mirror of
https://github.com/block/buzz.git
synced 2026-10-28 04:51:40 +00:00
## Behavior Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery, community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing, links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is retained for later opt-in. `--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz` opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup. The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission, and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features; `BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory. `BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines. Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection. Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET /operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership endpoint. ## Validation - Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse, duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh GitHub CI is pending. - Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed; default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed (mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub CI remains pending. - Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at `fb15d5b82`. - Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly. - Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the default-build suite. - Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and file-size checks). - Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too (hosted-only cases intentionally skip there). - Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping, reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean and restored controls pass. - Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At `24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches, matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account round trip. - Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default: 31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover. - Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch, preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical QR acceptance. - Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain. Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit. - Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls. Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed. - Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass. - Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR / pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in this check. - Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push snapshot. ## Review disposition | Feedback | Disposition | | --- | --- | | Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding ([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622), [queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640), [reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512)) | Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. | | Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue, transient HTTP retry classification ([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143)) | All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated mutation evidence above. | | Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. | | iOS interrupted key export ([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252)) | Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented. Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains pending. | | Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit ([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556)) | Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. | | Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported community mappings. | | Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app recovery/reset and remains deferred. | | Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains here. | | Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied. Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. | | Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. | | Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not demonstrated defects. | ## Remaining draft gates Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human acceptance and current CI are still required before merge. Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented capability. Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` (including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS, exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record results before marking review complete. --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
328 lines
9.9 KiB
Dart
328 lines
9.9 KiB
Dart
import 'package:buzz/shared/hosted/hosted_environment.dart';
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import 'dart:convert';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/community/community.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/hosted/account_identity_store.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/hosted/device_identity_source.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/hosted/self_hosted_entry.dart';
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import 'package:flutter_secure_storage/flutter_secure_storage.dart';
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import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
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import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
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void main() {
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TestWidgetsFlutterBinding.ensureInitialized();
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const relay = 'wss://community.example';
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// Public test vectors, never real user signing material.
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final key = nostr.Keys('1'.padLeft(64, '0'));
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final other = nostr.Keys('2'.padLeft(64, '0'));
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late _Storage storage;
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late List<Community> probes;
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late SelfHostedEntry entry;
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var current = true;
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var refuseProbe = false;
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SelfHostedEntry makeEntry() => SelfHostedEntry(
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storage: storage,
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identities: DeviceIdentitySource(storage: storage),
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accountStore: AccountIdentityStore(storage: storage),
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probe: (community) async {
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// The durable key must already exist before any network operation.
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expect(storage.data.values, contains(community.nsec));
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probes.add(community);
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if (refuseProbe) throw StateError('Connection refused');
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},
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);
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setUp(() {
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storage = _Storage();
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probes = [];
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current = true;
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refuseProbe = false;
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entry = makeEntry();
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});
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Future<Community> prepare({
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String address = relay,
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String? nsec,
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String? savedPubkey,
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bool create = false,
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}) => entry.prepare(
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relay: address,
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name: 'Community',
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nsec: nsec,
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savedPubkey: savedPubkey,
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create: create,
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isCurrent: () => current,
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);
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void expectUntouched() {
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expect(storage.writes, 0);
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expect(probes, isEmpty);
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}
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test(
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'reserved hosted domains refuse imported and generated identities',
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() async {
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for (final address in [
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'wss://team.communities.buzz.xyz',
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'wss://team.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz',
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'wss://BUILDERLAB.XYZ.',
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]) {
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if (!HostedEnvironment.requiresAuth(Uri.parse(address).host)) continue;
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await expectLater(
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prepare(address: address, nsec: key.nsec),
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throwsStateError,
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);
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await expectLater(
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prepare(address: address, create: true),
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throwsStateError,
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);
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}
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expectUntouched();
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expect(storage.data, isEmpty);
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},
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);
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test('invalid addresses and invalid nsec never persist or probe', () async {
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for (final address in [
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'ws://community.example',
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'wss://user@community.example',
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'wss://community.example/path',
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'wss://community.example?token=value',
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'wss://community.example#fragment',
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]) {
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await expectLater(
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prepare(address: address, nsec: key.nsec),
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throwsFormatException,
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);
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}
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for (final nsec in ['invalid', key.public, key.npub]) {
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await expectLater(
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prepare(nsec: nsec),
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throwsA(AccountIdentityFailure.invalidKey),
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);
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}
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expectUntouched();
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expect(storage.data, isEmpty);
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});
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test(
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'failed probe retains generated key across a new service and retry',
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() async {
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refuseProbe = true;
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await expectLater(prepare(create: true), throwsStateError);
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expect(storage.writes, 1);
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final persisted = Map<String, String>.of(storage.data);
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final first = probes.single;
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expect(first.pubkey, AccountIdentityStore.publicKeyForNsec(first.nsec!));
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refuseProbe = false;
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entry = makeEntry();
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final retried = await prepare(create: true);
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expect(retried.pubkey, first.pubkey);
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expect(retried.nsec, first.nsec);
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expect(storage.data, persisted);
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expect(storage.writes, 1);
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expect(probes, hasLength(2));
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},
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);
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for (final brokenEnumeration in [false, true]) {
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for (final source in ['legacy', 'community', 'account']) {
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test(
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'$source identity with broken enumeration=$brokenEnumeration forbids generation; explicit reuse preserves saved keys',
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() async {
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if (source == 'account') {
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await AccountIdentityStore(storage: storage).create(key.nsec);
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} else if (source == 'legacy') {
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storage.data['buzz_nsec'] = key.nsec;
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} else {
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storage.data['buzz_communities'] = jsonEncode([
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{'name': 'Saved', 'nsec': key.nsec, 'pubkey': key.public},
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]);
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storage.data['buzz_nsec'] = other.nsec;
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}
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storage.failEnumeration = brokenEnumeration;
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final before = Map<String, String>.of(storage.data);
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final writesBefore = storage.writes;
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final inventory = await entry.choices();
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expect(inventory.complete, !brokenEnumeration);
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if (!brokenEnumeration || source != 'account') {
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expect(
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inventory.choices.map((choice) => choice.pubkey),
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contains(key.public),
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);
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}
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await expectLater(
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prepare(create: true),
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throwsA(
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brokenEnumeration
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? AccountIdentityFailure.unreadable
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: AccountIdentityFailure.absent,
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),
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);
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expect(storage.writes, writesBefore);
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expect(probes, isEmpty);
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expect(storage.data, before);
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final community = await prepare(savedPubkey: key.public);
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expect(community.nsec, key.nsec);
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expect(community.pubkey, key.public);
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expect(community.relayUrl, relay);
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for (final saved in before.entries) {
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expect(storage.data[saved.key], saved.value);
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}
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expect(probes, [community]);
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},
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);
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}
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}
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test(
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'account and community choices deduplicate the same saved identity',
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() async {
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await AccountIdentityStore(storage: storage).create(key.nsec);
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storage.data['buzz_nsec'] = key.nsec;
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expect((await entry.choices()).choices.map((choice) => choice.pubkey), [
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key.public,
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]);
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},
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);
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test('unreadable account key never permits new generation', () async {
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storage.data[AccountIdentityStore.storageKey] = 'broken';
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await expectLater(
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prepare(create: true),
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throwsA(AccountIdentityFailure.unreadable),
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);
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expectUntouched();
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});
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test(
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'explicit replacement preserves refused key and retries the chosen key',
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() async {
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refuseProbe = true;
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await expectLater(prepare(nsec: key.nsec), throwsStateError);
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refuseProbe = false;
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final joined = await prepare(nsec: other.nsec);
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expect(joined.pubkey, other.public);
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final retained = AccountIdentityStore(
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storage: storage,
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).forPairing(key.public);
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expect(await retained.withKeys((keys) async => keys.public), key.public);
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expect((await prepare(create: true)).pubkey, other.public);
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expect(probes, hasLength(3));
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},
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);
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test(
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'missing explicit saved identity never falls back to generation',
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() async {
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await expectLater(
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prepare(savedPubkey: key.public, create: true),
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throwsA(AccountIdentityFailure.absent),
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);
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expectUntouched();
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},
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);
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for (final boundary in ['before', 'read', 'write']) {
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test(
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'cancellation at $boundary fences probe and preserves any durable key',
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() async {
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if (boundary == 'before') current = false;
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if (boundary == 'read') storage.onRead = () => current = false;
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if (boundary == 'write') storage.onWrite = () => current = false;
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await expectLater(prepare(nsec: key.nsec), throwsStateError);
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expect(probes, isEmpty);
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expect(storage.writes, boundary == 'write' ? 1 : 0);
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if (boundary == 'before') expect(storage.reads, 0);
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if (boundary == 'write') {
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expect(storage.data.values, contains(key.nsec));
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current = true;
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storage.onWrite = null;
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expect((await prepare()).pubkey, key.public);
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expect(storage.writes, 1);
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} else {
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expect(storage.data, isEmpty);
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}
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},
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);
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}
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test('unconfirmed durable write cannot reach the relay probe', () async {
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storage.dropWrites = true;
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await expectLater(
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prepare(nsec: key.nsec),
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throwsA(AccountIdentityFailure.unreadable),
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);
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expect(probes, isEmpty);
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expect(storage.data, isEmpty);
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});
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}
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class _Storage extends Fake implements FlutterSecureStorage {
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final data = <String, String>{};
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int writes = 0;
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int reads = 0;
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bool dropWrites = false;
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bool failEnumeration = false;
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void Function()? onRead;
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void Function()? onWrite;
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@override
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Future<Map<String, String>> readAll({
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AppleOptions? iOptions,
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AndroidOptions? aOptions,
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LinuxOptions? lOptions,
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WebOptions? webOptions,
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AppleOptions? mOptions,
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WindowsOptions? wOptions,
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}) async {
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if (failEnumeration) throw StateError('unrelated entry cannot decrypt');
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return Map.of(data);
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}
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@override
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Future<void> delete({
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required String key,
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AppleOptions? iOptions,
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AndroidOptions? aOptions,
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LinuxOptions? lOptions,
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WebOptions? webOptions,
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AppleOptions? mOptions,
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WindowsOptions? wOptions,
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}) async {
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data.remove(key);
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}
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@override
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Future<String?> read({
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required String key,
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AppleOptions? iOptions,
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AndroidOptions? aOptions,
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LinuxOptions? lOptions,
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WebOptions? webOptions,
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AppleOptions? mOptions,
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WindowsOptions? wOptions,
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}) async {
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reads++;
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onRead?.call();
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return data[key];
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}
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@override
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Future<void> write({
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required String key,
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required String? value,
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AppleOptions? iOptions,
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AndroidOptions? aOptions,
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LinuxOptions? lOptions,
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WebOptions? webOptions,
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AppleOptions? mOptions,
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WindowsOptions? wOptions,
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}) async {
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writes++;
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if (!dropWrites && value != null) data[key] = value;
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onWrite?.call();
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}
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}
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