Files
buzz/mobile/lib/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart
Wes f59b326568 Fix mobile onboarding policy loading, browser cancellation and pairing feedback (#8874)
Mobile onboarding could reject valid large legal documents, stay busy
after closing Android browser sign-in, and hide pairing-import errors
behind the community-link form. This change bounds join-policy responses
at 4 MiB while retaining 64 KiB for other responses, handles Android
browser cancellation through the native lifecycle/channel, keeps Cancel
sign-in usable, and shows friendly pairing errors on the landing screen
with a live-region announcement. Identity mismatch checks remain intact.

The browser-cancellation implementation incorporates the candidate from
#8847 (`cb241b3f1`); coordinate landing to avoid duplicate work. This PR
consolidates the three fixes exercised together during Android
onboarding acceptance.

## Validation

- Pixel 9 / Android 17, production hosted services, isolated debug
installs. Human acceptance plus native UI, saved public-identity and
restart checks as noted below. No iOS acceptance in this session.
- Latest build and invite-first acceptance: base
`a12ad1cdd29da8b2923eca5408e963a2659777ab` plus these patches.
- Focused tests on that base plus patches: **88 passed** across
hosted_journeys_test, hosted_admission_test, browser_auth_test,
pairing_hosted_handoff_test and pairing_provider_test, with
`BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz`.
- Earlier baseline: 81 focused cases passed plus one
staging-configuration case passed separately (82 distinct cases across
seven onboarding/recovery files); these are historical, not current-head
certification.
- Earlier policy change: 41 focused tests, changed-file analysis and
isolated mutation check passed on the earlier base. Earlier browser
candidate native instrumentation/mutation evidence was not rerun on this
combined revision.
- Android debug APK built and installed successfully. Mandatory
commit/push hooks passed at `6442e5ff9`: analysis clean; mobile tests
4,047 passed / 34 skipped; additional package runs 4 and 27 passed;
file-size checks passed. These broad tests ran through the required push
hook, not a manually invoked suite. CI remains pending.

## Live testing report — October 31

| Journey | Result and evidence boundary |
|---|---|
| Fresh email signup / identity / hosted invite | Reproduced policy
response exceeding 64 KiB; after fix, admission and restart passed.
Profile/message visible locally; cross-account message receipt remains
unproven. Tested at `cfcaef4e9f` plus policy patch. |
| Browser close → retry → login → existing identity recovery → restart |
Passed at `d14f33a170` plus patches; recovered the expected public
identity and community. |
| Pairing a different identity into an existing install | Rejected
without replacing the original key. Initially hidden error became
visible with friendly copy; Back and restart preserved the community at
`b80217de3` plus patches. |
| Fresh pairing → wait for desktop approval → sign-in → community →
restart | Passed at `20742a236` plus patches; human confirmed approval
gate, saved public identity matched. |
| First-time desktop cancellation → welcome → fresh QR retry → community
→ restart | Passed at `20742a236` plus patches. Cancellation error
remained raw `user_denied`. |
| Android system Back while awaiting pairing approval | Human-confirmed
in already-onboarded Add Community; first-time phone-side Back variation
remains untested. |
| Wrong pairing code → rejection → correction → completion |
Human-confirmed at `a2540fbe3` plus patches. Exact error and
same-session versus fresh-QR retry were not independently captured. |
| Interrupt account onboarding at community picker → process restart →
recovery → admission | Passed at `a2540fbe3` plus patches. Restart
opened Add a community; Find my communities restored choices without
another login. Human completed admission. No destination had yet been
selected. |
| Invite-first into fresh signed-out app → intended community → restart
| Passed at `a12ad1cdd` plus patches; saved identity/destination
matched. Existing member and existing browser session. Initial Android
VIEW intent explicitly targeted the test package; ordinary HTTPS default
app-link resolution and new-member admission remain untested. |
| Malformed community input → error → Back → restart | Passed for `not a
community`; original community preserved. `not-a-community` is a valid
single-label hostname and was not counted as malformed-input evidence. |

## Remaining gaps and findings

Not release certification. Pairing landing-error regression/mutation
evidence is now recorded below. Current combined-revision native
instrumentation has not been rerun; its limited scope is described
below.

Deferred behavior, not implemented here:
- Wrong browser account after fresh pairing is correctly rejected, but
Retry reuses that app account session; in-app account switching must
preserve the transferred identity and destination. The live happy path
used a manual browser-account switch and fresh install.
- Pairing wait has no visible Cancel; tested system Back works.
- Desktop cancellation exposes raw error wording.
- Interrupted community selection requires an extra Find my communities
step.

Master checklist remains partial: seven categories exercised this
session, signup/community creation has historical coverage, seven
categories unexercised. New-member link-first admission, deeper
interruption/server-commit recovery, expiry/revocation/network failures,
key import, organization/self-hosted paths, phone-to-desktop transfer,
eligibility gates, accessibility/app-link variants and iOS require
separate coverage. Channel-discovery work is separate (#8869).

## Review checkpoint

[Carl’s
review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8874#pullrequestreview-5724095754)
found no code blockers at `6442e5ff9`. Carl also reviewed test-only
follow-up `d43958653` and found no issues, accepting both validation
gaps as closed. A subsequent review identified stale callback → resume
cancelling a newer Android login. A narrow native fix and regression
validation are in progress; prior readiness attestation is withdrawn
pending this behavior change.

- **Android stack check passed (Pixel 9, Android 17):** after fresh
account sign-in, the human stopped at the community picker without
closing/restarting. `dumpsys activity activities` showed exactly one
MainActivity in Invite First task 567, with no CustomTab in that task or
the full component list. ChromeTabbedActivity remained in a separate
pre-existing browser task. This rules out a lingering duplicate activity
in this run; it does not independently trace `onNewIntent` or establish
all Android/browser variants. Binary production sources match
`6442e5ff9`.
- **Pairing regression/mutation passed:** extended the existing QR
journey using the real encrypted NIP-AB import and hosted coordinator.
Asserts visible friendly mismatch feedback, live-region wrapper,
unchanged stored community/account identity, and Back to home. Reused
the existing socket fake. Hosted journey + pairing provider files: 70
passed with configured auth domain; opt-out hosted journey file: 3
passed / 21 skipped; changed-file analysis clean. Isolated clone:
control passed, hiding the landing error failed the visible text
assertion, restoration passed. No production source change in this
follow-up.
- **Duplicate landing:** #8847 is superseded by this combined PR; its
Android slice is included here. No merge performed.

BrowserAuthPluginTest manually drives plugin hooks using an unmanaged
Activity and fake browser launcher. It proves the plugin state machine
only, not MainActivity wiring, real lifecycle order, process death, or
duplicate app_links callback delivery. Current CI does not run Android
instrumentation. Android ignores the debug ephemeral-login flag and
shares browser cookies.

Readiness checklist: agent review completed on production changes and
test follow-up; agent exercised the changed behavior; human completed
the documented Android journeys and final sign-in check.



## Stale callback follow-up (`b7aaaa788`)

Addresses [the later Android lifecycle
review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8874#pullrequestreview-5724197312):
a recognized callback now clears browser-dismissal tracking before
rejecting a mismatched state. A stale callback cannot complete or cancel
the newer login. The existing native journey now includes the
intervening resume, successful current callback, and genuine browser
dismissal after a stale callback. Only two native files changed; policy
and pairing fixes are unchanged.

Validation: 88 focused Dart tests passed. Android app and test APK build
passed. On Pixel 9, the native plugin journey passed; in an isolated
source/Git/build clone, removing the reset failed at the newer attempt's
expected-zero-replies assertion; exact restoration passed. This proves
the plugin state machine on Android, not a real late browser callback
through OS lifecycle delivery. Carl reviewed `b7aaaa788` and found the
fix correct and minimal with no blockers. Human browser-close/retry
check remains pending; PR stays draft until that passes. Current-head CI
is also required for merge.

Accepted limitation: if a recognized stale callback arrives after the
current browser tab has already gone, automatic dismissal is suppressed
and the user may need the visible Cancel button. The callback cannot
complete sign-in without matching state; Dart validation remains
authoritative.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-10-31 12:43:01 -06:00

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import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:math' as math;
import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import '../../shared/auth/auth.dart';
import '../../shared/hosted/hosted_flow_provider.dart';
import '../../shared/hosted/account_identity_store.dart';
import '../../shared/hosted/hosted_environment.dart';
import '../../shared/community/paired_community_landing.dart';
import '../../shared/crypto/ecdh.dart';
import '../../shared/crypto/nip44.dart';
import '../../shared/relay/relay.dart';
import '../../shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart';
import 'pairing_crypto.dart';
import 'pairing_socket.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/event_signing.dart';
part 'pairing_provider_helpers.dart';
part 'pairing_state.dart';
/// HTTP client used by [PairingNotifier] for the validation request.
final pairingHttpClientProvider = Provider<http.Client>((ref) {
final client = http.Client();
ref.onDispose(client.close);
return client;
});
typedef PairingSocketFactory =
PairingSocket Function({
required String wsUrl,
required String ephemeralPrivkey,
required void Function(List<dynamic> message) onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
});
typedef PairingCredentialValidator =
Future<void> Function({required String relayUrl, required String? nsec});
const identityExportAuthorizationTtl = Duration(minutes: 2);
final identityExportClockProvider = Provider<DateTime Function()>((ref) {
return DateTime.now;
});
class PairingNotifier extends Notifier<PairingState> {
final PairingSocketFactory _socketFactory;
final PairingCredentialValidator? _credentialValidator;
final RelaySocketFactory _validationSocketFactory;
RelaySocket? _validationSocket;
PairingSocket? _socket;
Timer? _sessionTimeout;
Completer<bool>? _codeResult;
String? _codeRequestId;
int _codeRequestSequence = 0;
Community? _identityExportCommunity;
bool _identityExportBiometricOnly = false;
PairingNotifier({
PairingSocketFactory? socketFactory,
PairingCredentialValidator? credentialValidator,
RelaySocketFactory validationSocketFactory = RelaySocket.new,
}) : _socketFactory = socketFactory ?? _createPairingSocket,
_credentialValidator = credentialValidator,
_validationSocketFactory = validationSocketFactory;
static PairingSocket _createPairingSocket({
required String wsUrl,
required String ephemeralPrivkey,
required void Function(List<dynamic> message) onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
}) => PairingSocket(
wsUrl: wsUrl,
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
@override
PairingState build() {
ref.onDispose(_cleanup);
return const PairingState();
}
Future<void> pair(String rawInput) async {
if (state.status == PairingStatus.connecting ||
state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.status == PairingStatus.transferring) {
return;
}
final trimmed = rawInput.trim();
if (trimmed.startsWith('nostrpair://')) {
return _pairNipAb(trimmed);
}
// Legacy buzz:// flow.
return _pairLegacy(trimmed);
}
Future<bool> authorizeIdentityExport({required Community community}) async {
if (state.authorizationInProgress) return false;
final biometricOnly =
community.sensitiveActionPolicy == SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled;
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(
authorizationInProgress: true,
clearErrorMessage: true,
);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizationSessionProvider)
.authorize(biometricOnly: biometricOnly);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration) return false;
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
state = state.copyWith(
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _authorizationError(result),
);
return false;
}
// Keep the authorized snapshot and exported payload in the same key
// representation used by RelayConfig for authentication.
_identityExportCommunity = community.copyWith(nsec: community.nsec?.trim());
_identityExportBiometricOnly = biometricOnly;
_identityExportAuthorizedAt = ref.read(identityExportClockProvider)();
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: false);
return true;
}
/// Confirm that the SAS code matches. Called by the UI after user approval.
void confirmSas() {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
_userConfirmedSas = true;
state = state.copyWith(userConfirmedSas: true);
if (_sasConfirmReceived) unawaited(_continueAfterSas());
}
/// Check user input with the source; never compare a QR-derived SAS when the
/// source has negotiated an independent desktop-only code.
Future<bool> verifyDesktopCode(String code) async {
if (!state.requiresDesktopCode ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
_codeResult != null ||
!RegExp(r'^\d{6}$').hasMatch(code)) {
return false;
}
final result = Completer<bool>();
_codeResult = result;
_codeRequestId = '${++_codeRequestSequence}';
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: _encryptMessage({
'type': 'code-submit',
'code': code,
'request_id': _codeRequestId,
}),
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
try {
// Keep this logical attempt pending until its response or session cleanup.
// A local deadline cannot undo a guess already consumed by the source.
return await result.future;
} finally {
if (identical(_codeResult, result)) {
_codeResult = null;
_codeRequestId = null;
}
}
}
void setProtectSensitiveActions(bool value) {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.sendsIdentityToDesktop ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
state = state.copyWith(protectSensitiveActions: value);
}
Future<void> _continueAfterSas() async {
if (!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (_sendIdentityToSource && !_exportIdentityIsCurrent()) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
errorMessage:
'The active community changed. Start identity export again.',
);
return;
}
final authorizedAt = _identityExportAuthorizedAt;
final elapsed = authorizedAt == null
? null
: ref.read(identityExportClockProvider)().difference(authorizedAt);
final hasFreshExportAuthorization =
elapsed != null &&
!elapsed.isNegative &&
elapsed < identityExportAuthorizationTtl;
if (_sendIdentityToSource && !hasFreshExportAuthorization) {
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: true);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizationSessionProvider)
.authorize(biometricOnly: _identityExportBiometricOnly);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
!state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _authorizationError(result),
);
return;
}
} else if (!_sendIdentityToSource && state.protectSensitiveActions) {
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: true);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider)
.authorizeBiometricProtection();
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
!state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _biometricProtectionError(result),
);
return;
}
}
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
status: PairingStatus.transferring,
authorizationInProgress: false,
);
if (_sendIdentityToSource) {
_sendIdentityPayload();
} else {
final pending = _pendingPayload;
if (pending != null) {
_pendingPayload = null;
_handlePayload(pending);
}
}
}
static String _biometricProtectionError(
DeviceAuthResult result,
) => switch (result) {
DeviceAuthResult.cancelled =>
'Biometric setup was cancelled. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.unavailable =>
'Biometrics are unavailable. Enroll Face ID or biometrics and try again, or turn this option off.',
DeviceAuthResult.lockedOut =>
'Biometrics are locked. Unlock them in system settings and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.failed =>
'Biometric confirmation failed. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.success => '',
};
static String _authorizationError(
DeviceAuthResult result,
) => switch (result) {
DeviceAuthResult.cancelled =>
'Identity confirmation was cancelled. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.unavailable =>
'Device authentication is unavailable. Configure a device passcode or biometrics and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.lockedOut =>
'Device authentication is locked. Unlock it in system settings and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.failed =>
'Identity confirmation failed. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.success => '',
};
/// Deny the SAS code. Send abort and terminate.
void denySas() {
_sendAbort('sas_mismatch');
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'SAS code mismatch — pairing cancelled for security.',
);
}
void reset() {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState();
}
void _cleanup() {
if (_codeResult?.isCompleted == false) _codeResult!.complete(false);
_codeResult = null;
_codeRequestId = null;
_pairingGeneration++;
_validationSocket?.dispose();
_validationSocket = null;
_sessionTimeout?.cancel();
_sessionTimeout = null;
_socket?.dispose();
_socket = null;
_processedEventIds.clear();
_publishedEventIds.clear();
_sasConfirmReceived = false;
_userConfirmedSas = false;
_pendingPayload = null;
_sendIdentityToSource = false;
_identityExportCommunity = null;
_identityExportBiometricOnly = false;
_identityExportAuthorizedAt = null;
}
// ── NIP-AB pairing flow ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Session state kept between steps.
String? _ephemeralPrivkey;
String? _ephemeralPubkey;
Uint8List? _sessionSecret;
String? _sourcePubkey;
Uint8List? _sessionId;
Uint8List? _sasInput;
Uint8List? _conversationKey;
bool _sasConfirmReceived = false;
bool _userConfirmedSas = false;
bool _sendIdentityToSource = false;
int _pairingGeneration = 0;
DateTime? _identityExportAuthorizedAt;
Map<String, dynamic>? _pendingPayload; // buffered until user confirms SAS
final Set<String> _publishedEventIds = {};
final Set<String> _processedEventIds = {}; // NIP-AB §Duplicate Event Handling
Future<void> _pairNipAb(String uri) async {
final generation = _pairingGeneration;
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.connecting);
try {
// 1. Parse the nostrpair:// URI.
final qr = parseNostrpairUri(uri);
_sourcePubkey = qr.sourcePubkey;
_sessionSecret = qr.sessionSecret;
_sendIdentityToSource =
Uri.parse(uri).queryParameters['mode'] == 'recover';
final relayWsUrl = qr.relays.first;
// 2. Generate ephemeral keypair.
final keychain = nostr.Keys.generate();
_ephemeralPrivkey = keychain.secret;
_ephemeralPubkey = keychain.public;
// 3. Derive session ID and SAS immediately (we know source pubkey from QR).
_sessionId = deriveSessionId(qr.sessionSecret);
final ecdhShared = ecdhSharedSecret(_ephemeralPrivkey!, qr.sourcePubkey);
final (sasCode, sasInput) = deriveSas(ecdhShared, qr.sessionSecret);
_sasInput = sasInput;
// Pre-compute NIP-44 conversation key for encrypting events.
_conversationKey = getConversationKey(
_ephemeralPrivkey!,
qr.sourcePubkey,
);
// 4. Connect to relay with ephemeral keys.
final socket = _socketFactory(
wsUrl: relayWsUrl,
ephemeralPrivkey: _ephemeralPrivkey!,
onMessage: (message) {
if (generation == _pairingGeneration) _handleRelayMessage(message);
},
onDisconnected: (error) {
if (generation == _pairingGeneration) _handleDisconnected(error);
},
);
_socket = socket;
await socket.connect();
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
if (!socket.isConnected) {
throw StateError('Pairing socket did not reach the connected state');
}
// 5. Subscribe for kind:24134 events tagged to our ephemeral pubkey.
socket.subscribe('pair', 24134, _ephemeralPubkey!);
// 6. Wait briefly for EOSE, then send offer.
// (In practice, we send the offer immediately — the relay will buffer it.)
await Future.delayed(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
// 7. Build and send the offer event.
final offerContent = _encryptMessage({
'type': 'offer',
if (!_sendIdentityToSource) 'confirmation': 'desktop-code-v1',
'version': 1,
'session_id': bytesToHex(_sessionId!),
});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: offerContent,
tags: [
['p', qr.sourcePubkey],
],
);
// 8. Display SAS code and wait for sas-confirm from source.
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
sasCode: formatSas(sasCode),
sendsIdentityToDesktop: _sendIdentityToSource,
protectSensitiveActions: ref.read(relayConfigProvider).nsec == null,
);
// 9. Start 120s session timeout.
_sessionTimeout = Timer(const Duration(seconds: 120), () {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.success &&
state.status != PairingStatus.error) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Pairing session timed out.',
);
}
});
} on FormatException catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Invalid pairing code: ${e.message}',
);
} catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
debugPrint('Pairing connection error: $e');
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: _friendlyErrorMessage(e),
);
}
}
void _handleRelayMessage(List<dynamic> data) {
if (data.isEmpty) return;
final type = data[0] as String;
final rejected =
type == 'OK' &&
data.length >= 3 &&
_publishedEventIds.remove(data[1]) &&
data[2] == false;
final closed = type == 'CLOSED' && data.length >= 2 && data[1] == 'pair';
if ((rejected || closed) &&
state.status != PairingStatus.success &&
state.status != PairingStatus.error) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Pairing couldn’t continue. Scan a new desktop QR code and try again.',
);
return;
}
if (type == 'EVENT' && data.length >= 3) {
final eventJson = data[2] as Map<String, dynamic>;
_handlePairingEvent(eventJson);
}
// Ignore EOSE, NOTICE, etc.
}
void _handlePairingEvent(Map<String, dynamic> eventJson) {
try {
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: validate kind.
final kind = eventJson['kind'] as int?;
if (kind != 24134) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: validate pubkey is from expected source.
final eventPubkey = eventJson['pubkey'] as String?;
if (eventPubkey == null) return;
if (_sourcePubkey != null && eventPubkey != _sourcePubkey) return;
// NIP-AB §Duplicate Event Handling: discard already-processed events.
final eventId = eventJson['id'] as String?;
if (eventId == null) return;
if (_processedEventIds.contains(eventId)) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: check p-tag points to us.
final tags = (eventJson['tags'] as List<dynamic>?) ?? [];
final hasOurPTag = tags.any((t) {
if (t is List && t.length >= 2) {
return t[0] == 'p' && t[1] == _ephemeralPubkey;
}
return false;
});
if (!hasOurPTag) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: verify event signature (NIP-01).
// The nostr package's Event.fromJson verifies id + sig on construction.
try {
final event = verifiedNostrEventFromJson(jsonEncode(eventJson));
if (event.id != eventId) return; // id mismatch
} catch (_) {
return; // invalid signature or malformed event
}
// Decrypt NIP-44 content.
final content = eventJson['content'] as String?;
if (content == null || content.isEmpty) return;
final decryptKey = getConversationKey(_ephemeralPrivkey!, eventPubkey);
final decrypted = nip44Decrypt(decryptKey, content);
final msg = jsonDecode(decrypted) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final msgType = msg['type'] as String?;
switch (msgType) {
case 'desktop-code':
if (!_sendIdentityToSource &&
state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas &&
!_sasConfirmReceived) {
state = state.copyWith(requiresDesktopCode: true);
}
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'code-rejected':
if (state.requiresDesktopCode &&
msg['request_id'] == _codeRequestId &&
_codeResult?.isCompleted == false) {
_codeResult!.complete(false);
if (msg['remaining_attempts'] == 0) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Too many incorrect codes. Scan a new desktop QR code and try again.',
);
}
}
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'sas-confirm':
_handleSasConfirm(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId); // record after successful processing
case 'payload':
_handlePayload(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'abort':
_handleAbort(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'complete':
_handleComplete(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
}
} catch (e) {
// Silently discard invalid events per NIP-AB §Event Validation.
}
}
void _handleSasConfirm(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas) return;
final receivedHash = msg['transcript_hash'] as String?;
if (receivedHash == null) return;
// Verify transcript hash.
final expectedHash = deriveTranscriptHash(
_sessionId!,
hexToBytes(_sourcePubkey!),
hexToBytes(_ephemeralPubkey!),
_sasInput!,
_sessionSecret!,
);
final receivedBytes = hexToBytes(receivedHash);
if (!constantTimeEquals(receivedBytes, expectedHash)) {
// NIP-AB §Step 3: target MUST send abort with reason "sas_mismatch".
_sendAbort('sas_mismatch');
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Security verification failed — possible attack. Pairing aborted.',
);
return;
}
_sasConfirmReceived = true;
if (state.requiresDesktopCode && _codeResult?.isCompleted == false) {
_codeResult!.complete(true);
}
// If the user already tapped "Codes Match", complete the transition now
// that the transcript hash is verified.
if (_userConfirmedSas) {
unawaited(_continueAfterSas());
}
// Otherwise stay in confirmingSas — user must still confirm via confirmSas().
}
bool _exportIdentityIsCurrent() {
final authorizedCommunity = _identityExportCommunity;
final currentConfig = ref.read(relayConfigProvider);
return authorizedCommunity != null &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec != null &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec!.isNotEmpty &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec == currentConfig.nsec &&
authorizedCommunity.relayUrl == currentConfig.storedOrigin;
}
void _sendIdentityPayload() {
if (!_exportIdentityIsCurrent()) {
_sendAbort('identity_changed');
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'The active community changed. Start identity export again.',
);
return;
}
final nsec = _identityExportCommunity!.nsec!;
final content = _encryptMessage({
'type': 'payload',
'payload_type': 'nsec',
'payload': nsec,
});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
}
void _handlePayload(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
// Only accept payload after the transcript hash was verified.
if (!_sasConfirmReceived) return;
// If the user hasn't confirmed SAS yet, buffer the payload.
// It will be processed when confirmSas() is called.
if (state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas) {
_pendingPayload = msg;
return;
}
if (state.status != PairingStatus.transferring) return;
state = state.copyWith(status: PairingStatus.storing);
final payloadType = msg['payload_type'] as String?;
final payload = msg['payload'] as String?;
if (payload == null) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Received empty payload from source.',
);
return;
}
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
final protectSensitiveActions = state.protectSensitiveActions;
unawaited(
_processPayload(
payloadType,
payload,
pairingGeneration: pairingGeneration,
protectSensitiveActions: protectSensitiveActions,
),
);
}
void _handleComplete(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
if (!_sendIdentityToSource || state.status != PairingStatus.transferring) {
return;
}
if (msg['success'] != true) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Desktop could not store the identity.',
);
return;
}
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.success);
}
void _handleAbort(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
final reason = msg['reason'] as String? ?? 'unknown';
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Source device aborted pairing: $reason',
);
}
Future<void> _processPayload(
String? payloadType,
String payload, {
required int pairingGeneration,
required bool protectSensitiveActions,
}) async {
try {
// Parse the custom payload.
final data = jsonDecode(payload) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final relayUrl = data['relayUrl'] as String?;
final pubkey = data['pubkey'] as String?;
final nsec = data['nsec'] as String?;
if (relayUrl == null) {
throw const FormatException('Missing relayUrl in payload');
}
// Validate relay URL to prevent SSRF via private network addresses.
_validateRelayUrl(relayUrl);
state = state.copyWith(destinationRelayUrl: relayUrl);
final community = Community.create(
name: Community.nameFromUrl(relayUrl),
relayUrl: relayUrl,
pubkey: pubkey,
nsec: nsec,
sensitiveActionPolicy: protectSensitiveActions
? SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled
: SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
bool current() =>
pairingGeneration == _pairingGeneration &&
state.status == PairingStatus.storing &&
!_sendIdentityToSource;
if (HostedEnvironment.requiresAuth(Uri.parse(relayUrl).host)) {
final flow = ref.read(hostedFlowProvider);
await flow.stagePairedCommunity(community, isCurrent: current);
if (!current()) return;
// NIP-AB complete acknowledges durable transfer, not hosted admission.
_sendComplete(true);
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState();
unawaited(flow.retry());
return;
}
final credentialValidator = _credentialValidator ?? _validateCredentials;
await credentialValidator(relayUrl: relayUrl, nsec: nsec);
if (!current()) return;
await ref
.read(authProvider.notifier)
.authenticateWithCommunity(community, shouldContinue: current);
if (!current()) return;
// A validated transfer is not successful admission until storage succeeds.
_sendComplete(true);
_cleanup();
state = state.copyWith(status: PairingStatus.success);
ref.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider.notifier).request(community);
} catch (e) {
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
state.status != PairingStatus.storing ||
_sendIdentityToSource) {
return;
}
_sendComplete(false);
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: e == AccountIdentityFailure.mismatch
? 'This device uses a different identity. Your saved identity has been kept.'
: 'Could not import the identity. Try pairing again.',
);
}
}
void _sendAbort(String reason) {
try {
final content = _encryptMessage({'type': 'abort', 'reason': reason});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
} catch (_) {
// Best-effort.
}
}
void _sendComplete(bool success) {
try {
final content = _encryptMessage({'type': 'complete', 'success': success});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
} catch (_) {
// Best-effort — complete is advisory per NIP-AB.
}
}
/// Encrypt a message using NIP-44 with the ephemeral conversation key.
String _encryptMessage(Map<String, dynamic> message) {
final plaintext = jsonEncode(message);
return nip44Encrypt(_conversationKey!, plaintext);
}
/// Build and publish a kind:24134 event signed with ephemeral keys.
void _publishEvent({
required int kind,
required String content,
required List<List<String>> tags,
}) {
// Add timestamp jitter (0-30s) for metadata privacy.
final jitter = math.Random.secure().nextInt(31);
final createdAt = (DateTime.now().millisecondsSinceEpoch ~/ 1000) - jitter;
final event = signNostrEvent(
kind: kind,
content: content,
tags: tags,
secretKey: _ephemeralPrivkey!,
createdAt: createdAt,
);
_publishedEventIds.add(event.id);
_socket?.publishEvent(event.toMap());
}
void _handleDisconnected(Object? error) {
if (state.status == PairingStatus.success ||
state.status == PairingStatus.error) {
return;
}
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Lost connection to pairing relay.',
);
}
// ── Legacy buzz:// flow ───────────────────────────────────────────────
Future<void> _pairLegacy(String rawInput) async {
final generation = _pairingGeneration;
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.connecting);
try {
final community = _parseLegacyInput(rawInput);
if (HostedEnvironment.requiresAuth(Uri.parse(community.relayUrl).host)) {
final flow = ref.read(hostedFlowProvider);
await flow.stagePairedCommunity(
community,
isCurrent: () => generation == _pairingGeneration,
);
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = const PairingState();
unawaited(flow.retry());
return;
}
final validator = _credentialValidator ?? _validateCredentials;
await validator(relayUrl: community.relayUrl, nsec: community.nsec);
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
await ref
.read(authProvider.notifier)
.authenticateWithCommunity(
community,
shouldContinue: () => generation == _pairingGeneration,
);
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.success,
destinationRelayUrl: community.relayUrl,
);
ref.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider.notifier).request(community);
} on FormatException catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Invalid pairing code: ${e.message}',
);
} on RelayException catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Could not connect to relay (${e.statusCode}). '
'Check that the pairing code is valid.',
);
} catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Connection failed. Make sure your device can reach the '
'relay server.',
);
}
}
Future<void> _validateCredentials({
required String relayUrl,
required String? nsec,
}) async {
if (nsec == null || nsec.isEmpty) {
throw const FormatException('Pairing payload missing nsec');
}
final uri = Uri.parse(relayUrl);
final scheme = uri.scheme == 'https' ? 'wss' : 'ws';
final wsUrl = uri.replace(scheme: scheme).toString();
final socket = _validationSocketFactory(
wsUrl: wsUrl,
nsec: nsec,
onMessage: (_) {},
onConnected: () {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
_validationSocket = socket;
try {
await socket.connect().timeout(const Duration(seconds: 8));
if (socket.state != SocketState.connected) {
throw StateError('Relay did not authenticate the paired identity');
}
} finally {
if (identical(_validationSocket, socket)) _validationSocket = null;
await socket.disconnect();
}
}
Community _parseLegacyInput(String raw) {
var payload = raw.trim();
if (payload.startsWith('buzz://')) {
payload = payload.substring('buzz://'.length);
}
final normalized = base64Url.normalize(payload);
final jsonStr = utf8.decode(base64Url.decode(normalized));
final decoded = jsonDecode(jsonStr);
if (decoded is! Map<String, dynamic>) {
throw const FormatException('Pairing payload is not a JSON object');
}
final relayUrl = decoded['relayUrl'] as String?;
if (relayUrl == null) {
throw const FormatException('Missing relayUrl in payload');
}
_validateRelayUrl(relayUrl);
return Community.create(
name: Community.nameFromUrl(relayUrl),
relayUrl: relayUrl,
pubkey: decoded['pubkey'] as String?,
nsec: decoded['nsec'] as String?,
sensitiveActionPolicy: SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
}
}
final pairingProvider = NotifierProvider<PairingNotifier, PairingState>(
PairingNotifier.new,
);