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## Summary
Adds a locally stored **NIP-49 encrypted key backup** (`ncryptsec`) to
the desktop app, per the plan reviewed in buzz-development (Rev 3,
approved 9/10 by Wren; implementation also reviewed and approved 9/10).
**Two-artifact design — canonical bytes originate entirely in Rust:**
- `create_ncryptsec_backup` runs under the `identity_mutation` lock:
encrypt → decrypt-verify against the live pubkey → atomic `0o600` write
to `{app_data_dir}/identity.ncryptsec` → reread/byte-compare → return
the exact persisted bytes. The frontend never re-derives or re-encrypts.
- `save_ncryptsec_copy` writes a portable copy via the save dialog
(parse-gated, secret-file semantics) and never mutates canonical state.
- `generate_backup_passphrase`: 6 words from the EFF short wordlist via
`OsRng` (custom passphrases min 12 chars).
- Import accepts `ncryptsec1` with optional password; the raw-`nsec`
path is untouched. Different-pubkey import and sign-out wipe the
app-managed backup (post-commit, best-effort — a failed import can never
destroy the still-live identity's backup; regression-tested).
**Never-relay guarantee (egress guard + tripwires):**
- `egress_guard.rs` fail-closed at all 8 `/events` submission boundaries
(relay submit funnel, 3× `relay.rs`, huddle STT, both engram submitters,
native WS choke point), rejecting `ncryptsec1`/`NCRYPTSEC1` in text and
binary frames. Scope is deliberately ncryptsec-only: pairing
intentionally carries raw nsec inside its encrypted session.
- Site-granular `/events` inventory tripwire: per-file (`/events` count,
guard-call count) pairs; unlisted files expect zero. Mutation-style
tests prove a ninth site in an existing file, a removed guard, and a new
unlisted file all fail the scan.
- ncryptsec source-allowlist scans in **both** trees (Rust + TS).
**Frontend:** onboarding `BackupStep` is encrypted-by-default — the
default path never invokes `get_nsec` (e2e asserts the command log).
Raw-nsec export stays behind an explicit click with prior semantics.
Shared `EncryptedBackupCreator` powers onboarding + a new settings row;
the import form auto-switches to encrypted mode on `ncryptsec1` paste
(case-insensitive HRP).
**Open product call for @tlongwell-block:** onboarding default is
*encrypted* in this PR; flipping to raw-default is a small change either
way (documented in the plan).
Review history: plan Rev 3 and the implementation were both iterated
with Wren to 9/10 (two blockers from round 1 — import ordering,
inventory granularity — plus an uppercase-bech32 hardening gap, all
fixed in `dde37183e`). Thread: buzz-development.
### Related issue
Follow-up to the direction explored in #385 (NIP-PB, closed) — this
ships local NIP-49 (the standard) instead of a new NIP. No open
duplicate found.
### Testing
All at exactly `dde37183e` (same shell, HEAD verified):
- `cargo test` — 1680 passed / 0 failed / 14 ignored (includes a
deliberate ~70s log_n-18 NIP-49 round trip, spec vector, wrong-password,
NFKC, uppercase-vector decrypt, injection test per egress boundary,
inventory mutation tests, import-ordering regression tests)
- `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` — clean; `cargo fmt
--check` — clean
- `pnpm typecheck` — clean; JS unit suite 3529/3529; biome (repo-pinned
2.4.16) clean
- Playwright `onboarding-backup` / `onboarding` /
`onboarding-agent-defaults` / `profile-nsec-reveal` — 86 passed, 1 known
avatar-reservation flake (passed on rerun; untouched by this diff).
`passThroughBackupStep` now exercises the encrypted default, so every
downstream onboarding spec covers the new path.
- Note: browser e2e fakes the crypto via the mock bridge (fixed
spec-vector blob); decryption correctness is proven in the Rust tests.
## Latest onboarding integration
The current head adds an additive `IdentityInfo.storage` field
(`ephemeral`, `system-keyring`, `local-file`, or `environment`) so
onboarding can accurately explain where the active identity is
protected. It surfaces storage metadata only—never key material—and
leaves the existing lost/keyring-locked recovery behavior intact.
---------
Signed-off-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Tyler Longwell <tlongwell@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Taylor Ho <taylorkmho@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: npub1223z34hd7vtwc6qj4s7flsxkj644nlre2nthu7lrrmkumhu3xddsrx9r6w <52a228d6edf316ec6812ac3c9fc0d696ab59fc7954d77e7be31eedcddf91335b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
118 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
118 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* E2E tests for the destructive sign-out confirmation flow.
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*
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* Signing out wipes the identity key and all local data, so the dialog gates
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* "Delete My Data" behind two explicit steps:
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* 1. backup — check "I have saved my private key"
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* 2. typed confirmation — type the exact phrase "wipe all my data"
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*/
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import { expect, type Page, test } from "@playwright/test";
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import { installMockBridge } from "../helpers/bridge";
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import { openSettings } from "../helpers/settings";
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const CONFIRM_PHRASE = "wipe all my data";
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async function openSignOutDialog(page: Page) {
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await openSettings(page, "profile");
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const section = page.getByTestId("settings-signout");
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await section.scrollIntoViewIfNeeded();
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await page.getByTestId("signout-open-dialog").click();
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await expect(page.getByRole("alertdialog")).toBeVisible({ timeout: 5_000 });
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}
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test("delete button unlocks only after backup + typed phrase", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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await installMockBridge(page);
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await page.goto("/");
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await openSignOutDialog(page);
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const deleteButton = page.getByTestId("signout-confirm");
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const backupCheckbox = page.getByTestId("signout-backup-confirm");
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const phraseInput = page.getByTestId("signout-confirm-phrase");
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// Delete is locked initially; the backup checkbox is immediately usable.
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await expect(deleteButton).toBeDisabled();
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await expect(backupCheckbox).toBeEnabled();
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await backupCheckbox.click();
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// Backup alone is not enough.
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await expect(deleteButton).toBeDisabled();
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// Wrong phrase keeps it locked.
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await phraseInput.fill("wipe my data");
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await expect(deleteButton).toBeDisabled();
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// Exact phrase (case/whitespace tolerant) unlocks it.
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await phraseInput.fill(` ${CONFIRM_PHRASE.toUpperCase()} `);
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await expect(deleteButton).toBeEnabled();
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// Clearing the phrase locks it again.
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await phraseInput.fill("");
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await expect(deleteButton).toBeDisabled();
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});
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test("completing both gates invokes sign_out", async ({ page }) => {
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await installMockBridge(page);
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await page.goto("/");
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await openSignOutDialog(page);
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await page.getByTestId("signout-backup-confirm").click();
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await page.getByTestId("signout-confirm-phrase").fill(CONFIRM_PHRASE);
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const deleteButton = page.getByTestId("signout-confirm");
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await expect(deleteButton).toBeEnabled();
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await deleteButton.click();
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await expect
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.poll(() =>
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page.evaluate(
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() =>
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(
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window as Window & { __BUZZ_E2E_COMMANDS__?: string[] }
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).__BUZZ_E2E_COMMANDS__?.includes("sign_out") ?? false,
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),
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)
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.toBe(true);
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});
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test("cancel resets the gates for the next open", async ({ page }) => {
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await installMockBridge(page);
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await page.goto("/");
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await openSignOutDialog(page);
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// Satisfy both gates, then cancel.
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await page.getByTestId("signout-backup-confirm").click();
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await page.getByTestId("signout-confirm-phrase").fill(CONFIRM_PHRASE);
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await page.getByRole("button", { name: "Cancel" }).click();
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await expect(page.getByRole("alertdialog")).not.toBeVisible();
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// Reopen — everything must be reset again.
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await page.getByTestId("signout-open-dialog").click();
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await expect(page.getByRole("alertdialog")).toBeVisible();
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await expect(page.getByTestId("signout-backup-confirm")).not.toBeChecked();
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await expect(page.getByTestId("signout-confirm-phrase")).toHaveValue("");
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await expect(page.getByTestId("signout-confirm")).toBeDisabled();
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});
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test("nsec load failure still allows sign-out (backup step degrades)", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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await installMockBridge(page, { nsecError: "Keychain locked" });
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await page.goto("/");
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await openSignOutDialog(page);
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// Error shown in place of the key; checkbox is still usable so the user is
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// not locked out of signing out.
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await expect(page.getByTestId("signout-nsec-error")).toContainText(
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"Keychain locked",
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);
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const backupCheckbox = page.getByTestId("signout-backup-confirm");
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await expect(backupCheckbox).toBeEnabled();
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await backupCheckbox.click();
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await page.getByTestId("signout-confirm-phrase").fill(CONFIRM_PHRASE);
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await expect(page.getByTestId("signout-confirm")).toBeEnabled();
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});
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