4 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Will Pfleger	836e7d0d06	feat(desktop): browse and moderate every community in the Admin Console (#8027) ... The Admin Console only ever saw the community the desktop happened to be connected to. With #8011's community reads, the console can now browse every community on the relay and, for signed staff, moderate any of them by name without switching connections. 🤖 ## What changes - **Communities tab.** Lists every live community on the relay, searchable by host prefix with "Load more" paging. The connected community is pinned at the top by exact host match. Report rows get a community badge that opens that community. - **Community page.** Reports, Restrictions, Members and Actions, each scoped to the community on the page. The Actions form has no host field: it always acts on the page's community, and the TypeScript host normalization is gone from the Actions tab. - **Native reads** (`admin_list_communities`, `admin_search_members`, `admin_get_member`, `admin_get_event`). Every request validates the explicit community host and NIP-98-signs the real method and URL. Failures come back as a structured error (`status`, `bodyComplete`, `bodyEmpty`, `code`), so the UI can tell an older relay's empty 404, a coded `event_not_found` and a transport failure apart, and never says "not found" unless the relay did. - **Explicit-host lifts.** `admin_lift_restriction` sends the page's community host, not the active relay's. It freezes the relay and signer the intent was reviewed under, and refuses to send if either has changed. - **Pending actions survive navigation.** A panel-level `DirectActionsProvider` holds the frozen intent, so switching communities or tabs mid-confirm doesn't lose it. Only Discard drops it. A signer change remounts the controller and drops it. - **Fenced lookups.** Member and event lookups are keyed by origin, signer, community, target and a generation counter, so a late answer for one community can't unlock Review in another. - **Shared member picker** (`MemberSearchResult`, also used by Add Member), showing the truncated npub so members with the same name can be told apart. Delete accepts a note link and previews the message before Review. Relay staff are blocked before Review. - **Disabled admin auth is read-only.** With `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=disabled` the Communities tab and community pages still render, and report badges still open them, but every ban, timeout, delete, add-member and lift control is disabled. The settings badge says the console is read-only and that acting needs `nip98`. Staffing stays hidden. - #7904's protections in the Actions tab are kept: frozen intent, `requestId`, Retry, `notSent` and the key-backup guard. - **Readable load errors.** Admin list and detail loads show the relay's error message (for example "request is not authorized"), never the raw JSON envelope. - **Failed kicks reload the report.** A resolve that fails with `enforcement_failed` reloads the report, so its failed action and "Cancel & reopen" appear immediately. - **Key backups never leave in a search.** Every admin API request URL passes the NIP-49 key-backup guard before it is signed or sent: community and legacy reads, mutations, the connection probe (before its first, unsigned request) and feedback-attachment fetches. The community and member search boxes, including the directory's Load more, refuse a pasted `nsec` or `ncryptsec` anywhere in the input without calling the relay. - **`just admin-seed` for multi-community testing.** Besides the local community, it seeds `beta.localhost:3000`, `gamma.localhost:3000` and 50 filler communities, with named members, a ban and a timeout in each named community, a report with Kick available, and a message for the delete preview. Rerunning it restores all of that to the starting state. It refuses, writing nothing, while a moderation action is unfinished on a seeded report. - The bodyless `GET /events/{id}` preview is added to the events-URL egress inventory. It sends no body, so it carries no key material. ## Tests Native (Rust): - `empty_404_and_405_read_as_complete_and_empty`, `coded_404_carries_the_relay_code`, `truncated_and_over_cap_bodies_are_incomplete`, `transport_failure_has_no_status`: the structured read error tells an older relay, a coded refusal, a cut-off body and a transport failure apart. - `a_401_retry_is_signed_by_the_same_keys`, `lift_signs_the_send_and_401_retry_with_the_checked_keys`: the 401 retry never switches keys. - `read_urls_validate_the_explicit_host_and_encode_the_query`, `lift_url_sends_the_page_host_not_the_active_relay`, `list_url_carries_host_and_cursor_and_refuses_a_changed_relay`, `lift_refuses_before_sending_on_signer_change_or_bad_host`: requests target the explicit host and refuse to send after a relay or signer change. jsdom: - `actions-pending-nav`: a pending intent survives a community change, and only Discard drops it. - `actions-fenced-lookup`, `fenced-load`: a late lookup for an old key never shows under, or unlocks, the new one. - `actions-same-ids`: the same pubkey and event id are read separately in each community. - `actions-community-change-drops-member`, `actions-page-host`, `actions-success`, `actions-identity`: the form acts only in the page's community, and confirm sends the frozen intent. - `actions-preview-errors`, `actions-delete-link`, `actions-staff-target`, `actions-disabled-auth`: preview errors, delete by note link, the staff block, and community pages rendering read-only with every action control disabled under disabled admin auth. - `communities-directory`, `communities-unsupported`, `community-badge`, `community-badge-disabled-auth`: the directory, older relays, and report badges, which open community pages under disabled admin auth too. - `restrictions-lift-signer-change`. The existing restriction tests now run on the community page and use `admin_lift_restriction`. Mutation checks: removing the pending-navigation guard turns `actions-pending-nav` red, and dropping the host from the fence key turns `actions-fenced-lookup`, `actions-same-ids` and `fenced-load` red. Ungating restriction lifts on `canMutate` turns `actions-disabled-auth` red. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-10-08 13:58:07 -04:00
Will Pfleger	bd0896f5c0	fix(desktop): read channel metadata and member lists from writer after writes (#7999) ... 🤖 This fixes two problems with the same cause. Since #3268, the relay can answer an unpinned `/query` from the Aurora read replica, as long as the replica has proved it's within `BUZZ_REPLICA_READ_MAX_AGE_MS` (1000 ms) of the writer. That's fine for display reads, but it doesn't guarantee a client sees its own write. **Problem 1: channel creation (Wes's report).** Right after creating a channel, the desktop read back the channel's kind:39000 metadata by `#d`. If that read landed on a replica that hadn't replayed the event yet, it failed with `channel created but metadata not yet available`. The channel existed, but the chosen template (canvas, agents) was never applied. **Problem 2: member lists.** After any membership change, the member-list refetch could also hit a lagging replica. The relay returned the list from before the change, and the desktop cached it as fresh for five minutes (`CHANNEL_MEMBERS_STALE_TIME_MS`). Someone just removed could still show as a member, or someone just added could be missing. ## Fix 1: metadata read-backs go to the writer `channel_metadata_filter` is a shared builder that adds `"consistency": "strong"`, so the relay serves the read from the writer. It follows the same pattern as the canvas head reads. All four metadata read-backs that follow a write use it: `create_channel`, `update_channel`, `fetch_starter_channel_metadata` (its retry and fallback are unchanged) and the open-DM refetch in `dms.rs`. A unit test fails if the flag is removed from the builder. The template's agent-add step also reads channel members (kind:39002) right after create. `get_channel_members` takes an opt-in `read_your_writes` flag that sends `"consistency": "strong"`. Only `createChannelManagedAgents` sets it on that path, so the agent-add step sees the creator's membership. ## Fix 2: a 31-second writer-read window after membership changes Every membership write the desktop makes calls `noteChannelMembershipChange` for each channel it changed: - the native write wrappers `createChannel`, `openDm`, `joinChannel`, `leaveChannel`, `addChannelMembers`, `removeChannelMember` and `changeChannelMemberRole` - the Bestie conversation open - huddle agent add and remove, for both the huddle channel and its parent - `ensure_starter_channels` and `sync_agents_to_active_huddle`. Both return every channel they created, joined or changed in `changed_channel_ids`, including ones that landed before a later step failed. The original error text is rethrown unchanged. - live join, leave, removed and `admin_kick` system messages, and member-added and member-removed notifications - a report kick resolved from the Admin Console, once the relay confirms it succeeded and only when the report's channel is in the active community. The kick goes through the admin HTTP API, not a channel event. Ban, timeout and their lifts only change `community_bans`, not channel membership, so they need no record. For 31 seconds after a change, measured on `performance.now()`, `getChannelMembers` for that channel sends `readYourWrites`. Why 31 seconds: the relay caps its replica staleness budget at `FENCE_STALENESS` (30 s), so once the window closes, no supported configuration can serve the pre-change list. The constant's comment ties it to `FENCE_STALENESS`. One app-level listener cancels any roster fetch already in flight and refetches. When it registers, it also refreshes every channel whose window is still open. All other member-list reads still use the replica. **Community switch.** The window map is cleared when the community changes. Each awaited write captures a generation through `beginChannelMembershipWrite()` before its first native call, and the reset advances it. So a write that settles after a community switch records nothing in the new community. Live events don't need this fence, because the reset disconnects the relay client first and frames from the old connection are dropped. ## Coverage - A Rust test drives `ensure_starter_channels` against a stub relay that accepts the creates but never serves metadata, and checks that both created starter channels are still reported. - Desktop tests cover the writer-read window, the Admin Console kick, and writes that settle after a community switch. - The desktop E2E test bridge (`desktop/src/testing/e2eBridge.ts`) mirrors the strong reads and `changed_channel_ids`, so E2E runs exercise the fixed behavior. This doesn't address the smaller race in the relay's per-pod accessible-channels cache, and it doesn't change mobile. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-10-01 11:32:16 -04:00
Will Pfleger	f001ebbb6e	feat(desktop): add Admin Console Actions tab for direct staff actions (#7904) ... Builds on #7883 (merged). Adds an **Actions** tab to the Admin Console so relay staff can ban, time out, or delete directly through the #7883 endpoints (`POST /members/{pubkey}/ban`, `POST /members/{pubkey}/timeout`, `POST /events/{id}/delete`), with no report required. ## Design - **Frozen intent.** Review freezes the whole request (origin, relay, signer, community, action, target, reason, duration, `requestId`). Confirm and Retry resend it unchanged, so a manual retry reuses the same `requestId` and stays idempotent on the relay. The intent is cleared only on a definitive non-409 4xx (`preserveRequestIdOnError`). A 409 or a 202 pending keeps it, except `409 request_id_conflict`, which is final for that id and drops the intent so no futile Retry is offered. A 202 pending renders as a neutral notice, not an error. - **Bound to signer and relay.** The intent carries `expectedPubkey` and `expectedRelay`. Native `admin_direct_action` refuses before sending any request if either is blank or no longer matches (`assert_expected_signer` / `assert_expected_relay_scope`). The tab is keyed on pubkey + origin, so an identity or relay switch remounts it and drops any frozen intent. - **Survives tab switches.** `ActionsTab` stays mounted while the panel is open and is only hidden on other tabs, with the same pubkey + origin key, so a pending, ambiguous or in-flight action (and its `requestId`) is still there on return. - **Nothing-sent refusals.** Every native refusal before the first request leaves (malformed host, changed relay or signer, bad target or duration, the key-backup guard on Reason, a missing HTTP client, the first request build, the signing-key lookup) returns `AdminMutationError` with `notSent: true`; the tab drops the intent and offers no Retry. The request build for the retry after a 401 stays ambiguous, because the first request already went out. The changed-relay refusal says "active relay changed since the action was confirmed; nothing was sent". - **Disabled auth.** With `canMutate=false`, Review, Confirm and every field are disabled. - **Community host.** The host is prefilled from the active relay URL by `communityHostFromRelayUrl` (URL host, lowercased, default port and trailing dot stripped, matching the relay's `normalize_host`) and shown read-only as "Community: <host>" with a Change link. It follows the active community until the operator edits it; with no relay URL the input shows directly. Review derives the host from the same `getRelayWsUrl()` value it freezes into `expectedRelay`, so the two can't disagree. The host is validated natively (`validate_community_host`) and sent only as the `communityHost` query, never in the body. The body is `{requestId, reason?, expirationSecs?}`, built by the pure `direct_action_request`; only a timeout takes a duration. - **Member picker.** Ban and timeout pick the member the way `AddMemberDialog` does: `useUserSearchQuery` name search, `parsePubkeyInput` for a pasted npub or hex in any case, and a selected chip. The target is always sent as lowercase hex. Name search is a profile search on the active relay, not a member list, so it runs only when the host is the connected community; for another host the field takes npub or hex only, and the hint stays visible even with a key selected. Editing the host to a different community clears the pick and the search query, so returning to the original host doesn't bring it back; pressing Change alone keeps it. Each named result shows a short npub so same-name profiles can be told apart, the selected chip opens the full key, and the confirm step shows "Name (npub1…abcd)" plus the full npub (`PubKey variant="full"`). A search result's name is frozen for display only; a pasted key uses `useUserProfileQuery` on the active community, otherwise the short npub. Result buttons follow the disabled state. Changing the member or host drops a frozen intent. Delete keeps its hex event id (native `Hex64` route type, shared with pubkeys). A query that starts with `nsec1` or `ncryptsec1` in any case is never searched; the picker shows "That's a secret key. Never paste it here." instead. - **Errors.** `target_is_staff` and `request_id_conflict` get dedicated copy; other codes fall back to the relay message (`adminErrorCode`). An empty 404/405 from a relay without these routes reads "This relay doesn't support direct actions yet."; an uncoded 404/405 with a body keeps its own text. Success shows a toast. - **Key-backup guard.** Every admin JSON mutation body (the three direct routes and the existing report-resolve routes) passes `egress_guard::assert_no_key_backup_bytes` in `helpers.rs` before signing. The egress inventory points at that guarded boundary. - **One signer snapshot.** `admin_direct_action` reads `signing_keys()` once, checks `expectedPubkey` against it, and signs the request and any 401 retry with that same `Keys`. - **Serialized Review.** Review and its inputs lock while the relay URL resolves; a late Review cannot replace a frozen or submitting intent. - **Reason audience.** Before confirmation the tab states that the reason is delivered to the affected user, and for channel deletes posted publicly in the room tombstone (same copy as the Reports tab). Confirmation shows the frozen reason. ## Fix → test → mutation | Fix | Test | Mutation that turns it red | |---|---|---| | Manual retry reuses `requestId` | `actions-retry` | mint a new id per attempt | | Intent preserved across retryable outcomes | `actions-retry`, `actions-errors` | always clear the frozen intent | | Confirmation tied to signer + relay | Rust `direct_action_refuses_a_changed_signer_or_relay` | skip the signer check | | Identity/origin change drops intent | `actions-identity` | drop the tab key | | Disabled auth keeps Submit off | `actions-disabled-auth` | remove the `canMutate` gate | | Key-backup bytes never leave (`ncryptsec1…` / `NCRYPTSEC1…`, zero requests; ordinary reason sends) | Rust `direct_action_refuses_key_backup_reason_before_any_request` | remove the guard call → panics (request sent) | | Checked signer is the signing key | Rust `direct_action_signs_only_with_the_validated_snapshot` (identity swapped after the signer snapshot is taken, before validation) | re-read `signing_keys()` for signing → signed with the swapped key | | Late Review cannot replace the intent | `actions-review-race` (Review, Review, Confirm ambiguous, Retry → one `requestId`) | drop the Review lock | | Pending is a neutral notice | `actions-pending-neutral` | store pending in the error state → `pending notice must render` | | `request_id_conflict` offers no Retry | `actions-request-id-conflict` | keep the intent on every 409 → `request_id_conflict`, `no Retry for a spent request id` | | Reason audience copy + frozen reason | `actions-audience` | drop the audience copy; drop the frozen reason | | Host prefilled read-only, Change reveals the input | `actions-host-prefill` | drop the prefill → `host must be prefilled from the active relay` | | Name result sent as hex and named on confirm | `actions-member-search` | — | | npub and uppercase hex sent as lowercase hex | `actions-member-keys` | drop the direct key result → `no direct result for npub1…` | | Another community turns name search off with a hint | `actions-foreign-host` | — | | A host change clears the pick, even after returning to the first host; hint stays with a key selected | `actions-host-change-drops-member` | hide the pick by host instead of clearing it → `returning to the first host must not restore the old pick` | | Same-name results differ by key; confirm shows the chosen full npub and sends that key | `actions-same-name` | drop the full npub from confirm → `confirm must show the full npub` | | Results can't be selected once auth is disabled | `actions-results-disabled` | — | | Secret key never reaches search, warning shown | `actions-secret-key` | remove the check → `a secret key reached search_users` | | Pending action survives a tab round-trip, Retry reuses `requestId` | `actions-tab-roundtrip-pending` | render the tab conditionally → `pending notice survives` | | Ambiguous failure survives a tab round-trip | `actions-tab-roundtrip-ambiguous` | render conditionally → fails | | In-flight failure on another tab shows on return | `actions-tab-roundtrip-inflight` | render conditionally → fails | | Pre-send refusal drops the intent, no Retry | `actions-not-sent`, Rust `direct_action_marks_a_pre_send_refusal_not_sent` | ignore `notSent` → `intent dropped; no Retry` | | Key-backup refusal is nothing-sent; Review editable again | Rust `direct_action_refuses_key_backup_reason_before_any_request`, `actions-backup-reason-not-sent` | drop `not_sent` on the guard → panics at the `notSent` assert; stub `notSent: false` → `no Retry after a pre-send refusal` | | Only an empty 404/405 reads as an old relay | `actions-old-relay` | drop the empty-body condition → `404 admin API error: Not Found` | --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-30 18:53:13 -04:00
Will Pfleger	8f8c4dfade	feat(desktop): relay admin console for the /api/admin/v1 operator surface (#4768) ... Adds a relay admin console under Settings — the single surface for relay-level operator work — replacing the previously unreachable moderation section. Operators authenticate with their own Nostr key over NIP-98 — no browser extension, no bearer token — to view deployment-wide moderation reports and product feedback, resolve/dismiss/escalate/reopen reports, update feedback status, and manage the operator/moderator staffing roster. ## Nav reachability The old `moderation` section id was defined in `settingsSections` but never wired into any group in `settingsNavGroups`, so the sidebar never rendered it — unreachable since #1617. This PR replaces it with a `relay-admin` section wired into the Communities nav group, pointing at the relay admin console, and drops the separate `admin-console` section id so a single surface owns relay-level trust & safety. The Relay admin nav entry is always visible. Auth gates the panel itself; the nav entry is a door, not a credential — hiding it behind discovery state would strand an operator whose relay transiently fails NIP-11 discovery with no path back to the connection settings. ## Discovery and connection On mount the console reads the connected relay's NIP-11 document for the optional `admin_api` field. When a valid origin is discovered **and its host matches the connected relay's host** (case-insensitive, host identity only), it is automatically saved and probed — the panel renders immediately with no Save step required. A cross-host advertisement is pre-fill only: it populates the manual origin field under Advanced and is never saved or probed without an explicit Save, so a relay cannot direct an unconsented NIP-98 signature at a third-party origin; residual exposure on the same-host path is bounded by NIP-98's URL/method/payload binding. Saving is only required for manual origin changes. The advertised origin is untrusted input: revalidated through `AdminOrigin::parse`, falling back to manual entry when absent or invalid. A saved manual origin always takes precedence over discovery. ## Auth and transport (Rust, `src-tauri/src/commands/admin/`) - `AdminOrigin` value object: validates scheme + host + optional port, rejects credentials/path/query/fragment; `http://` only for loopback. The relay side normalizes its configured admin host at config load and compares inbound `Host`/`Origin` hosts case-insensitively. - `AdminRoute` closed enum: no IPC surface accepts arbitrary URLs, so the NIP-98-signed URL is byte-identical to the fetched URL. - Dedicated no-redirect `reqwest` client as an SSRF guard: a relay `3xx` is an error and the NIP-98 header never crosses origins. - `admin_probe` signs `GET /probe` and returns a typed state (`nip98Authorized` / `nip98Denied` / `disabled` / `notAdminApi` / `networkOrIntercepted`). The response body is validated against the full relay contract — `nip98Authorized` only when the complete NIP-98 invariant holds, `disabled` only on a coherent disabled-mode body; any incoherent or unrelated JSON classifies as `notAdminApi`, so the console never fails open at the network boundary. Unknown fields are tolerated for forward compatibility. - NIP-98 signing via `AppState::signing_keys()`, one retry on `401` with a fresh signed event; response size bounded by a `Content-Length` preflight and a streaming byte counter; per-pubkey origin storage with atomic `0o600` writes. ## Relay admin console The console is gated behind the relay `OPERATOR`/`MODERATOR` roles from #3777; every `/api/admin/v1/*` route returns `403` to anyone else. Community self-administration (`community-members` / Invites) and in-channel enforcement (the 9040–9043 signed commands) are a separate axis and are untouched. The previously-duplicate community report queue (`ModerationQueueCard`, `moderationQueue.ts`, and three dead hooks) was unreachable dead code and is deleted in its own commit; `useBanMemberMutation` and the rest of `features/moderation/hooks.ts` remain in use by the members sidebar and message menu. ## Console UI (TypeScript, `src/features/admin-console/`) - `AdminConsoleSettingsCard`: discovery + probe flow, honest copy for every probe state, manual origin under an `Advanced` disclosure at the bottom. The role (operator/moderator) is rendered in the connection status line as plain text ("Connected as operator") — no badge-shaped elements above the tab row. The origin provenance (relay config / database) appears inside the Advanced card as small muted text. Section title changed to `Admin`. - `AdminConsolePanel` with Reports / Feedback / Staffing tabs (Staffing gated on `role === "operator"`); reports and feedback grouped by community for cross-community triage. - **Reports**: always requests `scope=all` so the existing resolve/cancel/reopen controls can reach every status (`open`, `processing`, `resolved`, `dismissed`, `escalated`). The relay's omitted-scope default is `escalated`-only (the platform-safety backstop); `scope=all` is explicit and scoped to this console. Full action matrix per `target_kind` (event → delete/kick/ban/timeout/dismiss/escalate; pubkey → ban/timeout/dismiss/escalate; blob → dismiss/escalate); kick is suppressed when the report carries no `channelId`. A `processing` row stays navigable — enforcement state lives in the detail view. A `failed` action (always pre-mutation) offers a single **Cancel & reopen** via `POST /reports/{id}/cancel` with `{actionId}` fencing; there is no client-side retry. `pending`/`enforcing` actions belong to the relay recovery worker and offer no button; a `409` reloads detail. Lists refetch on back-navigation after a mutation. - **Report failure UX**: `reportErrorMessage()` strips 4xx/5xx status prefixes and surfaces the relay's own error reason in the toast (e.g. relay returns `"400: you cannot report this content"` → toast shows `"you cannot report this content"`). Self-report blocking UI removed — the relay has no self-report gate, and the failure was purely client-side error surfacing. - **Reason audience disclosure**: the Reason (optional) field shows exact copy under the input based on selected action — Delete discloses that reason is sent verbatim to the affected user and posted publicly in the room; Kick/Ban/Timeout disclose affected-user only; Dismiss/Escalate disclose reporter only. These mirror the actual relay notice paths. - **Enforcement history**: the report detail carries the governing action even after the report leaves `processing` — a report enforced then reopened is `open` yet still shows its `succeeded` action as executed history alongside the resolve form; a reopen does not un-happen a ban. The resolve form gates on `open` status alone. - **Reopen**: terminal reports (`resolved`/`dismissed`/`escalated`) can be returned to `open` for re-triage via `POST /reports/{id}/reopen`. Reopen never reverses applied enforcement, and the copy says so. - **Feedback**: list, detail, and status control (`new`/`reviewed`/`archived`) with a generation-fenced attachment viewer. A purged source community severs provenance to `null` rather than deleting the row; severed rows bucket under a "source community removed" heading. - **Staffing**: Add is create-only with display names resolved via `useUsersBatchQuery` and npub cross-fade on hover (`HoverStaffingIdentity`). An entered key that already appears in the authoritative roster (config, owner-fallback, or DB) is rejected locally with an inline duplicate-key message and no request is issued; a `409 Conflict` from add, role change, or remove surfaces the relay's parsed error body via `adminErrorMessage(e)` — distinguishing config-backed key conflicts from last-operator conflicts without HTTP-status inference. Roster with `config`/`owner_fallback`/`db` source labels; config-backed entries disable remove client-side. In-place role change via `<select>` calling `putAdminOperator`; the relay responds with the effective `OperatorEntry` (`pubkey`, `effectiveRole`, `sources`) in the same shape as the roster list. Read-only badge for config-managed entries. - **Timeout expiry**: `useTimeoutState` clears the store when derived state is `INACTIVE` but the store is still active; the 1s tick is scoped to entries with a known `expiresAtMs` and owned by `ComposerTimeoutBanner` (mounted only while a timeout is active), while `ChannelPane` subscribes to the boolean `useTimeoutActive()` — the pane re-renders when a timeout starts or ends, not every second. `useMembersSidebarModeration` ticks `nowMs` only while the sidebar is open, the viewer can moderate, and some member has a future `mutedUntil`; the tick after the last expiry stops the interval. - Staffing refreshes the principal after a self-demotion or self-removal: `AdminConsolePanel` passes `onSelfMutation` to `StaffingTab`, which re-probes the saved origin so the role badge and tab visibility update without a manual re-probe. - Staffing mutation failures, including both 409 variants (config-backed key vs. last operator), surface the relay's parsed error via `adminErrorMessage`, so the last-operator recovery guidance is shown. - Mutations confirm via `sonner` toasts; failures surface the relay's parsed error `message`, not raw JSON. The `disabled` auth mode renders read-only. ## Mutation idempotency Resolve and reopen carry a per-attempt `requestId`. On first submit the whole command (`{requestId, action, reason, expirationSecs}`) is frozen; after an ambiguous failure (409, 5xx, transport error, truncated response) the snapshot is retained, action/reason/duration controls are locked, and the retry sends the exact same payload byte-for-byte. A definitive pre-commit rejection (non-409 4xx with `bodyComplete: true`) discards the snapshot, unlocks controls, and the corrected submit uses a fresh payload. On success the toast derives from the authoritative `AdminReportResolution` (`activeAction.action` when present; otherwise `status` for decision-only outcomes) — never from the mutable form selection. The native mutation commands — including operator delete — reject with a typed `AdminMutationError` carrying the relay's HTTP status (`relayStatus`, `null` when no verdict exists) and a `bodyComplete` flag that is `true` only when the full response body was read. ## Restriction routes contract change `GET /members/restrictions` and `DELETE /members/{pubkey}/ban|timeout` now take `communityHost` instead of `communityId`; the relay resolves the tenant itself and returns `400 unknown_community_host` for an unmapped host. This is a breaking contract change with no compatibility shim: the relay must run this build before a desktop that uses it, scripts sending `communityId` must switch, and rolling the relay back breaks the desktop Restrictions UI. `docs/admin/README.md` documents the three routes in the route inventory and carries the migration note. Restriction calls also carry the relay the list was loaded from, and the native side rejects a mismatch before building any URL. ## Hardening - Saved admin origins are stored per pubkey and per relay host. The host slug parses the relay URL, keeps the port-drop for DNS names, and encodes IPv6 hosts canonically, so two IPv6 relays never share a file and no IPv6 slug can match a DNS slug. - NIP-11 admin discovery has its own 10s request deadline and reads `/info` success and error bodies through the bounded reader with a 64 KiB cap (`Content-Length` is only a pre-check). - `PUT /operators` builds its `OperatorEntry` response from the validated body (`effectiveRole = role`, `sources = ["db"]`) instead of re-reading the roster, so a concurrent change can't turn a committed write into a `403`. Related: #3777 (relay `OPERATOR`/`MODERATOR` role model + NIP-98 auth + `admin_api` NIP-11 advertisement — provides the runtime and the discovery field this console consumes) Related: [builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure#140](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/140) (prod admin ingress allowlist and NIP-98 rollout) ## Screenshots Captured headless at `197f0ba0c` against the mock bridge (1280×720). ### Setup **Origin setup — Advanced disclosure open, idle state**  **Authorized console — all three tabs**  ### Reports **Reports queue — open, processing, resolved across two relay groups**  **Open report detail — reporter, target, message snapshot, resolve form**  **Processing report — PROCESSING/HARASSMENT, ban enforcing state**  **Resolve form — Delete selected, audience disclosure copy**  **Resolved report — enforcement history block**  ### Feedback **Feedback list — community grouping with status badges**  **Feedback detail — mutable status control (operator mode)**  **Feedback detail — passive status badge (read-only/disabled mode)**  ### Staffing **Staffing roster — config/owner\_fallback/db source labels**  **Add form — new pubkey filled, ready to submit**  **Duplicate rejection — inline error for existing principal**  --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-24 17:34:25 -04:00