Files
buzz/mobile/test/features/pairing/pairing_provider_test.dart
Tom Brow a93f3282cc perf(mobile): retain preference crypto across reconnects (#8442)
Foreground reconnects rebuild preference managers and repeatedly derive
the same NIP-44 keys on the UI isolate. Retain the six crypto objects in
providers scoped to relay configuration and identity while preserving
manager refresh, subscription, and publication behavior. Community
changes, key rotation, and sign-out invalidate the retained objects.

RelayConfig normalizes the signing key once at its shared accessor, so
identity, theme encryption, event signing, and NIP-42 authentication
receive the same value, including when an active configuration key has
surrounding whitespace. The identity-export authorization snapshot uses
the same normalized key for the active-identity check and the outgoing
recovery payload. The branch incorporates main's relay-scoped preference
managers.

### Validation
- Regression exercises six production crypto providers across
reconnects, configuration/key changes, and sign-out. Reintroducing a
session dependency makes it fail.
- Added a loopback WebSocket regression that exercises actual
RelaySocket NIP-42 authentication with a padded key and verifies its
challenge, relay, pubkey and signature. It fails before shared key
normalization.
- Added a connected-theme regression for whitespace-padded keys,
encryption round-trip, and a valid published event signature. It fails
before the normalization fix.
- Added padded-key identity export coverage through authorization, SAS
confirmation, exactly one normalized payload, and successful completion.
Separate relay-change and key-rotation tests verify both fresh and
expired grants fail closed. The padded-key regression failed before the
fix.
- Current head: all 48 focused pairing/crypto/auth tests and mobile
analysis passed. All [CI
checks](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/39497098787) passed,
including mobile test shards, Android, native Swift tests and release
builds. Codex feedback is addressed; Jude approved this exact head after
independent regression and mutation checks. Fresh [Codex security
review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8442#issuecomment-6300273942)
found no concrete issues.
- Previous head: 122 config/socket/crypto/theme tests, 44 read-state
tests, and all [GitHub CI
checks](https://github.com/block/buzz/actions/runs/39491550425) passed,
including mobile test shards, Android, native Swift tests and release
builds.
- Original implementation: native iOS Debug build and full local
repository checks passed. A paired simulator background/resume capture
had no samples in the targeted crypto constructors or key derivation; an
82 ms UI frame remained. Debug/JIT, profiler overhead and shared-host
activity prevent an overall speedup claim. The later normalization
change is covered by the production-provider regression above.
- Two image decode timing failures occurred in the initial local full
suite; direct baseline/patch runs, the subsequent full repository run,
and the latest full mobile suite passed.

Cold-start credential validation is unchanged: padded persisted keys are
rejected by AuthNotifier before RelayConfig is constructed. The
normalization regressions cover active configurations and identity
export, not broader persisted-key acceptance.

<!-- buzz-review-completed -->

---------

Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
2026-10-20 14:57:53 -07:00

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import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_page.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/theme/theme.dart';
import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/community/paired_community_landing.dart';
import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:local_auth/local_auth.dart';
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_crypto.dart';
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart';
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_socket.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/auth/auth.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/ecdh.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/nip44.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/relay/relay.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart';
/// Exercises payload validation, credential import, and cancellation across
/// pairing and credential-validation socket lifetimes.
void main() {
group('PairingNotifier', () {
late ProviderContainer container;
late FakeAuthNotifier fakeAuth;
ProviderContainer createContainer() {
fakeAuth = FakeAuthNotifier();
return ProviderContainer(
overrides: [authProvider.overrideWith(() => fakeAuth)],
);
}
tearDown(() => container.dispose());
test(
'reset closes legacy validation and rejects its late success',
() async {
final socket = _PendingValidationSocket();
final auth = FakeAuthNotifier();
final notifier = PairingNotifier(
validationSocketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required nsec,
required onMessage,
required onConnected,
required onDisconnected,
}) => socket,
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
authProvider.overrideWith(() => auth),
],
);
final input = base64Url.encode(
utf8.encode(
jsonEncode({
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.example',
'nsec': 'pending-key',
}),
),
);
final pending = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(input);
notifier.reset();
expect(socket.disposed, isTrue);
socket.connection.complete();
await pending;
expect(auth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
},
);
test('starts in idle state', () {
container = createContainer();
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(state.errorMessage, isNull);
});
test(
'disconnect during connect does not null-dereference the socket',
() async {
final notifier = PairingNotifier(
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
}) => _DisconnectingSocket(disconnectCallback: onDisconnected),
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier)],
);
const code =
'nostrpair://62287897da61e3fa294b4570575f7db8bea147d6631150f2e4656714c645fb1e'
'?secret=abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1';
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
contains('Lost connection to pairing relay'),
);
},
);
test('payload missing nsec errors before contacting relay', () async {
container = createContainer();
// Valid payload shape but no nsec — provider should refuse without
// attempting any network call.
final code = _encodePairingCode();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('missing nsec'));
expect(fakeAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
});
test('accepts buzz scheme prefix', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = 'buzz://${_encodePairingCode()}';
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('missing nsec'));
expect(fakeAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
});
test('invalid base64 sets format error', () async {
container = createContainer();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('not-valid!!!');
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Invalid pairing code'));
});
test('base64 with valid JSON but missing fields errors', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode({'foo': 'bar'})));
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Missing relayUrl'));
});
test('empty input errors', () async {
container = createContainer();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('');
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
});
test('rejects private IP relay URLs (SSRF)', () async {
container = createContainer();
for (final ip in [
'10.0.0.1',
'172.16.0.1',
'192.168.1.1',
'169.254.169.254',
]) {
final code = _encodePairingCode(relayUrl: 'http://$ip:3000');
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error, reason: 'should reject $ip');
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('private network'));
container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).reset();
}
});
test('rejects non-http/https schemes', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = _encodePairingCode(relayUrl: 'file:///etc/passwd');
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Invalid pairing code'));
});
test('rejects JSON array payload', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode([1, 2, 3])));
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('not a JSON object'));
});
test('reset returns to idle from error state', () async {
container = createContainer();
// Trigger an error.
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('not-valid!!!');
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).reset();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
});
group('identity import protection', () {
const sourceSecret =
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506';
const sessionSecretHex =
'abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789';
late _ControllableSocket socket;
late PairingNotifier notifier;
late FakeAuthNotifier importAuth;
late _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer authorizer;
late Completer<void> validation;
late String pairingCode;
setUp(() {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
pairingCode =
'nostrpair://${source.public}'
'?secret=$sessionSecretHex'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1';
validation = Completer<void>();
importAuth = FakeAuthNotifier();
authorizer = _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer();
notifier = PairingNotifier(
credentialValidator:
({required String relayUrl, required String? nsec}) =>
validation.future,
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required onDisconnected,
}) {
socket = _ControllableSocket(
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
return socket;
},
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
authProvider.overrideWith(() => importAuth),
sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider.overrideWithValue(authorizer),
],
);
container.read(pairingProvider);
notifier = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier);
});
Future<void> beginImport({required bool protected}) async {
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(protected);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
if (protected && authorizer.result != DeviceAuthResult.success) return;
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'payload',
'payload_type': 'credentials',
'payload': jsonEncode({
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.test',
'pubkey': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).public,
'nsec': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).nsec,
}),
},
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.storing);
}
testWidgets('early input is submitted when desktop negotiation arrives', (
tester,
) async {
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await pairing;
await tester.pumpWidget(
UncontrolledProviderScope(
container: container,
child: MaterialApp(
theme: AppTheme.light(),
home: const PairingPage(),
),
),
);
final localCode = container.read(pairingProvider).sasCode;
final code = localCode == '111111' ? '222222' : '111111';
await tester.enterText(
find.byKey(const Key('pairing-code-input')),
code,
);
await tester.pump();
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
isEmpty,
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump();
final submissions = socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit')
.toList();
expect(submissions, hasLength(1));
expect(submissions.single['code'], code);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await tester.pump();
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsNothing);
expect(find.text('Protect your identity'), findsOneWidget);
notifier.reset();
await tester.pumpWidget(const SizedBox.shrink());
});
testWidgets(
'delayed desktop responses retain one attempt and leave code entry',
(tester) async {
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await pairing;
expect(socket.published.single['tags'], hasLength(1));
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.single['confirmation'],
'desktop-code-v1',
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).requiresDesktopCode, isTrue);
final wrong = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111');
final first = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).last;
expect(first['type'], 'code-submit');
expect(first['code'], '111111');
bool? wrongResult;
unawaited(wrong.then((value) => wrongResult = value));
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
expect(wrongResult, isNull);
expect(await notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111'), isFalse);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
hasLength(1),
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'code-rejected',
'request_id': first['request_id'],
'remaining_attempts': 4,
},
);
expect(await wrong, isFalse);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
await tester.pumpWidget(
UncontrolledProviderScope(
container: container,
child: MaterialApp(
theme: AppTheme.light(),
home: const PairingPage(),
),
),
);
await tester.enterText(
find.byKey(const Key('pairing-code-input')),
'222222',
);
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsOneWidget);
expect(
find.text('Couldn’t check the code. Try again.'),
findsNothing,
);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
hasLength(2),
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'payload',
'payload_type': 'credentials',
'payload': jsonEncode({
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.test',
'pubkey': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).public,
'nsec': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).nsec,
}),
},
);
await tester.pump();
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsNothing);
expect(find.text('Protect your identity'), findsOneWidget);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(false);
notifier.confirmSas();
await tester.pump();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.storing);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'sas-confirm'),
isEmpty,
);
notifier.reset();
await tester.pumpWidget(const SizedBox.shrink());
},
);
testWidgets(
'delayed final rejection exits the session and reset cancels pending verification',
(tester) async {
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await pairing;
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
final result = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111');
final request = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).last;
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'code-rejected',
'request_id': request['request_id'],
'remaining_attempts': 0,
},
);
expect(await result, isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
notifier.reset();
final nextPairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await nextPairing;
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
final pending = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('222222');
notifier.reset();
expect(await pending, isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
},
);
test(
'a rejected offer exits code entry instead of silently waiting',
() async {
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
socket.relayMessageCallback([
'OK',
socket.published.single['id'],
false,
'event must have exactly one p tag',
]);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
contains('Scan a new desktop QR code'),
);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
},
);
test('admission rejection never reports a successful transfer', () async {
importAuth.authentication = Completer<void>();
importAuth.entered = Completer<void>();
final finished = Completer<void>();
container.listen(pairingProvider, (_, next) {
if (next.status == PairingStatus.error && !finished.isCompleted) {
finished.complete();
}
});
await beginImport(protected: false);
validation.complete();
await importAuth.entered!.future;
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isEmpty,
);
importAuth.authentication!.completeError(
StateError('Admission refused'),
);
await finished.future;
final completions = socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((message) => message['type'] == 'complete')
.toList();
expect(completions, hasLength(1));
expect(completions.single['success'], isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider), isNull);
});
test('unchecked protection persists on a successful import', () async {
await beginImport(protected: false);
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
importAuth.lastCommunity?.sensitiveActionPolicy,
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.success);
expect(
container.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider),
importAuth.lastCommunity,
);
});
test('checked protection persists on a successful import', () async {
await beginImport(protected: true);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
importAuth.lastCommunity?.sensitiveActionPolicy,
SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled,
);
});
test('unenrolled biometrics prevent a protected import', () async {
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.unavailable;
await beginImport(protected: true);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Enroll Face ID or biometrics'));
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isFalse,
);
});
test('reset during NIP-AB connection retires its continuation', () async {
final pending = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
notifier.reset();
await pending;
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
expect(socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret), isEmpty);
});
test('reset during NIP-AB offer delay prevents a late offer', () async {
final pending = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
notifier.reset();
await pending;
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
expect(socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret), isEmpty);
});
test('stale biometric approval cannot advance a reset import', () async {
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(true);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
notifier.reset();
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isFalse,
);
});
test('reset invalidates pending authentication persistence', () async {
importAuth.authentication = Completer<void>();
await beginImport(protected: false);
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNotNull);
notifier.reset();
importAuth.authentication!.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(
container.read(authProvider).value!.status,
AuthStatus.unauthenticated,
);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
});
test('reset invalidates pending credential validation', () async {
await beginImport(protected: false);
notifier.reset();
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isFalse,
);
});
});
group('desktop identity recovery', () {
const sourceSecret =
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506';
const sessionSecretHex =
'abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789';
late _ControllableSocket socket;
late PairingNotifier notifier;
late String recoveryCode;
late _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer authorizer;
late DateTime now;
setUp(() async {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
recoveryCode =
'nostrpair://${source.public}'
'?secret=$sessionSecretHex'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1&mode=recover';
authorizer = _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer();
now = DateTime.utc(2026, 8, 6);
notifier = PairingNotifier(
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required onDisconnected,
}) {
socket = _ControllableSocket(
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
return socket;
},
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
relayConfigProvider.overrideWith(_RecoveryRelayConfig.new),
sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider.overrideWithValue(authorizer),
identityExportClockProvider.overrideWithValue(() => now),
],
);
container.read(pairingProvider);
notifier = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier);
});
test('recovery authorization honors biometric protection', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled),
),
isTrue,
);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isTrue);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.sendsIdentityToDesktop, isTrue);
expect(
socket.published.first['tags'],
isNot(contains(equals(['confirmation', 'code-entry']))),
);
notifier.confirmSas();
expect(
socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).map((m) => m['type']),
['offer'],
);
expect(state.sasCode, hasLength(6));
});
test('reset invalidates pending preflight authorization', () async {
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
final authorization = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).authorizationInProgress, isTrue);
notifier.reset();
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
expect(await authorization, isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
});
test('concurrent preflight requests start one authentication', () async {
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
final community = _exportCommunity(
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
final first = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community);
final second = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community);
expect(await second, isFalse);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
expect(await first, isTrue);
});
test('unchecked protection allows device passcode fallback', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isFalse);
});
for (final padded in [false, true]) {
test(
'matching SAS exports normalized nsec (padded: $padded)',
() async {
final community =
_exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser).copyWith(
nsec: padded
? ' \n${_RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec}\t '
: _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec,
);
container
.read(relayConfigProvider.notifier)
.update(baseUrl: community.relayUrl, nsec: community.nsec);
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).userConfirmedSas, isTrue);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage, isNull);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
final sentMessages = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(
sourceSecret,
);
final payloads = sentMessages.where(
(message) => message['type'] == 'payload',
);
expect(payloads, hasLength(1));
expect(payloads.single['payload_type'], 'nsec');
expect(payloads.single['payload'], _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'complete', 'success': true},
);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.success,
);
},
);
}
test(
'malformed payload invalidates authorization before another session',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'payload', 'payload_type': 'nsec'},
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
final replacementSocket = socket;
notifier.confirmSas();
replacementSocket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(
replacementSocket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
},
);
test('skipped preflight authorization sends no identity', () async {
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(authorizer.calls, 0);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
});
test(
'failed transfer reauthorization publishes no identity payload',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.cancelled;
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('cancelled'));
final sentMessages = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret);
expect(
sentMessages.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
},
);
test(
'stale authorization cannot advance a replacement pairing session',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
final firstSocket = socket;
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
notifier.confirmSas();
firstSocket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
notifier.reset();
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
final replacementSocket = socket;
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
for (final pairingSocket in [firstSocket, replacementSocket]) {
final sentMessages = pairingSocket.decryptedPublishedMessages(
sourceSecret,
);
expect(
sentMessages.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
}
},
);
test('clock rollback invalidates the export authorization', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.subtract(const Duration(minutes: 1));
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
});
test(
'websocket relay origin remains bound after canonicalization',
() async {
final community = _exportCommunity(
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
).copyWith(relayUrl: 'wss://relay.test');
container
.read(relayConfigProvider.notifier)
.update(baseUrl: community.relayUrl, nsec: community.nsec);
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any(
(message) =>
message['type'] == 'payload' &&
message['payload'] == community.nsec,
),
isTrue,
);
},
);
for (final change in ['community', 'key']) {
for (final expired in [false, true]) {
test(
'$change switch aborts ${expired ? 'expired' : 'fresh'} export grant',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
if (expired) now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
container
.read(relayConfigProvider.notifier)
.update(
baseUrl: change == 'community'
? 'https://other-relay.test'
: 'https://relay.test',
nsec: change == 'community'
? _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec
: nostr.Keys(
'2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222',
).nsec,
);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
},
);
}
}
test('expired biometric-only authorization preserves its mode', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isTrue);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
});
test(
'expired passcode-fallback authorization preserves its mode',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isFalse);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
},
);
test('cancelled authorization prevents pairing from starting', () async {
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.cancelled;
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isFalse,
);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
contains('cancelled'),
);
});
test('desktop storage failure surfaces an error', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'complete', 'success': false},
);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('could not store'));
});
});
});
}
/// Encode a credentials payload the same way the desktop app would.
String _encodePairingCode({
String relayUrl = 'http://test:3000',
String? pubkey,
String? nsec,
}) {
final json = <String, dynamic>{
'relayUrl': relayUrl,
// ignore: use_null_aware_elements
if (pubkey != null) 'pubkey': pubkey,
// ignore: use_null_aware_elements
if (nsec != null) 'nsec': nsec,
};
return base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode(json)));
}
/// A fake [AuthNotifier] that records calls instead of touching secure storage.
class FakeAuthNotifier extends AsyncNotifier<AuthState>
implements AuthNotifier {
Community? lastCommunity;
Completer<void>? authentication;
Completer<void>? entered;
bool signedOut = false;
@override
Future<AuthState> build() async =>
const AuthState(status: AuthStatus.unauthenticated);
@override
Future<void> signOut() async {
signedOut = true;
state = const AsyncData(AuthState(status: AuthStatus.unauthenticated));
}
@override
Future<void> authenticateWithCommunity(
Community community, {
bool Function()? shouldContinue,
bool activate = true,
}) async {
if (shouldContinue != null && !shouldContinue()) return;
lastCommunity = community;
entered?.complete();
await authentication?.future;
if (shouldContinue != null && !shouldContinue()) return;
state = AsyncData(
AuthState(status: AuthStatus.authenticated, community: community),
);
}
}
class _DisconnectingSocket extends PairingSocket {
final void Function(Object? error) disconnectCallback;
_DisconnectingSocket({required this.disconnectCallback})
: super(
wsUrl: 'ws://unused',
ephemeralPrivkey:
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506',
onMessage: (_) {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
@override
Future<void> connect() async {
disconnectCallback(Exception('Connection closed'));
}
}
Community _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy policy) => Community(
id: 'export-community',
name: 'Export',
relayUrl: 'https://relay.test',
nsec: _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec,
sensitiveActionPolicy: policy,
addedAt: DateTime.utc(2026),
);
class _RecoveryRelayConfig extends RelayConfigNotifier {
static final nsec = nostr.Keys(
'1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111',
).nsec;
@override
RelayConfig build() => RelayConfig(baseUrl: 'https://relay.test', nsec: nsec);
}
class _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer implements SensitiveActionAuthorizer {
DeviceAuthResult result = DeviceAuthResult.success;
Completer<DeviceAuthResult>? pending;
int calls = 0;
bool? lastIdentityBiometricOnly;
@override
Future<DeviceAuthResult> authorizeIdentityAction({
required bool biometricOnly,
}) async {
calls++;
lastIdentityBiometricOnly = biometricOnly;
return pending?.future ?? result;
}
@override
Future<DeviceAuthResult> authorizeBiometricProtection() async {
calls++;
return pending?.future ?? result;
}
@override
Future<List<BiometricType>> enrolledBiometrics() async => const [];
}
class _ControllableSocket extends PairingSocket {
final String ephemeralPrivkey;
final void Function(List<dynamic> message) relayMessageCallback;
final List<Map<String, dynamic>> published = [];
bool _connected = false;
int _eventSequence = 0;
_ControllableSocket({
required this.ephemeralPrivkey,
required super.onMessage,
required super.onDisconnected,
}) : relayMessageCallback = onMessage,
super(wsUrl: 'ws://unused', ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey);
@override
bool get isConnected => _connected;
@override
Future<void> connect() async => _connected = true;
@override
void subscribe(String subId, int kind, String pubkeyHex) {}
@override
void publishEvent(Map<String, dynamic> event) => published.add(event);
@override
void dispose() => _connected = false;
List<Map<String, dynamic>> decryptedPublishedMessages(String sourceSecret) {
final key = getConversationKey(
sourceSecret,
nostr.Keys(ephemeralPrivkey).public,
);
return published
.map(
(event) =>
jsonDecode(nip44Decrypt(key, event['content'] as String))
as Map<String, dynamic>,
)
.toList();
}
void sendSourceMessage({
required String sourceSecret,
required String sessionSecretHex,
required Map<String, dynamic> message,
bool includeTranscriptHash = false,
}) {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
final targetPubkey = nostr.Keys(ephemeralPrivkey).public;
final sessionSecret = hexToBytes(sessionSecretHex);
final body = Map<String, dynamic>.from(message);
if (includeTranscriptHash) {
final shared = ecdhSharedSecret(sourceSecret, targetPubkey);
final (_, sasInput) = deriveSas(shared, sessionSecret);
body['transcript_hash'] = bytesToHex(
deriveTranscriptHash(
deriveSessionId(sessionSecret),
hexToBytes(source.public),
hexToBytes(targetPubkey),
sasInput,
sessionSecret,
),
);
}
final key = getConversationKey(sourceSecret, targetPubkey);
final event = nostr.Event.from(
kind: 24134,
content: nip44Encrypt(key, jsonEncode(body)),
tags: [
['p', targetPubkey],
],
secretKey: sourceSecret,
createdAt: 1_700_000_000 + _eventSequence++,
);
relayMessageCallback(['EVENT', 'pair', event.toMap()]);
}
}
class _PendingValidationSocket extends RelaySocket {
_PendingValidationSocket()
: super(
wsUrl: 'wss://relay.example',
nsec: null,
onMessage: (_) {},
onConnected: () {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
final connection = Completer<void>();
bool disposed = false;
@override
Future<void> connect() => connection.future;
@override
void dispose() => disposed = true;
@override
Future<void> disconnect() async => disposed = true;
}