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The in-app Admin Console needs to work on any community the relay
serves, not only the one the desktop is connected to. This adds four
read-only routes under `/api/admin/v1` that the stacked desktop PR
builds on, puts every admin route under one explicit access rule, and
binds every admin request's signature to its real method, which fixes
signed `HEAD` on reads.
## Access rule
| Mode | Moderation reads | Writes | Staffing (`/operators`) |
|---|---|---|---|
| `nip98` (default) | signed, any staff role | signed, role-checked |
signed Operator |
| `disabled` | served to anyone who can reach the relay | `403` | `403`
|
"Moderation reads" means every read: reports, feedback and attachments,
restrictions, and the four community routes below. `nip98` behavior is
unchanged, and the Operator API (`/operator/*`) is untouched.
**Existing `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=disabled` deployments start serving the four
new reads** (community directory, member search, member lookup without
staff status, and stored events by ID) with no config change. The
startup `WARN`, `docs/admin/README.md`, `.env.example`,
`deploy/compose/.env.example` and the `just admin` comment list exactly
what disabled mode exposes, say it should be reachable only by people
allowed to see all moderation data in every community, and say the whole
relay port must be private: the admin API is on the relay's main
listener and its hostname check uses the caller's `Host` header. `just
admin` binds the relay to `127.0.0.1` unless `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` is
exactly `nip98`, so an unset, padded or misspelled value stays local.
In code, `authorize()` returns `AdminAccess`, either `NetworkTrusted`
(disabled mode, no identity) or `Staff(AdminPrincipal)` (`nip98`, any
rostered Operator or Moderator). Each route makes one check: **view**
(`authorize()` succeeding), **act** (`AdminAccess::act()`, must be
`Staff`, then the existing role checks) or **operator**
(`AdminAccess::operator()`, must be an Operator). Act and operator
refuse `NetworkTrusted` with `403 this endpoint requires
BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=nip98`; no principal is ever created for an anonymous
caller. `every_route_makes_its_check_in_both_auth_modes` lists every
mounted admin route with its check and asserts the result in both modes,
and `every_route_is_listed` fails when `router()` mounts a route that
list does not name.
## Routes
All four live in `api/admin/reads.rs`; `mod.rs` only registers them.
Their queries reject unknown fields, like `ReportQuery`. The three
`?communityHost=` routes share `CommunityQuery`, which now rejects
unknown fields too, so the existing unban, untimeout and direct-action
routes that use it do the same; their desktop callers send only
`communityHost`. Every admin route that takes `limit` validates it with
the module's shared `limit()` helper, so an out-of-range value is `400
invalid_limit`.
| Route | Returns |
|---|---|
| `GET /communities?q=&cursor=&limit=` | `{items: [{id, host,
icon\|null}], nextCursor\|null}` |
| `GET /members/search?communityHost=&q=&limit=` | `{items: [{pubkey,
displayName\|null, nip05\|null, avatarUrl\|null}]}` |
| `GET /members/{pubkey}?communityHost=` | `{pubkey, profile:
{displayName, nip05, avatarUrl, about}\|null, role:
"owner"\|"admin"\|"member"\|null, banned, mutedUntil\|null, isStaff:
bool\|null}` |
| `GET /events/{id}?communityHost=` | `{id, authorPubkey, kind, content,
createdAt, deletedAt\|null, channelId\|null}` |
- **One community per read.** Community-scoped routes bind
`communityHost` through the tenant binder (`400 unknown_community_host`)
and read only that community's `users`, `relay_members`,
`community_bans` and `events` rows.
- **Directory.** It uses the binder's liveness rule (not archived, not
deleted, `deletion_state = 'active'`), so every listed host can be
opened. `q` is an escaped, case-insensitive host prefix of at most 255
characters (`400 invalid_query`). Results are ordered and paged by
`lower(host)`, which is unique, so the opaque base64url cursor carries
only the last host; a malformed cursor is `400 invalid_cursor`. `limit`
is 1 to 100 with a default of 50.
- **Member search.** It reuses `search_users`, which already escapes,
binds and scopes, with no second escaping layer. `q` is trimmed and must
be 1 to 100 characters (`400 invalid_query`), and `limit` is 1 to 50
(default 20). It searches community profiles, so former members appear.
- **Member lookup.** `isStaff` uses the same roster lookup as the
direct-action staff guard and is returned to signed staff only: it is
`null` in disabled mode, where the roster is never read. A roster lookup
failure is a 500, never "not staff".
- **Event preview.** It reads the event by `(community_id, id)` and
never returns a private kind (see below). A malformed id, an id stored
only in another community and a private kind are all `404
event_not_found`, the same answer as an absent event.
## Private events
Admin reads never reveal events the relay keeps private.
`admin_hidden_kinds()` combines the four private kind sets in
`buzz_core::kind`: `AUTHOR_ONLY_KINDS`, `RESULT_GATED_KINDS`,
`P_GATED_KINDS` and `SHARED_GATED_KINDS`. The whole shared-gated set is
hidden, including events tagged `["shared","true"]`; the shared tag is
never evaluated. Every HTTP response applies it the way it treats a
missing event: event preview is `404 event_not_found`, report detail
returns the report with `message: null` and `targetAuthorPubkey: null`,
and the report list returns a null target author.
Moderators can still act on these events, they just cannot read them.
Report detail is one query with the hidden-kind list as a parameter,
exposed two ways: `admin_get_report` hides private kinds and backs every
HTTP response (GET detail, the resolve response, reopen, cancel and the
reporter-notice worker), while `admin_get_report_for_enforcement` reads
the target unfiltered and is used only by the resolve handler's
enforcement load (the staff-target check and ban, timeout and kick
target derivation) and by the recovery worker for interrupted actions.
Its result is never serialized, so a ban from a report on a private
persona bans the real author while GET still shows nothing.
## Method binding
Axum serves `HEAD` through `GET` handlers, but the read handlers
authorized with a literal `"GET"`, so a correctly signed `HEAD` was
rejected. Admin reads now authorize through `authorize_read` and writes
through `authorize_write`, both of which use the request's real method
and full target, so no handler hardcodes a method string. A database
error behind any admin route is now logged before it becomes a 500.
## Directory query plan
`idx_communities_host` is on `lower(host)` in the default collation, so
the prefix `LIKE` is a filter, not an index condition. The plan walks
the index in order and stops once it has `limit` matches. A common
prefix is cheap (on local Postgres 16 with 21,359 communities, a first
page skipped 2,728 index rows in 3.9 ms), but a prefix with few or no
matches walks every index entry, so its cost grows with the number of
communities. A `COLLATE "C"` index would turn the prefix into an index
range; it is left out because the admin directory is low-traffic and the
cost is small at current scale.
The cursor condition is `lower(host) > COALESCE($2, '')`, with no `OR`,
so it remains an index condition under a generic plan:
```text
-> Bitmap Index Scan on idx_communities_host
Index Cond: (lower((host)::text) > COALESCE($2, ''::text))
```
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Hayt <211b96e6a2b7f45fd4047988976c7bbbeeda0c15f3ae7b32eec20834b5a55118@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>