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## Why Agents send an HTTP typing pulse (`POST /events`, kind 20002) every 3–5 seconds while they work. #8207 already routes the pulse's write-restriction and serving checks through #8208's short-TTL caches. Two per-pulse costs were still left at the membership step: - **A fresh ban read** for the agent, plus its owner when the agent comes in through NIP-OA (`deny_banned` → `community_ban_outcome`). - **Four writer round-trips for owner-admitted agents**, on every request: `materialize_nip_oa_owner` runs 2× `ensure_user` + the `agent_owner_pubkey` upsert + an `is_agent_owner` confirm, even though the link already exists. ## What changes - **Typing's ban check reads the restriction cache.** `submit_event` already parses the event before the membership step, so typing pulses call a new `enforce_relay_membership_ephemeral`. Its ban check reads through `restriction_state_cached`, the same 30s bound the pulse's write-restriction check already has. Every other HTTP route, persistent `POST /events`, and socket auth still read fresh (`cached: false`). - **`materialize_nip_oa_owner` skips a link it already knows.** If `observer_owner_cache` already holds `(community, agent, owner) = true`, it returns `true` right away. `agent_owner_pubkey` has one production writer, which sets it only `WHERE agent_owner_pubkey IS NULL`, and nothing clears it, so the skipped writes were no-ops. This helps every caller (HTTP, socket auth, audio). The owner-link disconnect only runs on the first write, so it still runs. - **`observer_owner_cache` capacity goes from 1k to 100k**, so concurrently active agents actually hit it. That's tens of MB per pod at most, the same scale as `restriction_cache`. Per-pulse Postgres work at the membership step: | Agent | Before | After | |---|---|---| | Direct relay member | host lookup (writer) + membership + ban | host lookup (writer) + membership | | Owner-admitted (NIP-OA) | host lookup + 2 memberships + 2 bans + 4 writer trips | host lookup + 2 memberships | ## Not in this PR - **Caching host → community.** It's the tenant-binding step every HTTP request goes through, and it reads from the writer. Community deletion depends on new requests not binding once a community leaves `active`. A cache would keep binding a quiescing community for its TTL. The serving-write leases may make that harmless, but that needs a closer look than a "safe fixes" PR. - **Caching relay membership.** Removing a member has no HTTP equivalent of the socket disconnect, so a cache would delay removal by its TTL. - **The desktop client reusing one connection.** That's going in a separate buzz-app PR. ## Unrelated one-liner The `sadscan` pre-commit hook scans whole staged files. It blocked this commit on a pre-existing test-only URI in `handlers/auth.rs` (`postgres://buzz:buzz_dev@127.0.0.1:1/buzz`, a deliberately unreachable stub). I added the hook's own `// sadscan:disable np.postgres.1` marker to that line. ## Testing - New Postgres tests. I confirmed each one fails when its guard is removed: - `typing_ban_gate_uses_cached_restriction_row`: a member banned in Postgres with a cached clear row can still type. Fails if typing reads fresh. - `persistent_post_ban_gate_reads_fresh`: a stale cached ban doesn't refuse a kind-9 post that Postgres allows. Fails if every kind reads the cache. - `known_owner_link_skips_materialize_writes`: after the link is cached, deleting the agent row behind the cache's back stays deleted. Fails without the short-circuit. - `scripts/postgres-test-run.sh -p buzz-relay --lib --tests`: 397/397 passed. This was local PG14. - `cargo test -p buzz-relay`: 1430 passed and 7 failed. The same 7 fail without this commit in this environment: 6 `api::media` tests can't find a `buzz` role on :5432, and `mesh_demo` returns a 504. - `cargo clippy -p buzz-relay --all-targets -D warnings` is clean. - An independent agent review found no blockers. Its optional suggestions are test gaps: nothing pins the owner-cascade cached read, or the `false` literals at socket auth. - **Not yet done:** a run against a live local relay, and human testing. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Signed-off-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Honey <8e307ae0076a4dab6b94b036ea3edc7e08f823a625269c1e6919e881a048b4d2@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>