Files
buzz/mobile/lib/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart
klopez4212 5173fad660 feat(pairing): enter desktop codes on mobile (#8085)
## Summary
Enter a desktop-only, random six-digit code on mobile to pair without a
desktop confirmation click. Verification uses the encrypted session,
limits guesses to five, and never treats the QR-derived transcript as
approval. Older clients retain desktop confirmation.

Adds digit-only error shakes and native haptics, a separate biometrics
choice, and a direct community-icon arrival animation. Fixes dropped
early offers and resets completed pairing so reopening or signing out
cannot get stuck.

### Related issue
Related: #8060; no duplicate code-entry PR found.
<img width="780" height="1688" alt="01-enter-code"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a99ced3e-4305-4ac6-a6cc-d598ced423e7"
/>
<img width="780" height="1688" alt="02-incorrect-code"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/19cdb109-1f10-40a9-a661-1d7ba89c81c1"
/>
<img width="780" height="1688" alt="03-biometrics"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/af1b2924-9ab6-4d1a-b4b1-fccfdf446404"
/>
<img width="780" height="1688" alt="04-community-loading"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/84145d82-843a-4c25-aef7-6492fc241d4b"
/>
<img width="897" height="388" alt="05-desktop-code"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d8a2e469-7e42-466a-988f-bab6b1df85fc"
/>

### Release order
Deploy the updated pairing relay first, then desktop, then mobile. The
relay now allows eight events per connection (seven for a successful
fifth guess plus room for cancellation), with a corresponding bounded
delivery budget. Existing clients remain supported; older client
combinations keep desktop confirmation.

### Testing
- 103 mobile pairing tests, 270 core tests, 51 relay integration tests,
and the new real-relay fifth-guess flow passed.
- The real-relay regression verifies proof, decrypted identity import,
and completion after four wrong guesses. Restoring the old six-event cap
makes it fail.
- A paused-clock desktop regression confirms slow readiness cannot
extend the visible QR beyond protocol expiry. Mobile regression covers
typing before negotiation completes.
- Core/pair-relay Clippy and full native desktop Clippy/workspace tests
passed. Mobile analysis passed; broad mobile runs each hit an unrelated
failure (a gateway-script timeout and a native-menu missing-plugin
error), and both affected test files passed separately.
- Repository-wide Rust testing exhausted local disk space while
compiling unrelated packages. The final push omitted that
resource-blocked hook and avoided repeating the desktop/mobile runs
above; hosted CI remains required.

---------

Signed-off-by: kenny lopez <klopez4212@gmail.com>
2026-10-05 13:42:39 -04:00

966 lines
31 KiB
Dart
Raw Permalink Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters

This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:math' as math;
import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import '../../shared/auth/auth.dart';
import '../../shared/community/paired_community_landing.dart';
import '../../shared/crypto/ecdh.dart';
import '../../shared/crypto/nip44.dart';
import '../../shared/relay/relay.dart';
import '../../shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart';
import 'pairing_crypto.dart';
import 'pairing_socket.dart';
part 'pairing_provider_helpers.dart';
part 'pairing_state.dart';
/// HTTP client used by [PairingNotifier] for the validation request.
final pairingHttpClientProvider = Provider<http.Client>((ref) {
final client = http.Client();
ref.onDispose(client.close);
return client;
});
typedef PairingSocketFactory =
PairingSocket Function({
required String wsUrl,
required String ephemeralPrivkey,
required void Function(List<dynamic> message) onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
});
typedef PairingCredentialValidator =
Future<void> Function({required String relayUrl, required String? nsec});
const identityExportAuthorizationTtl = Duration(minutes: 2);
final identityExportClockProvider = Provider<DateTime Function()>((ref) {
return DateTime.now;
});
class PairingNotifier extends Notifier<PairingState> {
final PairingSocketFactory _socketFactory;
final PairingCredentialValidator? _credentialValidator;
final RelaySocketFactory _validationSocketFactory;
RelaySocket? _validationSocket;
PairingSocket? _socket;
Timer? _sessionTimeout;
Completer<bool>? _codeResult;
String? _codeRequestId;
int _codeRequestSequence = 0;
Community? _identityExportCommunity;
bool _identityExportBiometricOnly = false;
PairingNotifier({
PairingSocketFactory? socketFactory,
PairingCredentialValidator? credentialValidator,
RelaySocketFactory validationSocketFactory = RelaySocket.new,
}) : _socketFactory = socketFactory ?? _createPairingSocket,
_credentialValidator = credentialValidator,
_validationSocketFactory = validationSocketFactory;
static PairingSocket _createPairingSocket({
required String wsUrl,
required String ephemeralPrivkey,
required void Function(List<dynamic> message) onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
}) => PairingSocket(
wsUrl: wsUrl,
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
@override
PairingState build() {
ref.onDispose(_cleanup);
return const PairingState();
}
Future<void> pair(String rawInput) async {
if (state.status == PairingStatus.connecting ||
state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.status == PairingStatus.transferring) {
return;
}
final trimmed = rawInput.trim();
if (trimmed.startsWith('nostrpair://')) {
return _pairNipAb(trimmed);
}
// Legacy buzz:// flow.
return _pairLegacy(trimmed);
}
Future<bool> authorizeIdentityExport({required Community community}) async {
if (state.authorizationInProgress) return false;
final biometricOnly =
community.sensitiveActionPolicy == SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled;
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(
authorizationInProgress: true,
clearErrorMessage: true,
);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizationSessionProvider)
.authorize(biometricOnly: biometricOnly);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration) return false;
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
state = state.copyWith(
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _authorizationError(result),
);
return false;
}
_identityExportCommunity = community;
_identityExportBiometricOnly = biometricOnly;
_identityExportAuthorizedAt = ref.read(identityExportClockProvider)();
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: false);
return true;
}
/// Confirm that the SAS code matches. Called by the UI after user approval.
void confirmSas() {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
_userConfirmedSas = true;
state = state.copyWith(userConfirmedSas: true);
if (_sasConfirmReceived) unawaited(_continueAfterSas());
}
/// Check user input with the source; never compare a QR-derived SAS when the
/// source has negotiated an independent desktop-only code.
Future<bool> verifyDesktopCode(String code) async {
if (!state.requiresDesktopCode ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
_codeResult != null ||
!RegExp(r'^\d{6}$').hasMatch(code)) {
return false;
}
final result = Completer<bool>();
_codeResult = result;
_codeRequestId = '${++_codeRequestSequence}';
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: _encryptMessage({
'type': 'code-submit',
'code': code,
'request_id': _codeRequestId,
}),
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
try {
// Keep this logical attempt pending until its response or session cleanup.
// A local deadline cannot undo a guess already consumed by the source.
return await result.future;
} finally {
if (identical(_codeResult, result)) {
_codeResult = null;
_codeRequestId = null;
}
}
}
void setProtectSensitiveActions(bool value) {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.sendsIdentityToDesktop ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
state = state.copyWith(protectSensitiveActions: value);
}
Future<void> _continueAfterSas() async {
if (!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (_sendIdentityToSource && !_exportIdentityIsCurrent()) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
errorMessage:
'The active community changed. Start identity export again.',
);
return;
}
final authorizedAt = _identityExportAuthorizedAt;
final elapsed = authorizedAt == null
? null
: ref.read(identityExportClockProvider)().difference(authorizedAt);
final hasFreshExportAuthorization =
elapsed != null &&
!elapsed.isNegative &&
elapsed < identityExportAuthorizationTtl;
if (_sendIdentityToSource && !hasFreshExportAuthorization) {
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: true);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizationSessionProvider)
.authorize(biometricOnly: _identityExportBiometricOnly);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
!state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _authorizationError(result),
);
return;
}
} else if (!_sendIdentityToSource && state.protectSensitiveActions) {
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: true);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider)
.authorizeBiometricProtection();
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
!state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _biometricProtectionError(result),
);
return;
}
}
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
status: PairingStatus.transferring,
authorizationInProgress: false,
);
if (_sendIdentityToSource) {
_sendIdentityPayload();
} else {
final pending = _pendingPayload;
if (pending != null) {
_pendingPayload = null;
_handlePayload(pending);
}
}
}
static String _biometricProtectionError(
DeviceAuthResult result,
) => switch (result) {
DeviceAuthResult.cancelled =>
'Biometric setup was cancelled. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.unavailable =>
'Biometrics are unavailable. Enroll Face ID or biometrics and try again, or turn this option off.',
DeviceAuthResult.lockedOut =>
'Biometrics are locked. Unlock them in system settings and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.failed =>
'Biometric confirmation failed. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.success => '',
};
static String _authorizationError(
DeviceAuthResult result,
) => switch (result) {
DeviceAuthResult.cancelled =>
'Identity confirmation was cancelled. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.unavailable =>
'Device authentication is unavailable. Configure a device passcode or biometrics and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.lockedOut =>
'Device authentication is locked. Unlock it in system settings and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.failed =>
'Identity confirmation failed. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.success => '',
};
/// Deny the SAS code. Send abort and terminate.
void denySas() {
_sendAbort('sas_mismatch');
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'SAS code mismatch — pairing cancelled for security.',
);
}
void reset() {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState();
}
void _cleanup() {
if (_codeResult?.isCompleted == false) _codeResult!.complete(false);
_codeResult = null;
_codeRequestId = null;
_pairingGeneration++;
_validationSocket?.dispose();
_validationSocket = null;
_sessionTimeout?.cancel();
_sessionTimeout = null;
_socket?.dispose();
_socket = null;
_processedEventIds.clear();
_publishedEventIds.clear();
_sasConfirmReceived = false;
_userConfirmedSas = false;
_pendingPayload = null;
_sendIdentityToSource = false;
_identityExportCommunity = null;
_identityExportBiometricOnly = false;
_identityExportAuthorizedAt = null;
}
// ── NIP-AB pairing flow ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Session state kept between steps.
String? _ephemeralPrivkey;
String? _ephemeralPubkey;
Uint8List? _sessionSecret;
String? _sourcePubkey;
Uint8List? _sessionId;
Uint8List? _sasInput;
Uint8List? _conversationKey;
bool _sasConfirmReceived = false;
bool _userConfirmedSas = false;
bool _sendIdentityToSource = false;
int _pairingGeneration = 0;
DateTime? _identityExportAuthorizedAt;
Map<String, dynamic>? _pendingPayload; // buffered until user confirms SAS
final Set<String> _publishedEventIds = {};
final Set<String> _processedEventIds = {}; // NIP-AB §Duplicate Event Handling
Future<void> _pairNipAb(String uri) async {
final generation = _pairingGeneration;
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.connecting);
try {
// 1. Parse the nostrpair:// URI.
final qr = parseNostrpairUri(uri);
_sourcePubkey = qr.sourcePubkey;
_sessionSecret = qr.sessionSecret;
_sendIdentityToSource =
Uri.parse(uri).queryParameters['mode'] == 'recover';
final relayWsUrl = qr.relays.first;
// 2. Generate ephemeral keypair.
final keychain = nostr.Keys.generate();
_ephemeralPrivkey = keychain.secret;
_ephemeralPubkey = keychain.public;
// 3. Derive session ID and SAS immediately (we know source pubkey from QR).
_sessionId = deriveSessionId(qr.sessionSecret);
final ecdhShared = ecdhSharedSecret(_ephemeralPrivkey!, qr.sourcePubkey);
final (sasCode, sasInput) = deriveSas(ecdhShared, qr.sessionSecret);
_sasInput = sasInput;
// Pre-compute NIP-44 conversation key for encrypting events.
_conversationKey = getConversationKey(
_ephemeralPrivkey!,
qr.sourcePubkey,
);
// 4. Connect to relay with ephemeral keys.
final socket = _socketFactory(
wsUrl: relayWsUrl,
ephemeralPrivkey: _ephemeralPrivkey!,
onMessage: (message) {
if (generation == _pairingGeneration) _handleRelayMessage(message);
},
onDisconnected: (error) {
if (generation == _pairingGeneration) _handleDisconnected(error);
},
);
_socket = socket;
await socket.connect();
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
if (!socket.isConnected) {
throw StateError('Pairing socket did not reach the connected state');
}
// 5. Subscribe for kind:24134 events tagged to our ephemeral pubkey.
socket.subscribe('pair', 24134, _ephemeralPubkey!);
// 6. Wait briefly for EOSE, then send offer.
// (In practice, we send the offer immediately — the relay will buffer it.)
await Future.delayed(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
// 7. Build and send the offer event.
final offerContent = _encryptMessage({
'type': 'offer',
if (!_sendIdentityToSource) 'confirmation': 'desktop-code-v1',
'version': 1,
'session_id': bytesToHex(_sessionId!),
});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: offerContent,
tags: [
['p', qr.sourcePubkey],
],
);
// 8. Display SAS code and wait for sas-confirm from source.
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
sasCode: formatSas(sasCode),
sendsIdentityToDesktop: _sendIdentityToSource,
protectSensitiveActions: ref.read(relayConfigProvider).nsec == null,
);
// 9. Start 120s session timeout.
_sessionTimeout = Timer(const Duration(seconds: 120), () {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.success &&
state.status != PairingStatus.error) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Pairing session timed out.',
);
}
});
} on FormatException catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Invalid pairing code: ${e.message}',
);
} catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
debugPrint('Pairing connection error: $e');
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: _friendlyErrorMessage(e),
);
}
}
void _handleRelayMessage(List<dynamic> data) {
if (data.isEmpty) return;
final type = data[0] as String;
final rejected =
type == 'OK' &&
data.length >= 3 &&
_publishedEventIds.remove(data[1]) &&
data[2] == false;
final closed = type == 'CLOSED' && data.length >= 2 && data[1] == 'pair';
if ((rejected || closed) &&
state.status != PairingStatus.success &&
state.status != PairingStatus.error) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Pairing couldn’t continue. Scan a new desktop QR code and try again.',
);
return;
}
if (type == 'EVENT' && data.length >= 3) {
final eventJson = data[2] as Map<String, dynamic>;
_handlePairingEvent(eventJson);
}
// Ignore EOSE, NOTICE, etc.
}
void _handlePairingEvent(Map<String, dynamic> eventJson) {
try {
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: validate kind.
final kind = eventJson['kind'] as int?;
if (kind != 24134) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: validate pubkey is from expected source.
final eventPubkey = eventJson['pubkey'] as String?;
if (eventPubkey == null) return;
if (_sourcePubkey != null && eventPubkey != _sourcePubkey) return;
// NIP-AB §Duplicate Event Handling: discard already-processed events.
final eventId = eventJson['id'] as String?;
if (eventId == null) return;
if (_processedEventIds.contains(eventId)) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: check p-tag points to us.
final tags = (eventJson['tags'] as List<dynamic>?) ?? [];
final hasOurPTag = tags.any((t) {
if (t is List && t.length >= 2) {
return t[0] == 'p' && t[1] == _ephemeralPubkey;
}
return false;
});
if (!hasOurPTag) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: verify event signature (NIP-01).
// The nostr package's Event.fromJson verifies id + sig on construction.
try {
final event = nostr.Event.fromJson(jsonEncode(eventJson));
if (event.id != eventId) return; // id mismatch
} catch (_) {
return; // invalid signature or malformed event
}
// Decrypt NIP-44 content.
final content = eventJson['content'] as String?;
if (content == null || content.isEmpty) return;
final decryptKey = getConversationKey(_ephemeralPrivkey!, eventPubkey);
final decrypted = nip44Decrypt(decryptKey, content);
final msg = jsonDecode(decrypted) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final msgType = msg['type'] as String?;
switch (msgType) {
case 'desktop-code':
if (!_sendIdentityToSource &&
state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas &&
!_sasConfirmReceived) {
state = state.copyWith(requiresDesktopCode: true);
}
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'code-rejected':
if (state.requiresDesktopCode &&
msg['request_id'] == _codeRequestId &&
_codeResult?.isCompleted == false) {
_codeResult!.complete(false);
if (msg['remaining_attempts'] == 0) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Too many incorrect codes. Scan a new desktop QR code and try again.',
);
}
}
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'sas-confirm':
_handleSasConfirm(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId); // record after successful processing
case 'payload':
_handlePayload(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'abort':
_handleAbort(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'complete':
_handleComplete(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
}
} catch (e) {
// Silently discard invalid events per NIP-AB §Event Validation.
}
}
void _handleSasConfirm(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas) return;
final receivedHash = msg['transcript_hash'] as String?;
if (receivedHash == null) return;
// Verify transcript hash.
final expectedHash = deriveTranscriptHash(
_sessionId!,
hexToBytes(_sourcePubkey!),
hexToBytes(_ephemeralPubkey!),
_sasInput!,
_sessionSecret!,
);
final receivedBytes = hexToBytes(receivedHash);
if (!constantTimeEquals(receivedBytes, expectedHash)) {
// NIP-AB §Step 3: target MUST send abort with reason "sas_mismatch".
_sendAbort('sas_mismatch');
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Security verification failed — possible attack. Pairing aborted.',
);
return;
}
_sasConfirmReceived = true;
if (state.requiresDesktopCode && _codeResult?.isCompleted == false) {
_codeResult!.complete(true);
}
// If the user already tapped "Codes Match", complete the transition now
// that the transcript hash is verified.
if (_userConfirmedSas) {
unawaited(_continueAfterSas());
}
// Otherwise stay in confirmingSas — user must still confirm via confirmSas().
}
bool _exportIdentityIsCurrent() {
final authorizedCommunity = _identityExportCommunity;
final currentConfig = ref.read(relayConfigProvider);
return authorizedCommunity != null &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec != null &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec!.isNotEmpty &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec == currentConfig.nsec &&
authorizedCommunity.relayUrl == currentConfig.storedOrigin;
}
void _sendIdentityPayload() {
if (!_exportIdentityIsCurrent()) {
_sendAbort('identity_changed');
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'The active community changed. Start identity export again.',
);
return;
}
final nsec = _identityExportCommunity!.nsec!;
final content = _encryptMessage({
'type': 'payload',
'payload_type': 'nsec',
'payload': nsec,
});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
}
void _handlePayload(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
// Only accept payload after the transcript hash was verified.
if (!_sasConfirmReceived) return;
// If the user hasn't confirmed SAS yet, buffer the payload.
// It will be processed when confirmSas() is called.
if (state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas) {
_pendingPayload = msg;
return;
}
if (state.status != PairingStatus.transferring) return;
state = state.copyWith(status: PairingStatus.storing);
final payloadType = msg['payload_type'] as String?;
final payload = msg['payload'] as String?;
if (payload == null) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Received empty payload from source.',
);
return;
}
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
final protectSensitiveActions = state.protectSensitiveActions;
unawaited(
_processPayload(
payloadType,
payload,
pairingGeneration: pairingGeneration,
protectSensitiveActions: protectSensitiveActions,
),
);
}
void _handleComplete(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
if (!_sendIdentityToSource || state.status != PairingStatus.transferring) {
return;
}
if (msg['success'] != true) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Desktop could not store the identity.',
);
return;
}
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.success);
}
void _handleAbort(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
final reason = msg['reason'] as String? ?? 'unknown';
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Source device aborted pairing: $reason',
);
}
Future<void> _processPayload(
String? payloadType,
String payload, {
required int pairingGeneration,
required bool protectSensitiveActions,
}) async {
try {
// Parse the custom payload.
final data = jsonDecode(payload) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final relayUrl = data['relayUrl'] as String?;
final pubkey = data['pubkey'] as String?;
final nsec = data['nsec'] as String?;
if (relayUrl == null) {
throw const FormatException('Missing relayUrl in payload');
}
// Validate relay URL to prevent SSRF via private network addresses.
_validateRelayUrl(relayUrl);
state = state.copyWith(destinationRelayUrl: relayUrl);
// Validate credentials against the relay via NIP-42 WS handshake.
final credentialValidator = _credentialValidator ?? _validateCredentials;
await credentialValidator(relayUrl: relayUrl, nsec: nsec);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
state.status != PairingStatus.storing ||
_sendIdentityToSource) {
return;
}
// Send complete only after credentials are validated.
_sendComplete(true);
// Store as community and switch to it.
final community = Community.create(
name: Community.nameFromUrl(relayUrl),
relayUrl: relayUrl,
pubkey: pubkey,
nsec: nsec,
sensitiveActionPolicy: protectSensitiveActions
? SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled
: SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
await ref
.read(authProvider.notifier)
.authenticateWithCommunity(community);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
state.status != PairingStatus.storing ||
_sendIdentityToSource) {
return;
}
_cleanup();
state = state.copyWith(status: PairingStatus.success);
ref.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider.notifier).request(community);
} catch (e) {
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
state.status != PairingStatus.storing ||
_sendIdentityToSource) {
return;
}
_sendComplete(false);
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Failed to import credentials: $e',
);
}
}
void _sendAbort(String reason) {
try {
final content = _encryptMessage({'type': 'abort', 'reason': reason});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
} catch (_) {
// Best-effort.
}
}
void _sendComplete(bool success) {
try {
final content = _encryptMessage({'type': 'complete', 'success': success});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
} catch (_) {
// Best-effort — complete is advisory per NIP-AB.
}
}
/// Encrypt a message using NIP-44 with the ephemeral conversation key.
String _encryptMessage(Map<String, dynamic> message) {
final plaintext = jsonEncode(message);
return nip44Encrypt(_conversationKey!, plaintext);
}
/// Build and publish a kind:24134 event signed with ephemeral keys.
void _publishEvent({
required int kind,
required String content,
required List<List<String>> tags,
}) {
// Add timestamp jitter (0-30s) for metadata privacy.
final jitter = math.Random.secure().nextInt(31);
final createdAt = (DateTime.now().millisecondsSinceEpoch ~/ 1000) - jitter;
final event = nostr.Event.from(
kind: kind,
content: content,
tags: tags,
secretKey: _ephemeralPrivkey!,
createdAt: createdAt,
);
_publishedEventIds.add(event.id);
_socket?.publishEvent(event.toMap());
}
void _handleDisconnected(Object? error) {
if (state.status == PairingStatus.success ||
state.status == PairingStatus.error) {
return;
}
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Lost connection to pairing relay.',
);
}
// ── Legacy buzz:// flow ───────────────────────────────────────────────
Future<void> _pairLegacy(String rawInput) async {
final generation = _pairingGeneration;
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.connecting);
try {
final community = _parseLegacyInput(rawInput);
final validator = _credentialValidator ?? _validateCredentials;
await validator(relayUrl: community.relayUrl, nsec: community.nsec);
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
await ref
.read(authProvider.notifier)
.authenticateWithCommunity(community);
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.success,
destinationRelayUrl: community.relayUrl,
);
ref.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider.notifier).request(community);
} on FormatException catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Invalid pairing code: ${e.message}',
);
} on RelayException catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Could not connect to relay (${e.statusCode}). '
'Check that the pairing code is valid.',
);
} catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Connection failed. Make sure your device can reach the '
'relay server.',
);
}
}
Future<void> _validateCredentials({
required String relayUrl,
required String? nsec,
}) async {
if (nsec == null || nsec.isEmpty) {
throw const FormatException('Pairing payload missing nsec');
}
final uri = Uri.parse(relayUrl);
final scheme = uri.scheme == 'https' ? 'wss' : 'ws';
final wsUrl = uri.replace(scheme: scheme).toString();
final socket = _validationSocketFactory(
wsUrl: wsUrl,
nsec: nsec,
onMessage: (_) {},
onConnected: () {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
_validationSocket = socket;
try {
await socket.connect().timeout(const Duration(seconds: 8));
} finally {
if (identical(_validationSocket, socket)) _validationSocket = null;
await socket.disconnect();
}
}
Community _parseLegacyInput(String raw) {
var payload = raw.trim();
if (payload.startsWith('buzz://')) {
payload = payload.substring('buzz://'.length);
}
final normalized = base64Url.normalize(payload);
final jsonStr = utf8.decode(base64Url.decode(normalized));
final decoded = jsonDecode(jsonStr);
if (decoded is! Map<String, dynamic>) {
throw const FormatException('Pairing payload is not a JSON object');
}
final relayUrl = decoded['relayUrl'] as String?;
if (relayUrl == null) {
throw const FormatException('Missing relayUrl in payload');
}
_validateRelayUrl(relayUrl);
return Community.create(
name: Community.nameFromUrl(relayUrl),
relayUrl: relayUrl,
pubkey: decoded['pubkey'] as String?,
nsec: decoded['nsec'] as String?,
sensitiveActionPolicy: SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
}
}
final pairingProvider = NotifierProvider<PairingNotifier, PairingState>(
PairingNotifier.new,
);