mirror of
https://github.com/block/buzz.git
synced 2026-11-11 20:01:09 +00:00
## Behavior Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery, community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing, links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is retained for later opt-in. `--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz` opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup. The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission, and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features; `BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory. `BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines. Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection. Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET /operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership endpoint. ## Validation - Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse, duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh GitHub CI is pending. - Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed; default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed (mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub CI remains pending. - Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at `fb15d5b82`. - Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly. - Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the default-build suite. - Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and file-size checks). - Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too (hosted-only cases intentionally skip there). - Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping, reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean and restored controls pass. - Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At `24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches, matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account round trip. - Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default: 31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover. - Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch, preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical QR acceptance. - Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain. Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit. - Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls. Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed. - Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass. - Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR / pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in this check. - Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push snapshot. ## Review disposition | Feedback | Disposition | | --- | --- | | Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding ([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622), [queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640), [reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512)) | Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. | | Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue, transient HTTP retry classification ([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143)) | All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated mutation evidence above. | | Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. | | iOS interrupted key export ([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252)) | Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented. Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains pending. | | Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit ([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556)) | Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. | | Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported community mappings. | | Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app recovery/reset and remains deferred. | | Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains here. | | Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied. Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. | | Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. | | Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not demonstrated defects. | ## Remaining draft gates Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human acceptance and current CI are still required before merge. Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented capability. Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` (including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS, exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record results before marking review complete. --------- Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
1460 lines
50 KiB
Dart
1460 lines
50 KiB
Dart
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_page.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/theme/theme.dart';
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import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/community/paired_community_landing.dart';
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import 'dart:async';
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import 'dart:convert';
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import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
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import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
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import 'package:local_auth/local_auth.dart';
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import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
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import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_crypto.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_socket.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/auth/auth.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/ecdh.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/nip44.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/relay/relay.dart';
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import 'package:buzz/shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart';
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/// Exercises payload validation, credential import, and cancellation across
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/// pairing and credential-validation socket lifetimes.
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void main() {
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group('PairingNotifier', () {
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late ProviderContainer container;
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late FakeAuthNotifier fakeAuth;
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ProviderContainer createContainer() {
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fakeAuth = FakeAuthNotifier();
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return ProviderContainer(
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overrides: [authProvider.overrideWith(() => fakeAuth)],
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);
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}
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tearDown(() => container.dispose());
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test(
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'reset closes legacy validation and rejects its late success',
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() async {
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final socket = _PendingValidationSocket();
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final auth = FakeAuthNotifier();
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final notifier = PairingNotifier(
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validationSocketFactory:
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({
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required wsUrl,
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required nsec,
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required onMessage,
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required onConnected,
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required onDisconnected,
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}) => socket,
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);
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container = ProviderContainer(
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overrides: [
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pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
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authProvider.overrideWith(() => auth),
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],
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);
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final input = base64Url.encode(
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utf8.encode(
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jsonEncode({
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'relayUrl': 'https://relay.example',
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'nsec': 'pending-key',
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}),
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),
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);
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final pending = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(input);
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notifier.reset();
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expect(socket.disposed, isTrue);
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socket.connection.complete();
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await pending;
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expect(auth.lastCommunity, isNull);
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expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
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},
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);
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test('starts in idle state', () {
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container = createContainer();
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final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
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expect(state.status, PairingStatus.idle);
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expect(state.errorMessage, isNull);
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});
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test(
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'disconnect during connect does not null-dereference the socket',
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() async {
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final notifier = PairingNotifier(
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socketFactory:
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({
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required wsUrl,
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required ephemeralPrivkey,
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required onMessage,
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required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
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}) => _DisconnectingSocket(disconnectCallback: onDisconnected),
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);
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container = ProviderContainer(
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overrides: [pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier)],
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);
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const code =
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'nostrpair://62287897da61e3fa294b4570575f7db8bea147d6631150f2e4656714c645fb1e'
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'?secret=abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789'
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'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1';
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await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
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expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
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expect(
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container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
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contains('Lost connection to pairing relay'),
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);
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},
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);
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test('payload missing nsec errors before contacting relay', () async {
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container = createContainer();
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// Valid payload shape but no nsec — provider should refuse without
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// attempting any network call.
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final code = _encodePairingCode();
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await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
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final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
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expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
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expect(state.errorMessage, contains('missing nsec'));
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expect(fakeAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
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});
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test('accepts buzz scheme prefix', () async {
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container = createContainer();
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final code = 'buzz://${_encodePairingCode()}';
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await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
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final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
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expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
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expect(state.errorMessage, contains('missing nsec'));
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expect(fakeAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
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});
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test('invalid base64 sets format error', () async {
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container = createContainer();
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await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('not-valid!!!');
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final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
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expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
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expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Invalid pairing code'));
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});
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test('base64 with valid JSON but missing fields errors', () async {
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container = createContainer();
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final code = base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode({'foo': 'bar'})));
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await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
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final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
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expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
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expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Missing relayUrl'));
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});
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test('empty input errors', () async {
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container = createContainer();
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await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('');
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final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
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expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
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});
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test('rejects private IP relay URLs (SSRF)', () async {
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container = createContainer();
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for (final ip in [
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'10.0.0.1',
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'172.16.0.1',
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'192.168.1.1',
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'169.254.169.254',
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]) {
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final code = _encodePairingCode(relayUrl: 'http://$ip:3000');
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await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
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final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
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expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error, reason: 'should reject $ip');
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expect(state.errorMessage, contains('private network'));
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container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).reset();
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}
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});
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test('rejects non-http/https schemes', () async {
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container = createContainer();
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final code = _encodePairingCode(relayUrl: 'file:///etc/passwd');
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await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
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final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
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expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
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expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Invalid pairing code'));
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});
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test('rejects JSON array payload', () async {
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container = createContainer();
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final code = base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode([1, 2, 3])));
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await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
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final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
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expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
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expect(state.errorMessage, contains('not a JSON object'));
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});
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test('reset returns to idle from error state', () async {
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container = createContainer();
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// Trigger an error.
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await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('not-valid!!!');
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expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
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container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).reset();
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expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
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});
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group('identity import protection', () {
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const sourceSecret =
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'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506';
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const sessionSecretHex =
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'abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789';
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late _ControllableSocket socket;
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late PairingNotifier notifier;
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late FakeAuthNotifier importAuth;
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late _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer authorizer;
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late Completer<void> validation;
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late String pairingCode;
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setUp(() {
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final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
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pairingCode =
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'nostrpair://${source.public}'
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'?secret=$sessionSecretHex'
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'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1';
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validation = Completer<void>();
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importAuth = FakeAuthNotifier();
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authorizer = _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer();
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notifier = PairingNotifier(
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credentialValidator:
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({required String relayUrl, required String? nsec}) =>
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validation.future,
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socketFactory:
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({
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required wsUrl,
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required ephemeralPrivkey,
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required onMessage,
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required onDisconnected,
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}) {
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socket = _ControllableSocket(
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ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
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onMessage: onMessage,
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onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
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);
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return socket;
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},
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);
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container = ProviderContainer(
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overrides: [
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pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
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authProvider.overrideWith(() => importAuth),
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sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider.overrideWithValue(authorizer),
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],
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);
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container.read(pairingProvider);
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notifier = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier);
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});
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Future<void> beginImport({required bool protected}) async {
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await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
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notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(protected);
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notifier.confirmSas();
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socket.sendSourceMessage(
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sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
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sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
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message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
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includeTranscriptHash: true,
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);
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await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
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if (protected && authorizer.result != DeviceAuthResult.success) return;
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socket.sendSourceMessage(
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sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
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sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
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message: {
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'type': 'payload',
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'payload_type': 'credentials',
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'payload': jsonEncode({
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'relayUrl': 'https://relay.test',
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'pubkey': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).public,
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'nsec': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).nsec,
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}),
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},
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);
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await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
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expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.storing);
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}
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testWidgets('early input is submitted when desktop negotiation arrives', (
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tester,
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) async {
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final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
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await tester.pump();
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await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
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await pairing;
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await tester.pumpWidget(
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UncontrolledProviderScope(
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container: container,
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child: MaterialApp(
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theme: AppTheme.light(),
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home: const PairingPage(),
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),
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),
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);
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final localCode = container.read(pairingProvider).sasCode;
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final code = localCode == '111111' ? '222222' : '111111';
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await tester.enterText(
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find.byKey(const Key('pairing-code-input')),
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code,
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);
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await tester.pump();
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expect(
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socket
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.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
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.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
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isEmpty,
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);
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socket.sendSourceMessage(
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sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
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sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
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message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
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);
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await tester.pump();
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await tester.pump();
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final submissions = socket
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.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
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.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit')
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.toList();
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expect(submissions, hasLength(1));
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expect(submissions.single['code'], code);
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socket.sendSourceMessage(
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sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
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sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await tester.pump();
|
||
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsNothing);
|
||
expect(find.text('Protect your identity'), findsOneWidget);
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
await tester.pumpWidget(const SizedBox.shrink());
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
testWidgets(
|
||
'delayed desktop responses retain one attempt and leave code entry',
|
||
(tester) async {
|
||
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
|
||
await tester.pump();
|
||
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
|
||
await pairing;
|
||
expect(socket.published.single['tags'], hasLength(1));
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.single['confirmation'],
|
||
'desktop-code-v1',
|
||
);
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
|
||
);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).requiresDesktopCode, isTrue);
|
||
final wrong = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111');
|
||
final first = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).last;
|
||
expect(first['type'], 'code-submit');
|
||
expect(first['code'], '111111');
|
||
bool? wrongResult;
|
||
unawaited(wrong.then((value) => wrongResult = value));
|
||
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
|
||
expect(wrongResult, isNull);
|
||
expect(await notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111'), isFalse);
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
|
||
hasLength(1),
|
||
);
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {
|
||
'type': 'code-rejected',
|
||
'request_id': first['request_id'],
|
||
'remaining_attempts': 4,
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
expect(await wrong, isFalse);
|
||
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
|
||
await tester.pumpWidget(
|
||
UncontrolledProviderScope(
|
||
container: container,
|
||
child: MaterialApp(
|
||
theme: AppTheme.light(),
|
||
home: const PairingPage(),
|
||
),
|
||
),
|
||
);
|
||
await tester.enterText(
|
||
find.byKey(const Key('pairing-code-input')),
|
||
'222222',
|
||
);
|
||
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
|
||
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsOneWidget);
|
||
expect(
|
||
find.text('Couldn’t check the code. Try again.'),
|
||
findsNothing,
|
||
);
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
|
||
hasLength(2),
|
||
);
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {
|
||
'type': 'payload',
|
||
'payload_type': 'credentials',
|
||
'payload': jsonEncode({
|
||
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.test',
|
||
'pubkey': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).public,
|
||
'nsec': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).nsec,
|
||
}),
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
await tester.pump();
|
||
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsNothing);
|
||
expect(find.text('Protect your identity'), findsOneWidget);
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
|
||
PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
|
||
);
|
||
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
|
||
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(false);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
await tester.pump();
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.storing);
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'sas-confirm'),
|
||
isEmpty,
|
||
);
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
await tester.pumpWidget(const SizedBox.shrink());
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
testWidgets(
|
||
'delayed final rejection exits the session and reset cancels pending verification',
|
||
(tester) async {
|
||
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
|
||
await tester.pump();
|
||
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
|
||
await pairing;
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
|
||
);
|
||
final result = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111');
|
||
final request = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).last;
|
||
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {
|
||
'type': 'code-rejected',
|
||
'request_id': request['request_id'],
|
||
'remaining_attempts': 0,
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
expect(await result, isFalse);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
|
||
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
final nextPairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
|
||
await tester.pump();
|
||
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
|
||
await nextPairing;
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
|
||
);
|
||
final pending = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('222222');
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
expect(await pending, isFalse);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
test(
|
||
'a rejected offer exits code entry instead of silently waiting',
|
||
() async {
|
||
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
|
||
socket.relayMessageCallback([
|
||
'OK',
|
||
socket.published.single['id'],
|
||
false,
|
||
'event must have exactly one p tag',
|
||
]);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
|
||
contains('Scan a new desktop QR code'),
|
||
);
|
||
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
test('admission rejection never reports a successful transfer', () async {
|
||
importAuth.authentication = Completer<void>();
|
||
importAuth.entered = Completer<void>();
|
||
final finished = Completer<void>();
|
||
container.listen(pairingProvider, (_, next) {
|
||
if (next.status == PairingStatus.error && !finished.isCompleted) {
|
||
finished.complete();
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
await beginImport(protected: false);
|
||
validation.complete();
|
||
await importAuth.entered!.future;
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.where((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
|
||
isEmpty,
|
||
);
|
||
importAuth.authentication!.completeError(
|
||
StateError('Admission refused'),
|
||
);
|
||
await finished.future;
|
||
final completions = socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.where((message) => message['type'] == 'complete')
|
||
.toList();
|
||
expect(completions, hasLength(1));
|
||
expect(completions.single['success'], isFalse);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider), isNull);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('unchecked protection persists on a successful import', () async {
|
||
await beginImport(protected: false);
|
||
|
||
validation.complete();
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(
|
||
importAuth.lastCommunity?.sensitiveActionPolicy,
|
||
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
|
||
);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.success);
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider),
|
||
importAuth.lastCommunity,
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('checked protection persists on a successful import', () async {
|
||
await beginImport(protected: true);
|
||
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
|
||
validation.complete();
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(
|
||
importAuth.lastCommunity?.sensitiveActionPolicy,
|
||
SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled,
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('unenrolled biometrics prevent a protected import', () async {
|
||
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.unavailable;
|
||
|
||
await beginImport(protected: true);
|
||
|
||
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
|
||
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
|
||
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
|
||
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Enroll Face ID or biometrics'));
|
||
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
|
||
isFalse,
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('reset during NIP-AB connection retires its continuation', () async {
|
||
final pending = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
await pending;
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
|
||
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
|
||
expect(socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret), isEmpty);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('reset during NIP-AB offer delay prevents a late offer', () async {
|
||
final pending = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
await pending;
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
|
||
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
|
||
expect(socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret), isEmpty);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('stale biometric approval cannot advance a reset import', () async {
|
||
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
|
||
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
|
||
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
|
||
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(true);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
|
||
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
|
||
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
|
||
isFalse,
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('reset invalidates pending authentication persistence', () async {
|
||
importAuth.authentication = Completer<void>();
|
||
await beginImport(protected: false);
|
||
|
||
validation.complete();
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNotNull);
|
||
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
importAuth.authentication!.complete();
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(authProvider).value!.status,
|
||
AuthStatus.unauthenticated,
|
||
);
|
||
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('reset invalidates pending credential validation', () async {
|
||
await beginImport(protected: false);
|
||
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
validation.complete();
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
|
||
isFalse,
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
group('desktop identity recovery', () {
|
||
const sourceSecret =
|
||
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506';
|
||
const sessionSecretHex =
|
||
'abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789';
|
||
late _ControllableSocket socket;
|
||
late PairingNotifier notifier;
|
||
late String recoveryCode;
|
||
late _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer authorizer;
|
||
late DateTime now;
|
||
|
||
setUp(() async {
|
||
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
|
||
recoveryCode =
|
||
'nostrpair://${source.public}'
|
||
'?secret=$sessionSecretHex'
|
||
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1&mode=recover';
|
||
authorizer = _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer();
|
||
now = DateTime.utc(2026, 8, 6);
|
||
notifier = PairingNotifier(
|
||
socketFactory:
|
||
({
|
||
required wsUrl,
|
||
required ephemeralPrivkey,
|
||
required onMessage,
|
||
required onDisconnected,
|
||
}) {
|
||
socket = _ControllableSocket(
|
||
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
|
||
onMessage: onMessage,
|
||
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
|
||
);
|
||
return socket;
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
container = ProviderContainer(
|
||
overrides: [
|
||
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
|
||
relayConfigProvider.overrideWith(_RecoveryRelayConfig.new),
|
||
sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider.overrideWithValue(authorizer),
|
||
identityExportClockProvider.overrideWithValue(() => now),
|
||
],
|
||
);
|
||
container.read(pairingProvider);
|
||
notifier = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('recovery authorization honors biometric protection', () async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
|
||
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isTrue);
|
||
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
|
||
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
|
||
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
|
||
expect(state.sendsIdentityToDesktop, isTrue);
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket.published.first['tags'],
|
||
isNot(contains(equals(['confirmation', 'code-entry']))),
|
||
);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).map((m) => m['type']),
|
||
['offer'],
|
||
);
|
||
expect(state.sasCode, hasLength(6));
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('reset invalidates pending preflight authorization', () async {
|
||
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
|
||
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
|
||
|
||
final authorization = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
|
||
);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).authorizationInProgress, isTrue);
|
||
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
|
||
|
||
expect(await authorization, isFalse);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
|
||
isFalse,
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('concurrent preflight requests start one authentication', () async {
|
||
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
|
||
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
|
||
final community = _exportCommunity(
|
||
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
final first = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community);
|
||
final second = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community);
|
||
|
||
expect(await second, isFalse);
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
|
||
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
|
||
expect(await first, isTrue);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('unchecked protection allows device passcode fallback', () async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isFalse);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test(
|
||
'matching SAS sends nsec and successful completion finishes',
|
||
() async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).userConfirmedSas, isTrue);
|
||
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
|
||
PairingStatus.transferring,
|
||
);
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
|
||
final sentMessages = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret);
|
||
expect(
|
||
sentMessages.any(
|
||
(message) =>
|
||
message['type'] == 'payload' &&
|
||
message['payload_type'] == 'nsec' &&
|
||
message['payload'] == _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec,
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'complete', 'success': true},
|
||
);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.success);
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
test(
|
||
'malformed payload invalidates authorization before another session',
|
||
() async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'payload', 'payload_type': 'nsec'},
|
||
);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
|
||
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
final replacementSocket = socket;
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
replacementSocket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
|
||
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
|
||
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
|
||
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
|
||
expect(
|
||
replacementSocket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
|
||
isFalse,
|
||
);
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
test('skipped preflight authorization sends no identity', () async {
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 0);
|
||
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
|
||
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
|
||
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
|
||
isFalse,
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test(
|
||
'failed transfer reauthorization publishes no identity payload',
|
||
() async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
|
||
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.cancelled;
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
|
||
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
|
||
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
|
||
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
|
||
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('cancelled'));
|
||
final sentMessages = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret);
|
||
expect(
|
||
sentMessages.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
|
||
isFalse,
|
||
);
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
test(
|
||
'stale authorization cannot advance a replacement pairing session',
|
||
() async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
|
||
final firstSocket = socket;
|
||
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
|
||
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
firstSocket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
|
||
|
||
notifier.reset();
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
final replacementSocket = socket;
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
|
||
PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
|
||
);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
|
||
|
||
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
|
||
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
|
||
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
|
||
for (final pairingSocket in [firstSocket, replacementSocket]) {
|
||
final sentMessages = pairingSocket.decryptedPublishedMessages(
|
||
sourceSecret,
|
||
);
|
||
expect(
|
||
sentMessages.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
|
||
isFalse,
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
test('clock rollback invalidates the export authorization', () async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
now = now.subtract(const Duration(minutes: 1));
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
|
||
PairingStatus.transferring,
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test(
|
||
'websocket relay origin remains bound after canonicalization',
|
||
() async {
|
||
final community = _exportCommunity(
|
||
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
|
||
).copyWith(relayUrl: 'wss://relay.test');
|
||
container
|
||
.read(relayConfigProvider.notifier)
|
||
.update(baseUrl: community.relayUrl, nsec: community.nsec);
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
|
||
PairingStatus.transferring,
|
||
);
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.any(
|
||
(message) =>
|
||
message['type'] == 'payload' &&
|
||
message['payload'] == community.nsec,
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
for (final expired in [false, true]) {
|
||
test(
|
||
'community switch aborts ${expired ? 'expired' : 'fresh'} export grant',
|
||
() async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(
|
||
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
|
||
),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
if (expired) now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
|
||
container
|
||
.read(relayConfigProvider.notifier)
|
||
.update(
|
||
baseUrl: 'https://other-relay.test',
|
||
nsec: nostr.Keys(
|
||
'2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222',
|
||
).nsec,
|
||
);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
|
||
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
|
||
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
|
||
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
|
||
expect(
|
||
socket
|
||
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
|
||
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
|
||
isFalse,
|
||
);
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
test('expired biometric-only authorization preserves its mode', () async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
|
||
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isTrue);
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
|
||
PairingStatus.transferring,
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test(
|
||
'expired passcode-fallback authorization preserves its mode',
|
||
() async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
|
||
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isFalse);
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
|
||
PairingStatus.transferring,
|
||
);
|
||
},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
test('cancelled authorization prevents pairing from starting', () async {
|
||
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.cancelled;
|
||
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
|
||
),
|
||
isFalse,
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
|
||
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
|
||
expect(
|
||
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
|
||
contains('cancelled'),
|
||
);
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
test('desktop storage failure surfaces an error', () async {
|
||
expect(
|
||
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
|
||
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
|
||
),
|
||
isTrue,
|
||
);
|
||
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
|
||
notifier.confirmSas();
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
|
||
includeTranscriptHash: true,
|
||
);
|
||
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
|
||
socket.sendSourceMessage(
|
||
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
|
||
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
|
||
message: {'type': 'complete', 'success': false},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
|
||
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
|
||
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('could not store'));
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
});
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Encode a credentials payload the same way the desktop app would.
|
||
String _encodePairingCode({
|
||
String relayUrl = 'http://test:3000',
|
||
String? pubkey,
|
||
String? nsec,
|
||
}) {
|
||
final json = <String, dynamic>{
|
||
'relayUrl': relayUrl,
|
||
// ignore: use_null_aware_elements
|
||
if (pubkey != null) 'pubkey': pubkey,
|
||
// ignore: use_null_aware_elements
|
||
if (nsec != null) 'nsec': nsec,
|
||
};
|
||
return base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode(json)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// A fake [AuthNotifier] that records calls instead of touching secure storage.
|
||
class FakeAuthNotifier extends AsyncNotifier<AuthState>
|
||
implements AuthNotifier {
|
||
Community? lastCommunity;
|
||
Completer<void>? authentication;
|
||
Completer<void>? entered;
|
||
bool signedOut = false;
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
Future<AuthState> build() async =>
|
||
const AuthState(status: AuthStatus.unauthenticated);
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
Future<void> signOut() async {
|
||
signedOut = true;
|
||
state = const AsyncData(AuthState(status: AuthStatus.unauthenticated));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
Future<void> authenticateWithCommunity(
|
||
Community community, {
|
||
bool Function()? shouldContinue,
|
||
bool activate = true,
|
||
}) async {
|
||
if (shouldContinue != null && !shouldContinue()) return;
|
||
lastCommunity = community;
|
||
entered?.complete();
|
||
await authentication?.future;
|
||
if (shouldContinue != null && !shouldContinue()) return;
|
||
state = AsyncData(
|
||
AuthState(status: AuthStatus.authenticated, community: community),
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
class _DisconnectingSocket extends PairingSocket {
|
||
final void Function(Object? error) disconnectCallback;
|
||
|
||
_DisconnectingSocket({required this.disconnectCallback})
|
||
: super(
|
||
wsUrl: 'ws://unused',
|
||
ephemeralPrivkey:
|
||
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506',
|
||
onMessage: (_) {},
|
||
onDisconnected: (_) {},
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
Future<void> connect() async {
|
||
disconnectCallback(Exception('Connection closed'));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
Community _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy policy) => Community(
|
||
id: 'export-community',
|
||
name: 'Export',
|
||
relayUrl: 'https://relay.test',
|
||
nsec: _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec,
|
||
sensitiveActionPolicy: policy,
|
||
addedAt: DateTime.utc(2026),
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
class _RecoveryRelayConfig extends RelayConfigNotifier {
|
||
static final nsec = nostr.Keys(
|
||
'1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111',
|
||
).nsec;
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
RelayConfig build() => RelayConfig(baseUrl: 'https://relay.test', nsec: nsec);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
class _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer implements SensitiveActionAuthorizer {
|
||
DeviceAuthResult result = DeviceAuthResult.success;
|
||
Completer<DeviceAuthResult>? pending;
|
||
int calls = 0;
|
||
bool? lastIdentityBiometricOnly;
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
Future<DeviceAuthResult> authorizeIdentityAction({
|
||
required bool biometricOnly,
|
||
}) async {
|
||
calls++;
|
||
lastIdentityBiometricOnly = biometricOnly;
|
||
return pending?.future ?? result;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
Future<DeviceAuthResult> authorizeBiometricProtection() async {
|
||
calls++;
|
||
return pending?.future ?? result;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
Future<List<BiometricType>> enrolledBiometrics() async => const [];
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
class _ControllableSocket extends PairingSocket {
|
||
final String ephemeralPrivkey;
|
||
final void Function(List<dynamic> message) relayMessageCallback;
|
||
final List<Map<String, dynamic>> published = [];
|
||
bool _connected = false;
|
||
int _eventSequence = 0;
|
||
|
||
_ControllableSocket({
|
||
required this.ephemeralPrivkey,
|
||
required super.onMessage,
|
||
required super.onDisconnected,
|
||
}) : relayMessageCallback = onMessage,
|
||
super(wsUrl: 'ws://unused', ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey);
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
bool get isConnected => _connected;
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
Future<void> connect() async => _connected = true;
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
void subscribe(String subId, int kind, String pubkeyHex) {}
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
void publishEvent(Map<String, dynamic> event) => published.add(event);
|
||
|
||
@override
|
||
void dispose() => _connected = false;
|
||
|
||
List<Map<String, dynamic>> decryptedPublishedMessages(String sourceSecret) {
|
||
final key = getConversationKey(
|
||
sourceSecret,
|
||
nostr.Keys(ephemeralPrivkey).public,
|
||
);
|
||
return published
|
||
.map(
|
||
(event) =>
|
||
jsonDecode(nip44Decrypt(key, event['content'] as String))
|
||
as Map<String, dynamic>,
|
||
)
|
||
.toList();
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
void sendSourceMessage({
|
||
required String sourceSecret,
|
||
required String sessionSecretHex,
|
||
required Map<String, dynamic> message,
|
||
bool includeTranscriptHash = false,
|
||
}) {
|
||
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
|
||
final targetPubkey = nostr.Keys(ephemeralPrivkey).public;
|
||
final sessionSecret = hexToBytes(sessionSecretHex);
|
||
final body = Map<String, dynamic>.from(message);
|
||
if (includeTranscriptHash) {
|
||
final shared = ecdhSharedSecret(sourceSecret, targetPubkey);
|
||
final (_, sasInput) = deriveSas(shared, sessionSecret);
|
||
body['transcript_hash'] = bytesToHex(
|
||
deriveTranscriptHash(
|
||
deriveSessionId(sessionSecret),
|
||
hexToBytes(source.public),
|
||
hexToBytes(targetPubkey),
|
||
sasInput,
|
||
sessionSecret,
|
||
),
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
final key = getConversationKey(sourceSecret, targetPubkey);
|
||
final event = nostr.Event.from(
|
||
kind: 24134,
|
||
content: nip44Encrypt(key, jsonEncode(body)),
|
||
tags: [
|
||
['p', targetPubkey],
|
||
],
|
||
secretKey: sourceSecret,
|
||
createdAt: 1_700_000_000 + _eventSequence++,
|
||
);
|
||
relayMessageCallback(['EVENT', 'pair', event.toMap()]);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
class _PendingValidationSocket extends RelaySocket {
|
||
_PendingValidationSocket()
|
||
: super(
|
||
wsUrl: 'wss://relay.example',
|
||
nsec: null,
|
||
onMessage: (_) {},
|
||
onConnected: () {},
|
||
onDisconnected: (_) {},
|
||
);
|
||
final connection = Completer<void>();
|
||
bool disposed = false;
|
||
@override
|
||
Future<void> connect() => connection.future;
|
||
@override
|
||
void dispose() => disposed = true;
|
||
@override
|
||
Future<void> disconnect() async => disposed = true;
|
||
}
|