Files
buzz/crates/buzz-admin/src/main.rs
Kalvin C 8a2c9af2db feat(deletion): add durable whole-community deletion (#4425)
## Summary

Adds a durable, operator-controlled V1 for deleting an entire Buzz
community without deleting another tenant's data.

The workflow is exposed through `buzz-admin deletions`:

- `sweep` records independent fleet storage-taxonomy observations
- `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, and `approve` manage a deletion request
- `unblock` resumes a fail-closed request after an operator records
remediation identity and reason
- `run` and `drain` execute bounded work

Requests advance through a PostgreSQL-backed state machine and stop at
`retention_pending` after logical deletion has been independently
verified across PostgreSQL, object storage, and Redis.

This PR ships the engine and CLI, not a continuously running worker or
Kubernetes packaging. For V1, a cluster/VM administrator invokes
`/usr/local/bin/buzz-admin` from the existing relay image, for example
with `kubectl exec` or an equivalent container/VM exec path.

## What whole-community V1 removes

For the target community, V1 removes:

- rows from the allowlisted community-scoped PostgreSQL catalog,
including members, profiles, authored events and bodies, DMs, reactions,
mentions, memberships, tokens, workflows, moderation, audit, feedback,
and rate-limit state
- media sidecars and upload-attribution records under
`_meta/<community>/` and `_uploads/<community>/`
- Git repository pointers under `repos/<community>/`
- Redis keys under `buzz:<community>:*`

The community row survives as a permanent tombstone, and deletion
control-plane records remain as evidence of the request, approval,
execution, and result.

## Safety model

Deletion is not a broad `DELETE CASCADE` followed by optimistic cleanup.
The destructive boundaries are durable and fail closed.

### 1. Inventory and approval

- `submit` resolves the target and freezes the schema plus summary-only
storage inventory.
- Approval is bound to the exact request, community, and frozen
inventory digest.
- Unsupported manifest versions, malformed keys inside the target's
owned prefixes, live scoped-table/write-fence coverage drift,
frozen-inventory mismatch, and approval mismatch block execution rather
than guessing. Migration and catalog revision numbers are not
authorization gates; the executor validates the live safety shape
instead.
- Storage inventory is server-side prefix scoped to exactly:
  - `_meta/<community>/`
  - `_uploads/<community>/`
  - `repos/<community>/`
- The deletion path never lists the whole shared bucket and has no
arbitrary per-community object cap. Its listing work is proportional to
the target community's bindings, not total fleet storage.
- Fleet-wide taxonomy sweeps remain independent observability. They
report unknown writer shapes but do not gate deletion submission,
fencing, or destructive progress. Maintainers must add deletion taxonomy
coverage whenever a new community-owned object-key class is introduced;
writer-coverage tests bind the current media and Git writers to that
contract.

### 2. Quiesce, fence, and destructive freeze

- Writes continue through submission, inventory, and approval. They stop
when execution moves the target into `quiescing` and then establishes
the durable fence.
- Already-admitted external effects finish under heartbeated
serving-write leases; the exact admitted lease may renew while the
community is quiescing, but new lease acquisition is rejected. The
executor drains admitted leases before destructive work.
- Invite minting after quiescing begins fails as typed `AccessDenied`
(HTTP 503 at the relay boundary) before an invite can be persisted.
- Database triggers enforce the community write fence across the
complete catalog of community-scoped tables. Startup/readiness and
destructive execution validate that catalog so a newly added but
unfenced table cannot silently escape.
- **Named isolation assumption — fresh write snapshot.** Every writer
transaction that can reach a community-fenced relation must use
PostgreSQL `READ COMMITTED`; each guarded write therefore observes a
statement snapshot no older than acquisition of the community deletion
lock. `REPEATABLE READ` and `SERIALIZABLE` can retain a pre-fence
snapshot and are unsupported for writers. The writer pool refuses
non-`READ COMMITTED` sessions at connection setup, and both SQL fence
functions reject an explicit per-transaction isolation override with
SQLSTATE `25000`. Configuration-delivered bad isolation can surface
through SQLx as a pool-acquire timeout because every `after_connect`
attempt is rejected; the precise `community writes require READ
COMMITTED isolation` reason remains observable when the SQL guard is
reached. Read-only replica transactions are outside this assumption.
- Holding the shared advisory lock until the guarded write executes is a
separate liveness condition: under `READ COMMITTED`, releasing it early
does not permit resurrection because the trigger rechecks the fence, but
it can turn a fleet sweep into a statement-wide SQLSTATE `55000` abort.
- After the fence closes writers, storage is re-enumerated into chunked
side-table rows. Per-prefix counts and digests bind those concrete keys
to the destructive manifest.
- Manifest chunk insertion, update, and deletion are protected after
freeze. This closes the race where an unbound key could otherwise appear
after the manifest was committed.

### 3. Checkpointed destruction

- Target-owned object bindings are deleted from the frozen destructive
manifest in bounded batches with durable progress.
- The concrete key list lives in chunked side-table rows rather than one
request-row JSON value. It supports large communities, resumable
execution, and terminal cleanup.
- Missing objects are accepted as idempotent crash-window outcomes;
malformed ownership, changed evidence, and unexplained target-prefix
drift fail closed.
- PostgreSQL purging remains scoped by `community_id`, including the
guarded NIP-RS hard-delete path discovered with real Desktop kind
`30078` read-state data.
- Redis cleanup explicitly scans and `UNLINK`s only
`buzz:<community_id>:*`. Natural expiry is insufficient because some
keys, including tunnel generation counters used as fencing state, are
deliberately persistent.

### 4. Independent verification

- PostgreSQL logical absence is checked after purge.
- The three target-owned storage prefixes are freshly inventoried again
and must be empty.
- Redis requires two complete empty namespace scans.
- Only after all three stores pass does the request advance through
`logically_verified` to `retention_pending`.

## What V1 deliberately does not erase

### Shared content-addressed storage

Per-community deletion removes bindings, metadata, attribution records,
and Git pointers. It does **not** physically delete fleet-shared CAS
bytes that another community may still reference:

- media blobs and thumbnails
- Git manifests, packs, and indexes (`manifests/`, `packs/`, and `idx/`)

Safe reclamation requires a separate fleet-wide reachability and
retention GC. Unknown keys elsewhere in the shared bucket do not block
one community's deletion; malformed or unrecognized keys inside that
community's three owned prefixes still fail closed.

### External retained copies

The online logical-deletion proof does not erase object
versions/replicas, database backups/WAL, CDN copies, provider retention
copies, or observability exports. Those require their own retention and
purge controls.

### Member-only erasure

This PR erases a whole community. It does not implement the different
operation "erase one npub while preserving the community."

Removing membership or accepting NIP-09 is not member erasure. A
member-only workflow would need to find and selectively remove or redact
authored event content and pubkeys, profile data, DMs, reactions,
mentions, memberships/roles, tokens, workflows/subscriptions, upload
attribution, moderation/audit history, repository attribution, and
identity embedded in tags or JSON. It would also need explicit rules for
ownership transfer, surviving replies and thread metadata, audit-chain
integrity, immutable Git history, and shared-CAS reachability. That
requires a pubkey-level fence and selective graph rewrite; it is a
separate deletion product, not a safe extension of this whole-tenant
worker.

## In scope

- migration `0029_community_deletion.sql`: requests, approvals, leases,
manifest chunks, checkpoints, tombstones, and the universal write-fence
catalog
- durable executor leases, generations, heartbeats, retry/block state,
and resumable stage transitions
- operator-driven `sweep`, `submit`, `list`, `inspect`, `approve`,
`unblock`, `run`, and `drain` commands
- serving-path fences for database writes and external effects across
event ingest, media, Git, workflow, push, invites, mesh/tunnel, and
related paths
- target-prefix-only storage inventory, summary manifests, post-fence
destructive chunks, and bounded batch deletion
- exact community Redis namespace purge and two-pass absence
verification
- cross-community isolation, crash/resume, manifest-integrity,
writer-taxonomy, and schema/migration regressions
- desired-state `schema/schema.sql` support without requiring a SQLx
migration ledger

## Deferred / not covered

- dedicated Helm/chart worker Deployment, service account, secrets,
probes, resources, and network policy
- autonomous `buzz-admin deletions worker` poll loop and worker-only
health server
- least-privilege separation among migration, relay-serving, and
destructive execution roles
- fleet-wide shared-CAS physical GC
- backup/provider/CDN/observability retention completion
- member-only erasure
- provider-native conditional-delete improvements
- a general force-continue escape hatch; permanent safety failures
remain fail closed unless an operator remediates the cause and records
an audited `unblock`

The removed continuous-worker implementation remains deferred; no remote
follow-up branch is claimed by this PR.

## Validation

### Current PR head and repository state

Current pushed head: `359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`, rebased
onto `cc9a2f783375e51a6e8d1f2f9d01d5f7e22813d1` (`origin/main` at push
time). The complete PR diff is now 47 files, 9,834 additions, and 517
deletions.

The bespoke source-scanner stack was removed to keep this PR scoped to
community deletion. Tyler/team requested the underlying fenced-write
safety behavior, not `ast-grep`,
`crates/buzz-db/tests/community_fenced_writes.rs`, its 27 fixtures, or
the new `scripts/lints/community_*.yml` rules. Those scanner-specific
files, dependencies, Hermit links, and runner wiring are absent from the
current tree. The production database write fence, startup/destructive
live-catalog validation, and deletion behavior remain.

Source validation on this exact SHA passed:

- `cargo fmt --all -- --check`
- `bash -n scripts/run-tests.sh`
- `cargo nextest run -p buzz-db --all-targets`: 102 passed, 173 skipped,
0 failed
- `cargo nextest run -p buzz-deletion --all-targets`: 10 passed, 9
skipped, 0 failed
- `cargo nextest run -p buzz-admin --all-targets`: 1 passed, 0 failed
- affected-package/all-target Clippy with warnings denied
- lockfile consistency
- Helm 3.16.4 lint and all 44 chart unit tests
- Helm region controls using that fixture: default
`BUZZ_S3_REGION=us-east-1`, explicit `eu-west-2` override, and
blank-region schema rejection

The prior Kubernetes battery below was run against
`928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04`. It remains useful evidence
for the patch-equivalent production deletion implementation, but it is
**not** claimed as exact-SHA evidence for current head
`359d8402ee15f049768f54156f67b953c7a7e2ed`; the current cleanup removes
only scanner/test/tooling infrastructure. CI restarted for the new head
after the rebase and is pending. Human review remains
`CHANGES_REQUESTED`.

### Prior-head live Kubernetes deletion and safety gates

The full program used one immutable image, real PostgreSQL, Redis,
MinIO, and a three-relay Kubernetes release:

- source: `928992237358a3294621ac0280830b77155abc04` (**prior head**)
- image: `buzz-e2e:sha-928992237358`
- immutable image digest:
`sha256:a1a204f4618ac22d9e210be5e5290645a15d79831ae30b0e44379357c8e4a895`
- evidence root:
`/tmp/buzz-e2e/20260807T033025Z-928992237358-full-gates/`
- evidence-manifest digest:
`82875c5bc9bea7370b796a7aef3457b3a1c8306c84c59e0f7388bbb5ad30e865`

Passed gates at that prior head:

- **Chart/operator region:** default `us-east-1`, explicit nondefault
propagation, blank-region schema rejection, live in-pod environment, and
an in-pod taxonomy sweep over 18 objects with zero unknown.
- **Fenced writers and lifecycle:** open-write/fence ordering;
100-attempt anti-starvation; invite, push matcher, and exhausted-reaper
bystander isolation; non-`READ-COMMITTED` rejection; manifest/tombstone
contracts; eight-failure stage block and audited `unblock`.
- **Destructive lifecycle:** submit → approve → run →
`retention_pending`; PostgreSQL tombstone and Redis/S3 verification
true; zero retries/errors; terminal reruns rejected with exit 5.
- **Fresh 10,001-object crash boundary:** exactly two chunks (10,000 +
1). The executor deleted chunk 0 from MinIO while its PostgreSQL stamp
was row-lock-blocked, was killed with `SIGKILL`, left one object and
both stamps absent, then resumed the same request under generation 2 to
zero objects and terminal state.
- **Independent dead-owner recovery:** a dedicated executor claimed
generation 1, blocked before effects, and was killed through containerd
with `SIGKILL` (no TERM cleanup). The request remained owned and
unreclaimable before lease expiry; a successor claimed generation 2
after 60 seconds and completed with two attempts and zero retries.
- **Three-pod socket isolation:** ordinary NIP-42 and joined
huddle-audio target witnesses on every replica received exact `1008 /
community deleted`; healthy-tenant witnesses on those pods remained
live; deleted-host reconnect returned HTTP 404.
- **Health/provenance:** all replicas independently returned ready and
retained the exact image digest before/after destructive runs and an
audio-enabled rolling restart; PostgreSQL, Redis, and MinIO were healthy
at close.

Instrument corrections were retained as evidence rather than counted as
product failures: a foreground PostgreSQL forward caused an initial
`PoolTimedOut`; Kubernetes pod deletion exercised graceful TERM rather
than dead-owner recovery; shell-background socket witnesses died with
their parent; and the first image build hit the corporate TLS proxy.
Detached forwarding/witnesses, containerd `SIGKILL`, and the configured
internal CA/Artifactory mirror produced the discriminating runs without
weakening product security.

### Prior-head cleanup

For the prior-head Kubernetes run, the Helm release was removed,
namespace absence was verified, run-owned Screen sessions were absent,
and that source worktree remained clean. The evidence manifest was
independently recomputed and every indexed artifact passed `shasum -a
256 -c`. The current `359d8402` source worktree is also clean after the
scanner-only cleanup and push.

---------

Signed-off-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Kalvin Chau <kalvin@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: am <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub122y0pqkertljmedu303rl0aqrj3w8pvu43t6jxm6875lzg6f2pwqegc3xc <5288f082d91aff2de5bc8be23fbfa01ca2e3859cac57a91b7a3fa9f12349505c@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub1dccv64krpcpse5cmkzfeh998cftungyatw3djt8jwdw6g43f7fyqzzmrf7 <6e30cd56c30e030cd31bb0939b94a7c257c9a09d5ba2d92cf2735da45629f248@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: cid <d9f92a72922bf45c17379a47d64dae84b6020397c2d5a52b5317d512068cd9d3@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-12 09:25:58 -07:00

593 lines
21 KiB
Rust

#![deny(unsafe_code)]
//! Buzz instance administration CLI.
//!
//! # Member management (NIP-43)
//!
//! ## Why only kind:13534 (membership list), not kind:8000/8001 (deltas)
//!
//! CLI intentionally does not emit kind 8000/8001 deltas —
//! `publish_nip43_delta` is in-process-only (no Redis hop), so a sidecar call
//! stores but never pushes. The 13534 list snapshot is the authoritative roster
//! and rides Redis to live clients. Do not wire a delta call that passes
//! in-process tests and silently no-ops in the deployed `compose exec` path.
//!
//! ## Same-second domination guard
//!
//! The `custom_created_at = max(now, newest_existing_13534 + 1s)` bump defeats
//! same-second domination for serial invocations; it does NOT serialize
//! concurrent CLI processes — two near-simultaneous adds can read the same
//! newest timestamp and collide on the bumped second. run.sh serialization is
//! the guard against parallel adds (e.g. `xargs -P`).
mod deletions;
use std::sync::Arc;
use anyhow::Result;
use buzz_core::kind::KIND_NIP43_MEMBERSHIP_LIST;
use buzz_core::tenant::{relay_url_authority, TenantContext};
use buzz_db::{Db, DbConfig};
use buzz_pubsub::{EventTopic, PubSubManager};
use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
use nostr::{EventBuilder, Keys, Kind, Tag};
use tracing::warn;
#[derive(Parser)]
#[command(name = "buzz-admin", about = "Buzz instance administration")]
struct Cli {
#[command(subcommand)]
command: Command,
}
#[derive(Subcommand)]
enum Command {
/// Add a pubkey to the relay membership list.
///
/// Accepts a bech32 npub or 64-char hex pubkey. After inserting the DB row,
/// publishes a kind:13534 membership roster via Redis so live clients see
/// the updated list immediately.
AddMember {
/// Nostr public key — bech32 npub or 64-char hex.
#[arg(long)]
pubkey: String,
/// Role: "admin" or "member" (default: member). Cannot be "owner" —
/// use RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY config to set the relay owner.
#[arg(long, default_value = "member")]
role: String,
},
/// Remove a pubkey from the relay membership list.
///
/// Accepts a bech32 npub or 64-char hex pubkey. After removing the DB row,
/// publishes a kind:13534 membership roster via Redis. Cannot remove the
/// relay owner — change RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY config instead.
RemoveMember {
/// Nostr public key — bech32 npub or 64-char hex.
#[arg(long)]
pubkey: String,
/// Only remove if the member's current role matches this value.
/// Omit to remove regardless of role.
#[arg(long)]
role: Option<String>,
},
/// List all relay members.
ListMembers,
/// Generate a new Nostr keypair (for bootstrapping).
GenerateKey,
/// Run pending database migrations.
Migrate,
/// Inspect deployment-wide Buzz product feedback.
ProductFeedback {
#[command(subcommand)]
command: ProductFeedbackCommand,
},
/// Durable CLI-only whole-community deletion control plane.
Deletions {
#[command(subcommand)]
command: deletions::DeletionsCommand,
},
/// Emit kind:39000/39002 events for channels missing them.
///
/// Channels created via direct SQL (seed scripts, pre-migration data) won't
/// have Nostr discovery events. This command creates them so pure-nostr
/// clients can see those channels. Idempotent — safe to run multiple times.
ReconcileChannels {
/// Relay private key (hex) for signing events. Falls back to
/// BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY env var. If neither is set, generates
/// an ephemeral key (events will be unverifiable after restart).
#[arg(long)]
relay_key: Option<String>,
},
}
#[derive(Subcommand)]
enum ProductFeedbackCommand {
/// List feedback across every community as JSON.
List {
/// Maximum records to return.
#[arg(long, default_value_t = 100, value_parser = clap::value_parser!(u16).range(1..=1000))]
limit: u16,
},
}
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
// Install the ring CryptoProvider for rustls. The workspace redis TLS
// feature compiles both aws-lc-rs and ring in transitively, so rustls can't
// auto-select a provider and would panic on the first rediss:// (ElastiCache)
// Redis TLS connection without this. Mirrors buzz-relay's main().
rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider()
.install_default()
.expect("failed to install rustls crypto provider");
let cli = Cli::parse();
let code = match run(cli).await {
Ok(code) => code,
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("error: {e}");
5
}
};
std::process::exit(code);
}
async fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<i32> {
match cli.command {
Command::GenerateKey => {
let keys = Keys::generate();
println!("Public key: {}", keys.public_key().to_hex());
println!("Secret key: {}", keys.secret_key().display_secret());
println!("\nSet BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY to the secret key to use this identity.");
Ok(0)
}
Command::Migrate => {
let db = connect_db().await?;
db.migrate().await?;
println!("Database migrations complete.");
Ok(0)
}
Command::AddMember { pubkey, role } => cmd_add_member(pubkey, role).await,
Command::RemoveMember { pubkey, role } => cmd_remove_member(pubkey, role).await,
Command::ListMembers => cmd_list_members().await,
Command::ProductFeedback {
command: ProductFeedbackCommand::List { limit },
} => cmd_list_product_feedback(limit).await,
Command::Deletions { command } => deletions::run(command).await,
Command::ReconcileChannels { relay_key } => {
reconcile_channels(relay_key).await?;
Ok(0)
}
}
}
async fn cmd_add_member(pubkey_arg: String, role: String) -> Result<i32> {
if let Err(msg) = validate_role(&role) {
eprintln!("error: {msg}");
return Ok(1);
}
let pubkey_hex = match parse_pubkey_hex(&pubkey_arg) {
Ok(h) => h,
Err(msg) => {
eprintln!("error: {msg}");
return Ok(1);
}
};
let (db, pubsub, relay_keypair) = connect_member_services().await?;
let tenant = resolve_admin_tenant(&db).await?;
match db
.add_relay_member(tenant.community(), &pubkey_hex, &role, None)
.await
{
Ok(true) => println!("added {pubkey_hex} as {role}"),
Ok(false) => println!("already a member: {pubkey_hex} (no change)"),
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("error: DB write failed: {e}");
return Ok(5);
}
}
if let Err(e) = publish_membership_list_with_bump(&db, &pubsub, &relay_keypair, &tenant).await {
eprintln!("warning: member added to DB but list publish failed: {e}");
}
Ok(0)
}
async fn cmd_remove_member(pubkey_arg: String, role_filter: Option<String>) -> Result<i32> {
if let Some(ref role) = role_filter {
if let Err(msg) = validate_role(role) {
eprintln!("error: {msg}");
return Ok(1);
}
}
let pubkey_hex = match parse_pubkey_hex(&pubkey_arg) {
Ok(h) => h,
Err(msg) => {
eprintln!("error: {msg}");
return Ok(1);
}
};
let (db, pubsub, relay_keypair) = connect_member_services().await?;
let tenant = resolve_admin_tenant(&db).await?;
use buzz_db::relay_members::RemoveResult;
let result = if let Some(ref role) = role_filter {
db.remove_relay_member_if_role(tenant.community(), &pubkey_hex, role)
.await
} else {
db.remove_relay_member(tenant.community(), &pubkey_hex)
.await
};
match result {
Ok(RemoveResult::Removed) => println!("removed {pubkey_hex}"),
Ok(RemoveResult::NotFound) => {
eprintln!("error: member not found: {pubkey_hex}");
return Ok(2);
}
Ok(RemoveResult::IsOwner) => {
eprintln!(
"error: cannot remove relay owner: {pubkey_hex}\n\
To change the owner, update RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY and restart."
);
return Ok(3);
}
Ok(RemoveResult::RoleMismatch) => {
let role_str = role_filter.as_deref().unwrap_or("(unknown)");
eprintln!("error: role mismatch — {pubkey_hex} is not currently '{role_str}'");
return Ok(4);
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("error: DB write failed: {e}");
return Ok(5);
}
}
if let Err(e) = publish_membership_list_with_bump(&db, &pubsub, &relay_keypair, &tenant).await {
eprintln!("warning: member removed from DB but list publish failed: {e}");
}
Ok(0)
}
async fn cmd_list_product_feedback(limit: u16) -> Result<i32> {
let db = connect_db().await?;
let feedback = db.list_product_feedback(i64::from(limit)).await?;
println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&feedback)?);
Ok(0)
}
async fn cmd_list_members() -> Result<i32> {
let db = connect_db().await?;
let tenant = resolve_admin_tenant(&db).await?;
let members = db.list_relay_members(tenant.community()).await?;
if members.is_empty() {
println!("(no relay members)");
return Ok(0);
}
println!(
"{:<66} {:<8} {:<66} created_at",
"pubkey", "role", "added_by"
);
println!("{}", "-".repeat(160));
for m in &members {
let added_by = m.added_by.as_deref().unwrap_or("-");
println!(
"{:<66} {:<8} {:<66} {}",
m.pubkey,
m.role,
added_by,
m.created_at.format("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
);
}
Ok(0)
}
/// Validate that `role` is `"member"` or `"admin"`. Rejects `"owner"`.
fn validate_role(role: &str) -> std::result::Result<(), String> {
match role {
"member" | "admin" => Ok(()),
"owner" => {
Err("role 'owner' cannot be set via CLI — use RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY config".to_string())
}
other => Err(format!(
"invalid role '{other}': must be 'member' or 'admin'"
)),
}
}
/// Parse a bech32 npub or 64-char hex pubkey into lowercase hex.
fn parse_pubkey_hex(input: &str) -> std::result::Result<String, String> {
nostr::PublicKey::parse(input)
.map(|pk| pk.to_hex())
.map_err(|e| format!("invalid pubkey '{input}': {e}"))
}
/// Publish kind:13534 with `custom_created_at = max(now, newest_existing + 1s)`.
///
/// Guarantees the new event is not dominated by a same-second prior invocation,
/// so `replace_addressable_event` always inserts and dispatches to Redis.
///
/// See module-level doc for the TOCTOU caveat on concurrent CLI processes.
async fn publish_membership_list_with_bump(
db: &Db,
pubsub: &Arc<PubSubManager>,
relay_keypair: &Keys,
tenant: &TenantContext,
) -> Result<()> {
let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap_or_default()
.as_secs();
let relay_pubkey = relay_keypair.public_key();
let relay_pubkey_bytes = relay_pubkey.to_bytes();
// Query the newest existing kind:13534 for this relay's pubkey (channel_id=None).
let newest_ts = db
.get_latest_global_replaceable(
tenant.community(),
KIND_NIP43_MEMBERSHIP_LIST as i32,
&relay_pubkey_bytes,
)
.await?
.map(|e| e.event.created_at.as_secs());
// custom_created_at = max(now, existing + 1s) — defeats same-second domination.
let ts = match newest_ts {
Some(existing) => (existing + 1).max(now),
None => now,
};
let members = db.list_relay_members(tenant.community()).await?;
let mut tags: Vec<Tag> = Vec::with_capacity(members.len() + 1);
// NIP-70 protected-event marker — prevents re-broadcasting by third parties.
tags.push(Tag::parse(["-"]).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to build '-' tag: {e}"))?);
for member in &members {
tags.push(
Tag::parse(["member", &member.pubkey, &member.role])
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to build member tag: {e}"))?,
);
}
let event = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(KIND_NIP43_MEMBERSHIP_LIST as u16), "")
.tags(tags)
.custom_created_at(nostr::Timestamp::from(ts))
.sign_with_keys(relay_keypair)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to sign kind:13534: {e}"))?;
let (stored, was_inserted) = db
.replace_addressable_event(tenant.community(), &event, None)
.await?;
if was_inserted {
// Publish to Redis so live clients receive the updated roster.
// Community-global scope (EventTopic::Global) matches the relay's own
// membership-list publish path; the tenant fixes the community.
if let Err(e) = pubsub
.publish_event(tenant, EventTopic::Global, &stored.event)
.await
{
warn!("Redis publish of kind:13534 failed: {e}");
}
}
tracing::info!(
member_count = members.len(),
ts,
"NIP-43 membership list published by buzz-admin"
);
Ok(())
}
/// Connect to DB, Redis pub/sub, and load the relay keypair.
///
/// `BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY` is required — the CLI signs kind:13534 events.
async fn connect_member_services() -> Result<(Db, Arc<PubSubManager>, Keys)> {
let db = connect_db().await?;
let relay_keypair = {
let hex = std::env::var("BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY").map_err(|_| {
anyhow::anyhow!(
"BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY is required for add-member/remove-member.\n\
The relay must have a stable signing key to publish kind:13534 events."
)
})?;
Keys::parse(&hex).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY: {e}"))?
};
let redis_url =
std::env::var("REDIS_URL").unwrap_or_else(|_| "redis://localhost:6379".to_string());
let redis_pool = {
let cfg = deadpool_redis::Config::from_url(&redis_url);
cfg.create_pool(Some(deadpool_redis::Runtime::Tokio1))
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Redis pool creation failed: {e}"))?
};
let pubsub = Arc::new(
PubSubManager::new(&redis_url, redis_pool)
.await
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("PubSub init failed: {e}"))?,
);
Ok((db, pubsub, relay_keypair))
}
async fn connect_db() -> Result<Db> {
let db_url = std::env::var("DATABASE_URL")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "postgres://buzz:buzz_dev@localhost:5432/buzz".to_string());
let db = Db::new(&DbConfig {
database_url: db_url,
..DbConfig::default()
})
.await?;
Ok(db)
}
/// Resolve the deployment's tenant from the configured `RELAY_URL` host.
///
/// `buzz-admin` runs inside the relay container (`compose exec relay
/// buzz-admin …`), so it shares the relay's `RELAY_URL` and resolves the same
/// single community against the durable `communities` host map. This is
/// deliberately NOT a default tenant: an unmapped host fails closed with an
/// error, mirroring the relay's own `bind_community` row-zero seam. The CLI is
/// single-community per invocation — there is no cross-community sweep.
async fn resolve_admin_tenant(db: &Db) -> Result<TenantContext> {
let relay_url =
std::env::var("RELAY_URL").unwrap_or_else(|_| "ws://localhost:3000".to_string());
// Derive the authority the *same* way startup seeding and live request
// resolution do (`buzz_core::tenant::relay_url_authority`): host plus an
// explicit non-default port, IPv6 brackets preserved. A plain
// `Url::host_str()` drops the port/brackets, so for `ws://localhost:3000`
// the admin would look up `localhost` while startup seeded `localhost:3000`
// — and `wss://relay.example:8443` would resolve `relay.example`. Sharing
// the helper keeps buzz-admin byte-identical to the community startup seeds.
let host = relay_url_authority(&relay_url);
let record = db.lookup_community_by_host(&host).await?.ok_or_else(|| {
anyhow::anyhow!(
"RELAY_URL host '{host}' is not mapped to a community.\n\
buzz-admin operates on the configured relay's community; ensure the \
relay has started and seeded its community (or set RELAY_URL to a \
mapped host)."
)
})?;
Ok(TenantContext::resolved(record.id, record.host))
}
async fn reconcile_channels(relay_key_arg: Option<String>) -> Result<()> {
use buzz_core::kind::KIND_NIP29_GROUP_ADMINS;
use buzz_db::event::EventQuery;
let db = connect_db().await?;
// Resolve relay signing key: arg > env > ephemeral
let relay_keys = match relay_key_arg.or_else(|| std::env::var("BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY").ok()) {
Some(key_hex) => {
Keys::parse(&key_hex).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid relay key: {e}"))?
}
None => {
let k = Keys::generate();
eprintln!(
"Warning: no relay key provided — using ephemeral key {}",
k.public_key().to_hex()
);
eprintln!("Events signed with this key won't be verifiable after this run.");
eprintln!("Pass --relay-key or set BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY for production use.");
k
}
};
let tenant = resolve_admin_tenant(&db).await?;
let channels = db.list_channels(tenant.community(), None).await?;
if channels.is_empty() {
println!("No channels in database.");
return Ok(());
}
let mut reconciled = 0u32;
let mut skipped = 0u32;
for channel in &channels {
let channel_id_str = channel.id.to_string();
// Check if kind:39000 already exists
let existing = db
.query_events(&EventQuery {
kinds: Some(vec![39000]),
d_tag: Some(channel_id_str.clone()),
limit: Some(1),
..EventQuery::for_community(tenant.community())
})
.await
.unwrap_or_default();
if !existing.is_empty() {
skipped += 1;
continue;
}
let members = db.get_members(tenant.community(), channel.id).await?;
// kind:39000 — channel metadata
{
let mut tags: Vec<Tag> = vec![Tag::parse(["d", &channel_id_str])?];
tags.push(Tag::parse(["name", &channel.name])?);
if let Some(ref desc) = channel.description {
if !desc.is_empty() {
tags.push(Tag::parse(["about", desc])?);
}
}
if channel.visibility == "private" {
tags.push(Tag::parse(["private"])?);
} else {
tags.push(Tag::parse(["public"])?);
}
if channel.channel_type == "dm" {
tags.push(Tag::parse(["hidden"])?);
}
tags.push(Tag::parse(["closed"])?);
tags.push(Tag::parse(["t", &channel.channel_type])?);
let event = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(39000), "")
.tags(tags)
.sign_with_keys(&relay_keys)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("sign kind:39000: {e}"))?;
db.replace_addressable_event(tenant.community(), &event, Some(channel.id))
.await?;
}
// kind:39001 — admins
{
let mut tags: Vec<Tag> = vec![Tag::parse(["d", &channel_id_str])?];
for m in members
.iter()
.filter(|m| m.role == "owner" || m.role == "admin")
{
let pk = hex::encode(&m.pubkey);
tags.push(Tag::parse(["p", &pk, &m.role])?);
}
let event = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(KIND_NIP29_GROUP_ADMINS as u16), "")
.tags(tags)
.sign_with_keys(&relay_keys)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("sign kind:39001: {e}"))?;
db.replace_addressable_event(tenant.community(), &event, Some(channel.id))
.await?;
}
// kind:39002 — members
{
let mut tags: Vec<Tag> = vec![Tag::parse(["d", &channel_id_str])?];
for m in &members {
let pk = hex::encode(&m.pubkey);
tags.push(Tag::parse(["p", &pk, "", &m.role])?);
}
let event = EventBuilder::new(Kind::Custom(39002), "")
.tags(tags)
.sign_with_keys(&relay_keys)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("sign kind:39002: {e}"))?;
db.replace_addressable_event(tenant.community(), &event, Some(channel.id))
.await?;
}
reconciled += 1;
}
println!(
"Reconciled {reconciled} channels ({skipped} already had events, {} total).",
channels.len()
);
Ok(())
}