Files
buzz/mobile/test/shared/hosted/self_hosted_entry_test.dart
Wes b6aa5539e3 feat(mobile): account onboarding, key recovery and hosted reconnect (#8375)
## Behavior

Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery,
community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab
features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or
empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and
background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing,
links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is
retained for later opt-in.


`--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz`
opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup.
The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission,
and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features;
`BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their
backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory.

`BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and
reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure
assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling
assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at
Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not
replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines.

Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile
interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file
import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and
authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound
account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the
advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection.
Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS
startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET
/operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership
endpoint.

## Validation

- Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents
readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while
generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection
uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances
dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a
subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the
subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different
account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured
domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate
isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse,
duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an
empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses
synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live
backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh
GitHub CI is pending.

- Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage
enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit
known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links
release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response
encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by
ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed;
default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production
fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the
identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey
assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures
are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not
exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed
(mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub
CI remains pending.

- Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at
`fb15d5b82`.
- Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing
and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing
pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly.
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through
hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored
controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the
default-build suite.
- Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its
pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated
transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding
selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both
configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and
file-size checks).

- Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission
and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or
already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted
removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too
(hosted-only cases intentionally skip there).
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping,
reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory
reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean
and restored controls pass.
- Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the
iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At
`24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches,
matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes
it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did
not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native
cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account
round trip.

- Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known
identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement
of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the
retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default:
31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations
fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot
enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover.

- Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after
account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch,
preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The
configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the
production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored
controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical
QR acceptance.

- Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses
atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain.
Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request
abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit.
- Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain
account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and
native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls.
Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real
file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because
simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device
protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed.

- Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default
selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus
whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed
Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally
initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form
fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass.
- Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator
in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR /
pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab
connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in
this check.

- Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size
checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push
snapshot.

## Review disposition

| Feedback | Disposition |
| --- | --- |
| Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate
invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding
([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622),
[queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640),
[reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512))
| Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven
ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. |
| Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue,
transient HTTP retry classification
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143))
| All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated
mutation evidence above. |
| Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite
checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the
preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. |
| iOS interrupted key export
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252))
| Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented.
Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains
pending. |
| Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556))
| Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. |
| Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab
configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported
community mappings. |
| Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the
reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app
recovery/reset and remains deferred. |
| Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current
base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains
here. |
| Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the
operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied.
Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. |
| Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local
work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed
implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. |
| Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not
demonstrated defects. |

## Remaining draft gates

Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this
revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend
backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery
policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The
empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary
pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human
acceptance and current CI are still required before merge.



Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must
use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add
support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing
an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented
capability.


Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS`
(including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab
controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build
with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise
browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS,
exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record
results before marking review complete.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
2026-10-19 15:46:58 -06:00

328 lines
9.9 KiB
Dart

import 'package:buzz/shared/hosted/hosted_environment.dart';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:buzz/shared/community/community.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/hosted/account_identity_store.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/hosted/device_identity_source.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/hosted/self_hosted_entry.dart';
import 'package:flutter_secure_storage/flutter_secure_storage.dart';
import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
void main() {
TestWidgetsFlutterBinding.ensureInitialized();
const relay = 'wss://community.example';
// Public test vectors, never real user signing material.
final key = nostr.Keys('1'.padLeft(64, '0'));
final other = nostr.Keys('2'.padLeft(64, '0'));
late _Storage storage;
late List<Community> probes;
late SelfHostedEntry entry;
var current = true;
var refuseProbe = false;
SelfHostedEntry makeEntry() => SelfHostedEntry(
storage: storage,
identities: DeviceIdentitySource(storage: storage),
accountStore: AccountIdentityStore(storage: storage),
probe: (community) async {
// The durable key must already exist before any network operation.
expect(storage.data.values, contains(community.nsec));
probes.add(community);
if (refuseProbe) throw StateError('Connection refused');
},
);
setUp(() {
storage = _Storage();
probes = [];
current = true;
refuseProbe = false;
entry = makeEntry();
});
Future<Community> prepare({
String address = relay,
String? nsec,
String? savedPubkey,
bool create = false,
}) => entry.prepare(
relay: address,
name: 'Community',
nsec: nsec,
savedPubkey: savedPubkey,
create: create,
isCurrent: () => current,
);
void expectUntouched() {
expect(storage.writes, 0);
expect(probes, isEmpty);
}
test(
'reserved hosted domains refuse imported and generated identities',
() async {
for (final address in [
'wss://team.communities.buzz.xyz',
'wss://team.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz',
'wss://BUILDERLAB.XYZ.',
]) {
if (!HostedEnvironment.requiresAuth(Uri.parse(address).host)) continue;
await expectLater(
prepare(address: address, nsec: key.nsec),
throwsStateError,
);
await expectLater(
prepare(address: address, create: true),
throwsStateError,
);
}
expectUntouched();
expect(storage.data, isEmpty);
},
);
test('invalid addresses and invalid nsec never persist or probe', () async {
for (final address in [
'ws://community.example',
'wss://user@community.example',
'wss://community.example/path',
'wss://community.example?token=value',
'wss://community.example#fragment',
]) {
await expectLater(
prepare(address: address, nsec: key.nsec),
throwsFormatException,
);
}
for (final nsec in ['invalid', key.public, key.npub]) {
await expectLater(
prepare(nsec: nsec),
throwsA(AccountIdentityFailure.invalidKey),
);
}
expectUntouched();
expect(storage.data, isEmpty);
});
test(
'failed probe retains generated key across a new service and retry',
() async {
refuseProbe = true;
await expectLater(prepare(create: true), throwsStateError);
expect(storage.writes, 1);
final persisted = Map<String, String>.of(storage.data);
final first = probes.single;
expect(first.pubkey, AccountIdentityStore.publicKeyForNsec(first.nsec!));
refuseProbe = false;
entry = makeEntry();
final retried = await prepare(create: true);
expect(retried.pubkey, first.pubkey);
expect(retried.nsec, first.nsec);
expect(storage.data, persisted);
expect(storage.writes, 1);
expect(probes, hasLength(2));
},
);
for (final brokenEnumeration in [false, true]) {
for (final source in ['legacy', 'community', 'account']) {
test(
'$source identity with broken enumeration=$brokenEnumeration forbids generation; explicit reuse preserves saved keys',
() async {
if (source == 'account') {
await AccountIdentityStore(storage: storage).create(key.nsec);
} else if (source == 'legacy') {
storage.data['buzz_nsec'] = key.nsec;
} else {
storage.data['buzz_communities'] = jsonEncode([
{'name': 'Saved', 'nsec': key.nsec, 'pubkey': key.public},
]);
storage.data['buzz_nsec'] = other.nsec;
}
storage.failEnumeration = brokenEnumeration;
final before = Map<String, String>.of(storage.data);
final writesBefore = storage.writes;
final inventory = await entry.choices();
expect(inventory.complete, !brokenEnumeration);
if (!brokenEnumeration || source != 'account') {
expect(
inventory.choices.map((choice) => choice.pubkey),
contains(key.public),
);
}
await expectLater(
prepare(create: true),
throwsA(
brokenEnumeration
? AccountIdentityFailure.unreadable
: AccountIdentityFailure.absent,
),
);
expect(storage.writes, writesBefore);
expect(probes, isEmpty);
expect(storage.data, before);
final community = await prepare(savedPubkey: key.public);
expect(community.nsec, key.nsec);
expect(community.pubkey, key.public);
expect(community.relayUrl, relay);
for (final saved in before.entries) {
expect(storage.data[saved.key], saved.value);
}
expect(probes, [community]);
},
);
}
}
test(
'account and community choices deduplicate the same saved identity',
() async {
await AccountIdentityStore(storage: storage).create(key.nsec);
storage.data['buzz_nsec'] = key.nsec;
expect((await entry.choices()).choices.map((choice) => choice.pubkey), [
key.public,
]);
},
);
test('unreadable account key never permits new generation', () async {
storage.data[AccountIdentityStore.storageKey] = 'broken';
await expectLater(
prepare(create: true),
throwsA(AccountIdentityFailure.unreadable),
);
expectUntouched();
});
test(
'explicit replacement preserves refused key and retries the chosen key',
() async {
refuseProbe = true;
await expectLater(prepare(nsec: key.nsec), throwsStateError);
refuseProbe = false;
final joined = await prepare(nsec: other.nsec);
expect(joined.pubkey, other.public);
final retained = AccountIdentityStore(
storage: storage,
).forPairing(key.public);
expect(await retained.withKeys((keys) async => keys.public), key.public);
expect((await prepare(create: true)).pubkey, other.public);
expect(probes, hasLength(3));
},
);
test(
'missing explicit saved identity never falls back to generation',
() async {
await expectLater(
prepare(savedPubkey: key.public, create: true),
throwsA(AccountIdentityFailure.absent),
);
expectUntouched();
},
);
for (final boundary in ['before', 'read', 'write']) {
test(
'cancellation at $boundary fences probe and preserves any durable key',
() async {
if (boundary == 'before') current = false;
if (boundary == 'read') storage.onRead = () => current = false;
if (boundary == 'write') storage.onWrite = () => current = false;
await expectLater(prepare(nsec: key.nsec), throwsStateError);
expect(probes, isEmpty);
expect(storage.writes, boundary == 'write' ? 1 : 0);
if (boundary == 'before') expect(storage.reads, 0);
if (boundary == 'write') {
expect(storage.data.values, contains(key.nsec));
current = true;
storage.onWrite = null;
expect((await prepare()).pubkey, key.public);
expect(storage.writes, 1);
} else {
expect(storage.data, isEmpty);
}
},
);
}
test('unconfirmed durable write cannot reach the relay probe', () async {
storage.dropWrites = true;
await expectLater(
prepare(nsec: key.nsec),
throwsA(AccountIdentityFailure.unreadable),
);
expect(probes, isEmpty);
expect(storage.data, isEmpty);
});
}
class _Storage extends Fake implements FlutterSecureStorage {
final data = <String, String>{};
int writes = 0;
int reads = 0;
bool dropWrites = false;
bool failEnumeration = false;
void Function()? onRead;
void Function()? onWrite;
@override
Future<Map<String, String>> readAll({
AppleOptions? iOptions,
AndroidOptions? aOptions,
LinuxOptions? lOptions,
WebOptions? webOptions,
AppleOptions? mOptions,
WindowsOptions? wOptions,
}) async {
if (failEnumeration) throw StateError('unrelated entry cannot decrypt');
return Map.of(data);
}
@override
Future<void> delete({
required String key,
AppleOptions? iOptions,
AndroidOptions? aOptions,
LinuxOptions? lOptions,
WebOptions? webOptions,
AppleOptions? mOptions,
WindowsOptions? wOptions,
}) async {
data.remove(key);
}
@override
Future<String?> read({
required String key,
AppleOptions? iOptions,
AndroidOptions? aOptions,
LinuxOptions? lOptions,
WebOptions? webOptions,
AppleOptions? mOptions,
WindowsOptions? wOptions,
}) async {
reads++;
onRead?.call();
return data[key];
}
@override
Future<void> write({
required String key,
required String? value,
AppleOptions? iOptions,
AndroidOptions? aOptions,
LinuxOptions? lOptions,
WebOptions? webOptions,
AppleOptions? mOptions,
WindowsOptions? wOptions,
}) async {
writes++;
if (!dropWrites && value != null) data[key] = value;
onWrite?.call();
}
}