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0ee6093790
🤖 The Codex Security Review gate trusted GitHub's `author_association` (`MEMBER`/`OWNER`), but GitHub only reports `MEMBER` to viewers who can see the membership. The workflow `GITHUB_TOKEN` cannot see private `block` org membership, which is GitHub's default, so most Block employees read as `CONTRIBUTOR` and their PRs never reviewed automatically. The same applied to the comment path, where private members could not authorize a review with `@buzz-security-review <sha>`. Trust is now repo write access, read from `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/collaborators/{user}/permission` via `getCollaboratorPermissionLevel`, which is independent of membership visibility and works with the authorize job's existing `contents: read` and `pull-requests: read` permissions. A user is trusted only when `permission` is `write` (which includes `maintain`) or `admin`. A successful lookup is not enough: on this public repository, an account with no relationship to it returns `200` with `read`, not 404. Outside contributors can only push to forks and come back `read`, so they still need an explicit command from a trusted user. The check covers the PR author on `pull_request_target`, the commenter on `issue_comment` (the job-level `author_association` filter is removed so the trusted script makes that decision), and the stale-marking path on PR updates. Transient API errors are retried. Authorization fails closed: any lookup error other than 404 fails the job instead of authorizing. Stale-marking is conservative: an existing review is always marked stale without consulting permissions, and a failed lookup counts as untrusted, so a previous range's review can never appear current for a new head. A commenter without write access is logged and ignored instead of failing the run. --------- Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>