Files
buzz/mobile/lib/shared/hosted/hosted_relay_auth.dart
Wes b6aa5539e3 feat(mobile): account onboarding, key recovery and hosted reconnect (#8375)
## Behavior

Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery,
community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab
features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or
empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and
background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing,
links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is
retained for later opt-in.


`--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz`
opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup.
The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission,
and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features;
`BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their
backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory.

`BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and
reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure
assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling
assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at
Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not
replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines.

Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile
interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file
import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and
authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound
account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the
advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection.
Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS
startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET
/operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership
endpoint.

## Validation

- Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents
readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while
generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection
uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances
dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a
subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the
subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different
account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured
domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate
isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse,
duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an
empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses
synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live
backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh
GitHub CI is pending.

- Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage
enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit
known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links
release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response
encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by
ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed;
default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production
fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the
identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey
assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures
are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not
exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed
(mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub
CI remains pending.

- Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at
`fb15d5b82`.
- Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing
and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing
pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly.
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through
hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored
controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the
default-build suite.
- Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its
pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated
transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding
selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both
configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and
file-size checks).

- Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission
and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or
already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted
removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too
(hosted-only cases intentionally skip there).
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping,
reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory
reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean
and restored controls pass.
- Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the
iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At
`24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches,
matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes
it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did
not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native
cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account
round trip.

- Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known
identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement
of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the
retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default:
31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations
fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot
enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover.

- Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after
account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch,
preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The
configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the
production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored
controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical
QR acceptance.

- Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses
atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain.
Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request
abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit.
- Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain
account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and
native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls.
Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real
file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because
simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device
protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed.

- Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default
selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus
whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed
Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally
initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form
fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass.
- Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator
in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR /
pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab
connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in
this check.

- Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size
checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push
snapshot.

## Review disposition

| Feedback | Disposition |
| --- | --- |
| Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate
invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding
([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622),
[queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640),
[reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512))
| Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven
ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. |
| Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue,
transient HTTP retry classification
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143))
| All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated
mutation evidence above. |
| Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite
checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the
preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. |
| iOS interrupted key export
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252))
| Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented.
Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains
pending. |
| Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556))
| Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. |
| Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab
configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported
community mappings. |
| Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the
reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app
recovery/reset and remains deferred. |
| Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current
base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains
here. |
| Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the
operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied.
Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. |
| Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local
work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed
implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. |
| Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not
demonstrated defects. |

## Remaining draft gates

Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this
revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend
backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery
policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The
empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary
pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human
acceptance and current CI are still required before merge.



Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must
use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add
support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing
an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented
capability.


Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS`
(including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab
controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build
with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise
browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS,
exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record
results before marking review complete.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
2026-10-19 15:46:58 -06:00

246 lines
7.7 KiB
Dart

import 'dart:async';
import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
import '../relay/relay_provider.dart';
import 'builderlab_account.dart';
import 'account_identity_store.dart';
import 'hosted_environment.dart';
final builderlabAccountProvider = Provider<BuilderlabAccountClient>((ref) {
final account = BuilderlabAccountClient();
ref.onDispose(account.dispose);
return account;
});
final hostedRelayAuthProvider = Provider<HostedRelayAuth>((ref) {
final auth = HostedRelayAuth(ref.watch(builderlabAccountProvider));
ref.onDispose(auth.dispose);
return auth;
});
/// Each transport owns its client lifetime; configuration and auth are shared.
final hostedHttpClientFactoryProvider = Provider<http.Client Function()>((ref) {
final auth = ref.watch(hostedRelayAuthProvider);
final config = ref.watch(relayConfigProvider);
return () => HostedRelayHttpClient(auth, config);
});
/// One account session, with a short-lived assertion for the current relay/key.
/// Enable alongside backend issuance; legacy and self-hosted builds stay usable.
class HostedRelayAuth extends ChangeNotifier {
HostedRelayAuth(
this.account, {
this.enabled = const bool.fromEnvironment('BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH'),
DateTime Function()? now,
}) : _now = now ?? DateTime.now;
final BuilderlabAccountClient account;
final bool enabled;
final DateTime Function() _now;
({
String relay,
String pubkey,
String token,
DateTime expiry,
BuilderlabAccount account,
})?
_cached;
Future<void>? _pending;
bool _disposed = false;
String? failedRelay;
String? failedPubkey;
AccountFailure? failure;
bool protects(RelayConfig config) =>
enabled &&
HostedEnvironment.requiresAuth(Uri.parse(config.baseUrl).host) &&
HostedEnvironment.supportsRelay(Uri.parse(config.baseUrl));
Future<Map<String, String>> headers(RelayConfig config) async {
if (!protects(config)) return const {};
final relay = Uri.parse(config.wsUrl).replace(path: '').toString();
final pubkey = pubkeyFromNsec(config.nsec);
if (pubkey == null) throw AccountFailure.denied;
while (!_disposed) {
final cached = _cached;
if (cached != null &&
cached.relay == relay &&
cached.pubkey == pubkey &&
identical(cached.account, account.account) &&
cached.expiry.isAfter(_now())) {
return {'Nostr-Federated-Identity': 'Bearer ${cached.token}'};
}
final pending = _pending;
if (pending != null) {
// Different communities share account restoration, never assertions.
try {
await pending;
} on AccountFailure {
if (failedRelay == config.baseUrl && failedPubkey == pubkey) rethrow;
}
continue;
}
final operation = _issue(config, relay, pubkey);
_pending = operation;
try {
await operation;
} finally {
_pending = null;
}
}
throw AccountFailure.unavailable;
}
Future<void> _issue(RelayConfig config, String relay, String pubkey) async {
try {
if (account.account == null && await account.restore() == null) {
throw AccountFailure.signedOut;
}
final session = account.account!;
// Issuance can create a binding. Reconnect must not silently give a
// different, unbound account this community's saved identity.
final current = await account.currentIdentity();
if (!identical(session, account.account)) throw AccountFailure.denied;
final identity = current['identity'];
if (current['error'] != null) throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
if (identity == null) {
final AccountIdentitySnapshot? saved;
try {
saved = await AccountIdentityStore()
.forSubject(session.subject)
.read();
} on AccountIdentityFailure {
throw AccountFailure.storage;
}
if (saved?.pubkey != pubkey ||
!saved!.hasBackupFor(
backend: BuilderlabAccountClient.origin.origin,
subject: session.subject,
)) {
throw AccountFailure.denied;
}
} else if (identity is! Map || identity['pubkey_hex'] != pubkey) {
throw AccountFailure.denied;
}
final value = await account.relayAssertion(
relay,
config.nsec!,
expectedSubject: session.subject,
);
final token = value['assertion'];
final expiry = value['expires_at'];
if (token is! String ||
token.isEmpty ||
token.length > 16384 ||
token.contains(RegExp(r'[\r\n]')) ||
value['nostr_pubkey'] != pubkey ||
expiry is! int) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
final now = _now().millisecondsSinceEpoch ~/ 1000;
if (expiry <= now || expiry > now + 300) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
final expires = DateTime.fromMillisecondsSinceEpoch(
expiry * 1000,
isUtc: true,
);
if (_disposed) throw AccountFailure.unavailable;
if (!identical(session, account.account)) {
return;
}
_cached = (
relay: relay,
pubkey: pubkey,
token: token,
expiry: expires.subtract(
Duration(seconds: (expiry - now) > 60 ? 30 : (expiry - now) ~/ 2),
),
account: session,
);
// Issuance alone cannot prove admission after a relay refusal.
if (failure != AccountFailure.denied) connected(config);
} on AccountFailure catch (error) {
if (!_disposed) {
failedRelay = config.baseUrl;
failedPubkey = pubkey;
failure = error;
notifyListeners();
}
rethrow;
}
}
/// Clear a scoped failure only after this community actually reconnects.
void connected(RelayConfig config) {
if (_disposed || (failedRelay != null && failedRelay != config.baseUrl)) {
return;
}
failure = null;
failedRelay = null;
failedPubkey = null;
notifyListeners();
}
void rejected(
RelayConfig config,
String? usedToken, {
bool terminal = false,
}) {
if (!protects(config) || usedToken == null) return;
if ('Bearer ${_cached?.token}' == usedToken) _cached = null;
if (terminal && !_disposed) {
failedRelay = config.baseUrl;
failedPubkey = pubkeyFromNsec(config.nsec);
failure = AccountFailure.denied;
notifyListeners();
}
}
@override
void dispose() {
_disposed = true;
_cached = null;
super.dispose();
}
}
/// Captures the signing context with the request. Never follows redirects with
/// credentials or replays a failed write automatically.
class HostedRelayHttpClient extends http.BaseClient {
HostedRelayHttpClient(
this.auth,
this.config, {
http.Client? inner,
this.canSend,
}) : _inner = inner ?? http.Client();
final HostedRelayAuth auth;
final RelayConfig config;
final http.Client _inner;
final bool Function()? canSend;
@override
Future<http.StreamedResponse> send(http.BaseRequest request) async {
final origin = Uri.parse(config.baseUrl);
final scoped = request.url.origin == origin.origin && auth.protects(config);
if (scoped) {
request.followRedirects = false;
request.headers.addAll(await auth.headers(config));
}
if (canSend != null && !canSend!()) {
throw StateError('Relay request expired');
}
final response = await _inner.send(request);
if (scoped && (response.statusCode == 401 || response.statusCode == 403)) {
auth.rejected(config, request.headers['Nostr-Federated-Identity']);
}
return response;
}
@override
void close() => _inner.close();
}