Files
buzz/mobile/lib/shared/deeplink/deep_link.dart
Wes b6aa5539e3 feat(mobile): account onboarding, key recovery and hosted reconnect (#8375)
## Behavior

Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery,
community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab
features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or
empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and
background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing,
links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is
retained for later opt-in.


`--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz`
opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup.
The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission,
and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features;
`BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their
backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory.

`BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and
reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure
assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling
assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at
Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not
replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines.

Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile
interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file
import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and
authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound
account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the
advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection.
Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS
startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET
/operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership
endpoint.

## Validation

- Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents
readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while
generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection
uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances
dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a
subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the
subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different
account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured
domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate
isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse,
duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an
empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses
synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live
backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh
GitHub CI is pending.

- Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage
enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit
known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links
release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response
encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by
ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed;
default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production
fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the
identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey
assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures
are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not
exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed
(mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub
CI remains pending.

- Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at
`fb15d5b82`.
- Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing
and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing
pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly.
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through
hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored
controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the
default-build suite.
- Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its
pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated
transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding
selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both
configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and
file-size checks).

- Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission
and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or
already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted
removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too
(hosted-only cases intentionally skip there).
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping,
reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory
reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean
and restored controls pass.
- Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the
iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At
`24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches,
matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes
it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did
not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native
cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account
round trip.

- Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known
identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement
of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the
retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default:
31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations
fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot
enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover.

- Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after
account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch,
preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The
configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the
production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored
controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical
QR acceptance.

- Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses
atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain.
Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request
abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit.
- Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain
account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and
native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls.
Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real
file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because
simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device
protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed.

- Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default
selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus
whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed
Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally
initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form
fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass.
- Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator
in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR /
pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab
connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in
this check.

- Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size
checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push
snapshot.

## Review disposition

| Feedback | Disposition |
| --- | --- |
| Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate
invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding
([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622),
[queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640),
[reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512))
| Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven
ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. |
| Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue,
transient HTTP retry classification
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143))
| All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated
mutation evidence above. |
| Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite
checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the
preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. |
| iOS interrupted key export
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252))
| Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented.
Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains
pending. |
| Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556))
| Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. |
| Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab
configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported
community mappings. |
| Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the
reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app
recovery/reset and remains deferred. |
| Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current
base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains
here. |
| Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the
operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied.
Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. |
| Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local
work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed
implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. |
| Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not
demonstrated defects. |

## Remaining draft gates

Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this
revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend
backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery
policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The
empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary
pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human
acceptance and current CI are still required before merge.



Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must
use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add
support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing
an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented
capability.


Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS`
(including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab
controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build
with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise
browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS,
exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record
results before marking review complete.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
2026-10-19 15:46:58 -06:00

463 lines
14 KiB
Dart

/// Parsing for `buzz://` deep links.
///
/// Mirrors the desktop handler in `desktop/src-tauri/src/deep_link.rs`:
/// `buzz://message?channel=<uuid>&id=<hex>[&thread=<hex>]` references a
/// message (optionally inside a thread) in a channel. Required params that
/// are missing or empty make the link invalid — the caller never sees a
/// half-formed target.
library;
import '../relay/relay_validation.dart';
import '../hosted/hosted_environment.dart';
/// A parsed deep link supported by the app.
sealed class BuzzDeepLink {
const BuzzDeepLink();
/// Community addressed by entry links; other actions have no relay target.
String? get relayUrl => null;
}
/// A parsed relay invite link.
///
/// Canonical share links are `https://<relay>/invite/<code>`. The custom
/// `buzz://join?relay=<ws(s)://relay>&code=<code>` form is only an installed-app
/// handoff from the web landing page.
class InviteDeepLink extends BuzzDeepLink {
/// Relay URL normalized to the websocket scheme used by the app.
@override
final String relayUrl;
/// Invite code from the link.
final String code;
/// Optional receipt proving acceptance of the relay's current join policy.
final String? policyReceipt;
const InviteDeepLink({
required this.relayUrl,
required this.code,
this.policyReceipt,
});
@override
bool operator ==(Object other) =>
other is InviteDeepLink &&
other.relayUrl == relayUrl &&
other.code == code &&
other.policyReceipt == policyReceipt;
@override
int get hashCode => Object.hash(relayUrl, code, policyReceipt);
@override
String toString() =>
'InviteDeepLink(relay: $relayUrl, code: $code, policyReceipt: $policyReceipt)';
}
/// A parsed channel-only deep link.
///
/// Canonical form: `buzz://channel/<channel-uuid>`.
class ChannelDeepLink extends BuzzDeepLink {
/// Channel UUID from the sole path segment.
final String channelId;
const ChannelDeepLink({required this.channelId});
@override
bool operator ==(Object other) =>
other is ChannelDeepLink && other.channelId == channelId;
@override
int get hashCode => channelId.hashCode;
@override
String toString() => 'ChannelDeepLink(channel: $channelId)';
}
/// A parsed `buzz://message` deep link.
class MessageDeepLink extends BuzzDeepLink {
/// Local community identifier for notification-originated links.
/// Canonical shared links omit this because community IDs are device-local.
final String? communityId;
/// Channel UUID from the `channel` query param.
final String channelId;
/// Event ID (hex) from the `id` query param.
final String messageId;
/// Optional thread root event ID from the `thread` query param.
final String? threadRootId;
const MessageDeepLink({
this.communityId,
required this.channelId,
required this.messageId,
this.threadRootId,
});
@override
bool operator ==(Object other) =>
other is MessageDeepLink &&
other.communityId == communityId &&
other.channelId == channelId &&
other.messageId == messageId &&
other.threadRootId == threadRootId;
@override
int get hashCode =>
Object.hash(communityId, channelId, messageId, threadRootId);
@override
String toString() =>
'MessageDeepLink(community: $communityId, channel: $channelId, id: $messageId, '
'thread: $threadRootId)';
}
/// Build a canonical `buzz://message` link for a channel message.
///
/// Mirrors `desktop/src/features/messages/lib/messageLink.ts` so links copied
/// or shared from mobile round-trip through every client's parser:
/// `buzz://message?channel=<uuid>&id=<eventId>[&thread=<rootId>]`.
///
/// An empty [threadRootId] is treated as "no thread" so callers can pass
/// through a nullable thread reference without extra checks.
String buildMessageLink({
required String channelId,
required String messageId,
String? threadRootId,
}) {
if (channelId.isEmpty) {
throw ArgumentError('buildMessageLink: channelId is required');
}
if (messageId.isEmpty) {
throw ArgumentError('buildMessageLink: messageId is required');
}
final params = <String, String>{
'channel': channelId,
'id': messageId,
if (threadRootId != null && threadRootId.isNotEmpty) 'thread': threadRootId,
};
return Uri(
scheme: 'buzz',
host: 'message',
queryParameters: params,
).toString();
}
/// Parse a canonical `buzz://channel/<channel-uuid>` URI.
///
/// The channel ID must be the URI's sole non-empty path segment. Query
/// parameters and fragments are rejected so malformed or ambiguous links never
/// become navigation targets.
ChannelDeepLink? parseChannelDeepLink(Uri uri) {
if (uri.scheme != 'buzz' || uri.host != 'channel') return null;
if (uri.hasQuery ||
uri.hasFragment ||
uri.userInfo.isNotEmpty ||
uri.hasPort) {
return null;
}
if (uri.pathSegments.length != 1 || uri.pathSegments.single.isEmpty) {
return null;
}
final channelId = uri.pathSegments.single;
if (!RegExp(
r'^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$',
caseSensitive: false,
).hasMatch(channelId)) {
return null;
}
return ChannelDeepLink(channelId: channelId.toLowerCase());
}
/// Parse a `buzz://message?…` URI into a [MessageDeepLink].
///
/// Returns `null` unless the URI exactly matches the canonical message-link
/// shape: no path, fragment, credentials, duplicate or unknown parameters; a
/// UUID channel; and 64-character hexadecimal message/thread event IDs.
MessageDeepLink? parseMessageDeepLink(Uri uri) {
if (uri.scheme != 'buzz' || uri.host != 'message') return null;
if (uri.path.isNotEmpty ||
uri.hasFragment ||
uri.userInfo.isNotEmpty ||
uri.hasPort) {
return null;
}
const allowedParams = {'channel', 'id', 'thread'};
if (uri.queryParametersAll.keys.any((key) => !allowedParams.contains(key)) ||
uri.queryParametersAll.values.any((values) => values.length != 1)) {
return null;
}
final channel = uri.queryParameters['channel'];
final id = uri.queryParameters['id'];
final thread = uri.queryParameters['thread'];
final uuid = RegExp(
r'^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$',
caseSensitive: false,
);
final eventId = RegExp(r'^[0-9a-f]{64}$', caseSensitive: false);
if (channel == null ||
!uuid.hasMatch(channel) ||
id == null ||
!eventId.hasMatch(id) ||
(thread != null && !eventId.hasMatch(thread))) {
return null;
}
return MessageDeepLink(
channelId: channel.toLowerCase(),
messageId: id.toLowerCase(),
threadRootId: thread?.toLowerCase(),
);
}
/// Parse canonical HTTPS invite links and `buzz://join` app handoffs.
///
/// Accepted forms:
/// - `https://<relay>/invite/<code>` -> `wss://<relay>` + code
/// - `http://localhost/invite/<code>` -> `ws://localhost` + code in debug builds
/// - `buzz://join?relay=<wss://relay>&code=<code>` -> relay + code
/// - `buzz://join?relay=<ws://localhost>&code=<code>` -> local relay in debug
///
/// Rejects credentials, fragments, missing params, nested relay credentials, and
/// non-invite paths so scanners do not accidentally treat arbitrary URLs as
/// community admission links.
InviteDeepLink? parseInviteDeepLink(Uri uri) {
if (uri.hasFragment || uri.userInfo.isNotEmpty) return null;
if (uri.scheme == 'buzz') {
if (uri.host != 'join') return null;
final relay = uri.queryParameters['relay'];
final code = uri.queryParameters['code'];
if (relay == null || relay.isEmpty || code == null || code.isEmpty) {
return null;
}
final relayUri = Uri.tryParse(relay);
if (relayUri == null ||
(relayUri.scheme != 'ws' && relayUri.scheme != 'wss') ||
relayUri.host.isEmpty ||
relayUri.userInfo.isNotEmpty ||
relayUri.hasFragment) {
return null;
}
try {
validateInviteRelayUri(relayUri);
} on FormatException {
return null;
}
final normalizedRelay = Uri(
scheme: relayUri.scheme,
host: relayUri.host,
port: relayUri.hasPort ? relayUri.port : null,
).toString();
final policyReceipt = uri.queryParameters['policy_receipt'];
return InviteDeepLink(
relayUrl: normalizedRelay,
code: code,
policyReceipt: policyReceipt == null || policyReceipt.isEmpty
? null
: policyReceipt,
);
}
if (uri.scheme == 'https' || uri.scheme == 'http') {
if (uri.host.isEmpty) return null;
final segments = uri.pathSegments;
if (segments.length != 2 ||
segments[0] != 'invite' ||
segments[1].isEmpty) {
return null;
}
final relayScheme = uri.scheme == 'https' ? 'wss' : 'ws';
final relayUri = Uri(
scheme: relayScheme,
host: uri.host,
port: uri.hasPort ? uri.port : null,
);
try {
validateInviteRelayUri(relayUri);
} on FormatException {
return null;
}
final relay = Uri(
scheme: relayScheme,
host: uri.host,
port: uri.hasPort ? uri.port : null,
).toString();
return InviteDeepLink(relayUrl: relay, code: segments[1]);
}
return null;
}
/// Parse any supported Buzz deep link.
BuzzDeepLink? parseBuzzDeepLink(Uri uri) =>
parseNostrBindDeepLink(uri) ??
parseAddCommunityDeepLink(uri) ??
parseInviteDeepLink(uri) ??
parseChannelDeepLink(uri) ??
parseMessageDeepLink(uri);
/// A validated Buzz repository, pull request, or issue permalink.
class EntityDeepLink extends BuzzDeepLink {
final String type;
final String owner;
final String repository;
final String? eventId;
const EntityDeepLink({
required this.type,
required this.owner,
required this.repository,
this.eventId,
});
}
/// Parse canonical `buzz://repo|pr|issue` permalinks for inline presentation.
EntityDeepLink? parseEntityDeepLink(Uri uri) {
if (uri.scheme != 'buzz' || !{'repo', 'pr', 'issue'}.contains(uri.host)) {
return null;
}
if (uri.path.isNotEmpty ||
uri.hasFragment ||
uri.userInfo.isNotEmpty ||
uri.hasPort) {
return null;
}
final allowed = uri.host == 'repo' ? {'owner', 'd'} : {'id', 'owner', 'd'};
final queryParameters = uri.queryParametersAll;
final parameterKeys = queryParameters.keys.toSet();
if (parameterKeys.difference(allowed).isNotEmpty ||
allowed.difference(parameterKeys).isNotEmpty ||
allowed.any((key) => queryParameters[key]?.length != 1)) {
return null;
}
final owner = uri.queryParameters['owner'];
final repository = uri.queryParameters['d'];
final eventId = uri.queryParameters['id'];
final hex = RegExp(r'^[0-9a-f]{64}$', caseSensitive: false);
final repositoryName = RegExp(r'^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$');
if (owner == null ||
!hex.hasMatch(owner) ||
repository == null ||
!repositoryName.hasMatch(repository) ||
repository.contains('..')) {
return null;
}
if (uri.host != 'repo' && (eventId == null || !hex.hasMatch(eventId))) {
return null;
}
return EntityDeepLink(
type: uri.host,
owner: owner.toLowerCase(),
repository: repository,
eventId: eventId?.toLowerCase(),
);
}
/// Web signup's challenge. Values are untrusted until authenticated verification.
class NostrBindDeepLink extends BuzzDeepLink {
final Map<String, String> fields;
NostrBindDeepLink._(Map<String, String> fields)
: fields = Map.unmodifiable(fields);
String get challengeId => fields['challenge_id']!;
String get nonce => fields['nonce']!;
DateTime get expiresAt => DateTime.parse(fields['expires_at']!);
@override
String toString() => 'NostrBindDeepLink(redacted)';
}
class AddCommunityDeepLink extends BuzzDeepLink {
@override
final String relayUrl;
final String name;
const AddCommunityDeepLink({required this.relayUrl, required this.name});
}
bool _webHandoffShape(Uri uri, String host, Set<String> allowed) =>
uri.scheme == 'buzz' &&
uri.host == host &&
uri.path.isEmpty &&
!uri.hasFragment &&
!uri.hasPort &&
uri.userInfo.isEmpty &&
uri.toString().length <= 8192 &&
uri.queryParametersAll.keys.every(allowed.contains) &&
uri.queryParametersAll.values.every((values) => values.length == 1);
NostrBindDeepLink? parseNostrBindDeepLink(Uri uri) {
const fields = {
'challenge_id',
'nonce',
'verification_code',
'audience',
'action',
'protocol',
'version',
'origin',
'expires_at',
'return',
'callback_url',
};
if (!_webHandoffShape(uri, 'nostr-bind', fields) ||
!fields.every(uri.queryParameters.containsKey)) {
return null;
}
final p = uri.queryParameters;
if (!RegExp(
r'^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$',
).hasMatch(p['challenge_id']!) ||
!RegExp(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$').hasMatch(p['nonce']!) ||
!RegExp(r'^[0-9]{6}$').hasMatch(p['verification_code']!) ||
p['audience'] != 'buzz:nostr-identity' ||
p['action'] != 'bind_nostr_identity' ||
p['protocol'] != 'buzz-nostr-identity' ||
p['version'] != '1' ||
p['origin'] != HostedEnvironment.origin.toString() ||
p['return'] != 'browser_fragment_v1' ||
p['callback_url'] !=
HostedEnvironment.origin.resolve('/buzz').toString() ||
!RegExp(r'(Z|[+-][0-9]{2}:[0-9]{2})$').hasMatch(p['expires_at']!) ||
DateTime.tryParse(p['expires_at']!) == null) {
return null;
}
return NostrBindDeepLink._(p);
}
AddCommunityDeepLink? parseAddCommunityDeepLink(Uri uri) {
if (!_webHandoffShape(uri, 'add-community', {'relay', 'name'})) return null;
final relay = Uri.tryParse(uri.queryParameters['relay'] ?? '');
final name = uri.queryParameters['name'];
if (relay == null ||
relay.scheme != 'wss' ||
relay.host.isEmpty ||
relay.host.endsWith('.') ||
relay.userInfo.isNotEmpty ||
relay.hasQuery ||
relay.hasFragment ||
(relay.path.isNotEmpty && relay.path != '/') ||
name == null ||
name.trim().isEmpty ||
name.length > 200) {
return null;
}
try {
validateInviteRelayUri(relay);
} on FormatException {
return null;
}
return AddCommunityDeepLink(
relayUrl: Uri(
scheme: 'wss',
host: relay.host,
port: relay.hasPort ? relay.port : null,
).toString(),
name: name,
);
}