Files
buzz/desktop/src-tauri/src/relay.rs
Wes 8953cbfff5 fix(desktop): keep managed agent avatars usable across communities (#7732)
## Summary

Fix Desktop-managed agents losing avatars after joining another
community. The saved persona/instance stores one desired source URL, but
authenticated media belongs to a community. Republishing community A’s
URL in B does not make that image accessible in B.

- Before comparing or publishing kind-0, reuse or copy
configured-community avatar media into the pinned destination. Keep
exact image bytes, including animation, and leave the saved source
unchanged.
- Keep the previous profile on transfer/publication failure so existing
reconciliation can retry. Reuse destination bytes during source outages;
after source removal, reuse only an already-published signed destination
picture with the same original content hash.
- Refresh source permissions through narrow, serialized IPC without
reconnecting or resetting the active community. Startup waits until the
latest permission update completes before restoring agents.

### Related issue

Refs #2366 (avatar portion only, not runtime availability). Related
#2659 deliberately excludes avatar/media mirroring; this change
addresses that media boundary without introducing runtime fan-out.
Searched existing issues/PRs for `avatar community` before opening.

## Contract and safety

Desktop-managed profiles still follow the saved persona source; this
does not introduce community-specific persona editing. Agent-managed
profiles still opt out of automatic reconciliation.

Authenticated transfer requests use the fixed agent key/NIP-OA tag,
origin-scoped Blossom auth, and the pinned destination, never mutable
active-workspace owner credentials. They refuse redirects, enforce
30-second request timeouts and bounded bodies, verify SHA-256 and
detected image MIME, and validate the returned descriptor’s
origin/hash/MIME/size. Source permission is rechecked after an awaited
destination HEAD miss. The removed-source fallback verifies the
destination profile’s signature, kind, signer, origin, and
original-media hash without contacting the removed source.

Ordinary external images retain passthrough behavior and receive no
community credentials. No public-media policy change, image-reader URL
rewriting, new persistence, background service, or global profile merge.

## Testing

Normal commit and push hooks passed on exact head
`925781eece66d5f6a4b084b3b3abd6309cda357e`; working tree clean before
and after:

- Desktop formatting/lint, typecheck, and **6,508 tests**.
- Full native workspace suite, including **3,204 desktop-library tests**
(19 ignored), integration tests, terminal crates, and doc tests.
- Native Clippy on default and `mesh-llm` workspace/all-target
configurations with warnings denied; repository file-size and
branch-skew gates.

Regression coverage exercises production reconciliation/shared
publication against two local HTTP fixtures: add/edit/restart, upload
and rejected-publication retry, removed-source local-image preservation,
fixed signer/destination, redirect/hash/descriptor/size failures,
revocation during pending HEAD, and opt-out no-I/O. Mounted
initialization tests cover inactive-list changes without workspace
reset, two deferred permission updates, and rejection of either update.

Earlier working-tree validation at base
`4ab4f786085a23fe6126529861840eff6048ceee` also passed the E2E frontend
build and four Chromium mock-bridge community flows (boot, switch,
active removal/fallback, leave-final/setup). Subsequent production
changes only serialize permission writes and wait for a stable latest
update; the complete suites above cover the final commit. Mutations
independently removing serialization or stable waiting failed the new
regression.

## Remaining validation and limitations

- No live production avatar was changed. Native GUI rendering against
two hosted communities remains to be verified with a build containing
this fix; local HTTP fixtures and the browser mock bridge do not
establish that outcome.
- A removed/unreachable source with no existing destination copy cannot
be recovered automatically. Choose a reachable image/source in that
case.
- This is a publication/reconciliation fix, not a visual redesign. No
before/after native GUI screenshots are claimed. Broad repository CI
remains required; it was not duplicated locally.

## Review

Independent security/scope and caller/ordering reviews are clear after
the bounded fixes. Final hook-ordering reread covered the staged tree
that became this commit. Commit authorship/sign-off use the implementing
Carl identity and configured Carl signing key.

Signed-off-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Carl <32a2e2c9d428ee08902cab75d956da2c1d235a22d4766b0dd4138bf6e2e5db1d@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-09-18 06:14:28 -06:00

742 lines
30 KiB
Rust

use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64, Engine as _};
use nostr::{EventBuilder, JsonUtil, Keys, Kind, Tag};
use reqwest::{Method, RequestBuilder};
use serde::de::DeserializeOwned;
use serde::Deserialize;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
// nostr 0.36 alias — required for cross-version bridging with buzz-sdk.
use crate::app_state::AppState;
const DEFAULT_RELAY_WS_URL: &str = "ws://localhost:3000";
// A reached-but-malformed 2xx body is NOT a connectivity failure, so this
// message must never carry the "relay unreachable:" prefix the frontend
// classifier keys on. Extracted to a const so a test can pin that contract.
const MALFORMED_RESPONSE_MESSAGE: &str = "relay returned malformed response: not valid JSON";
// Per-request deadline for the `POST /query` HTTP bridge, covering both the
// header exchange and full body consumption. The shared `http_client` sets no
// client-level timeout — deliberately, because it is also used for long-running
// STT/TTS model downloads, builderlab auth, and the media proxy — so a stalled
// or half-open `/query` connection would otherwise leave the request pending
// forever, hanging the caller (e.g. a thread-history load that never resolves
// and shows a permanent skeleton). A per-request timeout scoped to `/query`
// bounds that without affecting the client's other users. A timeout surfaces
// through `classify_request_error` as the stable `"relay unreachable: request
// timed out"` string. Set above the 25s WS history timeout so a slow-but-live
// relay is not cut off before the WebSocket path would be.
const QUERY_REQUEST_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(30);
fn configured_env_var(name: &str) -> Option<String> {
std::env::var(name)
.ok()
.map(|value| value.trim().to_string())
.filter(|value| !value.is_empty())
}
pub fn relay_ws_url() -> String {
configured_env_var("BUZZ_RELAY_URL")
.or_else(|| option_env!("BUZZ_DESKTOP_BUILD_RELAY_URL").map(str::to_string))
.unwrap_or_else(|| DEFAULT_RELAY_WS_URL.to_string())
}
/// Read the workspace relay URL override, if set. Returns `None` when no
/// override is active or when the mutex is poisoned (best-effort).
pub(crate) fn workspace_relay_override(state: &AppState) -> Option<String> {
state
.relay_url_override
.lock()
.ok()
.and_then(|guard| guard.clone())
}
/// Returns the relay WebSocket URL, checking the workspace override first.
/// Precedence: workspace override > env vars > build-time vars > default.
pub fn relay_ws_url_with_override(state: &AppState) -> String {
workspace_relay_override(state).unwrap_or_else(relay_ws_url)
}
/// Returns the relay HTTP API base URL, checking the workspace override first.
/// Precedence: workspace override > env vars > build-time vars > default.
pub fn relay_api_base_url_with_override(state: &AppState) -> String {
match workspace_relay_override(state) {
Some(url) => relay_http_base_url(&url),
None => relay_api_base_url(),
}
}
/// Selects the relay a managed agent should use for a relay operation.
///
/// Always the active workspace relay. The legacy per-record `relay_url` pin is
/// deliberately IGNORED (agents-everywhere, #2122): every agent is eligible on
/// every community, and the pair the caller is acting on is identified by the
/// workspace relay, never by a stored pin. The record field is still parsed
/// and persisted untouched — old records need no migration and a rollback to a
/// pin-honoring build reads the same file — so the parameter stays in the
/// signature as documentation of what is being ignored at the one choke point
/// all agent relay resolution flows through. Resolving at read-time also means
/// a stale stored value can never leak into reconcile, spawn, or profile sync.
/// Uniform for both Local and Provider backends.
pub fn effective_agent_relay_url(_record_relay: &str, workspace_relay: &str) -> String {
workspace_relay.to_string()
}
pub fn relay_http_base_url(relay_url: &str) -> String {
let trimmed = relay_url.trim().trim_end_matches('/');
if let Some(suffix) = trimmed.strip_prefix("wss://") {
return format!("https://{}", suffix);
}
if let Some(suffix) = trimmed.strip_prefix("ws://") {
return format!("http://{}", suffix);
}
trimmed.to_string()
}
mod scope;
pub use scope::{
assert_expected_relay_scope, assert_expected_signer, bind_expected_relay_scope,
bind_expected_signer, ScopedWorkspaceRelay,
};
pub fn relay_api_base_url() -> String {
if let Some(base) = configured_env_var("BUZZ_RELAY_HTTP") {
return base.trim_end_matches('/').to_string();
}
if let Some(base) = option_env!("BUZZ_DESKTOP_BUILD_RELAY_HTTP") {
return base.trim().trim_end_matches('/').to_string();
}
relay_http_base_url(&relay_ws_url())
}
// ── NIP-98 HTTP auth ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
pub fn build_nip98_auth_header(
method: &Method,
url: &str,
body: &[u8],
state: &AppState,
) -> Result<String, String> {
let keys = state.keys.lock().map_err(|error| error.to_string())?;
build_nip98_auth_header_for_keys(&keys, method, url, body)
}
pub fn build_nip98_auth_header_for_keys(
keys: &Keys,
method: &Method,
url: &str,
body: &[u8],
) -> Result<String, String> {
let payload_hash = hex::encode(Sha256::digest(body));
// Nonce ensures unique event IDs even for identical requests in the same second.
// Without this, rapid-fire calls (e.g. query → submit → re-query) with the same
// body produce identical NIP-98 event hashes and trigger relay replay detection.
let nonce_hex = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
let tags = vec![
Tag::parse(vec!["u", url]).map_err(|error| format!("url tag failed: {error}"))?,
Tag::parse(vec!["method", method.as_str()])
.map_err(|error| format!("method tag failed: {error}"))?,
Tag::parse(vec!["payload", &payload_hash])
.map_err(|error| format!("payload tag failed: {error}"))?,
Tag::parse(vec!["nonce", &nonce_hex])
.map_err(|error| format!("nonce tag failed: {error}"))?,
];
let event = EventBuilder::new(Kind::HttpAuth, "")
.tags(tags)
.sign_with_keys(keys)
.map_err(|error| format!("sign failed: {error}"))?;
Ok(format!(
"Nostr {}",
BASE64.encode(event.as_json().as_bytes())
))
}
// ── Error handling ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Classify a `send()` failure into a stable, URL-free error string.
///
/// The returned string always starts with `"relay unreachable:"` so the
/// frontend connectivity classifier can detect it with a simple prefix check.
pub(crate) fn classify_request_error(e: &reqwest::Error) -> String {
let display = e.to_string().to_lowercase();
if e.is_timeout() {
"relay unreachable: request timed out".to_string()
} else if e.is_connect() {
"relay unreachable: could not connect to relay".to_string()
} else if display.contains("dns") || display.contains("failed to lookup") {
"relay unreachable: relay host not found".to_string()
} else {
"relay unreachable: network error".to_string()
}
}
/// Preserve a body-consumption timeout as the stable connectivity classification.
///
/// `send()` resolves once response headers arrive, so a body that stalls past
/// the request deadline trips the timeout during body consumption rather than
/// at `send()`. That is a connectivity failure, not a malformed body or a plain
/// status error. Both body-consumption paths — the 2xx `parse_json_response`
/// and the non-2xx `relay_error_message` — route their consumption error
/// through this one helper so a stalled body can never be classified as
/// "request timed out" on one path while the other buries it under a malformed
/// or status label. Returns `Some("relay unreachable: request timed out")` for
/// a timeout; `None` otherwise, leaving the caller to apply its own non-timeout
/// label.
fn classify_body_timeout(e: &reqwest::Error) -> Option<String> {
e.is_timeout().then(|| classify_request_error(e))
}
/// Detect responses that were intercepted by a captive portal or auth proxy.
///
/// Returns `Some(msg)` when the response clearly did not come from the relay:
/// - Cloudflare Access redirect (final URL on `*.cloudflareaccess.com`)
/// - Any other HTML response (proxy login page, captive portal, etc.)
///
/// Pure function: takes the already-extracted host and content-type strings so
/// it can be unit-tested without constructing a real `reqwest::Response`.
fn classify_intercepted_response(final_host: &str, content_type: &str) -> Option<String> {
let host = final_host.to_lowercase();
let ct = content_type.to_lowercase();
// Cloudflare Access intercepts requests and redirects to its own domain.
// Label-boundary check prevents `notcloudflareaccess.com.evil.example` from
// matching.
if host == "cloudflareaccess.com" || host.ends_with(".cloudflareaccess.com") {
return Some(
"relay unreachable: network sign-in required (Cloudflare Access / VPN) \
— re-authenticate and reconnect"
.to_string(),
);
}
// Generic HTML body from any other proxy or captive portal.
if ct.contains("text/html") {
return Some(
"relay unreachable: relay returned an unexpected HTML page \
(VPN or proxy sign-in?)"
.to_string(),
);
}
None
}
/// Deserialize a successful response as JSON, guarding against intercepted pages.
///
/// Extracts the final URL host and `Content-Type` header before consuming the
/// response body. If the response looks like a captive-portal page, returns the
/// appropriate `"relay unreachable:"` message instead of attempting JSON parsing.
/// URL details are deliberately omitted from error strings so raw URLs are never
/// surfaced in the UI.
pub(crate) async fn parse_json_response<T: DeserializeOwned>(
response: reqwest::Response,
) -> Result<T, String> {
let final_host = response.url().host_str().unwrap_or("").to_string();
let content_type = response
.headers()
.get(reqwest::header::CONTENT_TYPE)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.unwrap_or("")
.to_string();
if let Some(msg) = classify_intercepted_response(&final_host, &content_type) {
return Err(msg);
}
// A successful HTTP response whose body fails to deserialize means the relay
// was reached but returned something unexpected (protocol mismatch, relay bug,
// corrupted body) — NOT a connectivity failure. Keep it off the
// "relay unreachable:" bucket so it surfaces loudly instead of being treated
// as a transient unreachable-relay condition. The reqwest error detail is
// dropped because it contains the raw URL.
//
// A body-consumption timeout is the exception: `send()` resolves once
// headers arrive, so a body that stalls past the request deadline trips the
// timeout HERE rather than at send(). That is a connectivity failure, not a
// malformed body, so route it through `classify_body_timeout` — the same
// helper the non-2xx error-body path uses — to preserve the stable
// "relay unreachable: request timed out" label.
response.json::<T>().await.map_err(|e| {
classify_body_timeout(&e).unwrap_or_else(|| MALFORMED_RESPONSE_MESSAGE.to_string())
})
}
/// Extract the `retry in Ns` hint from a rate-limit error string.
///
/// Matches the canonical format emitted by the relay in both HTTP 429 bodies
/// and CLOSED/NOTICE messages: `quota exceeded; retry in 4s`.
fn extract_retry_in_hint(body: &str) -> Option<u64> {
let re_match = body.find("retry in ")?;
let after = &body[re_match + "retry in ".len()..];
let digits: String = after.chars().take_while(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()).collect();
digits.parse::<u64>().ok()
}
pub async fn relay_error_message(response: reqwest::Response) -> String {
let status = response.status();
// Check for intercepted/proxy responses before reading the body.
let final_host = response.url().host_str().unwrap_or("").to_string();
let content_type = response
.headers()
.get(reqwest::header::CONTENT_TYPE)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.unwrap_or("")
.to_string();
if let Some(msg) = classify_intercepted_response(&final_host, &content_type) {
return msg;
}
// Real relay error: extract the structured message field if available.
// `text()` consumes the body, which — like the 2xx path — can trip the
// request deadline if the relay sends status headers then stalls the body.
// Preserve that timeout as the stable connectivity classification via the
// shared helper instead of letting `unwrap_or_default` swallow it into a
// bare status label. A non-timeout body error still degrades to an empty
// body → status-only message, exactly as before.
let body = match response.text().await {
Ok(body) => body,
Err(e) => {
if let Some(timeout) = classify_body_timeout(&e) {
return timeout;
}
String::new()
}
};
// 429 Too Many Requests → typed `relay rate-limited:` prefix so the TS
// client can report back-pressure without confusing it with a
// connectivity failure (`relay unreachable:`). Also arm the Rust-side
// admission gate here — the one place every relay HTTP error funnels
// through — so the next relay-backed command waits out the quota window
// instead of burning it (see `relay_admission`).
if status == reqwest::StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS {
let hint = extract_retry_in_hint(&body);
// Clamp the hint to MAX_HINT_SECONDS before arming the Rust gate AND
// before embedding it in the returned string, so the caller sees the
// same bounded hint the native HTTP gate actually honours.
let capped_hint = hint.map(|s| s.min(crate::relay_admission::MAX_HINT_SECONDS));
crate::relay_admission::activate_rate_limit(capped_hint);
if let Some(secs) = capped_hint {
return format!("relay rate-limited: retry in {secs}s");
}
return "relay rate-limited: quota exceeded".to_string();
}
if let Ok(value) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&body) {
if let Some(message) = value.get("message").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str) {
return format!("relay returned {status}: {message}");
}
if let Some(error) = value.get("error").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str) {
return format!("relay returned {status}: {error}");
}
}
// Non-JSON, non-HTML body: emit status only — no raw body in the UI.
format!("relay returned {status}")
}
// ── HTTP bridge: POST /query ────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Execute a one-shot query via the relay's HTTP bridge (`POST /query`).
///
/// Filters are serialized as a JSON array. The request is authenticated with
/// a NIP-98 event signed by the user's keys. Returns the deserialized array of
/// events.
pub async fn query_relay(
state: &AppState,
filters: &[serde_json::Value],
) -> Result<Vec<nostr::Event>, String> {
query_relay_at(state, &relay_api_base_url_with_override(state), filters).await
}
/// Like [`query_relay`] but targets an explicit HTTP API base URL instead of
/// the workspace override. Used when a query must hit a specific relay (e.g.
/// reconciling an agent's profile on the relay where it was published).
pub async fn query_relay_at(
state: &AppState,
api_base_url: &str,
filters: &[serde_json::Value],
) -> Result<Vec<nostr::Event>, String> {
crate::relay_admission::wait_for_rate_limit().await;
let url = format!("{}/query", api_base_url);
let body_bytes =
serde_json::to_vec(filters).map_err(|e| format!("filter serialization failed: {e}"))?;
let auth = build_nip98_auth_header(&Method::POST, &url, &body_bytes, state)?;
send_query_request(
&state.http_client,
&url,
&auth,
None,
body_bytes,
QUERY_REQUEST_TIMEOUT,
)
.await
}
pub async fn query_relay_at_with_keys(
state: &AppState,
api_base_url: &str,
filters: &[serde_json::Value],
keys: &Keys,
auth_tag: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<Vec<nostr::Event>, String> {
crate::relay_admission::wait_for_rate_limit().await;
let url = format!("{}/query", api_base_url);
let body_bytes =
serde_json::to_vec(filters).map_err(|e| format!("filter serialization failed: {e}"))?;
let auth = build_nip98_auth_header_for_keys(keys, &Method::POST, &url, &body_bytes)?;
send_query_request(
&state.http_client,
&url,
&auth,
auth_tag,
body_bytes,
QUERY_REQUEST_TIMEOUT,
)
.await
}
/// Build an authenticated relay HTTP request using already-signed NIP-98 auth.
///
/// The caller owns request ordering around this helper: rate-limit admission,
/// egress checks, URL/body construction, send, error classification, and response
/// parsing remain outside. `body` is accepted as final bytes so this helper never
/// reserializes, normalizes, or changes the payload that was signed.
fn build_authenticated_relay_request(
client: &reqwest::Client,
method: Method,
url: &str,
auth: &str,
body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
auth_tag: Option<&str>,
timeout: Option<std::time::Duration>,
) -> RequestBuilder {
let mut request = client.request(method, url).header("Authorization", auth);
if body.is_some() {
request = request.header("Content-Type", "application/json");
}
if let Some(tag) = auth_tag {
request = request.header("x-auth-tag", tag);
}
if let Some(timeout) = timeout {
request = request.timeout(timeout);
}
if let Some(body) = body {
request = request.body(body);
}
request
}
/// Issue an authenticated `POST /query` and parse the response, applying the
/// per-request `timeout` that bounds a stalled or half-open relay connection.
///
/// Both `/query` builders funnel through this one helper so the timeout can
/// never be applied to one builder and dropped from the other, and so a test
/// can drive the real send/timeout/classify path with a short deadline against
/// a stalled loopback. A timeout surfaces through `classify_request_error` as
/// the stable `"relay unreachable: request timed out"` string.
async fn send_query_request(
http_client: &reqwest::Client,
url: &str,
auth: &str,
auth_tag: Option<&str>,
body_bytes: Vec<u8>,
timeout: std::time::Duration,
) -> Result<Vec<nostr::Event>, String> {
let response = build_authenticated_relay_request(
http_client,
Method::POST,
url,
auth,
Some(body_bytes),
auth_tag,
Some(timeout),
)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| classify_request_error(&e))?;
if !response.status().is_success() {
return Err(relay_error_message(response).await);
}
parse_json_response(response).await
}
// ── Command response parsing ────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Parse a command-event OK message of the form `"response:<json>"`.
///
/// Buzz's command kinds (e.g. 41010, 30620, 46020) acknowledge writes via
/// relay OK messages whose payload is a `response:`-prefixed JSON document.
/// This helper strips the prefix and deserializes the remainder as `T`.
pub fn parse_command_response<T: DeserializeOwned>(message: &str) -> Result<T, String> {
// Try the spec format first: "response:{...}".
if let Some(json) = message.strip_prefix("response:") {
return serde_json::from_str(json).map_err(|e| format!("response parse failed: {e}"));
}
// Fallback: raw JSON (backward compat for relays that omit the prefix).
serde_json::from_str(message)
.map_err(|e| format!("expected 'response:' prefix or valid JSON, got: {message} ({e})"))
}
// ── Profile event builder ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Build a signed kind:0 profile event, optionally injecting a verified NIP-OA auth tag.
///
/// This is a pure function (no I/O) extracted from `sync_managed_agent_profile` so that
/// the event-building and auth-tag-injection logic can be unit tested without HTTP calls.
///
/// `buzz-sdk` uses `nostr 0.36` while the desktop crate uses `nostr 0.37`. Cross-version
/// bridging is done via hex-encoded public keys and raw tag slices — both versions share the
/// same wire format.
fn build_profile_event(
agent_keys: &nostr::Keys,
display_name: &str,
avatar_url: Option<&str>,
about: Option<&str>,
auth_tag_json: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<nostr::Event, String> {
let builder = crate::events::build_profile(Some(display_name), None, avatar_url, about, None)?;
let builder = if let Some(tag_json) = auth_tag_json {
// Bridge nostr 0.37 PublicKey → nostr 0.36 PublicKey via hex encoding.
let agent_pubkey_hex = agent_keys.public_key().to_hex();
let compat_pubkey = nostr::PublicKey::from_hex(&agent_pubkey_hex)
.map_err(|e| format!("failed to convert agent pubkey for auth verification: {e}"))?;
// Verify Schnorr signature before injecting into profile event.
buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::verify_auth_tag(tag_json, &compat_pubkey)
.map_err(|e| format!("auth tag verification failed for profile event: {e}"))?;
// parse_auth_tag returns a nostr 0.36 Tag; bridge to nostr 0.37 via raw slice.
let compat_tag = buzz_sdk_pkg::nip_oa::parse_auth_tag(tag_json)
.map_err(|e| format!("failed to parse verified auth tag: {e}"))?;
let tag = nostr::Tag::parse(compat_tag.as_slice())
.map_err(|e| format!("failed to convert auth tag to nostr 0.37: {e}"))?;
builder.tags([tag])
} else {
builder
};
builder
.sign_with_keys(agent_keys)
.map_err(|e| format!("failed to sign profile event: {e}"))
}
pub(crate) mod profile_avatar;
// ── Managed-agent profile sync ──────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Sync a managed agent's kind:0 profile event to the relay using NIP-98 auth.
///
/// The agent signs its own profile event and the NIP-98 HTTP-auth event, so no
/// API token is required. `about` carries the agent's authored public
/// description (see `managed_agents::record_effective_description`); the
/// relay treats kind:0
/// fields as absolute, so passing `None` clears any previously published about.
/// Configured-community avatar media is copied into this target before signing;
/// transfer failure never replaces the existing profile with a foreign URL.
pub async fn sync_managed_agent_profile(
state: &AppState,
relay_url: &str,
agent_keys: &nostr::Keys,
display_name: &str,
avatar_url: Option<&str>,
about: Option<&str>,
auth_tag: Option<&str>, // NIP-OA auth tag JSON
) -> Result<(), String> {
crate::relay_admission::wait_for_rate_limit().await;
// Resolve media before replacing the complete profile. A failed transfer
// leaves the previous kind:0 untouched and the saved source available to retry.
let avatar_url =
profile_avatar::localize_avatar(state, relay_url, agent_keys, avatar_url, auth_tag).await?;
let event = build_profile_event(
agent_keys,
display_name,
avatar_url.as_deref(),
about,
auth_tag,
)?;
let event_json = event.as_json();
let body_bytes = event_json.into_bytes();
crate::egress_guard::assert_no_key_backup_bytes(&body_bytes, "agent profile sync")?;
let url = format!("{}/events", relay_http_base_url(relay_url));
let auth = build_nip98_auth_header_for_keys(agent_keys, &Method::POST, &url, &body_bytes)?;
let mut request = state
.media_fetch_client
.post(&url)
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30))
.header("Authorization", auth)
.header("Content-Type", "application/json");
if let Some(tag) = auth_tag {
request = request.header("x-auth-tag", tag);
}
let response = request
.body(body_bytes)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| classify_request_error(&e))?;
if !response.status().is_success() {
let msg = relay_error_message(response).await;
return Err(format!(
"Could not sync the agent's profile metadata: {msg}"
));
}
let result: SubmitEventResponse = parse_json_response(response).await?;
if !result.accepted {
return Err(format!("relay rejected agent profile: {}", result.message));
}
Ok(())
}
// ── Agent profile query ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Query the relay for an agent's kind:0 profile event.
///
/// Queries the relay identified by `relay_url`. Callers uniformly pass the
/// relay resolved by `effective_agent_relay_url` for every agent regardless of
/// backend — always the active workspace relay — so the query targets the host
/// the profile is actually published to.
///
/// Returns the parsed profile content (display_name, picture, about) if a
/// kind:0 event exists for the given pubkey, or `None` if no profile is
/// published.
pub async fn query_agent_profile(
state: &AppState,
relay_url: &str,
agent_pubkey: &str,
) -> Result<Option<AgentProfileInfo>, String> {
let filter = serde_json::json!({
"authors": [agent_pubkey],
"kinds": [0],
"limit": 1
});
let events = query_relay_at(state, &relay_http_base_url(relay_url), &[filter]).await?;
let Some(event) = events.first() else {
return Ok(None);
};
let Ok(content) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&event.content) else {
return Ok(None);
};
Ok(Some(AgentProfileInfo {
display_name: content
.get("display_name")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(str::to_string),
picture: content
.get("picture")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(str::to_string),
about: content
.get("about")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(str::to_string),
}))
}
/// Parsed fields from a kind:0 profile event.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AgentProfileInfo {
pub display_name: Option<String>,
pub picture: Option<String>,
/// Published public description (kind:0 `about`).
pub about: Option<String>,
}
// ── Signed-event submission ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
mod get;
pub use get::get_relay_json;
mod submit;
pub use submit::{
submit_event, submit_event_at_created_at, submit_event_at_with_keys,
submit_event_with_keys_created_at, submit_signed_event_at_with_keys, SubmitEventResponse,
};
/// Sign an event with explicit keys and POST it to `/events` with NIP-98 auth.
///
/// Managed-agent flows use this to publish as the agent itself while still
/// including the stored NIP-OA auth tag when the relay requires owner-backed
/// membership.
pub async fn submit_event_with_keys(
builder: nostr::EventBuilder,
state: &AppState,
keys: &Keys,
auth_tag: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<SubmitEventResponse, String> {
let event = builder
.sign_with_keys(keys)
.map_err(|e| format!("failed to sign event: {e}"))?;
submit_signed_event_with_keys(&event, state, keys, auth_tag).await
}
/// POST an already-signed event using the same explicit identity for NIP-98.
pub async fn submit_signed_event_with_keys(
event: &nostr::Event,
state: &AppState,
keys: &Keys,
auth_tag: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<SubmitEventResponse, String> {
if event.pubkey != keys.public_key() {
return Err("signed event does not match the publishing identity".to_string());
}
crate::relay_admission::wait_for_rate_limit().await;
let url = format!("{}/events", relay_api_base_url_with_override(state));
let body_bytes = event.as_json().into_bytes();
crate::egress_guard::assert_no_key_backup_bytes(&body_bytes, "signed event submit (keys)")?;
let auth_header = build_nip98_auth_header_for_keys(keys, &Method::POST, &url, &body_bytes)?;
let mut request = state
.http_client
.post(&url)
.header("Authorization", auth_header)
.header("Content-Type", "application/json");
if let Some(tag) = auth_tag {
request = request.header("x-auth-tag", tag);
}
let response = request
.body(body_bytes)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| classify_request_error(&e))?;
if !response.status().is_success() {
return Err(relay_error_message(response).await);
}
let result: SubmitEventResponse = parse_json_response(response).await?;
if !result.accepted {
return Err(format!("relay rejected event: {}", result.message));
}
Ok(result)
}
// ── Tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;