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## What this does
In enforce mode, NIP-FI denials used to be returned without a reason
counter or a log line. This PR records enforce denials with the same
`WouldDeny` reasons, label sets and log fields as shadow. **Admission
behavior does not change**: statuses, close codes and frame order are
all the same.
- **`buzz_nip_fi_enforce_total{route,stage,outcome,community}`**: the
same shape as `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_total`, including an `admit`/`admit`
stage, so `1 - admit/total` is the enforce denial rate. Each socket or
HTTP request gets exactly one verdict.
-
**`buzz_nip_fi_enforce_session_end_total{route,reason=expired|revoked,community}`**:
once per admitted session.
- **`buzz_nip_fi_enforce_strict_proof_total{route,outcome,community}`**:
the outcome of the proof check that actually decided the request.
Nothing is verified twice.
- **Log lines** `nip-fi enforce deny` and `nip-fi enforce session end`
(info, `mode="enforce"`, from `buzz_relay::nip_fi_shadow`). Shadow's
`nip-fi shadow would-deny` gains `mode="shadow"`. Neither mode logs
admits.
### How each verdict is recorded once
- **Sockets (root, audio).** `EnforceSession` moves Pending →
Admitted(pubkey) → Ended under one std mutex, and records inside the
lock with no awaits.
- Root admits at its AUTH commit; audio admits at its join commit.
- A refusal for a non-NIP-FI reason retires the session without a
record. Audio retires it before rollback.
- A deadline the effect gate sees before the expiry worker is claimed at
that seam.
- **Ends.** Revocation and expiry are recorded only by the terminal
transition that wins (`publish_authorization_denied`), and only while
the socket isn't already cancelled. A community close or cancellation
that wins first records nothing.
- **HTTP.** The router guard scopes each enforced request with one
verdict. An agent token's verdict is deferred to the end of the request:
- the first owner-decided refusal is the verdict, otherwise the request
was admitted;
- membership rechecks, batches, Git success and early returns each count
once.
- **Owner provenance** comes from the decision itself
(`BanVerdict{outcome,source}` from one `restriction_state` read), with
no rereads.
- Reasons: `owner_banned`, `owner_ban_unavailable`, `not_stored_owner`,
`owner_link_unavailable`.
- When the agent's own ban read fails and there's a token owner, the
result is `owner/unavailable`, as shadow records it.
- A ban or failed restriction read that ingest catches on `POST /events`
after membership passed replaces the request's admit with `owner/denied`
when the owner's row decided the ban, or `owner/unavailable` on a failed
read. An agent's own ban is not recorded as its owner's.
## Shadow-to-enforce map
| Shadow signal | Enforce counterpart |
|---|---|
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_total` denials: upgrade, guard, HTTP admission,
AUTH pairing, deny set, stale binding | `buzz_nip_fi_enforce_total` with
the same stage/outcome, plus a `nip-fi enforce deny` line |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_total` owner stage: ws, audio, http | the same,
from the original decision: root/audio ban seam and owner link; HTTP
`enforce_membership`, smart Git, Git settings, buzz/v1 ban reread |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_total` `deadline/session_deadline` (pending) |
`EnforceSession::expire`, from the worker's winning terminal or the
effect gate that saw it first |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_total` admit |
`buzz_nip_fi_enforce_total{stage="admit",outcome="admit"}`, one per
socket or request |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_session_end_total{reason=expired\|revoked}` |
`buzz_nip_fi_enforce_session_end_total`, same labels |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_strict_proof_total` |
`buzz_nip_fi_enforce_strict_proof_total`, from the deciding check (a
rejection is the route's 403, or 401 when the proof is missing) |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_disconnect_total{admin,accepted}` |
`buzz_nip_fi_disconnect_total` (`api/nip_fi.rs:160`) |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_disconnect_total{admin,propagation_failure}` |
`buzz_nip_fi_disconnect_propagation_failures_total`
(`api/nip_fi.rs:180–185`) |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_disconnect_total{admin,capacity}` |
`buzz_nip_fi_disconnect_capacity_rejections_total`
(`api/nip_fi.rs:196–201`) |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_disconnect_total{cross_pod,capacity}` |
`buzz_nip_fi_cross_pod_capacity_exceeded_total`
(`api/nip_fi.rs:433–434`) |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_disconnect_total{cross_pod,poison}` |
`buzz_nip_fi_cross_pod_shard_poison_total` (`api/nip_fi.rs:442–443`) |
| `buzz_nip_fi_shadow_disconnect_total{cross_pod,lag}` |
`buzz_nip_fi_disconnect_lag_total` (`main.rs:1596–1602`) |
The enforce series was renamed from `buzz_nip_fi_enforce_denied_total`
to `buzz_nip_fi_enforce_total` when it gained the `admit` stage.
## Tests
Infra-free, in the `test-unit` lane:
- `state::enforce_end_is_recorded_only_by_the_winning_terminal`: root
scan, audio scan and deadline, each against a community close or
cancellation first and FI first.
- `nip_fi_http::enforce_strict_proof_records_the_deciding_check_once`:
pass and reject, and no record when cardinality refuses.
-
`nip_fi_shadow_session::audio_owner_link_refusal_shares_roots_seam_and_reasons`:
calls the shared owner-link helper with route `audio`, not a huddle
socket.
- The existing shadow, upgrade, router and HTTP enforce tests.
Postgres lane:
-
`handlers::auth::enforce_root_auth_records_owner_refusals_from_one_decision`:
clean admit then `expired` through the real expiry worker; banned token
owner, banned stored owner, other stored owner and a failed ban read;
authorization reads counted from the decision only.
-
`handlers::auth::enforce_root_deadline_seen_by_the_gate_first_is_recorded_once`:
both orderings.
- `audio::handler::enforce_join_commit_is_the_audio_admission`: drives
the join-commit seam directly, not a huddle socket or the expiry worker:
committed then expired; archived with an expiry held inside the
rollback; gate-first deadline.
-
`api::bridge::token_owner_reaches_membership_on_every_nip_fi_http_route`:
one verdict per request on every NIP-FI HTTP route, including sidebar,
read-state, Blossom and Git, for an owner ban, a stored-owner conflict
and a clear owner.
-
`api::bridge::token_owner_ban_reread_is_the_fixed_nip_fi_denial_on_http`:
own ban, owner ban and unavailable at the reread, on sidebar and Git
settings.
-
`api::bridge::token_owner_publish_ban_is_the_fixed_nip_fi_denial_on_http`:
a late ban or failed read on `POST /events` at the write, typing,
moderation and relay-admin checks records exactly one owner denial and
no admit when only the owner is banned, and no owner denial when the
agent alone or both are banned.
-
`audio::handler::tests::already_expired_audio_bootstrap_records_the_deadline`:
an already-expired bootstrap records `deadline/session_deadline`, not a
deny-set denial.
Each new test names the mutation that turns it red. These were run red:
- deleting root's `session.admit(pubkey)`
- deleting audio's commit `session.admit(pubkey)`
- deleting `effect_refused`
- deleting enforce from `retire_shadow`
- deleting the commit seam's `expire`
- deleting the cancellation guard
- deleting the own-read-failure provenance
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <wpfleger@block.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>