Commit Graph

4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Luke Tornquist
039e1c8d59 feat(relay): write the NIP-43 member list in the membership transaction (#8482)
## Summary

The relay-signed NIP-43 member list (kind:13534) was published after
each membership change had already committed. If that publish failed, or
if a change never republished at all (startup `bootstrap_owner`), the
list stayed wrong until the background reconcile sweep found and fixed
it. #8467 moved that sweep off the startup path. This PR removes the
reason the sweep exists.

Now every `buzz-db` function that changes `relay_members` writes the new
list **in the same transaction**, as its last statement before commit:
- It takes the per-community list lock last, reads the members, signs
the list, retires the old one and inserts the new one.
- If the list write fails, the membership change rolls back and the
caller gets an error.
- A call that changes nothing (already a member, role mismatch, host
exists, limit reached) writes no list.

The functions return `MembershipWrite<T> { outcome, snapshot }`. Callers
push `snapshot` to live subscribers after commit. That push is the only
thing left outside the transaction; if it fails, live clients see the
change on their next fetch, and the stored list is already correct.

Write paths covered (RPR #2, every write path): `add_relay_member`,
`claim_relay_membership`, `claim_relay_invite`, `remove_relay_member`,
`remove_relay_member_if_role`, `update_relay_member_role`,
`bootstrap_owner` / `provision_owner`, `transfer_ownership`,
`backfill_from_allowlist`, and the owner insert in
`create_community_with_owner[_and_nip_fi_issuers]`. Community deletion
removes the members together with the community, so it writes no list.

The relay keypair is passed in explicitly instead of being stored on
`Db`, so the compiler finds every caller.

### Behavior changes

- **Open relays get an accurate list too.** Provisioning and ownership
transfer used to publish only when `require_relay_membership` was on.
The write is now unconditional.
- **Same-second changes can't reuse an id.** The list's `created_at` is
one second past the newest earlier list for that community, including
retired ones, or the current time if that is later. Before, adding and
then removing a member in the same second could produce an event with
the same id as an earlier list. The insert then failed, and the stale
list stayed live. A burst of changes can push `created_at` ahead of the
clock by up to one second per change; it returns to the clock once the
burst ends.
- **`buzz-admin add-member` / `remove-member`** no longer build their
own list (`publish_membership_list_with_bump` is deleted). They push the
list the database wrote. Concurrent CLI runs now serialize on the
database lock rather than depending on `run.sh` running one at a time.
- **Owner mutations lock the community row `FOR NO KEY UPDATE`.**
`transfer_ownership` and `bootstrap_owner` used `FOR UPDATE`. The list
insert takes `FOR KEY SHARE` on that row through `events.community_id`'s
foreign key, so a repair holding the list lock, or a removal or role
update holding a member row, deadlocked with a concurrent owner change.
`FOR NO KEY UPDATE` still conflicts with archive, unarchive and deletion
admission, so the lifecycle ordering is unchanged.
- **Startup delivers its list to other replicas.** When backfill or
`bootstrap_owner` changes members at startup, the relay fans the newest
list out through pub/sub once its state is ready, so clients connected
to other replicas during a rolling deploy see an owner rotation without
a refetch.
- **New `buzz-admin republish-members`.** Rewrites the community's list
from the stored members in one community-write transaction and pushes it
live. This replaces the sweep as the repair for a list that is missing
or stale: a `relay_members` change made directly in SQL, a restore, or a
deployment that turns on `BUZZ_REQUIRE_RELAY_MEMBERSHIP` after running
without it.

## Rollout

Nothing rewrites a list automatically once the sweep is gone. A
community whose list drifted before this deploys stays wrong until its
next membership change or until an operator runs `buzz-admin
republish-members`. Either deploy #8467 and let its sweep complete one
pass first, or run `republish-members` for each community after this
deploys. The command repairs only the community that `RELAY_URL` maps
to, so on a relay hosting many communities, run it once per community
host.

## What got simpler

Deleted:
- `reconcile_nip43_membership_snapshots`,
`spawn_nip43_membership_reconciler`, its leader lock key and #8467's
standby retry
- the three `nip43_membership_snapshot_needs_reconciliation*` drift
reads (one already deprecated)
- `publish_nip43_membership_list` / `publish_nip43_membership_locked`,
the separate after-commit republish at every call site, and
`buzz-admin`'s duplicate publisher
- the reconcile metrics `buzz_nip43_membership_reconciliations_total`
and `buzz_nip43_membership_reconciliation_failures_total`
- the after-commit publish metrics
`buzz_nip43_membership_publications_total` and
`buzz_nip43_membership_publication_seconds`, and the
`publish_nip43_membership_locked` transaction metric label. A failed
list write is now a failed membership write and shows up in the caller's
existing error handling and the transaction metrics of its write path.
- the `BUZZ_NIP43_RECONCILE_INTERVAL_SECS` setting

There is now one way the list gets written, and it can't disagree with
`relay_members` after commit.

**Unused deploy config (outside this repo):** hosted deployments that
set `BUZZ_NIP43_RECONCILE_INTERVAL_SECS` can drop it. It is now ignored.
Dashboards or alerts on the four deleted metrics will stop receiving
data.

## Testing

New Postgres tests (`buzz-db`):
- `relay_members::every_membership_write_commits_its_list`: for each
write path, the returned list is the single live kind:13534 and names
exactly the committed members. No-op calls return no list and leave the
live list alone.
- `relay_members::a_failed_list_write_rolls_back_the_membership_change`:
holds the list lock, waits for the join to block on it, cancels that
statement, and checks that the member was not added and the previous
list is still live.
- `relay_members::concurrent_joins_all_land_in_the_list`: 8 concurrent
joins; the final list names all 8.
-
`relay_members::same_second_return_to_an_earlier_membership_writes_a_new_list`:
add, remove, add, remove within a second; every list is newer than the
last and no id repeats.
- `relay_members::owner_transfer_and_list_repair_both_commit` and
`relay_members::owner_transfer_and_member_removal_both_commit`: hold a
repair (list lock) or removal (member row) open, wait until a transfer
blocks behind it, then finish it. Both transactions commit; with `FOR
UPDATE` back in place, one of them fails.
- `community::create_community_with_owner_is_atomic_and_create_only` and
`relay_invite::bounded_claim_exhausts_and_existing_member_retry_does_not_consume`
now also check the list.

Each new test was checked to fail against a mutation of the new code
that brings back the old behavior (details in the thread).

Stacked on #8467. Merge order: #8467, then #8468, then this.

---------

Signed-off-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Elrond <28d6302a099e5225b02c4155ac4236e4912603df2ab08dbfc2f4fef08ce598c8@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-10-20 11:39:13 -04:00
Will Pfleger
836e7d0d06 feat(desktop): browse and moderate every community in the Admin Console (#8027)
The Admin Console only ever saw the community the desktop happened to be
connected to. With #8011's community reads, the console can now browse
every community on the relay and, for signed staff, moderate any of them
by name without switching connections. 🤖

## What changes

- **Communities tab.** Lists every live community on the relay,
searchable by host prefix with "Load more" paging. The connected
community is pinned at the top by exact host match. Report rows get a
community badge that opens that community.
- **Community page.** Reports, Restrictions, Members and Actions, each
scoped to the community on the page. The Actions form has no host field:
it always acts on the page's community, and the TypeScript host
normalization is gone from the Actions tab.
- **Native reads** (`admin_list_communities`, `admin_search_members`,
`admin_get_member`, `admin_get_event`). Every request validates the
explicit community host and NIP-98-signs the real method and URL.
Failures come back as a structured error (`status`, `bodyComplete`,
`bodyEmpty`, `code`), so the UI can tell an older relay's empty 404, a
coded `event_not_found` and a transport failure apart, and never says
"not found" unless the relay did.
- **Explicit-host lifts.** `admin_lift_restriction` sends the page's
community host, not the active relay's. It freezes the relay and signer
the intent was reviewed under, and refuses to send if either has
changed.
- **Pending actions survive navigation.** A panel-level
`DirectActionsProvider` holds the frozen intent, so switching
communities or tabs mid-confirm doesn't lose it. Only Discard drops it.
A signer change remounts the controller and drops it.
- **Fenced lookups.** Member and event lookups are keyed by origin,
signer, community, target and a generation counter, so a late answer for
one community can't unlock Review in another.
- **Shared member picker** (`MemberSearchResult`, also used by Add
Member), showing the truncated npub so members with the same name can be
told apart. Delete accepts a note link and previews the message before
Review. Relay staff are blocked before Review.
- **Disabled admin auth is read-only.** With `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=disabled`
the Communities tab and community pages still render, and report badges
still open them, but every ban, timeout, delete, add-member and lift
control is disabled. The settings badge says the console is read-only
and that acting needs `nip98`. Staffing stays hidden.
- #7904's protections in the Actions tab are kept: frozen intent,
`requestId`, Retry, `notSent` and the key-backup guard.
- **Readable load errors.** Admin list and detail loads show the relay's
error message (for example "request is not authorized"), never the raw
JSON envelope.
- **Failed kicks reload the report.** A resolve that fails with
`enforcement_failed` reloads the report, so its failed action and
"Cancel & reopen" appear immediately.
- **Key backups never leave in a search.** Every admin API request URL
passes the NIP-49 key-backup guard before it is signed or sent:
community and legacy reads, mutations, the connection probe (before its
first, unsigned request) and feedback-attachment fetches. The community
and member search boxes, including the directory's Load more, refuse a
pasted `nsec` or `ncryptsec` anywhere in the input without calling the
relay.
- **`just admin-seed` for multi-community testing.** Besides the local
community, it seeds `beta.localhost:3000`, `gamma.localhost:3000` and 50
filler communities, with named members, a ban and a timeout in each
named community, a report with Kick available, and a message for the
delete preview. Rerunning it restores all of that to the starting state.
It refuses, writing nothing, while a moderation action is unfinished on
a seeded report.
- The bodyless `GET /events/{id}` preview is added to the events-URL
egress inventory. It sends no body, so it carries no key material.

## Tests

Native (Rust):
- `empty_404_and_405_read_as_complete_and_empty`,
`coded_404_carries_the_relay_code`,
`truncated_and_over_cap_bodies_are_incomplete`,
`transport_failure_has_no_status`: the structured read error tells an
older relay, a coded refusal, a cut-off body and a transport failure
apart.
- `a_401_retry_is_signed_by_the_same_keys`,
`lift_signs_the_send_and_401_retry_with_the_checked_keys`: the 401 retry
never switches keys.
- `read_urls_validate_the_explicit_host_and_encode_the_query`,
`lift_url_sends_the_page_host_not_the_active_relay`,
`list_url_carries_host_and_cursor_and_refuses_a_changed_relay`,
`lift_refuses_before_sending_on_signer_change_or_bad_host`: requests
target the explicit host and refuse to send after a relay or signer
change.

jsdom:
- `actions-pending-nav`: a pending intent survives a community change,
and only Discard drops it.
- `actions-fenced-lookup`, `fenced-load`: a late lookup for an old key
never shows under, or unlocks, the new one.
- `actions-same-ids`: the same pubkey and event id are read separately
in each community.
- `actions-community-change-drops-member`, `actions-page-host`,
`actions-success`, `actions-identity`: the form acts only in the page's
community, and confirm sends the frozen intent.
- `actions-preview-errors`, `actions-delete-link`,
`actions-staff-target`, `actions-disabled-auth`: preview errors, delete
by note link, the staff block, and community pages rendering read-only
with every action control disabled under disabled admin auth.
- `communities-directory`, `communities-unsupported`, `community-badge`,
`community-badge-disabled-auth`: the directory, older relays, and report
badges, which open community pages under disabled admin auth too.
- `restrictions-lift-signer-change`. The existing restriction tests now
run on the community page and use `admin_lift_restriction`.

Mutation checks: removing the pending-navigation guard turns
`actions-pending-nav` red, and dropping the host from the fence key
turns `actions-fenced-lookup`, `actions-same-ids` and `fenced-load` red.
Ungating restriction lifts on `canMutate` turns `actions-disabled-auth`
red.

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-10-08 13:58:07 -04:00
Will Pfleger
8f8c4dfade feat(desktop): relay admin console for the /api/admin/v1 operator surface (#4768)
Adds a relay admin console under Settings — the single surface for
relay-level operator work — replacing the previously unreachable
moderation section. Operators authenticate with their own Nostr key over
NIP-98 — no browser extension, no bearer token — to view deployment-wide
moderation reports and product feedback, resolve/dismiss/escalate/reopen
reports, update feedback status, and manage the operator/moderator
staffing roster.

## Nav reachability

The old `moderation` section id was defined in `settingsSections` but
never wired into any group in `settingsNavGroups`, so the sidebar never
rendered it — unreachable since #1617. This PR replaces it with a
`relay-admin` section wired into the Communities nav group, pointing at
the relay admin console, and drops the separate `admin-console` section
id so a single surface owns relay-level trust & safety.

The Relay admin nav entry is always visible. Auth gates the panel
itself; the nav entry is a door, not a credential — hiding it behind
discovery state would strand an operator whose relay transiently fails
NIP-11 discovery with no path back to the connection settings.

## Discovery and connection

On mount the console reads the connected relay's NIP-11 document for the
optional `admin_api` field. When a valid origin is discovered **and its
host matches the connected relay's host** (case-insensitive, host
identity only), it is automatically saved and probed — the panel renders
immediately with no Save step required. A cross-host advertisement is
pre-fill only: it populates the manual origin field under Advanced and
is never saved or probed without an explicit Save, so a relay cannot
direct an unconsented NIP-98 signature at a third-party origin; residual
exposure on the same-host path is bounded by NIP-98's URL/method/payload
binding. Saving is only required for manual origin changes. The
advertised origin is untrusted input: revalidated through
`AdminOrigin::parse`, falling back to manual entry when absent or
invalid. A saved manual origin always takes precedence over discovery.

## Auth and transport (Rust, `src-tauri/src/commands/admin/`)

- `AdminOrigin` value object: validates scheme + host + optional port,
rejects credentials/path/query/fragment; `http://` only for loopback.
The relay side normalizes its configured admin host at config load and
compares inbound `Host`/`Origin` hosts case-insensitively.
- `AdminRoute` closed enum: no IPC surface accepts arbitrary URLs, so
the NIP-98-signed URL is byte-identical to the fetched URL.
- Dedicated no-redirect `reqwest` client as an SSRF guard: a relay `3xx`
is an error and the NIP-98 header never crosses origins.
- `admin_probe` signs `GET /probe` and returns a typed state
(`nip98Authorized` / `nip98Denied` / `disabled` / `notAdminApi` /
`networkOrIntercepted`). The response body is validated against the full
relay contract — `nip98Authorized` only when the complete NIP-98
invariant holds, `disabled` only on a coherent disabled-mode body; any
incoherent or unrelated JSON classifies as `notAdminApi`, so the console
never fails open at the network boundary. Unknown fields are tolerated
for forward compatibility.
- NIP-98 signing via `AppState::signing_keys()`, one retry on `401` with
a fresh signed event; response size bounded by a `Content-Length`
preflight and a streaming byte counter; per-pubkey origin storage with
atomic `0o600` writes.

## Relay admin console

The console is gated behind the relay `OPERATOR`/`MODERATOR` roles from
#3777; every `/api/admin/v1/*` route returns `403` to anyone else.
Community self-administration (`community-members` / Invites) and
in-channel enforcement (the 9040–9043 signed commands) are a separate
axis and are untouched. The previously-duplicate community report queue
(`ModerationQueueCard`, `moderationQueue.ts`, and three dead hooks) was
unreachable dead code and is deleted in its own commit;
`useBanMemberMutation` and the rest of `features/moderation/hooks.ts`
remain in use by the members sidebar and message menu.

## Console UI (TypeScript, `src/features/admin-console/`)

- `AdminConsoleSettingsCard`: discovery + probe flow, honest copy for
every probe state, manual origin under an `Advanced` disclosure at the
bottom. The role (operator/moderator) is rendered in the connection
status line as plain text ("Connected as operator") — no badge-shaped
elements above the tab row. The origin provenance (relay config /
database) appears inside the Advanced card as small muted text. Section
title changed to `Admin`.
- `AdminConsolePanel` with Reports / Feedback / Staffing tabs (Staffing
gated on `role === "operator"`); reports and feedback grouped by
community for cross-community triage.
- **Reports**: always requests `scope=all` so the existing
resolve/cancel/reopen controls can reach every status (`open`,
`processing`, `resolved`, `dismissed`, `escalated`). The relay's
omitted-scope default is `escalated`-only (the platform-safety
backstop); `scope=all` is explicit and scoped to this console. Full
action matrix per `target_kind` (event →
delete/kick/ban/timeout/dismiss/escalate; pubkey →
ban/timeout/dismiss/escalate; blob → dismiss/escalate); kick is
suppressed when the report carries no `channelId`. A `processing` row
stays navigable — enforcement state lives in the detail view. A `failed`
action (always pre-mutation) offers a single **Cancel & reopen** via
`POST /reports/{id}/cancel` with `{actionId}` fencing; there is no
client-side retry. `pending`/`enforcing` actions belong to the relay
recovery worker and offer no button; a `409` reloads detail. Lists
refetch on back-navigation after a mutation.
- **Report failure UX**: `reportErrorMessage()` strips 4xx/5xx status
prefixes and surfaces the relay's own error reason in the toast (e.g.
relay returns `"400: you cannot report this content"` → toast shows
`"you cannot report this content"`). Self-report blocking UI removed —
the relay has no self-report gate, and the failure was purely
client-side error surfacing.
- **Reason audience disclosure**: the Reason (optional) field shows
exact copy under the input based on selected action — Delete discloses
that reason is sent verbatim to the affected user and posted publicly in
the room; Kick/Ban/Timeout disclose affected-user only; Dismiss/Escalate
disclose reporter only. These mirror the actual relay notice paths.
- **Enforcement history**: the report detail carries the governing
action even after the report leaves `processing` — a report enforced
then reopened is `open` yet still shows its `succeeded` action as
executed history alongside the resolve form; a reopen does not un-happen
a ban. The resolve form gates on `open` status alone.
- **Reopen**: terminal reports (`resolved`/`dismissed`/`escalated`) can
be returned to `open` for re-triage via `POST /reports/{id}/reopen`.
Reopen never reverses applied enforcement, and the copy says so.
- **Feedback**: list, detail, and status control
(`new`/`reviewed`/`archived`) with a generation-fenced attachment
viewer. A purged source community severs provenance to `null` rather
than deleting the row; severed rows bucket under a "source community
removed" heading.
- **Staffing**: Add is create-only with display names resolved via
`useUsersBatchQuery` and npub cross-fade on hover
(`HoverStaffingIdentity`). An entered key that already appears in the
authoritative roster (config, owner-fallback, or DB) is rejected locally
with an inline duplicate-key message and no request is issued; a `409
Conflict` from add, role change, or remove surfaces the relay's parsed
error body via `adminErrorMessage(e)` — distinguishing config-backed key
conflicts from last-operator conflicts without HTTP-status inference.
Roster with `config`/`owner_fallback`/`db` source labels; config-backed
entries disable remove client-side. In-place role change via `<select>`
calling `putAdminOperator`; the relay responds with the effective
`OperatorEntry` (`pubkey`, `effectiveRole`, `sources`) in the same shape
as the roster list. Read-only badge for config-managed entries.
- **Timeout expiry**: `useTimeoutState` clears the store when derived
state is `INACTIVE` but the store is still active; the 1s tick is scoped
to entries with a known `expiresAtMs` and owned by
`ComposerTimeoutBanner` (mounted only while a timeout is active), while
`ChannelPane` subscribes to the boolean `useTimeoutActive()` — the pane
re-renders when a timeout starts or ends, not every second.
`useMembersSidebarModeration` ticks `nowMs` only while the sidebar is
open, the viewer can moderate, and some member has a future
`mutedUntil`; the tick after the last expiry stops the interval.
- Staffing refreshes the principal after a self-demotion or
self-removal: `AdminConsolePanel` passes `onSelfMutation` to
`StaffingTab`, which re-probes the saved origin so the role badge and
tab visibility update without a manual re-probe.
- Staffing mutation failures, including both 409 variants (config-backed
key vs. last operator), surface the relay's parsed error via
`adminErrorMessage`, so the last-operator recovery guidance is shown.
- Mutations confirm via `sonner` toasts; failures surface the relay's
parsed error `message`, not raw JSON. The `disabled` auth mode renders
read-only.

## Mutation idempotency

Resolve and reopen carry a per-attempt `requestId`. On first submit the
whole command (`{requestId, action, reason, expirationSecs}`) is frozen;
after an ambiguous failure (409, 5xx, transport error, truncated
response) the snapshot is retained, action/reason/duration controls are
locked, and the retry sends the exact same payload byte-for-byte. A
definitive pre-commit rejection (non-409 4xx with `bodyComplete: true`)
discards the snapshot, unlocks controls, and the corrected submit uses a
fresh payload. On success the toast derives from the authoritative
`AdminReportResolution` (`activeAction.action` when present; otherwise
`status` for decision-only outcomes) — never from the mutable form
selection.

The native mutation commands — including operator delete — reject with a
typed `AdminMutationError` carrying the relay's HTTP status
(`relayStatus`, `null` when no verdict exists) and a `bodyComplete` flag
that is `true` only when the full response body was read.

## Restriction routes contract change

`GET /members/restrictions` and `DELETE /members/{pubkey}/ban|timeout`
now take `communityHost` instead of `communityId`; the relay resolves
the tenant itself and returns `400 unknown_community_host` for an
unmapped host. This is a breaking contract change with no compatibility
shim: the relay must run this build before a desktop that uses it,
scripts sending `communityId` must switch, and rolling the relay back
breaks the desktop Restrictions UI. `docs/admin/README.md` documents the
three routes in the route inventory and carries the migration note.
Restriction calls also carry the relay the list was loaded from, and the
native side rejects a mismatch before building any URL.

## Hardening

- Saved admin origins are stored per pubkey and per relay host. The host
slug parses the relay URL, keeps the port-drop for DNS names, and
encodes IPv6 hosts canonically, so two IPv6 relays never share a file
and no IPv6 slug can match a DNS slug.
- NIP-11 admin discovery has its own 10s request deadline and reads
`/info` success and error bodies through the bounded reader with a 64
KiB cap (`Content-Length` is only a pre-check).
- `PUT /operators` builds its `OperatorEntry` response from the
validated body (`effectiveRole = role`, `sources = ["db"]`) instead of
re-reading the roster, so a concurrent change can't turn a committed
write into a `403`.

Related: #3777 (relay `OPERATOR`/`MODERATOR` role model + NIP-98 auth +
`admin_api` NIP-11 advertisement — provides the runtime and the
discovery field this console consumes)
Related:
[builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure#140](https://github.com/squareup/builderbot-platform-core-infrastructure/pull/140)
(prod admin ingress allowlist and NIP-98 rollout)


## Screenshots

Captured headless at `197f0ba0c` against the mock bridge (1280×720).

### Setup

**Origin setup — Advanced disclosure open, idle state**
![Relay admin panel with Advanced: admin origin disclosure open before
probe](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/02-origin-setup.png)

**Authorized console — all three tabs**
![Authorized relay console showing Connected as operator status and
Reports/Feedback/Staffing
tabs](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/03-origin-authorized.png)

### Reports

**Reports queue — open, processing, resolved across two relay groups**
![Reports tab showing community-grouped list with spam/open,
harassment/processing, illegal/resolved
rows](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/04-reports-queue.png)

**Open report detail — reporter, target, message snapshot, resolve
form**
![Open spam report detail with reported message content and
Delete/Kick/Ban/Timeout/Dismiss/Escalate action
buttons](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/05-report-detail-open.png)

**Processing report — PROCESSING/HARASSMENT, ban enforcing state**
![Processing harassment report detail showing enforcement state with ban
action in enforcing
status](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/06-report-enforcement.png)

**Resolve form — Delete selected, audience disclosure copy**
![Resolve form with Delete action selected showing "Sent verbatim to the
affected user and posted publicly in the room" audience
copy](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/07-resolve-form.png)

**Resolved report — enforcement history block**
![Resolved/illegal report detail showing Resolved by, Resolved at, and
Act ID fields from completed
enforcement](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/08-resolved-history.png)

### Feedback

**Feedback list — community grouping with status badges**
![Feedback tab showing relay.example.com group with new/reviewed items
and source-community-removed
group](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/09-feedback-list.png)

**Feedback detail — mutable status control (operator mode)**
![Feedback detail with new/reviewed/archived status tab control visible
for
mutation](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/10-feedback-mutable.png)

**Feedback detail — passive status badge (read-only/disabled mode)**
![Feedback detail in disabled mode showing passive "Status NEW" badge
with no mutation
control](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/11-feedback-readonly.png)

### Staffing

**Staffing roster — config/owner\_fallback/db source labels**
![Staffing tab showing three operators with config, owner_fallback, and
db source
labels](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/12-staffing-roster.png)

**Add form — new pubkey filled, ready to submit**
![Staffing add form with a new 64-hex pubkey entered and moderator role
selected](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/13-staffing-add.png)

**Duplicate rejection — inline error for existing principal**
![Staffing add form showing "Already an operator: operator. Use Remove
to revoke before re-adding with a different role." error for an existing
config-backed
operator](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/block/buzz/f92559f9fab694b51afd60fdf76cb276de2fa830/docs/pr4768/14-staffing-dup.png)

---------

Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Alia <d32955ad69077062930cc46cfe2df30ca9aaf6f8e76422681265e9e9af704d78@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-24 17:34:25 -04:00
Kalvin C
68e670e001 feat: add read-only deployment moderation dashboard (#1999)
Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
Co-authored-by: npub1ntr8jjcqq6gt06q5avvqttfjgpwshmra22pcmcagdnukw4ja4nqqsa9g54 <9ac6794b000690b7e814eb1805ad32405d0bec7d52838de3a86cf967565dacc0@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
2026-07-17 12:50:06 -07:00