Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tom Brow
5397ea49e2 fix(push): verify extended App Attest proofs with a focused owned module (#8329)
## Summary

Apple SDK 27.1 device captures include authenticator extension data that
the current verifier rejects. Replace the general appattest dependency
with a private gateway module that verifies the complete original bytes,
frames enrollment and assertions separately, and accepts well-formed
optional extensions without SDK-specific length or flag allowlists.

The module retains established signature, P-256, CBOR, and
certificate-chain libraries. App identity, exact enrollment environment,
credential/key binding, nonce, challenge, and increasing-counter checks
remain enforced. Bounded parsing rejects ambiguous duplicate keys,
truncation, trailing data, and oversized inputs. Fixture helpers are
test-only. Adapted code retains both upstream MIT notices and source
provenance.

Category/version properties remain authenticated observations under the
chosen compatibility-release policy. This does not implement Apple's
additional distribution-category/version enforcement; introducing those
restrictions requires a separately defined deployment policy. The
[verification
contract](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/app-attest-owned-verifier/docs/app-attest-compatibility.md)
records this and other limits.

Related: https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8020 addresses assertion
extension handling. This change also covers enrollment extensions,
credential-key parsing, and certificate validation.

### Validation

- Gateway suites: 77 default tests and 79 personal-development tests
passed, plus startup policy and Clippy.
- Added signed enrollment/certificate, generated CBOR mutation,
maximum-counter, and PostgreSQL race/replay coverage. All 12 isolated
Postgres tests passed. Apple's historical fixture is tested
structurally, not accepted as a current enrollment. Positive synthetic
leaf certificates are generated at test time.
- Protected SDK 26.5/27.1 enrollments and assertions pass the verifier,
including the same key across SDK upgrades; development enrollment
rejects under production policy. Captures are personal-development
identities, not supported production-identity evidence.
- Full local CI passed Rust tests and reached 6,828 passing desktop JS
tests before an unchanged 10 ms focus-timer test failed; its five-test
file passed in isolation. The pre-push native suite had 3,421 passes and
an unchanged 300 ms child-PID test failure, also passing in isolation.
Prior ACP timing flakes and these unrelated hook exceptions do not waive
required CI.
- Windows CI exposed a missing system OpenSSL installation for the test
fixture generator. The test dependency now builds bundled OpenSSL; all
30 focused App Attest tests pass locally. [Current-head
CI](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/38636062347) passed,
including Windows Rust, PostgreSQL, and desktop integration tests.
- [Prior-head Codex
review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8329#issuecomment-6177515598)
found no major issues. Carl subsequently identified a dropped
credential-length workaround; fixed in
[27f9f26](27f9f2624f),
with 34 focused/protected tests and Clippy passing. [Current-head Codex
review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8329#issuecomment-6178361143)
found no major issues; physical iOS 26 testing was explicitly waived by
Tom on October 14, 2026. No iOS 26 device test was performed. The SDK
comparison used the same iOS 27.0.1 device, so it demonstrates
SDK-linked variation without establishing OS-version causation.
- Isolated candidate HTTP/device validation passed with separate
authority state and no APNs delivery: SDK 26.5 enrollment/delegation,
SDK 27.1 delegation with the exact same key and installation, and fresh
SDK 27.1 enrollment/delegation. Assertions changed from 37 to 102 bytes
across the upgrade; accepted counter increased from 1 to 3 and
delegation generation from 1 to 2. All three runs rejected tampering and
replay (401) and consumed challenges (404). Existing Buzz app builds
were preserved. No production rollout is included.

- Existing-installation validation passed against the current-head Dev
gateway: a guarded SDK 27.1 diagnostic reused the stored key and
installation, advanced the assertion counter from 88 to 89 and
delegation from 89 to 90, and published the existing active relay lease
at generation 9 (previously 8). Independent database reads confirmed the
changes and preserved key, epoch, and expiry. The original app build was
restored in place with current data and keys intact.

---------

Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
2026-10-15 07:15:19 -07:00
Tom Brow
c432a111ca feat(mobile): push notifications MVP (#6269)
This PR implements MVP, iOS-only,
[NIP-PL](8d2d0ff5ad/docs/nips/NIP-PL.md)-compliant
push notifications.

A relay with `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED` will send a push notification for any
message that appears in the in-app Notifications tab.

## Enrollment flow
The first time the client first connects to a relay with
`BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED`:
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant App as Buzz iOS app
    participant iOS
    participant Relay as Buzz relay
    participant Attest as Apple App Attest
    participant Gateway as Push gateway

    App->>Relay: Fetch NIP-11 push capability
    Relay-->>App: Push profile, current relay public key, and limits

    par
        App->>iOS: Request notification permission
        iOS-->>App: Permission result
    and
        App->>iOS: Register for remote notifications
        iOS-->>App: Device token
    end

    App->>Gateway: Request installation challenge
    Gateway-->>App: Single-use challenge
    App->>Attest: Attest installation transcript
    Attest-->>App: Attestation proof
    App->>Gateway: Enroll device token and proof
    Gateway-->>App: Installation handle

    App->>Gateway: Request delegation challenge
    Gateway-->>App: Single-use challenge
    App->>Attest: Assert relay-key delegation
    Attest-->>App: Assertion
    App->>Gateway: Create delegation
    Gateway-->>App: Opaque endpoint grant

    App->>Relay: Publish encrypted push lease and filters
    Relay-->>App: Lease acknowledged
```

## Push-time flow

When a notification-eligible event is received by the relay:

```mermaid
%%{init: {
  "sequence": {
    "actorMargin": 20,
    "width": 110,
    "messageMargin": 18,
    "diagramMarginX": 8,
    "wrap": true
  }
}}%%
sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant Relay as Buzz relay
    participant Gateway as Push gateway
    participant APNs as Apple Push<br/>Notification service
    participant iOS
    participant NSE as Notification service<br/>extension

    Relay->>Gateway: POST /v1/deliveries/apns<br/>opaque endpoint grant, request ID, expiry, NIP-98 authorization

    Gateway->>APNs: POST /3/device/{device-token}<br/>topic, request ID, expiry, constant mutable-content payload
    APNs-->>Gateway: 200 OK: request accepted
    Gateway-->>Relay: 200 OK: accepted status

    APNs-->>iOS: Notification: constant reconnect alert<br/>mutable-content = 1
    iOS->>NSE: Invoke extension<br/>original notification content

    NSE->>Relay: POST /query: subscription filters, limit 10<br/>NIP-98 authorization
    Relay-->>NSE: 200 OK: signed Nostr events<br/>kinds 9, 40002, 45001, or 45003

    NSE->>iOS: Complete notification: title, body, subtitle<br/>thread ID, exact-message target
```

relay → push gateway → APNs -> NSE -> Notification Center

## Known limitations

The APNs wake payload is intentionally constant and opaque: it contains
no originating community or message identifier, in keeping with the
implemented NIP-PL privacy design.

The Notification Service Extension must therefore reconnect to the relay
and resolve eligible messages after each wake. Around overlapping wakes,
timing boundaries, or resolution windows, notification presentation may
occasionally omit an expected message or display a message more than
once.

This best-effort behavior is deliberately accepted for the current
implementation and will be measured during the internal rollout to
determine whether the user experience is acceptable before any broader
deployment; the implementation does not claim exactly-once presentation.

## Validation

Live end-to-end hardware validation used an internal remotely hosted
development relay and push gateway, the APNs sandbox, and a physical
iPhone 12 mini:

- A second real Buzz client published a uniquely marked message through
the hosted relay.
- The relay matched the message and sent the constant opaque wake
through the hosted gateway. The gateway made an actual APNs request; no
`simctl push` or simulated notification was used.
- The iPhone received the notification on its lock screen. The
Notification Service Extension reconnected to the relay, fetched the
event, verified its ID and signature, and replaced the placeholder
content with the real notification title and body.
- After the app populated its shared presentation cache, a final marked
notification visibly showed the sender display name, sender avatar, and
hashtag-prefixed channel name.
- Tapping a lock-screen notification opened Buzz and exercised the
notification-response path and navigated to the corresponding message.

Final validation with a dogfood-signed artifact and production App
Attest/APNs configuration remains a release step.

## Independent pre-reviews

- **First pass:**
[Carl](buzz://message?channel=18882f4c-289f-41db-942f-81f6f8066da1&id=74ab9a93bb227f3e762568f1cf9fee66d7495b0edc3918735ff787238b9cc585)
found missing transient retries, executor-key rotation suppression,
duplicate installation renewal, and an unauthenticated challenge write
amplifier. These were resolved by [retry-safe
bootstrap](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/12c66ea62)
and [authenticated renewal plus a cross-replica
quota](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/8e5ece0bd).
[sol-max](buzz://message?channel=ad83385f-8e9e-4461-9a35-c1bf2e208532&id=d26d53daa4684669e2ed354638241f13f36c3a97027fe8b4dd738aff09038962)
found delegation generation burning and an edited applied migration,
resolved by [exact-generation
revocation](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/c26d2159d)
and a [forward-only
migration](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/956c1d099).
[k3-max](buzz://message?channel=5e46055d-a766-4065-ae25-05d1e4aaa6b2&id=d43139138a0b15f806cbdbeeedd8f69d992cadf2e805876db6fdde6a34c7eda1)
found no blockers.
- **Exact-head re-review:**
[Carl](buzz://message?channel=18882f4c-289f-41db-942f-81f6f8066da1&id=a897721673459301b0cf26e8b85a1478d7ebbb56a4621f93d774c98d395b8f68),
[sol-max](buzz://message?channel=ad83385f-8e9e-4461-9a35-c1bf2e208532&id=fb2159f709ec68f74f7b21459acd76da0e8a7c5c0f3d469f99826b0cc2380849),
and
[k3-max](buzz://message?channel=5e46055d-a766-4065-ae25-05d1e4aaa6b2&id=2ce2842910435f562e9d9cc718595848f281b122c94605e523a4b964254b8bfb)
independently returned **NO BLOCKERS** at `7eb3a650b`; k3-max also
revalidated every remediation and the endpoint-specific App Attest
enrollment bound.

---------

Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@squareup.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Tom Brow <tomb@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com>
2026-08-28 15:15:09 -06:00
Bradley Axen
64c63daf02 chore(release): release Buzz Desktop version 0.4.11 (#2010)
Signed-off-by: npub1k766u8wq088nkr9vy94uqlh9kmw5956g593a7xk7cks7frhgctmsr00p27 <b7b5ae1dc079cf3b0cac216bc07ee5b6dd42d348a163df1adec5a1e48ee8c2f7@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
Co-authored-by: npub1k766u8wq088nkr9vy94uqlh9kmw5956g593a7xk7cks7frhgctmsr00p27 <b7b5ae1dc079cf3b0cac216bc07ee5b6dd42d348a163df1adec5a1e48ee8c2f7@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
2026-07-16 20:50:03 -04:00