Files
buzz/crates/buzz-agent/Cargo.toml
Wes 4cd82f5132 feat(buzz-agent): add opt-in workspace-scoped Databricks reuse (#7606)
Posted by Brain, Wes Billman’s AI assistant, on behalf of `wesbillman`.

## Summary

Add an opt-in `databricks::DatabricksConnection` over the existing
PKCE/coordinator and v2 catalog machinery. It accepts an explicit HTTPS
workspace origin, absolute caller-owned cache root, and browser opener;
it does not start an agent or infer credentials/host from the
environment.

- Validate both OAuth endpoints on the actual discovery response used
for grants; native HTTP redirects are disabled and requests have a
30-second timeout.
- Keep strict cache/single-flight state in a separate namespace. Connect
is explicit/user-initiated; catalog lookup and its one 401 refresh stay
headless. Tokens are not exposed by the connection API.
- Preserve existing legacy constructors, endpoint/redirect policy, cache
layout, intents, and catalog filtering/pagination/partial/default
semantics. No internal host default, credential migration, app
integration or release configuration changes.

### Intentional shared changes

OAuth success/discovery JSON is capped at 1 MiB; error JSON at 16 KiB.
Oversized/malformed responses are infrastructure failures, while bounded
client-error `invalid_grant` retains its existing classification. OAuth
diagnostics omit raw bodies/URLs/opener/callback details. Overflowing
token expiry returns an infrastructure failure. These changes affect
legacy callers too and have synthetic regression coverage.

See [the reuse contract](crates/buzz-agent/DATABRICKS_REUSE.md) for API,
compatibility and caller obligations. Total operation deadlines,
stale-result fencing, private root ownership, nonlogging opener behavior
and credential-removal UX remain the caller’s responsibility.

### Related issue

Related discovery work: #6918. Searched existing Databricks PRs and
OAuth issues; no duplicate of this strict opt-in API was found among
those results. This is a new reuse boundary, not a claim of a live
credential leak.

### Testing

Published head: `cf33eb2f4f267d5808e068e35127d5504f0bc674`, based on
main `78618804ec86a014524ad7d1fb55928e8f5c3edf`.
Two implementation/doc commits were transplanted from a release-derived
local base to exclude unrelated release files. `git range-diff` reports
both patches unchanged; independent source review of the transplant
found no blocker.

**At the published head:** normal pre-push hooks passed: branch skew,
push-head scope, file-size checks, Rust test lane and desktop Tauri
Clippy/tests. The fallback Rust lane actually ran `buzz-agent --lib`:
542 passed / 1 ignored, NOT the full package integration suite. Hosted
full package/repository CI remains pending. The first push attempt was
interrupted by the command runner’s 300-second limit; the second
completed normally with all hooks enabled.

**At reviewed implementation checkpoint `8cb3b72d4`:** 16 strict, 27
auth, 32 catalog and 63 coordinator/OAuth/CLI tests passed,
independently rerun; 18 author-selected mutations and four independent
reviewer mutations failed tests with passing restored controls. The
subsequent `539319411` delta changed only two doc-comment blocks. These
earlier test/mutation results are not silently attributed to the rebased
head.

Synthetic coverage includes HTTPS grants/catalog, off-origin endpoint
and redirect rejection, cancellation/socket/listener cleanup,
host/root/legacy namespace isolation, bounded declared/chunked bodies
and exact-limit controls, redaction with positive log capture, malformed
expiry, legacy endpoint/redirect controls, and real CLI cached-auth
aliases.

Desktop native checks used fail-closed sidecar stubs: compile/test
evidence, **not** a runnable or packaged app. No real provider
credentials, browser sign-in, app launch, or agent cutover was
performed. Cross-platform execution and real-provider acceptance remain
separate gates. No merge or downstream adoption is requested by this PR.

---------

Signed-off-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-13 08:04:56 -06:00

86 lines
3.3 KiB
TOML

[package]
name = "buzz-agent"
version.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
repository.workspace = true
description = "Minimal, unbreakable ACP-compliant agent. Non-streaming. Tool-calls-as-output."
readme = "README.md"
keywords = ["acp", "agent", "llm", "mcp", "minimal"]
categories = ["command-line-utilities", "web-programming"]
[lib]
name = "buzz_agent"
path = "src/lib.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "buzz-agent"
path = "src/main.rs"
# Test-only fake MCP server. Built unconditionally because cargo can't gate
# bins on `cfg(test)`, but it's tiny and only used by integration tests.
[[bin]]
name = "fake-mcp"
path = "tests/bin/fake_mcp.rs"
# Test-only lock holder: a real second process that takes the coordinator's
# cross-process advisory lock, so the auth tests can prove genuine
# inter-process single-flight and crash-release rather than same-process
# handles. Tiny; only used by the databricks auth integration tests.
[[bin]]
name = "lock-holder"
path = "tests/bin/lock_holder.rs"
# Test-only auth worker: a real second process that runs the PUBLIC auth
# coordinator API (`acquire_with_intent`) with a scripted browser opener and a
# shared temp cache, so the auth tests can prove the cross-process single-flight
# contract end-to-end — durable cooldown sharing and one-grant/one-cache races
# across a genuine process boundary, not two in-process handles. Only used by
# the databricks auth integration tests.
[[bin]]
name = "auth-worker"
path = "tests/bin/auth_worker.rs"
[dependencies]
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros", "io-std", "io-util", "sync", "process", "time", "net"] }
serde = { workspace = true }
serde_json = { workspace = true }
serde_yaml = { workspace = true }
reqwest = { workspace = true, features = ["json", "rustls", "form"] }
rmcp = { version = "1", default-features = false, features = ["client", "transport-child-process"] }
arc-swap = "1"
getrandom = "0.4"
tracing = { workspace = true }
tracing-subscriber = { workspace = true }
# OAuth 2.0 PKCE for Databricks (and future browser-auth providers).
async-trait = "0.1"
axum = { workspace = true }
base64 = "0.22"
hex = { workspace = true }
sha2 = { workspace = true }
url = { workspace = true }
urlencoding = "2"
webbrowser = "1"
dirs = "6"
# Cross-process advisory file lock (flock on Unix, LockFileEx on Windows) for
# the auth coordinator's single-flight. Kept off std's `File::try_lock` so the
# crate stays buildable on the repo's declared 1.88 MSRV (those std APIs are
# 1.89+).
fs2 = "0.4"
[target.'cfg(unix)'.dependencies]
nix = { version = "0.31", default-features = false, features = ["signal", "process"] }
[dev-dependencies]
# Synthetic TLS OAuth/catalog servers exercise the strict HTTPS production path.
rcgen = { version = "0.14", default-features = false, features = ["crypto", "ring"] }
tokio-rustls = { version = "0.26", default-features = false, features = ["ring", "tls12"] }
tokio = { workspace = true, features = ["test-util", "rt-multi-thread", "macros", "io-std", "io-util", "sync", "process", "time", "net"] }
nix = { version = "0.31", default-features = false, features = ["signal", "process"] }
axum = { workspace = true }
hex = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true }
sha2 = { workspace = true }
tempfile = "3"