Files
buzz/mobile/lib/shared/hosted/builderlab_account.dart
Wes b6aa5539e3 feat(mobile): account onboarding, key recovery and hosted reconnect (#8375)
## Behavior

Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery,
community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab
features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or
empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and
background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing,
links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is
retained for later opt-in.


`--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz`
opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup.
The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission,
and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features;
`BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their
backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory.

`BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and
reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure
assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling
assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at
Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not
replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines.

Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile
interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file
import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and
authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound
account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the
advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection.
Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS
startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET
/operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership
endpoint.

## Validation

- Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents
readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while
generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection
uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances
dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a
subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the
subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different
account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured
domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate
isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse,
duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an
empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses
synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live
backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh
GitHub CI is pending.

- Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage
enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit
known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links
release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response
encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by
ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed;
default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production
fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the
identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey
assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures
are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not
exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed
(mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub
CI remains pending.

- Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at
`fb15d5b82`.
- Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing
and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing
pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly.
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through
hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored
controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the
default-build suite.
- Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its
pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated
transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding
selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both
configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and
file-size checks).

- Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission
and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or
already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted
removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too
(hosted-only cases intentionally skip there).
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping,
reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory
reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean
and restored controls pass.
- Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the
iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At
`24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches,
matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes
it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did
not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native
cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account
round trip.

- Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known
identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement
of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the
retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default:
31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations
fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot
enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover.

- Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after
account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch,
preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The
configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the
production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored
controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical
QR acceptance.

- Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses
atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain.
Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request
abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit.
- Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain
account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and
native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls.
Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real
file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because
simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device
protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed.

- Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default
selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus
whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed
Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally
initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form
fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass.
- Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator
in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR /
pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab
connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in
this check.

- Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size
checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push
snapshot.

## Review disposition

| Feedback | Disposition |
| --- | --- |
| Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate
invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding
([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622),
[queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640),
[reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512))
| Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven
ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. |
| Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue,
transient HTTP retry classification
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143))
| All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated
mutation evidence above. |
| Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite
checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the
preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. |
| iOS interrupted key export
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252))
| Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented.
Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains
pending. |
| Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556))
| Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. |
| Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab
configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported
community mappings. |
| Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the
reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app
recovery/reset and remains deferred. |
| Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current
base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains
here. |
| Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the
operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied.
Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. |
| Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local
work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed
implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. |
| Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not
demonstrated defects. |

## Remaining draft gates

Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this
revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend
backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery
policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The
empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary
pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human
acceptance and current CI are still required before merge.



Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must
use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add
support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing
an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented
capability.


Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS`
(including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab
controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build
with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise
browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS,
exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record
results before marking review complete.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
2026-10-19 15:46:58 -06:00

354 lines
12 KiB
Dart

import '../storage/serial_queue.dart';
import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
import 'package:flutter_secure_storage/flutter_secure_storage.dart';
import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
import '../storage/secure_storage.dart';
import 'hosted_environment.dart';
import 'bounded_http_response.dart';
import '../relay/relay_session.dart';
import 'account_identity_store.dart';
/// Errors contain no response bodies, credentials, or recovered private keys.
/// Only [AccountFailure.signedOut] means "no session"; every other failure
/// leaves the account state unknown.
enum AccountFailure {
signedOut,
denied,
accountSetupRequired,
unavailable,
invalidResponse,
storage,
/// Login completed for a different account than the stored session.
differentAccount,
/// The server definitively refused this request (400/404/409/422); sending
/// it again unchanged cannot succeed.
rejected,
}
class BuilderlabAccount {
const BuilderlabAccount({
required this.subject,
required this.expiresAt,
this.needsAccountSetup = false,
});
final bool needsAccountSetup;
final String subject;
final DateTime expiresAt;
}
/// Builderlab's CLI and NIP-FA adapter use the same server-side CLI credential.
/// This client uses the native header, never a browser cookie. Browser handoff
/// is deliberately a separate boundary: an app link is not an account session.
///
/// One session per device, scoped to its account subject. A login for another
/// subject is refused until the caller clears the session and every fact it
/// holds for the previous subject.
class BuilderlabAccountClient {
BuilderlabAccountClient({
http.Client? httpClient,
FlutterSecureStorage? storage,
}) : _http = httpClient ?? http.Client(),
_storage = storage ?? defaultStorage;
/// Device-only: the session never syncs or restores onto another device.
@visibleForTesting
static const defaultStorage = accountSecureStorage;
static final origin = HostedEnvironment.origin;
static const _prefix = '/api/goose';
/// Sessions are scoped per origin so staging never reads production state.
static final _storageKey =
'buzz_hosted_session_${origin.host.replaceAll('.', '_')}_v1';
final http.Client _http;
final FlutterSecureStorage _storage;
String? _credential;
BuilderlabAccount? _account;
final _queue = SerialQueue();
bool _disposed = false;
BuilderlabAccount? get account => _account;
/// Runs operations one at a time in call order, so a callback exchange that
/// arrives during startup restore waits instead of failing.
Future<T> _serial<T>(Future<T> Function() operation) {
final result = _queue.run(() {
if (_disposed) throw AccountFailure.unavailable;
return operation();
});
return result;
}
Future<BuilderlabAccount?> restore() => _serial(() async {
final record = await _readRecord();
if (record == null) return null;
try {
final verified = await _verify(record.credential);
if (verified.subject != record.subject) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
return _adopt(record.credential, verified);
} on AccountFailure catch (failure) {
if (failure == AccountFailure.signedOut) {
await _clear();
return null;
}
rethrow;
}
});
/// Receives a one-use code only from a validated browser callback. PKCE is
/// verified by Builderlab; state and callback origin are checked by the caller.
Future<BuilderlabAccount> exchange({
required String code,
required String verifier,
}) => _serial(() async {
if (code.isEmpty ||
!RegExp(r'^[A-Za-z0-9._~-]{43,128}$').hasMatch(verifier)) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
final stored = await _readRecord();
final result = await _request(
'/v1/auth/login/exchange',
body: {'code': code, 'code_verifier': verifier},
);
final credential = result['session_credential'];
if (credential is! String ||
credential.isEmpty ||
credential.length > 512) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
final verified = await _verify(credential);
if (DateTime.tryParse(
result['expires_at'] is String ? result['expires_at'] as String : '',
) !=
verified.expiresAt) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
if (stored != null && stored.subject != verified.subject) {
throw AccountFailure.differentAccount;
}
if (_disposed) throw AccountFailure.unavailable;
final record = jsonEncode({
'origin': origin.toString(),
'credential': credential,
'subject': verified.subject,
'expires_at': verified.expiresAt.toIso8601String(),
});
try {
await _storage.write(key: _storageKey, value: record);
if (await _storage.read(key: _storageKey) != record) {
throw AccountFailure.storage;
}
} catch (_) {
throw AccountFailure.storage;
}
return _adopt(credential, verified);
});
/// An unreadable record is a storage failure, never an absent session: its
/// subject is unknown, so only an explicit [clearLocalSession] may drop it.
Future<({String credential, String subject})?> _readRecord() async {
final String? saved;
try {
saved = await _storage.read(key: _storageKey);
} catch (_) {
throw AccountFailure.storage;
}
if (saved == null) return null;
try {
final value = jsonDecode(saved);
if (value is Map<String, dynamic> &&
value['origin'] == origin.toString() &&
value['credential'] is String &&
value['subject'] is String) {
return (
credential: value['credential'] as String,
subject: value['subject'] as String,
);
}
} on FormatException {
// Falls through to the storage failure below.
}
throw AccountFailure.storage;
}
BuilderlabAccount _adopt(String credential, BuilderlabAccount verified) {
if (_disposed) throw AccountFailure.unavailable;
_credential = credential;
return _account = verified;
}
Future<BuilderlabAccount> _verify(String credential) async {
final result = await _request('/v1/auth/me', credential: credential);
final subject = result['subject'];
final expiry = result['expires_at'];
final parsed = expiry is String ? DateTime.tryParse(expiry) : null;
if (subject is! String || subject.isEmpty || parsed == null) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
if (!parsed.isAfter(DateTime.now().toUtc())) throw AccountFailure.signedOut;
final standing = result['account_standing'];
final needsSetup =
standing is Map &&
(standing['details_status'] == 'ACCOUNT_DETAILS_STATUS_MISSING' ||
standing['screening_status'] ==
'ACCOUNT_SCREENING_STATUS_NOT_SCREENED');
return BuilderlabAccount(
subject: subject,
expiresAt: parsed,
needsAccountSetup: needsSetup,
);
}
/// Public identity metadata only. Private-key recovery belongs to the identity
/// storage owner, which must derive and verify the key before any persistence.
Future<Map<String, dynamic>> currentIdentity() =>
post('/v1/buzz/nostr-identities/current', {});
/// Authenticated JSON POST to a Buzz account route on the fixed origin. The
/// credential never leaves this client. A 401 clears the stored session only
/// when the session check also rejects it; otherwise it is [AccountFailure.denied].
Future<Map<String, dynamic>> post(String path, Map<String, dynamic> body) =>
_post(path, body);
Future<Map<String, dynamic>> _post(
String path,
Map<String, dynamic> body, {
String? signingKey,
String? expectedSubject,
}) {
if (!RegExp(r'^/v1/buzz(/[a-z0-9_-]+)+$').hasMatch(path)) {
throw ArgumentError.value(path, 'path', 'not a /v1/buzz/ route');
}
return _serial(() async {
final credential = _credential;
if (credential == null) throw AccountFailure.signedOut;
if (expectedSubject != null && _account?.subject != expectedSubject) {
throw AccountFailure.denied;
}
try {
return await _request(
path,
credential: credential,
body: body,
signingKey: signingKey,
);
} on AccountFailure catch (failure) {
if (failure == AccountFailure.denied &&
_account?.needsAccountSetup == true) {
throw AccountFailure.accountSetupRequired;
}
if (failure != AccountFailure.signedOut) rethrow;
}
// Routes also answer 401 for authorization failures, so only a rejected
// session check ends the session.
try {
await _verify(credential);
} on AccountFailure catch (failure) {
if (failure == AccountFailure.signedOut) await _clear();
rethrow;
}
throw AccountFailure.denied;
});
}
/// Proves the saved key. The issuer may establish its first account binding;
/// conflicting or retired bindings are refused atomically by the backend.
Future<Map<String, dynamic>> relayAssertion(
String relay,
String nsec, {
required String expectedSubject,
}) => _post(
'/v1/buzz/identity/assertions',
{
'relay_url': relay,
'nostr_pubkey': AccountIdentityStore.publicKeyForNsec(nsec),
},
signingKey: nsec,
expectedSubject: expectedSubject,
);
Future<void> clearLocalSession() => _serial(_clear);
Future<void> _clear() async {
_credential = null;
_account = null;
try {
await _storage.delete(key: _storageKey);
} catch (_) {
throw AccountFailure.storage;
}
}
Future<Map<String, dynamic>> _request(
String path, {
String? credential,
Map<String, dynamic>? body,
String? signingKey,
}) async {
try {
final request =
http.Request(
body == null ? 'GET' : 'POST',
origin.replace(path: '$_prefix$path'),
)
..followRedirects = false
..headers['Accept'] = 'application/json';
if (credential != null) {
request.headers['X-BB-Session-Credential'] = credential;
}
if (body != null) {
request.headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
request.headers['Origin'] = origin.toString();
request.body = jsonEncode(body);
if (signingKey != null) {
request.headers['Authorization'] = buildNip98AuthHeader(
method: 'POST',
url: request.url.toString(),
bodyBytes: request.bodyBytes,
nsec: signingKey,
);
}
}
final response = await boundedHttpResponse(_http, request);
if (kDebugMode && response.statusCode >= 400) {
debugPrint(
'Builderlab ${origin.host} ${request.method} $path: HTTP ${response.statusCode} contentType=${response.headers['content-type']?.split(';').first}',
);
}
if (response.statusCode == 401) throw AccountFailure.signedOut;
if (response.statusCode == 403) throw AccountFailure.denied;
if (const {400, 404, 409, 422}.contains(response.statusCode)) {
throw AccountFailure.rejected;
}
if (response.statusCode < 200 || response.statusCode >= 300) {
throw AccountFailure.unavailable;
}
final value = jsonDecode(utf8.decode(response.bodyBytes));
if (value is! Map<String, dynamic>) throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
return value;
} on AccountFailure {
rethrow;
} on FormatException {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
} catch (_) {
throw AccountFailure.unavailable;
}
}
void dispose() {
_disposed = true;
_credential = null;
_account = null;
_http.close();
}
}