Files
buzz/mobile/lib/shared/relay/relay_socket.dart
Wes b6aa5539e3 feat(mobile): account onboarding, key recovery and hosted reconnect (#8375)
## Behavior

Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery,
community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab
features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or
empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and
background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing,
links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is
retained for later opt-in.


`--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz`
opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup.
The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission,
and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features;
`BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their
backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory.

`BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and
reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure
assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling
assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at
Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not
replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines.

Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile
interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file
import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and
authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound
account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the
advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection.
Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS
startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET
/operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership
endpoint.

## Validation

- Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents
readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while
generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection
uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances
dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a
subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the
subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different
account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured
domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate
isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse,
duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an
empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses
synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live
backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh
GitHub CI is pending.

- Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage
enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit
known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links
release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response
encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by
ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed;
default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production
fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the
identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey
assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures
are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not
exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed
(mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub
CI remains pending.

- Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at
`fb15d5b82`.
- Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing
and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing
pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly.
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through
hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored
controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the
default-build suite.
- Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its
pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated
transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding
selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both
configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and
file-size checks).

- Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission
and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or
already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted
removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too
(hosted-only cases intentionally skip there).
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping,
reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory
reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean
and restored controls pass.
- Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the
iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At
`24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches,
matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes
it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did
not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native
cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account
round trip.

- Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known
identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement
of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the
retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default:
31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations
fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot
enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover.

- Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after
account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch,
preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The
configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the
production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored
controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical
QR acceptance.

- Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses
atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain.
Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request
abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit.
- Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain
account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and
native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls.
Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real
file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because
simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device
protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed.

- Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default
selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus
whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed
Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally
initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form
fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass.
- Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator
in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR /
pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab
connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in
this check.

- Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size
checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push
snapshot.

## Review disposition

| Feedback | Disposition |
| --- | --- |
| Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate
invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding
([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622),
[queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640),
[reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512))
| Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven
ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. |
| Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue,
transient HTTP retry classification
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143))
| All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated
mutation evidence above. |
| Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite
checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the
preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. |
| iOS interrupted key export
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252))
| Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented.
Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains
pending. |
| Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556))
| Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. |
| Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab
configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported
community mappings. |
| Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the
reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app
recovery/reset and remains deferred. |
| Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current
base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains
here. |
| Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the
operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied.
Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. |
| Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local
work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed
implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. |
| Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not
demonstrated defects. |

## Remaining draft gates

Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this
revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend
backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery
policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The
empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary
pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human
acceptance and current CI are still required before merge.



Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must
use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add
support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing
an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented
capability.


Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS`
(including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab
controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build
with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise
browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS,
exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record
results before marking review complete.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
2026-10-19 15:46:58 -06:00

277 lines
7.4 KiB
Dart

import 'dart:io';
import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import 'package:web_socket_channel/io.dart';
import 'package:web_socket_channel/web_socket_channel.dart';
import 'nostr_models.dart';
import 'relay_websocket.dart';
/// Low-level websocket connection with NIP-42 authentication.
///
/// Handles the raw websocket lifecycle: connect, authenticate via NIP-42
/// challenge/response, send/receive JSON frames, and disconnect.
///
/// Does NOT handle reconnection — that is [RelaySessionNotifier]'s job.
enum SocketState { disconnected, connecting, authenticating, connected }
class RelayAuthRejectedException implements Exception {
final String message;
const RelayAuthRejectedException(this.message);
@override
String toString() => 'Relay authentication rejected: $message';
}
Exception classifyRelayAuthFailure(String message) {
if (message.startsWith('error:')) return Exception(message);
return RelayAuthRejectedException(message);
}
class RelaySocket {
/// Interval for sending a ping and awaiting its pong before disconnecting.
static const pingInterval = Duration(seconds: 30);
@visibleForTesting
static Duration debugPingInterval = pingInterval;
final String _wsUrl;
final String? _nsec;
final void Function(List<dynamic> message) _onMessage;
final void Function() _onConnected;
final void Function(Object? error) _onDisconnected;
WebSocketChannel? _channel;
StreamSubscription<dynamic>? _subscription;
SocketState _state = SocketState.disconnected;
Completer<void>? _authCompleter;
Timer? _authTimeout;
String? _pendingAuthEventId;
SocketState get state => _state;
/// Scoped assertion supplied by the connection owner before connecting.
Map<String, String> headers = const {};
RelaySocket({
required String wsUrl,
required String? nsec,
required void Function(List<dynamic> message) onMessage,
required void Function() onConnected,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
}) : _wsUrl = wsUrl,
_nsec = nsec,
_onMessage = onMessage,
_onConnected = onConnected,
_onDisconnected = onDisconnected;
/// Connect to the relay and complete NIP-42 authentication.
Future<void> connect() async {
if (_state != SocketState.disconnected) return;
_state = SocketState.connecting;
try {
_channel = IOWebSocketChannel(
openRelayWebSocket(
Uri.parse(_wsUrl),
headers: headers,
pingInterval: debugPingInterval,
),
);
await _channel!.ready;
} catch (e) {
_state = SocketState.disconnected;
_onDisconnected(e);
return;
}
// The channel may have been disposed while we were awaiting ready
// (e.g. provider rebuild triggered dispose() concurrently).
if (_channel == null) {
_state = SocketState.disconnected;
return;
}
_state = SocketState.authenticating;
_authCompleter = Completer<void>();
_subscription = _channel!.stream.listen(
_handleRawMessage,
onError: (Object error) {
_failAuth(error);
_resetConnection();
_onDisconnected(error);
},
onDone: () {
_failAuth(null);
_resetConnection();
_onDisconnected(null);
},
);
// Wait for auth to complete (or timeout).
_authTimeout = Timer(const Duration(seconds: 8), () {
if (_authCompleter != null && !_authCompleter!.isCompleted) {
_authCompleter!.completeError(
TimeoutException('NIP-42 auth timed out after 8s'),
);
}
});
try {
await _authCompleter!.future;
_authTimeout?.cancel();
_state = SocketState.connected;
_onConnected();
} catch (e) {
_authTimeout?.cancel();
await disconnect();
_onDisconnected(e);
}
}
/// Send a raw JSON array over the websocket.
void send(List<dynamic> payload) {
_channel?.sink.add(jsonEncode(payload));
}
/// Gracefully close the connection.
Future<void> disconnect() async {
_resetConnection();
final channel = _channel;
_channel = null;
if (channel != null) {
await channel.sink.close();
}
}
void dispose() {
_resetConnection();
_channel?.sink.close();
_channel = null;
}
void _resetConnection() {
_state = SocketState.disconnected;
_subscription?.cancel();
_subscription = null;
_authTimeout?.cancel();
_authTimeout = null;
_pendingAuthEventId = null;
}
void _failAuth(Object? error) {
if (_authCompleter != null && !_authCompleter!.isCompleted) {
_authCompleter!.completeError(error ?? Exception('Connection closed'));
}
}
void _handleRawMessage(dynamic raw) {
final String text;
if (raw is String) {
text = raw;
} else {
return; // Binary frames are not part of the Nostr protocol.
}
final List<dynamic> data;
try {
data = jsonDecode(text) as List<dynamic>;
} catch (_) {
return; // Malformed JSON.
}
if (data.isEmpty) return;
final type = data[0] as String;
switch (type) {
case 'AUTH':
_handleAuthChallenge(data);
case 'OK':
_handleOk(data);
default:
// Pass EVENT, EOSE, NOTICE, etc. upstream.
_onMessage(data);
}
}
/// Handle the relay's AUTH challenge: sign a kind:22242 event and respond.
void _handleAuthChallenge(List<dynamic> data) {
if (data.length < 2) return;
final challenge = data[1] as String;
if (_nsec == null) {
_failAuth(Exception('No nsec available for NIP-42 auth'));
return;
}
try {
// Decode bech32 nsec to hex private key.
final privkeyHex = nostr.Nip19.decode(payload: _nsec).data;
if (privkeyHex.isEmpty) {
_failAuth(Exception('Invalid nsec'));
return;
}
// Build the auth tags.
final tags = <List<String>>[
['relay', _wsUrl],
['challenge', challenge],
];
// Create and sign the kind:22242 AUTH event.
final event = nostr.Event.from(
kind: EventKind.auth,
content: '',
tags: tags,
secretKey: privkeyHex,
);
_pendingAuthEventId = event.id;
send(['AUTH', event.toMap()]);
} catch (e) {
_failAuth(e);
}
}
@visibleForTesting
void debugHandleOkForTest(List<dynamic> data) => _onMessage(data);
/// Handle OK frames. During auth, complete the auth flow.
void _handleOk(List<dynamic> data) {
if (data.length < 3) return;
final eventId = data[1] as String;
final accepted = data[2] as bool;
// Check if this OK is for our pending AUTH event.
if (_pendingAuthEventId != null && eventId == _pendingAuthEventId) {
_pendingAuthEventId = null;
if (accepted) {
if (_authCompleter != null && !_authCompleter!.isCompleted) {
_authCompleter!.complete();
}
} else {
final message = data.length > 3
? data[3] as String
: 'Auth rejected by relay';
_failAuth(classifyRelayAuthFailure(message));
}
return;
}
// Pass non-auth OK frames upstream for pending event tracking.
_onMessage(data);
}
}
/// HTTP upgrade failures retain their status through WebSocketChannel.
bool relayUpgradeRefused(Object? error) {
if (error is WebSocketChannelException) error = error.inner;
return error is WebSocketException &&
(error.httpStatusCode == 401 || error.httpStatusCode == 403);
}