Files
buzz/mobile/lib/shared/hosted/web_connect_binding.dart
Tom Brow 4ff02bf03b perf(mobile): sign events with native libsecp256k1 on iOS and Android (#8654)
Mobile signs every Nostr event (sends, relay AUTH, media auth headers,
preference writes) in pure Dart on the UI isolate. On an iPhone SE (2nd
gen, Profile build) one BIP-340 signature costs about 10.7 ms and
deriving the public key another 5.6 ms, so a burst of signed writes
drops frames.

This adds `mobile/packages/buzz_secp256k1`, a small FFI package that
builds vendored bitcoin-core/libsecp256k1 v0.8.0 (ecdh, extrakeys,
schnorrsig modules) through a Dart build hook, so the same C and the
same Dart API ship on iOS and Android with no platform bridge code. All
13 `nostr.Event.from` signing sites now go through `signNostrEvent`,
which keeps the `nostr` package's event-id serialization and moves only
key derivation and signing to native code. Calls stay synchronous.

The package also exposes `schnorrVerify` and `ecdhX`; follow-up PRs move
verification and the NIP-44 conversation key over. Incoming relay events
are still not verified, unchanged by this PR.

Safety: the signing context is randomized once per isolate, secret keys
and keypairs are wiped from the native scratch buffer after each call,
aux randomness comes from `Random.secure()`, and the static verify
context runs libsecp256k1's self test before first use.

### Validation

- Added tests: BIP-340 official vectors and native-vs-pure-Dart
differential tests in the package; `event_signing_test.dart` signs with
64 random keys and checks pubkey, event id and signature against the
existing `nostr` builder and verifier, plus malformed-key rejection.
- Full mobile analyze and test suite pass locally.
- Builds: iOS release (framework ~1.3 MB) and Android debug APK with the
library for arm64-v8a, armeabi-v7a and x86_64 (~1.2–1.3 MB each).
- On-device (iPhone SE 2nd gen, Profile, median per op): sign 10,736 µs
→ 41 µs, derive pubkey 5,580 µs → 16.5 µs, full signed event 10,744 µs →
65 µs. Event-id JSON and SHA-256 are 23 µs, so they stay in Dart.
- Device, iOS (iPhone SE 2nd gen, Profile): `buzz_secp256k1.framework`
embedded; the signed-in app authenticated to a real community relay,
loaded channels and history, and paged older messages. No native-asset
or secp256k1 errors in the console.
- Device, Android (emulator, debug): APK contains `libbuzz_secp256k1.so`
and loads it. Against a local mock relay that verifies with the
pure-Dart `nostr` package, the app's NIP-42 AUTH, NIP-98 `POST /query`
headers, and kind 20001/30078 events all verified.
- Blossom GET auth, iOS: the dev relay returns 401 for unauthenticated
`/media/` GETs. From inside the running app, the production
`MediaGetAuthService.headersFor()` header for a nonexistent hash got 404
(accepted, file missing), compared with 401 without it. The community
has no relay-hosted image, so none was rendered.


buzz-review-completed (agent review, Codex and security review clean;
device validation above; human app test not applicable under the mobile
testing exception)

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Signed-off-by: Tom Brow <tomb@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: george <973be878edd6d4f79692a3827f20a6f7fe0ed0362f269ff6b6ba8867033d7d8e@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 16:28:26 -07:00

94 lines
3.0 KiB
Dart

import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import '../deeplink/deep_link.dart';
import 'hosted_environment.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/event_signing.dart';
/// The owner supplies keys only inside this callback, after authenticating and
/// resolving identity. Neither this service nor its result retains a secret.
typedef WithWebConnectKeys =
Future<T> Function<T>(Future<T> Function(nostr.Keys keys) operation);
typedef VerifyWebConnectBinding =
Future<String> Function({
required String subject,
required String challengeId,
required String nonce,
required String signedPayload,
});
/// Binds a web challenge using the authenticated account's verification API.
/// The API must consume it for [subject] and return the verified bound pubkey.
/// A signature is never returned to a browser: shape checks alone cannot prove
/// that an incoming challenge belongs to the account signed into the app.
class WebConnectBindingService {
final DateTime Function() now;
WebConnectBindingService({DateTime Function()? now})
: now = now ?? DateTime.now;
Future<Uri> complete({
required NostrBindDeepLink request,
required String subject,
required String expectedPubkey,
required WithWebConnectKeys withKeys,
required VerifyWebConnectBinding verify,
bool Function()? isCurrent,
}) async {
void checkCurrent() {
if (isCurrent != null && !isCurrent()) {
throw const FormatException('Binding attempt cancelled');
}
}
checkCurrent();
if (subject.isEmpty || !request.expiresAt.isAfter(now())) {
throw const FormatException('Binding request expired or unauthenticated');
}
final signed = await withKeys<({String payload, String pubkey})>((
keys,
) async {
if (keys.public.toLowerCase() != expectedPubkey.toLowerCase()) {
throw const FormatException('Identity does not match');
}
final event = signNostrEvent(
kind: 24243,
content: '',
tags: [
for (final field in const [
'challenge_id',
'nonce',
'verification_code',
'audience',
'action',
'protocol',
'version',
'origin',
'expires_at',
])
[field, request.fields[field]!],
],
secretKey: keys.secret,
);
// Encode through the library's canonical event representation.
final payload = event.toJson();
if (jsonDecode(payload) is! Map) {
throw const FormatException('Invalid signed event');
}
return (payload: payload, pubkey: keys.public);
});
checkCurrent();
final boundPubkey = await verify(
subject: subject,
challengeId: request.challengeId,
nonce: request.nonce,
signedPayload: signed.payload,
);
if (boundPubkey.toLowerCase() != signed.pubkey.toLowerCase()) {
throw const FormatException('Verified identity does not match');
}
return HostedEnvironment.origin.resolve('/buzz');
}
}