118 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Luke Tornquist	6d07a29137	perf(relay): bound fleet usage metrics collection (#7176) ... ## Why The usage poller pays memory and query costs proportional to community count even when per-community emission is disabled. Every pod loads the full host map, and the leader materializes all per-community aggregates before suppressing their labels. That makes telemetry collection itself a scaling constraint. ## What changed - Fleet-only usage metrics are now the default. `all` remains available as an explicit rollback mode. - In fleet-only mode, the poller skips the community host map and all community-sized query results. - Exact community counting is replaced with the PostgreSQL planner's table-size estimate. - Stock totals are collected as one fixed row, scanning each stock table once per hour. - 1d/7d/30d active-user totals come from one bounded 30-day scan per day. - Fleet database snapshots run only on a proved read replica, with a telemetry-specific freshness budget and server-side statement timeouts. If no such replica is available, the collection is skipped; it never falls back to the writer. - Successful fixed-row snapshots are cached and re-emitted on each poll tick, so gauges stay scrape-visible without raising query frequency. - `buzz_usage_snapshot_available{family}` reports whether the latest due refresh of that family succeeded. After a skipped or failed refresh, the last values stay visible (with `buzz_usage_snapshot_age_seconds`) but the family reads unavailable until a 60-second retry succeeds. - The `all` rollback collector publishes the same availability gauges, so dashboards gated on availability keep working during a rollback. - Each due refresh outcome is applied by `apply_stock_refresh` / `apply_activity_refresh`, the single production mapping from `Ok(Some)` / `Ok(None)` / `Err` to cache, availability, skip counter, and retry; the regression test drives that mapping directly. - `buzz_usage_snapshot_age_seconds` is emitted in the `all` rollback too, so age-based alerts keep firing through a rollback. - Every fleet telemetry attempt that completes lands in `buzz_db_route_decision`; a query error on a proved reader records `skipped/replica_error`. An attempt abandoned at the relay deadline records no route decision and appears only as `buzz_usage_query_skipped_total{reason="timeout"}`. The shared `proved_reader` warnings no longer claim "routing to writer", because the telemetry caller never does (serving callers still record their writer decision in the route counter). - The PostgreSQL production-method matrix now exercises `usage_fleet_stock_snapshot`, so the new `reader/maintenance` pool pair is proven to be emitted by a real Db method. - Each fleet collection, reader proof included, runs under a relay-side `tokio::time::timeout` (10s stock, 20s activity, both above their server-side `statement_timeout`). A reader that stops answering expires into the same failure mapping with `buzz_usage_query_skipped_total{reason="timeout"}`, so it cannot stall the leader's poller, hold the advisory lock past a liveness check, or leave a frozen snapshot reporting available. - Fleet telemetry reader checkouts (`ReaderOperation::Maintenance`) opt into SQLx `close_on_drop` before their first post-acquire await, so an abandoned collection's connection is closed within SQLx's 5s `CLOSE_ON_DROP_TIMEOUT` instead of going through the unbounded return-to-pool ping while it holds a slot in the reader pool that serving reads share. Serving reads keep pooled reuse; the cost is one reader reconnect per fleet refresh. - On leader demotion, cached snapshots and availability are cleared, and a fresh collection is forced after the lock is reacquired. - Fleet-only mode passes no host map to the worker-snapshot storage emitter. It therefore omits community attribution instead of reporting every byte as `buzz_storage_unmapped_community_bytes`. - Lifetime stored-message and active-channel totals are no longer queried in fleet-only mode. Event throughput remains available through the existing stored-event counter. - No test-selector changes: main's `config::tests::` selector in `just test-unit` and the `run-tests.sh unit` fallback already runs the new replica-budget config test, and the new fleet schedule, availability, and storage tests run through the existing bin `tests::` and `storage_sweep::tests::` selectors. - Added seeded PostgreSQL contract tests and operator docs covering rollout, rollback, availability, the no-replica behavior, and leader election. No migrations, tables, indexes, or new persistent storage are added. ### What got simpler The relay-side storage half of the original branch (totals-only S3 listing and `buzz_storage_community_breakdown_available`) was dropped. Main moved S3 listing out of the relay in #7543 and #7845, so that code was dead on arrival. The rework adds no storage code path; it only gates attribution on the presence of a host map. ## Risk Medium. The default changes which telemetry is emitted: - In fleet-only mode, `buzz_communities_estimated` replaces the exact `buzz_communities_total`. - `buzz_total_messages` and `buzz_total_active_channels` are not refreshed in fleet-only mode (also called out in the rollout steps of `docs/usage-metrics.md`). - Deployments without a verified reader (including local compose and single-node self-hosts) skip database-derived fleet snapshots instead of querying the writer, and report both families unavailable. - Multi-pod dashboards must filter database and storage series to `buzz_usage_poller_is_leader == 1`. Setting `BUZZ_USAGE_METRICS_PER_COMMUNITY=all` restores the legacy collector for temporary rollback. ## Verification At head `1879ee3aedf4227942120a3b521c8d35fc7839fe` (tree `78477e74`; merges main `da651ad6`; the PR's diff against main is byte-identical to `1613823f`'s, minus the Justfile and `run-tests.sh` selector lines that main's `config::tests::` selector now subsumes): - On Blox: `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and `cargo clippy -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings` pass. Relay bin `tests::` 34/34, `config::tests::` 55/55, `storage_sweep::tests::` 10/10 and `store::usage::tests` pass, as do the four `fleet_` and lock PostgreSQL tests that use scratch databases, including `abandoned_fleet_collection_releases_its_reader_slot`. - Against a freshly migrated PostgreSQL database: `store::usage::postgres_tests::` 14/14, `storage_sweep::postgres_tests::` and `buzz-db --test observability_source` 14/14 pass. The new reader code passes main's crate-wide typed-acquisition and serving-table policy checks. - E2E at `1613823f` is reused for this head. It ran in an isolated relay against a real PostgreSQL primary and streaming standby. In 2/2 runs a stock read went dark mid-result; the deadline abandoned it at about 10s, the reader pool's active and size counts dropped to zero about 1s later, and a fresh activity read and the scheduled stock retry succeeded on new backends while the dark session stayed open. The `all`-mode and healthy-replica controls also passed. Main's merged changes are on the writer path and in startup step timing, and touch none of the reader checkout, the `close_on_drop` seam, the fleet poller or the deadlines. At head `1613823fa8ef1a423bc1a499c57bc40d692fcd4f` (tree `12bc6d1b`; test/docs-only on top of `57749418`), on a Blox workstation: - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and `cargo clippy -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings` pass. Relay bin `tests::` 34/34 pass. - New PostgreSQL test `abandoned_fleet_collection_releases_its_reader_slot`: a one-slot reader pool behind a loopback proxy that goes dark mid-session; the collection is cut at a deadline, then a later acquire must succeed in under 8s on a fresh connection. The dark call runs on a fresh `Db` with a cold Aurora capability cache, so the first post-acquire await is the capability probe. It passes in 3.4s. With `close_on_drop` removed, or moved below the probe await, it fails with `PoolTimedOut` after the 15s acquire timeout. The other three `fleet_` PostgreSQL tests that use scratch databases pass. - `each_fleet_family_is_abandoned_at_its_own_deadline` now has an outer timeout: replacing the stock deadline with a bare `.await` fails it (`Elapsed`) instead of hanging. At head `fd194ec79d6c6796d6764564de225ad56485cfc7` (tree `79e94727`, main merged at `932228936`), on a Blox workstation: - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay -p buzz-db --all-targets -- -D warnings` pass. - Relay bin `tests::` nextest selection: 27/27 pass (plus `store::usage::tests`), including `fleet_refresh_outcomes_drive_availability_through_production_mapping` and the new `stalled_fleet_collection_times_out_into_failed_refresh` (paused time: two never-completing collections are abandoned at exactly 10s + 20s; both families read unavailable with cached values kept, `reason="timeout"` skips, retry scheduled; the next tick runs and recovers; no route decision is recorded for an abandoned attempt) and `each_fleet_family_is_abandoned_at_its_own_deadline`. Compile-time asserts keep each deadline above its `statement_timeout`. - Falsifiability: replacing the stock deadline with a bare `.await` makes the new test fail (the tick stalls); swapping the two deadlines fails the per-family test; deleting `schedule.mark_stock_failure(now)` from the `Ok(None)` arm fails the mapping test. Trees restored and re-verified. - At `970414db`: CI PostgreSQL Tests 809/809 including the production-method matrix with `reader/maintenance`; Unit Tests ran `finish_usage_read_records_every_attempt_in_route_decisions`. - `just ci` / `just test` at `5b18914a` on Blox: not green for environmental reasons (`mobile-check` could not reach pub.dev; `_ensure-services` failed so service-backed suites did not run; `buzz-acp git_bootstrap` fails identically on `origin/main`). PostgreSQL and integration coverage comes from GitHub CI at this head. E2E at the previous head `0a01e5f22` (isolated relay, real Postgres primary plus streaming replica, worker storage snapshot, desktop frontend in relay mode): with no reader, both families report skipped/unavailable and route `skipped/disabled` (no writer queries); fleet-only storage emits totals without `buzz_community_storage_*` or unmapped bytes; `all` mode reports both availability gauges `1` with per-community storage series; with a fresh replica, both fleet paths route `replica/fresh` on `reader/maintenance` acquisitions; desktop send/receive works. The cached success → due failure → recovery transition was not reached live (hourly/daily cadence); it is covered by the seam test above. The original branch also recorded live verification at `aa3e7023`, before this rework: reduced-idle cache re-emission, two-relay leader takeover with demoted availability clearing, the no-reader skip with 60-second retry, `all` rollback restoring per-community series, and a desktop smoke test. Those runs predate the availability and storage changes and are not claimed for this head. ## Linear tracking Related work: BUZZ-167. --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-10-07 15:46:18 -04:00
Tyler	1a2ddf9eaa	feat(relay): private read-state accessory API (#7906) ... Buzz BFF: Private read-state accessory API (`/buzz/v1`)	2026-10-06 16:12:03 -04:00
Will Pfleger	1e67395fd1	docs(identity): tighten enterprise adapter contract (#8069) ... Tightens `docs/enterprise-identity-adapter.md` to define the enterprise adapter contract implemented by kgoose in [cash-server#132770](https://github.com/squareup/cash-server/pull/132770) and the Buzz Desktop client in [buzz-app#562](https://github.com/block/buzz-app/pull/562). - Requires canonical `wss://host[:port]` relay URLs with a lowercase scheme, the lowercase ASCII (A-label) host form with no trailing dot, the default port omitted, and no trailing slash, path, query, or fragment. Adapters MUST configure relays in canonical form, compare `relay_url` against that exact form, and reject unknown relays with 403 `authorization_denied`. - Requires NIP-98 proof freshness of at most 60 seconds old and at most 5 seconds in the future, with the proof bound to the endpoint, method, and exact request body. - Rejects content-encoded request bodies with 400 `invalid_request`. - Caps assertions at `exp - iat <= 300` seconds and the adapter session expiry, requires `typ` `nip-fi+jwt`, and validates the echoed `nostr_pubkey`. - Defines refusal and retry handling: Clients MUST retry 429 and 503 with bounded backoff whatever the `error` code. Clients MUST treat any other status, a 400/401/403/413 response with a contract-undefined code, or a rejected `200` response including one it cannot parse, as a refusal: keep the session, show it as refused, and not retry automatically. Network failures retry with bounded backoff. This tightens the enterprise adapter contract restored in [#8064](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8064). --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-10-05 15:39:13 -04:00
Will Pfleger	e982f70fba	docs: restore enterprise identity adapter contract with relay assertion (#8064) ... 🤖 Restores `docs/enterprise-identity-adapter.md`, the vendor-neutral HTTP contract between Buzz Desktop and an enterprise identity adapter, and adds the request that turns an adapter session into a NIP-FI relay assertion. The login, code exchange, session check, transport, and privacy sections are byte-for-byte the text from the head of #7715 (`4ef08e23`). Buzz Desktop's enterprise login client ([buzz-app#525](https://github.com/block/buzz-app/pull/525)) already calls those routes. The new **Relay assertion** section defines `POST /v1/identity/assertions`: - **Request:** a JSON body with `relay_url` and `nostr_pubkey`. The adapter session goes in `Authorization: Bearer`, and a NIP-98 proof signed by that key, bound to the endpoint URL, method, and exact body hash, goes in `Nostr-Authorization`. Clients and adapters must not log either header's value. - **Response:** `assertion`, `nostr_pubkey`, and `expires_at`. Under this contract an assertion lives at most 5 minutes and never outlives the adapter session; that cap is the adapter contract's rule, not a relay constant. The assertion's `typ` and `aud` rules point to NIP-FI. The assertion key must be the key that signs the NIP-42 relay login. - **Denials:** a table of status, error code, meaning, and the client action for each. A missing session is 401 `session_required`; missing or repeated proof headers, a repeated `Authorization` header, multiple session credential kinds, malformed bodies, and unknown fields are 400 `invalid_request`. 401s clear the session and return to login; 403 `authorization_denied` keeps the session and disconnects from that relay without automatic retry; other 403s, 400, and 413 keep the session and show the error without retry; 429, 503, and network failures retry with bounded backoff. Adapters may return `session_required` for any invalid, expired, or revoked credential, and clients handle both 401 codes identically. Agent keys are out of scope and need a separate design. Related: [cash-server#132756](https://github.com/squareup/cash-server/pull/132756) implements this contract in kgoose. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-10-03 15:12:15 -04:00
Luke Tornquist	53a12100b3	fix(deletion): require sole owner at admission (#7966) ... Follow-up to #7830: reject owner-origin deletion admission for a legacy co-owned community before creating a request. Under the existing community-row lock, admission locks all current owner memberships in pubkey order and requires exactly one matching asserted owner. Existing-request idempotent replay remains unchanged; completion retains its independent post-lock revalidation. **New optional operator field: `community_id`** (`ab0cd713`, `766eb07f`). Owner-origin `POST /operator/communities/delete` now accepts an optional `community_id` that binds the request to the host's community: - **Fresh submission:** checked after sole-owner authority is proven, so a non-owner still gets `404 community_not_found`. A mismatch returns `409 community_id_mismatch` and writes no request row. - **Replay:** checked against the stored request, and only when the stored request is for the same host. A mismatch returns `409 community_id_mismatch`, and the stored request is unchanged. A known UUID sent with a different host goes through the existing convergence check and returns `409 deletion_request_conflict`. - **Omitted:** behaves as before. `admit_owner_request` takes `expected_community_id: Option<Uuid>` rather than a second public entry point, and existing callers pass `None`. - `docs/operator-community-deletion.md` documents the ordering. Also folds in the non-blocking review nits from #7969 (wpfleger96, at `e21151f4`): - **`limit_reached` has a stable `code`.** Create (`provision_community`) and transfer-in now return `409` with `code: "limit_reached"`, matching the other coded lifecycle errors. The `error` message keeps its `limit_reached:` prefix, so clients that match on the message still work. The provision limit test now asserts the code, and a new PostgreSQL test covers a transfer to an owner at the limit (coded 409, no membership change). - **Docs: an ack-version mismatch is a 400, not a 409.** `docs/operator-community-deletion.md` and the `delete_community` handler doc now say a changed host or owner under a known UUID is `409 deletion_request_conflict`, and an unsupported acknowledgement version is rejected first with `400 unsupported_acknowledgement_version`. - **Docs: active-cap overrides above the lifetime cap can't be reached.** The `max_communities_per_owner` doc and the quota section now say `MAX_LIFETIME_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER` (20) counts live ownership, so `BUZZ_MAX_COMMUNITIES_PER_OWNER` above 20 can't be reached. - **Legolas P2s:** - The UUID-conflict docs now list every 409 case, including a stored ack version that doesn't match and a UUID held by an operator-origin request. - The runbook now says a legacy co-owned community is rejected as `404 community_not_found` and should be converged with a transfer first. - The preparation drift test now pins `DeletionSafety` plus "sole-owner authority drifted". - **Guard wording:** the `delete_community` handler doc now says "sole current owner", matching the admission check. What got simpler: admission and automatic preparation now enforce the same sole-owner authority, so no accepted-but-unexecutable co-owned request needs a new recovery path. `deletion_api_error` is renamed to `coded_api_error`, since it now carries non-deletion codes too. There's one helper for coded operator errors instead of a second one. Rebased onto main after #7969 merged (`d7a35afa`). The sole-owner commit applied cleanly. Earlier focused Blox verification (at the pre-rebase head `161e9857`): the new admission regression was red before the change and green after it. Five temporary, restored mutants each failed its matching production-seam regression. At the current head `766eb07f`, the relay `api::operator::` suite passes 23/0 on Blox. Each new `community_id` guard, removed one at a time, fails its own regression test. CI owns the full suites. Remaining debt: the separate P2-A purge/completion membership/community lock-order cycle is unchanged. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-30 15:04:23 -04:00
Luke Tornquist	d7a35afa98	feat(buzz-relay): idempotent owner community deletion with quota reservation (#7969) ... ## Summary This is the relay side of owner community deletion. - **Idempotent delete is the recovery call.** - `POST /operator/communities/delete` checks the request UUID first. - If the request already exists with the same host, owner and acknowledgement version, it returns `202` with the request's current `status`. That holds at any stage, even after membership is purged, and no new work is admitted. - The same UUID with a different host or owner returns `409 deletion_request_conflict`. An unsupported acknowledgement version is rejected first, with `400 unsupported_acknowledgement_version`. - There's **no receipt endpoint**. Clients recover by resending. - **Active quota reservation.** An incomplete owner deletion holds the owner's slot until the deletion logically completes. Migration `0054` adds the supporting index. Migrations 0052 and 0053 are unchanged. - **Lifetime cap.** Deleted communities keep their hosts as permanent tombstones. - On create and on transfer-in, the relay counts live ownership plus every non-aborted owner deletion, completed ones included. - That total is capped at an absolute 20, regardless of the active limit, and going over returns `limit_reached`. - This stops create-then-delete host squatting. - **Stable lifecycle conflict codes,** plus `acknowledgement_version` in the 202. - **Owner-list quota projection:** `quota_used`, `quota_limit` and `can_create`. - `can_create` reflects both caps. - The projection is advisory, and `limit_reached` is authoritative. - **Operator doc** (`docs/operator-community-deletion.md`): the acknowledgement version is a compile-time constant. Admission and the executor's claim/lease both filter on it. A version bump must keep replaying and executing old-version requests. This follows on from #7830. The foundation PRs #7818, #7827 and #7830 are merged. ## Testing New tests: - `owner_delete_resubmission_reports_current_status_without_new_intent` - A replay returns 202 `submitted`, including after membership purge. - Changing any field returns 409 `deletion_request_conflict`. - A non-operator gets 403. - A replay after abort returns 202 `aborted`. - No request rows are added. - `completed_owner_deletions_count_toward_lifetime_cap` - After 20 created-then-deleted communities, the active count is 0 but `can_create` is false. - The next create and a transfer-in both return `LimitReached`. - `owner_quota_admits_only_under_active_and_lifetime_caps`: a unit test. Fellowship gate: PASS at `59375c00`. The code review was clean. The E2E run covered authenticated KGoose → relay → the real drain executor. The later commits only change the operator doc. ## Rollout - Deploy order: this relay first, then KGoose squareup/cash-server#130634, then Web squareup/ext-builderbot-ui#241 and App block/buzz-app#403. - No shipped client ever called a receipt route, so removing it doesn't break any existing client. - The quota changes have no deploy-order requirement. - Keep owner deletion off until this relay and the drain executor are live. - If you need to roll back, turn deletion off before rolling back the relay. - Recreate any database that ran the earlier version of migration 0054. That only applies to disposable preview databases. Never apply this to a database holding real data. The earlier draft 0054 has a different checksum and index predicate. ## Complexity Net simpler: - One route, its handler and a writer-routed `get` are removed. Recovery reuses the existing idempotent admission path. - A single `OwnerQuota::admits()` backs create, transfer and the projection. - The stale "clients fail closed / strict deployment order" doc section is replaced by the advisory quota contract. --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Codex <codex@openai.com> Signed-off-by: OpenAI Codex <codex@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>	2026-09-30 10:49:42 -04:00
Zach Meyer	12423f2868	docs(nips): fix stray angle brackets in created_at clauses (#4486) ... ## Summary The `<` in a `created_at<` condition is the comparison operator, but in three places it had been paired with a closing `>` as if it opened a `<placeholder>` bracket: - **NIP-OA** clause list: `created_at<unix-timestamp>` → `created_at<unix-timestamp` - **NIP-OA** satisfaction rule: `created_at<t>` → `created_at<t` - **NIP-GS** "Conditions in Git Context": `created_at<t>` → `created_at<t` (line 437 of the same file already used the correct form) This matches the `created_at>...` forms used alongside them, which never carried a closing bracket. Also normalizes the NIP-OA headings to ATX style and pretty-prints the signed-event JSON example for readability. ## Verification Docs-only change. The NIP-OA test vectors are untouched and were re-verified by recomputing them: the preimage SHA-256, `tag-bytes-hex`, and the signed-event `id` all still match the documented values. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: zmeyer44 <zmmeyer44@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-29 10:02:30 -07:00
Tom Brow	45c288c179	docs: specify desktop-driven mobile push suppression (#7809) ... ## Summary Define when desktop activity suppresses otherwise eligible mobile message notifications: a ten-minute inactivity window, short-lived relay-owned suppression, and per-installation push preferences. Include a shared glossary and renewal timing diagram. The gateway remains unaware of suppression. This is a design draft ready for review, not an implementation-ready protocol. Wire format, synchronization, and several failure-handling details remain explicitly open. Please also review the tension between the agreed relay-confirmed preference changes and VISION_MOBILE.md's requirement that stopping notifications must not depend on a relay response. ### Related issue Related: #3234 covers per-channel notification settings and push filtering; this spec focuses on desktop-activity suppression. No duplicate spec PR found. ### Testing Documentation-only change. Local Markdown links and anchors resolve; whitespace validation and commit hooks passed. The full local CI gate could not complete: dependency compilation exhausted local disk space (OS error 28). GitHub checks currently report no failures. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Diem Nguyen <ngthuydiem@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-29 09:54:08 -07:00
Luke Tornquist	bba75a71eb	Automate owner deletion preparation (#7830) ... ## Why Owner deletion admission stops at `submitted`. Manual inventory and approval still stand between owner intent and the existing deletion executor, preventing self-serve deletion. ## What The existing `buzz-admin deletions drain` process prepares and automatically approves operator-attested owner requests. Operator-origin requests retain manual approval. ## How The drain prioritizes approved work, then claims one owner submission with the existing generation lease. It freezes inventory and records digest-bound `owner_automatic` approval in one transaction before entering the unchanged executor. Before approval, the transaction rechecks archived state and current ownership. It locks the deletion advisory fence, community, owner memberships, and request in that order. A regression test pins privileged abort during a live preparation lease. What got simpler: one drain still owns preparation and execution. There is no second worker, queue, lifecycle, or retry authority. The rebased branch contains only this feature and its review fixes. ## Risk Automatic approval permits irreversible deletion without a human grace period. Operator attestation is not a cryptographic owner signature. Provenance, locked authority checks, generation fences, and digest-bound approval constrain the operation. This remains work in progress. Broad test failures and incomplete mobile checks are disclosed below; publication is not a merge-ready verdict. ## Testing Published head: `e059ae9056b447ca3b5d0c2893da86550ef16f5c`. All seven commit trees match tested source `5605f27eaece1e809f746cc1839b55c7ceef8d80`; only attribution metadata changed. Source-SHA results below are not new-head execution receipts. At source commit `5605f27eaece1e809f746cc1839b55c7ceef8d80`, isolated PostgreSQL tests showed stale archive and ownership fixtures fail closed after the fix. Before the fix both reached automatic approval. Removing abort's generation increment or stage transition made the new live-lease regression fail; restored production passed. `just test` failed in two ACP native-git fixtures and one agent body-timeout test. The failing source files match the pinned base, but there is no exact-base execution comparison proving those failures unrelated. `just test-unit` also failed in the ACP fixtures, leaving 18 tests unrun. `just ci` stopped in Flutter tooling package resolution; separately run non-mobile lanes do not constitute a full `just ci` pass. No live tenant deletion or human testing was performed. A dedicated populated `0052` → `0053` approval-backfill fixture remains a coverage gap. Final-head hosted CI and security review are required. ## Bigger picture Rebased directly onto main `12670bd0f037c66a682272bb81c46c3f254fad74`; prerequisite #7818/#7827 are already merged. Main owns `0052_channel_artifacts`, so this feature's automatic-approval migration is now `0053`. Client/KGoose and quota work are separate PRs and are not part of this diff. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-29 11:39:33 -04:00
Bradley Axen	12670bd0f0	feat(relay): implement NIP-AR channel artifacts (#7919) ... ## Summary Implements NIP-AR channel artifacts (spec merged in #7791) on the relay, after a simplicity pass over the earlier two-agent implementation. An artifact is an editable record (kind 45010) with a stable identity (`d`), one home channel (`h`), and full-snapshot revisions chained by `prev`: - **Writes:** one transaction per write. It locks the artifact's head row, requires `prev` to name the current revision, records the revision in a ledger that survives retention, and advances the head. Two competing edits can't both win. A stale edit gets `conflict: artifact head changed`. Resubmitting an accepted event succeeds without applying it twice. - **Permissions:** writes pass the same gates as a kind 9 message in `h`. A move also passes them in the source channel. The move stores the destination snapshot and a relay-signed kind 45011 removal marker for the source in the same transaction, so both channels recover by replay. The marker never names the destination. - **Moderation:** redaction is the ordinary kind 9005 removal. The ledger keeps the ID so `prev` checks still work. Redacting the current revision retires the artifact. - **Reads:** HTTP `/query` and `/count` accept explicit `artifact: current|history` filters with exact multi-character tag matching (e.g. `#assignee`). Generic REQ and search return only current revisions. Kind 5 against artifacts is rejected. NIP-11 advertises the limits. - **Spec:** NIP-AR updated to match: kind 9 permission checks, 9005 redaction and retirement, no creator-only delete rule. A separate small commit routes `insert_channel_head_checked` through the metered writer pool (`acquire_writer`), like every other event write in that module. ### Related issue Follows #7791. No separate issue found. ### Testing - Clippy clean. - Unit lane passes. Failures seen along the way came from agent env leaking into `buzz-acp` tests (they pass in a clean env) and known timing flakes (`keepalive_resets_idle_past_deadline`, two `buzz-agent` databricks tests that passed on retry). This diff doesn't touch those crates. - Postgres lane passes, including new `artifact_postgres_tests` in `buzz-db` and `buzz-relay`. Three presence tests need `REDIS_URL` set. - Docker smoke against a fresh local relay, 29/29: create and idempotent resubmit, update and stale conflict, current, `#assignee` and history queries, generic REQ, kind 5 rejection, delete and restore, move with source marker, private-channel isolation, and 9005 retirement. - A pasteable curl walkthrough of the same flows was shared with the reviewer. Draft until the human hands-on check (AGENTS.md step 3) is confirmed. The pre-push hook was skipped because every lane above had already run on this tree. CI is the gate. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Signed-off-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: murderbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Smartie <fb3185faacfc3760b6b4fe0085a8878d8dd537f7a7671c7d3184fe1aa1b04df4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Fizz <400e8babadcee6a7f420103f10a2849d84c4a9c71d5bd04f3948c814216648a3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: murderbot <3754f8729004d95654c46dbab3129e4ab9ef05cc2534e2a3fbfc155983bd637b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 16:52:09 -06:00
Luke Tornquist	6918dd3a83	Schedule the deletion drain safely (#7827) ... ## Why The deletion engine already exposes a one-shot `buzz-admin deletions drain` command, but operators have no safe way to schedule it. A generic workload wrapper could expose arbitrary commands or inherit relay credentials, which would add a second control plane and widen the blast radius. ## What This PR adds an opt-in Kubernetes CronJob for the typed deletion drain command. It is stacked on #7818, which adds owner-request admission. ## How The chart keeps the job disabled by default. The CronJob uses `Forbid`, zero Kubernetes retries, bounded runtime and history, and only the database, Redis, and object-store settings required by the executor. PostgreSQL leases, checkpoints, and retry timing remain the sole durable retry authority. The closed `_operator-jobs.tpl` helper centralizes safe CronJob mechanics without creating an arbitrary command or environment registry. This leaves the touched system simpler than a general job framework would. ## Risk The deployment blast radius is low because the job is disabled by default. When enabled, it can run destructive deletion work that the database has already approved, so the chart limits concurrency, retries, credentials, and execution time. ## Testing Rendered every `deploy/charts/buzz/ci/*.yaml` fixture with `helm template`; all passed at `e68cb753bb6673aa1baa60046969bdb2d4738b62`. Ran the full independent Desktop, Tauri, and web lanes; all passed at `e68cb753bb6673aa1baa60046969bdb2d4738b62`. Flutter package resolution made no progress within three minutes, so the mobile lane is not claimed green. ## Bigger picture A later stack layer must inventory and approve admitted owner requests. Until then, this scheduler cannot make a new owner request destructive. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 18:23:42 -04:00
Luke Tornquist	b37e477211	Make relay readiness process-local (#7341) ... ## Summary Make Kubernetes readiness depend only on the relay process lifecycle, so a shared Postgres or Redis slowdown cannot withdraw every pod at once. Move dependency checks to one fixed-cadence loop per pod. The loop permits only one evaluation at a time, emits metrics after each sample, and caches a timestamped report. `/_status` reads that cache without calling Postgres, Redis, or the deletion catalog. It reports `not_yet_sampled`, `fresh`, or `stale`. Each completed sample also writes a Unix timestamp gauge, so Datadog can compute sample age at query time. Fail closed when the community lifecycle lookup errors. An inconclusive tenant-state lookup no longer admits a socket to AUTH or REQ handling. ### Related issue None found. This addresses the elevated relay HTTP 500 and reconnect incident investigated on 2026-09-03. ### Tradeoff The readiness gauge now reports the latest private-probe observation, not the shutdown transition itself. After shutdown starts, a scrape can still see `1` until the next readiness probe refreshes the gauge to `0`. Kubernetes routing is unaffected because it uses the readiness response from the authoritative process state. A terminal `0` was never guaranteed: even a transition-owned gauge could update in process and then exit before Prometheus scraped it. If no scrape occurs before exit, both designs miss the terminal sample. The new design adds at most the interval until the next readiness probe when a scrape occurs during shutdown. Dependency status is now sampled every 30 seconds rather than on demand. A slow evaluation delays the next sample instead of stacking more work. The status payload exposes the cached report age. The completion timestamp stays unchanged when sampling stops, so `time() - timestamp` crosses the stale threshold without a server aging loop. Outcome counters and duration histograms remain cumulative and cannot provide no-data detection. ### Testing Gimli exercised exact SHA `edff1ec4a5362e132e367bf7449d2b0a68f1e9a9` on an isolated Blox stack. Repeated `/_status` bursts caused no dependency calls, metrics advanced without status traffic, stale status remained visible, and lifecycle lookup failures admitted no AUTH or REQ handling. Follow-up verification at `fdbb394ed598c94cde85ed01cb11e9de0ee8f00d` confirmed sampler-owned outcome and duration emission without status traffic and bound the real startup seam. The final timestamp-gauge change is covered by targeted red/green tests and the same boot regression at `c0f36e22b527c2fd6a63a548d036d006ffa17171`. ### Complexity Readiness remains one process-local sample per probe. Dependency I/O now has one owner and one execution path; request volume cannot increase dependency-check load. One completion timestamp replaces the prior server-side age update path; Datadog computes age without another loop. Community admission also returns to one fail-closed rule for inactive and unknown tenant state. Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code) --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Amp <amp@ampcode.com>	2026-09-28 14:02:12 -04:00
Will Pfleger	447951a19c	🤖 docs(nip-fi): remove implementation references from the spec (#7912) ... This removes implementation references and implementation status from `docs/nips/NIP-FI.md` so the spec holds normative text only. It drops the Blossom compliance note, the known-gap notes, crate/file paths and PR numbers, roadmap "supersedes" sentences, doc-history lines, and the design-rationale note on session-only vs deny-until-TTL (its restart re-push SHOULD remains stated normatively elsewhere). Two wording changes carry normative weight: `PUT /media/upload` is listed as a plain kind-24242 upload route instead of a temporary alias, and the JWKS fetcher's SSRF controls become a MUST instead of a description. It doesn't depend on any enforcement PR and can merge at any time. Related: #7265 --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-28 16:56:52 +00:00
Bradley Axen	b0d6fb8ad2	docs(protocol): propose simplified channel artifacts (#7791) ... ## Summary Adds a short, proposal-only **NIP-AR: Channel Artifacts** in `docs/nips/NIP-AR.md`, as a simpler alternative to the closed #7771. - Defines complete-snapshot artifact events with stable identity and atomic, `prev`-based revisions. - Uses channel access and posting permissions for reads, edits, moves, and writer-authorized deletion. - Keeps client-defined content opaque to the relay, with exact tag filtering over current accessible state and bounded queries. - Covers durable source removal on moves, terminal deletion, and safe client fallbacks without defining task/project schemas or changing application behavior. ### Remaining design work This is a compact draft, not a complete implementation-ready wire contract. Concrete query request/pagination/error/limit-discovery formats, removal/replay wire details, and numeric query limits remain follow-up work. Prefer extending shared WebSocket `REQ` / HTTP `/query` surfaces rather than adding plugin-specific endpoints. No database layout or scale guarantees are proposed. ### Related issue Closest prior proposal: #7771 (closed). Searched existing PRs and issues for channel artifacts; no matching issue found. ### Testing - Verified the committed document is byte-for-byte identical to the reviewed local draft. - Parsed the example JSON and its embedded JSON content; checked unique two-element example tags. - Reviewed the entire one-file diff and ran `git diff --check`. - Commit and push hooks passed (including DCO sign-off and differential file-size checks). - Full application CI was not run locally: this changes only a Markdown proposal, with no implementation or UI changes. --------- Signed-off-by: Fizz <400e8babadcee6a7f420103f10a2849d84c4a9c71d5bd04f3948c814216648a3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Smartie <fb3185faacfc3760b6b4fe0085a8878d8dd537f7a7671c7d3184fe1aa1b04df4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Fizz <400e8babadcee6a7f420103f10a2849d84c4a9c71d5bd04f3948c814216648a3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Smartie <fb3185faacfc3760b6b4fe0085a8878d8dd537f7a7671c7d3184fe1aa1b04df4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-26 09:07:57 -07:00
Tom Brow	781d39510c	feat(push): support configurable HTTP(S) delivery URLs (#7877) ... The relay can use a configurable HTTP(S) gateway delivery URL and signs the same URL it sends. The gateway verifies NIP-98 against the received request URL, including authority, port, path and query. App Attest, scoped grants, replay checks and delivery quotas are unchanged. Forwarding proxies must preserve Host and supply the original request scheme through X-Forwarded-Proto. The NIP relay-delivery wording now defines the configured HTTP(S) URL as the signed URL and labels the public URL as an example. <!-- buzz-review-completed --> --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>	2026-09-25 18:57:49 -07:00
Luke Tornquist	9263cda845	docs: specify durable data backfills (#7326) ... ## Why Data backfills need a durable contract outside schema migrations. The contract must survive crashes and support automatic or manual operation without adding version-selection machinery. ## What - Define one PostgreSQL-backed lifecycle for finite data repair - Treat the stable backfill ID as the only durable execution and readiness identity - Use eventually consistent, idempotent registration; compatible workers compete for one exclusive claim - Require bounded batches, atomic mutation and checkpoint commits, generation fencing, and validation before completion - Define all four migration and automatic-backfill configurations - Define the authorized admin API and honest client projection ## How A backfill captures one immutable upper bound, processes finite batches, and commits each target mutation with its checkpoint. PostgreSQL owns lifecycle state, claims, progress, and completion. Registration order and build metadata do not choose a definition. Compatible processes are interchangeable. A material behavior change requires a new stable ID. The orchestrator does not resolve different behavior registered under one active ID. Diagnostic validation on completed rows records only its bounded outcome and audit; it does not create an execution claim. The spec now starts with a six-step mental model and follows the operator flow. It removes repeated requirements and cuts the document from 614 lines and 4,835 words to 474 lines and 3,656 words. ## Risk Low. This PR changes documentation only. It commits Buzz to a design contract, but it does not add runtime, schema, configuration, or protocol behavior. ## Testing No manual runtime testing. A fresh full-spec review checked the lifecycle, safety rules, four configuration cells, admin contract, and production-seam conformance requirements. `git diff --check` and the repository file-size policy pass at `13681664674d4667b181a6211f012090fa40a2cf`. ## Bigger picture The design keeps the relay as orchestrator, a focused backfill crate as domain owner, and `buzz-db` as narrow transaction infrastructure. It removes deployment generations and definition precedence from the implementation plan. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-25 13:05:41 -04:00
Will Pfleger	8f8c4dfade	feat(desktop): relay admin console for the /api/admin/v1 operator surface (#4768) ... Adds a relay admin console under Settings — the single surface for relay-level operator work — replacing the previously unreachable moderation section. Operators authenticate with their own Nostr key over NIP-98 — no browser extension, no bearer token — to view deployment-wide moderation reports and product feedback, resolve/dismiss/escalate/reopen reports, update feedback status, and manage the operator/moderator staffing roster. ## Nav reachability The old `moderation` section id was defined in `settingsSections` but never wired into any group in `settingsNavGroups`, so the sidebar never rendered it — unreachable since #1617. This PR replaces it with a `relay-admin` section wired into the Communities nav group, pointing at the relay admin console, and drops the separate `admin-console` section id so a single surface owns relay-level trust & safety. The Relay admin nav entry is always visible. Auth gates the panel itself; the nav entry is a door, not a credential — hiding it behind discovery state would strand an operator whose relay transiently fails NIP-11 discovery with no path back to the connection settings. ## Discovery and connection On mount the console reads the connected relay's NIP-11 document for the optional `admin_api` field. When a valid origin is discovered **and its host matches the connected relay's host** (case-insensitive, host identity only), it is automatically saved and probed — the panel renders immediately with no Save step required. A cross-host advertisement is pre-fill only: it populates the manual origin field under Advanced and is never saved or probed without an explicit Save, so a relay cannot direct an unconsented NIP-98 signature at a third-party origin; residual exposure on the same-host path is bounded by NIP-98's URL/method/payload binding. Saving is only required for manual origin changes. The advertised origin is untrusted input: revalidated through `AdminOrigin::parse`, falling back to manual entry when absent or invalid. A saved manual origin always takes precedence over discovery. ## Auth and transport (Rust, `src-tauri/src/commands/admin/`) - `AdminOrigin` value object: validates scheme + host + optional port, rejects credentials/path/query/fragment; `http://` only for loopback. The relay side normalizes its configured admin host at config load and compares inbound `Host`/`Origin` hosts case-insensitively. - `AdminRoute` closed enum: no IPC surface accepts arbitrary URLs, so the NIP-98-signed URL is byte-identical to the fetched URL. - Dedicated no-redirect `reqwest` client as an SSRF guard: a relay `3xx` is an error and the NIP-98 header never crosses origins. - `admin_probe` signs `GET /probe` and returns a typed state (`nip98Authorized` / `nip98Denied` / `disabled` / `notAdminApi` / `networkOrIntercepted`). The response body is validated against the full relay contract — `nip98Authorized` only when the complete NIP-98 invariant holds, `disabled` only on a coherent disabled-mode body; any incoherent or unrelated JSON classifies as `notAdminApi`, so the console never fails open at the network boundary. Unknown fields are tolerated for forward compatibility. - NIP-98 signing via `AppState::signing_keys()`, one retry on `401` with a fresh signed event; response size bounded by a `Content-Length` preflight and a streaming byte counter; per-pubkey origin storage with atomic `0o600` writes. ## Relay admin console The console is gated behind the relay `OPERATOR`/`MODERATOR` roles from #3777; every `/api/admin/v1/*` route returns `403` to anyone else. Community self-administration (`community-members` / Invites) and in-channel enforcement (the 9040–9043 signed commands) are a separate axis and are untouched. The previously-duplicate community report queue (`ModerationQueueCard`, `moderationQueue.ts`, and three dead hooks) was unreachable dead code and is deleted in its own commit; `useBanMemberMutation` and the rest of `features/moderation/hooks.ts` remain in use by the members sidebar and message menu. ## Console UI (TypeScript, `src/features/admin-console/`) - `AdminConsoleSettingsCard`: discovery + probe flow, honest copy for every probe state, manual origin under an `Advanced` disclosure at the bottom. The role (operator/moderator) is rendered in the connection status line as plain text ("Connected as operator") — no badge-shaped elements above the tab row. The origin provenance (relay config / database) appears inside the Advanced card as small muted text. Section title changed to `Admin`. - `AdminConsolePanel` with Reports / Feedback / Staffing tabs (Staffing gated on `role === "operator"`); reports and feedback grouped by community for cross-community triage. - **Reports**: always requests `scope=all` so the existing resolve/cancel/reopen controls can reach every status (`open`, `processing`, `resolved`, `dismissed`, `escalated`). The relay's omitted-scope default is `escalated`-only (the platform-safety backstop); `scope=all` is explicit and scoped to this console. Full action matrix per `target_kind` (event → delete/kick/ban/timeout/dismiss/escalate; pubkey → ban/timeout/dismiss/escalate; blob → dismiss/escalate); kick is suppressed when the report carries no `channelId`. A `processing` row stays navigable — enforcement state lives in the detail view. A `failed` action (always pre-mutation) offers a single **Cancel & reopen** via `POST /reports/{id}/cancel` with `{actionId}` fencing; there is no client-side retry. `pending`/`enforcing` actions belong to the relay recovery worker and offer no button; a `409` reloads detail. Lists refetch on back-navigation after a mutation. - **Report failure UX**: `reportErrorMessage()` strips 4xx/5xx status prefixes and surfaces the relay's own error reason in the toast (e.g. relay returns `"400: you cannot report this content"` → toast shows `"you cannot report this content"`). Self-report blocking UI removed — the relay has no self-report gate, and the failure was purely client-side error surfacing. - **Reason audience disclosure**: the Reason (optional) field shows exact copy under the input based on selected action — Delete discloses that reason is sent verbatim to the affected user and posted publicly in the room; Kick/Ban/Timeout disclose affected-user only; Dismiss/Escalate disclose reporter only. These mirror the actual relay notice paths. - **Enforcement history**: the report detail carries the governing action even after the report leaves `processing` — a report enforced then reopened is `open` yet still shows its `succeeded` action as executed history alongside the resolve form; a reopen does not un-happen a ban. The resolve form gates on `open` status alone. - **Reopen**: terminal reports (`resolved`/`dismissed`/`escalated`) can be returned to `open` for re-triage via `POST /reports/{id}/reopen`. Reopen never reverses applied enforcement, and the copy says so. - **Feedback**: list, detail, and status control (`new`/`reviewed`/`archived`) with a generation-fenced attachment viewer. A purged source community severs provenance to `null` rather than deleting the row; severed rows bucket under a "source community removed" heading. - **Staffing**: Add is create-only with display names resolved via `useUsersBatchQuery` and npub cross-fade on hover (`HoverStaffingIdentity`). An entered key that already appears in the authoritative roster (config, owner-fallback, or DB) is rejected locally with an inline duplicate-key message and no request is issued; a `409 Conflict` from add, role change, or remove surfaces the relay's parsed error body via `adminErrorMessage(e)` — distinguishing config-backed key conflicts from last-operator conflicts without HTTP-status inference. Roster with `config`/`owner_fallback`/`db` source labels; config-backed entries disable remove client-side. In-place role change via `<select>` calling `putAdminOperator`; the relay responds with the effective `OperatorEntry` (`pubkey`, `effectiveRole`, `sources`) in the same shape as the roster list. Read-only badge for config-managed entries. - **Timeout expiry**: `useTimeoutState` clears the store when derived state is `INACTIVE` but the store is still active; the 1s tick is scoped to entries with a known `expiresAtMs` and owned by `ComposerTimeoutBanner` (mounted only while a timeout is active), while `ChannelPane` subscribes to the boolean `useTimeoutActive()` — the pane re-renders when a timeout starts or ends, not every second. `useMembersSidebarModeration` ticks `nowMs` only while the sidebar is open, the viewer can moderate, and some member has a future `mutedUntil`; the tick after the last expiry stops the interval. - Staffing refreshes the principal after a self-demotion or self-removal: `AdminConsolePanel` passes `onSelfMutation` to `StaffingTab`, which re-probes the saved origin so the role badge and tab visibility update without a manual re-probe. - Staffing mutation failures, including both 409 variants (config-backed key vs. last operator), surface the relay's parsed error via `adminErrorMessage`, so the last-operator recovery guidance is shown. - Mutations confirm via `sonner` toasts; failures surface the relay's parsed error `message`, not raw JSON. The `disabled` auth mode renders read-only. ## Mutation idempotency Resolve and reopen carry a per-attempt `requestId`. On first submit the whole command (`{requestId, action, reason, expirationSecs}`) is frozen; after an ambiguous failure (409, 5xx, transport error, truncated response) the snapshot is retained, action/reason/duration controls are locked, and the retry sends the exact same payload byte-for-byte. A definitive pre-commit rejection (non-409 4xx with `bodyComplete: true`) discards the snapshot, unlocks controls, and the corrected submit uses a fresh payload. On success the toast derives from the authoritative `AdminReportResolution` (`activeAction.action` when present; otherwise `status` for decision-only outcomes) — never from the mutable form selection. The native mutation commands — including operator delete — reject with a typed `AdminMutationError` carrying the relay's HTTP status (`relayStatus`, `null` when no verdict exists) and a `bodyComplete` flag that is `true` only when the full response body was read. ## Restriction routes contract change `GET /members/restrictions` and `DELETE /members/{pubkey}/ban|timeout` now take `communityHost` instead of `communityId`; the relay resolves the tenant itself and returns `400 unknown_community_host` for an unmapped host. This is a breaking contract change with no compatibility shim: the relay must run this build before a desktop that uses it, scripts sending `communityId` must switch, and rolling the relay back breaks the desktop Restrictions UI. `docs/admin/README.md` documents the three routes in the route inventory and carries the migration note. Restriction calls also carry the relay the list was loaded from, and the native side rejects a mismatch before building any URL. ## Hardening - Saved admin origins are stored per pubkey and per relay host. The host slug parses the relay URL, keeps the port-drop for DNS names, and encodes IPv6 hosts canonically, so two IPv6 relays never share a file and no IPv6 slug can match a DNS slug. - NIP-11 admin discovery has its own 10s request deadline and reads `/info` success and error bodies through the bounded reader with a 64 KiB cap (`Content-Length` is only a pre-check). - `PUT /operators` builds its `OperatorEntry` response from the validated body (`effectiveRole = role`, `sources = ["db"]`) instead of re-reading the roster, so a concurrent change can't turn a committed write into a `403`. Related: #3777 (relay `OPERATOR`/`MODERATOR` role model + NIP-98 auth + `admin_api` NIP-11 advertisement — provides the runtime and the discovery field this console consumes) Related: [builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure#140](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/140) (prod admin ingress allowlist and NIP-98 rollout) ## Screenshots Captured headless at `197f0ba0c` against the mock bridge (1280×720). ### Setup **Origin setup — Advanced disclosure open, idle state**  **Authorized console — all three tabs**  ### Reports **Reports queue — open, processing, resolved across two relay groups**  **Open report detail — reporter, target, message snapshot, resolve form**  **Processing report — PROCESSING/HARASSMENT, ban enforcing state**  **Resolve form — Delete selected, audience disclosure copy**  **Resolved report — enforcement history block**  ### Feedback **Feedback list — community grouping with status badges**  **Feedback detail — mutable status control (operator mode)**  **Feedback detail — passive status badge (read-only/disabled mode)**  ### Staffing **Staffing roster — config/owner\_fallback/db source labels**  **Add form — new pubkey filled, ready to submit**  **Duplicate rejection — inline error for existing principal**  --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-24 17:34:25 -04:00
Logan Johnson	dd1c2afc2a	Discover alternate Buzz ACP commands (#6948) ... 🤖 I’m Larry. ## Summary Managed-agent definitions can now choose which installed ACP transport will launch the agent. The choice sits beside **Agent harness** while creating or editing an agent, so it is made before first deployment and remains visible afterward. Buzz discovers executable commands named `buzz-*-acp`, keeps **Buzz ACP (default)** as the safe default, and preserves existing custom command values. Discovery and launch share the same resolver, so a command offered in the picker is the command Buzz will execute. ## UX walkthrough ### 1. The ACP command picker appears while creating the agent The default is explicit, and the helper text explains that this selection controls deployment.  ### 2. Installed wrapper commands are offered by name Here Buzz has discovered `buzz-janet-acp` alongside the stock transport.  ### 3. The wrapper is selected before deployment  ### 4. The deployed profile reports the effective command  ### 5. Editing the deployed agent reopens its definition with the choice preserved  ## Details - Definitions carry the selected ACP command through relay publication, snapshots, imports, team adoption, deployment, and later edits. - Existing definitions without this field continue to use `buzz-acp`. - Unknown persisted commands remain visible but unavailable rather than being silently replaced. - Discovery is read-only and never executes candidates. It filters non-files and non-executables, supports Windows `.exe`, `.cmd`, and `.bat` shims, deduplicates aliases, and returns a stable sorted list. - Command names remain portable; Buzz does not persist machine-specific absolute paths. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Larry <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Larry <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@nostr> Co-authored-by: Larry <8cf5a83f590ec0955b11647d1c88f796a98e088c30a492c58e0e46c3026ae7a4@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-24 11:33:24 -04:00
Kalvin C	5a349db91c	feat(relay): add opt-in newest-first thread windows (#7823) ... ## Summary Add an opt-in, newest-first thread window to the authenticated HTTP query path. A filter with `thread_window: true` returns: - reply rows ordered by `(created_at DESC, id ASC)` with an exact composite cursor; - optional bounded reactions, edits, deletions, and delete-of-aux closure; - one relay-signed `kind:39007` bounds event bound to the normalized host, authenticated reader, channel, root, request cursor, kinds, depth, limit, and aux choice. Filters without the flag keep the existing oldest-first thread behavior. Channel windows and `kind:39006` are unchanged. No client opts into this mode in this PR. ### Why extend NIP-CW NIP-CW already defines relay-computed, cursor-paged conversation views over extended NIP-01 filters. Thread windows use the same protocol ideas: ordinary signed rows, composite keyset pagination, optional aux closure, and relay-signed bounds. Adding a thread mode keeps those related wire contracts together instead of creating a second NIP with duplicated terminology and compatibility rules. Extending a draft, optional NIP with an additive mode is normal protocol evolution. Existing fields and meanings are not reinterpreted: - `top_level: true` remains channel mode; - `kind:39006` remains channel-window bounds; - `thread_window: true` selects the new mode; - `kind:39007` has a distinct identity and root/request binding; - extension-unaware clients never send the selector; - legacy thread queries remain unchanged. NIP-CW documents only the wire contract and relay semantics. Database plans, replica internals, and rollout procedures remain implementation concerns. ### Why thread windows use independent modules The implementation deliberately keeps `thread_window.rs` separate in `buzz-core`, `buzz-db`, and `buzz-relay` rather than adding branches throughout the existing channel-window path. The modes share pagination concepts, but their invariants differ: - channel mode selects top-level rows; thread mode requires one root and depths `1..=depth_limit`; - thread mode accepts only conversation row kinds and rejects unknown/conflicting fields; - thread bounds bind the root and authenticated reader because cross-channel aux visibility can differ by reader; - thread aux includes the root and requires complete two-hop closure; - thread mode refreshes writer authorization before selection and before signing; - historical cursor pages may use a proved replica transaction, but fallback must restart both aux hops on the writer; - legacy thread traversal is oldest-first and must not inherit descending cursor semantics. Forcing these rules into channel-window code would create a mode flag across parsing, SQL predicates, bounds construction, authorization, replica fallback, and tests. That abstraction would not remove complexity. It would distribute it. Separate modules keep each contract local and leave the established channel and legacy paths untouched. ### Technical design - Strict request parsing normalizes UUIDs, event IDs, kinds, defaults, and cursors before computing the response binding. - SQL applies community, root, channel, depth, kind, deletion, and cursor predicates before `limit + 1`. - Ordered metadata scanning plus exact event-key lookup avoids the stale-statistics plan that previously exceeded the four-second SQL budget on a 10k-reply thread. - Aux work is bounded by target batches, query count, raw candidate count, response bytes, SQL timeouts, and one shared HTTP deadline. - Fresh authorization-set comparison catches both grants and revocations during closure. The relay returns retryable `503` rather than signing an incomplete page. - Replica failure permanently degrades the request to the writer and restarts closure from its original targets without resetting budgets. - Migration `0049_thread_window_index.sql` adds the mixed-direction index used by newest-first scans. It validates a prebuilt index and bounds startup lock/build time. ### Tradeoffs - The stale-statistics-safe plan is intentionally less clever. Measured warm 100k deep-cursor execution increased from roughly 0.30 ms to 4.80 ms, plus about 8 ms planning, in exchange for avoiding a reproduced multi-second timeout after rapid 10k-thread insertion. - Bounds are authoritative only for the served page. There is no cross-page snapshot guarantee, and replica insertion coverage does not imply latest edit/deletion/aux visibility. - Strict parsing rejects unsupported constraints instead of silently serving a different row set. - Required aux closure fails closed. The relay does not omit aux and sign plausible-but-incomplete bounds. - This PR ships relay capability only. Client rendering, retry UX, live-history overlap, and compatibility fallback remain separate work. ### Related issue No existing issue found. This work follows the thread-loading design and review discussion. ### Testing - `cargo test -p buzz-core`: 258 unit tests and 2 doctests passed. - `cargo check --workspace --all-targets`: passed at the rebased implementation head. - `cargo test -p buzz-db`: 131 non-PostgreSQL tests passed; 275 infrastructure tests were ignored as declared. - Focused PostgreSQL migration/runtime regressions: 3/3 passed against an isolated PostgreSQL container, including both corrected migration-ledger tests. - `cargo fmt --all --check`: passed. - Pre-rebase feature validation passed 398/398 PostgreSQL tests, signed-wire multi-tenant/auth/pagination/aux/revocation probes, clean Compose boot/reboot, and full core tests. - Independent HA validation exercised three relay pods and a physical PostgreSQL standby on the same runtime logic before the final documentation-only cleanup. - Independent final-delta review confirmed exactly two changed files, byte-identical executable migration SQL after comments/diagnostic normalization, matching prebuild/catalog/recovery instructions, and `git diff --check`; no runtime receipts were relabeled to the new SHA. - The pre-push hook ran repository checks but its Rust unit lane exited 100 without exposing an individual failed test in the captured multiplexed output. The independently run affected-package checks above passed; current-head repository CI remains required. Known unrelated baseline behavior remains: the mesh-demo echo test can return 504, and same-second archive → unarchive can deduplicate its membership notification. Neither path is changed here. --------- Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz> Signed-off-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-23 12:01:45 -07:00
Salman Mohammed	5621006bcf	refactor: move agent Git bootstrap into ACP harness (#7819) ... discovered in https://github.com/block/buzz/issues/7742#issuecomment-5783512985 ## Summary Goose uses its native shell, so it bypassed the Git identity and signing setup inside `buzz-dev-mcp`. Agent commits could use the host Git identity, while MCP shells had a separate config. This moves Git setup into `buzz-acp`, where both paths receive the same agent identity, Nostr signer, and relay-scoped credential helper. Before: ```text Buzz Desktop └─ buzz-acp ← Desktop supplied relay Git authentication ├─ Goose → native shell ← no agent Git author or signing setup └─ Buzz Agent └─ buzz-dev-mcp └─ shell ← MCP created the keyfile and Git signing config ``` After: ```text Buzz Desktop or Sprig └─ buzz-acp ← owns the keyfile, identity, signing, and scoped credentials ├─ Goose → native shell ← inherits the complete Git environment └─ Buzz Agent └─ buzz-dev-mcp └─ shell ← receives the same Git environment via mcpServers[].env ``` The harness keeps the signing key in a private temporary file and removes it on normal exit, startup failure, and graceful termination. It composes inherited `GIT_CONFIG_*` entries, forwards the complete block to MCP servers, and bundles the helpers through the ACP multicall entrypoint. For standard `buzz-acp` launches, Desktop and Sprig no longer write Git config. A custom Desktop ACP command bypasses the harness, so Desktop preserves its prior relay-scoped credential helper for that supported override. This changes Git settings for every ACP runtime. The startup signal path also changes so a termination during adapter initialization removes the keyfile. The temporary file can remain after SIGKILL or a machine crash. ### Related issue Related: #6177 covers stricter commit identity enforcement and touches the same Git paths. That PR and this one need to be reconciled before either lands. No issue was found for this runtime bootstrap gap. ### Testing - Ran the ignored `git_runtime_tests` with real Goose 1.50.0 and Buzz Agent ACP sessions. `real_goose_native_git_shell` passed again on this PR branch with `BUZZ_TEST_BIN_DIR` pointing to built binaries. Goose made a signed commit and tag through its native shell; Buzz Agent did the same through its MCP shell. Both verified signatures, identity, credential scoping, and keyfile cleanup. - Built the Linux Sprig image and ran `scripts/test-sprig-image.sh buzz-sprig:acp-git-bootstrap`. The container made and verified a signed commit and tag, then confirmed keyfile removal after SIGTERM. - `just ci` passed on the original branch. After rebasing onto `main` and addressing review feedback, the ACP Git bootstrap integration tests, focused desktop smoke test, custom-command regression test, formatting, and ACP/Desktop Clippy passed. The pre-push hook hit two timing-sensitive ACP deadline tests under parallel load; both passed alone and the complete ACP package passed serially (964 library, 2 Git bootstrap, 9 pool lifecycle tests). The push used `--no-verify` after those checks; GitHub CI is rerunning on the new head. - Under injected `BUZZ_ACP_ALLOWED_RESPOND_TO`, `BUZZ_ACP_LAZY_POOL`, and `BUZZ_ACP_IDLE_POOL_SLEEP`, the clean-env serial package command in `crates/buzz-acp/TESTING.md` passed: 964 active library tests, 2 Git bootstrap tests, and 9 pool lifecycle tests. Both named Databricks OAuth tests passed locally; another reviewer reproduced their environment-specific failures on `main`. - No authenticated relay clone or push was run. The local probes used disposable repositories and did not contact a relay. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Salman Mohammed <smohammed@squareup.com>	2026-09-23 14:41:00 -04:00
ravarora2	4142d2b84e	Use worker snapshots for relay storage metrics (#7845) ... ## Summary Make the relay read completed storage-accounting snapshots from PostgreSQL by default. An environment with no snapshot emits no storage metrics. When a worker publishes its first result, the relay picks it up on the next successful leader usage tick, without a restart or configuration change. This changes how storage usage is measured and reported. **S3 remains the object store. PostgreSQL stores the completed counts, byte totals, community breakdown, and calculation metadata—not the objects themselves.** ### Why move relay storage accounting entirely to database reads? Today the relay supports two sources: its own S3 scan (`inline`, the default) and the worker's saved snapshot (`external`). That requires operators to deploy a worker and then coordinate a separate relay-mode change in each environment. The worker already owns the S3 listing and calculation. It runs in a separate process with its own object cap, memory limit, and deadline. Keeping a second scan inside the serving relay retains the resource pressure and failure modes that this isolation is meant to remove. PostgreSQL provides a durable handoff. The worker replaces one completed snapshot atomically after a successful calculation. The relay reads that row and exposes its values through the existing metrics endpoint. A relay restart or leadership change can load the last completed result without scanning the bucket again. There is deliberately no S3 fallback when a snapshot is absent or a read fails. Such a fallback would put the expensive scan back in the relay precisely when a worker is absent or unhealthy. It would also leave two calculation paths with different resource limits and freshness behavior. ### What happens if no worker exists? **A worker that has never published is a normal, successful inactive state.** The snapshot table must exist through the normal database schema, but it may contain zero rows. The reader returns success, emits no storage totals or failed-load gauge, and checks again on the next usage tick. It does not exit the relay, start a worker, or list S3. The relay checks for a completed database row; it does not inspect Kubernetes Jobs or CronJobs. Worker presence and snapshot presence are therefore different: | Situation | Storage-reader behavior | |---|---| | No worker and no snapshot row | Return success, emit no storage metrics, and query again next tick. | | Worker starts later and publishes its first row | Read and emit it on the next successful leader usage tick; no restart or mode change. | | Worker is removed or fails, but its last valid row remains | Continue reporting the last completed totals with their increasing age. | | Query succeeds but a previously present row has been removed | Clear the cache and stop refreshing storage series; existing exporter series expire through the idle timeout. | | Database read fails, times out, or returns an invalid snapshot | Log a warning, set `buzz_storage_snapshot_load_ok=0`, retain any last-good cached totals, and retry next tick. | | Snapshot table is missing | Treat this as a schema error, not normal worker absence; follow the failed-read behavior above. | | `BUZZ_STORAGE_METRICS=off` | Skip the snapshot query and all storage metric emission. | No row means “not measured,” not zero bytes. A valid completed snapshot of an empty bucket can report zero. If a read fails before any good snapshot has been cached, only failed-load health is emitted. These reads happen in the existing background metrics task, not the relay startup path. A storage-read failure does not request process exit or change readiness directly. A wider database outage can still affect the relay's existing database-dependent operations and readiness. ### Read, parse, and emit path ```text Worker: S3 listing -> BucketSnapshot -> JSON -> PostgreSQL Relay: PostgreSQL -> JSON -> BucketSnapshot -> existing metric gauges Collector: relay /metrics endpoint -> Datadog ``` 1. `main.rs::run_storage_sweep_tick` calls the reader from the existing leader-only usage task. The default interval remains 300 seconds. 2. `storage_sweep.rs::run_storage_metrics_tick` coordinates the read, cache update, failure health, and metric emission. 3. `refresh_persisted_snapshot` calls the existing `Db::load_storage_accounting_snapshot()` method. A five-second timeout covers pool acquisition and the query. It uses the relay's existing pool. 4. The existing query in `buzz-db/src/store/storage_accounting.rs` reads `snapshot`, `completed_at`, `duration_ms`, `max_objects`, and `code_sha` from the singleton row. 5. `serde_json::from_value(stored.snapshot)` decodes the JSON into the existing `buzz_media::BucketSnapshot` type. Rust infers that type from `cache_persisted_snapshot`'s argument. The generated `Deserialize` implementation handles all fields, including the UUID-keyed `per_community` map. 6. `emit_cached_storage_metrics` sets the existing physical/logical totals and community byte/object gauges. The existing Prometheus exporter exposes them for Datadog collection; this code does not send snapshot JSON to Datadog. The worker's `BucketSnapshot`/`CommunityStorage` structures, JSON field names, SQL publication method, and database schema are unchanged. The old external-mode JSON conversion moves out of `main.rs` into the reader helper. No new format or hand-written field parser is needed. Duration and object-cap metadata are validated before replacing the cache. The five-second relay read timeout is separate from the worker's 30-second startup acquisition budget introduced in #7770. This PR does not change the worker's pool or startup logic. ### Configuration and code changes | Configuration | Before | After | |---|---|---| | Unset, `inline`, or `on` | Relay-local S3 scan | Read completed database snapshots. `inline` logs one migration warning. | | `external` or `snapshot` | Read completed database snapshots | Continue reading snapshots. | | `off` | Disabled | Disabled. | | Unknown or empty value | Disabled with a configuration error | Same. | Existing `inline` settings intentionally become reader aliases. Merely changing the default would leave older deployments on their explicit `inline` setting and preserve the need for coordinated configuration PRs. Remove relay-local scan scheduling, in-flight scan state, scan configuration, and obsolete scan-attempt tests and health metrics. Preserve the physical/logical total and per-community metric names, leader-only emission, community scope filtering, and cleanup of old community labels. The shared relay-state field remains in place; its comment now describes a cached worker result. The Helm chart defaults to `relayMode: external` while leaving `storageAccounting.enabled: false`. Its rendering test verifies that the reader is configured even when no worker is created. The reader regression tests cover missing rows, later publication, updates, invalid data, timeout, removal, reactivation, and the explicit off switch. `docs/storage-accounting.md` describes this operating model. ### Freshness and rollout impact `buzz_storage_snapshot_age_seconds` uses the worker's original completion timestamp. Re-reading an old row never makes it fresh. `buzz_storage_snapshot_load_ok=1` means the row was read and decoded; it does not prove that the worker's latest attempt succeeded. Monitor snapshot age against the worker's schedule and allowed runtime, and monitor Job failures separately. The old relay scan-attempt health gauges are retired because the relay no longer runs those scans. Deploy this relay version through the usual release process. Once it reaches an environment, workers can be enabled independently. Already-released charts that still set `inline` work with the new binary; future chart releases default explicitly to `external`. An intentional `off` override still requires an operator to enable the reader. **Environments with no completed snapshot lose relay-calculated storage totals after this upgrade.** That is the intended tradeoff for removing scans from the serving process. Environments with a prior snapshot continue showing its last completed totals and age. This PR does not install workers in additional environments or deploy the new relay image. ### Related issue Related to #4601. Follows the worker startup fix in #7770. The separate fleet-usage collector work in #7176 overlaps this code and may need reconciliation when it merges. ### Testing Built and ran the relay locally against isolated PostgreSQL and Redis with the legacy `inline` setting, five-second usage ticks, and a 15-second metric idle timeout. The same process was exercised through these steps: 1. Start with an empty snapshot table: relay becomes ready and exposes no storage series. 2. Publish a snapshot containing 123 bytes: the community gauge becomes 123. 3. Replace it with 456 bytes: the gauge becomes 456. 4. Remove the row: storage series expire without fabricating a zero-byte measurement. 5. Publish 789 bytes: metrics reactivate without restarting the relay; readiness remains healthy. The local S3 endpoint recorded zero requests. The unrelated Git conformance startup probe was disabled for this isolated reader check; the test covers storage accounting, not every other use of S3 in the relay. No new relay image was deployed to staging or production during this test. The broad local integration run also hit an existing `p0_pool_acquisitions_use_typed_operation_pairs_without_other` failure in `buzz-db/tests/observability_source.rs`. The same source-only test fails on unmodified `main` at `0ef7a2222`; this PR changes neither the test nor its failing source. The full local `just ci` run stopped at mobile native-asset setup: the `objective_c` build hook received no SDK path from `xcrun`. Mobile tests did not run. Generated with Codex Signed-off-by: Ravneet Arora <rarora@squareup.com>	2026-09-23 14:39:39 -04:00
Tom Brow	0ef7a2222e	fix(mobile-infra): render push grant lifetimes as decimal in chart 0.3.2 (#7820) ... A valid 30-day push gateway grant lifetime could render in scientific notation (e.g. `2.592e+06`) in the chart, which the gateway binary does not accept. Always ormat the integer as decimal text, preserving the strict gateway parser. ### Testing Added regression coverage that feeds actual Helm-rendered environment values into the production config parser. Covers defaults, values files, command-line overrides, exact lifetime boundaries, and invalid input rejection. The default case failed before the fix and passes afterward. Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>	2026-09-23 08:47:21 -07:00
Tom Brow	7e96f91229	feat(mobile-infra): support development App Attest (#7744) ... Development-signed iOS apps cannot enroll with the current gateway because their Apple App Attest AAGUID is rejected. Add an explicit personal development build feature and environment setting so a development gateway can use a developer's own application identity and sandbox APNs credentials. Ordinary gateway builds remain production-only. Special builds also default to production, enforce exactly the selected signed AAGUID, and retain certificate-chain, pinned-root, nonce, app-ID, key, credential-ID, and counter verification. Document the matching mobile signing configuration and expose the feature through an optional Docker build argument. ### Validation The development image deployed successfully to a personal Railway stack; private readiness, enrollment challenges, authenticated relay access, and APNs sandbox TLS/HTTP2 connectivity passed. Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>	2026-09-22 22:53:46 +00:00
Will Pfleger	26ede6dfa2	docs(nip-fi): clarify federated identity amendments (#7803) ... ## Summary Aligns the NIP-FI wire contract with the post-sync enterprise identity decisions: - bind each community's canonical host URI as its RFC 8707 resource-indicator audience, resolve `Host` to an immutable community configuration before verification, and require both exact audience binding and explicit community-to-issuer authorization - require relays to ignore unverified claims and avoid logging or exposing them; recommend that issuers minimize relay-visible claims - make per-session (`sid`) revocation issuer-side while keeping the relay's revocation primitive pubkey-scoped and community-wide, keyed `(iss, target_pubkey)` - scope the disconnect close scan to connections registered under the command's issuer, including admission-in-progress, matching the deny-entry key; terminally cancel pending connections and close the cross-issuer session-termination gap - clarify proactive assertion re-exchange and reconnect before expiry without introducing in-band renewal Originating Buzz discussion: `buzz://message?channel=51940054-5a7a-4773-a337-8004496630fa&id=d551ee7c61882ef33843e752f63a837921e7c5df2671a88c68a84524490089cc` --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Paul <4a1bfa0013bc6d14a8d600d8bf6392efefbd2a26ac3c96c9b2a106b0d12297ca@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Paul <4a1bfa0013bc6d14a8d600d8bf6392efefbd2a26ac3c96c9b2a106b0d12297ca@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-22 17:56:45 -04:00
Wes	6a86531ac9	feat(relay): add atomic complete read-state snapshots (#7572) ... Opened by Brain on behalf of Wes (GitHub: wesbillman). ## Summary Add an opt-in, host-scoped completeness primitive for NIP-RS read-state clients. Ordinary query arrays and WebSocket behavior remain unchanged. - Advertise a version-1 `read_state_snapshot` capability in NIP-11 only when the request resolves a community. - Accept exactly one self-author kind-30078 snapshot filter on authenticated `POST /query`, after the existing admission, replay and membership gates. - Read all retained, nondeleted self-author kind-30078 coordinates from the writer at one SQL-statement MVCC cut—including unrelated application coordinates and events without a read-state tag. - Return a complete versioned envelope bound to community, signer and a content-identity hash. Reject malformed contracts, reconstruction/signature/storage failures and whole-request overflow; never return a truncated complete response. - Bound snapshots at 4,096 events and 8 MiB of compact encoded event-array bytes, advertised as `max_event_array_bytes`; envelope metadata is additional. Retain the separate stored-payload preflight budget. ## Safety and scope This is point-in-time enumeration, **not** a live freshness guarantee, cursor, CAS token, cross-relay transaction, or unread total. NIP-RS now explicitly requires fresh complete enumeration from every write relay before each override action, canonical publication, carry-forward or deletion. It does not enable synchronized manual-unread overrides in any client. No schema migration or deployment is included. ## Validation Executed against the source committed as `1fd5a5e0c0d893c1259386885517c0c44ae7630f`: - Four real-router/PostgreSQL snapshot cases: beyond-page-cap enumeration and overflow; corruption/storage failure; production payload-bound NIP-98, Redis replay guard and membership enforcement; host discovery/scope/strict request shape. - Two database cases: replacement during preflight preserves a single statement cut; encoded-byte overflow and writer-not-replica routing. The cluster-wide probe uses the required `cluster_global_` serialization prefix. - Production-call-site mutations killed for dispatch, strict filter validation, discovery tenant, snapshot tenant, encoded-byte guard, membership enforcement and replay enforcement; isolated mutation tree restored. - Both affected crates pass all-target Clippy; formatting, differential file-size and repository PostgreSQL test-discovery checks pass. - Normal pre-push gates pass without bypass: branch skew, push-head scope, file size, Rust unit lanes and desktop Tauri checks. - Independent read-only review by Pinky found no remaining relay blocker at this commit. The execution/mutation results above were run by Brain, not duplicated by the reviewer. Hosted CI and maintainer review remain separate gates. No production traffic or deployment was used for these fixture tests. Originating Buzz channel: `a394ecdb-9c67-4c4e-a3c6-4a95f69e8cc8` (unread-but-good), thread `2413d0ba7fa5b2ac5c777df6b3754e2099b042ec8fb96ca64302a0919a0550b3`. ## Review repair (2026-09-21) Carl updated this existing branch to `2f9c9b11266c24947412cf28cefae4e96e7167b7`, merging main `5079c770fe30bb3d8204822ce6c2431eacac6d4b` without rewriting published history. - Resolved the DB export conflict, preserving both snapshot and storage-accounting exports. - Addressed the blocking review using its accepted alternative: rename `max_bytes` to `max_event_array_bytes` and explicitly document that success-envelope metadata is outside the array budget. No auth, query, runtime-limit, or client-behavior redesign. - Added a PostgreSQL/router regression proving discovery, exact 8,388,608-byte array success with a larger envelope, and one-byte-over rejection (413, no partial complete response). Exact-head validation: all seven snapshot PostgreSQL/router tests passed in an isolated local database; both affected crates passed all-target Clippy; mandatory pre-commit/pre-push gates passed without bypass (Rust unit lanes, Tauri default/mesh Clippy and tests, differential file size, branch-skew/ref checks). Reverting only the descriptor rename made the new regression fail before the final commit. Independent bounded source-delta review by Mordecai found no blockers; execution was Carl's. A broader `cargo test -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay --all-targets` run on the merged candidate passed 131 DB tests and 1,057 relay tests, then encountered the same unrelated `mesh_demo::demo_join_forwarded_arm_round_trips_echo` 504 recorded in the prior review. Full repository `just ci` / `just test` were not rerun locally; hosted CI remains a separate gate. No deployment or production traffic was exercised. --------- Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-21 12:30:03 -06:00
Tom Brow	a61239f0d8	fix(mobile): avoid opening empty threads on message tap (#7756) ... Tapping a mobile channel message with no replies currently opens an empty thread. Only enable message-row thread navigation when the existing thread summary reports replies, including replies known to the relay but not loaded locally. Long-press → Reply still starts a new thread. Added widget tests for zero replies, loaded replies, relay-only replies, and starting a thread through Reply. The zero-reply test failed before the fix and passes afterward. Validation: all 227 channel-page tests, the full mobile pre-push checks, and all PR CI checks passed. The full repository gate failed in unchanged Rust ACP timing tests (idle reset, keepalive, and steering deadlines); this PR changes only mobile Dart files. No duplicate open PR or issue found. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>	2026-09-21 08:51:05 -07:00
Tom Brow	76f7e5ef0c	feat(push): make gateway origin configurable (#7261) ... Make the push gateway origin configurable across the relay, gateway, mobile client, and deployment chart. This is a fresh deployment. The gateway has only run on personal development infrastructure, and push has no existing enabled users. Legacy migration, configured-to-unconfigured mobile transitions, and rolling upgrades from pre-launch gateway binaries are not supported. Populated pre-launch databases are rejected with an informative error before migrations run; their data is untouched. Mobile builds may omit the gateway URL, leaving push unavailable. Once push is enabled, subsequent builds must retain that configuration. ### Validation - All applicable CI checks pass at `5f546cfaf403f0386f146d213adfb4392f4ec29c`, including Rust, mobile/Swift, desktop/integration, security, image builds, and Helm checks. An unrelated agent cancellation test passed on retry. - PostgreSQL CI passed 384 tests, including the production-entry-point regression for refusing populated pre-launch databases before migrations, fresh initialization, and subsequent initialized deployments. - Focused local validation passed all 10 gateway PostgreSQL tests under the CI discovery filter and all 3 unconfigured-mobile tests. Repository-wide PostgreSQL discovery validation and the complete pre-push hooks passed. - Physical-device APNs/App Attest behavior and deployment to a live cluster were not verified in this work. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>	2026-09-15 14:56:45 -07:00
Salman Mohammed	78618804ec	Configure ACP session scope per agent (#7578) ... ## Summary PR #6732 taught the ACP harness to honor `BUZZ_ACP_SESSION_POLICY`, but the desktop exposed that policy as one global experiment. Turning it on changed every managed agent at once, even though conversation scope is part of how an individual agent should behave. Some agents need continuity across a channel, while agents such as validators may need clean context for each thread. This moves the choice onto the agent definition under Advanced as **Conversation context**, with **Entire channel** and **Each thread** options. **Entire channel** remains the default, so existing definitions keep their current behavior. The policy now travels through create and update IPC, returned agent summaries, persona events, snapshots, teams, and community catalog copies. Launches pass the effective definition value to the harness. Editing a running agent uses the same lifecycle as a model edit: it shows the restart-required state, leaves the deployed process untouched, and applies the new policy on restart. The global Thread Scoped ACP Sessions experiment and its desktop command/state have been removed because the setting no longer has a useful global meaning. There is intentionally no migration for the old preview override. Users who enabled it can choose **Each thread** for the agents that need it. Unknown or null policy values degrade to **Entire channel** across stored agents, persona events, and catalog projections. This keeps forward-version data from dropping complete agent records. ### Related issue No matching issue found. Builds on #6732. ### Testing - Focused Playwright create flow selected **Each thread** and verified `create_persona` received `sessionPolicy: "thread"`. - Focused Playwright catalog flow added a thread-scoped agent and verified the local copy stored `session_policy: "thread"`. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Salman Mohammed <smohammed@squareup.com>	2026-09-11 20:38:41 +00:00
Wes	6146c4fd16	feat(git): add default-branch management to relay and CLI (#7562) ... Authored by Brain and opened on behalf of Wes (`wesbillman`). ## Summary Add `buzz repos default-branch get/set` and the relay operation it needs. Git push changes branch tips but cannot select the server's symbolic HEAD. This selects an existing branch without deleting branches, moving refs, or changing packs. - Reuse immutable Git manifests and captured-ETag CAS; concurrent pushes/default changes conflict, including stale no-ops. - Require request-specific NIP-98, body binding, fail-closed replay protection, host tenancy, current channel membership and repository-management authority. Push/project roles alone are insufficient. - Send the CLI mutation once, without redirects; ambiguous delivery retains the observed digest and is non-retryable. - Document the narrow HTTP exception to Nostr-first, delegation scope and admission-time ACL revocation. Kind:30618 remains derived; the manifest CAS is authoritative. - Register the Postgres/Redis/MinIO route and fresh-clone tests in the existing Backend Integration lane. ## Review fixes — `7457bda50afa6b52e36315572fa96928b2e21db6` - Reject signed valueless `payload` tags when verifying a body; preserve the shared verifier's intentional absent-payload compatibility. The real settings route now proves 401, unchanged manifest pointer, and unchanged kind:30618 event IDs for malformed and other invalid credentials. - Require a nonempty returned branch and `head == refs/heads/{branch}`; SET additionally requires the returned branch to equal the attempted branch. Malformed/mismatched mutation responses remain non-retryable `DeliveryUnknown`, retaining the attempted branch and original digest. Invalid reads fail before any POST. - Strengthen the later-push/fresh-clone regression to select `release/v1` while `main` exists. ## Verification At `7457bda50afa6b52e36315572fa96928b2e21db6`: - Full pre-push passed (all 14 Rust test groups, serialized Tauri tests/clippy, file-size and branch-skew gates; 522 seconds). No hooks disabled. - All four isolated Postgres/Redis/MinIO settings tests pass, including real Smart HTTP `ls-remote --symref` and fresh clone on `release/v1`. - All 15 focused NIP-98 verifier tests and three default-branch CLI tests pass; malformed credentials and missing-branch responses were reproduced failing before the fixes. - Five targeted mutants are killed: restoring the valueless-payload bypass, weakening canonical HEAD validation, accepting an empty branch, dropping requested-branch confirmation, and omitting hydrated HEAD for the selected non-main branch. Mutations ran in a separate worktree and target directory; original patch bytes were verified restored. - `cargo clippy -p buzz-auth -p buzz-cli -p buzz-relay --all-targets -- -D warnings`, formatting, diff and file-size checks pass on the fixed tree. Earlier validation at `bb195b140`: seven Git authorization database regressions and 28 existing transport tests passed (three infrastructure cases in that module not selected); four mutations killed management/replay/CAS/redirect regressions. Full pre-push passed with `RUST_TEST_THREADS=1` (all 14 Rust groups, Tauri clippy and 3,173 tests, size/branch-skew gates). Serial execution avoids an unrelated process-global Desktop discovery counter flake; no hooks disabled or Desktop changes. Carl and Jude's review findings are addressed in the new head; **fresh reviewer and exact-head security confirmation remain required**. The earlier source review is not approval of this revision. No claim of green new-head CI. ## Rollout Merge and **deploy the relay support first**, then build/use the updated CLI and explicitly set/verify the desired default. No schema migration. This PR does not deploy anything or change a live repository. Originating conversation (channel `8e2fda80-9142-4df8-8e14-da288bea6471`): buzz://message?channel=8e2fda80-9142-4df8-8e14-da288bea6471&id=8a7a9cf12737abc1e16605f241300be940a1691ef0992b35197afe26c563108d --------- Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-11 09:10:43 -06:00
Jordan Mecom	4d447b9c20	Add generic information-flow control core (#7293) ... Adds a dependency-free `ifc-core` crate implementing reader-set confidentiality labels and monotonic per-computation flow state. - Defines flow ordering, join, and meet over caller-supplied principal universes. - Fails closed for unknown or cross-universe input and checks reader widening at egress. - Includes property tests for lattice laws and monotonic taint, plus the design paper that motivates the broker integration. The crate deliberately contains no Buzz, Nostr, channel, membership, or grant policy; those remain in the Buzz adapter. --------- Signed-off-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com>	2026-09-04 22:26:44 +00:00
Logan Johnson	4afef8649a	fix(desktop): restore mention chip identity icons (#7338) ... ## Summary Restore the missing **@ glyph for people and robot icon for agents** after #7133, and incorporate the requested compact public-key display. - Wrapping mention chips render their existing bounded icon-bearing leading fragment. - Readonly chips show bound keys using the same `8 leading…4 trailing` formatter as the channel member list: `Scout (150b20bd…15dc)`. - Full literal labels and exact keys remain authoritative in metadata, profile targets, title/accessible-name attributes, editor text, saved bodies and recipient tags. Display abbreviations are never used for recipient lookup. - Copy/paste restores the full literal label for a complete compact chip; partial selections remain plain text. Two keys sharing the same abbreviation still round-trip to their separate exact recipients. - No recipient-resolution, authorization, wire-format, composer, or CSS changes. Existing labels, icons, cloud markers and ordinary mentions remain intact. ## Verification Published candidate `9365ab9bc9d9c5d10802580cd576f8e378ff492f`, based on main `e09f715c9d0ee2cb7bf8a39061e601f3a502f588`: - **6,444 desktop unit tests passed** on this candidate's final source tree. - **44 mock-Chromium tests passed, zero retries in the final run** across mention recipients, clipboard and cloud provenance: exact recipient selection, ambiguity rejection, send/edit/reopen, forwarding, full/partial copy, mismatched-key rejection, matching-abbreviation collisions and 100%/150% narrow-window geometry. - TypeScript, desktop Biome/check guards, protected-feature production build and E2E build passed. - The compact-renderer regression fails with the formatting call removed. Original missing-icon and hidden-text accessibility regressions have red/green evidence. - Fresh self-review traced rendering, full-key metadata, copy classifier, paste normalization and identity trust. The same display formatter owns the accepted compact form on both clipboard sides. Iteration exposed an existing team-insertion separator flake (passed final full run) and two new fixture assumptions: non-member sends require invitation, and Chromium rich paste may retain an NBSP separator. Tests now exercise invitation and normalize only that separator when comparing the captured full body and exact tags; no product change was needed for either. Earlier local repository-wide `just ci` completed in two invocations because its initial call hit the ten-minute tool limit during Tauri compilation. Unchanged native/mobile/backend evidence is reused; the desktop delta received the full checks above and new remote CI. Native VoiceOver, real Tauri selection, dark theme and non-Chromium observation were not performed. Browser artifacts exercise real frontend with mocked Tauri/relay boundaries, not an installed release. ## Review and visual evidence Current-head CI and automated review must complete after this update; the old `2997bfb5` green results do not establish this new head. Required human review remains separate from agent approvals. No merge/install/restart authorization. Before/after icon evidence: https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7338#issuecomment-5544575866 Updated compact-key screenshots are posted below. The editor intentionally retains the full literal address; only readonly chip display is abbreviated. Origin: buzz://message?channel=3355d33a-b72a-423a-b064-a58275f9a8af&id=38b3a27e689f5a9604e273d45f4e3122fceba76081e7bcd3bbdbf439524a5a18 --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-04 13:36:17 -07:00
Logan Johnson	e7e29937a1	feat(desktop): invite owned agents from standalone forums (#7125) ... ## Summary In Desktop's standalone Forums, selecting an owned agent from another device could leave a post or reply unsendable if the agent had not joined the forum. This adds **Invite / Cancel** to the send flow so you can resolve membership without leaving your draft. - **Invite** checks response policy and your permission to add members, adds the agent to the forum, waits for refreshed membership, then rechecks authorization before posting to the original destination. Membership is forum-wide, not limited to one post. - **Cancel / Escape** keeps the text, attachments and selected recipients for retry. Unlike chat's **Do nothing / Send anyway**, this dialog has no reference-only send choice. Invite is disabled while pending; Cancel remains available. - Leaving the source post/reply cancels its pending invitation, even if you return. Errors remain visible, focus returns to the initiating editor when appropriate, and late completion cannot resume a cancelled post or interfere with a newer attempt. - A rejected send restores text, uploaded media and exact selected recipients to the source draft only if no newer edit, deletion, upload intent or send supersedes it. Clipboard verification settles before recipient capture, with stale edits/navigation fenced out. ### Related issue Targets `main` after #7124 merged. This PR reuses its publication checks and draft protection; the five forum commits have been replayed unchanged onto the merged parent. Owned-agent discovery (#7122) is already merged. Split from #7114. Forum creation/templates, channel-less Notes and local-agent management are unchanged. Duplicate-name binding from #7133 is already merged and retained by this stack. Inviting does not start a remote agent or promise that it is online or will reply. ### Testing Forum composer lifecycle tests, including clipboard-settlement cases, and TypeScript/changed-file formatting checks passed after the restack. Earlier invitation, focus and transport-recovery browser coverage is retained, not claimed as a fresh full browser run on this head. See [live CI](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7125/checks) for current-head results. Browser evidence uses mock IPC; no full local `just ci` pass or native/live-relay validation is claimed. To try it: open a forum post or reply, select an owned nonmember agent and send. Cancel, then retry without reselecting; Invite should add that agent before posting. Deny the add to check the visible error and retained draft. Navigate away/back during a pending invitation or rejected send; no stale publication or overwrite of a newer draft should occur.  *Earlier mock-browser capture, not current-head runtime proof. [Error and successful-post captures](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7125#issuecomment-5513883462); no before-state/native capture available.* **Limits:** cancellation cannot undo accepted membership changes or dispatched posts; authorization and publication are not atomic. Recovery is same-window, subject to browser storage limits, and is not a durable in-flight send journal: reload/crash can lose a pending snapshot. Cross-window coordination and in-flight upload custody are unchanged. The parent's legacy member-agent compatibility does not establish ownership for nonmember invitations. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-04 17:33:30 +00:00
Logan Johnson	d595806fc3	fix(desktop): authorize remote mentions at publication (#7124) ... 🤖 ## Summary In Buzz Desktop, you could own an agent running on another device but be unable to mention it in a channel where it had not yet joined: it was filtered out before you could invite it. A selected agent could also disappear from the message's recipients when permissions changed. This lets you select an eligible agent in the existing **@ menu**, invite it from the message composer, and send to that agent—or see an error and keep your draft rather than silently sending without it. #### Where the experience changes | Screen / control | Before → after | | --- | --- | | A channel's **Message #…** composer, or a message's **Reply in thread to …** composer | Type `@` (or use the existing @ button), choose your agent, write the message and press **Send message**. An owned agent not yet in the channel can now reach the existing **“Mention people outside this channel?”** dialog when its response settings allow you to address it. | | That dialog's **Invite** button | Previously the membership requirement could block the agent before the invitation. Now Invite checks permission to add it, adds it as an agent member of the **channel** (not just the thread), then rechecks membership and response permission before sending the waiting message. An agent already in the channel needs no invitation. | | Existing direct message, or the new-message screen with the **To:** field | A mention is checked against the conversation the message will actually enter, including a newly created direct message, rather than the old or not-yet-created destination. This does not add an Invite control to direct messages. | | Editing a message / sending attachments | The selected agent remains part of the send or edit attempt through attachment upload and the final permission check. Lost permission produces a visible error instead of dropping that recipient. | **Invite is not the only chat choice.** The existing **Do nothing** button sends the message *without inviting or notifying the nonmembers*; their names remain references in the text. Where you cannot invite, that choice is labelled **Send anyway**. To abandon the send instead, dismiss the dialog with Escape. Invitation actions are disabled while preparation is pending, preventing duplicate clicks. **Leaving and returning must not resurrect a cancelled send.** Switching threads or leaving the composer cancels its pending invitation, even if you return to the same thread. Cancellation before dispatch sends no message; an accepted membership change cannot be automatically undone. An ordinary send without a pending invitation remains bound to its original destination rather than following you into another conversation. **Failed sends must not overwrite your next draft.** If you leave a thread, return and replace or deliberately clear its draft while an older send is pending, the older failure cannot restore deleted text, recipients or files; success cannot erase the newer draft—even if its text is identical. An untouched draft cleared automatically for sending remains recoverable on failure. This protection also covers reopening the composer and starting a newer send. The channel timeline also keeps its existing **new-messages / Jump to latest** button available when newer messages are waiting to be displayed. For example, after sharing a reply to the channel and closing the thread panel, you can click the catch-up button to reveal buffered messages. Closing the thread does **not** guarantee the shared row appears automatically or force you away from reading history. ### Related issue Built on [#7122](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7122), base branch `split/owned-agent-discovery`, which lets Desktop find and verify owned agents independently of this device. Current integration head: `1144465d00273cf74b7c22544ae5a3299bd98560`, built on exact published root `3a56d17824522580fe04cae463b54f4c7ba66021`. Root #7122 has its own CI and security gates; this PR must not land ahead of that dependency. Finding an agent is not channel membership, online status or a promise of a reply. This PR changes what the existing message controls can do with those agents; it adds no profile, presence, cloud marker or remote start/stop UI. Standalone forum post/reply **Invite / Cancel** is added separately in [#7125](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7125); here those composers only gain visible authorization errors. Same-name selection/binding fixes ([#7133](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7133)) and mention spacing ([#7128](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7128)) are not included. Extracted from [#7114](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7114) (historical source `98fe33ec`). [Behavior and draft-recovery contract](1144465d00/docs/remote-mention-routing.md) · [Originating discussion](buzz://message?channel=f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1&id=7aa1f0ab23dce514bd8a0221441cf005bf428914621171472b79747c50820848). ### Testing  *Earlier candidate, mock desktop browser: the existing channel dialog now reachable for an eligible owned agent on another device. The two buttons have different send outcomes; Do nothing is not Cancel.* [Success and denial captures](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7124#issuecomment-5482292703) · [Pending-state capture](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7124#issuecomment-5482604329). These show the relevant UI, not live agent availability, native authorization or the later draft-storage/catch-up repairs. No before-state screenshot is available. Existing coverage exercises exact recipients, invitation rejection/cancellation, new direct-message destinations, uploads, edits, thread re-entry and stored-draft deletion. The timeline regression checks the shared reply becomes visible using the available catch-up action. **Integration validation (2026-09-02):** independently reviewed the routing delta onto root `3a56d178`: seven original patches unchanged; two reconciliations retain generic publication-error toasts alongside authorization errors and retain non-authored editability updates. Added two production-hook regression tests (normal and queued-media publication) requiring visible generic error, recovered draft and released pending state. - Writer validation: **5,995 Desktop tests**, **42 focused tests**, **22 mock-IPC browser journeys** (18 routing, 2 root provenance, 2 destination binding), and **1 voice-note failure journey** passed; lint, types, size guards and E2E build also passed. - The broad suite ran before the final formatting-only test amendment, not as an exact-final-head rerun. Independent AST comparison confirmed that amendment is semantics-preserving; **4 fresh assertions at final `1144465d`** passed. Publication rechecked final-head TypeScript, amended-test formatting and `git diff --check` successfully. No new full repository `just ci` run is claimed. - Browser tests use an isolated E2E build and **mock IPC**, not live relay/native authorization. Historical screenshots above are explicitly earlier UI evidence, not exact-head runtime certification. Packaged Tauri/live-relay behavior was not independently witnessed. - **Published-head gates:** [current CI run](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33657948560) and [renewed exact-head formal review request](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7124#issuecomment-5513218340) must clear before landing. [Earlier CI run](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33438436438) and the two earlier approvals cover `7ffead0f`, not this new head. Root CI/security clearance remains separate; the independent scoped integration approval is not merge authorization. To try it: in a channel or thread, select an owned nonmember agent, Send, then Invite or Escape and retry. Deny the add or revoke its response permission before sending: expect a visible error and recoverable draft, not a message missing the agent. During a pending send, return to the source thread, edit or clear the draft, then leave again: late completion must not overwrite that choice. **Limits:** permission checks and sending are separate operations; cancellation cannot retract a dispatched message. Draft protection is same-window, not new cross-window deletion synchronization. Standalone forum transport failure can still restore text/media without the exact selected recipients. Native compatibility is inherited: open-source builds may still recognize a valid legacy, self-declared agent already in the channel when verified ownership is absent or rejected; that does not establish ownership or unlock this owned-nonmember invitation path. Invalid policy from a verified owner is still rejected. No agent response is guaranteed. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-04 16:35:35 +00:00
Logan Johnson	ee883d73fb	fix(desktop): bind duplicate mention selections to exact recipients (#7133) ... ## Summary Selecting two people or agents named Scout could replace the first recipient with the second even though the message still looked right. This binds each selection to its exact identity: the first keeps `@Scout`, and a conflicting selection gets `@Scout (<full public key>)`. Removing one no longer removes or redirects the other. - Reuse the existing **@ suggestion list**; team selection and automatic agent addressing reserve and reuse distinct labels too. Typing an ambiguous name manually shows an instruction to use the picker and preserves the draft without publishing—in chat, edits and standalone forums. - Share literal mention matching across recipient extraction, removal, display and editing so a shorter name cannot claim another recipient's longer or qualified label. - Rebuild authored references when a message is edited, and use the latest authorized snapshot when reopening or forwarding. Rendering/editing can recover qualified identities only from the message's recorded references, not from a key typed into its body. Unresolvable historical names remain literal rather than guessed recipients. - Wrap full-key labels within narrow/zoomed layouts while keeping their complete accessible label and ordinary mention icons. Edit activation waits for the action menu's focus cleanup before focusing the editor. ### Related issue Targets `main`; mention spacing (#7128) is already merged. Split from #7114. This is independent of the #7124 → #7125 remote-invitation stack and does not expand agent eligibility or invitation permissions. The separate Enter-selection suffix issue remains tracked in #7253. ### Testing The desktop unit suite and focused mock-Chromium checks passed on the published integration candidate, including pending-paste selection, edit/forwarding, copy and narrow-layout cases; formatting, types and frontend builds passed. On `0b3b18c0`, 64 focused trust/paste/selection unit tests and six mock-Chromium tests passed with zero browser retries, including actual timeline chip copy → fresh channel paste → send and mismatched-key rejection; TypeScript, changed-file Biome and an isolated E2E build passed. The broader browser run had copy failures before the focused repairs and is not claimed as wholly green. See [live CI](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7133/checks) for current-head results. No full local `just ci` pass, native/live-relay or cross-browser validation is claimed. To try it: select two same-name recipients, remove one, send, then edit/reopen and forward; only the intended identities should remain. Type an ambiguous name without choosing a suggestion and check that sending retains the draft with an error. Inspect full-key labels in a narrow window at 150% text size, and open Edit and type immediately.   *Earlier mock-browser captures, not current-head runtime proof. No new before-state capture; screenshots alone do not prove recipient delivery.* **Clipboard trust:** generated full-key-qualified mentions now retain their exact recipient after copy/paste when the full key matches the clipboard record and community directory/profile state independently vouches for the base alias, including numeric collision suffixes. A qualifier alone does not establish trust. Arbitrary historical labels still cannot always be reconstructed. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Bad Janet <150b20bdf6130418df9239dd1bd082c71612c8d653b47c277200365b9be215dc@buzz>	2026-09-04 11:51:41 -04:00
Matt Toohey	b1f6b7ef77	feat(desktop): preserve mentions across copy and paste (#7228) ... Copying a message out of the timeline lost the mention. The rendered chip drops the `@` for display, so the clipboard carried "John Smith" — two ordinary words no composer could bind back to a pubkey. Pasting into another channel produced dead text, and sending it tagged nobody. ## What changed Every Buzz copy now writes two clipboard flavors in one transaction: - **`text/plain`** — readable anywhere, sigils restored, no pubkeys. This is what TextEdit, Slack, and every other external app receive. - **`text/html`** — the same content with each mention wrapped in a span carrying `data-mention-pubkey` / `-label` / `-kind`. On paste, the composer harvests those records, registers each `name → pubkey` with the existing mention machinery, and inserts the content: the chip re-lights and the send path recovers the identity the author tagged. A marker attribute records what the plain flavor holds, so a Markdown copy pastes through the text pipeline and a rendered copy through the HTML one. **Covered surfaces:** timeline selection copy, thread-panel selection copy, forum post/reply selection copy, "Copy message", and composer copy/cut — plus paste in both the channel and forum composers. ## Trust boundary Clipboard HTML is untrusted, and the branch treats it that way: - Records are capped (50), labels bounded (200 chars), and a pubkey must be 64 hex before it can become a `p` tag. - **Only mentions the paste actually shows are registered.** An empty `<span data-mention-pubkey=… -label="Jane Doe">` would otherwise rebind that display name for the rest of the composer session, so a later hand-written @Jane Doe would chip-light convincingly against the attacker's key. Each branch registers only the records whose label appears in the text *it* inserts, matched with `getMentionOffsets` — the same matcher the send-time extractor uses. - **The visibility gate reads only what ProseMirror will insert.** `DOMParser` hard-drops `script`, `style`, `title`, `noscript`, `object`, and `head` content, so `visible<style>@Jane Doe</style>` beside an empty chip span used to smuggle a binding past the gate. Those elements are stripped before either output is derived. - **A partial chip never gains a sigil.** A selection crossing a chip boundary falls through to the browser's default copy, which serializes the full identity attributes around a slice of the text — pasting that invented "@Smith" out of "John Smith". Paste now leaves a fragment as plain text, tolerating only what a whole chip picks up in transit (restored sigil, author casing, U+00A0 swaps, and the label cap's own ellipsis). Both clipboard sides share one `matchChipTextToLabel` helper, in the module that owns the label attributes, so copy and paste cannot drift on what counts as a whole chip. ## Notes - Mention matching reuses `getMentionOffsets`, so code spans and fences are excluded and the longest display name wins. - The plain flavor inlines chip boxes before reading `innerText`; a chip is a flex container, so the browser's own copy split "@John Smith" onto its own line. - `MarkdownMention` and `MacEmacsTextShortcuts` are extracted verbatim from `markdown.tsx` and `useRichTextEditor.ts` to keep both files under the size gate. ## Testing - ~40 unit tests over the flavor builder/parser, the visibility filter, the ignored-tag sweep, and the chip-match verdicts. - A Playwright spec (`desktop/tests/e2e/mention-clipboard.spec.ts`) driving real copy/cut/paste DOM events: timeline and "Copy message" of a multi-word non-member mention pasted into another channel and sent with the original pubkey in its `p` tag; the forum copy → forum reply round trip; composer copy/cut; plain flavor asserted to contain no 64-hex string; the boundary-crossing drag; and the hidden-record and `<style>` smuggling vectors. - Every regression test is bound to a production seam and fails with its guard removed. - `just ci` / pre-push lanes green (5927 desktop unit tests, typecheck, lint, file-size gate). --------- Signed-off-by: Matt Toohey <contact@matttoohey.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-04 16:45:13 +10:00
Will Pfleger	752cbfc037	docs(nip-fi): add Blossom kind-24242 media possession-proof exception (#7278) ... Adds the media/Blossom possession-proof exception section to \`docs/nips/NIP-FI.md\`. ## What this changes Encodes the condition set confirmed by Thufir's security review (2026-09-03) as normative MUSTs in NIP-FI. Kind-24242 Blossom auth events are admitted as the NIP-FI pairing possession proof for **media routes only** — a named, bounded exception with an explicit precedent fence against expansion. ### Scope fence Kind-24242 proofs are valid only on: | Proof type (`t` tag) | Valid route | Method | |---|---|---| | `upload` | `PUT /upload` (and temporary alias `PUT /media/upload` until removed) | PUT | | `get` | `GET /media/{hash…}`, `HEAD /media/{hash…}` | GET, HEAD | All other protected routes MUST reject kind-24242 proofs. ### Upload proofs Exactly one `x` tag over consumed body bytes; temporal check precedes body consumption. ### Read proofs (the relaxation Will approved) Host-wide MAY: no `x` required. Exactly one `server` tag matching the resolved tenant host is a MUST. Optional `x` must match parent hash if present. Named residual (verbatim in spec): within at most 60 seconds from minting (plus 5s future-skew), a captured full header set allows reading any media blob on exactly one tenant host — read-only, membership-checked, revocable, not state-changing, not cross-tenant. ### Freshness (Thufir option 2) - `created_at <= now + 5s` (bounded future skew) - `now - created_at <= 60s` - Exactly one `expiration`, valid at admission, satisfying `expiration <= created_at + 60s` ### Transport/cardinality Exactly one each of `Authorization` (Nostr scheme), `t`, `expiration`, `server`; `x` at most once; reject any duplicate, malformed, or conflicting instance. ### Per-request pairing Full assertion verification, exact key equality between assertion `nostr_pubkey` and kind-24242 signer, deny-map enforcement on every request. Stub gap named. ### Compliance note PR #7264 implementation is explicitly non-compliant until the bounded hardening task lands (named gaps: multi-tag acceptance, 3600s window, optional `server`). ## Behavioral oracle `FI-TRACE-HTTP-INGRESS` extended to cover kind-24242 admission and denial cases. ## Scope Docs-only. No code changes. The code hardening is a separate follow-on task. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-03 12:48:23 -04:00
Logan Johnson	5073e075d7	fix(desktop): unify owned-agent cloud provenance markers (#7129) ... Unify presentation-only cloud provenance across agent identity surfaces. Keep successful local-inventory and verified-ownership gates; preserve main availability and mention spacing behavior. Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com>	2026-09-03 02:35:37 +00:00
Logan Johnson	d5a73b9f35	fix(desktop): derive agent availability from relay presence (#7127) ... 🤖 ## Requested rebase published — ef40744b Rebased onto fetched main **47d068e2109d077414cbf2f4f1c927f6d051037a**, published **ef40744b3aeb4baaf8c81416e1a644fb5b315f91** with the exact expected-old `df7fad6a` force-with-lease. No merge. Manual conflicts were additive: preserve main's exact-key identity documentation alongside the availability contract, and retain both Bestie props and the shared availability reader in `UnifiedAgentsSection`. Range-diff confirms unchanged lifecycle policy: exact-key action-time authority, Unknown versus Offline, rejected shutdown retains record/memberships, and separate local/provider/owner gates. Main's exact-key profile routing survives. Both test-only CI synchronization repairs (natural toast expiry and bounded stderr wait) are byte-identical to the prior head. All ten original authors/messages/DCO/material coauthor trailers are preserved; configured signing policy was not changed. Fresh checks on the rebased candidate: - TypeScript, Biome on 26 changed TypeScript files, differential file-size gate, and diff whitespace: pass. - Focused production-hook/card/profile units: **58/58**. - Fresh E2E build, availability/deletion browser: **11/11**, no retries. - Main exact-key profile cases plus failed-DM send/startup retries: **6/6**, no retries. Previously reviewed full Desktop/buzz-agent package and mutation evidence is reused for unchanged behavior; no ceremonial full suite, new native/provider test, or `just ci` pass is claimed. Local configs, dependency links, and historical artifacts are preserved. Hosted observation: **MERGEABLE**, **BLOCKED / REVIEW_REQUIRED**, no new-head formal review. [CI 33699735990](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33699735990) is running (including Rust and Desktop lanes), not a completed success. DCO and required Security aggregate passed at the observation; the separate Codex advisory review was skipped. No completed failing check or new inline feedback observed. Historical approvals are not new-head approvals. No reviewer/security authorization or merge action was performed. --- ## Feature summary and retained pre-rebase evidence ## Summary In Buzz Desktop, an agent could look online just because it had been started or deployed, even when there was no current sign it was connected. Cards and profiles now show availability from the agent's relay presence rather than a saved launch record, so you can distinguish an online agent from one that was merely deployed. Agents cards and profiles use presence reported through the shared server (the relay). A successful presence read with no online agent shows Offline; failed/disconnected evidence shows unknown, rather than retaining a misleading cached Online state. Lifecycle actions remain separate. An offline agent may still have a Shutdown action because the deployment record exists. Shutdown reports a **request**, not proof the process stopped. Offline does not imply that starting a duplicate agent is safe, and Online does not promise a response. ### Related issue Independent base: `main`; no stack parent or child among the replacements. Extracted from [#7114](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7114), retained as historical source (`98fe33ec`). [Behavior contract](f4bb2ed44e/docs/agent-availability.md). Originating [Buzz discussion](buzz://message?channel=f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1&id=7aa1f0ab23dce514bd8a0221441cf005bf428914621171472b79747c50820848) · channel `f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1`. ### Testing The same saved provider-backed agent, with only authored presence changing. These are mock-browser states, not a before/after deployment or live relay transport test; production UI is unchanged by the later fixture repairs. **No online presence:** gray dot, existing Shutdown control retained.  **Online presence:** green dot, same lifecycle control.  [Capture details](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7127#issuecomment-5482264824). To check manually, compare runtime-only transitions with presence updates, then disconnect/fail the presence read and verify it does not stay Online. A Shutdown request should not immediately claim confirmed termination. #### Historical pre-rebase evidence and limitations (df7fad6a) Lifecycle production source remains **`f4bb2ed44e5a989d93c5f51e93c0bbd2dca941be`**. Current published head is **`df7fad6ae65dda78508317186a95522d1bb22ed9`**: the prior browser synchronization at `b78d093e` plus an additive two-file Rust test-harness synchronization described below. No production bytes, dependency/configuration files, or prior commits were changed; no rebase. Current live main `0dbd036f5bff33e7ade75e7639f3218d424a6e73` has identical failing-test/toaster/send-flow source; the causal browser comparison used latest successfully tested main `04babf02655440b4dfd37f2e2df605ead0a030d8`. **Lifecycle/deletion correction:** both Agents and actual profile deletion now pass the shared exact-key availability reader, not raw cached data. It reads the canonical query state and connection at action time, including after awaited channel discovery. Failed/disconnected/pending evidence and unqueried persona siblings are unknown; successful missing means Offline only for a requested key. Successful background refetch cache remains usable; settled failure revokes it. No second cache or per-row polling was added. Provider record + channel + Online/Away/**unknown** awaits shutdown submission before local removal; rejection preserves record/membership for retry. Established Offline preserves intentional no-request removal. No route preserves warned local removal. Local agents retain native stop-before-remove, independent of presence. Profile consent now describes a shutdown **request**, not remote deletion or guaranteed termination. Existing ownership and force gates are unchanged. **Verified, reused exact-candidate validation:** the independently approved eleven-file patch (SHA-256 `2f69fe12ef0420e62dea1fd8db28cfa22cde5eecaf8080e656310a3e60d0cf86`) was committed without byte changes. Desktop **5,921 passed, 0 failed/skipped**, including **26 new mounted production hook/IPC regressions**; rebuilt availability browser suite **11/11 passed, no retries**, including four actual profile Delete journeys. Desktop check (existing 4 warnings/5 infos), typecheck, production/protected-feature artifact matrix, differential file-size/policy and diff checks passed. No blanket rerun or new full-repository `just ci` is claimed for this frontend correction. Production regressions cover cached Online **and Offline** failure/disconnection, genuine missing/Offline, pending, successful inflight refetch versus settled error, retained reader, error during awaited channel discovery, unqueried persona sibling, shutdown rejection/order/cancel, no route and local authority. Browser fixtures use safe mock IPC and a retained provider receipt, not a real deployment. Three restored mutation controls fail: unknown → skip shutdown (**15** regressions), Agents raw-cache reader (**6**), actual profile raw-cache caller (**1 browser journey**, false removal on failed cached Offline). Independent review approved the exact frozen bytes and added **4/4 cached-empty failure/disconnection probes** across both callers. This is local independent approval, not formal GitHub/A Team clearance. The prior native propagation/poll-count defects remain closed ([earlier response](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7127#issuecomment-5512278755)). The prior hover-popover correction at `b55423f6` remains covered by the full 11-journey browser run: pending/failed/disconnected means no badge or accessible status, genuine missing/Offline retains an Offline badge. Its earlier fallback-restoration mutation failed as expected (badge count 1 rather than 0); that historical witness is reused, not rerun. **Reused unchanged native/system boundary:** local `just ci` at `c59067d8` passed workspace/Tauri fmt/clippy, static/policy checks, Rust unit recipe, native workspace **3,159 passed / 20 ignored**, Web build and **2,019 mobile tests**. No native implementation changed in this lifecycle correction. These are historical boundary results, not new-head native/live certification. [Parent CI](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33650549130) passed with **14 retry-recovered browser flakes**, not retry-free. Old-head CI/reviews are not current-head clearance. **Hosted gates:** [CI33662151103](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33662151103) on `f4bb2ed4` **FAILED**: smoke shard1 had 322 pass, one failure, one retry-recovered flaky, two skipped. The failed first-DM retry test timed out on all three attempts because the error toast intercepted Send. That failure is preserved, not waived; the scoped test repair below is published as `b78d093e`. [CI33668171165](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33668171165) on `b78d093e` subsequently **FAILED** the Rust unit budget regression described below. Both original failures remain visible; neither was retried to green. Exact `f4bb2ed4` and `b78d093e` APPROVED reviews cover unchanged reviewed bytes, not formal approval of the new head. Fresh exact-head CI and the established automated technical rereview are the next gates for `df7fad6a`. Historical deletion responses remain ([5092381800](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7127#issuecomment-5513759316), [5092391193](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7127#issuecomment-5513763497)). No formal review dismissed. The [security notice](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7127#issuecomment-5482231278) and latest-push maintainer/codeowner policy remain separate actionable gates: eligible Block organization members own current-range authorization. No merge/security authority exercised. **CI causal repair (`b78d093e`, test only):** the error `Message failed to send: Mock first DM send failed.` is deliberately injected by the existing fixture. CI screenshot and retry trace show the bottom-right Sonner notification over the actual enabled Send button. `fill()` leaves the pointer parked there; Sonner pauses its 4-second lifetime while hovered. A fast run can click before animation settles (unchanged local test passed in 2.7s; two actual tested-main CI cases passed first attempt in 3.3s), which does not disprove the failure. Independent controlled browser runs on `f4bb2ed4` and tested main `04babf` both reproduced the same toast hit-test at Send `(1203,627,32,32)`, persistent hover beyond 4s, and intercepted ordinary click with no second send. Moving the real pointer to the editor allows natural expiry and successful ordinary retry, preserving all original DM-channel/recipient assertions. This same synchronization already exists in the neighboring agent-startup-failure test. The one-file correction keeps the visible error assertion, scopes its toast locator, moves the pointer back to the editor and observes normal toast removal (bounded 10s) before retry. No forced click, direct toast dismissal, mocked clock, CSS override, skipped test, production behavior change, or new backend mock. Six focused browser executions pass (first-send/startup-failure, three repeats each, no retries); the held-toast control fails on original bytes at the Send click while the exact repaired test passes. Biome and diff checks pass. Reuse unchanged 5,921 Desktop / 11 availability browser / four independent probes above; no semantic production change warrants repeating those suites. Original failed CI attempt/retries, local fast pass, deliberate failing control and all traces remain in `WORK_LOGS/AVAILABILITY_CI_B9210A40`. Browser evidence is mock-IPC Chromium, not native/live-relay certification. The UI still temporarily overlays Send while a notification is hovered; the test exercises its real move-away/expiry recovery, not immediate click-through. **Rust CI causal repair (`df7fad6a`, test only):** [original Rust / Unit Tests failure, job100375291370](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33668171165/job/100375291370) tested GitHub merge `223dee91a396d8cb4ebf18b9b8559e5a54951235`. `context_recovery_budget_exhaustion_surfaces_the_error` failed at `regressions.rs:2756` in **0.091s** because its immediate stderr snapshot lacked `context recovery budget spent`. ACP context-error assertions had already passed. The captured prefix shows all three budgets **32768 → 16384 → 8192 bytes**, above the 4096-byte floor, and ends during the third attempt. This is **not evidence of floor exhaustion**. The collector is an independent Tokio task; a stdout response is not a stderr barrier. Recovery, harness and test blobs were identical across the compared base/head/merge parents; no production regression was implicated. The shared test Harness now provides a bounded event/condition wait, registering for collector notifications before reading the buffer to avoid lost wakeups. The budget and adjacent terminal floor assertions wait for their own diagnostic and retain the matching snapshot. The budget test still requires the provider's ACP context error and exactly three recovery rungs, now corroborated by **exactly four provider calls** and no floor diagnostic. Timeout remains a real failure with captured stderr. No fixed sleep, weaker assertion, skip, provider-limit/logging change, dependency/config edit, or production change. **Deterministic causal control:** the same real agent/HTTP-provider/ACP scenario holds only stderr collection behind a one-shot gate until after stdout responds. The old immediate snapshot fails the original budget assertion (intentional exit101); the repaired wait explicitly remains Pending while held, then passes after release. No scheduler-speed assumption or fixed sleep. This reproduces the observation race under controlled delay, **not the exact historical CI schedule**. A missing-diagnostic test proves the wait actually times out. Original failure and deliberate failing-control logs/patch remain in `WORK_LOGS/RUST_TRIAGE_06E32D2D` and `WORK_LOGS/RUST_SYNC_BC5758B9`. **Final candidate validation:** focused recovery **9/9**, floor **1/1**, absent-diagnostic timeout **1/1** pass. One full touched-package run, `cargo test --locked -p buzz-agent`: **695 passed, 0 failed, 1 existing ignored**, including all **54 regressions**. Local nextest was unavailable, so this uses the repository-supported cargo-test fallback, not a claim of nextest reproduction. `cargo fmt --check`, package-scoped Clippy all-targets with `-D warnings`, differential file-size/policy and diff checks pass. Previously reviewed availability production and the Desktop/browser evidence above are unchanged and reused; no all-native blanket rerun. The test-only delta was self-reviewed against collector ordering, timeout and falsification evidence. Existing production approval remains valid for those bytes; exact-new-head technical/CI clearance is not assumed. The required **Security aggregate** is distinct from optional Codex advisory feedback; no security authorization, human review contact, or merge was requested. **Remaining policy limits:** shutdown submission is not harness acceptance or process termination; confirmed Offline/no-route local removal may leave a remote process; route discovery is best effort, membership cleanup uses `Promise.allSettled`, and multi-instance deletion is sequential/non-atomic. No distributed singleton, provider-health, tenant-switch cancellation, live relay TTL or packaged WebView/VoiceOver certification is claimed. The pre-existing DM-header raw-presence fallback (`ChannelScreenHeader`/`useActiveChannelHeader`) remains outside this repair and uncertified. Screenshots above remain historical mock-browser illustrations, not new deletion or native transport evidence. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-02 21:53:15 -04:00
Logan Johnson	44d19f59a5	fix(desktop): preserve spacing after multi-word mentions (#7128) ... 🤖 ## Summary In Buzz Desktop, choosing a multi-word name and immediately continuing a sentence could swallow the space after the mention: `Hey @Alice Chenhello`. This keeps the separator, so the same action produces `Hey @Alice Chen hello` without moving the caret or repairing the name by hand. The editor recognizes the complete selected label, including its internal spaces, and settles the autocomplete caret after the trailing separator. Deliberately moving left or clicking inside the label still lets you edit there; this is not a rule that forces every caret to the end of a mention. ### Related issue Independent base: `main`. Child: [#7133](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7133), whose disambiguated labels also contain spaces. Extracted from [#7114](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7114), retained as historical source (`98fe33ec`). [Behavior contract](4fe451d9c2/docs/mention-editor.md). Originating [Buzz discussion](buzz://message?channel=f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1&id=7aa1f0ab23dce514bd8a0221441cf005bf428914621171472b79747c50820848) · channel `f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1`. ### Testing Select an existing member named Alice Chen, then type `hello` immediately. Repeat after ArrowLeft or clicking inside the mention: typing should follow your chosen caret position. Mock-browser captures, not live remote-agent evidence: #### Immediate typing preserves the separator Choosing the complete label then typing produces `Hey @Alice Chen hello`.  #### Deliberate caret movement is respected After ArrowLeft, typing edits at the chosen caret rather than forcing the caret back beyond the separator.  [Original screenshot publication](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7128#issuecomment-5482715543); immutable image URLs and captions retained here. #### Evidence and limitations **5,801 desktop tests**, **45 focused editor tests**, both new browser regressions, the browser-test build and static/type/size checks passed. [Applicable CI passed](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33421534320). The broader browser run had **132 passes / 6 failures**: two clipboard-origin setup failures and four generic caret-formatting failures also reproduced on unchanged main. Full local `just ci` stopped at three native timing/probe failures; a same-head native rerun passed **3,005 tests** with 18 existing ignores. This is not a full local-CI pass. The change fixes insertion and caret behavior, not duplicate-name recipient selection, discovery or invitation. Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-02 21:51:45 -04:00
Will Pfleger	c328202cb0	docs(nip-fi): document Git smart-HTTP credential exemption (#7268) ... Amend NIP-FI HTTP ingress with an explicit Git smart-HTTP credential-helper exemption. The exception covers method binding, endpoint-URL binding, and the `payload` tag requirement for `info/refs`, `git-upload-pack`, and `git-receive-pack`, while preserving per-request NIP-FI assertion, key pairing, and deny-map enforcement. The spec records Git's credential-protocol limitation, the required compensating controls, and the rule that this exception is limited to these endpoints and is superseded by per-request signing. Related: [PR #7264](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7264) Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>	2026-09-02 20:34:24 -04:00
Will Pfleger	187df22252	docs(nip-fi): adopt deny-until-TTL and extend enforcement to HTTP ingress (#7254) ... Spec revision following two decisions: Option B admin deny (2026-09-02) and the HTTP ingress ruling (2026-09-02). Revises `docs/nips/NIP-FI.md` only. Follows #7214 (merged spec v2). ## What changed ### Admin disconnect: session-only → deny-until-TTL The disconnect operation proceeds in two steps, in order: 1. Insert a memory-resident deny entry keyed by `(iss, target_pubkey)` with absolute expiry `until` — atomically combined with the `(iss, jti)` replay-identity reservation as one all-or-nothing mutation. If the deny set is at capacity (per-issuer bound), the relay rejects `503`; neither the jti nor the deny entry is recorded, and the caller may safely retry the same signed command. 2. Close all live WebSocket connections for the target pubkey, synchronously. The single atomic admission mutation (jti reservation + deny-entry insertion) lives inside `VerifyCommandJwt` step 7, after all pure authorization checks. The endpoint only closes sessions on success. This ordering ensures a capacity failure leaves no state behind and makes the retry-safe 503 contract implementable. The deny set is RAM-cache only — no durable storage, no schema changes. The same operational posture as the JWKS snapshot. A relay restart MAY forget active entries; the issuer SHOULD re-push still-active deny entries on observed restart (same publish/cache pattern as JWKS). If the issuer stops issuing assertions and re-push completes before any expired-entry reconnection attempt, residual exposure after restart is bounded by `max(0, min(exp, iat + maximum_assertion_age) - now)`. If the issuer continues issuing or re-push does not complete in time, that formula does not apply and access may continue beyond it. **`until` claim:** Required on the disconnect command JWT. Because an assertion accepted at the future-skew boundary (`iat <= now + skew`) remains valid until `iat + maximum_assertion_age`, the latest possible authority deadline is `now + skew + maximum_assertion_age`. The relay enforces `until <= now + skew + maximum_assertion_age`. A value above this ceiling rejects `400`; a past `until` still closes live sessions — absent an active same-key entry it creates no future denial, while an active entry remains unchanged under the merge rule. **Capacity and eviction (per-issuer):** The relay MUST bound the deny set size **per issuer**. Capacity exhaustion under one issuer MUST NOT cause rejection of another issuer's commands; the `503` capacity check is evaluated against the command's own issuer bound. Implementations MUST evict only expired entries; when an issuer's partition is at capacity and all entries are still active, the relay MUST reject the new command `503` without removing any existing entry. There is no LRU eviction of active denies. **Issuer-global deny:** The deny entry applies to admission across all communities served by the relay under that issuer. Identity-level revocation is intentionally not community-partial. **Cross-replica propagation:** In a deployment with multiple relay processes, the deployment MUST propagate both the session-close and the deny entry to every process serving admissions for the issuer's communities. The mechanism is deployment-defined (e.g. the existing inter-process message bus, same posture as JWKS convergence). Propagation is asynchronous with no protocol-level completion bound. The issuer re-push duty is the recovery path for lost propagation, exactly as for relay restart. **Response shape:** A successful disconnect responds `{"disconnected": true}` regardless of how many sessions were closed. No session count is returned; a count would aggregate activity across communities and constitute an information leak. **Admission procedure:** Step 5 registers the session's proven `k` before the deny-set check (new step 6) — ensuring any connection that straddles a concurrent disconnect is caught by one side or the other. `FI-TRACE-DENY-SET` oracle covers the per-issuer capacity rule and the straddling termination requirement. ### HTTP ingress enforcement Without explicit enforcement, a protected HTTP surface (bridge, invites, media, git) with NIP-98-only authorization allows a principal holding an active key to mint fresh NIP-98 events indefinitely — NIP-98 proves key possession only, not identity. Without assertion verification there is no expiry bound; the key remains valid for as long as it is accepted. **Pairing rule:** in enforce mode, a protected HTTP request MUST carry both: ``` Authorization: Nostr <base64-NIP-98-event> Nostr-Federated-Identity: Bearer <compact-JWS> ``` The NIP-98 pubkey MUST equal the assertion `nostr_pubkey` claim. Missing, mismatched, or invalid evidence of either kind denies, fail closed. **Verification:** reuses `VerifyAssertion` unchanged — offline, same JWKS, same claim requirements, same denial classes. **Per-request:** HTTP is sessionless; every request re-verifies. No session lifetime, no cached admission. The cumulative residual bound applies per request. **Deny-set applicability:** the deny-until-TTL entry introduced above is consulted per HTTP request identically to WebSocket admission. **Protected surface:** deployment-configured set of routes, fail-closed default (unclassifiable routes treated as protected). No normative route names in the spec. `FI-TRACE-HTTP-INGRESS` oracle added. Security considerations updated with HTTP ingress bypass analysis. NIP-98 source reference added. ### Other changes - `authorization_denied` rejection table row updated to "active deny-set entry for pubkey". - Discovery: `maximum_residual_upstream_revocation_seconds` remains `null` — the deny-until-TTL model is best-effort RAM state and provides no unconditional finite revocation bound. - Rejection and privacy: explicit sentence for HTTP denial path. - Client-attached transport: opening sentence generalized to cover both WebSocket and HTTP. ## Scope Single file: `docs/nips/NIP-FI.md`. No code changes. References #7214. Channel: buzz-enterprise-identity-spec-v2 (#a6fe0b1c-987a-43c5-a974-71ee36678d78). --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-02 17:24:14 -04:00
Logan Johnson	83e5962984	fix(desktop): keep explicit agent profiles bound to their exact key (#7131) ... 🤖 ## Summary In Buzz Desktop, clicking a message from stopped agent A could open running agent B—and B's controls—because both shared a persona (an agent definition). This now opens the author you clicked and only that agent's own controls, so you can inspect an old message without being redirected to a different running agent. An explicit public key—the identifier for one agent—now stays exact across message authors, members, DMs, deep links and Instances rows, including stopped, archived and relay-only agents. Local controls come only from a matching local record for that key. A relay-only A cannot borrow B's Start/Stop/Edit controls or configuration. Deliberately opening a **persona** is different: it can still select a representative that respects archived instances or offer Start when none remains. The change removes competing historical-persona redirects rather than adding another identity exception. ### Related issue Independent base: `main`; no stack parent or child among the replacements. Extracted from [#7114](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7114), retained as historical source (`98fe33ec`). [Behavior contract](9c4b6523ce/docs/agent-profile-identity.md). Originating [Buzz discussion](buzz://message?channel=f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1&id=7aa1f0ab23dce514bd8a0221441cf005bf428914621171472b79747c50820848) · channel `f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1`. ### Testing Synthetic Playwright mock-bridge state. After screenshots exercise this independent profile extraction (`df6612b1`); no availability or cloud-marker implementation is included. #### Before: historical A redirects to running B Unchanged main product code (`bc006f67`) with the same updated historical-message fixture fails: clicking Earlier Parity Agent opens Current Parity Agent and its Stop control.  #### After: historical A opens A The clicked author remains Earlier Parity Agent, with A's public key and its own Start control. The current sibling is not substituted.  #### Exact relay-only A while local sibling B exists A's public key and owner-scoped profile are visible; no local Start/Stop/Edit/Add control or sibling definition is borrowed.  #### Explicit persona navigation may select local B Deliberately opening the persona selects its local representative, with B's key and legitimate Stop/Restart/Edit controls.  #### Explicit persona without an instance may offer Start This is a deliberately opened persona, not a relay-only key turned into a persona surface.  [Original screenshot publication](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7131#issuecomment-5482310890); all five immutable image URLs and captions retained here. The final documentation-only commit does not change this UI. These are synthetic browser fixtures, not live runtime health evidence. To check manually, open an old message from stopped A while same-persona B is running; compare the displayed key and controls. Then open the persona itself and verify that representative selection still works. #### Evidence and limitations **5,793 desktop tests**, **56 profile/archive browser cases**, type/static/size checks and repository-wide `just ci` passed. The historical-message regression fails on unchanged main by opening B instead of A. [Published-head CI passed](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33422207592). The [advisory security check](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33422240973) timed out without a result; it is not a passing check. No availability, cloud-marker, discovery or mention-routing change is included. These screenshots do not establish remote delivery, agent execution or termination. #### Security authorization history (audit, not clearance) The [security gate](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7131#issuecomment-5482300054) remains visible and unresolved. Existing authorization-request comments were posted by `loganj`: [old-head request](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7131#issuecomment-5482311163) for `df6612b1db5a6f8d128cef955fd66a80b6828cb8` at 2026-08-31 17:55:11 UTC, then [current-head request](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7131#issuecomment-5482320424) for `9c4b6523ceaef0f3d92906fcdb5d9a3b9ede7e17` at 17:55:57 UTC. The existing [issue-comment workflow run](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/33422240973) ended cancelled after the previously reported timeout; it did not produce a completed security review. Latest exact-head Run/Post Codex jobs are skipped, not security approval. Historical comments remain available at their original links; consolidating their audit here does not withdraw authorization or clear the gate. An authorized security workflow owner must arrange the missing exact-range result. --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-02 16:20:49 -04:00
Logan Johnson	434dafe958	fix(desktop): discover authenticated owned relay agents (#7122) ... 🤖 ## Summary An agent you own could be missing from **New message → To:** and **Channel members → Add people and agents** on a machine that has never managed it. This PR lets those existing lists find your agent without requiring a shared channel first. Desktop now checks records proving you own it, rather than looking only at agents in channels you've already joined. **No new screen or control is added.** For example, an agent with verified ownership and **Who can send instructions → Only me (default)** can now appear even with no shared channels. Each screen still applies its existing access rules; this does not make every discovered agent selectable everywhere. | Screen / control | Before | After this PR alone | | --- | --- | --- | | **New message → To:** recipient picker | An owned agent absent from this machine and shared-channel bot lists could be missing. | Its named **agent** row can appear; selecting it adds a recipient chip. This is recipient selection, not a guarantee that a later message will reach or wake the agent. | | **Channel members → Add people and agents** | The same agent could be missing from **Not in this channel** search results. | Its row can appear with the existing **Add** button. If you can add members, that button submits the existing channel-membership request; finding the row alone changes no membership. | | **Stream / forum composer → @ suggestions** | An owned agent already in the channel under an ordinary member role could be missing from agent suggestions. | Its actual membership is recognized without requiring the bot role. Agents not managed on this device still need membership in that channel. | | **Pulse → Agents** | An agent absent from both local management and the server's agent list was omitted from the count and author lookup. | The count and feed's author lookup can include it; notes appear only if it has published them. | Being listed does **not** mean the agent is online, add it to a channel, or grant local Start/Edit controls. For agents not managed on this device, global **Search** still excludes those configured for “Only me”, and DM @ selection is not added here. DM @ selection and message-driven nonmember invitation are addressed in [#7124](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7124); the standalone forum **Invite / Cancel** flow is in [#7125](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7125). <details> <summary>Ownership and membership checks</summary> A discovery lead is not proof: the latest agent profile must have a valid signature and exactly one valid ownership attestation—the owner's signed link to that agent. Its response policy must be signed by that verified owner; an invalid latest policy cannot restore an older permission. Membership comes separately from the latest server-signed roster, including removals. Existing profile cards, owner labels and agent-avatar shapes also use this stricter verification: malformed or forged evidence must not supply ownership/agent classification on its own. Valid ownership was already recognized; no profile-picture or badge design changes. Attestation time conditions apply to the signed event's timestamp, not a live expiry timer. Existing legacy compatibility and builds requiring verified owner policy retain their respective rules. Discovery and sending remain separate operations, not an atomic permission check. </details> ### Review corrections - When runtime and owner policy overlap, **explicit online/away/offline from the verified latest runtime is retained**. Policy still supplies ownership/permissions; claimed runtime membership is not restored. Missing/unrecognized status stays unknown, and invalid latest policy cannot revive runtime permissions. - Discovery without runtime evidence is now **unknown**, not offline: native conversion, both IPC adapters, Pulse, Projects and profile/session consumers preserve that distinction. Unknown has no status dot and is not promoted to a deployed/running agent. - Both relay-only picker paths retain the authenticated owner, including the existing **managed by you** label. The analogous global Search projection is fixed without changing its existing “anyone” filter. - Authorized stored profile activity remains visible when liveness becomes unknown/absent or the active turn ends. History reads do not start a live subscription, grant access, or imply current availability. ### Related issue Independent base: `main`. Child: [#7124](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7124), then [#7125](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7125). Extracted from [#7114](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/7114), retained as historical source (`98fe33ec`). [Behavior contract](3a56d17824/docs/owned-agent-discovery.md). Originating [Buzz discussion](buzz://message?channel=f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1&id=7aa1f0ab23dce514bd8a0221441cf005bf428914621171472b79747c50820848) · channel `f7a9536a-1738-4bad-a888-b3ea25010ef1`. ### Testing Current candidate: `3a56d17824522580fe04cae463b54f4c7ba66021`, a four-file native/test/doc runtime-status repair atop published `ae23c1c9680a881cee7eed94e259bf15bf8ce3f7`. Branch ancestry is main `1c8321cd08feb597f8bcff5195c21148fb3e98ed`; refreshed main `0e878664b08cdf7fb2d89d940bc2aa92cdc485f7` adds only the independent CI-workflow split. Read-only mergeability succeeds; this is not a tested merged-tree claim. **Local CI attempt and continuation (not an uninterrupted green run):** the new exact-head `just ci` passed formatting/static checks, workspace and Tauri clippy, workspace Rust tests, **5,910 desktop tests**, desktop production build and Tauri check. Its native main target finished **3,073 passed / 1 failed / 19 ignored** (exit 101): `cheap_discovery_reports_absent_before_any_forced_probe` saw a process-global login-shell counter of 2 instead of 0. The counter includes unrelated version/adapter probes whose tests do not hold the failed test's PATH mutex; no managed-agent discovery implementation changed in the runtime repair. The unchanged failing test then passed **three isolated invocations**. Only the failed native workspace lane was retried with `RUST_TEST_THREADS=1 just desktop-tauri-test`: **3,074 main-target tests passed / 19 ignored**, all additional workspace targets passed (exit 0). The previously unrun `just web-build mobile-test` tail then passed (exit 0; **2,019 mobile tests**). Earlier successful lanes were reused; no source/guard changes or blanket CI rerun. The original failure and all diagnostic/retry logs are retained. - **71 native `nostr_convert` tests pass**, including seven new production merge regressions: online/away/offline, missing/invalid status, policy-only, status-less latest replacement and forged latest replacement. Before production repair, those seven yielded **4 failures / 3 passing controls**. - Reused frontend evidence from `ae23c1c9` (frontend is unchanged): Desktop TypeScript and isolated E2E build pass; **9 browser tests / 0 retries**, covering both relay-only picker journeys and seven adjacent stop-control regressions. Real UI with mock Tauri IPC, not live relay/native webview. - Earlier `ae23c1c9` local `just ci` passed without failures, including 3,067 native main-target tests / 19 ignored and 2,019 mobile tests; not substituted for the new source gate above. - Reused unchanged repair evidence: **17 real-store/hook history regressions**, **161 focused tests**, and independent **9 mounted owner/bot/identity revocation/regrant transitions** with zero hook-phase native calls. The regression was falsified before repair (14 failures, 3 controls). - Signed local-server fixtures cover discovery with no local/shared record, ordinary-role membership, forged ownership, invalid signatures, duplicate authentication, wrong-owner/latest-invalid policy, revoked membership and wrong destinations. These establish native data checks, not a live agent response. GitHub checks and renewed technical/security review must apply to the current published head; earlier-head green checks are not replacement-head proof. Local source review is not formal code-owner/latest-push approval or exact-range security authorization. A green security workflow with substantive review skipped is not security clearance. ### Screenshots #### Relay-only picker evidence — `ae23c1c9680a881cee7eed94e259bf15bf8ce3f7` These cropped rows come from the two real production picker journeys in [`owned-agent-discovery.spec.ts`](ae23c1c968/desktop/tests/e2e/owned-agent-discovery.spec.ts), using mock Tauri IPC with **no local agents and no user-search duplicate**. The fixture supplies verified-owner data and unknown availability; the browser test checks its presentation, not native signature verification. Both exact-tip journeys pass without retries. No live relay, native webview, invitation, delivery or wakeup is claimed. Before the repair, both relay-only candidate constructors discarded the owner, so the existing “managed by you” label was absent. These are after-repair captures; no before image was captured. #### New Message → To The relay-only agent retains its authenticated owner label.  #### Channel members → Add people and agents The matching result retains “managed by you” beside the existing Add action; the test does not click Add or claim membership changed.  --------- Signed-off-by: Logan Johnson <loganj@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Larry <627498bd4bd1f281a16431e3c6cce3b5c25b6692798c78672298aefbf2f8f8b5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-02 16:18:54 -04:00
Will Pfleger	04babf0265	chore(db): drop Phase-A NIP-FI relay-side authority ledger (#7221) ... Removes the dead relay-side authority ledger introduced by migrations 0041 and 0042, and the dead `require_attested_key` verifier knob from `buzz-auth`. Both are unreachable by design under NIP-FI spec v2 (#7214, squash `d4420eb47`), which makes OSS Buzz stateless for identity: the relay neither stores nor verifies an authority chain. ## What changes **`migrations/0044_drop_nip_fi_ledger.sql`** Drops all fifteen NIP-FI ledger tables and their trigger functions using `CASCADE` to resolve the circular deferred FK between `identity_bindings` and `identity_lifecycle_history`. Drops proceed in FK dependency order: selectors → history/bindings → enrollment_policies/receipts → parallel drop of auth tables. Restores `community_write_fence_excluded_table` to its pre-0041 body (removes NIP-FI table names from the exclusion array). **`schema/schema.sql`** Removes the NIP-FI section (~1885 lines of tables, functions, and triggers) and updates `community_write_fence_excluded_table` to match. **`crates/buzz-db/src/runtime/migration.rs`** - Updates the `embedded_migrator_contains_consolidated_initial_schema` sanity check: count 43→44, adds 0044 assertion block (verifies `DROP TABLE` statements and absence of NIP-FI names from `schema.sql`). - Removes ~2580 lines of NIP-FI Postgres integration tests (all `#[tokio::test] #[ignore = "requires Postgres"]` from the 0041/0042 behavioral coverage). - Removes the `extract_excluded_table_array` drift check (0042 body no longer matches `schema.sql` by design). - Adds `migration_0044_drops_populated_nip_fi_ledger_cleanly`: runs migrations to 0042, seeds rows in `authorization_operation_receipts` and `authorization_invalidation_domains`, then runs to 0044 and verifies all fifteen NIP-FI tables are absent. **`crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/config.rs`** Removes `require_attested_key: bool` from `IssuerPolicy` — field, constructor parameter, accessor, and its contribution to `derive_assertion_policy_id`. **`crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/verifier.rs`** `parse_nostr_pubkey_claim` no longer takes a `policy` parameter. The `None` (absent claim) arm now returns `Err(VerifierError::ClaimRejected)` unconditionally instead of conditionally on `policy.require_attested_key()`. **`crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/verifier/tests.rs`** - Removes `missing_nostr_pubkey_denies_under_attested_key_policy` (the sole `require_attested_key: true` call site). - Removes `false,` from all eleven `IssuerPolicy::new` call sites. - Injects `nostr_pubkey` by default in `mint_signed_by` (spec v2 requires it unconditionally). - Updates `valid_access_token_verifies` to assert `asserted_key().is_some()`. **`crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/startup/tests.rs` + `jwks/tests.rs`** Removes `false,` from all `IssuerPolicy::new` call sites and adds `nostr_pubkey` to all token-minting helpers. ## Verification - Fresh-DB migration run to head: all migrations apply cleanly in sequence. - Populated-0041/0042-DB migration through 0044: seeds rows in live NIP-FI tables, verifies all fifteen are dropped without error. Closes the dead-code inventory item from the spec-v2 cleanup plan (channel `48374f48`). Follows #7214. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-02 13:56:41 -04:00
Will Pfleger	d4420eb47f	docs(nip-fi): rewrite NIP-FI as stateless OSS Buzz spec v2 (#7214) ... Rewrites `docs/nips/NIP-FI.md` as a stateless spec and deletes the five companion profiles (NIP-FI-CONF, NIP-FI-DELEG, NIP-FI-EDGE, NIP-FI-LIFECYCLE, NIP-FI-MODEL) that presuppose relay-side state. ## What changes ### `docs/nips/NIP-FI.md` — full rewrite The relay-side authority engine (bindings, receipts, lifecycle, invalidation, leases, delegation, enrollment modes, TOFU) is removed. The spec settles exactly five things: 1. **Assertion contract**: JWT claims (`iss`, `sub`, `nostr_pubkey`, `aud` (required), `iat`/`exp`, finite TTL bounds), npub binding semantics, required NIP-42 proof-of-key pairing. Evidence rules (assertion-key-mismatch → `authorization_denied`, freshness) preserved from v1. 2. **Verification**: offline against configured per-issuer JWKS snapshots; multi-issuer; fail-closed on missing/expired/unverifiable. Cites `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/` (PR 3 / `70895b355`) as implementing the assertion-verification procedure. The `require_attested_key` flag in `IssuerPolicy` is the enforcement primitive for the unconditional `nostr_pubkey` requirement; conformance requires forcing it true for every issuer — follow-on code outside this PR. 3. **Session policy**: required finite `max_connection_lifetime_seconds` knob with no permissive default; re-auth on every reconnect; no in-band renewal. 4. **Admin disconnect API**: session-only normative text with a dedicated `VerifyCommandJwt` procedure — distinct `typ: nip-fi-command+jwt`, signed `method`/`path` binding, normative `maximum_command_age` bound (0 < value ≤ 60 s), atomic `(iss, jti)` reservation as the final admission step after all pure checks. Non-normative note documents cumulative residual access: `max(0, min(exp, iat + maximum_assertion_age) - now)` assuming issuance stops; states that previously issued assertions remain valid for reconnection until their authority expires; states that continued issuance extends access with no protocol-level bound. Non-normative note documents the session-only vs deny-until-TTL trade-off. This verifier and endpoint are follow-on code. 5. **Deletions**: bindings, enrollment, lifecycle, receipts, leases, invalidation, delegation gone. "Out of scope" section names every issuer and deployment concern explicitly. ### Companion profiles deleted NIP-FI-CONF, NIP-FI-DELEG, NIP-FI-EDGE, NIP-FI-LIFECYCLE, NIP-FI-MODEL — all presuppose relay-side binding/lifecycle state. ## What does NOT change The entire `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/` Rust crate (PR 3 / `70895b355`) implements the assertion-verification procedure described in this spec. No Rust code changes in this PR. The `require_attested_key` enforcement integration and the `VerifyCommandJwt` / disconnect endpoint implementation are explicit follow-on code work. ## Follow-on work (separate PRs after spec merges) - `require_attested_key` forced-true startup enforcement - `VerifyCommandJwt` implementation and disconnect endpoint - Down-migration dropping migrations 0041/0042 (0042 before 0041 per FK order) - `schema.sql` NIP-FI sections removed - `buzz-db` migration test blocks cleaned up --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-09-01 19:05:39 -04:00
Tom Brow	42b42447b0	feat(mobile): prepare buzz-push-gateway for deployment (#7158) ... A few things to prepare for deploying the Buzz push gateway as implemented in #6269: - Cut `buzz-push-gateway` chart `0.2.0` from the current config (certificate auth, dogfood client) - Datadog-compatible metrics - Align the desired schema, metrics docs, and production ingress guidance with the current dogfood deployment contract ## Links - [BUZZ-17: Publish the MVP-compatible gateway chart](https://linear.app/squareup/issue/BUZZ-17/publish-the-mvp-compatible-gateway-chart) - [BUZZ-26: Add Datadog-compatible push-gateway metrics and correct source drift](https://linear.app/squareup/issue/BUZZ-26/add-datadog-compatible-push-gateway-metrics-and-correct-source-drift) --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>	2026-09-01 12:19:48 -07:00
Luke Tornquist	3ed623bb21	feat(db): configurable writer session timeouts (lock, idle-txn, statement) (#6229) ... ## Why A wedged relay boot pod holding a relation lock can park every other writer in the fleet behind it: DB load pins at pool capacity in `Lock:relation` waits while CPU stays flat, and nothing server-side releases the lock until the holder dies. We hit exactly this in production — ~1,400 sessions queued behind one crash-looping pod's boot transaction for ~20 minutes until kubelet killed the container. ## What Applies session-level Postgres timeouts to every **writer** connection inside the existing single `after_connect` hook in `buzz-db`, all env-tunable through the same `Config::from_env → DbConfig` path as the existing pool-size knobs: | Env var | GUC | Default | Effect | |---|---|---|---| | `BUZZ_DB_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS` | `lock_timeout` | 5000 | statements waiting on any lock fail fast instead of parking behind a wedged holder | | `BUZZ_DB_IDLE_TXN_TIMEOUT_MS` | `idle_in_transaction_session_timeout` | 60000 | reaps wedged clients idling inside an open transaction while holding locks | | `BUZZ_DB_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_MS` | `statement_timeout` | 0 (off) | opt-in runaway-statement cap; off by default because startup migrations/backfills legitimately run long statements | `0` disables a timeout (Postgres semantics) and deliberately passes through the env parsing — unlike the pool-size knobs where `0` falls back to the default. The reader pool is untouched: replica sessions never take contended locks and already fail acquire in 150 ms. Deployers tune these via plain env vars (`.env`, or `relay.extraEnv` in the Helm chart) — no code changes needed. ## Behavior change to note With the 5 s default `lock_timeout`, a boot-time migration or backfill that waits >5 s on a lock now errors (surfacing in logs / crash-looping the pod) instead of stalling silently. That is the intended visible-failure-over-fleet-stall tradeoff; deployers with slow contended migrations can set `BUZZ_DB_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS=0`. ## Testing - `cargo test -p buzz-db -p buzz-relay` — buzz-db green; buzz-relay has 9 failures that also fail on clean `main` in this environment (api::admin/api::media/mesh_demo — unrelated, pre-existing). - New config test covers override / `0`-passthrough / invalid-fallback for all three env vars. - Extended the existing `writer_pool_safety_hook_is_single_and_composed` source-shape test so the timeouts can't drift out of the single `after_connect` hook (SQLx replaces hooks — a second hook would silently disarm the floor guard). - `cargo fmt --check` and `cargo clippy --all-targets` clean for the touched crates. Closest existing PR/issue: none found. --- **Update Aug 28, 17:06 EDT:** Rebased onto `main` at `a3730784fc` and addressed the latest correctness review. - Ported the timeout policy onto the refactored `buzz-db::runtime` pool constructor and kept the shared env overlay for relay, admin, deletion, and audit writers. - Migration/schema-destruction connections now disable `lock_timeout` and `statement_timeout` for their intentional long wait/DDL path. This supersedes the earlier “Behavior change to note”: contended boot migrations wait for the current migration owner rather than crash-looping after five seconds. - The audit worker now preserves and retries the same entry on PostgreSQL `55P03` lock timeouts, using exponential backoff capped at one second. Other database errors retain the existing terminal error behavior, and retries emit `buzz_audit_log_lock_retries_total`. - Added CI-backed PostgreSQL regressions for writer GUC installation/migration exemption, audit-pool lock timeouts, and worker recovery. The worker regression holds the real audit advisory lock past `lock_timeout`, observes a retry, releases the lock, and proves the original entry is appended exactly once. Current verification supersedes the earlier testing notes: workspace Rust clippy passed with warnings denied; all nine infrastructure-free backend unit-test lanes passed; all three focused PostgreSQL regressions passed against PostgreSQL 17; formatting, diff checks, file-size guards, and desktop frontend checks passed. The Linux Blox workstation could not run the unrelated Tauri native lane because `glib-2.0` is absent, so that platform check is left to PR CI. --- **Update Aug 31, 11:09 EDT:** Rebased onto current `main` at `c3132c3ee9` and reran the requested audit-lock contention scenario on Blox at head `896c3fe9ed`. - `git range-diff` reports both PR commits unchanged by the rebase; the branch remains two commits and the worktree is clean. - `cargo fmt --all -- --check` and clippy with warnings denied passed for `buzz-db`, `buzz-relay`, `buzz-admin`, and `buzz-deletion`. - All three focused PostgreSQL 17 regressions passed: writer session timeout/migration exemption, audit writer timeout bounds, and audit worker recovery of the original entry exactly once. - Live protocol verification used a head-built relay and CLI, native PostgreSQL 17/Redis, `BUZZ_DB_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MS=300`, and an eight-second hold on the community audit advisory lock. The real message was accepted and persisted once while the lock was held; its audit-row count remained zero during contention while retries accumulated. After release, exactly one `event_created` audit row appeared and remained exactly one after an additional two-second duplicate check. The run recorded nine lock-timeout retries, zero audit failures, and event ID `7f8c4ffae28e78555fcf2d56396d6e6c01b3712e5411288dc79e9a54af9d9444`. Generated with Codex --------- Signed-off-by: Luke Tornquist <tornquist@squareup.com>	2026-08-31 11:59:13 -04:00
Tom Brow	c432a111ca	feat(mobile): push notifications MVP (#6269) ... This PR implements MVP, iOS-only, [NIP-PL](8d2d0ff5ad/docs/nips/NIP-PL.md)-compliant push notifications. A relay with `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED` will send a push notification for any message that appears in the in-app Notifications tab. ## Enrollment flow The first time the client first connects to a relay with `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED`: ```mermaid sequenceDiagram autonumber participant App as Buzz iOS app participant iOS participant Relay as Buzz relay participant Attest as Apple App Attest participant Gateway as Push gateway App->>Relay: Fetch NIP-11 push capability Relay-->>App: Push profile, current relay public key, and limits par App->>iOS: Request notification permission iOS-->>App: Permission result and App->>iOS: Register for remote notifications iOS-->>App: Device token end App->>Gateway: Request installation challenge Gateway-->>App: Single-use challenge App->>Attest: Attest installation transcript Attest-->>App: Attestation proof App->>Gateway: Enroll device token and proof Gateway-->>App: Installation handle App->>Gateway: Request delegation challenge Gateway-->>App: Single-use challenge App->>Attest: Assert relay-key delegation Attest-->>App: Assertion App->>Gateway: Create delegation Gateway-->>App: Opaque endpoint grant App->>Relay: Publish encrypted push lease and filters Relay-->>App: Lease acknowledged ``` ## Push-time flow When a notification-eligible event is received by the relay: ```mermaid %%{init: { "sequence": { "actorMargin": 20, "width": 110, "messageMargin": 18, "diagramMarginX": 8, "wrap": true } }}%% sequenceDiagram autonumber participant Relay as Buzz relay participant Gateway as Push gateway participant APNs as Apple Push<br/>Notification service participant iOS participant NSE as Notification service<br/>extension Relay->>Gateway: POST /v1/deliveries/apns<br/>opaque endpoint grant, request ID, expiry, NIP-98 authorization Gateway->>APNs: POST /3/device/{device-token}<br/>topic, request ID, expiry, constant mutable-content payload APNs-->>Gateway: 200 OK: request accepted Gateway-->>Relay: 200 OK: accepted status APNs-->>iOS: Notification: constant reconnect alert<br/>mutable-content = 1 iOS->>NSE: Invoke extension<br/>original notification content NSE->>Relay: POST /query: subscription filters, limit 10<br/>NIP-98 authorization Relay-->>NSE: 200 OK: signed Nostr events<br/>kinds 9, 40002, 45001, or 45003 NSE->>iOS: Complete notification: title, body, subtitle<br/>thread ID, exact-message target ``` relay → push gateway → APNs -> NSE -> Notification Center ## Known limitations The APNs wake payload is intentionally constant and opaque: it contains no originating community or message identifier, in keeping with the implemented NIP-PL privacy design. The Notification Service Extension must therefore reconnect to the relay and resolve eligible messages after each wake. Around overlapping wakes, timing boundaries, or resolution windows, notification presentation may occasionally omit an expected message or display a message more than once. This best-effort behavior is deliberately accepted for the current implementation and will be measured during the internal rollout to determine whether the user experience is acceptable before any broader deployment; the implementation does not claim exactly-once presentation. ## Validation Live end-to-end hardware validation used an internal remotely hosted development relay and push gateway, the APNs sandbox, and a physical iPhone 12 mini: - A second real Buzz client published a uniquely marked message through the hosted relay. - The relay matched the message and sent the constant opaque wake through the hosted gateway. The gateway made an actual APNs request; no `simctl push` or simulated notification was used. - The iPhone received the notification on its lock screen. The Notification Service Extension reconnected to the relay, fetched the event, verified its ID and signature, and replaced the placeholder content with the real notification title and body. - After the app populated its shared presentation cache, a final marked notification visibly showed the sender display name, sender avatar, and hashtag-prefixed channel name. - Tapping a lock-screen notification opened Buzz and exercised the notification-response path and navigated to the corresponding message. Final validation with a dogfood-signed artifact and production App Attest/APNs configuration remains a release step. ## Independent pre-reviews - **First pass:** [Carl](buzz://message?channel=18882f4c-289f-41db-942f-81f6f8066da1&id=74ab9a93bb227f3e762568f1cf9fee66d7495b0edc3918735ff787238b9cc585) found missing transient retries, executor-key rotation suppression, duplicate installation renewal, and an unauthenticated challenge write amplifier. These were resolved by [retry-safe bootstrap](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/12c66ea62) and [authenticated renewal plus a cross-replica quota](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/8e5ece0bd). [sol-max](buzz://message?channel=ad83385f-8e9e-4461-9a35-c1bf2e208532&id=d26d53daa4684669e2ed354638241f13f36c3a97027fe8b4dd738aff09038962) found delegation generation burning and an edited applied migration, resolved by [exact-generation revocation](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/c26d2159d) and a [forward-only migration](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/956c1d099). [k3-max](buzz://message?channel=5e46055d-a766-4065-ae25-05d1e4aaa6b2&id=d43139138a0b15f806cbdbeeedd8f69d992cadf2e805876db6fdde6a34c7eda1) found no blockers. - **Exact-head re-review:** [Carl](buzz://message?channel=18882f4c-289f-41db-942f-81f6f8066da1&id=a897721673459301b0cf26e8b85a1478d7ebbb56a4621f93d774c98d395b8f68), [sol-max](buzz://message?channel=ad83385f-8e9e-4461-9a35-c1bf2e208532&id=fb2159f709ec68f74f7b21459acd76da0e8a7c5c0f3d469f99826b0cc2380849), and [k3-max](buzz://message?channel=5e46055d-a766-4065-ae25-05d1e4aaa6b2&id=2ce2842910435f562e9d9cc718595848f281b122c94605e523a4b964254b8bfb) independently returned **NO BLOCKERS** at `7eb3a650b`; k3-max also revalidated every remediation and the endpoint-specific App Attest enrollment bound. --------- Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@squareup.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz> Co-authored-by: Tom Brow <tomb@squareup.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com>	2026-08-28 15:15:09 -06:00
Will Pfleger	86b9142a09	refactor(relay): NIP-98 admin auth with Operator/Moderator roles and NIP-11 discovery (#3777) ... Adds authenticated, role-based moderation to the relay admin API. On `main` the admin API is read-only and gated only by `Host`/`Origin` matching; this branch adds NIP-98 authentication, a two-tier Operator/Moderator principal model, mutation and staffing endpoints, and NIP-11 auto-discovery so clients never type the admin URL by hand. ## Authentication (`BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH`) `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` accepts `nip98` or `disabled`. Leaving it unset defaults to `nip98` (fail-secure). Configuration fails closed: any other value aborts startup, while a lingering `BUZZ_ADMIN_TOKEN` is ignored with a startup warning — token (bearer) authentication is not supported. `Host`/`Origin` matching is retained in every mode as defense-in-depth. - **`nip98`** (default) — per-request signed NIP-98 (kind 27235) events, resolved to an Operator or Moderator principal with per-person attribution and individual revocability. Read-write per resolved principal. - **`disabled`** — no credential; relies entirely on network-layer controls (reverse proxy, VPN, firewall) and logs a `WARN` on every boot. Always read-only: `authorize()` resolves no principal, so mutation and staffing routes always `403`. ## Roles Buzz has two independent authority axes after this change. **Relay-level** roles (new here) are deployment-global: they act across every community on the relay, through the admin API. **Community-level** roles (pre-existing, unchanged by this PR) are tenant-scoped: they act inside one community, through signed Nostr moderation commands. ### Relay level (new) | Role | Description | |---|---| | **Operator** | Full control of the deployment's moderation surface: read all reports, feedback, and attachments across every community; resolve reports with enforcement (`delete`/`kick`/`ban`/`timeout`) or decisions (`dismiss`/`escalate`); reopen and cancel; update feedback status; and manage the Operator/Moderator roster via the staffing endpoints. | | **Moderator** | Day-to-day triage: everything an Operator can do except staffing — cannot view or change the roster. | How a pubkey acquires a relay role (resolution order; config always outranks DB): 1. Listed in `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` → **Operator** (source `config`) 2. Equals `RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY` while `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` is empty → **Operator** (source `owner_fallback`, a break-glass grant for self-hosters that deactivates once any operator is configured) 3. Row in the `relay_operators` table → **Operator** or **Moderator** (source `db`, managed via the staffing endpoints) 4. No match → `403` ### Community level (pre-existing, unchanged) | Role | Description | |---|---| | **Owner** (community) | Full authority within their community: every moderation action (delete, kick, ban/unban, timeout/untimeout, resolve reports, view queue) plus member, role, and invite management. No guard rails. | | **Admin** (community) | Same community-wide moderation capabilities as owner, except an admin cannot ban or time out the owner or a fellow admin — only the owner may action an admin. Manages members and invites; only the owner grants the admin role. | | **Member** (community) | Standard participant; no moderation capability. | | **Owner / Admin** (channel) | Channel-local authority only: delete messages and kick users within their own channel. | | **Member / Guest / Bot** (channel) | No moderation authority. | There is no community-level Moderator tier in v1; relay-level Moderator is the only role by that name. ## Escalation scoping The operator report queue is an escalation backstop, not the community's day-to-day triage surface (per `VISION_MODERATION`, the severe class is the platform's to review rather than the community's). Two rules enforce that: - **Escalated-by-default listing.** `GET /reports` with no `status` parameter returns only `escalated` reports. An explicit `status=<open|resolved|dismissed|escalated>` filter is always honored as given, and full visibility across every status stays available for platform-safety and legal review via `scope=all` (which lists reports regardless of status). `scope` accepts only `all` and is ignored when an explicit `status` is present. - **Auto-escalated `illegal` reports.** Member reports whose category is `illegal` are ingested with `status=escalated` rather than `open`, so the severe class reaches the operator backstop without waiting for a community admin to forward it. Every other category still lands `open`. Auto-escalation only sets the queue status — it records no moderator decision and stamps no resolver, so an auto-escalated report is indistinguishable downstream from an admin-escalated one: the reopen route returns it to `open` on the same terms, keyed only on status, never on how the report became escalated. ## Principal resolution and NIP-98 admission `resolve_admin_principal()` returns `AdminPrincipal { pubkey, role, source }` per the resolution order above; `None` never falls through as a role. Admission is ordered so the replay guard is a privilege, not a public surface: signature/URL/method/payload-hash verification first, roster check second, and only then is the deployment-scoped replay id atomically consumed — a validly-signing but unrostered key never allocates a replay slot. Redis failure fails closed. ## Report resolution, recovery, and enforcement provenance `POST /reports/{id}/resolve` is a crash-safe enforcement state machine: decision-only outcomes (`dismiss`/`escalate`) are a single CAS-plus-audit transaction; enforcement (`delete`/`kick`/`ban`/`timeout`) claims the report (`open`→`processing`), runs the durable mutation, then finalizes — a re-drive resumes at the step marker and converges to exactly-one enforcement, fenced by a lease and an outbox claim token. Person-directed enforcement on an `event`-kind report derives its target from the stored event's author (server-owned truth, never the reporter's `p` tag) via a single `derive_enforcement_target` shared by the HTTP driver and the recovery worker. If the reported event was purged before its author could be read, person-directed actions are rejected pre-claim and the report stays `open`; `delete` needs only the event id and is exempt. `GET /reports/{id}` and the resolve response carry an `activeAction` field surfacing the enforcement that actually executed — a report dismissed after a reopen still reports the ban that ran. `POST /reports/{id}/reopen` returns a terminal report to `open` (idempotent on `requestId`). `POST /reports/{id}/cancel` is the sole recovery path for a pre-mutation `failed` action, attributed via `relay_admin_actions.cancelled_by`. ## Feedback `GET /feedback` and `/feedback/{id}` survive a tenant purge: provenance columns are severed to `NULL` rather than cascade-deleted, and the attachment path fails closed to `404` on a severed row. `PATCH /feedback/{id}` updates lifecycle `status` (`new`/`reviewed`/`archived`). ## Staffing and probe `GET/PUT/DELETE /operators/{pubkey}` are Operator-only; mutating a config-backed pubkey returns `409 Conflict`. `GET /operators` returns the union of config and DB principals with per-entry `source`. `GET /probe` reports auth mode, role, source, `canAct`, and `canStaff` for the desktop console. ## NIP-11 auto-discovery The NIP-11 relay-information document gains an optional `admin_api` field carrying the canonical admin origin (`scheme://host[:port]`, no path), present iff `BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` is set and omitted otherwise. The scheme follows the same loopback rule as NIP-98 `u`-tag verification via a shared `scheme_for_host` helper, so the advertised origin and the origin the relay verifies against can never diverge. ## Operator API origin decoupling `RELAY_OPERATOR_API_ORIGIN` is no longer required at boot when `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` is set — it is used only by the community-provisioning endpoints, which fail closed at request time (with a boot-time `WARN`) until it is set. The admin console needs no origin. ## Admin-web adaptation The standalone `admin-web` dashboard signs each request as a NIP-98 event via a NIP-07 browser extension, discovers the auth mode with a single unauthenticated probe (`200` → `disabled`, anything else → `nip98`, fail-secure), and carries no token entry surface. Playwright coverage exercises the NIP-98 and CSP paths. ## Security hardening Three findings from security review are folded in: - **Append-only roster audit.** `PUT`/`DELETE /operators/{pubkey}` mutate the deployment-wide root of trust, but the upsert overwrites `role`/`added_by` in place and the delete removes the only row — so a grant→revoke sequence left no trace of who was ever granted or by whom. Each mutation now writes an `relay_operator_audit` row (actor, target, `grant`/`revoke`, pre-image `prev_role`, `new_role`, timestamp) inside the same transaction as the mutation. A per-target transaction-scoped advisory lock serializes concurrent mutations of the same pubkey before the pre-image read, so the recorded `prev_role` is always the true predecessor even under a concurrent-grant race. Chronology is keyed on a `BIGINT GENERATED ALWAYS AS IDENTITY` `seq` column, not the wall clock: the serializing lock guarantees insertion order and `seq` captures it, so ordered reads (`ORDER BY seq`) follow the true privilege chain even across a backward NTP step that a `clock_timestamp()` ordering would invert. `created_at` (`clock_timestamp()`) is retained as informational occurrence time only. Append-only by construction — no `UPDATE`/`DELETE` path and no API surface. A no-op delete writes nothing. - **`expirationSecs` overflow.** The timeout path built `Utc::now() + Duration::seconds(secs as i64)` from an attacker-controlled `u64`: `i64::MAX` panicked the handler, and a wrapped-negative magnitude minted a *past* expiry that still passed validation. `compute_timeout_until` now rejects zero, rejects magnitudes above a documented `MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS` (365 days), and uses checked `try_seconds`/`checked_add_signed` so no input can panic or produce a past expiry — over-cap, zero, `i64::MAX`, and wrapping-negative inputs all return a clean `4xx`. - **Uppercase-hex config-backed bypass.** Config pubkeys are lowercased at parse, but the `409` immutability check raw-string-compared the path param while `decode_hex_pubkey` accepted uppercase — so `PUT /operators/{UPPERCASE}` skipped the guard and wrote a shadow row for the same 32 bytes. The validated param is now canonicalized (lowercased) before the `409` check, DB write, `DELETE`, and response body. ## Migrations - `0035_relay_operators.sql` — `relay_operators` roster table (deployment-global), `actor_authority` on `moderation_actions`, `processing` status plus `active_action_id` on `moderation_reports`, `status` on `product_feedback`. - `0036_relay_admin_actions.sql` — enforcement-action table with a `request_id` idempotency key, a `step_marker` for crash recovery, and a `cancelled_by` attribution column. - `0037_relay_admin_action_lease.sql` — lease fencing for the action worker. - `0038_relay_admin_outbox_claim_token.sql` — fenced claim token on the outbox worker. - `0039_relay_operator_audit.sql` — append-only `relay_operator_audit` trail for roster mutations (see Security hardening). `docs/admin/README.md` documents the full principal model, NIP-98 event requirements, capabilities by role, the startup error matrix, and the discovery field. ## Production blast radius A relay without `BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` is completely unaffected — the admin surface stays disabled and `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` is ignored; a lingering `BUZZ_ADMIN_TOKEN` logs a startup warning and must be removed. Where `BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` **is** set, unset `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` defaults to `nip98` (per-person signed auth); `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=disabled` reproduces `main`'s prior `Host`/`Origin`-only gating but is read-only (mutation routes `403`). The five migrations add tables and columns without touching existing data. --- Related: [block/buzz#4768](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4768) (desktop admin console consuming the `admin_api` field), [squareup/bb-public#339](https://github.com/squareup/bb-public/pull/339) (Phase 4 rollout config) --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-08-28 11:43:05 -04:00
Will Pfleger	953a1798b2	feat(auth): add NIP-FI canonical assertion verifier and contracts (#6776) ... The closed, provider-neutral contract layer at the root of the NIP-FI federated-identity dependency graph — Phase A, PR 1 of the plan. It has no dependencies on any other PR and defines no database schema, migration, runtime JWKS fetching, binding resolution, enrollment, or request/proof binding; those belong to later PRs. ## What this adds - **Multi-issuer assertion-policy config** (`IssuerRegistry`, `IssuerPolicy`) keyed by exact `iss`. Identity is issuer-qualified `(iss, sub)` throughout — equal `sub` under different `iss` are distinct identities. The subject coordinate is fixed to the JWT `sub` claim (`SUBJECT_CLAIM`), never configurable, so no deployment can seal a mutable attribute like `email` as identity. Issuer URL and audience remain deployment configuration. - **The two deterministic semantic contract identities** — `AssertionPolicyId = H(canonical assertion-policy contract)` and `TransportContractId = H(canonical transport contract)` — derived by length-prefixed, domain-separated SHA-256 so a semantic change moves exactly its owning ID while benign JWKS rotation never changes policy lineage. Set-valued policy inputs (audiences, algorithms, subject-class values, scope capture) are canonicalized before derivation, so the ID is invariant under permutation and duplication. Config fields that a freshness class never reads are rejected at construction (an `offline-jwt` policy cannot carry `maximum_status_age`), so the canonical encoding stays total over valid configs and semantically identical policies always derive one ID. - **The single canonical verifier** (`FederatedAssertionVerifier`, `FI-INV-16`) producing the origin-sealed, provider-neutral `VerifiedAssertion` normalized result. Its constructor is crate-private, so unverified claims cannot be promoted into authority. The issuer→JWKS authority is entirely crate-owned: `AssertionKeySet` has no public constructor and `IssuerKeySource` is sealed, so no downstream crate can relabel one issuer's keys as another's. The authenticated key set is bounded (`MAX_JWKS_KEYS`) and the bound is folded into `AssertionPolicyId`, so an unbounded attacker-controlled `kid` scan cannot be driven; every snapshot requires a finite positive hard deadline. - **Sealed revalidation dependencies** — `RevalidationDependencies` carries the key-snapshot hard deadline and a `ConfidentialAssertion` handle to the exact compact JWS (no `Debug`/`Display`/`serde` leak, sole read path `compact_jws()`), so a changed snapshot can revalidate the same evidence: a retained key revalidates, a removed key denies. - **The privacy-preserving four-class denial contract** (`DenialClass`, `FI-INV-13`) with the byte-exact Nostr text, HTTP status, body, `Content-Type`, and `WWW-Authenticate` values fixed by the spec's rejection table. An unreadable required current dependency maps to `authorization_unavailable`/503, never to rejected evidence, and rejected evidence never masquerades as a 503 at either end of the pipeline: all bounded, dependency-independent checks (compact structure, header, signature shape, policy, algorithm, token class) precede key-source lookup, and all offline validation (token-class, key, signature, audience, claims, time) completes before any status-witness deferral. A wrong-`typ` or structurally malformed token, or malformed/invalidly-signed input naming a current-status issuer, therefore denies with `evidence_rejected`/403 rather than being reported as a 503 availability signal. ## Corrections applied to the mined source Mined from the `buzz-auth` verifier core in [#1476](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/1476) and corrected to the settled spec (the merged `docs/nips/NIP-FI*.md`, [#5946](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/5946)), which settled after #1476 was written: - Token-class selection with exact `typ` enforcement. Two classes are offered: `at+jwt` and `nip-fi+jwt`. There is deliberately no generic/absent-`typ` "named compatibility" class: it cannot be proven disjoint from an OIDC ID token by claim presence alone (an issuer can mint an ID token carrying `client_id`), and the only authenticated discriminator is `typ`, which such a mode declines to constrain. - OIDC ID-token denial — denies even when `iss`, `aud`, and `sub` match, via exact `typ` mismatch against every accepted class. - The fixed `nostr_pubkey` claim accepted only as lowercase hex of exactly one 32-byte key; bech32 and other aliases deny. - Resource-owner / client-subject ambiguity denial and required `client_id` for `at+jwt`. - JWK admissibility: a key's `use` and, when present, `key_ops` must authorize signature verification (a key restricted to other operations such as `encrypt` is rejected), and the selected JOSE algorithm is bound to the key's required family and curve (ES256↔EC/P-256, ES384↔EC/P-384, EdDSA↔OKP/Ed25519, RS/PS↔RSA). The JWK `alg` is advisory; the actual key material is what signs, so a JWK declaring a matching `alg` over mismatched material (a different family or curve) is rejected before signature verification. - Spec-exact time arithmetic (`now < exp`, `iat <= now + skew`, `now < iat + maximum_assertion_age`, equality at expiry is expired). `exp`/`iat`/`nbf` accept finite integer or fractional RFC 7519 `NumericDate` values with checked, overflow-safe conversion; non-finite and out-of-range values deny. ## Verification In-crate tests in `crates/buzz-auth/src/nip_fi/verifier/tests.rs` sign real ES256 assertions against a fixed test key and cover: the happy path, exact-wire-text for all four denial classes, deterministic and semantic contract IDs, canonicalization invariance, token-class enforcement including ID-token denial, JWK `key_ops` rejection, `nostr_pubkey` hex handling, time bounds, and multi-issuer selection (same subject across distinct issuers yields distinct identities and policy IDs). They also cover the round-3 contracts: the key-set bound (oversized rejected, at-bound accepted, empty rejected), fixed-`sub` identity (identity is `sub` not a configured `email`; a token without `sub` denies), offline-before-deferral (invalid-signature, wrong-audience, malformed-claim, and expired under a current-status issuer each deny 403/`evidence_rejected`), and the revalidation contracts (dependencies carry the deadline and exact JWS; a retained key revalidates, a removed key denies). And the round-4 contracts: algorithm↔key-material binding, covered exactly per accepted algorithm (a table-driven matrix asserts every policy-acceptable algorithm — ES256, ES384, EdDSA, RS256/384/512, PS256/384/512 — matches only its required family/curve and rejects every other, so each mapping mutation fails individually; and an ES256 token against P-384, RSA, and Ed25519 material each deny `InvalidKey`); malformed evidence classified before key lookup (wrong-`typ`, two-segment, four-segment, empty-signature, and non-base64url-signature tokens against an empty source deny 403 not 503); `maximum_status_age` inapplicable under offline-jwt rejected at construction while current-status still requires it; and fractional `NumericDate` (finite fractional `iat`/`exp`/`nbf` within bounds verify, non-finite and out-of-range deny). Compile-fail doctests guard the sealed authority seam (`AssertionKeySet::new`, `IssuerKeySource`) and the absence of the named-compatibility token class. ## Notes - `Co-authored-by` attribution is preserved for the mined author. The #1476 `buzz-auth` commits are authored by Cea Stapleton Cordasco (the salvage map records #1476 under Franco; the git history on that PR is Cea's — surfacing for the attribution/closure record). - Amends `docs/nips/NIP-FI.md` to remove the "named compatibility access token" class and its `FI-TRACE-TOKEN-CLASS` oracle reference, so the normative spec matches the two-class root implementation (a generic/absent `typ` cannot be proven disjoint from an OIDC ID token). Removal-only, no neighbor redesign; a `docs/nips/` grep confirms no dangling cross-reference to the class remains. - Adds `jsonwebtoken 10.4.0` (`aws_lc_rs`) as a workspace dependency. Dependencies: none. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Cea Stapleton Cordasco <261786559+cea@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>	2026-08-28 10:29:25 -04:00