6 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Elrond	93ccf41255	fix(seed): refuse connection-string PGDATABASE in local-only admin seed guard ... psql -d treats URI and key=value values as full connection strings that override -h, so PGDATABASE could route the unarmed fixture writer to a shared database. Accept only a plain database name before either psql path, and extend the refusal test with URI and key/value cases (host=, hostaddr=, service=) plus a plain-name control that must reach psql. Also note in replica_fence that prepared-transaction coverage comes from the retained deferred trigger, not the insert-time app guard. Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-10-16 09:55:59 -04:00
Elrond	91b507a66c	buzz-db: check the floor only on newly inserted event rows ... Review rework for the insert-time created_at floor (BUZZ-316 phase 1). - Ordinary and thread event writers now run the floor check after their ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING INSERT, only when a row was inserted and before follow-ups. Replaying an already-stored id stays Duplicate even when its created_at has aged below the floor, matching the trigger. - Source policy: UPDATE rule catches ONLY, aliases and row-constructor column lists; quoted identifiers are normalized; the floor policy scans every crate's src via the shared workspace walk. - NIP-43 membership insert writes a literal NULL channel_id, pinned positionally; the bind-based exemption is gone. - Canvas CAS fixtures take a per-test base instead of a process-wide OnceLock. - seed-admin-dashboard.sh also refuses PGHOSTADDR, PGSERVICE and multi-host PGHOST. Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-10-14 14:25:17 -04:00
Elrond	7d21362bb9	buzz-db: check events created_at floor in the app writers (phase 1) ... Every channel-bearing INSERT INTO events now checks created_at against database clock_timestamp() minus CREATED_AT_FLOOR_SECS on the admitted transaction before inserting, and returns the typed, non-retryable DbError::CreatedAtFloorRejected. The check samples the clock after BEGIN, so the replica-fence wall min(oldest_xact_start, S) - floor - margin still covers it. Migration 0021's deferred trigger and the writer-pool GUC stay in place as the mixed-version backstop until phase 2. A source policy requires the check on every channel-bearing events INSERT and forbids production UPDATEs of events.created_at/channel_id. The admin seed script now refuses non-local PGHOST. Refs BUZZ-316. Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-10-14 13:50:01 -04:00
Will Pfleger	836e7d0d06	feat(desktop): browse and moderate every community in the Admin Console (#8027) ... The Admin Console only ever saw the community the desktop happened to be connected to. With #8011's community reads, the console can now browse every community on the relay and, for signed staff, moderate any of them by name without switching connections. 🤖 ## What changes - **Communities tab.** Lists every live community on the relay, searchable by host prefix with "Load more" paging. The connected community is pinned at the top by exact host match. Report rows get a community badge that opens that community. - **Community page.** Reports, Restrictions, Members and Actions, each scoped to the community on the page. The Actions form has no host field: it always acts on the page's community, and the TypeScript host normalization is gone from the Actions tab. - **Native reads** (`admin_list_communities`, `admin_search_members`, `admin_get_member`, `admin_get_event`). Every request validates the explicit community host and NIP-98-signs the real method and URL. Failures come back as a structured error (`status`, `bodyComplete`, `bodyEmpty`, `code`), so the UI can tell an older relay's empty 404, a coded `event_not_found` and a transport failure apart, and never says "not found" unless the relay did. - **Explicit-host lifts.** `admin_lift_restriction` sends the page's community host, not the active relay's. It freezes the relay and signer the intent was reviewed under, and refuses to send if either has changed. - **Pending actions survive navigation.** A panel-level `DirectActionsProvider` holds the frozen intent, so switching communities or tabs mid-confirm doesn't lose it. Only Discard drops it. A signer change remounts the controller and drops it. - **Fenced lookups.** Member and event lookups are keyed by origin, signer, community, target and a generation counter, so a late answer for one community can't unlock Review in another. - **Shared member picker** (`MemberSearchResult`, also used by Add Member), showing the truncated npub so members with the same name can be told apart. Delete accepts a note link and previews the message before Review. Relay staff are blocked before Review. - **Disabled admin auth is read-only.** With `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=disabled` the Communities tab and community pages still render, and report badges still open them, but every ban, timeout, delete, add-member and lift control is disabled. The settings badge says the console is read-only and that acting needs `nip98`. Staffing stays hidden. - #7904's protections in the Actions tab are kept: frozen intent, `requestId`, Retry, `notSent` and the key-backup guard. - **Readable load errors.** Admin list and detail loads show the relay's error message (for example "request is not authorized"), never the raw JSON envelope. - **Failed kicks reload the report.** A resolve that fails with `enforcement_failed` reloads the report, so its failed action and "Cancel & reopen" appear immediately. - **Key backups never leave in a search.** Every admin API request URL passes the NIP-49 key-backup guard before it is signed or sent: community and legacy reads, mutations, the connection probe (before its first, unsigned request) and feedback-attachment fetches. The community and member search boxes, including the directory's Load more, refuse a pasted `nsec` or `ncryptsec` anywhere in the input without calling the relay. - **`just admin-seed` for multi-community testing.** Besides the local community, it seeds `beta.localhost:3000`, `gamma.localhost:3000` and 50 filler communities, with named members, a ban and a timeout in each named community, a report with Kick available, and a message for the delete preview. Rerunning it restores all of that to the starting state. It refuses, writing nothing, while a moderation action is unfinished on a seeded report. - The bodyless `GET /events/{id}` preview is added to the events-URL egress inventory. It sends no body, so it carries no key material. ## Tests Native (Rust): - `empty_404_and_405_read_as_complete_and_empty`, `coded_404_carries_the_relay_code`, `truncated_and_over_cap_bodies_are_incomplete`, `transport_failure_has_no_status`: the structured read error tells an older relay, a coded refusal, a cut-off body and a transport failure apart. - `a_401_retry_is_signed_by_the_same_keys`, `lift_signs_the_send_and_401_retry_with_the_checked_keys`: the 401 retry never switches keys. - `read_urls_validate_the_explicit_host_and_encode_the_query`, `lift_url_sends_the_page_host_not_the_active_relay`, `list_url_carries_host_and_cursor_and_refuses_a_changed_relay`, `lift_refuses_before_sending_on_signer_change_or_bad_host`: requests target the explicit host and refuse to send after a relay or signer change. jsdom: - `actions-pending-nav`: a pending intent survives a community change, and only Discard drops it. - `actions-fenced-lookup`, `fenced-load`: a late lookup for an old key never shows under, or unlocks, the new one. - `actions-same-ids`: the same pubkey and event id are read separately in each community. - `actions-community-change-drops-member`, `actions-page-host`, `actions-success`, `actions-identity`: the form acts only in the page's community, and confirm sends the frozen intent. - `actions-preview-errors`, `actions-delete-link`, `actions-staff-target`, `actions-disabled-auth`: preview errors, delete by note link, the staff block, and community pages rendering read-only with every action control disabled under disabled admin auth. - `communities-directory`, `communities-unsupported`, `community-badge`, `community-badge-disabled-auth`: the directory, older relays, and report badges, which open community pages under disabled admin auth too. - `restrictions-lift-signer-change`. The existing restriction tests now run on the community page and use `admin_lift_restriction`. Mutation checks: removing the pending-navigation guard turns `actions-pending-nav` red, and dropping the host from the fence key turns `actions-fenced-lookup`, `actions-same-ids` and `fenced-load` red. Ungating restriction lifts on `canMutate` turns `actions-disabled-auth` red. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-10-08 13:58:07 -04:00
Will Pfleger	8f8c4dfade	feat(desktop): relay admin console for the /api/admin/v1 operator surface (#4768) ... Adds a relay admin console under Settings — the single surface for relay-level operator work — replacing the previously unreachable moderation section. Operators authenticate with their own Nostr key over NIP-98 — no browser extension, no bearer token — to view deployment-wide moderation reports and product feedback, resolve/dismiss/escalate/reopen reports, update feedback status, and manage the operator/moderator staffing roster. ## Nav reachability The old `moderation` section id was defined in `settingsSections` but never wired into any group in `settingsNavGroups`, so the sidebar never rendered it — unreachable since #1617. This PR replaces it with a `relay-admin` section wired into the Communities nav group, pointing at the relay admin console, and drops the separate `admin-console` section id so a single surface owns relay-level trust & safety. The Relay admin nav entry is always visible. Auth gates the panel itself; the nav entry is a door, not a credential — hiding it behind discovery state would strand an operator whose relay transiently fails NIP-11 discovery with no path back to the connection settings. ## Discovery and connection On mount the console reads the connected relay's NIP-11 document for the optional `admin_api` field. When a valid origin is discovered **and its host matches the connected relay's host** (case-insensitive, host identity only), it is automatically saved and probed — the panel renders immediately with no Save step required. A cross-host advertisement is pre-fill only: it populates the manual origin field under Advanced and is never saved or probed without an explicit Save, so a relay cannot direct an unconsented NIP-98 signature at a third-party origin; residual exposure on the same-host path is bounded by NIP-98's URL/method/payload binding. Saving is only required for manual origin changes. The advertised origin is untrusted input: revalidated through `AdminOrigin::parse`, falling back to manual entry when absent or invalid. A saved manual origin always takes precedence over discovery. ## Auth and transport (Rust, `src-tauri/src/commands/admin/`) - `AdminOrigin` value object: validates scheme + host + optional port, rejects credentials/path/query/fragment; `http://` only for loopback. The relay side normalizes its configured admin host at config load and compares inbound `Host`/`Origin` hosts case-insensitively. - `AdminRoute` closed enum: no IPC surface accepts arbitrary URLs, so the NIP-98-signed URL is byte-identical to the fetched URL. - Dedicated no-redirect `reqwest` client as an SSRF guard: a relay `3xx` is an error and the NIP-98 header never crosses origins. - `admin_probe` signs `GET /probe` and returns a typed state (`nip98Authorized` / `nip98Denied` / `disabled` / `notAdminApi` / `networkOrIntercepted`). The response body is validated against the full relay contract — `nip98Authorized` only when the complete NIP-98 invariant holds, `disabled` only on a coherent disabled-mode body; any incoherent or unrelated JSON classifies as `notAdminApi`, so the console never fails open at the network boundary. Unknown fields are tolerated for forward compatibility. - NIP-98 signing via `AppState::signing_keys()`, one retry on `401` with a fresh signed event; response size bounded by a `Content-Length` preflight and a streaming byte counter; per-pubkey origin storage with atomic `0o600` writes. ## Relay admin console The console is gated behind the relay `OPERATOR`/`MODERATOR` roles from #3777; every `/api/admin/v1/*` route returns `403` to anyone else. Community self-administration (`community-members` / Invites) and in-channel enforcement (the 9040–9043 signed commands) are a separate axis and are untouched. The previously-duplicate community report queue (`ModerationQueueCard`, `moderationQueue.ts`, and three dead hooks) was unreachable dead code and is deleted in its own commit; `useBanMemberMutation` and the rest of `features/moderation/hooks.ts` remain in use by the members sidebar and message menu. ## Console UI (TypeScript, `src/features/admin-console/`) - `AdminConsoleSettingsCard`: discovery + probe flow, honest copy for every probe state, manual origin under an `Advanced` disclosure at the bottom. The role (operator/moderator) is rendered in the connection status line as plain text ("Connected as operator") — no badge-shaped elements above the tab row. The origin provenance (relay config / database) appears inside the Advanced card as small muted text. Section title changed to `Admin`. - `AdminConsolePanel` with Reports / Feedback / Staffing tabs (Staffing gated on `role === "operator"`); reports and feedback grouped by community for cross-community triage. - **Reports**: always requests `scope=all` so the existing resolve/cancel/reopen controls can reach every status (`open`, `processing`, `resolved`, `dismissed`, `escalated`). The relay's omitted-scope default is `escalated`-only (the platform-safety backstop); `scope=all` is explicit and scoped to this console. Full action matrix per `target_kind` (event → delete/kick/ban/timeout/dismiss/escalate; pubkey → ban/timeout/dismiss/escalate; blob → dismiss/escalate); kick is suppressed when the report carries no `channelId`. A `processing` row stays navigable — enforcement state lives in the detail view. A `failed` action (always pre-mutation) offers a single **Cancel & reopen** via `POST /reports/{id}/cancel` with `{actionId}` fencing; there is no client-side retry. `pending`/`enforcing` actions belong to the relay recovery worker and offer no button; a `409` reloads detail. Lists refetch on back-navigation after a mutation. - **Report failure UX**: `reportErrorMessage()` strips 4xx/5xx status prefixes and surfaces the relay's own error reason in the toast (e.g. relay returns `"400: you cannot report this content"` → toast shows `"you cannot report this content"`). Self-report blocking UI removed — the relay has no self-report gate, and the failure was purely client-side error surfacing. - **Reason audience disclosure**: the Reason (optional) field shows exact copy under the input based on selected action — Delete discloses that reason is sent verbatim to the affected user and posted publicly in the room; Kick/Ban/Timeout disclose affected-user only; Dismiss/Escalate disclose reporter only. These mirror the actual relay notice paths. - **Enforcement history**: the report detail carries the governing action even after the report leaves `processing` — a report enforced then reopened is `open` yet still shows its `succeeded` action as executed history alongside the resolve form; a reopen does not un-happen a ban. The resolve form gates on `open` status alone. - **Reopen**: terminal reports (`resolved`/`dismissed`/`escalated`) can be returned to `open` for re-triage via `POST /reports/{id}/reopen`. Reopen never reverses applied enforcement, and the copy says so. - **Feedback**: list, detail, and status control (`new`/`reviewed`/`archived`) with a generation-fenced attachment viewer. A purged source community severs provenance to `null` rather than deleting the row; severed rows bucket under a "source community removed" heading. - **Staffing**: Add is create-only with display names resolved via `useUsersBatchQuery` and npub cross-fade on hover (`HoverStaffingIdentity`). An entered key that already appears in the authoritative roster (config, owner-fallback, or DB) is rejected locally with an inline duplicate-key message and no request is issued; a `409 Conflict` from add, role change, or remove surfaces the relay's parsed error body via `adminErrorMessage(e)` — distinguishing config-backed key conflicts from last-operator conflicts without HTTP-status inference. Roster with `config`/`owner_fallback`/`db` source labels; config-backed entries disable remove client-side. In-place role change via `<select>` calling `putAdminOperator`; the relay responds with the effective `OperatorEntry` (`pubkey`, `effectiveRole`, `sources`) in the same shape as the roster list. Read-only badge for config-managed entries. - **Timeout expiry**: `useTimeoutState` clears the store when derived state is `INACTIVE` but the store is still active; the 1s tick is scoped to entries with a known `expiresAtMs` and owned by `ComposerTimeoutBanner` (mounted only while a timeout is active), while `ChannelPane` subscribes to the boolean `useTimeoutActive()` — the pane re-renders when a timeout starts or ends, not every second. `useMembersSidebarModeration` ticks `nowMs` only while the sidebar is open, the viewer can moderate, and some member has a future `mutedUntil`; the tick after the last expiry stops the interval. - Staffing refreshes the principal after a self-demotion or self-removal: `AdminConsolePanel` passes `onSelfMutation` to `StaffingTab`, which re-probes the saved origin so the role badge and tab visibility update without a manual re-probe. - Staffing mutation failures, including both 409 variants (config-backed key vs. last operator), surface the relay's parsed error via `adminErrorMessage`, so the last-operator recovery guidance is shown. - Mutations confirm via `sonner` toasts; failures surface the relay's parsed error `message`, not raw JSON. The `disabled` auth mode renders read-only. ## Mutation idempotency Resolve and reopen carry a per-attempt `requestId`. On first submit the whole command (`{requestId, action, reason, expirationSecs}`) is frozen; after an ambiguous failure (409, 5xx, transport error, truncated response) the snapshot is retained, action/reason/duration controls are locked, and the retry sends the exact same payload byte-for-byte. A definitive pre-commit rejection (non-409 4xx with `bodyComplete: true`) discards the snapshot, unlocks controls, and the corrected submit uses a fresh payload. On success the toast derives from the authoritative `AdminReportResolution` (`activeAction.action` when present; otherwise `status` for decision-only outcomes) — never from the mutable form selection. The native mutation commands — including operator delete — reject with a typed `AdminMutationError` carrying the relay's HTTP status (`relayStatus`, `null` when no verdict exists) and a `bodyComplete` flag that is `true` only when the full response body was read. ## Restriction routes contract change `GET /members/restrictions` and `DELETE /members/{pubkey}/ban|timeout` now take `communityHost` instead of `communityId`; the relay resolves the tenant itself and returns `400 unknown_community_host` for an unmapped host. This is a breaking contract change with no compatibility shim: the relay must run this build before a desktop that uses it, scripts sending `communityId` must switch, and rolling the relay back breaks the desktop Restrictions UI. `docs/admin/README.md` documents the three routes in the route inventory and carries the migration note. Restriction calls also carry the relay the list was loaded from, and the native side rejects a mismatch before building any URL. ## Hardening - Saved admin origins are stored per pubkey and per relay host. The host slug parses the relay URL, keeps the port-drop for DNS names, and encodes IPv6 hosts canonically, so two IPv6 relays never share a file and no IPv6 slug can match a DNS slug. - NIP-11 admin discovery has its own 10s request deadline and reads `/info` success and error bodies through the bounded reader with a 64 KiB cap (`Content-Length` is only a pre-check). - `PUT /operators` builds its `OperatorEntry` response from the validated body (`effectiveRole = role`, `sources = ["db"]`) instead of re-reading the roster, so a concurrent change can't turn a committed write into a `403`. Related: #3777 (relay `OPERATOR`/`MODERATOR` role model + NIP-98 auth + `admin_api` NIP-11 advertisement — provides the runtime and the discovery field this console consumes) Related: [builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure#140](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/140) (prod admin ingress allowlist and NIP-98 rollout) ## Screenshots Captured headless at `197f0ba0c` against the mock bridge (1280×720). ### Setup **Origin setup — Advanced disclosure open, idle state**  **Authorized console — all three tabs**  ### Reports **Reports queue — open, processing, resolved across two relay groups**  **Open report detail — reporter, target, message snapshot, resolve form**  **Processing report — PROCESSING/HARASSMENT, ban enforcing state**  **Resolve form — Delete selected, audience disclosure copy**  **Resolved report — enforcement history block**  ### Feedback **Feedback list — community grouping with status badges**  **Feedback detail — mutable status control (operator mode)**  **Feedback detail — passive status badge (read-only/disabled mode)**  ### Staffing **Staffing roster — config/owner\_fallback/db source labels**  **Add form — new pubkey filled, ready to submit**  **Duplicate rejection — inline error for existing principal**  --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-24 17:34:25 -04:00
Kalvin C	68e670e001	feat: add read-only deployment moderation dashboard (#1999) ... Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1ntr8jjcqq6gt06q5avvqttfjgpwshmra22pcmcagdnukw4ja4nqqsa9g54 <9ac6794b000690b7e814eb1805ad32405d0bec7d52838de3a86cf967565dacc0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co> Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>	2026-07-17 12:50:06 -07:00