Files
buzz/crates/buzz-agent/src/auth_http.rs
Wes 4cd82f5132 feat(buzz-agent): add opt-in workspace-scoped Databricks reuse (#7606)
Posted by Brain, Wes Billman’s AI assistant, on behalf of `wesbillman`.

## Summary

Add an opt-in `databricks::DatabricksConnection` over the existing
PKCE/coordinator and v2 catalog machinery. It accepts an explicit HTTPS
workspace origin, absolute caller-owned cache root, and browser opener;
it does not start an agent or infer credentials/host from the
environment.

- Validate both OAuth endpoints on the actual discovery response used
for grants; native HTTP redirects are disabled and requests have a
30-second timeout.
- Keep strict cache/single-flight state in a separate namespace. Connect
is explicit/user-initiated; catalog lookup and its one 401 refresh stay
headless. Tokens are not exposed by the connection API.
- Preserve existing legacy constructors, endpoint/redirect policy, cache
layout, intents, and catalog filtering/pagination/partial/default
semantics. No internal host default, credential migration, app
integration or release configuration changes.

### Intentional shared changes

OAuth success/discovery JSON is capped at 1 MiB; error JSON at 16 KiB.
Oversized/malformed responses are infrastructure failures, while bounded
client-error `invalid_grant` retains its existing classification. OAuth
diagnostics omit raw bodies/URLs/opener/callback details. Overflowing
token expiry returns an infrastructure failure. These changes affect
legacy callers too and have synthetic regression coverage.

See [the reuse contract](crates/buzz-agent/DATABRICKS_REUSE.md) for API,
compatibility and caller obligations. Total operation deadlines,
stale-result fencing, private root ownership, nonlogging opener behavior
and credential-removal UX remain the caller’s responsibility.

### Related issue

Related discovery work: #6918. Searched existing Databricks PRs and
OAuth issues; no duplicate of this strict opt-in API was found among
those results. This is a new reuse boundary, not a claim of a live
credential leak.

### Testing

Published head: `cf33eb2f4f267d5808e068e35127d5504f0bc674`, based on
main `78618804ec86a014524ad7d1fb55928e8f5c3edf`.
Two implementation/doc commits were transplanted from a release-derived
local base to exclude unrelated release files. `git range-diff` reports
both patches unchanged; independent source review of the transplant
found no blocker.

**At the published head:** normal pre-push hooks passed: branch skew,
push-head scope, file-size checks, Rust test lane and desktop Tauri
Clippy/tests. The fallback Rust lane actually ran `buzz-agent --lib`:
542 passed / 1 ignored, NOT the full package integration suite. Hosted
full package/repository CI remains pending. The first push attempt was
interrupted by the command runner’s 300-second limit; the second
completed normally with all hooks enabled.

**At reviewed implementation checkpoint `8cb3b72d4`:** 16 strict, 27
auth, 32 catalog and 63 coordinator/OAuth/CLI tests passed,
independently rerun; 18 author-selected mutations and four independent
reviewer mutations failed tests with passing restored controls. The
subsequent `539319411` delta changed only two doc-comment blocks. These
earlier test/mutation results are not silently attributed to the rebased
head.

Synthetic coverage includes HTTPS grants/catalog, off-origin endpoint
and redirect rejection, cancellation/socket/listener cleanup,
host/root/legacy namespace isolation, bounded declared/chunked bodies
and exact-limit controls, redaction with positive log capture, malformed
expiry, legacy endpoint/redirect controls, and real CLI cached-auth
aliases.

Desktop native checks used fail-closed sidecar stubs: compile/test
evidence, **not** a runnable or packaged app. No real provider
credentials, browser sign-in, app launch, or agent cutover was
performed. Cross-platform execution and real-provider acceptance remain
separate gates. No merge or downstream adoption is requested by this PR.

---------

Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-13 08:04:56 -06:00

31 lines
1.1 KiB
Rust

//! Bounded OAuth response decoding shared by legacy and strict callers.
//!
//! Deliberate compatibility change: oversized discovery/token documents are
//! infrastructure failures, never grant rejections. Raw provider diagnostics
//! are not returned or logged (they can echo codes, verifiers and tokens).
use reqwest::Response;
use serde_json::Value;
pub(crate) const MAX_OAUTH_RESPONSE_BYTES: usize = 1024 * 1024;
pub(crate) const MAX_OAUTH_ERROR_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024;
pub(crate) async fn read_oauth_json(mut response: Response) -> Result<Value, ()> {
let limit = if response.status().is_success() {
MAX_OAUTH_RESPONSE_BYTES
} else {
MAX_OAUTH_ERROR_BYTES
};
if response.content_length().is_some_and(|n| n > limit as u64) {
return Err(());
}
let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(limit.min(16 * 1024));
while let Some(chunk) = response.chunk().await.map_err(|_| ())? {
if chunk.len() > limit - bytes.len() {
return Err(());
}
bytes.extend_from_slice(&chunk);
}
serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).map_err(|_| ())
}