mirror of
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This PR implements MVP, iOS-only,
[NIP-PL](8d2d0ff5ad/docs/nips/NIP-PL.md)-compliant
push notifications.
A relay with `BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED` will send a push notification for any
message that appears in the in-app Notifications tab.
## Enrollment flow
The first time the client first connects to a relay with
`BUZZ_PUSH_ENABLED`:
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant App as Buzz iOS app
participant iOS
participant Relay as Buzz relay
participant Attest as Apple App Attest
participant Gateway as Push gateway
App->>Relay: Fetch NIP-11 push capability
Relay-->>App: Push profile, current relay public key, and limits
par
App->>iOS: Request notification permission
iOS-->>App: Permission result
and
App->>iOS: Register for remote notifications
iOS-->>App: Device token
end
App->>Gateway: Request installation challenge
Gateway-->>App: Single-use challenge
App->>Attest: Attest installation transcript
Attest-->>App: Attestation proof
App->>Gateway: Enroll device token and proof
Gateway-->>App: Installation handle
App->>Gateway: Request delegation challenge
Gateway-->>App: Single-use challenge
App->>Attest: Assert relay-key delegation
Attest-->>App: Assertion
App->>Gateway: Create delegation
Gateway-->>App: Opaque endpoint grant
App->>Relay: Publish encrypted push lease and filters
Relay-->>App: Lease acknowledged
```
## Push-time flow
When a notification-eligible event is received by the relay:
```mermaid
%%{init: {
"sequence": {
"actorMargin": 20,
"width": 110,
"messageMargin": 18,
"diagramMarginX": 8,
"wrap": true
}
}}%%
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant Relay as Buzz relay
participant Gateway as Push gateway
participant APNs as Apple Push<br/>Notification service
participant iOS
participant NSE as Notification service<br/>extension
Relay->>Gateway: POST /v1/deliveries/apns<br/>opaque endpoint grant, request ID, expiry, NIP-98 authorization
Gateway->>APNs: POST /3/device/{device-token}<br/>topic, request ID, expiry, constant mutable-content payload
APNs-->>Gateway: 200 OK: request accepted
Gateway-->>Relay: 200 OK: accepted status
APNs-->>iOS: Notification: constant reconnect alert<br/>mutable-content = 1
iOS->>NSE: Invoke extension<br/>original notification content
NSE->>Relay: POST /query: subscription filters, limit 10<br/>NIP-98 authorization
Relay-->>NSE: 200 OK: signed Nostr events<br/>kinds 9, 40002, 45001, or 45003
NSE->>iOS: Complete notification: title, body, subtitle<br/>thread ID, exact-message target
```
relay → push gateway → APNs -> NSE -> Notification Center
## Known limitations
The APNs wake payload is intentionally constant and opaque: it contains
no originating community or message identifier, in keeping with the
implemented NIP-PL privacy design.
The Notification Service Extension must therefore reconnect to the relay
and resolve eligible messages after each wake. Around overlapping wakes,
timing boundaries, or resolution windows, notification presentation may
occasionally omit an expected message or display a message more than
once.
This best-effort behavior is deliberately accepted for the current
implementation and will be measured during the internal rollout to
determine whether the user experience is acceptable before any broader
deployment; the implementation does not claim exactly-once presentation.
## Validation
Live end-to-end hardware validation used an internal remotely hosted
development relay and push gateway, the APNs sandbox, and a physical
iPhone 12 mini:
- A second real Buzz client published a uniquely marked message through
the hosted relay.
- The relay matched the message and sent the constant opaque wake
through the hosted gateway. The gateway made an actual APNs request; no
`simctl push` or simulated notification was used.
- The iPhone received the notification on its lock screen. The
Notification Service Extension reconnected to the relay, fetched the
event, verified its ID and signature, and replaced the placeholder
content with the real notification title and body.
- After the app populated its shared presentation cache, a final marked
notification visibly showed the sender display name, sender avatar, and
hashtag-prefixed channel name.
- Tapping a lock-screen notification opened Buzz and exercised the
notification-response path and navigated to the corresponding message.
Final validation with a dogfood-signed artifact and production App
Attest/APNs configuration remains a release step.
## Independent pre-reviews
- **First pass:**
[Carl](buzz://message?channel=18882f4c-289f-41db-942f-81f6f8066da1&id=74ab9a93bb227f3e762568f1cf9fee66d7495b0edc3918735ff787238b9cc585)
found missing transient retries, executor-key rotation suppression,
duplicate installation renewal, and an unauthenticated challenge write
amplifier. These were resolved by [retry-safe
bootstrap](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/12c66ea62)
and [authenticated renewal plus a cross-replica
quota](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/8e5ece0bd).
[sol-max](buzz://message?channel=ad83385f-8e9e-4461-9a35-c1bf2e208532&id=d26d53daa4684669e2ed354638241f13f36c3a97027fe8b4dd738aff09038962)
found delegation generation burning and an edited applied migration,
resolved by [exact-generation
revocation](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/c26d2159d)
and a [forward-only
migration](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/6269/changes/956c1d099).
[k3-max](buzz://message?channel=5e46055d-a766-4065-ae25-05d1e4aaa6b2&id=d43139138a0b15f806cbdbeeedd8f69d992cadf2e805876db6fdde6a34c7eda1)
found no blockers.
- **Exact-head re-review:**
[Carl](buzz://message?channel=18882f4c-289f-41db-942f-81f6f8066da1&id=a897721673459301b0cf26e8b85a1478d7ebbb56a4621f93d774c98d395b8f68),
[sol-max](buzz://message?channel=ad83385f-8e9e-4461-9a35-c1bf2e208532&id=fb2159f709ec68f74f7b21459acd76da0e8a7c5c0f3d469f99826b0cc2380849),
and
[k3-max](buzz://message?channel=5e46055d-a766-4065-ae25-05d1e4aaa6b2&id=2ce2842910435f562e9d9cc718595848f281b122c94605e523a4b964254b8bfb)
independently returned **NO BLOCKERS** at `7eb3a650b`; k3-max also
revalidated every remediation and the endpoint-specific App Attest
enrollment bound.
---------
Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@squareup.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Tom Brow <tomb@squareup.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Jordan Mecom <jm@squareup.com>
176 lines
5.1 KiB
Rust
176 lines
5.1 KiB
Rust
//! Closed wire types for the stateful gateway.
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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pub const MAX_REQUEST_BYTES: usize = 8 * 1024;
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/// Maximum decoded Apple App Attest object accepted by the verifier.
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pub const MAX_APP_ATTESTATION_BYTES: usize = 16 * 1024;
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/// Enrollment carries the maximum App Attest object as standard base64 plus a
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/// bounded APNs endpoint and the closed JSON envelope. Other gateway requests
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/// remain subject to `MAX_REQUEST_BYTES`.
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pub const MAX_ENROLL_REQUEST_BYTES: usize =
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MAX_APP_ATTESTATION_BYTES.div_ceil(3) * 4 + MAX_ENDPOINT_HEX_BYTES * 2 + 1024;
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pub const MAX_GRANT_BYTES: usize = 4096;
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pub const MAX_ENDPOINT_HEX_BYTES: usize = 512;
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pub const APNS_RECONNECT_PAYLOAD: &[u8] =
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br#"{"aps":{"alert":{"body":"Reconnect to your relay now"},"mutable-content":1}}"#;
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pub const WIRE_VERSION: u8 = 1;
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
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pub enum AppProfile {
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BuzzIosDogfood,
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}
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impl AppProfile {
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pub const fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
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match self {
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Self::BuzzIosDogfood => "buzz-ios-dogfood",
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}
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}
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}
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/// Relay request. It deliberately has no application-payload field:
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/// the gateway emits one compiled-in APNs reconnect payload for every delivery.
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/// `endpoint_grant` is opaque authenticated ciphertext minted by the gateway
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/// sealing key and persisted with the relay-owned lease.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct DeliveryRequest {
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pub v: u8,
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pub endpoint_grant: String,
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pub request_id: uuid::Uuid,
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pub expires_at: i64,
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}
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/// Opaque delivery capability plaintext. It contains no APNs token: the random
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/// delegation id resolves through durable authority state, while the remaining
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/// fields are authenticated fences that make stale or cross-relay use fail.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct EndpointGrant {
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pub v: u8,
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pub delegation_id: uuid::Uuid,
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pub relay_pubkey: String,
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pub app_profile: AppProfile,
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pub endpoint_epoch: i64,
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pub generation: i64,
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pub expires_at: i64,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct InstallationChallengeRequest {
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pub v: u8,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
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pub struct InstallationChallengeResponse {
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pub challenge_id: uuid::Uuid,
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pub challenge: String,
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pub expires_at: i64,
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}
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/// Direct app enrollment. `attestation` is Apple's CBOR object and `key_id` is
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/// the App Attest key identifier, both base64 encoded. The attested key is the
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/// installation authority; no second application signing key is introduced.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct InstallationEnrollRequest {
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pub v: u8,
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pub challenge_id: uuid::Uuid,
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pub challenge: String,
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pub key_id: String,
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pub attestation: String,
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pub app_profile: AppProfile,
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pub endpoint: String,
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pub endpoint_epoch: i64,
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pub expires_at: i64,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
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pub struct InstallationEnrollResponse {
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pub installation_handle: uuid::Uuid,
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pub endpoint_epoch: i64,
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pub expires_at: i64,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct DelegationRequest {
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pub v: u8,
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pub challenge_id: uuid::Uuid,
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pub challenge: String,
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pub installation_handle: uuid::Uuid,
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pub endpoint_epoch: i64,
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pub generation: i64,
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pub relay_pubkey: String,
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pub not_before: i64,
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pub expires_at: i64,
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pub assertion: String,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
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pub struct DelegationResponse {
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pub endpoint_grant: String,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct RotateEndpointRequest {
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pub v: u8,
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pub challenge_id: uuid::Uuid,
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pub challenge: String,
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pub installation_handle: uuid::Uuid,
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pub endpoint_epoch: i64,
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pub new_endpoint_epoch: i64,
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pub endpoint: String,
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pub assertion: String,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct RevokeDelegationRequest {
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pub v: u8,
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pub challenge_id: uuid::Uuid,
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pub challenge: String,
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pub installation_handle: uuid::Uuid,
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pub relay_pubkey: String,
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pub generation: i64,
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pub assertion: String,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub struct RevokeInstallationRequest {
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pub v: u8,
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pub challenge_id: uuid::Uuid,
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pub challenge: String,
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pub installation_handle: uuid::Uuid,
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pub endpoint_epoch: i64,
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pub new_endpoint_epoch: i64,
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pub assertion: String,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
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pub struct MutationResponse {
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pub status: &'static str,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
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#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case", tag = "status", deny_unknown_fields)]
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pub enum DeliveryResponse {
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Accepted,
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InvalidEndpoint {
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generation: i64,
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invalid_at: Option<i64>,
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},
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Retry {
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retry_after_seconds: Option<i64>,
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},
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
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pub struct ErrorBody {
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pub error: &'static str,
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}
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