Files
buzz/crates/buzz-backend-kubernetes/src/classify.rs
Tyler 6530b58a61 feat(k8s): Kubernetes backend plugin + desktop deploy path (#4289)
# Kubernetes backend plugin (crates/buzz-backend-kubernetes) + desktop
deploy path

Implements docs/remote-agents.md (merged @ 28ae6cd21) as ONE PR: the
provider
binary, the desktop changes that make it work, the harness inactivity
reaper,
the Sprig image, and the conformance/live-test suites.

Channel: buzz-remote-agents (29414326-dba7-402d-b384-b1b34d63a2e6),
thread c42b70ef.

## What's here (by lane)
- **crates/buzz-backend-kubernetes** (Dawn): stdin/stdout JSON provider,
info +
  deploy; pure classify.rs (one match arm per spec state-machine row);
reconcile/GC with ownership-marker gate + same-clock orphan check;
per-attempt
immutable Secrets; three-tier env with clear-then-write authoritative
tier.
- **Desktop** (Mari): KD3 launch block from resolved descriptor, KD5
pre-secret
negotiation gate (resolve-once → stage-and-digest → info → protocol gate
→
deploy), KD1 Windows extension strip, bundling (externalBin + Justfile +
release/canary workflows + stub loops), tauri.windows.conf.json platform
  override (Decision B: no Windows artifact).
- **buzz-acp** (Max): KD4 BUZZ_ACP_EXIT_AFTER_INACTIVITY reaper
(pool-independent;
reset only at accepted dispatch; in-flight turn/heartbeat defers, never
resets);
BUZZ_ACP_EXIT_AFTER_INACTIVITY + BUZZ_ACP_NO_PRESENCE reserved. KD8 fix.
- **Image + tests** (Perci): Dockerfile.sprig (digest-pinned bases, exec
buzz-acp
PID 1, relay-scoped credential config), image contract script, provider
conformance suites (golden wire fixtures shared with desktop tests),
live-local
  runbook (namespace-scoped, shared-cluster safe).
- **Docs** (Sami, first commit): citation re-pin c1bca1b56 → 28ae6cd21
(44/49
were already byte-exact; 3 offsets fixed) + I3 presence-bound correction
(below).

## Named spec deviations (deliberate, each with rationale)
1. **No baked default image yet.** ghcr.io/block/buzz-sprig is
unpublished
(verified: anonymous pull 403 vs control 200). Omitted `image` returns
an
   in-band field-required error instead of a default.
2. **Image override STRICTER than spec §Image:** digest-only
(`name@sha256:<64hex>`); ALL tags rejected; `name:tag@digest`
normalized.
With no baked default the override is the only path, so tag-acceptance
would
make mutability the v1 norm. Strictness is reversible; a moved tag under
an
nsec is not. Baked digest default + tag re-acceptance = follow-up with
image
   publish.
3. **imagePullSecrets not in schema (v1).** Explicit user images may
rely on
namespace-preprovisioned pull credentials — the substrate boundary.
Field
added only if the publish decision proves it necessary. 9-field budget
intact.
4. **Decision A closed: writable empty workspace.** Nest projection =
named
   follow-up; no image-side scaffolding.
5. **Decision D overridden by Tyler (event b55398d8):** provider ships
bundled
with the desktop like buzz-acp/buzz-agent; spec §Distribution's separate
   release workflow deleted for v1.
6. **I3/vision presence bound corrected 90s → 180s.** PRESENCE_TTL_SECS
moved in
#3783 during this spec's base→merge window; the number was inherited,
not
chosen. Spec :206/:216/:928 + inline quote + VISION_REMOTE_AGENTS.md:59
corrected. ← Tyler: the vision is your document; this edit is flagged
for
   your explicit eyes.
7. **Spec citations are pinned to 28ae6cd21** (main at spec merge) and
resolve
   there, not at this PR's head — this PR's own lanes move
crates/buzz-acp/src/lib.rs by ~100 lines (19 citations across
KD4/KD6/KD7/
§Stop/§Launch data). Known Defects rows fixed BY this PR retire on
merge;
   the section documents main as of the pin.
8. **KD7 grace tension declared:** pod terminationGracePeriodSeconds=60
vs
KD7's measured ~87s shutdown tail at parallelism 10 (~197s at cap 32).
   KD7 is ruled out of scope, so L1-3's "enough grace for full graceful
shutdown" is NOT met at default config — deliberate, resolved by the KD7
   follow-up, not silently.

## Question for Tyler
Will ghcr.io/block/buzz-sprig publish PUBLIC? If private-by-policy,
§Image needs
an imagePullSecrets story before the baked-default follow-up can land.

## Out of scope (named follow-ups)
KD6 exit-code contract + KD7 shutdown budget (gate OnFailure), OnFailure
restart
policy, Windows provider binary, PVCs/nest projection, mesh
deployability,
sprig image publish workflow + baked multi-arch digest default.

## Reproduce locally (four traps that cost us real time)

**1. Git hooks inherit the invoking shell's PATH — pin the shell, not
just your
verification commands.** `rust-toolchain.toml` pins `1.95.0`, but the
rustup shim
that honors that pin lives in `~/.cargo/bin`. If Homebrew's cargo is
earlier on
PATH, `cargo` in this repo is 1.89.0, which cannot build the workspace
at all:

```
$ /opt/homebrew/bin/cargo check -p buzz-db
error: rustc 1.89.0 is not supported by the following packages:
  sqlx@0.9.0 requires rustc 1.94.0
  ...                                                    # exit 101
```

Verifying with `PATH="$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH" cargo test` does *not*
protect the
push: lefthook's `pre-push` → `just test-unit` re-resolves `cargo` from
the
shell's own PATH, so a green local run is followed by a hook failure on
a crate
you never touched. Export the PATH for the whole shell, not per-command.
This
bit twice.

**2. Line-scope your mutations, or the mutation edits its own
detector.** When
mutation-testing the respond-to guard, a whole-file `sed` on the mode
literal
touches 5 sites — the guard *and* the fixtures/assertions that test it.
The
mutation and its detector move together and the suite stays green, which
reads
as "this code is dead" when it actually means "you deleted the
experiment":

```
# WRONG — 5 sites, guard and tests mutate together
$ sed -i '' 's/"allowlist"/"allowlist-DISABLED"/g' src/env.rs
test result: ok. 145 passed; 0 failed          # false survivor

# RIGHT — 1 site, anchored to the guard's own definition line
$ sed -i '' '/^const RESPOND_TO_ALLOWLIST/s/"allowlist"/"allowlist-DISABLED"/' src/env.rs
failures:
    env::tests::allowlist_mode_with_an_empty_list_is_refused
    env::tests::an_allowlist_entry_that_is_not_64_hex_is_refused
test result: FAILED. 143 passed; 2 failed      # real kill
```

Restore by copying a pristine file back and confirming `git diff --stat`
is
empty, not by re-running an inverse `sed`.

**3. A completeness guard is not a correctness guard.** The shared wire
fixture
`tests/fixtures/provider-wire/deploy-full-launch.request.json` passed
every test
we had while containing four classes of invented data (wrong
`respond_to`
encoding, an env key no emitter writes, allowlist entries that fail the
harness's own 64-hex rule, a `launch.env` key from no descriptor layer).
The
provider's tests could not have caught this: its types are deliberately
indifferent to these values (`Option<String>`, `Vec<String>`, arbitrary
map), so
"the provider parses it" was never evidence that the desktop emits it.
The fix
was not a stronger provider assertion but a rule about provenance —
"recorded"
means executed-and-transcribed, and the desktop's whole-object equality
test is
the only enforcement that can exist. See the fixture README.

**4. Every drift this arc was a value that agreed with itself.** Five
invented
values were found, and not one was caught by an assertion failing — each
was
caught by someone asking where a value came from. A named constant
referenced
symbolically on both the fixture and assertion side. A `sed` that
mutated its
own detector. Six probe rows that all died at the same unrelated error.
A
descriptor struct literal compared against a fixture built from that
literal
(`launch.args: ["run","--session"]`, which the resolver actually returns
as
`["acp"]`). The general defense is not more assertions but provenance: a
stub is
a control that varies nothing, and the more faithful it looks the better
it
hides. Ask what executed, not what passed.

*Fixture-test determinism caveat (post-verification, Quinn + Dawn).* The
desktop's whole-object fixture test calls the real resolver, which
consults a
process-global harness registry whose own docs require
`registry_test_lock`
for any test touching it. The fixture test holds no lock and is
nonetheless
deterministic — but by containment, not by ordering. Measured, not
derived:
planting a definition with `id: "goose"` directly into the registry
(bypassing
the loader) changes the resolved descriptor from `args: ["acp"]` to
`args: ["--poisoned"]`, so `resolve_effective_harness_descriptor`
**does**
reach the registry for this id — it does not short-circuit on the
builtin
table first. Two controls discriminate: an empty registry and a registry
poisoned under a *different* id both return `["acp"]`. What actually
protects
the test is that the registry has exactly one writer
(`update_loaded_harness_registry`, reached only via
`warm_harness_registry_from_dir`) — but that writer concatenates **two**
sources of unequal strength (`custom_harnesses.rs:319-326`). Custom
files
pass through `load_custom_harnesses`, whose `check_id_collision` rejects
the
reserved builtin id `goose` case-insensitively at the loader — and that
leg
is tested (`load_applies_id_collision_check` writes a real `goose.json`
and
asserts the loader drops it). Preset definitions
(`preset_harness_definitions`, `presets.rs:177-193`) are a bare `.map`
over
`PRESET_HARNESSES` with **no collision check** — exhaustive call-site
enumeration at `60007fda4` finds four production `check_id_collision`
sites,
none on the preset path. That leg holds only because `goose` is not in
the
preset table today (intersection of TIER1 and preset ids is empty) —
executed, not just read: adding a preset with `id: "goose"`,
`args: ["--poisoned"]` and warming via the normal preset-only path
(`warm_harness_registry_from_dir(None)`, no custom dir, no direct
writer)
flips the fixture's emitted `launch.args` from `["acp"]` to
`["--poisoned"]`
at `60007fda4`, command/env/policy_env unchanged. So: no test in the
suite
can put a `goose` entry in the registry
via the custom path, and no preset currently carries one, so no
interleaving
can perturb this fixture — containment with one checked leg and one
coincidental one. A future fixture built on a **non-builtin** runtime id
has
no containment at all — it would be order-dependent against whatever
registry-writing test ran last and must take the lock.

*Late instance, found while reviewing the mode guard.* The guard
exact-matches
`respond_to` untrimmed and case-sensitively, which is only correct if
clap's
`ValueEnum` derive is case-sensitive. `config.rs` gives two answers: the
derive
at `:448-453` carries no `ignore_case`, while the crate's own tests call
`RespondTo::from_str(s, true)` — `ignore_case = true`. Reading the
source
supports either. Measured on the built binary instead: `owner-only`
starts,
`OWNER-ONLY` / `Owner-Only` / `ALLOWLIST` / `NOBODY` all exit rc=2
`invalid
value`. Case-sensitive at the CLI, so the guard is right — and right for
a
reason the source does not state. The `from_str(_, true)` tests exercise
a
different surface and are not evidence about the CLI.

*Corollary, and the sharper half.* When a test helper **reimplements**
production instead of calling it, the helper is a fork — and a fork can
be
right while production is wrong, or wrong in the same way, and the suite
reports green either way. Both `BUZZ_ACP_ALLOWED_*` gates are forked
like this:
production compares **strings** while the helpers compare **post-parse
enums**
(`config.rs:2623`) or re-derive the split
(`buzz-cli/.../channels.rs:1296`).
Production and the helper each carry their *own* copy of the empty-entry
filter
(`:1025` and `:1300`), so fixing one says nothing about the other.
Measured on
`buzz-cli`, restoring byte-exact between runs:

| tree | result |
|---|---|
| baseline | 274 passed |
| drop the empty-filter in **production** only (the real fix) | **274
passed** — no signal |
| drop it in the **test helper** only | **273 passed, 1 failed**
(`channels.rs:1338`) |

Two independent defects, stacked, and worse together than either alone:
production can be fixed with no test ever noticing, *and* the helper
cannot be
corrected without a false alarm demanding the bug back. The root cause
is one
bit of type information — `check_allowed_channel_add_policy(allowed_raw:
&str,
..)` cannot represent "unset", while production reads `env::var(..) ->
Result`,
where unset and `""` are different states. A helper whose parameter type
can't
represent all of production's input states isn't testing production's
states —
it's testing a subset it silently chose. Same family as the
struct-literal
descriptor and the fixture drift: the test and the thing it tests
agreeing with
each other, rather than the test measuring the thing. Neither defect is
in this
PR's diff (`git diff --name-only 28ae6cd21 <head> -- crates/buzz-cli` is
empty); both are now filed as NIP-34 issues on this repo: the fail-open
+
fork-helper defect at issue event `0524a4113f2d97fd…` and the respond-to
self-lock at `e32837498969b5e7…` (filed 2026-08-02 after Quinn measured
that
no prior filing existed — zero hits on GitHub `block/buzz` open *or*
closed
and zero on the relay's kind:1621 issues, against working positive
controls). The prescription was itself
mutation-tested before being written down: repairing the fork's
signature
(`Option<&str>` + assertion → `None`) still let the reintroduced
production
bug ship 274-green — an expressive fork is still a fork; it never
executes
production. So the `buzz-cli` fix has **three parts and one explicit
keep**:
drop the production filter; **delete** the helper and point its tests at
the
real `cmd_set_add_policy` (which self-discriminates by error variant —
`Usage` = refused, `Network(BadScheme)` = passed the gate — no relay
needed);
serialize the env-var tests behind one
**`tokio::sync::Mutex::const_new`**
lock taken with `.lock().await`, including the pre-existing `:1362`
integration test (the fork was silently buying test isolation — without
the
lock, parallel runs flake nondeterministically; a `std::sync::Mutex`
held
across `.await` trips `clippy::await_holding_lock` under `-D warnings`);
and
**keep** the then-dead `!allowed.is_empty()` clause with a comment
saying
why. It is unreachable-false (`split(',')` never yields an empty vec),
but it
is the only thing that keeps the reintroduced production bug detectable
—
mutation-tested: on a tree that deletes the clause, reintroducing the
empty-filter bug survives 275/0, because `""`/`","`/`" "` refuse either
way
and the filter goes semantically inert. Dead code can be load-bearing
for
tests: "provably unreachable" is an argument about behavior, never about
coverage. When a helper forks production, the fix has to delete the
fork:
any change that leaves two implementations standing can only ever be
verified against the one the tests call. *Final shape:* the keep and the
broad lock are both artifacts of the fork surviving in some form. The
extraction variant (Dawn, mutation-tested at `60007fda4`) removes the
tension: extract one `check_channel_add_policy_allowed(Option<&str>,
&str)`
that **production calls**, with the `Option` placed at the env boundary
where the `Result<String, VarError>` bit actually lives. 5/6 mutants
killed; the empty-filter survivor is proven **equivalent** (exhaustive
6174-pair check, 0 divergences, with a diverging negative control;
independently re-derived by a second generator — different tokens and
shape — 0 divergences on admitted policies, 500 on a non-admitted
control),
not a coverage hole — on a one-implementation tree there is no fork left
to
witness, so no dead clause needs keeping. One scope line on that
equivalence: it is **caller-conditional**, a property of the only
current
caller, not of the gate function — `cmd_set_add_policy`'s own match at
`:1027-1034` admits only three policies before the gate runs; a second
caller reaching the gate with arbitrary strings resurrects m1 as a real
hole. The lock does not disappear, it
narrows (Dawn's own correction, caught by Mari): lock exactly the tests
that mutate the process env — three-plus-one on a fork tree, two on the
extraction tree — behind one `tokio::sync::Mutex`, and the lock is part
of
the assertion, not hygiene: with it deleted, the gate test fails 8/8
runs
deterministically by receiving `Network(BadScheme)` where it expects
`Usage` — the unset test's `remove_var` clobbers the other's `set_var`,
and
**the gate test passes straight through the gate**, a false negative on
the
exact authz assertion the test exists to make. State it as an outcome:
these two tests must not observe each other's env writes. 276/0 stable
across 5 parallel runs, clippy `-D warnings` clean; independently
verified
(patch applied to a second worktree: result blob `d67e584be` matches the
patch index, full mutant matrix reproduces row for row). One new row no
earlier
prescription covered: collapsing unset into `Some("")` fails **closed**
—
an unconfigured deployment refuses every policy — killed by the unset
test.
Patch: `OUTBOX/BUZZ_CLI_ADD_POLICY_GATE_EXTRACT_FIX.patch`. The filed
issue
(`0524a411…`) carries the fork-shape prescription; whoever picks it up
should prefer the extraction shape, drop the dead-clause keep with it,
and
keep part 3 outcome-shaped: serialize whichever tests mutate the env.

## Verification (final HEAD `60007fda4`)
- Full touched-package suites at each integration merge (log in plan
file).
  At candidate parent `00e5b5fe9`: buzz-backend-kubernetes 154,
buzz-acp 673, desktop tauri 2100+3, pnpm 3908, workspace clippy/fmt/tsc
  all clean. The only delta to `60007fda4` is one character in
  `scripts/test-k8s-sprig-image-live.sh` (heredoc escape so the readlink
probe evaluates pod-side, not host-side at render); `crates/` tree hash
  is byte-identical at both SHAs, so the Rust receipts attach by tree
  identity. buzz-backend-kubernetes suite re-run in-shell at
  `HEAD == 60007fda4`: 154 passed.
- Adversarial one-HEAD gate (Sami): guard matrix 12/12, predicate
mutants
  7/7, doomed-invocation finding closed end-to-end; tree-hash carry to
  `60007fda4` confirmed (crates/buzz-backend-kubernetes blob unchanged).
- Live-local pass per TESTING.md + skill-buzz-testing (Perci, at
`60007fda4`): explicit `docker-desktop` context, digest-qualified image
  imported into node containerd `k8s.io` namespace, pull policy `Never`;
  pod printed `DIGEST_ABI_OK`, `resolved_spec` and `image_id` both the
  exact requested digest, script exit 0. Dedicated per-run namespace,
  ownership labels on every object, scoped cleanup verified empty after.
- Implementation review (Wren) at `60007fda4`: 9.6 minimalness /
  9.4 elegance / 9.3 correctness, no blocker.
- `origin/eva/k8s-backend` == `60007fda4` (ls-remote verified; SHA
  identity is byte identity).

---------

Signed-off-by: npub1mprnacetjua2xx3p5eddmhxyk6wv929ymm5py8kd2xfxurxahspqqlgyta <d8473ee32b973aa31a21a65adddcc4b69cc2a8a4dee8121ecd51926e0cddbc02@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Tyler <109685178+tlongwell-block@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: tlongwell-block <109685178+tlongwell-block@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: npub1jh9wn95s0472h86ahapupaf7m6kx4v9sx2n0atj2hltcfer8k06s5n3pyf <95cae996907d7cab9f5dbf43c0f53edeac6ab0b032a6feae4abfd784e467b3f5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Signed-off-by: npub1t2tgm7d8f995uqvmnm8h88sg3wnpp9a5xysjf6dg3tjmgt3ltulqdp8ehr <5a968df9a7494b4e019b9ecf739e088ba61097b4312124e9a88ae5b42e3f5f3e@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub1mprnacetjua2xx3p5eddmhxyk6wv929ymm5py8kd2xfxurxahspqqlgyta <d8473ee32b973aa31a21a65adddcc4b69cc2a8a4dee8121ecd51926e0cddbc02@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub17jjz49l9jjmhhk7cac63j8yt9z555n9cw8vk7v5jz4vzw4ppld5qgj57cc <f4a42a97e594b77bdbd8ee35191c8b28a94a4cb871d96f32921558275421fb68@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub1qyvc0c5kl4gqv2fd97fsk46tu378sqgy35vc83rvgfwne90sel7s0ed67d <011987e296fd5006292d2f930b574be47c7801048d1983c46c425d3c95f0cffd@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Dawn (sprout agent) <c6237ef84fa537c78dcee78efd2d4e59f728859c7f194da42ac51ededfa0be05@sprout-oss.stage.blox.sqprod.co>
Co-authored-by: npub1jh9wn95s0472h86ahapupaf7m6kx4v9sx2n0atj2hltcfer8k06s5n3pyf <95cae996907d7cab9f5dbf43c0f53edeac6ab0b032a6feae4abfd784e467b3f5@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: npub1t2tgm7d8f995uqvmnm8h88sg3wnpp9a5xysjf6dg3tjmgt3ltulqdp8ehr <5a968df9a7494b4e019b9ecf739e088ba61097b4312124e9a88ae5b42e3f5f3e@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-08-02 14:39:27 -04:00

378 lines
14 KiB
Rust

//! The deploy state machine (spec §Deploy State Machine), as a pure function.
//!
//! `classify` maps a verified observation plus the desired create intent to
//! one [`Action`]. It performs no I/O, so every row of the spec's table is a
//! unit test with no cluster. `reconcile` executes actions and re-enters.
//!
//! Two invariants are structural rather than remembered:
//!
//! * [`Action::Delete`] carries the [`Fence`] from the exact observation that
//! authorized it. There is no way to build a delete without one, so a later
//! helper cannot re-read and silently substitute a fresher fence.
//! * The pull-failure classifier ([`PullFailure`]) reaches only
//! [`Action::Report`] and [`Action::Observe`]. It is absent from
//! `Action::Delete`'s type, so "reason strings are never deletion
//! authority" is enforced by the compiler.
use crate::intent::Fingerprint;
/// The compare-and-delete fence: UID + resourceVersion from the observation
/// that authorized the deletion. A failed precondition means the object
/// changed since the read — re-enter, never retry the delete.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Fence {
pub uid: String,
pub resource_version: String,
}
/// Why a pod that never started looks permanently broken. Reporting only.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum PullFailure {
/// Registry auth: a 403/401 `ImagePullBackOff` retries forever without
/// ever succeeding, so "the pull retries" is false for this case.
Unauthorized,
/// The digest or repository does not exist at that registry.
ManifestUnknown,
/// The image has no variant for the node's architecture.
ArchMismatch,
}
/// The container's startup state, already decoded from pod status. Decoding
/// happens at the edge so this module stays free of API types.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Startup {
/// `state.running` — the harness process is up. This, not pod phase, is
/// what "live" means.
Started,
/// Started once and reached a terminal phase (Succeeded/Failed).
Terminated,
/// Never started, and self-healing is plausible: unschedulable during
/// scale-from-zero, an image pull in progress, a transient
/// `CreateContainerConfigError` whose Secret exists.
NeverStartedRecoverable,
/// Never started, and the provider *verified* the cause — not a reason
/// string. Either the referenced Secret is confirmed absent by a
/// most-recent read, or the image reference is structurally invalid.
NeverStartedProvablyBroken,
/// Never started; the pull is failing in a way that will not self-heal.
/// Still recoverable in the *never delete* sense — this only changes what
/// we report and how long we wait.
NeverStartedPullFailing(PullFailure),
}
/// A pod that passed identity and ownership verification: label-selected,
/// full-pubkey annotation equal to the derived pubkey, management marker
/// present. Constructing this type is the verification step's output, so an
/// unverified object cannot reach `classify` at all.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct VerifiedPod {
pub name: String,
pub fence: Fence,
/// Set once the apiserver accepts a delete. In Kubernetes there is no
/// `Terminating` phase — a pod being gracefully deleted stays in phase
/// `Running` for its whole grace period — so this must be checked
/// *before* startup state or the dying pod reads as the no-op row.
pub deletion_marked: bool,
pub startup: Startup,
/// The `buzz.block.xyz/create-intent` annotation as recorded at create.
/// `None` for a pod written before the annotation existed, which counts
/// as divergence.
pub recorded_intent: Option<Fingerprint>,
}
/// What the reconciler should do next.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Action {
/// Create the pod, then wait for the harness container to start.
Create,
/// Compare-and-delete, poll for actual disappearance, then re-enter.
Delete { name: String, fence: Fence },
/// Wait for a deletion already in flight, then re-enter.
AwaitDisappearance { name: String },
/// Strict no-op: return this `agent_id`, mutate nothing.
NoOp { agent_id: String },
/// Keep observing until started or the operation deadline expires; on
/// expiry report the latest condition. Never deletes, on this call or any
/// later one.
Observe { name: String },
/// Surface an actionable condition immediately rather than burning the
/// deadline on a failure that will not self-heal.
Report { name: String, failure: PullFailure },
}
/// Apply the spec's ordered rules to one verified observation.
///
/// `desired` is the freshly computed create intent; comparison is always
/// recorded-annotation vs freshly-computed, never a diff against the live pod
/// (admission defaulting would make every pod look divergent).
pub fn classify(observed: Option<&VerifiedPod>, desired: &Fingerprint) -> Action {
let Some(pod) = observed else {
// Row: no instance → create. First deploy, or after GC.
return Action::Create;
};
// Row: deletion-marked, ANY phase. Checked before startup state because
// there is no `Terminating` phase to match on — a gracefully deleting pod
// reports phase `Running` throughout its grace period, so testing startup
// first would mistake it for the live no-op row and return an id that
// evaporates.
if pod.deletion_marked {
return Action::AwaitDisappearance {
name: pod.name.clone(),
};
}
match &pod.startup {
// Row: live and started → strict no-op. Start must never kill a live
// agent mid-turn, whatever the fingerprint says.
Startup::Started => Action::NoOp {
agent_id: pod.name.clone(),
},
// Row: terminated → delete residue, then re-enter to create. This is
// the normal restart path — how a user revives a reaped agent.
Startup::Terminated => Action::Delete {
name: pod.name.clone(),
fence: pod.fence.clone(),
},
// Row: never started, provably non-recoverable → fenced replace.
// "Provably" means a verified absence or a structural defect, never a
// reason string.
Startup::NeverStartedProvablyBroken => Action::Delete {
name: pod.name.clone(),
fence: pod.fence.clone(),
},
// Inside the recoverable row: a pull that will not self-heal is
// reported immediately instead of consuming the 600s deadline. This
// changes reporting and wait behavior only — no delete authority.
Startup::NeverStartedPullFailing(failure) => Action::Report {
name: pod.name.clone(),
failure: *failure,
},
// Row: never started, recoverable — split on create-intent
// divergence. Divergence is evidence of a config change the user is
// waiting on, and it is the *only* thing that replaces a
// never-started pod. Pod age triggers nothing: any finite age
// threshold collides with Cluster Autoscaler's own pod-age delays,
// and delete-recreate resets exactly the age it keys on.
Startup::NeverStartedRecoverable => {
if pod.recorded_intent.as_ref() == Some(desired) {
Action::Observe {
name: pod.name.clone(),
}
} else {
Action::Delete {
name: pod.name.clone(),
fence: pod.fence.clone(),
}
}
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn fp(seed: &str) -> Fingerprint {
Fingerprint::for_test(seed)
}
fn pod(startup: Startup, intent: Option<Fingerprint>) -> VerifiedPod {
VerifiedPod {
name: "buzz-agent-abc123def456".into(),
fence: Fence {
uid: "uid-1".into(),
resource_version: "rv-1".into(),
},
deletion_marked: false,
startup,
recorded_intent: intent,
}
}
#[test]
fn no_instance_creates() {
assert_eq!(classify(None, &fp("a")), Action::Create);
}
#[test]
fn started_pod_is_strict_no_op() {
let p = pod(Startup::Started, Some(fp("a")));
assert_eq!(
classify(Some(&p), &fp("a")),
Action::NoOp {
agent_id: p.name.clone()
}
);
}
/// The asymmetry the spec states plainly: an edit cannot reach a started
/// pod until it exits, but it *can* reach a never-started one — the
/// never-started pod is the one the user is editing because it did not
/// start.
#[test]
fn started_pod_no_ops_even_when_intent_diverges() {
let p = pod(Startup::Started, Some(fp("old")));
assert_eq!(
classify(Some(&p), &fp("new")),
Action::NoOp {
agent_id: p.name.clone()
}
);
}
/// In Kubernetes a gracefully deleting pod stays in phase `Running`. If
/// the deletion mark were checked after startup state, this pod would
/// take the no-op row and `deploy` would return an id that evaporates.
#[test]
fn deletion_mark_beats_every_startup_state() {
for startup in [
Startup::Started,
Startup::Terminated,
Startup::NeverStartedRecoverable,
Startup::NeverStartedProvablyBroken,
Startup::NeverStartedPullFailing(PullFailure::Unauthorized),
] {
let mut p = pod(startup.clone(), Some(fp("a")));
p.deletion_marked = true;
assert_eq!(
classify(Some(&p), &fp("a")),
Action::AwaitDisappearance {
name: p.name.clone()
},
"deletion mark ignored for {startup:?}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn terminated_pod_is_replaced() {
let p = pod(Startup::Terminated, Some(fp("a")));
assert_eq!(
classify(Some(&p), &fp("a")),
Action::Delete {
name: p.name.clone(),
fence: p.fence.clone()
}
);
}
/// A never-started winner is repairable: pod exists, Secret confirmed
/// absent, container never started. A later deploy must delete-recreate
/// rather than no-op — the test that pins started-not-phase as the no-op
/// criterion.
#[test]
fn provably_broken_never_started_pod_is_replaced() {
let p = pod(Startup::NeverStartedProvablyBroken, Some(fp("a")));
assert_eq!(
classify(Some(&p), &fp("a")),
Action::Delete {
name: p.name.clone(),
fence: p.fence.clone()
}
);
}
/// The anti-livelock rule: identical desired intent means *never* delete,
/// however long the pod has been pending. Age is not an input to this
/// function at all, which is the strongest way to say so.
#[test]
fn recoverable_with_matching_intent_only_observes() {
let p = pod(Startup::NeverStartedRecoverable, Some(fp("same")));
assert_eq!(
classify(Some(&p), &fp("same")),
Action::Observe {
name: p.name.clone()
}
);
}
/// Repeated identical Starts can never delete anything — the same
/// classification, arbitrarily many times.
#[test]
fn repeated_identical_starts_never_delete() {
let p = pod(Startup::NeverStartedRecoverable, Some(fp("same")));
for _ in 0..100 {
assert!(!matches!(
classify(Some(&p), &fp("same")),
Action::Delete { .. }
));
}
}
/// The wedge escape: the user corrected a resource request or image, so
/// the never-started pod is built from configuration they have since
/// changed. Without this row the edit could never materialize.
#[test]
fn recoverable_with_divergent_intent_is_replaced() {
let p = pod(Startup::NeverStartedRecoverable, Some(fp("old")));
assert_eq!(
classify(Some(&p), &fp("new")),
Action::Delete {
name: p.name.clone(),
fence: p.fence.clone()
}
);
}
/// A pod predating the annotation has no recorded intent — that is
/// absence, which the spec groups with divergence.
#[test]
fn missing_recorded_intent_counts_as_divergence() {
let p = pod(Startup::NeverStartedRecoverable, None);
assert_eq!(
classify(Some(&p), &fp("any")),
Action::Delete {
name: p.name.clone(),
fence: p.fence.clone()
}
);
}
/// Permanent-looking pull failures report immediately instead of burning
/// 600s — and, critically, never delete.
#[test]
fn pull_failures_report_and_never_delete() {
for failure in [
PullFailure::Unauthorized,
PullFailure::ManifestUnknown,
PullFailure::ArchMismatch,
] {
let p = pod(Startup::NeverStartedPullFailing(failure), Some(fp("a")));
// Divergent intent too — still no delete from this arm.
for desired in [fp("a"), fp("different")] {
assert_eq!(
classify(Some(&p), &desired),
Action::Report {
name: p.name.clone(),
failure
}
);
}
}
}
/// Every delete carries the fence from the observation that authorized
/// it. Exhaustive over the delete-producing states, so a future arm that
/// forgets is caught here rather than in a cluster.
#[test]
fn every_delete_carries_the_authorizing_fence() {
let states = [
(Startup::Terminated, fp("a")),
(Startup::NeverStartedProvablyBroken, fp("a")),
(Startup::NeverStartedRecoverable, fp("divergent")),
];
for (startup, desired) in states {
let p = pod(startup, Some(fp("a")));
match classify(Some(&p), &desired) {
Action::Delete { fence, .. } => assert_eq!(fence, p.fence),
other => panic!("expected Delete, got {other:?}"),
}
}
}
}