buzz/crates/buzz-agent

buzz-agent

Minimal, unbreakable ACP-compliant LLM agent. Stdio in, tool calls out. Non-streaming. No persistence. No cleverness.

ACP is the Agent Client Protocol — JSON-RPC 2.0 over stdio between a client (Zed, JetBrains, buzz-acp, …) and an agent. MCP is how the agent talks to its tools.

buzz-agent is the agent.

What It Is

        +--------+   stdio (JSON-RPC 2.0)   +---------------+
        | client | <----------------------> |  buzz-agent |
        +--------+        ACP frames        +---------------+
                                              │            │
                                              │            │ rmcp (stdio)
                                              │            ▼
                                              │       MCP servers
                                              │       (your tools)
                                              ▼
                                            HTTPS
                                              │
                                              ▼
                                  Anthropic Messages API,
                                   OpenRouter, or any OpenAI-compat
                                  (vLLM, llama.cpp, Databricks,
                                   Block Gateway, Ollama, …)

A client sends session/prompt. The agent loops: call the LLM → get tool calls → run them via MCP → feed results back → repeat. The loop terminates when the LLM stops asking for tools, the round cap is hit, or the client cancels.

The agent's output is its tool calls. Generated text is forwarded to the client as agent_message_chunk updates, but the real work happens in the tools. The LLM call is non-streaming — one HTTP POST, one response.

Quick Start

# Build
cargo build --release -p buzz-agent

# Run against Anthropic
BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=anthropic \
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-... \
ANTHROPIC_MODEL=claude-sonnet-4-5 \
  ./target/release/buzz-agent

# Or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint
BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=openai \
OPENAI_COMPAT_API_KEY=sk-... \
OPENAI_COMPAT_MODEL=gpt-5 \
OPENAI_COMPAT_BASE_URL=https://api.openai.com/v1 \
  ./target/release/buzz-agent

# Or OpenRouter
BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=openrouter \
OPENROUTER_API_KEY=sk-or-v1-... \
OPENROUTER_MODEL=anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5 \
  ./target/release/buzz-agent

# Or Databricks model serving via OAuth 2.0 PKCE
BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=databricks \
DATABRICKS_HOST=https://dbc-...cloud.databricks.com \
DATABRICKS_MODEL=goose-claude-4-6-sonnet \
  ./target/release/buzz-agent

That's the whole setup. The agent reads JSON-RPC frames from stdin, writes them to stdout, and logs to stderr.

ACP Transcript

A complete round-trip. Lines starting with → are client→agent (stdin); ← are agent→client (stdout). Each line is one newline-terminated JSON value. Comments are not part of the wire.

// 1. Handshake.
→ {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":1,"clientCapabilities":{}}}
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"result":{
    "protocolVersion":1,
    "agentCapabilities":{
      "loadSession":false,
      "promptCapabilities":{"image":false,"audio":false,"embeddedContext":false},
      "mcpCapabilities":{"http":false,"sse":false}
    },
    "agentInfo":{"name":"buzz-agent","version":"0.1.0"}
  }}

// 2. Open a session. The client passes the MCP servers to spawn.
→ {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"session/new","params":{
    "cwd":"/tmp",
    "mcpServers":[{"name":"echo","command":"/usr/local/bin/echo-mcp","args":[],"env":[]}]
  }}
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"result":{"sessionId":"ses_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8"}}

// 3. Prompt. The agent loops until the LLM stops calling tools.
→ {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"session/prompt","params":{
    "sessionId":"ses_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8",
    "prompt":[{"type":"text","text":"echo hello"}]
  }}

// 4. Agent emits tool_call (status: pending) — visible to the UI.
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{
    "sessionId":"ses_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8",
    "update":{
      "sessionUpdate":"tool_call",
      "toolCallId":"toolu_01XYZ",
      "title":"echo__say",
      "kind":"other",
      "status":"pending",
      "rawInput":{"text":"hello"}
    }
  }}

// 5. Agent moves the call to in_progress, runs the MCP tool, then completed.
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{
    "sessionId":"ses_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8",
    "update":{"sessionUpdate":"tool_call_update","toolCallId":"toolu_01XYZ","status":"in_progress"}
  }}
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"session/update","params":{
    "sessionId":"ses_a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8",
    "update":{
      "sessionUpdate":"tool_call_update",
      "toolCallId":"toolu_01XYZ",
      "status":"completed",
      "content":[{"type":"content","content":{"type":"text","text":"hello"}}]
    }
  }}

// 8. The model sees the result, decides it's done, and the prompt resolves.
← {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"result":{"stopReason":"end_turn"}}

That's ACP. Three request methods (initialize, session/new, session/prompt), one inbound notification (session/cancel), and three outbound update variants (agent_message_chunk, tool_call, tool_call_update). The full server is hand-rolled in main.rs.

Configuration

Everything is environment variables. No flags, no config files. (We are a subprocess; subprocess config is environment.)

Variable	Default	Notes
BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER	—	Required. anthropic, openai, openrouter, databricks, or databricks_v2. No implicit fallback — the agent errors at startup when this is unset.
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY	—	Required when provider=anthropic.
ANTHROPIC_MODEL	—	Required when provider=anthropic.
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL	https://api.anthropic.com
ANTHROPIC_API_VERSION	2023-06-01
OPENAI_COMPAT_API_KEY	—	Required when provider=openai.
OPENAI_COMPAT_MODEL	—	Required when provider=openai.
OPENAI_COMPAT_BASE_URL	https://api.openai.com/v1	Point at vLLM, llama.cpp, Ollama, etc.
OPENAI_COMPAT_API	auto	auto | chat | responses. auto picks Responses for *.openai.com, Chat Completions everywhere else.
OPENROUTER_API_KEY	—	Required when provider=openrouter.
OPENROUTER_MODEL	—	Required when provider=openrouter. Use OpenRouter's vendor/model id, e.g. anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5.
OPENROUTER_BASE_URL	https://openrouter.ai/api/v1
DATABRICKS_HOST	—	Required when provider=databricks or provider=databricks_v2.
DATABRICKS_MODEL	—	Required when provider=databricks or provider=databricks_v2.
DATABRICKS_MODEL_FILTER	—	Optional discovery-only, comma-separated full-string */? patterns OR-matched against raw Databricks endpoint and Unity Catalog model-service IDs. Blank/unset shows all; this is visibility filtering, not an authorization boundary.
DATABRICKS_TOKEN	—	Optional static bearer escape hatch. If unset, Databricks uses browser OAuth + refresh cache.
BUZZ_AGENT_SYSTEM_PROMPT	built-in	Inline system prompt.
BUZZ_AGENT_SYSTEM_PROMPT_FILE	—	File path. Mutually exclusive with the above.
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_ROUNDS	0	Tool-loop iteration cap. 0 = unlimited.
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_OUTPUT_TOKENS	65536	Desired per-call ceiling. Set this at or below the served model's output limit for each agent deployment. Proactive handoff is independently based on 90% of BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS.
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_TOKEN_RECOVERIES	3	Retries after a successful response is truncated at the output-token limit. 0 disables recovery; the finite value and BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_ROUNDS prevent infinite retries.
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS	200000	Provider context window used by the handoff gate.
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_HANDOFFS	10	Max context handoffs per session before falling back to truncation.
BUZZ_AGENT_LLM_TIMEOUT_SECS	240	Max seconds with no response bytes before abandoning an LLM call (per-read inactivity, not wall-clock).
BUZZ_AGENT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS	1260	Per-tool call timeout in seconds
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_PARALLEL_TOOLS	8	Max concurrent tool calls per turn (1 = sequential)
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_SESSIONS	unlimited	Max concurrent ACP sessions. Sessions are cheap; default has no cap.
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_LINE_BYTES	4194304	4 MiB. Hard cap on inbound JSON-RPC frames.
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_HISTORY_BYTES	1048576	1 MiB. Old turns are evicted past this.
BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_TOOL_RESULT_TEXT_BYTES	51200	50 KiB. Per-result cap on tool-output text; oversize is middle-elided (head + tail kept) with an inline marker. Images are exempt.
BUZZ_AGENT_REQUIRE_REPLY	0 (1 on mesh)	1 enables the reply guard — remind the model to publish when a turn is about to end with nothing posted to Buzz. Desktop defaults it to 1 for Buzz shared-compute agents.

Reply Guard

Off by default, except on Buzz shared-compute (mesh) agents, where Buzz Desktop sets BUZZ_AGENT_REQUIRE_REPLY=1 automatically. With it enabled, a turn that is about to end without any recognized attempt to post to Buzz gets a reminder that its assistant text is invisible to humans, and is rerolled.

This exists because a Buzz agent's reasoning and tool output are not shown to anyone. A turn that does real work and never posts is a silent failure — the requester waits on a result that was produced and thrown away.

Mesh agents get it by default because they run on small local models, which are the ones most likely to do the work and then end the turn without publishing it. Setting BUZZ_AGENT_REQUIRE_REPLY=0 on the agent, persona, or global env opts a mesh agent back out; the default never overrides an explicit value.

Advisory, never a trap. At most two reminders, then the turn ends whether or not anything was published. The guard catches accidental omission; it does not compel speech. The reminder text explicitly licenses silence, because the built-in system prompt says publishing is optional and silence is often the correct outcome.

Recognition contract. A turn counts as having replied when it issues a call that:

• resolves to a registered, non-hook tool (a hallucinated tool name is rejected at preflight and never runs, so it must not disarm the guard),
• whose qualified name ends in __shell — i.e. the bare tool name is exactly shell, which is buzz-dev-mcp's shell tool and any other server's, and
• whose command argument contains messages send or reactions add.

messages send also covers messages send-diff. Reactions count because the built-in prompt directs agents to react rather than post a bare acknowledgement, so nagging an agent that reacted would punish documented behavior.

Detection is checked after the per-turn tool-call cap (MAX_TOOL_CALLS_PER_TURN) is applied: a publish-shaped call that was discarded never ran.

It recognizes an attempt, not a successful publish. Only the command text is inspected, never the exit status. A send that fails still satisfies the guard — which is fine, since a failed send already returns a non-zero exit and error JSON to the model, louder feedback than a reminder.

Known limits, both deliberate. A command assembled at runtime ($CMD) or buried in a wrapper script is missed, so that turn is reminded despite having posted. Text that merely quotes a send (echo "buzz messages send") matches, so that turn is not reminded. Missing a real post is the expensive direction, and substring matching is the forgiving one there. Neither edge is pinned by a test; the matcher is free to improve.

Budget. Reminders ride the existing _Stop gate and share BUZZ_AGENT_STOP_MAX_REJECTIONS — the outer cap on every end-turn objection. At the default 3 both reminders fit; at 1 only one does; at 0 the guard is off along with the hooks. A round carrying both a _Stop hook objection and a reminder costs one rejection and delivers both texts. This is not a new lifecycle hook — see MCP_DRIVEN_HOOKS.md.

Providers

buzz-agent speaks a few HTTP dialects. Pick with BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER.

Provider	BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER	Endpoint (auto)	Tested with
Anthropic	anthropic	POST {base}/v1/messages	claude-sonnet-4-5, claude-opus-4
OpenAI	openai	POST {base}/responses	gpt-5, gpt-5-mini, o4-mini, gpt-4o
vLLM	openai	POST {base}/chat/completions	any tool-calling model
llama.cpp	openai	POST {base}/chat/completions	any tool-calling GGUF
Ollama	openai	POST {base}/chat/completions	llama3.1, qwen2.5-coder
Block Gateway	openai	POST {base}/chat/completions	gpt-5, claude
OpenRouter	openrouter	POST {base}/chat/completions	anything they route (extended-thinking replay, provider-agnostic tool calling)
Databricks	databricks	POST {host}/serving-endpoints/{model}/invocations	goose-claude-4-6-sonnet
Databricks AI Gateway v2	databricks_v2	POST {host}/ai-gateway/{provider}/v1/...	workspace endpoints and Unity Catalog model-service FQNs; UC Claude services use Anthropic Messages, UC GPT-5+ services use OpenAI Responses, and unknown UC FQNs use MLflow Chat Completions

The optional DATABRICKS_MODEL_FILTER applies only to model discovery. Each comma-separated entry is trimmed and matched against the complete raw ID with case-sensitive * (zero or more characters) and ? (one Unicode character) semantics; patterns are OR-ed. Unset or blank preserves the full authenticated catalog. A nonblank value containing no usable patterns is rejected. This controls picker visibility only; Databricks and Unity Catalog permissions remain the authorization boundary. A filtered-empty result is authoritative and does not restore the built-in fallback models.

If BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=anthropic is selected without ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=openai is selected without OPENAI_COMPAT_API_KEY, or BUZZ_AGENT_PROVIDER=openrouter is selected without OPENROUTER_API_KEY, the agent returns an error — there is no implicit fallback to another provider.

provider=openai speaks two HTTP dialects: the Responses API (/v1/responses, required for GPT-5 / o-series tool-calling on OpenAI's own service) and the Chat Completions API (/chat/completions, the broadly-supported OpenAI-compatible wire format).

By default (OPENAI_COMPAT_API=auto) the agent picks Responses when OPENAI_COMPAT_BASE_URL points at an *.openai.com host and Chat Completions everywhere else. Pin the choice explicitly with OPENAI_COMPAT_API=chat or OPENAI_COMPAT_API=responses for providers that diverge from the default (e.g. a Responses-compatible self-hosted gateway).

provider=openrouter is first-class, not routed through provider=openai: it speaks OpenAI's Chat Completions wire format but with OpenRouter-specific extensions layered on top —

• reasoning.effort is set on the request when reasoning effort is configured. The request deliberately carries no provider.require_parameters filter: that filter routes only to endpoints advertising every parameter in the body, and 83 of 274 tools-capable OpenRouter models do not advertise reasoning, so it turns an effort setting into a hard 404 on a valid model id. A model that cannot reason answers without reasoning instead.
• The response's reasoning_details array (opaque extended-thinking payload) is captured and replayed byte-for-byte on the next turn's assistant message, so multi-turn tool use keeps the model's chain-of-thought.
• anthropic/* models get Anthropic-style cache_control breakpoints injected on the system message and the last two user messages.
• Retryable statuses (429 and typed provider_overloaded 503) honor the documented Retry-After header (clamped to a small ceiling — see RETRY_AFTER_CAP_SECS in llm.rs — since the sleep happens outside BUZZ_AGENT_LLM_TIMEOUT_SECS); 502 and untyped 503 retry with jittered backoff instead. 401 is treated as an expired/invalid key and refreshed once, while 402 (no credits) and 403 (guardrail/moderation/permission) fail immediately without retry.

Provider is a Rust enum with one match in Llm::complete. There is no trait, no Box<dyn>, no async-trait. Adding a provider is a match arm and one body/parse pair in llm.rs.

MCP Servers

The client passes MCP server specs in session/new. The agent spawns each one as a stdio subprocess, calls tools/list, and merges everything into a single tool catalog the LLM sees. Tool names are namespaced as server__tool (double underscore separator). Bare tool names containing __ are rejected at registration.

Example: a single echo MCP server.

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 2,
  "method": "session/new",
  "params": {
    "cwd": "/work",
    "mcpServers": [
      {
        "name": "echo",
        "command": "/usr/local/bin/echo-mcp",
        "args": ["--mode", "stdio"],
        "env": [
          { "name": "ECHO_VERBOSE", "value": "1" }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

Multiple servers: just add more entries. Tool calls fan out to the right server by namespace prefix.

Transport: stdio only. No HTTP, no SSE. We advertise this in agentCapabilities (mcpCapabilities.http: false, mcpCapabilities.sse: false); spec-compliant clients won't ask for what we don't have.

Security Model

The trust boundary is the operator who launched the agent. The harness, MCP server binaries, and API keys are all trusted. Untrusted input — model output, tool results, prompts — is bounded.

Boundary	Mechanism
Stdout discipline	Single-consumer mpsc channel feeding stdout. No two tasks can interleave bytes. All logs go to stderr.
MCP child env	Whitelist (PATH, HOME, TERM, LANG, LC_ALL, TMPDIR) plus what the client explicitly passes. Your ANTHROPIC_API_KEY does not leak into MCP children.
MCP child lifetime	Process group via setpgid(0,0) in pre_exec. On transport break or shutdown: killpg(SIGKILL). Grandchildren die too.
Server poisoning	After a timeout or transport break, the offending server is marked dead. Future calls trigger a lazy restart with exponential backoff. Other servers keep working.
Frame size	BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_LINE_BYTES (default 4 MiB). Oversize → connection killed.
LLM response size	16 MiB hard cap. Both Content-Length precheck and streaming-buffer cap.
Cancellation	tokio::select! { biased; _ = cancel.changed() => ... } at every loop boundary. Cancel always wins the race.
Session isolation	Unlimited concurrent sessions by default (configurable via BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_SESSIONS). One prompt per session at a time. Each session gets its own MCP servers.
tool_use ↔ tool_result pairing	Encoded in the type system. Every ToolCall and ToolResult carries a provider_id: String (not Option).

Bounded Everything

Limit	Default	Where
Inbound JSON-RPC frame	4 MiB	BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_LINE_BYTES
Single prompt	1 MiB	MAX_PROMPT_BYTES
History window	1 MiB	BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_HISTORY_BYTES
LLM response body	16 MiB	MAX_LLM_RESPONSE_BYTES
LLM error body	4 KiB	MAX_LLM_ERROR_BODY_BYTES
Tool result body (total, incl. images)	8 MiB	MAX_TOOL_RESULT_BYTES
Tool result text	50 KiB	BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_TOOL_RESULT_TEXT_BYTES
MCP servers / session	16	MAX_MCP_SERVERS
Tools / session	128	MAX_TOOLS_PER_SESSION
Tool description bytes	1 KiB	MAX_DESCRIPTION_BYTES
Tool schema bytes	4 KiB	MAX_SCHEMA_BYTES (oversize → replaced with {})
Tool calls per turn	64	MAX_TOOL_CALLS_PER_TURN
Loop rounds	0 (unlimited)	BUZZ_AGENT_MAX_ROUNDS
LLM read inactivity timeout	240 s	BUZZ_AGENT_LLM_TIMEOUT_SECS
Tool call timeout	1260 s	BUZZ_AGENT_TOOL_TIMEOUT_SECS

What This Is NOT

A short list, because the answer is mostly "no":

• Not a framework. No plugins, no recipes, no slash commands, no modes. MCP servers can participate in agent lifecycle via hook tools (_Stop, _PostCompact), but these are advisory, fail-open, and budget-bounded — not a plugin system.
• Not streaming. One non-streaming HTTP POST per round. The LLM's generated text is forwarded to the client as agent_message_chunk, but there is no token-level streaming.
• Not persistent. Everything is in-memory, per-process. No SQLite. When context fills, the agent summarizes its own history and continues (context handoff). No external persistence.
• Not an SDK. This is a binary. The protocol seam is stdin/stdout. Use it from any language.
• Not a UI. No TUI, no web, no notifications. The client renders.
• Not authenticated. API keys come from env. Use systemd, Docker secrets, or a wrapper.
• Not networked MCP. Stdio transport only. No HTTP/SSE MCP transport.
• Not load-able. No session/load. We advertise loadSession: false.
• Not a router. No agent-to-agent, no fan-out, no orchestration. One model. One loop.

Concurrency model:

                  ┌──── reader task ──────────┐
                  │  (stdin → JSON-RPC → ...) │
                  │                           │
   stdin ─────────┤   dispatch                │
                  │     │                     │
                  │     ├── initialize        │  (sync reply)
                  │     ├── session/new       │  (sync reply)
                  │     ├── session/prompt ───┼─── spawn ──> prompt task
                  │     │                     │              │
                  │     ├── session/cancel ───┼─> watch::send│ (biased select wins)
                  │     │                     │              │
                  └───────────────────────────┘              │
                                                             │
                  ┌── writer task ────────────────┐          │
   stdout ────────┤  mpsc<WireMsg> consumer       │<─────────┘
                  │  (the only stdout writer)     │
                  └───────────────────────────────┘

One reader, one writer, up to 8 concurrent prompt tasks (one per session).

Building

cargo build --release -p buzz-agent

Testing

cargo test -p buzz-agent

Test strategy is real subprocess, no mocks:

• Fake LLM — tests/fake_llm.rs and the helpers in tests/regressions.rs spin up a real tokio::net::TcpListener on port 0, parse Content-Length, and return scripted JSON. No HTTP mocking library.
• Fake MCP server — tests/bin/fake_mcp.rs is a separate binary controlled by env vars: FAKE_MCP_HANG_INIT, FAKE_MCP_TOOL_DELAY, FAKE_MCP_SPAWN_GRANDCHILD, etc. Each fault path is a real process being abused.
• Regression tests are the changelog. Each #[test] in regressions.rs is named for the bug it locks down: assistant_text_preserved_across_prompts, cancel_leaves_history_valid_for_next_prompt, mcp_init_timeout_kills_child, oversize_line_kills_connection. Read them in order to learn the protocol's failure modes.