Files
buzz/mobile/test/features/pairing/pairing_provider_test.dart
Wes b6aa5539e3 feat(mobile): account onboarding, key recovery and hosted reconnect (#8375)
## Behavior

Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery,
community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab
features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or
empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and
background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing,
links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is
retained for later opt-in.


`--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz`
opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup.
The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission,
and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features;
`BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their
backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory.

`BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and
reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure
assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling
assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at
Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not
replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines.

Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile
interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file
import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and
authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound
account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the
advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection.
Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS
startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET
/operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership
endpoint.

## Validation

- Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents
readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while
generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection
uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances
dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a
subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the
subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different
account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured
domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate
isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse,
duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an
empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses
synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live
backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh
GitHub CI is pending.

- Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage
enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit
known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links
release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response
encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by
ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed;
default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production
fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the
identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey
assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures
are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not
exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed
(mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub
CI remains pending.

- Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at
`fb15d5b82`.
- Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing
and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing
pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly.
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through
hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored
controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the
default-build suite.
- Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its
pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated
transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding
selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both
configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and
file-size checks).

- Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission
and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or
already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted
removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too
(hosted-only cases intentionally skip there).
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping,
reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory
reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean
and restored controls pass.
- Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the
iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At
`24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches,
matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes
it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did
not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native
cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account
round trip.

- Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known
identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement
of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the
retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default:
31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations
fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot
enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover.

- Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after
account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch,
preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The
configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the
production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored
controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical
QR acceptance.

- Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses
atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain.
Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request
abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit.
- Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain
account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and
native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls.
Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real
file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because
simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device
protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed.

- Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default
selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus
whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed
Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally
initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form
fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass.
- Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator
in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR /
pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab
connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in
this check.

- Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size
checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push
snapshot.

## Review disposition

| Feedback | Disposition |
| --- | --- |
| Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate
invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding
([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622),
[queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640),
[reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512))
| Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven
ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. |
| Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue,
transient HTTP retry classification
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143))
| All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated
mutation evidence above. |
| Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite
checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the
preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. |
| iOS interrupted key export
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252))
| Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented.
Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains
pending. |
| Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556))
| Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. |
| Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab
configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported
community mappings. |
| Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the
reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app
recovery/reset and remains deferred. |
| Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current
base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains
here. |
| Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the
operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied.
Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. |
| Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local
work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed
implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. |
| Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not
demonstrated defects. |

## Remaining draft gates

Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this
revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend
backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery
policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The
empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary
pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human
acceptance and current CI are still required before merge.



Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must
use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add
support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing
an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented
capability.


Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS`
(including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab
controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build
with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise
browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS,
exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record
results before marking review complete.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
2026-10-19 15:46:58 -06:00

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import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_page.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/theme/theme.dart';
import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/community/paired_community_landing.dart';
import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:local_auth/local_auth.dart';
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_crypto.dart';
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart';
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_socket.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/auth/auth.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/ecdh.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/nip44.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/relay/relay.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart';
/// Exercises payload validation, credential import, and cancellation across
/// pairing and credential-validation socket lifetimes.
void main() {
group('PairingNotifier', () {
late ProviderContainer container;
late FakeAuthNotifier fakeAuth;
ProviderContainer createContainer() {
fakeAuth = FakeAuthNotifier();
return ProviderContainer(
overrides: [authProvider.overrideWith(() => fakeAuth)],
);
}
tearDown(() => container.dispose());
test(
'reset closes legacy validation and rejects its late success',
() async {
final socket = _PendingValidationSocket();
final auth = FakeAuthNotifier();
final notifier = PairingNotifier(
validationSocketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required nsec,
required onMessage,
required onConnected,
required onDisconnected,
}) => socket,
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
authProvider.overrideWith(() => auth),
],
);
final input = base64Url.encode(
utf8.encode(
jsonEncode({
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.example',
'nsec': 'pending-key',
}),
),
);
final pending = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(input);
notifier.reset();
expect(socket.disposed, isTrue);
socket.connection.complete();
await pending;
expect(auth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
},
);
test('starts in idle state', () {
container = createContainer();
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(state.errorMessage, isNull);
});
test(
'disconnect during connect does not null-dereference the socket',
() async {
final notifier = PairingNotifier(
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
}) => _DisconnectingSocket(disconnectCallback: onDisconnected),
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier)],
);
const code =
'nostrpair://62287897da61e3fa294b4570575f7db8bea147d6631150f2e4656714c645fb1e'
'?secret=abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1';
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
contains('Lost connection to pairing relay'),
);
},
);
test('payload missing nsec errors before contacting relay', () async {
container = createContainer();
// Valid payload shape but no nsec — provider should refuse without
// attempting any network call.
final code = _encodePairingCode();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('missing nsec'));
expect(fakeAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
});
test('accepts buzz scheme prefix', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = 'buzz://${_encodePairingCode()}';
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('missing nsec'));
expect(fakeAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
});
test('invalid base64 sets format error', () async {
container = createContainer();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('not-valid!!!');
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Invalid pairing code'));
});
test('base64 with valid JSON but missing fields errors', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode({'foo': 'bar'})));
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Missing relayUrl'));
});
test('empty input errors', () async {
container = createContainer();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('');
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
});
test('rejects private IP relay URLs (SSRF)', () async {
container = createContainer();
for (final ip in [
'10.0.0.1',
'172.16.0.1',
'192.168.1.1',
'169.254.169.254',
]) {
final code = _encodePairingCode(relayUrl: 'http://$ip:3000');
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error, reason: 'should reject $ip');
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('private network'));
container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).reset();
}
});
test('rejects non-http/https schemes', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = _encodePairingCode(relayUrl: 'file:///etc/passwd');
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Invalid pairing code'));
});
test('rejects JSON array payload', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode([1, 2, 3])));
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('not a JSON object'));
});
test('reset returns to idle from error state', () async {
container = createContainer();
// Trigger an error.
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('not-valid!!!');
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).reset();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
});
group('identity import protection', () {
const sourceSecret =
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506';
const sessionSecretHex =
'abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789';
late _ControllableSocket socket;
late PairingNotifier notifier;
late FakeAuthNotifier importAuth;
late _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer authorizer;
late Completer<void> validation;
late String pairingCode;
setUp(() {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
pairingCode =
'nostrpair://${source.public}'
'?secret=$sessionSecretHex'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1';
validation = Completer<void>();
importAuth = FakeAuthNotifier();
authorizer = _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer();
notifier = PairingNotifier(
credentialValidator:
({required String relayUrl, required String? nsec}) =>
validation.future,
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required onDisconnected,
}) {
socket = _ControllableSocket(
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
return socket;
},
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
authProvider.overrideWith(() => importAuth),
sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider.overrideWithValue(authorizer),
],
);
container.read(pairingProvider);
notifier = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier);
});
Future<void> beginImport({required bool protected}) async {
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(protected);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
if (protected && authorizer.result != DeviceAuthResult.success) return;
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'payload',
'payload_type': 'credentials',
'payload': jsonEncode({
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.test',
'pubkey': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).public,
'nsec': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).nsec,
}),
},
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.storing);
}
testWidgets('early input is submitted when desktop negotiation arrives', (
tester,
) async {
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await pairing;
await tester.pumpWidget(
UncontrolledProviderScope(
container: container,
child: MaterialApp(
theme: AppTheme.light(),
home: const PairingPage(),
),
),
);
final localCode = container.read(pairingProvider).sasCode;
final code = localCode == '111111' ? '222222' : '111111';
await tester.enterText(
find.byKey(const Key('pairing-code-input')),
code,
);
await tester.pump();
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
isEmpty,
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump();
final submissions = socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit')
.toList();
expect(submissions, hasLength(1));
expect(submissions.single['code'], code);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await tester.pump();
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsNothing);
expect(find.text('Protect your identity'), findsOneWidget);
notifier.reset();
await tester.pumpWidget(const SizedBox.shrink());
});
testWidgets(
'delayed desktop responses retain one attempt and leave code entry',
(tester) async {
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await pairing;
expect(socket.published.single['tags'], hasLength(1));
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.single['confirmation'],
'desktop-code-v1',
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).requiresDesktopCode, isTrue);
final wrong = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111');
final first = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).last;
expect(first['type'], 'code-submit');
expect(first['code'], '111111');
bool? wrongResult;
unawaited(wrong.then((value) => wrongResult = value));
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
expect(wrongResult, isNull);
expect(await notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111'), isFalse);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
hasLength(1),
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'code-rejected',
'request_id': first['request_id'],
'remaining_attempts': 4,
},
);
expect(await wrong, isFalse);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
await tester.pumpWidget(
UncontrolledProviderScope(
container: container,
child: MaterialApp(
theme: AppTheme.light(),
home: const PairingPage(),
),
),
);
await tester.enterText(
find.byKey(const Key('pairing-code-input')),
'222222',
);
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsOneWidget);
expect(
find.text('Couldn’t check the code. Try again.'),
findsNothing,
);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
hasLength(2),
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'payload',
'payload_type': 'credentials',
'payload': jsonEncode({
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.test',
'pubkey': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).public,
'nsec': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).nsec,
}),
},
);
await tester.pump();
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsNothing);
expect(find.text('Protect your identity'), findsOneWidget);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(false);
notifier.confirmSas();
await tester.pump();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.storing);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'sas-confirm'),
isEmpty,
);
notifier.reset();
await tester.pumpWidget(const SizedBox.shrink());
},
);
testWidgets(
'delayed final rejection exits the session and reset cancels pending verification',
(tester) async {
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await pairing;
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
final result = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111');
final request = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).last;
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'code-rejected',
'request_id': request['request_id'],
'remaining_attempts': 0,
},
);
expect(await result, isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
notifier.reset();
final nextPairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await nextPairing;
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
final pending = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('222222');
notifier.reset();
expect(await pending, isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
},
);
test(
'a rejected offer exits code entry instead of silently waiting',
() async {
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
socket.relayMessageCallback([
'OK',
socket.published.single['id'],
false,
'event must have exactly one p tag',
]);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
contains('Scan a new desktop QR code'),
);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
},
);
test('admission rejection never reports a successful transfer', () async {
importAuth.authentication = Completer<void>();
importAuth.entered = Completer<void>();
final finished = Completer<void>();
container.listen(pairingProvider, (_, next) {
if (next.status == PairingStatus.error && !finished.isCompleted) {
finished.complete();
}
});
await beginImport(protected: false);
validation.complete();
await importAuth.entered!.future;
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isEmpty,
);
importAuth.authentication!.completeError(
StateError('Admission refused'),
);
await finished.future;
final completions = socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((message) => message['type'] == 'complete')
.toList();
expect(completions, hasLength(1));
expect(completions.single['success'], isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider), isNull);
});
test('unchecked protection persists on a successful import', () async {
await beginImport(protected: false);
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
importAuth.lastCommunity?.sensitiveActionPolicy,
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.success);
expect(
container.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider),
importAuth.lastCommunity,
);
});
test('checked protection persists on a successful import', () async {
await beginImport(protected: true);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
importAuth.lastCommunity?.sensitiveActionPolicy,
SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled,
);
});
test('unenrolled biometrics prevent a protected import', () async {
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.unavailable;
await beginImport(protected: true);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Enroll Face ID or biometrics'));
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isFalse,
);
});
test('reset during NIP-AB connection retires its continuation', () async {
final pending = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
notifier.reset();
await pending;
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
expect(socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret), isEmpty);
});
test('reset during NIP-AB offer delay prevents a late offer', () async {
final pending = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
notifier.reset();
await pending;
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
expect(socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret), isEmpty);
});
test('stale biometric approval cannot advance a reset import', () async {
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(true);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
notifier.reset();
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isFalse,
);
});
test('reset invalidates pending authentication persistence', () async {
importAuth.authentication = Completer<void>();
await beginImport(protected: false);
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNotNull);
notifier.reset();
importAuth.authentication!.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(
container.read(authProvider).value!.status,
AuthStatus.unauthenticated,
);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
});
test('reset invalidates pending credential validation', () async {
await beginImport(protected: false);
notifier.reset();
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isFalse,
);
});
});
group('desktop identity recovery', () {
const sourceSecret =
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506';
const sessionSecretHex =
'abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789';
late _ControllableSocket socket;
late PairingNotifier notifier;
late String recoveryCode;
late _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer authorizer;
late DateTime now;
setUp(() async {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
recoveryCode =
'nostrpair://${source.public}'
'?secret=$sessionSecretHex'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1&mode=recover';
authorizer = _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer();
now = DateTime.utc(2026, 8, 6);
notifier = PairingNotifier(
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required onDisconnected,
}) {
socket = _ControllableSocket(
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
return socket;
},
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
relayConfigProvider.overrideWith(_RecoveryRelayConfig.new),
sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider.overrideWithValue(authorizer),
identityExportClockProvider.overrideWithValue(() => now),
],
);
container.read(pairingProvider);
notifier = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier);
});
test('recovery authorization honors biometric protection', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled),
),
isTrue,
);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isTrue);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.sendsIdentityToDesktop, isTrue);
expect(
socket.published.first['tags'],
isNot(contains(equals(['confirmation', 'code-entry']))),
);
notifier.confirmSas();
expect(
socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).map((m) => m['type']),
['offer'],
);
expect(state.sasCode, hasLength(6));
});
test('reset invalidates pending preflight authorization', () async {
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
final authorization = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).authorizationInProgress, isTrue);
notifier.reset();
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
expect(await authorization, isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
});
test('concurrent preflight requests start one authentication', () async {
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
final community = _exportCommunity(
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
final first = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community);
final second = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community);
expect(await second, isFalse);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
expect(await first, isTrue);
});
test('unchecked protection allows device passcode fallback', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isFalse);
});
test(
'matching SAS sends nsec and successful completion finishes',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).userConfirmedSas, isTrue);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
final sentMessages = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret);
expect(
sentMessages.any(
(message) =>
message['type'] == 'payload' &&
message['payload_type'] == 'nsec' &&
message['payload'] == _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec,
),
isTrue,
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'complete', 'success': true},
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.success);
},
);
test(
'malformed payload invalidates authorization before another session',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'payload', 'payload_type': 'nsec'},
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
final replacementSocket = socket;
notifier.confirmSas();
replacementSocket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(
replacementSocket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
},
);
test('skipped preflight authorization sends no identity', () async {
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(authorizer.calls, 0);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
});
test(
'failed transfer reauthorization publishes no identity payload',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.cancelled;
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('cancelled'));
final sentMessages = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret);
expect(
sentMessages.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
},
);
test(
'stale authorization cannot advance a replacement pairing session',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
final firstSocket = socket;
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
notifier.confirmSas();
firstSocket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
notifier.reset();
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
final replacementSocket = socket;
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
for (final pairingSocket in [firstSocket, replacementSocket]) {
final sentMessages = pairingSocket.decryptedPublishedMessages(
sourceSecret,
);
expect(
sentMessages.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
}
},
);
test('clock rollback invalidates the export authorization', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.subtract(const Duration(minutes: 1));
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
});
test(
'websocket relay origin remains bound after canonicalization',
() async {
final community = _exportCommunity(
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
).copyWith(relayUrl: 'wss://relay.test');
container
.read(relayConfigProvider.notifier)
.update(baseUrl: community.relayUrl, nsec: community.nsec);
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any(
(message) =>
message['type'] == 'payload' &&
message['payload'] == community.nsec,
),
isTrue,
);
},
);
for (final expired in [false, true]) {
test(
'community switch aborts ${expired ? 'expired' : 'fresh'} export grant',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
if (expired) now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
container
.read(relayConfigProvider.notifier)
.update(
baseUrl: 'https://other-relay.test',
nsec: nostr.Keys(
'2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222',
).nsec,
);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
},
);
}
test('expired biometric-only authorization preserves its mode', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isTrue);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
});
test(
'expired passcode-fallback authorization preserves its mode',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isFalse);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
},
);
test('cancelled authorization prevents pairing from starting', () async {
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.cancelled;
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isFalse,
);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
contains('cancelled'),
);
});
test('desktop storage failure surfaces an error', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'complete', 'success': false},
);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('could not store'));
});
});
});
}
/// Encode a credentials payload the same way the desktop app would.
String _encodePairingCode({
String relayUrl = 'http://test:3000',
String? pubkey,
String? nsec,
}) {
final json = <String, dynamic>{
'relayUrl': relayUrl,
// ignore: use_null_aware_elements
if (pubkey != null) 'pubkey': pubkey,
// ignore: use_null_aware_elements
if (nsec != null) 'nsec': nsec,
};
return base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode(json)));
}
/// A fake [AuthNotifier] that records calls instead of touching secure storage.
class FakeAuthNotifier extends AsyncNotifier<AuthState>
implements AuthNotifier {
Community? lastCommunity;
Completer<void>? authentication;
Completer<void>? entered;
bool signedOut = false;
@override
Future<AuthState> build() async =>
const AuthState(status: AuthStatus.unauthenticated);
@override
Future<void> signOut() async {
signedOut = true;
state = const AsyncData(AuthState(status: AuthStatus.unauthenticated));
}
@override
Future<void> authenticateWithCommunity(
Community community, {
bool Function()? shouldContinue,
bool activate = true,
}) async {
if (shouldContinue != null && !shouldContinue()) return;
lastCommunity = community;
entered?.complete();
await authentication?.future;
if (shouldContinue != null && !shouldContinue()) return;
state = AsyncData(
AuthState(status: AuthStatus.authenticated, community: community),
);
}
}
class _DisconnectingSocket extends PairingSocket {
final void Function(Object? error) disconnectCallback;
_DisconnectingSocket({required this.disconnectCallback})
: super(
wsUrl: 'ws://unused',
ephemeralPrivkey:
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506',
onMessage: (_) {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
@override
Future<void> connect() async {
disconnectCallback(Exception('Connection closed'));
}
}
Community _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy policy) => Community(
id: 'export-community',
name: 'Export',
relayUrl: 'https://relay.test',
nsec: _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec,
sensitiveActionPolicy: policy,
addedAt: DateTime.utc(2026),
);
class _RecoveryRelayConfig extends RelayConfigNotifier {
static final nsec = nostr.Keys(
'1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111',
).nsec;
@override
RelayConfig build() => RelayConfig(baseUrl: 'https://relay.test', nsec: nsec);
}
class _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer implements SensitiveActionAuthorizer {
DeviceAuthResult result = DeviceAuthResult.success;
Completer<DeviceAuthResult>? pending;
int calls = 0;
bool? lastIdentityBiometricOnly;
@override
Future<DeviceAuthResult> authorizeIdentityAction({
required bool biometricOnly,
}) async {
calls++;
lastIdentityBiometricOnly = biometricOnly;
return pending?.future ?? result;
}
@override
Future<DeviceAuthResult> authorizeBiometricProtection() async {
calls++;
return pending?.future ?? result;
}
@override
Future<List<BiometricType>> enrolledBiometrics() async => const [];
}
class _ControllableSocket extends PairingSocket {
final String ephemeralPrivkey;
final void Function(List<dynamic> message) relayMessageCallback;
final List<Map<String, dynamic>> published = [];
bool _connected = false;
int _eventSequence = 0;
_ControllableSocket({
required this.ephemeralPrivkey,
required super.onMessage,
required super.onDisconnected,
}) : relayMessageCallback = onMessage,
super(wsUrl: 'ws://unused', ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey);
@override
bool get isConnected => _connected;
@override
Future<void> connect() async => _connected = true;
@override
void subscribe(String subId, int kind, String pubkeyHex) {}
@override
void publishEvent(Map<String, dynamic> event) => published.add(event);
@override
void dispose() => _connected = false;
List<Map<String, dynamic>> decryptedPublishedMessages(String sourceSecret) {
final key = getConversationKey(
sourceSecret,
nostr.Keys(ephemeralPrivkey).public,
);
return published
.map(
(event) =>
jsonDecode(nip44Decrypt(key, event['content'] as String))
as Map<String, dynamic>,
)
.toList();
}
void sendSourceMessage({
required String sourceSecret,
required String sessionSecretHex,
required Map<String, dynamic> message,
bool includeTranscriptHash = false,
}) {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
final targetPubkey = nostr.Keys(ephemeralPrivkey).public;
final sessionSecret = hexToBytes(sessionSecretHex);
final body = Map<String, dynamic>.from(message);
if (includeTranscriptHash) {
final shared = ecdhSharedSecret(sourceSecret, targetPubkey);
final (_, sasInput) = deriveSas(shared, sessionSecret);
body['transcript_hash'] = bytesToHex(
deriveTranscriptHash(
deriveSessionId(sessionSecret),
hexToBytes(source.public),
hexToBytes(targetPubkey),
sasInput,
sessionSecret,
),
);
}
final key = getConversationKey(sourceSecret, targetPubkey);
final event = nostr.Event.from(
kind: 24134,
content: nip44Encrypt(key, jsonEncode(body)),
tags: [
['p', targetPubkey],
],
secretKey: sourceSecret,
createdAt: 1_700_000_000 + _eventSequence++,
);
relayMessageCallback(['EVENT', 'pair', event.toMap()]);
}
}
class _PendingValidationSocket extends RelaySocket {
_PendingValidationSocket()
: super(
wsUrl: 'wss://relay.example',
nsec: null,
onMessage: (_) {},
onConnected: () {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
final connection = Completer<void>();
bool disposed = false;
@override
Future<void> connect() => connection.future;
@override
void dispose() => disposed = true;
@override
Future<void> disconnect() async => disposed = true;
}