Files
buzz/mobile/test/shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer_test.dart
Taylor Ho d8281b9c93 feat(mobile): require device authentication for identity export (#5116)
**Category:** new-feature
**User Impact:** Mobile users must confirm with Face ID, biometrics, or
their device passcode before sending their Buzz identity to Desktop.

**Problem:** A signed-in phone could send its full identity, including
the `nsec`, to a desktop without fresh local verification.

**Solution:** Require OS device authentication before opening the
identity-recovery scanner, retain that authorization only for the active
pairing session and short pairing window, and require fresh
authentication again if it expires before the identity payload is sent.
Normal app opening, identity import, and community removal remain
unchanged.

## Screencasts

| Enable Face ID | Use Face ID |
| --- | --- |
| ![Enabling Face ID during identity
import](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/5116/enable-face-id.gif)
| ![Using Face ID for identity
export](https://d24qwcpro867f5.cloudfront.net/repos/buzz/prs/5116/use-face-id.gif)
|

<details>
<summary>File changes</summary>

**Android and iOS integration**
- `mobile/android/app/build.gradle.kts` declares the AppCompat
dependency required by the biometric activity theme.
-
`mobile/android/app/src/main/kotlin/xyz/block/buzz/mobile/MainActivity.kt`
uses the activity type required by the system authentication prompt.
- `mobile/android/app/src/main/res/values/styles.xml` and
`mobile/android/app/src/main/res/values-night/styles.xml` use the
compatible launch theme.
- `mobile/ios/Podfile.lock` records the native local-authentication
dependency.
- `mobile/ios/Runner/Info.plist` explains why Buzz requests Face ID
access.

**Identity policy and pairing flow**
- `mobile/lib/shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart` wraps OS
authentication and maps platform errors to stable app-level outcomes.
- `mobile/lib/shared/community/community.dart` and
`mobile/lib/shared/community/community_storage.dart` persist the
sensitive-action policy.
- `mobile/lib/features/invites/invite_join_provider.dart` assigns the
explicit policy for invite-created communities.
- `mobile/lib/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart` gates export,
binds grants to the active community/session, reauthenticates expired
grants, and clears grants on every terminal path.
- `mobile/lib/features/pairing/pairing_page.dart` lets users choose
biometric protection while importing an identity.
- `mobile/lib/features/settings/settings_page.dart` wires pairing into
settings.
- `mobile/lib/features/settings/settings_page/connection_section.dart`
authenticates before opening export recovery and bounds the
foreground-resume wait.
- `mobile/pubspec.yaml` and `mobile/pubspec.lock` add and lock
`local_auth`.

**Coverage**
- `mobile/test/shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer_test.dart`
covers native result mapping, unsupported devices, and single-flight
behavior.
- `mobile/test/shared/community/community_test.dart` and
`mobile/test/shared/community/community_storage_test.dart` cover policy
defaults and persistence.
- `mobile/test/features/invites/invite_join_provider_test.dart` covers
the invite policy.
- `mobile/test/features/pairing/pairing_page_test.dart` covers import
protection controls.
- `mobile/test/features/pairing/pairing_provider_test.dart` covers
export/import authorization, stale/reset/concurrent guards, malformed
payload cleanup, and no-export failure paths.
- `mobile/test/features/settings/connection_section_test.dart` covers
the tap gate, lifecycle resume, and timeout behavior.

</details>

## Reproduction steps

1. Pair an identity into the mobile app.
2. Open Settings and choose “Send identity to desktop.”
3. Verify Face ID, biometrics, or the device passcode is required before
the recovery scanner opens.
4. Cancel device authentication and verify the scanner does not open and
no identity transfer begins.
5. Authenticate, scan a Desktop recovery code, confirm the SAS, and
verify the identity transfer completes.

## Validation

At `be5620f5f10aa6cc16e86a4f01f102f3d9aeef9b`:
- `cd mobile && ../bin/flutter analyze` — no issues
- `cd mobile && ../bin/flutter test` — 1,368 tests passed
- `cd mobile/android && JAVA_HOME=$(/usr/libexec/java_home -v 21)
./gradlew app:assembleDebug` — debug APK assembled successfully

---------

Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
2026-08-15 18:34:02 -07:00

198 lines
7.1 KiB
Dart

import 'dart:async';
import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
import 'package:local_auth/local_auth.dart';
import 'package:mocktail/mocktail.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart';
class _MockLocalAuthentication extends Mock implements LocalAuthentication {}
void main() {
late _MockLocalAuthentication authentication;
setUp(() {
authentication = _MockLocalAuthentication();
when(authentication.isDeviceSupported).thenAnswer((_) async => true);
when(
authentication.getAvailableBiometrics,
).thenAnswer((_) async => <BiometricType>[BiometricType.face]);
when(
() => authentication.authenticate(
localizedReason: any(named: 'localizedReason'),
authMessages: any(named: 'authMessages'),
biometricOnly: any(named: 'biometricOnly'),
sensitiveTransaction: any(named: 'sensitiveTransaction'),
persistAcrossBackgrounding: any(named: 'persistAcrossBackgrounding'),
),
).thenAnswer((_) async => true);
});
test('identity authorization retries after system backgrounding', () async {
final result = await LocalSensitiveActionAuthorizer(
authentication,
).authorizeIdentityAction(biometricOnly: false);
expect(result, DeviceAuthResult.success);
verify(
() => authentication.authenticate(
localizedReason: 'Confirm sending your Buzz identity to desktop',
authMessages: any(named: 'authMessages'),
biometricOnly: false,
sensitiveTransaction: true,
persistAcrossBackgrounding: true,
),
).called(1);
});
test('unsupported devices fail closed before authentication', () async {
when(authentication.isDeviceSupported).thenAnswer((_) async => false);
final result = await LocalSensitiveActionAuthorizer(
authentication,
).authorizeIdentityAction(biometricOnly: false);
expect(result, DeviceAuthResult.unavailable);
verifyNever(
() => authentication.authenticate(
localizedReason: any(named: 'localizedReason'),
authMessages: any(named: 'authMessages'),
biometricOnly: any(named: 'biometricOnly'),
sensitiveTransaction: any(named: 'sensitiveTransaction'),
persistAcrossBackgrounding: any(named: 'persistAcrossBackgrounding'),
),
);
});
const mappedExceptions = <LocalAuthExceptionCode, DeviceAuthResult>{
LocalAuthExceptionCode.userCanceled: DeviceAuthResult.cancelled,
LocalAuthExceptionCode.systemCanceled: DeviceAuthResult.cancelled,
LocalAuthExceptionCode.timeout: DeviceAuthResult.cancelled,
LocalAuthExceptionCode.temporaryLockout: DeviceAuthResult.lockedOut,
LocalAuthExceptionCode.biometricLockout: DeviceAuthResult.lockedOut,
LocalAuthExceptionCode.noCredentialsSet: DeviceAuthResult.unavailable,
LocalAuthExceptionCode.noBiometricsEnrolled: DeviceAuthResult.unavailable,
LocalAuthExceptionCode.noBiometricHardware: DeviceAuthResult.unavailable,
LocalAuthExceptionCode.biometricHardwareTemporarilyUnavailable:
DeviceAuthResult.unavailable,
LocalAuthExceptionCode.uiUnavailable: DeviceAuthResult.unavailable,
LocalAuthExceptionCode.authInProgress: DeviceAuthResult.failed,
};
for (final MapEntry(key: code, value: expected) in mappedExceptions.entries) {
test('maps ${code.name} to ${expected.name}', () async {
when(
() => authentication.authenticate(
localizedReason: any(named: 'localizedReason'),
authMessages: any(named: 'authMessages'),
biometricOnly: any(named: 'biometricOnly'),
sensitiveTransaction: any(named: 'sensitiveTransaction'),
persistAcrossBackgrounding: any(named: 'persistAcrossBackgrounding'),
),
).thenThrow(LocalAuthException(code: code));
final result = await LocalSensitiveActionAuthorizer(
authentication,
).authorizeIdentityAction(biometricOnly: false);
expect(result, expected);
});
}
test('biometric protection requires an enrolled biometric', () async {
when(
authentication.getAvailableBiometrics,
).thenAnswer((_) async => <BiometricType>[]);
final result = await LocalSensitiveActionAuthorizer(
authentication,
).authorizeBiometricProtection();
expect(result, DeviceAuthResult.unavailable);
verifyNever(
() => authentication.authenticate(
localizedReason: any(named: 'localizedReason'),
authMessages: any(named: 'authMessages'),
biometricOnly: any(named: 'biometricOnly'),
sensitiveTransaction: any(named: 'sensitiveTransaction'),
persistAcrossBackgrounding: any(named: 'persistAcrossBackgrounding'),
),
);
});
test(
'biometric protection does not fall back to a device passcode',
() async {
final result = await LocalSensitiveActionAuthorizer(
authentication,
).authorizeBiometricProtection();
expect(result, DeviceAuthResult.success);
verify(
() => authentication.authenticate(
localizedReason: 'Enable biometrics for secure actions',
authMessages: any(named: 'authMessages'),
biometricOnly: true,
sensitiveTransaction: true,
persistAcrossBackgrounding: true,
),
).called(1);
},
);
test('single-flight shares authorization with the same mode', () async {
final authorizer = _ControllableAuthorizer();
final session = SensitiveActionAuthorizationSession(authorizer);
final first = session.authorize(biometricOnly: false);
final second = session.authorize(biometricOnly: false);
expect(authorizer.biometricOnlyCalls, [false]);
authorizer.completeNext(DeviceAuthResult.success);
expect(await first, DeviceAuthResult.success);
expect(await second, DeviceAuthResult.success);
});
test('single-flight does not reuse a weaker in-flight mode', () async {
final authorizer = _ControllableAuthorizer();
final session = SensitiveActionAuthorizationSession(authorizer);
final passcodeAllowed = session.authorize(biometricOnly: false);
final biometricOnly = session.authorize(biometricOnly: true);
expect(authorizer.biometricOnlyCalls, [false]);
authorizer.completeNext(DeviceAuthResult.success);
expect(await passcodeAllowed, DeviceAuthResult.success);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.biometricOnlyCalls, [false, true]);
authorizer.completeNext(DeviceAuthResult.success);
expect(await biometricOnly, DeviceAuthResult.success);
});
}
class _ControllableAuthorizer implements SensitiveActionAuthorizer {
final biometricOnlyCalls = <bool>[];
final _pending = <Completer<DeviceAuthResult>>[];
void completeNext(DeviceAuthResult result) {
_pending.removeAt(0).complete(result);
}
@override
Future<DeviceAuthResult> authorizeIdentityAction({
required bool biometricOnly,
}) {
biometricOnlyCalls.add(biometricOnly);
final completer = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
_pending.add(completer);
return completer.future;
}
@override
Future<DeviceAuthResult> authorizeBiometricProtection() =>
throw UnimplementedError();
@override
Future<List<BiometricType>> enrolledBiometrics() =>
throw UnimplementedError();
}