Goose's pre-[#2680](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/2680) Windows
installer unpacked the CLI to `%USERPROFILE%\goose\goose.exe`. That
directory is on no standard `PATH`, and `common_binary_paths()` never
probed it, so users who installed Goose with the legacy installer stayed
permanently undiscovered — the residual half of #2239.
`resolve_command_uncached` finds binaries outside `PATH` only by
scanning `common_binary_paths()`, so adding the directory there is the
whole fix: Windows basename expansion already supplies
`goose.exe`/`.cmd`/`.bat`, and discovery, readiness probes, and spawn
all route through the same shared resolver. No Goose-specific resolution
path is introduced. The entry sits beside the existing Codex
`%LOCALAPPDATA%\Programs\OpenAI\Codex\bin` probe in the same
`#[cfg(windows)]` block.
The regression test is `#[cfg(windows)]` and is CI-reachable, not dead
code — the `desktop-build-windows` job runs `cargo test --manifest-path
desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.toml --target $env:TARGET` on `windows-latest`.
It asserts the probe list rather than planting a binary:
`common_binary_paths` is a process-lifetime `OnceLock`, so a test cannot
deterministically re-seed `USERPROFILE`, and planting an executable
under the real user profile is not an acceptable side effect. Verified
locally by widening the `cfg` to build on macOS — the test passes with
the probe and fails without it.
The `check-file-sizes.mjs` override for `managed_agents/discovery.rs`
moves 1835 → 1841, the exact post-`cargo fmt` gate count. Verified both
directions: 1841 passes, 1840 fails.
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
## Summary
`cargo-deny` started failing on **every** PR and on `main` when
**RUSTSEC-2026-0216** was published mid-afternoon today. Nothing in the
tree changed — cargo-deny fetches the advisory DB at run time, so main's
own `Security` job passed at `00ecf2c` and then began failing on the
same commit.
```
error[vulnerability]: Remote Denial of Service via malformed NIP-44 v2 payload
Cargo.lock:432 nostr 0.44.3 — RUSTSEC-2026-0216
advisories FAILED, bans ok, licenses ok, sources ok
```
The `nostr` NIP-44 v2 decrypt path reads a 2-byte unpadded-length prefix
via `buffer[0..2]` **after** the HMAC check passes, without verifying
the decrypted buffer holds 2 bytes. A sender who holds the conversation
key — i.e. any DM sender — can craft a payload that decrypts to 0 or 1
bytes and panic the receiver. Remote DoS through any relay that delivers
the event. No key material, plaintext, or memory corruption.
Affects `0.26.0` through `0.44.4`. Fixed in `0.44.5`.
## The change
Lockfiles only, 6 insertions / 6 deletions. The manifest already
declares `nostr = "0.44"` — a caret range — so `0.44.6` needs no
`Cargo.toml` edit.
| Lockfile | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| `Cargo.lock` | 0.44.3 | 0.44.6 |
| `desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.lock` | **0.44.4** | 0.44.6 |
**The desktop lockfile is the part worth reviewing.**
`desktop/src-tauri` is excluded from the root workspace
(`Cargo.toml:31`), and the `Security` job runs `cargo-deny check` at the
repo root — so it never sees that lockfile. It was pinning a vulnerable
*and* yanked `0.44.4` that no CI check would ever have flagged. Desktop
calls `nip44::decrypt` at `commands/identity.rs:495`. Credit to @Eva for
catching this; I'd have shipped the root-only fix and left it sitting
there.
**This isn't optional maintenance.** `0.44.0` through `0.44.4` are all
yanked on crates.io. `0.44.5` and `0.44.6` are the only live versions in
our range — staying put isn't an available option.
### On the two extra lines in the desktop lockfile
The desktop bump also repoints two existing dependency edges:
```
nostr-derive: syn 2.0.118 -> syn 1.0.109
tempfile: getrandom 0.4.3 -> getrandom 0.3.4
```
I checked these rather than waving them through: **no packages are added
or removed** — both versions were already present in the graph, so only
which edge points where changed. The resolution is stable across
repeated re-resolves, and a plain re-resolve without the bump produces
zero diff, so this isn't pre-existing lockfile staleness leaking in.
## Verification
At this commit, in a clean worktree off `origin/main`:
- `cargo-deny check advisories` → **`advisories ok`**, exit 0. The same
tree before the bump reported `advisories FAILED` with this advisory, so
the check is doing real work, not passing vacuously.
- `./scripts/run-tests.sh unit` → all five packages pass.
- `cargo test -p buzz-core` 229/229, `-p buzz-cli` 250/250, `-p
buzz-relay --lib` 750 pass / 1 fail — the sole failure
`api::mesh_demo::tests::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` is
pre-existing and reproduces identically at unmodified `00ecf2c`.
- `desktop-tauri-test` passed in the pre-push hook, which exercises the
crate whose lockfile changed.
## Why not a `deny.toml` ignore
Considered and rejected. This is a reachable panic triggerable by any DM
sender, and buzz-acp agents decrypt DMs from arbitrary senders.
Suppressing it would ship a live remote-DoS to every agent and client in
order to make a dashboard green.
## Note on `spin`
The yanked `spin 0.9.8` / `0.10.0` warnings in the same job are **not**
what fails CI — the log has exactly one hard error, this one. They're
`warning[yanked]`, and warnings don't fail the build. `spin` is also
three levels transitive (`mesh-llm-host-runtime → mdns-sd → flume →
spin`) under a dev-dependency, so it isn't ours to bump. Left alone
deliberately.
## Follow-up
Unblocks #3128 (relay-admin ban gate), which has a zero dependency-file
delta and will inherit this cleanly once main is merged in.
Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub1jmc9dt2lyvzu3h0kxlwxt5zg4fxp9476awyxw6gwxn72g6cw7exqs64whm <96f056ad5f2305c8ddf637dc65d048aa4c12d7daeb8867690e34fca46b0ef64c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Uses MeshLLM built-in `mesh` collective intelligence / Mixture of Agents
when Buzz Auto sees two or more distinct physical models. With zero or
one model, Auto remains ordinary `auto`. This is an alternative way to
improve tool responses, accuracy, and resistance to hallucination when a
high-latency distributed mesh contains diverse models.
Models and members may come and go: collective routing enables only
after stable capacity, drops on confirmed contraction, and can recover
later. Mesh-specific failures retry once through ordinary Auto.
This update also pins MeshLLM to a v0.73.1-compatible backport of
[MeshLLM #1074](https://github.com/Mesh-LLM/mesh-llm/pull/1074), so
client-only Buzz nodes cannot enter model election or download a remote
provider model. Buzz preserves the selected local sharing model and
switches an existing client to sharing across a controlled app restart,
retaining one runtime and one `:9337` / `:3131` pair per machine.
Validation:
- Full local `just ci` passes on the cleaned branch.
- MeshLLM host-runtime suite: 1,568 passed, 0 failed; strict Clippy
passes.
- Buzz desktop Tauri suite with `mesh-llm`: 1,721 passed, 0 failed;
strict feature Clippy passes.
- Playwright covers client-to-share using the saved local model and no
destructive stop.
- Packaged two-machine testing proved single-model routing, dual-model
collective routing, tool-markup fallback, and runtime reuse.
- Packaged client-only recheck routed a real Mini Buzz turn through M5
while Mini stayed `is_client=true`, `is_host=false`, hosted no models,
and created no Gemma cache.
Builds on the recovery work merged in #2823; this PR does not duplicate
it.
---------
Signed-off-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Michael Neale <michael.neale@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Fixes#2896
**Root cause:** `arboard = "3"` compiles with default features only
(`image-data`), so the Linux build has no Wayland backend. In a Wayland
session every copy lands on the XWayland clipboard; the compositor only
mirrors X11 selections while an XWayland window holds focus, and
arboard's clipboard client is windowless, so Wayland-native apps read
nothing. `set_text` still returns `Ok`, which is why the invite dialog
shows "Copied" with an empty clipboard.
**Fix:** enable arboard's `wayland-data-control` feature. Under Wayland
it uses the `zwlr-data-control` protocol; when `WAYLAND_DISPLAY` is
absent it falls back to X11 as before. The `wl-clipboard-rs` dependency
is target-gated inside arboard, so macOS and Windows builds are
unchanged.
**Verified:** `cargo check` passes on the desktop crate; wl-clipboard-rs
now resolves in the lockfile.
Signed-off-by: Shawn Yeager <shawn@shawnyeager.com>
