Files
buzz/mobile/lib/shared/hosted/browser_auth.dart
Wes b6aa5539e3 feat(mobile): account onboarding, key recovery and hosted reconnect (#8375)
## Behavior

Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery,
community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab
features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or
empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and
background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing,
links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is
retained for later opt-in.


`--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz`
opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup.
The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission,
and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features;
`BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their
backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory.

`BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and
reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure
assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling
assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at
Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not
replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines.

Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile
interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file
import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and
authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound
account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the
advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection.
Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS
startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET
/operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership
endpoint.

## Validation

- Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents
readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while
generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection
uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances
dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a
subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the
subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different
account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured
domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate
isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse,
duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an
empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses
synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live
backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh
GitHub CI is pending.

- Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage
enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit
known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links
release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response
encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by
ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed;
default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production
fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the
identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey
assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures
are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not
exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed
(mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub
CI remains pending.

- Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at
`fb15d5b82`.
- Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing
and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing
pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly.
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through
hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored
controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the
default-build suite.
- Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its
pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated
transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding
selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both
configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and
file-size checks).

- Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission
and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or
already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted
removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too
(hosted-only cases intentionally skip there).
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping,
reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory
reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean
and restored controls pass.
- Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the
iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At
`24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches,
matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes
it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did
not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native
cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account
round trip.

- Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known
identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement
of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the
retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default:
31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations
fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot
enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover.

- Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after
account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch,
preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The
configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the
production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored
controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical
QR acceptance.

- Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses
atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain.
Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request
abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit.
- Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain
account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and
native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls.
Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real
file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because
simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device
protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed.

- Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default
selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus
whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed
Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally
initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form
fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass.
- Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator
in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR /
pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab
connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in
this check.

- Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size
checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push
snapshot.

## Review disposition

| Feedback | Disposition |
| --- | --- |
| Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate
invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding
([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622),
[queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640),
[reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512))
| Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven
ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. |
| Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue,
transient HTTP retry classification
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143))
| All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated
mutation evidence above. |
| Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite
checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the
preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. |
| iOS interrupted key export
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252))
| Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented.
Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains
pending. |
| Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556))
| Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. |
| Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab
configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported
community mappings. |
| Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the
reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app
recovery/reset and remains deferred. |
| Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current
base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains
here. |
| Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the
operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied.
Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. |
| Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local
work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed
implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. |
| Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not
demonstrated defects. |

## Remaining draft gates

Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this
revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend
backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery
policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The
empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary
pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human
acceptance and current CI are still required before merge.



Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must
use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add
support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing
an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented
capability.


Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS`
(including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab
controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build
with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise
browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS,
exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record
results before marking review complete.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
2026-10-19 15:46:58 -06:00

288 lines
9.9 KiB
Dart

import '../storage/serial_queue.dart';
import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:math';
import 'package:app_links/app_links.dart';
import 'package:crypto/crypto.dart';
import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
import 'package:flutter/services.dart';
import 'package:flutter_secure_storage/flutter_secure_storage.dart';
import 'package:url_launcher/url_launcher.dart';
import '../storage/secure_storage.dart';
import 'hosted_environment.dart';
/// Safe to show as a generic retry prompt. Never carries a URL or server text.
enum BrowserAuthFailure { restartLogin, cancelled, unavailable, storage }
class BrowserAuthCode {
const BrowserAuthCode(this.code, this.verifier, this.intent);
final String code;
final String verifier;
final Map<String, String> intent;
}
/// One app-scoped owner. Subscribe to [codes] and [failures] before [initialize].
/// Callbacks bypass the community deep-link FIFO. A consumed code is never
/// replayed automatically: exchange failure requires a fresh browser login.
class BrowserAuth {
BrowserAuth({
FlutterSecureStorage? storage,
Future<String?> Function(Uri)? openBrowser,
DateTime Function()? now,
}) : _storage = storage ?? accountSecureStorage,
_openBrowser = openBrowser ?? _openPlatformBrowser,
_now = now ?? DateTime.now;
static const callback = 'xyz.block.buzz.mobile:/auth/callback';
static final _attemptKey =
'buzz_browser_auth_attempt_v1_${HostedEnvironment.origin.host}';
static final _intentKey =
'buzz_browser_auth_intent_v1_${HostedEnvironment.origin.host}';
static const _channel = MethodChannel('buzz/browser_auth');
final FlutterSecureStorage _storage;
final Future<String?> Function(Uri) _openBrowser;
final DateTime Function() _now;
final _codes = StreamController<BrowserAuthCode>.broadcast();
final _failures = StreamController<BrowserAuthFailure>.broadcast();
Stream<BrowserAuthCode> get codes => _codes.stream;
Stream<BrowserAuthFailure> get failures => _failures.stream;
StreamSubscription<Uri>? _links;
final _queue = SerialQueue();
bool _disposed = false;
bool _initialized = false;
int _generation = 0;
String? _activeState;
String? _consumedCallbackHash;
Future<T> _serial<T>(Future<T> Function() task) {
final result = _queue.run(() {
if (_disposed) throw BrowserAuthFailure.cancelled;
return task();
});
return result;
}
Future<void> initialize() async {
if (_initialized || _disposed) return;
_initialized = true;
final links = AppLinks();
_links = links.uriLinkStream.listen((uri) {
if (uri.scheme == 'xyz.block.buzz.mobile') {
unawaited(receive(uri).catchError((Object _) {}));
}
}, onError: (Object _) => _fail(BrowserAuthFailure.unavailable));
try {
final initial = await links.getInitialLink();
if (initial != null && initial.scheme == 'xyz.block.buzz.mobile') {
await receive(initial);
}
} catch (_) {
_fail(BrowserAuthFailure.unavailable);
}
}
/// Intent is opaque to authentication; callers validate its relay/challenge
/// before acting. Retained separately so missing state never loses navigation.
Future<Map<String, String>?> retainedIntent() => _serial(() async {
try {
final raw = await _storage.read(key: _intentKey);
if (raw == null) return null;
return Map<String, String>.from(jsonDecode(raw) as Map);
} catch (_) {
throw BrowserAuthFailure.storage;
}
});
/// Persist setup intent before remote work or acknowledging key transfer.
Future<void> retainIntent(Map<String, String> intent) => _serial(() async {
final raw = jsonEncode(intent);
if (raw.length > 16384) throw BrowserAuthFailure.storage;
await _storage.write(key: _intentKey, value: raw);
if (await _storage.read(key: _intentKey) != raw) {
throw BrowserAuthFailure.storage;
}
});
Future<void> start(Map<String, String> intent) async {
final generation = ++_generation;
final uri = await _serial(() async {
if (jsonEncode(intent).length > 16384) throw BrowserAuthFailure.storage;
final random = Random.secure();
String secret() => base64UrlEncode(
List.generate(32, (_) => random.nextInt(256)),
).replaceAll('=', '');
final verifier = secret();
final state = secret();
_activeState = state;
final record = jsonEncode({
'verifier': verifier,
'state': state,
'created': _now().toUtc().millisecondsSinceEpoch,
'intent': intent,
});
try {
await _storage.write(key: _intentKey, value: jsonEncode(intent));
await _storage.write(key: _attemptKey, value: record);
if (await _storage.read(key: _attemptKey) != record) {
throw BrowserAuthFailure.storage;
}
} catch (_) {
throw BrowserAuthFailure.storage;
}
return HostedEnvironment.origin.replace(
path: '/api/goose/v1/auth/login',
queryParameters: {
'type': 'cli',
'product': 'buzz',
'returnTo': callback,
'state': state,
'code_challenge': base64UrlEncode(
sha256.convert(ascii.encode(verifier)).bytes,
).replaceAll('=', ''),
'code_challenge_method': 'S256',
},
);
});
if (_disposed || generation != _generation) return;
try {
final result = await _openBrowser(uri);
if (!_disposed && generation == _generation && result != null) {
await receive(Uri.parse(result));
}
} on PlatformException catch (error) {
if (generation == _generation) {
_fail(
error.code == 'cancelled'
? BrowserAuthFailure.cancelled
: BrowserAuthFailure.unavailable,
);
}
} catch (_) {
if (generation == _generation) _fail(BrowserAuthFailure.unavailable);
}
}
Future<void> receive(Uri uri) {
final generation = _generation;
return _serial(() async {
if (generation != _generation) return;
void fail(BrowserAuthFailure failure) {
if (generation == _generation) _fail(failure);
}
// Reject noncanonical destination and duplicate query fields before reading
// secrets. Neither invalid state nor malformed callbacks mutate the session.
final callbackHash = sha256
.convert(utf8.encode(uri.toString()))
.toString();
if (callbackHash == _consumedCallbackHash) return;
final query = uri.queryParametersAll;
if (uri.toString().split('?').first != callback ||
uri.hasFragment ||
query.values.any((v) => v.length != 1) ||
query.keys.any((k) => k != 'state' && k != 'code' && k != 'error')) {
if (_activeState == null) fail(BrowserAuthFailure.restartLogin);
return;
}
try {
final saved = await _storage.read(key: _attemptKey);
if (saved == null) {
fail(BrowserAuthFailure.restartLogin);
return;
}
final record = jsonDecode(saved) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final expectedState = record['state'];
if (expectedState is! String ||
!RegExp(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$').hasMatch(expectedState)) {
throw BrowserAuthFailure.storage;
}
final age =
_now().toUtc().millisecondsSinceEpoch - (record['created'] as int);
if (age < 0 || age > const Duration(minutes: 10).inMilliseconds) {
fail(BrowserAuthFailure.restartLogin);
return;
}
if (query['state']?.single != expectedState) {
if (_activeState != expectedState) {
fail(BrowserAuthFailure.restartLogin);
}
return;
}
if (generation != _generation) return;
final code = query['code']?.single;
if (query.containsKey('error') ||
code == null ||
code.isEmpty ||
code.length > 4096) {
fail(BrowserAuthFailure.restartLogin);
return;
}
final verifier = record['verifier'] as String;
if (!RegExp(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$').hasMatch(verifier)) {
throw BrowserAuthFailure.storage;
}
final intent = Map<String, String>.from(record['intent'] as Map);
await _storage.delete(key: _attemptKey);
if (await _storage.read(key: _attemptKey) != null) {
throw BrowserAuthFailure.storage;
}
_activeState = null;
_consumedCallbackHash = callbackHash;
if (!_disposed && generation == _generation) {
_codes.add(BrowserAuthCode(code, verifier, Map.unmodifiable(intent)));
}
} catch (_) {
fail(BrowserAuthFailure.storage);
}
});
}
Future<void> cancel() async {
++_generation;
_activeState = null;
if (defaultTargetPlatform == TargetPlatform.iOS) {
try {
await _channel.invokeMethod<void>('cancel');
} catch (_) {
/* No session may be active. */
}
}
await _serial(() => _storage.delete(key: _attemptKey));
}
/// Call only after completing or explicitly abandoning the retained intent.
Future<void> clearIntent() => _serial(() => _storage.delete(key: _intentKey));
void _fail(BrowserAuthFailure failure) {
if (!_disposed) _failures.add(failure);
}
Future<void> dispose() async {
_disposed = true;
++_generation;
await _links?.cancel();
await _codes.close();
await _failures.close();
}
static Future<String?> _openPlatformBrowser(Uri uri) async {
if (defaultTargetPlatform == TargetPlatform.iOS) {
return _channel.invokeMethod<String>('start', {
'url': uri.toString(),
if (kDebugMode &&
const bool.fromEnvironment('BUZZ_DEBUG_PRIVATE_LOGIN'))
'ephemeral': 'true',
});
}
if (defaultTargetPlatform == TargetPlatform.android &&
await launchUrl(uri, mode: LaunchMode.inAppBrowserView)) {
return null;
}
throw BrowserAuthFailure.unavailable;
}
}