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Brings `buzz-media`, `buzz-relay`, all first-party kind-24242 minters, and desktop token minting into compliance with [NIP-FI §kind-24242](https://github.com/block/buzz/blob/main/docs/nips/NIP-FI.md). ## What changed **`buzz-media/src/auth.rs`** - Add `BlossomStrictness` enum (`Strict` | `Permissive`). `Strict` applies full NIP-FI rules (active modes); `Permissive` preserves pre-NIP-FI Off-mode behavior byte-identical [FI-INV-15]. - Rewrite `verify_blossom_auth_event_for_verb` with count-based cardinality: exactly one `t`/`expiration`/`server` in `Strict`; duplicate `x` also rejected. `Permissive` keeps main's boolean semantics exactly: any valued `t` other than the verb (including `""`) rejects, valueless `t` is ignored. - `Strict`: mandatory `server` tag on all proofs (upload + read); absent or mismatched → `evidence_rejected` (`ServerMismatch`). - `Strict`: 60-second proof window (`now - created_at <= 60s`, `expiration <= created_at + 60s`). `Permissive`: 3600s / optional server. - **[F1]** Permissive server validation uses any-match semantics: a proof with multiple `server` tags is accepted if any tag matches the bound host. This restores origin/main base behavior. Strict duplicate-rejection unchanged. - **[F1 compat]** Permissive server gate uses `server_values.is_empty()` (valued tags only) rather than `server_count > 0` (includes valueless tags). A lone valueless `["server"]` tag is treated as absent in Permissive/Off mode, matching pre-NIP-FI base behavior [FI-INV-15]. - **[F4]** Valueless `x` tags in Strict get reads are tracked before `filter_map` so they cannot become absent scope (host-wide authorization). Any `x` tag present in Strict must contain the exact requested sha256. - **[F3 unit]** Cases A–D in `auth.rs` are helper-level unit tests: they call `verify_blossom_upload_auth` and `verify_upload_hash_only` directly. They do not enter the upload pipeline (`process_upload`/`process_video_upload`). Retained as helper evidence. **`buzz-media/src/error.rs`** - Add `DuplicateTag(&'static str)` variant. - Add `blossom_denial_kind()` method: classifies each auth error as `MissingEvidence`, `EvidenceRejected`, or `AuthorizationDenied`. Non-auth errors return `None`. - `IntoResponse` retains the legacy JSON 401 shape [FI-INV-15]. **`buzz-relay/src/api/media.rs`** - Add `MediaDenial(MediaError, BlossomStrictness)` wrapper mapping to byte-exact NIP-FI fixed responses in `Strict`; falls through to legacy JSON in `Permissive`. - `blossom_strictness_from_state()` selects `Strict` when `state.config.nip_fi.is_enforce()`, otherwise `Permissive`. Strictness is threaded through the `admit_nip_fi_http_on_state` NIP-98 closures on upload and read, and through the post-admission X-SHA-256, hash-binding, and membership denials. - `extract_blossom_auth` keeps first-value `Authorization` extraction; Enforce rejects repeated fields at the `admit_nip_fi_http` cardinality gate, and Off keeps legacy behavior [FI-INV-15]. - Both membership-denial call sites use `media_denial(RelayMembershipRequired, strictness)` so Strict mode produces the correct fixed-text response. - `upload_blob` serving-write fence conversion (`:406`) uses `map_err(|e| media_denial(e, strictness))` — a community fence committed between auth admission and lease acquisition no longer resets Strict to Permissive. - Mode-driven regressions in `mod postgres_tests` (selected by the nextest `postgres-ci` profile via `test(/postgres_tests::/)`, `#[ignore = "requires Postgres"]`), run through the full relay router with a real Enforce verifier and assertion: Enforce rejects Permissive-only proofs (300s lifetime, missing `server` tag) on both upload routes and reads with `evidence rejected`; Off accepts the same proofs with pre-NIP-FI responses; DenyProtected answers 503 before any proof check; membership denials are `authorization denied` text/plain in Enforce and exact legacy JSON 403 in Off, with a member positive control. GET and HEAD are each discriminated (HEAD with a suppressed body). Both upload routes pin the handler's `X-SHA-256` missing/malformed/unsigned and post-body hash-mismatch denials in both modes. Off rejects an empty-valued `t` beside a valid one with legacy 401 JSON in either order, and ignores a valueless one. Exact status, Content-Type, challenge, and body bytes are pinned. **`buzz-media/src/upload.rs`** (`mod minio_tests`) - **[F3 pipeline]** Four tests exercising the actual post-body call sites (`process_upload` `:85`, `process_video_upload` `:413`) with real MinIO I/O: buffered/streaming × expired-proof-accept + mismatched-hash-reject. The positive cases use `fresh_strict_upload_auth` (`created_at = now-58`, `expiration = now+2`, lifetime = 60s) — Strict-admissible at sign time — followed by a real 3s sleep so the proof is expired when the upload completes. `nostr::Timestamp::now()` reads the OS wall clock directly; paused Tokio time does not advance it. The negative cases use a pre-expired proof with a mismatched `x` tag. All four are `#[ignore = "requires MinIO"]`; no CI lane runs them automatically. **`buzz-media/src/validation.rs`** - `minimal_valid_mp4()` promoted to `#[cfg(test)] pub(crate)` — a 618-byte pre-computed H.264/avc1 fast-start MP4 available to all `buzz-media` test modules; smoke-tested by `test_minimal_valid_mp4_passes_validate_video_file`. **`desktop/src-tauri/src/commands/media.rs`** - `sign_blossom_upload_auth`: `server` tag mandatory; upload expiry 60s (was 3600s/300s). - `MEDIA_GET_AUTH_EXPIRY_SECS`: 60s (was 600s). **`desktop/src-tauri/src/media_proxy.rs`** - Single re-mint+retry on 401/403 for range requests; non-auth failures do not retry. **`crates/buzz-cli/src/client.rs`** - Read expiry: 60s (was 600s). Upload expiry: 60s. `server` tag mandatory on upload. **`crates/buzz-dev-mcp/src/view_image.rs`** - `MEDIA_GET_AUTH_EXPIRY_SECS`: 60s (was 600s). Test updated. **`mobile/lib/shared/relay/media_auth.dart`** - `_mediaGetAuthLifetimeSeconds`: 60 (was 600). Refresh margin updated. **`mobile/lib/shared/relay/media_upload.dart`** - `_uploadAuthLifetimeSeconds`: 60 (was 300). `server` tag mandatory. **`mobile/lib/features/channels/media_viewer_page/video_viewer.dart`** - **[F2]** Remove Android-specific `VideoPlayerController.networkUrl` streaming path. `video_player_android` 2.9.5 freezes headers into static `DefaultHttpDataSource` request properties — a 60s proof minted at controller creation time becomes stale on seeks. All platforms use the authenticated local-file download path. - **[F2 transport]** `unawaited(request.sink.close())` before `client.send()`. `AbortableStreamedRequest` carries no request body; without closing the sink, `IOClient.send()` awaits `stream.pipe(ioRequest)` which blocks until the sink ends — every video download hung in loading indefinitely on every platform. - **[F2 pending-ctrl]** `pendingController` ref set before the first `await (initialize())`, cleared in all exit paths. Effect cleanup disposes `pendingController.value` so a close-during-init releases the native player even if the initialized event never arrives. - **[F2r(a)]** On native init failure (post-create, pre-initialized-event), the inner catch starts disposal detached via `unawaited(localController.dispose().catchError(...))` — the `.catchError` handler absorbs any disposal exception so it does not reach the test error zone — then rethrows the original load error. `video_player` 2.11.1 completes the init future with an error without disposing the native player. - **[F2r(b)]** Non-2xx error body cancelled via `_cancelVideoResponse()` (subscribe+cancel) instead of `drain()`. `drain()` waits for the upstream to close; a stalled server body blocked `initializeVideo` indefinitely. - **[F2r(d)]** `unawaited(localController.dispose().catchError(...))` in the catch — not `await`. Two failure mechanisms exist: (1) when `createWithOptions()` throws, `_creatingCompleter` is never completed and `await dispose()` deadlocks at `:682-683`, blocking the outer catch from setting error state. (2) when `createWithOptions()` succeeds but initialization fails, `dispose()` runs but its thrown exception becomes an unhandled async error reaching the test zone. Both are fixed: `unawaited` lets the outer catch run immediately and set `error.value`; `.catchError(...)` on the detached disposal future absorbs any disposal exception. **`mobile/test/features/channels/media_viewer_page/video_viewer_test.dart`** - `_FinalizingFakeClient`: calls `request.finalize().drain()` — a test without the sink fix times out because the drain never completes, validating the transport contract. - F2r(a): `forceInitError=true` fake emits `PlatformException` on subscribe; `disposeCallCount >= 1` verifies disposal even on init failure. - F2r(b): `stalledBody` `StreamController` with `onCancel` Completer (bounded completion signal, not a sleep). Asserts: (1) `bodyStreamCancelled=true` while body stream is still open (impossible with `drain()`); (2) error UI visible while body remains open. Restoring `drain()` breaks both. - F2r(c): `neverInitialize=true` fake never sends initialized event; unmount asserts `disposeCallCount >= 1` via `pendingController`. Distinct from the event-error case. - F2r(d): `forceCreateError=true` fake throws `PlatformException` from `createWithOptions()` itself (before any player ID is returned). Asserts error UI visible within a bounded deadline. With the old `await dispose()` the outer catch is blocked — `error.value` is never set and the error UI assertion fails at the deadline; with `unawaited(dispose())` the error text appears immediately. **`mobile/test/features/channels/media_viewer_page/video_viewer_transport_test.dart`** (separate file) - Real-IO loopback probes using `flutter_test` (not `package:test`) to avoid `depend_on_referenced_packages` lint. No `TestWidgetsFlutterBinding` — no HttpClient override interfering with `dart:io`. - Probe 1: `HttpServer.bind(loopbackIPv4, 0)` reads the full request body before replying. Without `sink.close()`, `req.drain()` hangs and the test times out. - Probe 2: server signals request arrival via a Completer (not a sleep); abort fires after confirmed arrival; `client.send()` must throw `RequestAbortedException` (typed assertion) within a bounded 5s deadline. **`scripts/test-video-upload.sh`** - Proof minted with `+60` expiry and mandatory `server` tag. **`buzz-test-client/tests/e2e_media*.rs`** + **`buzz-relay/src/api/media.rs` test fixtures** - All fixtures updated to 55s expiry + `server` tag. **`RELEASING.md`** - New "NIP-FI upload proof freshness (relay floor)" section documenting that 60s proofs require the first relay release carrying this PR's post-body hash-only check (the first tag > `v0.2.1` — update once cut) for reliable large-file uploads. Operators on older self-hosted relays (≤ `v0.2.1`) must upgrade before receiving these clients. ## Finding 3: 60s upload proofs vs old-relay compatibility Desktop/CLI/mobile upload proofs are now 60s. Older relays re-run full expiry verification after the body is transferred. A valid upload whose body transfer takes >60s will fail on an old relay. **Resolution (relay floor prerequisite):** `RELEASING.md` requires that verified supported deployments (relay releases confirmed to carry the post-body hash-only check, commit `75e9bef748`) be in place before distributing 60s-proof client builds. Unknown or unverified self-hosted relay deployments are excluded from distribution until they upgrade. This makes the verified-deployment status a prerequisite for release distribution, not a post-distribution advisory. The concrete tag (`> v0.2.1`) is to be recorded once cut. ## Sequencing note Builds on #7264 (merged): Blossom strictness is derived from its `config.nip_fi` mode in this PR, so enabling `BUZZ_NIP_FI_MODE=enforce` activates the strict verifier with no further wiring. ## GIF compatibility exception An unauthenticated Off-mode request on a configured tenant with no GIF provider changes from 404 to 401 (base `gifs.rs:269-275` checked an unconfigured provider first; the current code authenticates first). All other Off-mode Blossom responses are byte-identical to pre-NIP-FI behavior. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
169 lines
5.8 KiB
Dart
169 lines
5.8 KiB
Dart
import 'dart:convert';
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import 'package:flutter/widgets.dart';
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import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
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import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
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import 'relay_provider.dart';
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const _mediaGetAuthKind = 24242;
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const _mediaGetAuthLifetimeSeconds = 60;
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/// Re-sign this long before the cached auth event expires, so an in-flight
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/// request signed just before the boundary still lands well within validity.
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/// With a 60-second lifetime, the margin equals the lifetime: each request
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/// mints a fresh token (mint-per-request pattern for NIP-FI compliance).
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const _mediaGetAuthRefreshMarginSeconds = 60;
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/// Builds BUD-01 Blossom `t=get` auth headers for relay-host media URLs.
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///
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/// Returns an empty map for non-relay URLs or when no signing key is available,
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/// so callers can safely use this on arbitrary profile/custom-emoji URLs without
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/// leaking Buzz credentials to third-party hosts.
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///
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/// With a 60-second proof lifetime the refresh margin equals the lifetime, so
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/// `_refreshAt == signedAt` and the cache never hits: every call mints a fresh
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/// proof (mint-per-request pattern). This is intentional for NIP-FI compliance
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/// — caching a 60-second token is staleness-prone and provides no meaningful
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/// reduction in signing work. The service itself is rebuilt whenever the relay
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/// config — base URL or signing identity — changes, via
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/// [mediaGetAuthServiceProvider].
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class MediaGetAuthService {
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final String _baseUrl;
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final String? _nsec;
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final DateTime Function() _now;
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Map<String, String>? _cachedHeaders;
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DateTime? _refreshAt;
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MediaGetAuthService({
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required String baseUrl,
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required String? nsec,
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DateTime Function()? now,
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}) : _baseUrl = baseUrl,
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_nsec = nsec,
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_now = now ?? DateTime.now;
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bool isRelayMediaUrl(String url) {
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final uri = Uri.tryParse(url);
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final relayUri = Uri.tryParse(_baseUrl);
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if (uri == null || relayUri == null) return false;
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return _isRelayMediaUrl(uri, relayUri);
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}
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Map<String, String> headersFor(String url) {
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final nsec = _nsec;
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if (nsec == null || nsec.isEmpty) return const {};
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if (!isRelayMediaUrl(url)) return const {};
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final cached = _cachedHeaders;
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final refreshAt = _refreshAt;
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if (cached != null && refreshAt != null && _now().isBefore(refreshAt)) {
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return cached;
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}
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try {
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final signedAt = _now();
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final authEvent = _buildGetAuthEvent(nsec);
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final encoded = base64Url
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.encode(utf8.encode(authEvent.toJson()))
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.replaceAll('=', '');
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final headers = Map<String, String>.unmodifiable({
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'Authorization': 'Nostr $encoded',
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});
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_cachedHeaders = headers;
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_refreshAt = signedAt.add(
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const Duration(
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seconds:
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_mediaGetAuthLifetimeSeconds - _mediaGetAuthRefreshMarginSeconds,
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),
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);
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return headers;
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} catch (_) {
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// Read auth is best-effort: while the relay rollout flag is off, an
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// unsigned fetch still works. Once the flag is on, this request will 403
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// instead of crashing the widget tree because local key material is bad.
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return const {};
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}
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}
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bool _isRelayMediaUrl(Uri uri, Uri relayUri) {
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if (uri.scheme != 'http' && uri.scheme != 'https') return false;
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if (uri.host.isEmpty || relayUri.host.isEmpty) return false;
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// Extract the URL's origin and path. Query strings are ignored for media
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// host/path detection, matching the fetch target shape used by descriptors.
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final base = '${uri.scheme}://${uri.authority}';
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final mediaAuthority = extractServerAuthority(base);
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final relayAuthority = extractServerAuthority(_baseUrl);
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if (mediaAuthority == null || relayAuthority == null) return false;
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if (mediaAuthority.toLowerCase() != relayAuthority.toLowerCase()) {
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return false;
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}
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return uri.path.startsWith('/media/');
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}
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nostr.Event _buildGetAuthEvent(String nsec) {
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final privkeyHex = nostr.Nip19.decode(payload: nsec).data;
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if (privkeyHex.isEmpty) {
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throw Exception('Invalid nsec');
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}
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final expiration =
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(_now().millisecondsSinceEpoch ~/ 1000) + _mediaGetAuthLifetimeSeconds;
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final tags = <List<String>>[
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['t', 'get'],
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['expiration', '$expiration'],
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if (extractServerAuthority(_baseUrl) case final authority?)
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['server', authority],
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];
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return nostr.Event.from(
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kind: _mediaGetAuthKind,
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content: 'Get buzz-media',
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tags: tags,
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secretKey: privkeyHex,
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verify: false,
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);
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}
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}
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final mediaGetAuthServiceProvider = Provider<MediaGetAuthService>((ref) {
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final config = ref.watch(relayConfigProvider);
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return MediaGetAuthService(baseUrl: config.baseUrl, nsec: config.nsec);
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});
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Map<String, String> mediaGetHeadersFor(WidgetRef ref, String url) {
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return ref.read(mediaGetAuthServiceProvider).headersFor(url);
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}
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Map<String, String> mediaGetHeadersForContext(
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BuildContext context,
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String url,
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) {
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final container = ProviderScope.containerOf(context, listen: false);
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return container.read(mediaGetAuthServiceProvider).headersFor(url);
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}
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String? extractServerAuthority(String baseUrl) {
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final uri = Uri.parse(baseUrl);
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if (uri.host.isEmpty) return null;
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final host = uri.host.contains(':') ? '[${uri.host}]' : uri.host;
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final port = uri.hasPort ? uri.port : null;
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final authority = port == null ? host : '$host:$port';
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return _normalizeAuthority(authority);
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}
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String _normalizeAuthority(String authority) {
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var normalized = authority.trim().toLowerCase();
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if (normalized.endsWith('.')) {
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normalized = normalized.substring(0, normalized.length - 1);
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}
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if (normalized.endsWith(':443')) {
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return normalized.substring(0, normalized.length - ':443'.length);
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}
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if (normalized.endsWith(':80')) {
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return normalized.substring(0, normalized.length - ':80'.length);
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}
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return normalized;
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}
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