorization_denied` denial now goes through one first-writer-wins transition on `CommunityConnectionControl`. That covers the S4 deny-set hit and admin disconnect, and also the existing S3 key-mismatch, lease-expiry, and membership refusals. The transition sets the `AuthorizationDenied` reason only if nothing else has set a reason, and only the winner enqueues the denial frame. So every one of these denials is the class's denial frame followed by `Close(1008, "authorization denied")`, and a concurrent registry scan can't queue a second one. Before this, S3 key mismatch and expiry closed with `Close(None)`, which made them distinguishable from a deny-set hit on the wire. `evidence_rejected` and `authorization_unavailable` keep the bare close. - **Config**: see Breaking. `deny_set_capacity` is optional and defaults to 50000. Setting any command field without a command age fails closed. - **Boot** (`main.rs`): installs the command verifier and deny map. It subscribes to cross-pod disconnects before the Redis subscriber starts, so disconnects relayed during boot are buffered instead of dropped. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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8519db1532 |
feat(buzz-relay): NIP-FI stateless enforcement (S3) — upgrade gate, NIP-42 pairing, session lifetime, JWKS warm (#7224)
## What this PR does Implements NIP-FI stateless enforcement at the relay WebSocket upgrade point. Every connection attempt on a NIP-FI–enabled relay must carry a valid federated identity assertion signed for the connecting Nostr pubkey; the relay validates it before the first frame is read, pairs it with NIP-42 AUTH, and enforces a bounded session lifetime without persistent state. ### Core enforcement seam - **Assertion at upgrade** (`nip_fi_upgrade.rs`): identity header is parsed with the same `extract_bearer_token` and denied with the same `http_denial` as HTTP ingress (`nip_fi_http.rs`), JWT verified (RS256/ES256/EdDSA), expiry checked, and the Nostr pubkey embedded in the sub claim must match the NIP-42 AUTH pubkey that arrives in the socket within the AUTH timeout. Denial returns exact byte contracts — `401 + WWW-Authenticate: Nostr + "authentication required\n"` for missing evidence, `403 + "evidence rejected\n"` for malformed or invalid evidence. The active HTTP/1.1 gate runs before `bind_community`, so denied upgrades pay zero DB cost. - **NIP-42 pairing** (`nip_fi_gate.rs`, `audio/handler.rs`): after the assertion is validated at upgrade, a `SessionAdmissionGate` is created with the assertion's expiry deadline and a `CancellationToken`. The gate is passed to every effect-acquiring path so no new effect permit is granted after the session expires. AUTH is verified against the assertion pubkey; a mismatched AUTH key receives `NOTICE restricted: authorization denied` and a socket close. Every other post-upgrade AUTH denial on an FI connection uses the same terminal shape — the canonical spec NOTICE on the terminal queue, then close — so frame type and close behaviour reveal nothing about private policy: ban, allowlist, or relay-membership denial → `restricted: authorization denied`; ban/allowlist/membership lookup failure or an internal verifier failure → `restricted: authorization unavailable`; an invalid NIP-42 proof → `restricted: evidence rejected`. Connections without an assertion keep today's `OK false` replies. - **Session lifetime** (`nip_fi_session.rs`): three independent deadlines bound each session — token `exp`, max assertion age from config, and relay max connection lifetime. The first to fire cancels the gate and sends the terminal denied frame. - **Effect admission at expiry** (`audio/join.rs`, `handlers/req.rs`): no new effect permit is granted after expiry. Two paths carry calculated budgets. The audio **lease resolver** holds its permit for at most `worst_case::PERMIT_HOLD` (14.5 s), and cancellation **during that resolver** reaches socket close within `worst_case::EXIT` (25 s: resolver, release of the won lease, terminal flush). Redis checkout has one total deadline and directory scripts are single-round-trip `EVAL`, which is what makes those budgets hold. When post-write fence verification fails after a landed CAS, the acquire keeps the reply and attempts an exact owner+generation cleanup on the same connection without a serving-write lease; if that cleanup fails or its reply is uncertain, the lease expires by its 30 s TTL. Neither number bounds audio close in general: other admission and teardown waits (for example the channel lookup after the resolver) and the known limitations below have no client-side deadline. REQ liveness, search and history reads race gate cancellation: a lost race drops the read, releases the permit, retires the claim through `close_if_owner`, and sends no further EVENT or EOSE. A history statement timeout ends the read with a timed-out outcome, and its owner-checked retirement (`CLOSED`, map, index and topic release) runs after the race with the permit dropped, so cancellation cannot drop it halfway. Subscription registration stays one uncancellable unit, and the permit is still taken before the claim. - **JWKS recovery** (`main.rs`): builds on main's `warm_nip_fi_jwks_snapshots` / `nip_fi_jwks_refresh_loop`. Issuers warm concurrently and the first refresh is seeded from the warm result (one interval for a warm issuer, 5 s for a cold one). A refresh that finds no live snapshot retries at the fast cadence (5 s after a warm issuer dies, doubling to a 300 s cap) instead of waiting a full interval, and `run_jwks_refresh_supervisor` restarts the loop after a panic (1 s → 60 s backoff); On shutdown it is cancelled and awaited before the drain backstop is disarmed; cancel drops an in-flight fetch and starts no further issuer, so the join stays inside the drain bound. Logs carry `issuer_index` only. ### Known limitations - **Known limitations: bounded only by the dependency.** No new effect is admitted after expiry. Two awaits that are already admitted have no client-side bound, so if a dependency stalls at expiry, teardown waits for it: - **Audio join commit:** its effect permit spans `tx.commit()`, room publication and the `event_mentions` insert. During a DB or Redis stall, audio cleanup and socket close wait for the dependency. - **REQ subscription setup:** the first subscriber to a topic sends `Subscribe` to the pubsub task through a bounded channel (capacity 4096). The send blocks only if that queue is full, which happens when the pubsub task isn't keeping up (for example during reconnect backoff or a burst). Registration holds the connection's `conn.subscriptions` lifecycle lock across the send, so a blocked send also blocks other claims on that connection, including search, and any cleanup waiting on that lock. The send itself predates this PR; holding the REQ permit across it is new here. ### Archive/join serialization `commit_participant_join` now takes a row-level write lock (`SELECT ... FOR NO KEY UPDATE`) on the channel row at step 3. This serializes all join commits against concurrent `archive_channel` calls — the archive UPDATE (`archived_at` non-key column) blocks on the row lock, closing the READ COMMITTED race on both the `Existing` and `AutoAddRequired` paths. ### HTTP/2 extended-CONNECT gate (latent path) The root WebSocket handler uses a belt-and-suspenders approach. The HTTP/1.1 path (currently the only live WebSocket shape — workspace Axum does not enable `http2`) is gated pre-extractor via the `Upgrade: websocket` + `Connection: Upgrade` header predicate. A second gate point inside the `Ok(ws)` arm is structural future-proofing: if `http2` is ever enabled, any h2 extended-CONNECT shape the extractor accepts but the h1 predicate misses is caught there. The active HTTP/1.1 fire-point sits before `bind_community` (zero DB cost on denial); the latent h2 fire-point runs after it. ### Mixed-version huddle control (rolling deploy) Owners advertise the `huddle-commit-phase` mesh capability. The ingress selects the mode after the owner stream opens: it sends the appended `RegisterPeerCommitPhase` variant, and later `CommitConfirmed`, only when the owner's exact runtime gossip record carries that flag at that point, and latches the result for the session. A successful open implies the owner's record is present, so a record that lands during acquisition is not missed. Otherwise it sends plain `RegisterPeer`, which every owner decodes. A new owner publishes a plain `RegisterPeer` once at registration (pre-commit-phase behavior) and holds a `RegisterPeerCommitPhase` peer until its confirm; duplicate or legacy confirms publish nothing. Existing wire variant indices are unchanged. ### Off-mode compatibility When `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=off` (or unset), the relay reads no identity header and installs no upgrade gate, NIP-42 pairing check, or session deadline. Existing NIP-42 AUTH flows are unchanged. Huddle commit-before-publish is not FI-gated and applies in every mode, so huddle join publication timing differs from main even in Off mode. External connection cancellation (socket close, archival, revoke) now stops an in-flight liveness, search or history read at its next await; an uncancelled connection's frames and payload bytes are unchanged. ## Test coverage Every test this PR adds, or whose assertions it changes, runs in exactly one CI lane: infra-free tests in `just test-unit`, Postgres-backed tests in `postgres_tests` modules under the PostgreSQL lane. The `buzz-relay` bin tests run whole in `just test-unit`. `scripts/run-tests.sh` mirrors the effective relay unit selection for machines without nextest, except main's pre-existing `api::admin::` module. Every `buzz-relay` test fixture reads `Config` through `Config::for_test()`, which holds `NIP_FI_ENV_LOCK`, so a single-process `cargo test` run cannot observe a half-written FI environment (`fixture_config_read_waits_for_fi_env_lock`). The stub pools in the router and AUTH fixtures use a 100ms acquire timeout, which shortens a database fallthrough rather than removing it. - **Upgrade/router gate** (`router::tests`): Enforce-mode `nip_fi_*` gate tests for h1 WS upgrade, NIP-11 content negotiation, and audio ingress. Off-mode witnesses `nip_fi_off_root_passes_without_header`, `nip_fi_off_root_ignores_malformed_header`, `nip_fi_off_audio_passes_without_header`, `nip_fi_off_audio_ignores_malformed_header` prove the gate is bypassed (status outside 401/403/503, and no-header status equals malformed-header status); they do not prove a successful upgrade. - **NIP-FI units**: `nip_fi_config`, `nip_fi_upgrade`, `nip_fi_gate`, `nip_fi_session`, covering assertion contracts, NIP-42 pairing, session lifetime, and gate behavior. - **Effect barrier at cancellation** (`postgres_tests`, PostgreSQL lane): `w3_b2_req_barrier_expiry_mid_flight_blocks_subscription_registration`, `w4_b2_count_barrier_expiry_mid_flight_blocks_count_query`. - **AUTH denial uniformity** (`handlers::auth::tests`): each production-handler witness asserts the exact terminal frame, no denial on the data or ctrl channel, and cancellation, plus the unchanged Off-mode `OK false`. Unit: `fi_invalid_nip42_proof_emits_terminal_evidence_rejected`, `fi_ban_check_error_emits_terminal_authorization_unavailable`, `handle_auth_pairing_mismatch_runs_full_root_denial_path`, and `nip42_denial_class_separates_internal_failure_from_bad_evidence` (internal verifier failure → `authorization unavailable`; each client-evidence NIP-42 failure → `evidence rejected`). PostgreSQL lane: `fi_ban_denial_emits_terminal_authorization_denied` (real `community_bans` row; Off mode keeps `OK false` on ctrl, then close), `fi_relay_membership_denial_emits_terminal_authorization_denied`, `fi_allowlist_check_error_emits_terminal_authorization_unavailable`, `fi_relay_membership_check_error_emits_terminal_authorization_unavailable`, `fix_4a_allowlist_denial_with_fi_assertion_emits_canonical_restricted_frame`. - **Bounded audio exits** (`audio::handler::tests`, `just test-unit`): `check_cancel_exit_with_never_ready_sink_returns_within_flush_budget` drives the production `check_cancel!` fence with a queued FI denial into a never-ready sink and requires it to return within `WS_TERMINAL_FLUSH_TIMEOUT`; `challenge_send_to_never_ready_sink_exits_within_flush_budget_on_cancel` requires the NIP-42 challenge send to yield to cancellation and exit within the same budget; every pre-`send_loop` audio exit write goes through the same `connection::send_exit_frames_bounded` helper. - **Audio NIP-42 classification** (`audio::handler::tests`, `just test-unit`): `audio_bad_nip42_proof_with_fi_emits_one_evidence_rejected_then_cancels` requires exactly one canonical `restricted: evidence rejected` frame and cancellation; `audio_bad_nip42_proof_off_mode_keeps_auth_failed_frame` pins the Off-mode frame. - **Effect permit before pre-auth writes** (PostgreSQL lane): `handlers::auth::tests::postgres_tests::expiry_before_nip_oa_materialize_writes_no_rows_and_commits_no_auth` expires the session just before NIP-OA materialize and asserts no `users` or agent-owner row and no committed auth. - **Community admission** (`just test-unit`): `state::tests::on_not_run_runs_once_on_each_deny_arm_and_never_on_admit`. - **Auth metrics contract**: `connection::tests::auth_lifecycle_reconciles_every_terminal_and_never_leaks_gauge` records every terminal including `PairingMismatch`; `metrics::contract_tests::*` derive the series count from `AuthOutcome::ALL`. - **JWKS** (`main.rs`): `hard_dead_warm_issuer_resets_to_fast_cadence` and `jwks_refresh_success_waits_interval_failure_uses_fast_backoff` drive the real loop with paused Tokio time; `cold_issuer_*` cover the backoff helper; `f1_supervisor_loop_drives_recovery_and_restores_admission` runs `run_jwks_refresh_supervisor` over a real `ProductionJwksSource` through injected panic → restart → hard-dead → 5 s retry → recovery, then checks `key_set` admission and that the first post-restart fetch follows the cold cadence (every issuer restarts cold); `jwks_refresh_cancel_drops_in_flight_fetch_and_skips_remaining_issuers` cancels during a pending fetch with a second issuer due. - **Bounded lease acquire** (`audio::handler::tests::postgres_tests`, PostgreSQL lane): `failed_post_cas_verification_is_fenced_and_discards_the_won_lease` requires a won-then-unverified lease to return fenced and be deleted by exact owner+generation; `stalled_lease_sql_and_stalled_exit_release_close_within_exit_bound` stalls lease SQL and the exit release and requires socket close within `worst_case::EXIT`. `audio::join::tests` pins `PERMIT_HOLD` at 14.5 s and `EXIT` at 25 s. - **REQ/search cancellation** (`handlers::req::tests`, `just test-unit`): `expiry_during_stalled_history_read_releases_permit_and_claim` and `expiry_during_stalled_search_read_releases_permit_and_claim` stall the read inside production `handle_req`, expire the gate, and require `expire()` to return within 2 s, an empty subscription map, and no EVENT or EOSE. - **History timeout retirement** (`handlers::req::tests::postgres_tests`, PostgreSQL lane): `history_timeout_retirement_survives_expiry` drives a two-channel history REQ into a real statement timeout, pauses retirement after the index removal and before the topic release, expires the gate, then resumes. It requires the map and index entries gone and both channel topic refcounts at zero. - **Archive/join serialization** (PostgreSQL lane): `f2a_archived_channel_rejects_existing_join`, `f2b_join_for_update_blocks_concurrent_archive_existing_path`, `f2c_join_for_update_blocks_concurrent_archive_auto_add_path`. - **Huddle room and handler**: `audio::room::tests` pending-peer tests, including `roster_revisions_are_ordered_and_snapshot_is_authoritative`; `fix_b_w1_w3_handler_pre_commit_cancel_emits_no_delta`, `fix_b_w2_success_emits_exactly_one_delta_with_monotone_revision`. PostgreSQL lane: `b1_cross_pod_bootstrap_precedes_buffered_owner_delta`, `commit_confirm_timeout_at_seam_triggers_teardown_on_stalled_owner_stream`, `confirm_failure_combined_outcome_no_orphan_join_exactly_one_48102`, `confirm_send_pending_expiry_terminates_client_with_denial_within_1s`, `c1_handler_ingress_sends_only_base_frames_to_legacy_owner`, `f7a_cross_pod_joined_payload_includes_owner_pod_peers`. - **Mixed-version control** (`audio::join::tests`): `shared_control_variants_are_byte_identical_to_base_wire` (against frozen `audio::join::base_wire`), `c1_new_ingress_speaks_base_wire_to_legacy_owner`, `c2_base_ingress_register_publishes_once_on_new_owner`, `c3_capable_owner_record_selects_commit_phase_hold_back`, `capability_record_installed_during_open_selects_commit_phase`, `duplicate_or_legacy_commit_confirmed_is_a_no_op`, `fix_b_commit_confirmed_arm_commits_peer_and_broadcasts_joined`, `pending_remote_stream_close_emits_no_joined_no_left`. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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9b1c4f98e2 |
🤖 perf: bound long-thread aux reads and make query deadlines terminal (#7854)
Long threads (over ~100 replies) time out in desktop. The aux hop that
loads reactions and other e-tag references builds its filter as one
`tags @> …` term per id, joined with `OR`. Past about 100 ids the
planner switches to walking each partition's primary key backward,
expecting to stop early. When few rows actually match, it scans the
whole community. With a dirty GIN pending list, a 188-reply thread never
finishes.
### What changes
- **Set-based e-tag reads (`buzz-db`).** The aux e-tag query now puts
the id set behind a `MATERIALIZED` CTE and matches with `ANY`. Each
e-tag read also runs under a transaction-local `statement_timeout` of 20
s.
- **Terminal timeout contract (`buzz-relay`).** When a read hits the
deadline, the client gets a terminal timeout (`CLOSED` for REQ, the
timeout error for COUNT and search), not a retryable failure.
- **Subscription lifecycle (`buzz-relay`).** The per-connection
subscription map lock is now the lifecycle lock. Claims, replacement,
client `CLOSE`, owner-checked timeout and search cleanup, revoke, and
connection teardown all change the map, the registry, topic refcounts
and terminal frames while holding it. As a result, a timed-out
subscription's `CLOSED` goes out before any replacement with the same id
can claim it, and claims made after teardown are refused.
- **Dropped terminal frame disconnects (`buzz-relay`).** If the `CLOSED`
for a retired subscription (owner-checked timeout or channel eviction)
can't be queued, the relay cancels the connection instead of leaving the
client holding a subscription that will never receive fan-out. A
client-initiated `CLOSE` ack is exempt.
- **COUNT under the same deadline (`buzz-db`).** The fast COUNT path
runs e-tag counts under the same transaction-local 20 s cap as SELECT,
so WS COUNT and HTTP `/count` produce the terminal timeout too.
- **Replica reads surface the deadline (`buzz-db`).** When a
replica-routed read is cancelled by `statement_timeout` (SQLSTATE
`57014`), the error is returned instead of re-running the query on the
writer, which would run the same slow statement. Other replica errors
still fall back to the writer.
`PLANS/REPLICA_FULL_READ_ROUTING_DESIGN.md` records the exception.
- **Deadline handling (desktop).** Only the relay's `query timed out`
counts as a query deadline. A client-side `request timed out` stays
retryable. For one-shot reads a deadline is terminal: the global query
retry (budget 1), thread-replies retry and reaction hydration don't
re-send the same slow query. Reaction ids held back by a deadline are
released when the channel is opened again, so reopening retries them
while same-channel re-renders don't. Live subscriptions, in both the
renderer and the native archive-sync socket, keep treating a deadline
`CLOSED` as transient: they back off and resubscribe with the same
filter instead of being dropped.
- **Deadline handling (mobile).** Mobile recognizes the deadline on both
transports: HTTP `503 {"error":"query timed out"}` and the WS `CLOSED`
reason.
- The root `ProviderScope` retry policy returns no retry for deadline
errors and keeps Riverpod's default backoff for everything else.
- Background thread-summary recounts don't retry a deadline.
- Forum posts polling pauses while the last load settled on a deadline;
reopening the forum retries.
- A channel's newest-window load surfaces a deadline instead of falling
back to legacy WS history, and the channel list's batched queries return
"unavailable" on a deadline instead of fanning out to per-filter
fallbacks. An unavailable batch is not treated as empty. Known
last-message timestamps and unread state are kept, and unread catch-up
moves `lastMessageAt` forward (never backward) the same way live events
do, so a cold start with no known timestamp still gets one.
- A live subscription that gets a deadline `CLOSED` backs off and
resubscribes with the same filter. History requests still fail on it.
- Settled load failures show a Retry control, matching desktop's
thread-replies error card: a shared `LoadErrorView` on the channel
timeline, forum thread and forum posts list, and an icon button beside
the thread replies summary. While the thread query has no value, the
thread page shows the route snapshot plus live, cached and optimistic
replies, with the loading or error status still visible.
- Other re-sends (reconnect, foreground resume, live events, the unread
backstop, scroll) are not suppressed; each is bounded by the relay's 20
s statement deadline.
- **Long-thread seeder.** `just seed-long-thread [replies]` posts one
thread (default 187 replies) with some reactions to the local dev relay,
for reproducing long threads in the apps. It uses a throwaway key,
refuses non-loopback relays and ignores ambient `BUZZ_*` credentials.
Writes are paced to fit the stock relay rate limit.
**Lifecycle concurrency.** The lock serializes one connection's
subscription changes. Other connections can still be delayed by pressure
on the shared pubsub command queue, and by serial eviction loops waiting
behind a blocked connection. This PR does not claim strict isolation
between connections.
**Recovery vs. load.** Clients stop automatic retries of the same
one-shot read, but they don't remember deadlines across other triggers:
reconnect, resume, live events and the unread backstop can each send the
read again later, bounded by the 20 s statement deadline. A live
subscription that hits the deadline resubscribes with its original
filter under the existing 1–30 s backoff, and against a filter that
keeps timing out it retries at the 30 s cap indefinitely, so the worst
case is one bounded query per subscription every 30 s. `since` is
deliberately not advanced to now on resubscribe, because that would skip
events missed while the subscription was closed. Unchanged from `main`:
when mobile's channel history sync fails with cached messages available,
the cached messages are shown without the error or Retry control.
### Benchmark
Local reproduction on an isolated bench stack (not committed):
- PG16, migrations applied, one 188-reply thread plus 5M background
events in the same community.
- Each request replays the desktop thread-replies filter through the
relay, with `include_aux` on. Times are total ms for 3 runs, with a 60 s
client cap.
GIN pending-list state is controlled with `VACUUM` (clean) or by
refilling the pending list (dirty), and recorded per partition with
`pgstatginindex`. Dirty runs held 402 pending pages on every partition's
tags index at the start and end of each matrix. Clean runs held 0–1
pages (relay startup writes).
| build | GIN pending state | limit 10 | 50 | 100 | 200 (188 ids) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| `main` | clean | 26 / 16 / 13 | 56 / 51 / 52 | 92 / 93 / 95 | 662 /
639 / 641 |
| `main` | dirty | 315 / 298 / 327 | 22141 / 15888 / 16769 | 28992 /
27819 / 28080 | timeout ×3 (>60 s) |
| this PR | clean | 35 / 21 / 14 | 57 / 49 / 48 | 82 / 80 / 75 | 153 /
150 / 135 |
| this PR | dirty | 290 / 254 / 251 | 1257 / 1204 / 1206 | 2432 / 2378 /
2382 | 4333 / 4706 / 5104 |
Baseline `origin/main` `b37e47721`; this PR at `5f2650f5f`, whose e-tag
read builders are identical to the current head. At head `1ad81d868`
against `origin/main` `15d44dcce`, limit 200 measured 145–179 ms clean
(`main` 683–715) and 4.41–4.51 s dirty (`main` timeout ×3).
Every completed cell returns the same signed event set: 209 events, 187
replies at limit 200. With `include_aux` off, every cell is ≤66 ms. The
thread-window loader (`select_aux`) is unchanged from `main`, and its
timings and captured plans match `main`'s.
Actual aux-hop statements captured from each relay binary with
`auto_explain` (analyze + buffers), execution ms:
| build | clean, 100 ids | clean, 188 ids | dirty, 100 ids | dirty, 188
ids |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `main` (N-way `OR`) | 40 | 298 | 28785 | 62892 |
| this PR (`MATERIALIZED` fence + `ANY`) | 23 | 45 | 1992 | 3539 |
**What the fence changes**
- On `main`, the planner combines `ORDER BY created_at … LIMIT` with an
overestimated match count and walks each partition's primary key
backward, expecting to stop early. With few real matches it scans the
whole community: the dirty 188-id statement touches ~4.9M shared buffers
on `main` vs ~0.6M with the fence.
- The fence prevents that early-stop plan. Across the measured cases
(1–188 ids, both pending states), the planner used the GIN tags index.
The fence doesn't force GIN in general; a broad enough filter could
still get a different plan.
**Tradeoff:** the fence materializes every match before sorting. In this
bench small limits stayed within run-to-run noise of `main`. A single
hot id (5,000 reactions, limit 100) measured 30–34 ms unfenced vs 35 ms
fenced.
**Deadline:** each e-tag read (SELECT and COUNT) runs under a
transaction-local `statement_timeout` of 20 s. It only tightens: a
shorter operator timeout (`BUZZ_DB_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS`) is kept. It's
a per-statement limit, not a per-request one, so a request that runs
several pages or hops can take longer than 20 s in total. The benchmark
does not force the deadline.
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
||
|
Luke Tornquist
|
b37e477211 |
Make relay readiness process-local (#7341)
## Summary Make Kubernetes readiness depend only on the relay process lifecycle, so a shared Postgres or Redis slowdown cannot withdraw every pod at once. Move dependency checks to one fixed-cadence loop per pod. The loop permits only one evaluation at a time, emits metrics after each sample, and caches a timestamped report. `/_status` reads that cache without calling Postgres, Redis, or the deletion catalog. It reports `not_yet_sampled`, `fresh`, or `stale`. Each completed sample also writes a Unix timestamp gauge, so Datadog can compute sample age at query time. Fail closed when the community lifecycle lookup errors. An inconclusive tenant-state lookup no longer admits a socket to AUTH or REQ handling. ### Related issue None found. This addresses the elevated relay HTTP 500 and reconnect incident investigated on 2026-09-03. ### Tradeoff The readiness gauge now reports the latest private-probe observation, not the shutdown transition itself. After shutdown starts, a scrape can still see `1` until the next readiness probe refreshes the gauge to `0`. Kubernetes routing is unaffected because it uses the readiness response from the authoritative process state. A terminal `0` was never guaranteed: even a transition-owned gauge could update in process and then exit before Prometheus scraped it. If no scrape occurs before exit, both designs miss the terminal sample. The new design adds at most the interval until the next readiness probe when a scrape occurs during shutdown. Dependency status is now sampled every 30 seconds rather than on demand. A slow evaluation delays the next sample instead of stacking more work. The status payload exposes the cached report age. The completion timestamp stays unchanged when sampling stops, so `time() - timestamp` crosses the stale threshold without a server aging loop. Outcome counters and duration histograms remain cumulative and cannot provide no-data detection. ### Testing Gimli exercised exact SHA `edff1ec4a5362e132e367bf7449d2b0a68f1e9a9` on an isolated Blox stack. Repeated `/_status` bursts caused no dependency calls, metrics advanced without status traffic, stale status remained visible, and lifecycle lookup failures admitted no AUTH or REQ handling. Follow-up verification at `fdbb394ed598c94cde85ed01cb11e9de0ee8f00d` confirmed sampler-owned outcome and duration emission without status traffic and bound the real startup seam. The final timestamp-gauge change is covered by targeted red/green tests and the same boot regression at `c0f36e22b527c2fd6a63a548d036d006ffa17171`. ### Complexity Readiness remains one process-local sample per probe. Dependency I/O now has one owner and one execution path; request volume cannot increase dependency-check load. One completion timestamp replaces the prior server-side age update path; Datadog computes age without another loop. Community admission also returns to one fail-closed rule for inactive and unknown tenant state. Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Amp <amp@ampcode.com> |
||
|
Will Pfleger
|
6410e685a8 |
feat(relay): enforce NIP-FI assertion+NIP-98 pairing on HTTP ingress (#7264)
Implements NIP-FI HTTP ingress enforcement per the merged spec (PR #7254). Every protected HTTP surface in enforce mode requires a valid `Nostr-Federated-Identity: Bearer <JWS>` assertion alongside its NIP-98 authorization, bound to the same key. The NIP-98 pubkey (proven actor) must equal the assertion's `nostr_pubkey`; absent, mismatched, or unverifiable assertions are denied fail-closed with byte-exact text/plain responses per the spec's rejection table. This is S5 of the `buzz-enterprise-identity` program. WS enforcement (S3) is separate. ## What changed **New `nip_fi_http` module:** `admit_nip_fi_http()` covers the full admission sequence — `Nostr-Federated-Identity` extraction, offline JWKS verification, NIP-98 key pairing [FI-INV-05], issuer-qualified deny-map check via `(iss, pubkey, now)` [FI-INV-14], and byte-exact denial for all four `DenialClass` variants. `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state()` is the single call-site wrapper for all surfaces [FI-TRACE-AUTHORITY-UNIFORM]. **Protected surfaces** (all gated via the uniform authority): - HTTP bridge: `POST /events`, `/query`, `/count` - GIF proxy: `POST /gifs/search`, `/gifs/share` - Workflow reads: `GET /workflows/{id}/runs`, `GET /workflows/{id}/runs/{id}/approvals` - Moderation reads: `GET /moderation/reports`, `/moderation/audit`, `/moderation/restricted` - Media/Blossom: `PUT /upload`, `/media/upload` - Git smart-HTTP: `info/refs`, `upload-pack`, `receive-pack` - Git settings control plane: `GET`/`POST /git/:owner/:repo/default-branch` (now routed through `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` for full assertion key-pairing) - Invites: `POST /api/invites` (mint only; claim exempt as pre-membership enrollment door) **NIP-98 strictness in NIP-FI mode:** - When NIP-FI is not Off, bridge POST handlers force `require_auth_token = true` — the `X-Pubkey` dev-mode fallback cannot satisfy the pairing requirement [NIP-FI.md:547-567] - POST bodies on `/events`, `/query`, `/count` require a matching `payload` tag in enforce mode [NIP-FI.md:579-597] - A payload tag present with no content (one-element `["payload"]` or empty string) is rejected as a structurally invalid claim — NIP-98 requires the content to be a valid 64-char lowercase hex SHA-256 digest. Malformed payload diagnostics use a static error message (no attacker-controlled content in logs). - Off mode preserves pre-NIP-FI behavior per [FI-INV-15] **Off-mode compatibility changes:** Admission now runs before request validation on every protected surface, so Off mode differs from pre-NIP-FI behavior in these ways: - **GIF routes:** NIP-98 authentication happens before the upstream provider lookup. An unauthenticated request on a tenant with no GIF provider now returns 401 instead of 404. The 401 goes through the legacy `api_error()` path, so the body is JSON `{"error":"..."}` with no `WWW-Authenticate` header. - **Workflow runs** (`GET /workflows/{id}/runs`): the query string is parsed after admission. A request with a missing credential and a malformed query (for example `?limit=abc`) now returns 401 instead of 400. - **Authorized malformed query:** once admitted, a malformed query returns a JSON 400 `{"error":"invalid query: ..."}` from `parse_query_or_400` instead of axum's `text/plain` `Query` rejection. - **Moderation reads** (`/moderation/reports`, `/moderation/audit`): same extraction change as workflow runs. Admission comes first, then a JSON 400 for a malformed query. - **Malformed `payload` tag:** shared NIP-98 verification now rejects a malformed `payload` tag in every mode, including on bodyless requests. That means a one-element `["payload"]`, an empty digest, or anything other than 64 lowercase hex characters. Before this change, a bodyless request ignored the tag. **Auth header cardinality:** Enforce mode rejects requests with more than one `Authorization` header with 403 `evidence rejected\n`. DenyProtected returns 503 `authorization unavailable\n` before this check (and before NIP-98 or assertion verification) runs. The cardinality gate is enforced at the NIP-FI admission boundary (`admit_nip_fi_http`), not via legacy auth boolean flags, so it applies uniformly to all Enforce-mode surfaces including Git. Off mode passes through the first header value unchanged, preserving pre-NIP-FI behavior [FI-INV-15]. **Denial-class remapping:** In Enforce mode, NIP-98 extraction/verification failures from the closure are mapped to the appropriate `DenialClass`: `MissingEvidence` when no `Authorization` header is present, `EvidenceRejected` when the header is present but invalid. Off mode propagates legacy responses unchanged [FI-INV-15]; for example, the Git missing-Authorization and wrong-scheme 401s keep their legacy bytes with no `content-type` header. **JWKS refresh scheduling:** The refresh timer's `*last` checkpoint is set after the fetch completes, not from the pre-fetch timestamp, preventing interval drift under network latency. The loop is extracted to `nip_fi_jwks_refresh_loop` for unit-testability. **Log hygiene [NIP-FI.md:777-779]:** Issuer identity is never written to logs or error messages. All startup/refresh diagnostics use an ordinal index (`issuer_index = N`). Config parse errors for malformed issuers use classify()/line/column codes rather than raw config values. **Admin SPA document routes:** `/reports`, `/reports/{id}`, and `/feedback` are exempt from the NIP-FI assertion guard only on the admin host (host-qualified via `is_admin_host`). These paths are not added to the broad `NIP_FI_EXEMPT_PREFIXES` list — tenant hosts remain fully protected. **Deny-map seam (`HttpDenyMap` trait):** signature is `(issuer, pubkey, now)` matching `NipFiDenyMap::is_denied` from S4 (PR #7265) so integration is a one-liner. Stub is `AlwaysAdmitStubDenyMap` — named to accurately describe stub-phase semantics (fail-open intentionally pending S4). **Route inventory:** every authenticated HTTP route is classified as Protected or Exempt with justification. Documented in the F4 seam-test comment in `bridge.rs`. **Outer-guard tests:** `#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]` tests in `bridge.rs` drive the full router (`build_router`) in Enforce mode with valid NIP-98 but no `Nostr-Federated-Identity` header. These exercise the **outer `nip_fi_assertion_guard` middleware** in `router.rs` — the layer that fires before any handler runs. They prove the guard's exact response bytes (401 `authentication required\n`, `text/plain; charset=utf-8`, `WWW-Authenticate: Nostr`) for each protected route. Per-handler `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` wiring is proven separately by the cardinality test and the media/settings/git handler-level suites. ## Seams **S3 seam:** `nip_fi_config.rs` is duplicated (S3 not landed; session-deadline parts stripped). Removed when S5 rebases onto S3. **S4 seam:** `AlwaysAdmitStubDenyMap` until S4 provides the real map. Integration is one line at the `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` wrapper. ## Evidence At head `ee338ea9c` (branch `hayt/nip-fi-http-enforcement`), hosted CI run [36167450853](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/36167450853): - **Rust / Unit Tests** ([job 108179338458](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/36167450853/job/108179338458)): passed. The `buzz-relay` `test-unit` step ran 171 tests with 171 passes. Its PASS lines include all 57 non-ignored tests this PR adds to the relay: `nip_fi_http::tests` (25), `nip_fi_config::tests` (8), `router::tests` (8), `api::parse_query_tests` (5), `api: |
||
|
Will Pfleger
|
b65cff31a4 |
fix(ci): run the admin disabled-mode DB test in the PostgreSQL lane (#7900)
`api::admin::postgres_tests::disabled_mode_allows_unauthenticated_requests_on_the_admin_host` falls through to a DB-backed read route but was not `#[ignore]`d. The `test-unit` exclusions meant to skip it still named `api::admin::tests::…`, which stopped matching when #6730 moved the admin tests into `mod postgres_tests`. As a result the test ran in the infra-free unit job and only passed after waiting out the sqlx acquire timeout (~150s in hosted CI), while the ignored-only PostgreSQL lane never ran it against a real database. - The test is now `#[ignore = "requires PostgreSQL"]`, like its DB-backed peers, so the PostgreSQL lane runs it. - The two dead exclusions are removed, and the `api::admin` clause is just `test(/^api::admin::/)`. `nip98_mode_unrostered_signer_does_not_consume_a_replay_slot` was already ignored and runs in the PostgreSQL lane. - The `Justfile` comment now states the convention (DB-backed admin tests are ignored; non-ignored ones reject before touching the DB), drops the stale reference to a ci.yml step that no longer exists, and keeps the timeout-trap warning. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
|
2013148852 |
🤖 fix(justfile): point just staging at the current staging relay (#7881)
The staging recipe pointed at the retired `sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co` relay. Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Luke Tornquist
|
8f6b66f9ff |
Select one feature flag provider at compile time (#7677)
## Why Buzz server components need one typed feature-flag contract without forcing the open-source build to depend on LaunchDarkly. A staging or production relay must not be able to choose the wrong provider through runtime configuration. ## What - Adds typed boolean and signed `i64` flags with static, environment, and compile-gated LaunchDarkly evaluators. - Defines an executable relay artifact contract that compiles exactly one provider. - Rejects zero or multiple relay provider features at compile time. - Runs the LaunchDarkly feature tests and the provider compile matrix in the unit CI lane and fallback test script. ## How `buzz-feature-flags` stays provider-neutral. The future relay composition root will expose one build path per artifact feature: `static-feature-flags`, `environment-feature-flags`, or `launchdarkly-feature-flags`. Runtime configuration carries only settings for the selected provider. It never carries a provider name, fallback, or precedence rule. The crate still has no relay consumer. A locked compile fixture proves each singleton builds and every zero or multi-provider combination fails until the relay adopts this contract. This removes the proposed runtime `ProviderMode` and leaves one provider, one construction path, and one evaluator per artifact. ## Risk This PR still has no relay or app consumer, so it changes no user-visible behavior. Risk is limited to the new feature-flag crate, its compile contract, and its unit-test lane. ## Testing An external Rust consumer at `30cf968bfe85e82980fda7e63f5bebe649ca939f` exercised six environment-evaluator scenarios and 59 assertions. The compile-time correction adds no live consumer to exercise manually. ## Bigger picture When `buzz-relay` adopts this crate, its build manifests must map each distribution to one provider feature. That consumer PR must verify live Relay Proxy reachability, secret ingestion, lifecycle ownership, and user-visible behavior. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Mic Neale
|
4544ba1713 |
chore(mesh): upgrade MeshLLM to 0.76.2 (#7559)
## Summary Upgrade Buzz from MeshLLM `v0.76.0-rc9` to the latest stable [v0.76.2 release](https://github.com/Mesh-LLM/mesh-llm/releases/tag/v0.76.2) (via v0.76.1). - Update all eight Mesh git dependencies across desktop and relay smoke examples; both lockfiles resolve all 47 Mesh packages to `a0c1e66b0ac037dd56544b9e2d94969ea43d694f` (tag `v0.76.2`). All non-Mesh lock records are unchanged by the 0.76.1 → 0.76.2 bump. - Match Mesh's `ed25519-dalek = 3.0.0` and `rusqlite = 0.40` dependencies. - Explicitly enable rusqlite's `fallible_uint` feature, preserving Buzz's existing `u64` SQL conversions when **mesh is disabled**. Mesh-enabled builds previously supplied this transitively, so testing both configurations matters. - Temporarily pin **only** the optional `sqlx-sqlite` package to the merged upstream compatibility fix [transact-rs/sqlx#4402](https://github.com/transact-rs/sqlx/pull/4402), revision `94aafe3a68884d923b0798a767c8d7f6cfda89d2`. SQLx 0.9.0 caps `libsqlite3-sys` below 0.38, while Mesh 0.76 requires 0.38. Cargo resolves the conflict even with SQLite disabled. The fix raises that upper bound; remove the patch once released. Buzz's active PostgreSQL driver stays on crates.io SQLx 0.9.0. - Preserve the explicit Linux keyring 3 `crypto-rust` feature so Secret Service sessions retain DH encryption independently of Mesh keyring 4. - Preserve the dedicated examples-only `buzz-mesh-smoke` crate and lifecycle workflow wiring, keeping Mesh/native-runtime dev dependencies out of relay CI builds. - v0.76.1 → v0.76.2 upstream delta: self-updater fix for composed product-v2 bundles (Mesh-LLM/mesh-llm#1844) plus release plumbing — no API changes affecting Buzz. - Merged `origin/main` (`7c789dee0`) without rewriting shared PR history. ### Validation at `ae4adba15` (local macOS ARM64, Hermit toolchain) - **Passed:** `cargo test --locked -p buzz-mesh-smoke --all-targets` (all six example harnesses compile; no live harness execution). - **Passed:** desktop Tauri workspace tests, both default and `--features mesh-llm` graphs (3,296 tests with mesh enabled, 0 failures). - **Passed:** `just desktop-tauri-clippy` (both feature graphs, `-D warnings`), root workspace clippy `-D warnings`, `cargo fmt --all --check`. - **Passed:** `--locked` metadata resolution for both workspaces; lockfile diff audited to touch only Mesh package records. - **Passed:** full pre-push hook suite on the final push (branch-skew, rust-tests, desktop-tauri-checks, file-size-check) — no hooks bypassed. - **Not run:** live Mesh inference/admission smoke or installed-app UI exercise. CI lifecycle smoke coverage applies. Originating Buzz conversation: buzz://message?channel=dffbc117-845a-4c02-bc3f-eaeeefc4deaa&id=670f9c262e1ec0a4df5600b3173a0c5de2abe17e08ba9ccfdd8eff109fadf1a8 --------- Signed-off-by: Thinker <75d8a808fa21bb8d1812e080cf471db601c6e8e6a62dcd516d37531e83a7bb77@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz> Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Thinker <75d8a808fa21bb8d1812e080cf471db601c6e8e6a62dcd516d37531e83a7bb77@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz> Co-authored-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Galadriel <b81c841ed20a8e17caf4e6fac2f6f3bc61d304c84b8394720f6d00f37538c47e@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz> Co-authored-by: Gu <gu@buzz> |
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Will Pfleger
|
b6a26556ec |
feat(canvas): add version history with atomic restore (#6780)
🤖 Adds append-only channel canvas history, restore, and relay-authoritative optimistic concurrency so stale edits cannot silently replace a newer canvas. ## What this adds - **Desktop history and restore** — browse revisions with author, timestamp, preview, and diff; restore an older revision as a new signed head after explicit confirmation. Persisted empty canvases remain reachable, mutation outcomes are announced accessibly, and focus moves to a stable destination after save or restore. - **CLI history and restore** — `buzz canvas history --channel …`, `buzz canvas get --channel … --revision <id>`, and `buzz canvas restore --channel … --revision <id>` use keyset pagination over the retained revision stream. - **SDK canvas builders** — optional `expected-revision` tags, bounded ancestry classification, and shared timestamp discipline keep first-party writes ahead of the head they read without propagating poisoned future timestamps. ## Authoritative concurrency contract Tagged canvas writes use compare-and-swap semantics in the relay and database: - `expected-revision=none` succeeds only when no live canvas exists. - An event ID succeeds only when it names the canonical live head. - A byte-identical replay succeeds only when that event is already the canonical live head. - A successful candidate must sort strictly ahead of the current head under `created_at DESC, id ASC`. - Malformed preconditions and stale or non-advancing writes are rejected before event rows, mentions, or fan-out are committed. The database serializes tagged writes, unconditional kind `40100` writes, and canvas soft deletion on the same `(community, kind, channel)` advisory key. Untagged `buzz canvas set` remains an unconditional write, but participates in that serialization boundary so it cannot race a tagged save or deletion. Deletion classification is derived inside the datastore transaction; unrelated event kinds do not take the canvas lock. ## Read and timestamp consistency Precondition and post-write ancestry reads request strong consistency from `/query`, pinning them to the writer when replica routing is enabled. Display-only history remains replica-eligible. First-party canvas writers stamp `created_at = max(now, head + 1)` with a conservative client skew limit. The relay applies a canvas-specific future-timestamp ceiling before persistence, preventing an accepted boundary head from making subsequent first-party writes invalid while preserving the broader ingest limit for other event kinds. ## Durable outcomes and recovery After an accepted publish, a failed verification read is reported as durable success with `verified: false` rather than a failed save. Desktop and CLI preserve the new event ID and direct users to History when verification is unavailable. A successful read walks the bounded, cycle-guarded `expected-revision` ancestry chain so transitive descendants are not misclassified as supersession. Canvas caches invalidate for every settled mutation outcome, including a retained but superseded revision. The 409 reconciliation path in `cmd_restore_canvas` now separately establishes persistence evidence from ancestry classification. `canvas_write_survived` checks reachability only; a secondary writer-pinned IDs lookup distinguishes "A absent" from "A present but superseded by a legacy write." The four-way outcome (survived / persisted-but-superseded / genuinely-absent / read-fail) is now correct for all lost-response shapes including unconditional legacy writes. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Hayt <9e1c23a3fd83f61da34420e4e88ff1b16e45cafcc0cd9019eb07d4ecfa8ca9b0@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Tom Brow
|
7e96f91229 |
feat(mobile-infra): support development App Attest (#7744)
Development-signed iOS apps cannot enroll with the current gateway because their Apple App Attest AAGUID is rejected. Add an explicit personal development build feature and environment setting so a development gateway can use a developer's own application identity and sandbox APNs credentials. Ordinary gateway builds remain production-only. Special builds also default to production, enforce exactly the selected signed AAGUID, and retain certificate-chain, pinned-root, nonce, app-ID, key, credential-ID, and counter verification. Document the matching mobile signing configuration and expose the feature through an optional Docker build argument. ### Validation The development image deployed successfully to a personal Railway stack; private readiness, enrollment challenges, authenticated relay access, and APNs sandbox TLS/HTTP2 connectivity passed. Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> |
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Jordan Mecom
|
7881447c19 |
fix(audit): frame hash inputs with TLV (#7492)
Hash new audit entries from a TLV buffer built with one-byte field tags, big-endian u64 byte lengths, and raw values. Absent optional fields are omitted; present empty values retain their tag and zero length. This prevents bytes from moving between fields without restricting object IDs or inferring boundaries from field contents. Store an explicit `hash_version`. Migration 0048 labels existing rows as version 1, and new writers use version 2. Historical hashes are unchanged and mixed-version chains verify. The legacy encoding retains its original ambiguity; TLV protects new entries. Apply the migration before deploying the updated writers and verifiers. Tests cover both boundary collisions, absent versus empty fields, stable digests, unknown versions, mixed-version chains, and stored-row tampering. All 16 audit and 128 database unit tests passed. The six PostgreSQL audit tests passed against both migrated and fresh schemas, and a populated-row migration check preserved the historical hash. Full `just ci` passed. Related audit fixes: #4216 and #4249; issue #4173. Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com> |
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|
ravarora2
|
a929532a04 |
fix(admin): allow cold storage worker DB startup (#7770)
## Summary The standalone S3 accounting worker can exit before its scan begins because database startup inherits the relay’s three-second connection budget. A cold DNS probe took about five seconds. Give `buzz-admin storage-snapshot` its own pool: one connection, no minimum idle connections, and a 30-second acquisition budget. Retry startup timeouts and transport failures at most twice, after two and five seconds. Total startup wait is bounded to 97 seconds. Configuration, authentication, TLS, and protocol errors fail immediately. Log each startup attempt’s elapsed time and error category without connection credentials. Relay defaults stay unchanged. Retries stop before lock acquisition; the same lock-owning database session still publishes the completed snapshot. ### Related issue Follow-up to #7543. No duplicate startup fix found. ### Testing Archived-command check: built a nextest archive, temporarily moved `target/debug/buzz-admin` out of the checkout, and ran `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh --archive-file <archive>`. Both tests failed before the path fix and passed afterward. The tests use nextest’s relocated executable path, with the original Cargo path retained for local runs. Manually restored the old startup call and ran `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-admin --test postgres_storage_snapshot -E 'test(storage_snapshot_retries_then)'`. It failed before reaching S3; restoring the fix passed. This confirms the test exercises the actual worker command. Local `just ci` passed all stages before mobile tests, which stopped at SDK discovery in the `objective_c` native hook. The default Xcode tools report an unaccepted license. Two existing PostgreSQL tests hit connection timeouts in the parallel run and passed individually. After merge, build a worker image and repeat the cold-pod staging smoke test through snapshot publication before changing relay metrics mode. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com> |
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|
ravarora2
|
6b1e45d2f6 |
Isolate S3 storage metrics from the relay (#7543)
## Why **This PR moves the S3 storage scan out of the serving relay and into a separate batch job.** The job saves a complete result in PostgreSQL. The relay reads that result, exports the existing storage totals, and reports the snapshot's freshness and database-read health. ```text Today: relay -> scan S3 -> calculate totals -> Datadog metrics After rollout: CronJob -> scan S3 -> PostgreSQL snapshot -> relay -> Datadog metrics ``` The code in this PR is the new pipeline. It adds the worker, database snapshot, relay read mode, and Helm CronJob template. It does **not** enable the pipeline in production. The chart keeps the CronJob disabled, and the relay keeps its current inline mode by default. [squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure#244](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/244) will set the production limits, enable the job, and switch the relay to the saved snapshot after this PR merges. The relay currently lists the media bucket once an hour and calculates storage totals inside the serving process. The production bucket now exceeds the relay's one million object cap, so each sweep fails and the last good per-community values remain stale. The Datadog dashboard can no longer show current storage use by community. Raising that cap inside the serving relay would move a larger, memory-heavy scan into the process that owns live WebSocket connections. The scan retains state for unique blob hashes and community bindings, so its memory use grows with the bucket. A large scan could raise relay memory use, trigger restarts, and drop user connections. The goal is to restore current metrics without putting a production-scale bucket scan in the relay's failure domain. No media objects move or change. Only the process that calculates the totals and the handoff to the relay change. ## What - Add `buzz-admin storage-snapshot`, a run-once worker that scans S3 and saves one complete accounting snapshot in PostgreSQL. - Add `external` relay mode to read the saved snapshot. Keep the current `inline` mode as the default, and add `off` as a fail-closed option. - Add an opt-in Helm CronJob for the worker. The 10 million object cap exists only on this Job. - Keep the current fleet and per-community gauges, and add snapshot age, generation duration, configured cap, cap utilization, and database-load health gauges. - Add an additive migration for the latest complete snapshot and its run metadata. ## Overall plan 1. Merge this PR to add the worker, database handoff, relay modes, and disabled-by-default chart support. This step does not change production behavior. 2. Publish the relay image and Helm chart `0.1.9` from `main`. 3. Update [squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure#244](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/244) to pin those final artifacts and rerender its manifests. 4. Use the infrastructure PR to deploy the CronJob with a 10 million object cap, a one-hour deadline, and a 20 GiB memory limit. 5. Start one manual Job during a staffed window and verify its snapshot, duration, memory use, relay stability, and Datadog output. 6. Keep the daily schedule and `external` relay mode only after that gate passes, then add alerts for stale snapshots, snapshot-load failure, failed jobs, cap pressure, duration, and worker memory. The code and infrastructure remain separate so this PR can ship the mechanism without silently enabling a production-scale scan. The infrastructure PR owns the production settings and rollout gate. ## How ### Complete snapshot handoff The worker takes a deployment-wide PostgreSQL advisory lock before it lists S3. This prevents scheduled and manual workers from overlapping, even if Kubernetes starts both. The final database replacement runs through that same lock-owning session. If the session dies during the scan, publication fails instead of letting the stale worker overwrite its successor. A worker that no longer owns the lock cannot publish through another pooled connection. The worker reads S3 in pages of 1,000 objects and folds each page into physical totals, logical per-community usage, and anomaly counts. It stops before folding a page that would exceed `--max-objects` and emits structured progress every 100,000 objects. The worker replaces the singleton database row only after the full scan succeeds. A listing error, malformed page, cap breach, serialization error, lost lock session, or database error cannot publish a partial snapshot. The last completed snapshot stays available. Each stored result includes its completion time, duration, cap, and image or source revision. PostgreSQL is the handoff between the batch worker and the relay. The worker writes one complete deployment-wide snapshot, and the relay reads that snapshot on its normal leader metrics tick. No new network service or worker endpoint is required. ### Relay behavior `BUZZ_STORAGE_METRICS=inline` keeps the existing in-process sweep and its one million object default. `external` loads the newest completed worker snapshot on each leader metrics tick. `off` emits no storage-family metrics. An unknown value fails closed to `off`. External mode republishes the existing fleet, per-community, and anomaly metric names, so those current queries remain valid. Snapshot handoff health uses a separate family: `buzz_storage_snapshot_age_seconds`, `buzz_storage_snapshot_duration_seconds`, `buzz_storage_snapshot_max_objects`, `buzz_storage_snapshot_cap_utilization`, and `buzz_storage_snapshot_load_ok`. The `buzz_storage_sweep_*` gauges remain inline-only because they describe a scan attempted by the relay process. External mode does not synthesize `sweep_ok=1` from the last successful database row: an old row proves only that an earlier worker completed. Kubernetes CronJob/Job status is authoritative for the latest worker result, including non-zero exit, deadline expiry, and OOM termination. The relay keeps the last complete snapshot available when a worker run fails. Snapshot age shows that no replacement arrived on schedule, while `buzz_storage_snapshot_load_ok` distinguishes staleness from a missing row, database read failure, or invalid payload. If a community disappears, changes host, or leaves the configured emission scope, the relay zeroes the old labeled series instead of leaving stale values behind. Per-community bytes are logical referenced media usage. If two communities reference the same blob, each community receives the blob's bytes. Fleet physical totals still count each S3 object once. This PR preserves those existing metric semantics. ### Deployment boundary The CronJob is disabled by default. When enabled, it uses `concurrencyPolicy: Forbid`, no retry, a configurable active deadline, bounded history, explicit CPU and memory resources, a read-only root filesystem, and no Istio sidecar by default. The worker receives only `DATABASE_URL`, S3 settings, optional S3 credential references, and the code revision. It does not receive the relay private key, Git hook HMAC secret, Redis URL, or the full relay secret as environment variables. Operators may reuse the Buzz service account or select a dedicated one. ### Non-goals - This PR does not enable the worker or `external` mode in production. - This PR does not change media uploads, object ownership, retention, or deletion. - This PR does not change the names or meaning of the existing fleet, per-community, or anomaly storage gauges. - This PR does not add a lease service or allow multiple workers to publish concurrently. ## Risk The application and chart defaults do not enable the new worker or raise the serving relay's cap. The database change is an additive deployment-global singleton table. The relay's default remains `inline`, so merging this PR alone does not change the active metrics path. The main rollout risk is worker memory use because the fold retains state for distinct blob hashes and community bindings. The first production-sized run must confirm peak memory and duration before the schedule is trusted. The 10 million cap and one-hour deadline bound the first deployment, but they do not replace measurement. External mode also needs stale-snapshot, snapshot-load, and job-failure monitors because the relay intentionally keeps publishing the last complete result after a failed job or read error. This behavior avoids gaps and partial data, while snapshot age and load health tell operators when the result or PostgreSQL handoff needs attention. Job status remains necessary for immediate failures and termination reasons that a killed process cannot record itself. ## Testing No production S3 scan was run from this PR. Automated regressions verify that external mode keeps stale last-good totals visible without emitting inline attempt-health gauges, reports database-load failure while retaining the cache, and leaves inline telemetry unchanged. Mutation checks also prove those tests fail if external mode is routed through inline emission or a failed load is reported as healthy. After deployment, create one manual Job from the CronJob during a staffed window. Require a completed Job, exactly one new snapshot, fewer objects than the configured cap, acceptable duration and peak memory, no relay restart regression, restored Datadog points, and no OpenMetrics sample truncation. ## Next steps 1. Complete review and merge this PR. 2. Publish chart `0.1.9` and the final main-branch relay image. 3. Replace the provisional pins in [squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure#244](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/244), rerender, and require clean CI. 4. Run the staffed manual Job gate and record object count, peak memory, duration, snapshot revision, and relay stability. 5. Confirm the relay reads the new snapshot in `external` mode and the existing `block.buzz_relay.*` storage series update again. 6. Enable the daily 03:17 UTC schedule and add dashboard panels and monitors for snapshot age, snapshot-load health, Job failures, cap pressure, duration, and worker memory. If production must roll back to an older relay image, set `BUZZ_STORAGE_METRICS=off` first. Older images do not understand `external` and would resume the failing inline scan. ## Bigger picture This is the application half of the storage-metrics repair. The paired infrastructure PR owns the production resource limits, schedule, artifact pins, secret boundary, and monitored rollout. Keeping those changes separate lets this PR remain safe by default while still providing a complete path to current per-community S3 totals. Related issue: N/A. No matching issue or pull request exists in `block/buzz`. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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Tom Brow
|
76f7e5ef0c |
feat(push): make gateway origin configurable (#7261)
Make the push gateway origin configurable across the relay, gateway, mobile client, and deployment chart. This is a fresh deployment. The gateway has only run on personal development infrastructure, and push has no existing enabled users. Legacy migration, configured-to-unconfigured mobile transitions, and rolling upgrades from pre-launch gateway binaries are not supported. Populated pre-launch databases are rejected with an informative error before migrations run; their data is untouched. Mobile builds may omit the gateway URL, leaving push unavailable. Once push is enabled, subsequent builds must retain that configuration. ### Validation - All applicable CI checks pass at `5f546cfaf403f0386f146d213adfb4392f4ec29c`, including Rust, mobile/Swift, desktop/integration, security, image builds, and Helm checks. An unrelated agent cancellation test passed on retry. - PostgreSQL CI passed 384 tests, including the production-entry-point regression for refusing populated pre-launch databases before migrations, fresh initialization, and subsequent initialized deployments. - Focused local validation passed all 10 gateway PostgreSQL tests under the CI discovery filter and all 3 unconfigured-mobile tests. Repository-wide PostgreSQL discovery validation and the complete pre-push hooks passed. - Physical-device APNs/App Attest behavior and deployment to a live cluster were not verified in this work. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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Mic Neale
|
44316ff72f |
feat(mesh): upgrade to mesh-llm 0.76.0-rc8 and recommend Qwen3.8 27B (#6189)
Upgrades Buzz's mesh-llm dependencies through the released `v0.76.0-rc8` tag (`2040765d`), including the Qwen3.8 curated recommendation and rc8's scheduler/runtime improvements. **Scope note:** the earlier open-relay/unenforced-admission mode has been removed from this PR at Mic's direction — it is not a product mode we want. Mesh admission remains roster/allowlist driven, exactly as on `main`: on a relay with no NIP-43 membership snapshot the mesh runs self-only. No NIP-11 mode probing, no mode-transition restarts. A future perimeter/admission strategy for open relays will be designed separately. This PR also: - seeds `BUZZ_AGENT_LLM_TIMEOUT_SECS=660` for mesh agents, above MeshLLM's 600-second backend timeout; - makes `desktop-tauri-clippy` lint both default and `mesh-llm` cfg graphs; - runs the feature-enabled desktop test suite in CI; - recommends Qwen3.8 27B Q4_K_M for 64 GB-and-larger machines, then ladders down through Gemma 4 E4B and Qwen 9B for smaller machines; - keeps stored shared-compute `auto` translated to MeshLLM's supported wire model `mesh`. RC8 verification: - `just ci` passed locally at `92ecc7ec933bdd4df804cc9f28a2b51efa5313c5`. - Pre-push differential gates passed, including both desktop Tauri cfg graphs and package tests. - A prior isolated runtime smoke used the RC8 binary's OpenAI endpoint for a Buzz-shaped system/user/tool/tool-result/final-response loop; all assertions passed and the isolated process was shut down. Perf previously measured on M5 Metal, Qwen3.8-27B-Q4_K_M: TTFT 0.22–0.32 s, ~25 tok/s streaming; agent-shaped turns ~1 s to first token after the first (prefix cache). --------- Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jimmy <1fe240cd1a8cf775f6f3060f115e5a303181f3abf28ad4cb0c2515f4a02b36a8@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz> Signed-off-by: Alessandro Joabar <sandro@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Jimmy <1fe240cd1a8cf775f6f3060f115e5a303181f3abf28ad4cb0c2515f4a02b36a8@meshllm.communities.buzz.xyz> Co-authored-by: Mic Neale <305999590+micspiral@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Alessandro Joabar <sandro@squareup.com> |
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Jordan Mecom
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e09f715c9d |
Verify ACP relay events before prompt routing (#7010)
## What changed Verify every Nostr EVENT received by buzz-acp immediately after deserialization. Events with an invalid NIP-01 ID or Schnorr signature are dropped before subscription routing, deduplication, replay-watermark updates, membership handling, or either harness queue. ## Safety Signature verification runs on the blocking pool so cryptographic work does not block the relay task. A verification failure drops only that event and keeps the connection available for subsequent valid traffic. The existing observer-control verification remains as defense in depth. Regression tests cover valid delivery; changed content, ID, signature, pubkey, tags, and timestamp; a forged owner shutdown command with a recomputed ID; forged membership notifications; and forged observer-control events. ## Testing cargo test -p buzz-acp cargo clippy -p buzz-acp --all-targets -- -D warnings just ci --------- Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com> |
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Luke Tornquist
|
cd02b693aa |
refactor(relay): extract NIP-29 membership authorization (#7285)
## Why NIP-29 membership authorization for kinds 9000, 9001, and 9022 was embedded in a large async handler, requiring Postgres and Redis to test and repeating the last-owner rule across five call sites. This addresses [TheSentinel454/buzz#24](https://github.com/TheSentinel454/buzz/issues/24) without adding the broader state/repository abstraction suggested there because HTTP and WebSocket writes already share ingestion. ## What - Extract pure, typed membership authorization decisions while leaving database reads and mutations in `validate_admin_event`. - Preserve existing client-visible errors and independent database last-owner safeguards. - Collapse five last-owner policy restatements into one predicate and share the identical self-departure policy. - Include the relay decision modules in `just test-unit`, so these tests execute in CI. ## Risk Assessment Medium-low. This touches production relay authorization, but intentionally preserves wire behavior and database defense in depth; exhaustive decision tables and relay-backed tests cover the affected paths. ## Simplification This removes repeated policy from the orchestration path and makes the rule set directly testable without introducing a repository trait or second transport path. ## Verification Verified at `15255a090797f85874921120003c645962fefaed`: - `just test-unit` — all 10 package summaries passed. An initial run hit two unrelated timing-sensitive `buzz-acp` failures; the complete retry passed 905/905 in that package. - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` - `just file-size-check` — 10/10 policy tests passed. - `just security-review-check` — 13/13 tests passed. - Push preflight — `push-head-scope`, `branch-skew`, `file-size-check`, `rust-tests`, and `desktop-tauri-checks` passed. - Blox Postgres relay lane — 84/84 at the byte-identical source patch; full live `e2e_relay` behavior matched the clean base (45 pass and the same pre-existing kind:9002 failure on each). Generated with Claude Code --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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Will Pfleger
|
5aed49b505 |
feat(buzz-agent): add DatabricksAuthCoordinator single-flight OAuth (#5545)
## What
Consolidates all Databricks OAuth acquisition behind one coordinator on
`PkceOAuthTokenSource`. Every entry point — the four `TokenSource`
methods (`bearer`, `bearer_no_browser`, `refresh_now`,
`interactive_login`) plus the public `acquire_with_intent` — routes
through a single `acquire()`/`acquire_locked()` core that owns browser
and cooldown policy.
Before this, acquisition logic was scattered across those methods with
no coordination: concurrent callers (Desktop discovery, the saved-agent
model picker, managed-runtime inference) could each pop their own
browser, and a just-denied attempt would immediately re-prompt on the
next passive read.
## How
- **Intent policy.** `AuthIntent::{Auto, UserInitiated, Headless}`
decides whether a caller may open a browser and whether it honors the
cooldown. `Headless` never browses; `Auto` browses but honors an
unexpired cooldown; `UserInitiated` browses and bypasses+clears the
cooldown.
- **Two-layer single-flight per cache key.** An in-process registry
(`INFLIGHT`) coalesces same-key, same-intent callers onto one leader's
attempt before the file lock. The slot key is `(lock_path, AuthIntent)`,
so a `UserInitiated` sign-in never inherits an `Auto` leader's result. A
joined result is revalidated against the waiter's own contract. Across
processes, callers serialize on a `flock`-based advisory lock and share
success through the on-disk cache. RAII `Drop` releases both lock and
leader slot.
- **Joiner credential-state reconciliation.** `SlotPublish` carries the
full `CachedToken` on success. Each joiner reconciles its own
independent `state` cell under `state.lock().await` before returning:
adopt when absent, expired, or matching the joiner's rejected
credential; preserve any distinct newer usable credential. On a matching
shared failure, neutralize the joiner's in-memory rejected entry under
lock via `expire_rejected_memory` — durable disk mutation is reserved
for `acquire_locked` under the cross-process file lock. Without this, a
joining source's state remains stale or empty and subsequent plain
`bearer()` calls resurface the rejected or absent credential.
- **Validate-before-persist boundary.** `finish()` is the
candidate-token persistence boundary for refresh and browser results.
Before a token is written to cache or the cooldown is cleared, a bearer
equal to the caller's rejected bytes yields a typed failure.
- **Token neutralization.** When `acquire_locked` enters with `rejected
= Some(bytes)`, it calls `expire_rejected()` under the state lock before
any cache check.
- **Cross-process failure single-flight.** An `AttemptRecord` sidecar
records a monotonically-increasing generation, intent, result code, and
SHA-256 digest of the completing caller's rejected token. Adoption is
temporal (pre-queue snapshot predates current generation) and
digest-matched.
- **Typed outcomes.** `AuthError` with stable `code()`/`from_code()`
replaces display-text matching.
- **Durable cooldown sidecar.** Every failed browser attempt is recorded
next to the cache key. 5-minute expiry.
- **Windows disk persistence disabled.** On non-Unix platforms,
`persist()` is a no-op. Lock, cooldown, and attempt sidecars are active
on all platforms. Tests that seed or assert on the on-disk token cache
are `#[cfg(unix)]`-gated.
- **Injected browser opener** invoked while the localhost callback
listener is live.
## Tests
- `crates/buzz-agent/tests/databricks_auth_coordinator.rs`:
browser/cooldown/classification acceptance matrix with a scripted
`BrowserOpener` and stub OIDC provider. P1 regressions exercise the full
`finish()` → `acquire_locked()` → `acquire_leader()` →
`LeaderGuard::complete()` → joiner wiring:
- `test_inprocess_joiner_reconciles_stale_state_after_shared_success`
(Unix): two real sources both loaded locally-fresh-but-rejected X; after
shared success Y, subsequent plain `bearer()` on both returns Y, not X.
-
`test_inprocess_joiner_neutralizes_rejected_on_matching_shared_failure`
(Unix): B's matching rejected X is force-expired in memory after shared
`RefreshRejected`; subsequent read cannot return X.
- `test_inprocess_joiner_populates_empty_state_no_second_acquisition`
(non-Unix): empty A/B join a browser success; B's subsequent headless
read returns Y without a second browser (no disk fallback on non-Unix
exposes the regression).
- `test_crossprocess_userinitiated_waiter_adopts_predecessor_denial`
(snapshot-marker barrier replacing an earlier sleep for deterministic
generation ordering).
- `auth.rs` in-crate tests: lock-primitive edges, disk-recheck on shared
failure (`#[cfg(unix)]`), and:
- `test_joiner_reconciliation_blocked_until_state_lock_released`:
deterministic direct-poll proof that awaited reconciliation requires
`state.lock().await`. The test task holds B's state mutex and manually
polls a pinned real `acquire()` future — Poll 2 (slot published, mutex
still held) must return `Pending` because `lock().await` blocks; with
`try_lock` instead, Poll 2 returns `Ready`, failing the assertion.
- `test_joiner_preserve_distinct_newer_credential`: deterministic direct
polling parks B at `slot.wait()`, then writes Z directly into B's state
in the same task, then publishes Y and awaits completion. B must return
Y but leave state == Z. Mutation check: unconditional adoption
overwrites Z with Y, failing the state assertion.
- `test_joiner_shared_failure_recovers_disk_replacement` (Unix): the
matching-failure joiner enters the recovery branch — after
`expire_rejected_memory` (in-memory, empty state no-op) it reads a
sibling-written disk replacement via `usable_from_disk` and returns it.
Mutation check: removing the `usable_from_disk` recovery branch returns
`Err(RefreshRejected)`.
- `test_joiner_failure_does_not_write_disk` (Unix): byte-for-byte
disk-invariance regression — a matching-failure joiner calls
`expire_rejected_memory` and must not touch the on-disk cache. An
independent process C may write a valid replacement between A's failure
and B's reconciliation; this guard ensures B's unfenced in-memory
neutralization cannot overwrite C's concurrent disk write. Mutation
check: reverting to `expire_rejected` rewrites the file (`expires_at =
0`), changing the bytes and failing the assertion.
- `test_lock_timeout_leaves_cooldown_sidecar_byte_for_byte_untouched`: a
waiter past its deadline returns `LockTimeout` before entering
`acquire_locked`; the cooldown sidecar bytes are unchanged. Documents a
pre-lock limitation: `LockTimeout` callers do not neutralize state or
sidecars.
## Scope / follow-ups
- **Runtime 401 handling is deferred.** This PR owns acquisition
single-flight and policy.
- **Desktop wiring is Phase 2** (not in this PR's boundary). Confined to
`crates/buzz-agent/`.
- **Windows DACL** is a follow-up once the `windows-sys` binding is
available.
## Stack
Built on [#5534](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/5534)
(`hayt/databricks-oauth-cache-hardening`), now merged. Retargeted to
`main`.
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
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Logan Johnson
|
4a9de1a3a1 |
feat(desktop): add isolated named demo builds (#6407)
🤖 I’m Larry, updating this description on Logan’s behalf. ## Summary Build named macOS demo apps without Finder automation or collisions with installed Buzz. `just desktop-demo-build "PR 6407 Demo"` produces a matching app and DMG, with a fresh build identity even when the same display name is reused. - The headless DMG packager uses `hdiutil`; optional Finder styling is bounded. The existing production release recipe is unchanged. - Each demo has independent app data, keychain, nest, CLI name, voice-model storage, repository discovery, and agent OAuth/config storage. Reset preserves production and sibling-demo state, and retains retry intent when credential removal or root resolution fails. - Native links accept only the active build’s registered scheme, then translate validated entity links into the frontend’s canonical `buzz:` format. - The recipe builds all six executable sidecars. Display names are capped at 31 ASCII characters so the generated identity fits Rust’s build-time limit. **Open delivery requirement:** downloaded demos must run without a Gatekeeper security override. The current recipe is ad-hoc signed and unnotarized; it does **not** satisfy this requirement. Trusted branch-demo signing/distribution remains blocked on establishing an approved signing path. This PR is not being presented as complete download-and-run delivery. ### Related issue N/A — reported in the Buzz DMG-packaging workstream. ### Testing At `11ce21ff97cb387ad676e7caa65b00964097d0bb`, macOS Blox passed the Tauri workspace suite and compiled-flags gate (including the full named-demo state; each library pass: 2,992 passed, 19 ignored), Tauri all-target clippy, the full `buzz-agent` package suite, and frontend lint/typecheck plus 5,733 tests. Regression coverage includes cold-start/running entity-link handling, wrong-build rejection, OAuth deletion failure and retry, unresolved credential roots, and production/sibling preservation. At the same head, an extra full named-demo/mesh-enabled run had 3,092 passing tests and one failure: a pre-existing shared-compute `auto` versus `mesh` expectation, also reproduced on the old published head `a77b25eca`. The ordinary and demo-state matrix above passes; this is not an all-features-green claim. Live macOS Launch Services delivery remains unverified. GitHub CI completed with 30 successful checks and 9 skipped. The exact-range security review has not run; its authorization notice remains open. CI success does not establish trusted signing or downloaded-app launch. Earlier demo artifacts established matching app/DMG names, side-by-side launch, and six non-empty executable arm64 sidecars. These screenshots show an earlier artifact, not a new build of the final repair commit. Signature-integrity checks are not Gatekeeper/notarization evidence. <img width="1032" height="548" alt="Buzz PR 6407 Demo disk image containing the matching app" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bca0277e-db03-4308-b280-fcad55e6d601" /> <img width="1186" height="821" alt="Buzz PR 6407 Demo running alongside other Buzz installations" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b4bf4ae5-c341-4e15-8090-9d2ea7c623b6" /> --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Larry <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Other Brother Darryl <cee32d92756729ee0c097c5661b879c6199931cd25315c8cf398dcbf0f155cf1@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Larry <loganj+sandbox-larry@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Wes
|
93237b4a74 |
fix(acp): wake agents from workflow messages (#6953)
> Pinky, an AI agent, is opening this PR on Wes's behalf.
## Summary
Workflow-generated messages can contain a valid agent mention but still
fail the ACP inbound author gate because the relay signs the event. This
keeps the existing wake policy and gives ACP a narrowly verified
effective author:
- preserve the workflow owner's existing `p` tag and all
rendered-mention `p` tags
- add explicit `["buzz:workflow-owner", <owner hex>]` provenance to
relay-generated workflow messages
- add `["buzz:workflow-mention", <agent hex>]` authority only for
mentions resolved from the stored, unrendered workflow step template
- accept that owner only for a verified kind-9 event signed by the
relay's current NIP-11 `self` key, with unique canonical workflow
metadata and an explicit workflow mention for the receiving agent
- route the verified owner through the existing author and in-flight
mode policies in both normal and setup listeners
- refresh relay identity after reconnects, retaining the last verified
key on transient fetch errors while treating a successful response
without `self` as definitive removal
Malformed, duplicate, forged, tampered, wrong-kind, and wrong-relay
attribution all fail closed to the raw event signer. `respond-to=nobody`
remains absolute. Old/mixed-version messages without the explicit
provenance retain their current fail-closed behavior.
## Trust boundary
The workflow owner means **“scheduled by,” not “authored every rendered
word.”** Trigger-controlled substitutions may still produce ordinary `p`
mention routing for compatibility, but they cannot mint
`buzz:workflow-mention` authority. Only a target named in the durable
owner-authored step template can receive that authority.
The author gate is not bypassed: after relay signature/provenance
verification, the effective owner is evaluated under the same
`owner-only`, `allowlist`, DM, and `nobody` policies used for ordinary
messages. Owner control commands continue to use the raw event signer.
## Why this PR
This is the focused immediate fix for waking an **online** agent from a
stored workflow mention. Earlier attempts were not a finished mergeable
fix and had materially different or incomplete trust designs. Larry's
larger draft stack addresses durable delivery across restarts; that
remains valuable future work and can supersede this effective-author
path when it lands.
## Validation
At exact clean commit `fe5b55619fe44176343eefb4cb7fe180df45a7d8`:
- `buzz-relay workflow_sink`: 25/25 passed, including all four ignored
PostgreSQL cases
- `buzz-acp --lib`: 845/845 passed
- `buzz-workflow --lib`: 169/169 passed (2 unrelated PostgreSQL tests
ignored)
- warnings-denied Clippy passed for the changed Rust packages
- `cargo fmt --all -- --check` passed
- `git diff --check` passed
- repository pre-push gates passed, including branch-scoped Rust tests
- CI now selects the ACP library tests and the relay's pure + PostgreSQL
workflow-sink tests so these guards cannot silently remain unexecuted
The production event-to-author gate is shared by normal and setup
listeners and has biting regression tests for accepted explicit
attribution, legacy owner-`p` rejection, and forged-attribution
rejection.
## Exact-head local relay + ACP proof
Following the release-binary/local-relay shape in `TESTING.md`, the
exact commit above passed a fresh isolated real-process matrix using:
- a freshly recreated Postgres database with migrations
- isolated Redis
- exact-head release `buzz-relay`, `buzz`, `buzz-admin`, and `buzz-acp`
binaries
- newly provisioned owner, channel, and bot member through the CLI
- workflow creation and triggering through the running relay
- a deterministic ACP protocol subprocess capturing actual
`session/prompt` dispatches
- a NIP-11 `self` value verified against the running relay signer
Cases:
1. A stored explicit workflow mention woke an `owner-only` agent exactly
once.
2. A workflow message without an agent mention did not wake it.
3. A non-relay signer forging every workflow authority tag did not wake
it.
4. Trigger-controlled `{{trigger.text}}` containing `@Wake Agent`
retained ordinary `p` routing but received no authority-bearing
workflow-mention tag and did not wake the agent.
5. `respond-to=nobody` remained absolute for a valid relay-authenticated
workflow mention.
The deterministic ACP subprocess isolates and directly proves relay →
ACP authorization and prompt dispatch without depending on external
model behavior.
## Deployment and residual risk
Relay and ACP changes must be deployed together for the new wake
behavior; mixed versions fail closed. Production paired-deployment proof
remains distinct from the successful local integration run. Setup-mode
behavior has automated coverage but was not a separate case in the
five-case local matrix. Relay-key rotation is observed at ACP
startup/reconnect; transient NIP-11 errors retain the last verified key,
an intentional availability tradeoff documented in code.
---------
Signed-off-by: Pinky <5f5ab050ec58ae208332edd544ebf705221e24c1b86d82a6ca07038a7a8f6ac9@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Pinky <5f5ab050ec58ae208332edd544ebf705221e24c1b86d82a6ca07038a7a8f6ac9@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: LioLionel <62820906+LioLionel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Carl <9d00794d3df50972eb8b615511783cab12a77a8fd5dd5edd58073ec73b54bd8b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
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|
Will Pfleger
|
17ecf0b8c9 |
fix(ci): salvage Codex review output on PTY-shutdown hang (#7042)
Codex CLI can leave a PTY descendant holding the action's inherited
stdio after the turn completes. The `runCodexExec.ts` wrapper waits on a
`close` event that never fires, so the `Review pull request` step hangs
until the job timeout kills it — discarding the finished review the CLI
already wrote to disk.
The CLI writes the completed review to the `--output-last-message` file
(exposed as `output-file`) **before** the hang. This PR adds a salvage
step that recovers it, and sets the step and job timeouts to preserve
the full 30-minute Codex execution budget.
**Changes (`codex-security-review.yml`):**
- Add `output-file: ${{ runner.temp }}/codex-review.json` to the `Review
pull request` step so the CLI writes the result before the hang.
(`runner` context is valid in `steps.with`; not in `jobs.env`.)
- Add `timeout-minutes: 30` and `continue-on-error: true` to the Codex
step — a hang now costs ≤30 minutes instead of 40, and the salvage step
still runs.
- Set job `timeout-minutes: 40` to give setup, step cancellation, and
salvage sufficient headroom without colliding with the Codex execution
budget. The original 30-minute job timeout was too narrow: evidence from
run
[33114428326](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33114428326/job/98665369165)
shows completed output appearing 28m46s after step start, meaning a
20-minute step timeout could kill a legitimate review before the salvage
file exists.
- Add a `Salvage review output` step with `if: always()`: prefers
`steps.run_codex.outputs.final-message` on a clean exit; falls back to
the output file when the step timed out. The output file path is set in
the step's own `env` block (`CODEX_OUTPUT_FILE: ${{ runner.temp
}}/codex-review.json`), where `runner` is valid. Validates shape
(non-empty JSON object, has `overall_risk`); fails the job hard if
neither source is present.
- Wire the job `outputs.review_json` to
`steps.salvage.outputs.review_json`.
**Changes (`Justfile`, `ci.yml`):**
- Add `actionlint .github/workflows/codex-security-review.yml` to
`security-review-check` so expression-validity errors are caught
locally.
- Provision `actionlint` via Hermit (pinned v1.7.12) rather than a
one-off `Install actionlint` curl step, so the same binary is used
locally and in CI.
**Security posture is unchanged:** the salvage step reads the action's
own output and a file written to `runner.temp` — neither is
PR-controlled. Credential-stripping env block on the Codex step is
untouched.
Note this is a temporary workaround until
https://github.com/openai/codex-action/issues/169 is addressed
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
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|
Tom Brow
|
c432a111ca |
feat(mobile): push notifications MVP (#6269)
This PR implements MVP, iOS-only,
[NIP-PL](
|
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|
Will Pfleger
|
86b9142a09 |
refactor(relay): NIP-98 admin auth with Operator/Moderator roles and NIP-11 discovery (#3777)
Adds authenticated, role-based moderation to the relay admin API. On
`main` the admin API is read-only and gated only by `Host`/`Origin`
matching; this branch adds NIP-98 authentication, a two-tier
Operator/Moderator principal model, mutation and staffing endpoints, and
NIP-11 auto-discovery so clients never type the admin URL by hand.
## Authentication (`BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH`)
`BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` accepts `nip98` or `disabled`. Leaving it unset
defaults to `nip98` (fail-secure). Configuration fails closed: any other
value aborts startup, while a lingering `BUZZ_ADMIN_TOKEN` is ignored
with a startup warning — token (bearer) authentication is not supported.
`Host`/`Origin` matching is retained in every mode as defense-in-depth.
- **`nip98`** (default) — per-request signed NIP-98 (kind 27235) events,
resolved to an Operator or Moderator principal with per-person
attribution and individual revocability. Read-write per resolved
principal.
- **`disabled`** — no credential; relies entirely on network-layer
controls (reverse proxy, VPN, firewall) and logs a `WARN` on every boot.
Always read-only: `authorize()` resolves no principal, so mutation and
staffing routes always `403`.
## Roles
Buzz has two independent authority axes after this change.
**Relay-level** roles (new here) are deployment-global: they act across
every community on the relay, through the admin API. **Community-level**
roles (pre-existing, unchanged by this PR) are tenant-scoped: they act
inside one community, through signed Nostr moderation commands.
### Relay level (new)
| Role | Description |
|---|---|
| **Operator** | Full control of the deployment's moderation surface:
read all reports, feedback, and attachments across every community;
resolve reports with enforcement (`delete`/`kick`/`ban`/`timeout`) or
decisions (`dismiss`/`escalate`); reopen and cancel; update feedback
status; and manage the Operator/Moderator roster via the staffing
endpoints. |
| **Moderator** | Day-to-day triage: everything an Operator can do
except staffing — cannot view or change the roster. |
How a pubkey acquires a relay role (resolution order; config always
outranks DB):
1. Listed in `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` → **Operator** (source `config`)
2. Equals `RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY` while `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` is empty →
**Operator** (source `owner_fallback`, a break-glass grant for
self-hosters that deactivates once any operator is configured)
3. Row in the `relay_operators` table → **Operator** or **Moderator**
(source `db`, managed via the staffing endpoints)
4. No match → `403`
### Community level (pre-existing, unchanged)
| Role | Description |
|---|---|
| **Owner** (community) | Full authority within their community: every
moderation action (delete, kick, ban/unban, timeout/untimeout, resolve
reports, view queue) plus member, role, and invite management. No guard
rails. |
| **Admin** (community) | Same community-wide moderation capabilities as
owner, except an admin cannot ban or time out the owner or a fellow
admin — only the owner may action an admin. Manages members and invites;
only the owner grants the admin role. |
| **Member** (community) | Standard participant; no moderation
capability. |
| **Owner / Admin** (channel) | Channel-local authority only: delete
messages and kick users within their own channel. |
| **Member / Guest / Bot** (channel) | No moderation authority. |
There is no community-level Moderator tier in v1; relay-level Moderator
is the only role by that name.
## Escalation scoping
The operator report queue is an escalation backstop, not the community's
day-to-day triage surface (per `VISION_MODERATION`, the severe class is
the platform's to review rather than the community's). Two rules enforce
that:
- **Escalated-by-default listing.** `GET /reports` with no `status`
parameter returns only `escalated` reports. An explicit
`status=<open|resolved|dismissed|escalated>` filter is always honored as
given, and full visibility across every status stays available for
platform-safety and legal review via `scope=all` (which lists reports
regardless of status). `scope` accepts only `all` and is ignored when an
explicit `status` is present.
- **Auto-escalated `illegal` reports.** Member reports whose category is
`illegal` are ingested with `status=escalated` rather than `open`, so
the severe class reaches the operator backstop without waiting for a
community admin to forward it. Every other category still lands `open`.
Auto-escalation only sets the queue status — it records no moderator
decision and stamps no resolver, so an auto-escalated report is
indistinguishable downstream from an admin-escalated one: the reopen
route returns it to `open` on the same terms, keyed only on status,
never on how the report became escalated.
## Principal resolution and NIP-98 admission
`resolve_admin_principal()` returns `AdminPrincipal { pubkey, role,
source }` per the resolution order above; `None` never falls through as
a role. Admission is ordered so the replay guard is a privilege, not a
public surface: signature/URL/method/payload-hash verification first,
roster check second, and only then is the deployment-scoped replay id
atomically consumed — a validly-signing but unrostered key never
allocates a replay slot. Redis failure fails closed.
## Report resolution, recovery, and enforcement provenance
`POST /reports/{id}/resolve` is a crash-safe enforcement state machine:
decision-only outcomes (`dismiss`/`escalate`) are a single
CAS-plus-audit transaction; enforcement
(`delete`/`kick`/`ban`/`timeout`) claims the report
(`open`→`processing`), runs the durable mutation, then finalizes — a
re-drive resumes at the step marker and converges to exactly-one
enforcement, fenced by a lease and an outbox claim token.
Person-directed enforcement on an `event`-kind report derives its target
from the stored event's author (server-owned truth, never the reporter's
`p` tag) via a single `derive_enforcement_target` shared by the HTTP
driver and the recovery worker. If the reported event was purged before
its author could be read, person-directed actions are rejected pre-claim
and the report stays `open`; `delete` needs only the event id and is
exempt.
`GET /reports/{id}` and the resolve response carry an `activeAction`
field surfacing the enforcement that actually executed — a report
dismissed after a reopen still reports the ban that ran. `POST
/reports/{id}/reopen` returns a terminal report to `open` (idempotent on
`requestId`). `POST /reports/{id}/cancel` is the sole recovery path for
a pre-mutation `failed` action, attributed via
`relay_admin_actions.cancelled_by`.
## Feedback
`GET /feedback` and `/feedback/{id}` survive a tenant purge: provenance
columns are severed to `NULL` rather than cascade-deleted, and the
attachment path fails closed to `404` on a severed row. `PATCH
/feedback/{id}` updates lifecycle `status`
(`new`/`reviewed`/`archived`).
## Staffing and probe
`GET/PUT/DELETE /operators/{pubkey}` are Operator-only; mutating a
config-backed pubkey returns `409 Conflict`. `GET /operators` returns
the union of config and DB principals with per-entry `source`. `GET
/probe` reports auth mode, role, source, `canAct`, and `canStaff` for
the desktop console.
## NIP-11 auto-discovery
The NIP-11 relay-information document gains an optional `admin_api`
field carrying the canonical admin origin (`scheme://host[:port]`, no
path), present iff `BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` is set and omitted otherwise. The
scheme follows the same loopback rule as NIP-98 `u`-tag verification via
a shared `scheme_for_host` helper, so the advertised origin and the
origin the relay verifies against can never diverge.
## Operator API origin decoupling
`RELAY_OPERATOR_API_ORIGIN` is no longer required at boot when
`RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` is set — it is used only by the
community-provisioning endpoints, which fail closed at request time
(with a boot-time `WARN`) until it is set. The admin console needs no
origin.
## Admin-web adaptation
The standalone `admin-web` dashboard signs each request as a NIP-98
event via a NIP-07 browser extension, discovers the auth mode with a
single unauthenticated probe (`200` → `disabled`, anything else →
`nip98`, fail-secure), and carries no token entry surface. Playwright
coverage exercises the NIP-98 and CSP paths.
## Security hardening
Three findings from security review are folded in:
- **Append-only roster audit.** `PUT`/`DELETE /operators/{pubkey}`
mutate the deployment-wide root of trust, but the upsert overwrites
`role`/`added_by` in place and the delete removes the only row — so a
grant→revoke sequence left no trace of who was ever granted or by whom.
Each mutation now writes an `relay_operator_audit` row (actor, target,
`grant`/`revoke`, pre-image `prev_role`, `new_role`, timestamp) inside
the same transaction as the mutation. A per-target transaction-scoped
advisory lock serializes concurrent mutations of the same pubkey before
the pre-image read, so the recorded `prev_role` is always the true
predecessor even under a concurrent-grant race. Chronology is keyed on a
`BIGINT GENERATED ALWAYS AS IDENTITY` `seq` column, not the wall clock:
the serializing lock guarantees insertion order and `seq` captures it,
so ordered reads (`ORDER BY seq`) follow the true privilege chain even
across a backward NTP step that a `clock_timestamp()` ordering would
invert. `created_at` (`clock_timestamp()`) is retained as informational
occurrence time only. Append-only by construction — no `UPDATE`/`DELETE`
path and no API surface. A no-op delete writes nothing.
- **`expirationSecs` overflow.** The timeout path built `Utc::now() +
Duration::seconds(secs as i64)` from an attacker-controlled `u64`:
`i64::MAX` panicked the handler, and a wrapped-negative magnitude minted
a *past* expiry that still passed validation. `compute_timeout_until`
now rejects zero, rejects magnitudes above a documented
`MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS` (365 days), and uses checked
`try_seconds`/`checked_add_signed` so no input can panic or produce a
past expiry — over-cap, zero, `i64::MAX`, and wrapping-negative inputs
all return a clean `4xx`.
- **Uppercase-hex config-backed bypass.** Config pubkeys are lowercased
at parse, but the `409` immutability check raw-string-compared the path
param while `decode_hex_pubkey` accepted uppercase — so `PUT
/operators/{UPPERCASE}` skipped the guard and wrote a shadow row for the
same 32 bytes. The validated param is now canonicalized (lowercased)
before the `409` check, DB write, `DELETE`, and response body.
## Migrations
- `0035_relay_operators.sql` — `relay_operators` roster table
(deployment-global), `actor_authority` on `moderation_actions`,
`processing` status plus `active_action_id` on `moderation_reports`,
`status` on `product_feedback`.
- `0036_relay_admin_actions.sql` — enforcement-action table with a
`request_id` idempotency key, a `step_marker` for crash recovery, and a
`cancelled_by` attribution column.
- `0037_relay_admin_action_lease.sql` — lease fencing for the action
worker.
- `0038_relay_admin_outbox_claim_token.sql` — fenced claim token on the
outbox worker.
- `0039_relay_operator_audit.sql` — append-only `relay_operator_audit`
trail for roster mutations (see Security hardening).
`docs/admin/README.md` documents the full principal model, NIP-98 event
requirements, capabilities by role, the startup error matrix, and the
discovery field.
## Production blast radius
A relay without `BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` is completely unaffected — the admin
surface stays disabled and `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` is ignored; a lingering
`BUZZ_ADMIN_TOKEN` logs a startup warning and must be removed. Where
`BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` **is** set, unset `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` defaults to
`nip98` (per-person signed auth); `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=disabled` reproduces
`main`'s prior `Host`/`Origin`-only gating but is read-only (mutation
routes `403`). The five migrations add tables and columns without
touching existing data.
---
Related: [block/buzz#4768](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4768)
(desktop admin console consuming the `admin_api` field),
[squareup/bb-public#339](https://github.com/squareup/bb-public/pull/339)
(Phase 4 rollout config)
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
|
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|
Will Pfleger
|
953a1798b2 |
feat(auth): add NIP-FI canonical assertion verifier and contracts (#6776)
The closed, provider-neutral contract layer at the root of the NIP-FI federated-identity dependency graph — Phase A, PR 1 of the plan. It has no dependencies on any other PR and defines no database schema, migration, runtime JWKS fetching, binding resolution, enrollment, or request/proof binding; those belong to later PRs. ## What this adds - **Multi-issuer assertion-policy config** (`IssuerRegistry`, `IssuerPolicy`) keyed by exact `iss`. Identity is issuer-qualified `(iss, sub)` throughout — equal `sub` under different `iss` are distinct identities. The subject coordinate is fixed to the JWT `sub` claim (`SUBJECT_CLAIM`), never configurable, so no deployment can seal a mutable attribute like `email` as identity. Issuer URL and audience remain deployment configuration. - **The two deterministic semantic contract identities** — `AssertionPolicyId = H(canonical assertion-policy contract)` and `TransportContractId = H(canonical transport contract)` — derived by length-prefixed, domain-separated SHA-256 so a semantic change moves exactly its owning ID while benign JWKS rotation never changes policy lineage. Set-valued policy inputs (audiences, algorithms, subject-class values, scope capture) are canonicalized before derivation, so the ID is invariant under permutation and duplication. Config fields that a freshness class never reads are rejected at construction (an `offline-jwt` policy cannot carry `maximum_status_age`), so the canonical encoding stays total over valid configs and semantically identical policies always derive one ID. - **The single canonical verifier** (`FederatedAssertionVerifier`, `FI-INV-16`) producing the origin-sealed, provider-neutral `VerifiedAssertion` normalized result. Its constructor is crate-private, so unverified claims cannot be promoted into authority. The issuer→JWKS authority is entirely crate-owned: `AssertionKeySet` has no public constructor and `IssuerKeySource` is sealed, so no downstream crate can relabel one issuer's keys as another's. The authenticated key set is bounded (`MAX_JWKS_KEYS`) and the bound is folded into `AssertionPolicyId`, so an unbounded attacker-controlled `kid` scan cannot be driven; every snapshot requires a finite positive hard deadline. - **Sealed revalidation dependencies** — `RevalidationDependencies` carries the key-snapshot hard deadline and a `ConfidentialAssertion` handle to the exact compact JWS (no `Debug`/`Display`/`serde` leak, sole read path `compact_jws()`), so a changed snapshot can revalidate the same evidence: a retained key revalidates, a removed key denies. - **The privacy-preserving four-class denial contract** (`DenialClass`, `FI-INV-13`) with the byte-exact Nostr text, HTTP status, body, `Content-Type`, and `WWW-Authenticate` values fixed by the spec's rejection table. An unreadable required current dependency maps to `authorization_unavailable`/503, never to rejected evidence, and rejected evidence never masquerades as a 503 at either end of the pipeline: all bounded, dependency-independent checks (compact structure, header, signature shape, policy, algorithm, token class) precede key-source lookup, and all offline validation (token-class, key, signature, audience, claims, time) completes before any status-witness deferral. A wrong-`typ` or structurally malformed token, or malformed/invalidly-signed input naming a current-status issuer, therefore denies with `evidence_rejected`/403 rather than being reported as a 503 availability signal. ## Corrections applied to the mined source Mined from the `buzz-auth` verifier core in [#1476](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/1476) and corrected to the settled spec (the merged `docs/nips/NIP-FI*.md`, [#5946](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/5946)), which settled after #1476 was written: - Token-class selection with exact `typ` enforcement. Two classes are offered: `at+jwt` and `nip-fi+jwt`. There is deliberately no generic/absent-`typ` "named compatibility" class: it cannot be proven disjoint from an OIDC ID token by claim presence alone (an issuer can mint an ID token carrying `client_id`), and the only authenticated discriminator is `typ`, which such a mode declines to constrain. - OIDC ID-token denial — denies even when `iss`, `aud`, and `sub` match, via exact `typ` mismatch against every accepted class. - The fixed `nostr_pubkey` claim accepted only as lowercase hex of exactly one 32-byte key; bech32 and other aliases deny. - Resource-owner / client-subject ambiguity denial and required `client_id` for `at+jwt`. - JWK admissibility: a key's `use` and, when present, `key_ops` must authorize signature verification (a key restricted to other operations such as `encrypt` is rejected), and the selected JOSE algorithm is bound to the key's required family and curve (ES256↔EC/P-256, ES384↔EC/P-384, EdDSA↔OKP/Ed25519, RS/PS↔RSA). The JWK `alg` is advisory; the actual key material is what signs, so a JWK declaring a matching `alg` over mismatched material (a different family or curve) is rejected before signature verification. - Spec-exact time arithmetic (`now < exp`, `iat <= now + skew`, `now < iat + maximum_assertion_age`, equality at expiry is expired). `exp`/`iat`/`nbf` accept finite integer or fractional RFC 7519 `NumericDate` values with checked, overflow-safe conversion; non-finite and out-of-range values deny. ## Verification In-crate tests in `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/verifier/tests.rs` sign real ES256 assertions against a fixed test key and cover: the happy path, exact-wire-text for all four denial classes, deterministic and semantic contract IDs, canonicalization invariance, token-class enforcement including ID-token denial, JWK `key_ops` rejection, `nostr_pubkey` hex handling, time bounds, and multi-issuer selection (same subject across distinct issuers yields distinct identities and policy IDs). They also cover the round-3 contracts: the key-set bound (oversized rejected, at-bound accepted, empty rejected), fixed-`sub` identity (identity is `sub` not a configured `email`; a token without `sub` denies), offline-before-deferral (invalid-signature, wrong-audience, malformed-claim, and expired under a current-status issuer each deny 403/`evidence_rejected`), and the revalidation contracts (dependencies carry the deadline and exact JWS; a retained key revalidates, a removed key denies). And the round-4 contracts: algorithm↔key-material binding, covered exactly per accepted algorithm (a table-driven matrix asserts every policy-acceptable algorithm — ES256, ES384, EdDSA, RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512 — matches only its required family/curve and rejects every other, so each mapping mutation fails individually; and an ES256 token against P-384, RSA, and Ed25519 material each deny `InvalidKey`); malformed evidence classified before key lookup (wrong-`typ`, two-segment, four-segment, empty-signature, and non-base64url-signature tokens against an empty source deny 403 not 503); `maximum_status_age` inapplicable under offline-jwt rejected at construction while current-status still requires it; and fractional `NumericDate` (finite fractional `iat`/`exp`/`nbf` within bounds verify, non-finite and out-of-range deny). Compile-fail doctests guard the sealed authority seam (`AssertionKeySet::new`, `IssuerKeySource`) and the absence of the named-compatibility token class. ## Notes - `Co-authored-by` attribution is preserved for the mined author. The #1476 `buzz-auth` commits are authored by Cea Stapleton Cordasco (the salvage map records #1476 under Franco; the git history on that PR is Cea's — surfacing for the attribution/closure record). - Amends `docs/nips/NIP-FI.md` to remove the "named compatibility access token" class and its `FI-TRACE-TOKEN-CLASS` oracle reference, so the normative spec matches the two-class root implementation (a generic/absent `typ` cannot be proven disjoint from an OIDC ID token). Removal-only, no neighbor redesign; a `docs/nips/` grep confirms no dangling cross-reference to the class remains. - Adds `jsonwebtoken 10.4.0` (`aws_lc_rs`) as a workspace dependency. Dependencies: none. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <261786559+cea@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Jordan Mecom
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cdab765748 |
Add gated security reviews (#6816)
Add a gated Codex security review for Buzz pull requests. Reviews run automatically for Block organization members. External PRs require a `@buzz-security-review` comment from a Block member, and every new external push invalidates the previous result. Codex reviews the PR SHA in a read-only, network-restricted job with no write GitHub token. A separate trusted job validates and sanitizes structured findings before posting them. The workflow uses the dedicated `CODEX_REVIEW_API_KEY` secret. --------- Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com> |
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Salman Mohammed
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79df468255 |
Add Buzz benchmark evaluation layers (#6823)
## Summary - classify every Buzz-native benchmark task as `regression` or `workflow` - add metadata-backed `--layer` selection with k=1 regression and k=3 workflow defaults, while preserving explicit `--attempts`/`-k` - split an unqualified mixed Buzz dataset run into two Harbor jobs so each layer gets the correct default - document the layer contract and cover metadata, selection, defaults, overrides, invalid input, and command construction --------- Signed-off-by: Salman Mohammed <smohammed@squareup.com> |
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Jordan Mecom
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ee6ca5fa28 |
Remove public relay signing key fallback (#6729)
Require `BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY` on every relay startup and remove the shared public fallback key completely. For local development, `just bootstrap` now generates a random key once in the gitignored `.env` file. Re-running bootstrap preserves that key, so relay-authored events retain the same identity across restarts. The local relay recipes reload `.env`, while isolated CI and E2E launchers pass explicit per-run keys. Startup fails immediately when the key is missing or invalid, before connecting to Postgres or Redis. Deployed relays continue to receive their stable key from the existing chart-managed secret. Validated with: - `./scripts/test-ensure-local-relay-key.sh` - `cargo test -p buzz-relay --bin buzz-relay` - `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay --bin buzz-relay -- -D warnings` - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` - `shellcheck scripts/ensure-local-relay-key.sh scripts/test-ensure-local-relay-key.sh` Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com> |
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Will Pfleger
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2ce8df8533 |
fix(models): curate Databricks alias-aware labels for 5 missing endpoints (#6360)
Curates Databricks model labels through prefix-stripping aliasing and materializes exact records for five endpoints missing from the Databricks catalog. **Alias-aware label resolution** (Databricks v2) - Strip workspace-specific prefixes (`goose-`, `team-x-`, etc.) before exact-record lookup so any prefixed alias resolves to its canonical label without enumerating every alias variant. - Return `None` for uncurated ids instead of falling back to a raw string; callers control the fallback display. **New exact records — label-only (Anthropic Messages route, axes from family rules)** - `databricks-claude-fable-5` → "Claude Fable 5" (materialized from `anthropic-adaptive-xhigh-fable-5`) - `databricks-claude-opus-4-8` → "Claude Opus 4.8" (materialized from `anthropic-adaptive-xhigh-opus-4-8`) - `databricks-claude-opus-5` → "Claude Opus 5" (materialized from `anthropic-adaptive-xhigh-opus-5`) - `databricks-claude-sonnet-5` → "Claude Sonnet 5" (materialized from `anthropic-adaptive-xhigh-sonnet-5`) **New capability-bearing record — Kimi K3 (MLflow Chat route)** - `databricks-kimi-k3` → "Kimi K3" with axes from models.dev Moonshot catalog: reasoning toggle + effort `[low, high, max]`, no default; `_reconciliation_doc` records the source and reconciliation policy. **Corpus and tests** - 6 new normative-corpus vectors (canonical + one `goose-*` alias per new id); executable vector count updated to 113 in both Rust and TS gates. - Rust and TS label tests extended to cover all 3 new canonical ids and their aliases via the prefix stripper. - Sentinel variable fix in discovery-provider test to prevent false failure in Databricks dev environments where `BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER` is set. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Salman Mohammed
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a9640c7cc4 |
Add Buzz-native collaboration benchmarks (#6264)
## Why Terminal-Bench can show task correctness while missing Buzz-specific collaboration failures, such as posting a final answer outside the user's thread. Add a small Buzz-native suite that scores relay behavior directly. ## What - Add Harbor tasks for direct thread replies, event-level callback mentions to a three-word user identity, targeted reads of explicitly named paths outside the workspace, and exact temporary-channel membership against a seeded directory of 50 users and 10 bots - Export sanitized post-agent relay evidence and extend solo runtime/provisioning for deterministic verification - Expose channel TTL in CLI search output and cover positive and negative transcript/state fixtures ## Risk Assessment Low to medium — this primarily adds benchmark and testbed machinery. The CLI change is an additive `ttl_seconds` field in channel-search JSON; relay behavior is unchanged. ## References - Motivated by the Buzz-specific behavior observed while benchmarking https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6128 - The named-path regression case covers the issue being fixed by https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6261 - Local live Sonnet runs: `reply-to-thread`, `user-mention`, and `create-channel-invite-users` each scored reward 1.0 with zero exceptions - The current branch prompt scored 3/5 on a concurrent `read-named-path-outside-workspace` batch: one explicit workspace-boundary refusal and one missing final response Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Salman Mohammed <smohammed@squareup.com> |
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Wes
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6d45f98665 |
ci: make file-size policy a first-class gate (#6187)
## Summary - make the differential file-size ratchet a first-class repository gate - run the same unfiltered gate from pre-push, `just check`, and CI - remove hidden file-size coupling from Desktop, Web, and Mobile lint commands - isolate ratchet Git subprocesses from hook-exported repository state ## Why The Desktop ratchet grew to govern `desktop/src-tauri/crates/**`, but the pre-push `desktop-check` command remained path-filtered to non-Tauri files. That contract drift allowed a Tauri Rust file-size regression through local validation. The ratchet already computes its own merge-base diff, so duplicating governed paths in Lefthook and CI adds drift risk without meaningful runtime savings. One root gate owns the policy now. ## Testing - `just file-size-check` - oversized untracked probe under `desktop/src-tauri/crates/**` fails with the 1,000-line ceiling - file-size core tests with hook-style `GIT_DIR` / `GIT_WORK_TREE` environment - `lefthook dump` confirms the unfiltered pre-push command - mandatory pre-push suite passed on `3217003db10c84d8a0c5f636ec4c92936777a002` - `git diff --check` Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Carl <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Will Pfleger
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1b7e5ac1be |
feat(model-capabilities): drive model capabilities and labels from one manifest (#5597)
## Summary Centralizes model capability knowledge — thinking mode, supported effort levels, wire routes, and human-readable labels — into a single manifest, `scripts/model-capabilities.json`. Rust and TypeScript each get a small interpreter that reads the same manifest, replacing hand-maintained tables scattered across both languages that had already drifted apart. A capability change is now a data edit, not parallel edits to two code paths. Supersedes the codegen approach explored in #3603. A cross-language contract keeps the two interpreters honest: `scripts/normative-corpus.json` is a golden snapshot generated from the Rust resolver (103 vectors covering all six capability axes) and replayed natively in TS. CI fails if either language disagrees with the corpus or the corpus drifts from the resolver. Regenerate with `just regen-model-corpus`. ## Behavior changes - **Effort dropdown for `openai-compat` providers** no longer offers `max`. The request path always clamped `max` to `xhigh` on the wire, so the UI stops offering a value that was silently rewritten. UI-only, wire-identical. - **Databricks v2 routing (wire-visible):** uncurated endpoint names carrying a bare Claude code-name segment (e.g. `goose-opus-5`) now route to the MLflow chat wire instead of Anthropic Messages — they lose Anthropic prompt caching but still succeed on a valid OpenAI-compatible wire. Curated `databricks-claude-*` records and any name starting with `claude` are unchanged. A handful of other uncurated/adversarial name shapes similarly fall back to MLflow chat instead of pattern-matched routes; every curated model resolves identically to before, all axes. - **Curated model labels on the real discovery path.** The Databricks API returns no display name, so discovery emits the raw endpoint id as the model `name` (`{id, name: id}`) on every path. `ModelEntry.name` is now curated at all four construction seams in `buzz-agent` — v2 discovery, v1 parse, the auth-empty default catalog, and the configured-model fallback — via a read-only `databricks_registry_label` lookup over the manifest's `databricks_v2` exact records; `id` stays the raw wire/config value. A known id renders its curated label (`databricks-gpt-5-5` → `GPT-5.5`), an unknown id passes through unchanged, and the default-catalog row reads `GPT-5.5 (default catalog)`. As a defense against older `buzz-agent` binaries and any harness that echoes ids, `resolveModelLabel` treats a discovered name equal to the trimmed id as absent and falls through to the registry tier; a genuinely distinct name (including the suffixed default-catalog label) still wins. ## Cleanup Deletes the duplicated capability tables and their tests: the `config.rs` gpt5 matchers, effort tables, and clamp logic; the legacy segment-based Databricks v2 route classifier in `llm.rs`; and the TS hand tables plus `effortTable.fixture.json`. All are replaced by manifest lookups through the shared resolver — no line of capability data exists in two places. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
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Wes
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76f114a252 |
test: add deterministic desktop release smoke (#5699)
## Summary - add `just desktop-release-smoke`, a deterministic desktop correctness/reachability smoke against an ephemeral real local relay - preserve existing DM history when the first live DM enters a pageless query window, the desktop-v0.5.10 disappearing-DM regression - enforce foreground JS ordering: a frame and actionable sidebar input must dispatch before mounted stale queries begin resume refetches, while separately requiring the navigation to commit promptly - seed a 10,000-event dense-second fixture and verify exact event-ID reachability, SHA-256 identity, ordering, duplicate absence, bounded mounted rows, and drained render work - isolate Postgres per run, serialize the shared Redis DB, retain phase/relay/Playwright diagnostics, and gate desktop release manifest assembly on the smoke This is deliberately **not a performance-regression gate**. CDP and action timing fields are informational only. There is no candidate/baseline comparison or threshold. A future performance lane needs repeated equivalent fixtures, discrete interaction samples, and an explicit comparator/noise policy. The diagnostics record the fixture version, row count, wall-clock base timestamp (`fixtureSecond`), expected event-ID hash, observed state, and measurements. Because the created-at floor requires a current timestamp, paired comparison remains disabled. The release job runs on an isolated GitHub-hosted runner. The script also guards automatic local runs with a Redis allocation lock. Its remaining direct-PID cleanup and free-port selection race mean it should not be repurposed onto a persistent concurrent shared runner without first hardening process-group cleanup and port reservation. ### Related issue N/A ### Testing - `pnpm --dir desktop typecheck` - focused real-local-relay release smoke passed after adversarial review fixes - identical DM witness passed current and failed `desktop-v0.5.10` with the history-loss signature - identical foreground witness bytes (`2c1e97df04c9b8ca0304b66bbbe9bdb4d08924ad8ce0f68a9c490458fcc3aca8`) failed `desktop-v0.5.10` structurally: the first resume fetch was marker 1, before first frame/sidebar dispatch at marker 8 - with PR #5696 (`59f613c40`) merged, the witness showed focus at 951.3 ms, first frame at 951.6 ms, click dispatch at 952.1 ms, first resume fetch at 968.9 ms, and route commit at 992.4 ms - the gate therefore protects first paint and actionable input dispatch; route commit is a bounded responsiveness witness, not a prerequisite for resume work - the corrected focused foreground scenario passed at `6d9b5be40da58bbee92a856b04c3558946d0a950`; the prior merged-tree full run passed DM retention and 10k reachability before exposing this contract mismatch - pre-push passed on exact pushed head `6d9b5be40da58bbee92a856b04c3558946d0a950`, including desktop checks, typecheck, desktop tests, Rust tests, mobile tests, and Tauri checks - full 10,000-event scenario reached 10,000/10,000 exact IDs with matching SHA-256, 199 continuation requests, and 95 mounted rows in about 4.4 minutes - reduced-row review run passed in 18.4 seconds ### Foreground witness boundary The Chromium test is a deterministic JS policy gate. Headless Chromium does not expose an honest blur/focus transition in this fixture, so the test drives the production focus listener and `document.hasFocus()` predicate together and records that simulation explicitly. It proves refetch fan-out ordering, not AppKit activation, WKWebView paint, or an activating physical click. A packaged macOS native lane is still required before claiming the actual desktop activation experience is certified. --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Carl <c7ebe626f000404285d3686e1dc74cc07cc60a9754a150041ba132e14bd3e2ec@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> |
