Files
buzz/mobile/lib/shared/hosted/hosted_identity_service.dart
Wes b6aa5539e3 feat(mobile): account onboarding, key recovery and hosted reconnect (#8375)
## Behavior

Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery,
community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab
features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or
empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and
background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing,
links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is
retained for later opt-in.


`--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz`
opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup.
The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission,
and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features;
`BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their
backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory.

`BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and
reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure
assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling
assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at
Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not
replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines.

Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile
interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file
import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and
authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound
account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the
advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection.
Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS
startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET
/operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership
endpoint.

## Validation

- Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents
readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while
generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection
uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances
dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a
subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the
subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different
account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured
domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate
isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse,
duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an
empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses
synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live
backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh
GitHub CI is pending.

- Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage
enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit
known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links
release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response
encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by
ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed;
default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production
fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the
identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey
assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures
are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not
exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed
(mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub
CI remains pending.

- Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at
`fb15d5b82`.
- Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing
and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing
pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly.
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through
hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored
controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the
default-build suite.
- Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its
pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated
transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding
selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both
configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and
file-size checks).

- Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission
and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or
already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted
removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too
(hosted-only cases intentionally skip there).
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping,
reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory
reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean
and restored controls pass.
- Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the
iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At
`24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches,
matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes
it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did
not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native
cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account
round trip.

- Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known
identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement
of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the
retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default:
31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations
fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot
enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover.

- Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after
account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch,
preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The
configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the
production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored
controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical
QR acceptance.

- Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses
atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain.
Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request
abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit.
- Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain
account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and
native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls.
Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real
file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because
simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device
protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed.

- Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default
selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus
whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed
Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally
initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form
fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass.
- Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator
in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR /
pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab
connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in
this check.

- Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size
checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push
snapshot.

## Review disposition

| Feedback | Disposition |
| --- | --- |
| Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate
invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding
([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622),
[queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640),
[reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512))
| Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven
ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. |
| Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue,
transient HTTP retry classification
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143))
| All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated
mutation evidence above. |
| Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite
checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the
preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. |
| iOS interrupted key export
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252))
| Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented.
Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains
pending. |
| Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556))
| Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. |
| Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab
configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported
community mappings. |
| Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the
reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app
recovery/reset and remains deferred. |
| Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current
base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains
here. |
| Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the
operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied.
Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. |
| Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local
work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed
implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. |
| Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not
demonstrated defects. |

## Remaining draft gates

Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this
revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend
backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery
policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The
empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary
pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human
acceptance and current CI are still required before merge.



Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must
use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add
support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing
an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented
capability.


Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS`
(including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab
controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build
with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise
browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS,
exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record
results before marking review complete.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
2026-10-19 15:46:58 -06:00

324 lines
11 KiB
Dart

import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import 'account_identity_store.dart';
import 'builderlab_account.dart';
import 'device_identity_source.dart';
enum HostedIdentityState {
ready,
needsSelection,
needsBinding,
needsBackup,
mismatch,
recoveryBlocked,
needsAuthoritativeAbsence,
}
class HostedIdentityResult {
const HostedIdentityResult(
this.state, {
this.pubkey,
this.choices = const [],
});
final HostedIdentityState state;
final String? pubkey;
final List<DeviceIdentityChoice> choices;
}
/// Resolves identity safely. Generation requires a separately verified
/// complete absence contract and explicit legacy-key reconciliation; neither a
/// failed recovery nor an unbound account proves there is no prior identity.
class HostedIdentityService {
HostedIdentityService({
required this.account,
required this.store,
DeviceIdentitySource? deviceIdentities,
}) : deviceIdentities = deviceIdentities ?? DeviceIdentitySource();
final DeviceIdentitySource deviceIdentities;
final BuilderlabAccountClient account;
final AccountIdentityStore store;
Future<HostedIdentityResult> resolve({
bool Function()? isCurrent,
String? selectedPubkey,
}) => _resolve(isCurrent, selectedPubkey);
Future<HostedIdentityResult> _resolve(
bool Function()? isCurrent,
String? selectedPubkey,
) async {
void checkCurrent() {
if (isCurrent != null && !isCurrent()) throw AccountFailure.unavailable;
}
checkCurrent();
final subject = account.account?.subject;
if (subject == null) throw AccountFailure.signedOut;
final store = this.store.forSubject(subject);
final local = await store.read();
final response = await account.currentIdentity();
_sameAccount(subject);
if (response['error'] != null) throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
final identity = response['identity'];
final String? bound;
if (identity == null) {
bound = null; // The current API omits the optional unbound identity.
} else if (identity is Map<String, dynamic>) {
bound = _pubkey(identity['pubkey_hex']);
} else {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
if (local != null && bound != null) return _result(local, bound, subject);
final status = await account.post('/v1/buzz/nsec-backups/status', {});
_sameAccount(subject);
checkCurrent();
final listed = status['backup_nostr_pubkeys'];
if (status['error'] != null || listed is! List) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
final statusBound = status['current_nostr_pubkey'] == null
? null
: _pubkey(status['current_nostr_pubkey']);
final statusKeys = listed.map(_pubkey).toSet();
if (statusBound != bound) throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
if (local != null) {
// A previously chosen recovery key may still await binding after a
// restart. Its account-scoped receipt and current backup listing preserve
// that choice even when the account also retains older identities.
final confirmedSelection =
statusKeys.contains(local.pubkey) &&
local.hasBackupFor(
backend: BuilderlabAccountClient.origin.origin,
subject: subject,
);
if (statusKeys.any((key) => key != local.pubkey) && !confirmedSelection) {
return const HostedIdentityResult(HostedIdentityState.mismatch);
}
return _result(local, bound, subject);
}
final device = await deviceIdentities.choices();
final savedAccounts = await store.identities();
final choices = [
...device,
for (final saved in savedAccounts)
if (!device.any((item) => item.pubkey == saved.pubkey))
DeviceIdentityChoice(saved.pubkey, 'Saved identity'),
];
_sameAccount(subject);
checkCurrent();
// The authoritative bound key already on this device needs no remote
// decryption, even when the account retains backups of older identities.
final matchingDevice =
bound != null && choices.any((item) => item.pubkey == bound);
if ((statusKeys.isEmpty && bound == null) || matchingDevice) {
final eligible = choices
.where((item) => bound == null || item.pubkey == bound)
.toList();
if (eligible.isNotEmpty) {
final chosen =
selectedPubkey ??
(bound != null && eligible.length == 1
? eligible.single.pubkey
: null);
if (!eligible.any((item) => item.pubkey == chosen)) {
return HostedIdentityResult(
HostedIdentityState.needsSelection,
choices: eligible,
);
}
void checkSelection() {
_sameAccount(subject);
checkCurrent();
}
final saved = device.any((item) => item.pubkey == chosen)
? await deviceIdentities.adopt(
chosen!,
store,
checkCurrent: checkSelection,
)
: await store.adoptSaved(chosen!, checkCurrent: checkSelection);
return _result(saved, bound, subject);
}
}
if (statusBound == null && statusKeys.isEmpty) {
final generated = await store.generateIfAbsent(
authorize: () async {
_sameAccount(subject);
checkCurrent();
final reconciled = (await deviceIdentities.choices()).isEmpty;
_sameAccount(subject);
checkCurrent();
return reconciled;
},
);
_sameAccount(subject);
checkCurrent();
return generated == null
? const HostedIdentityResult(
HostedIdentityState.needsAuthoritativeAbsence,
)
: _result(generated, bound, subject);
}
final recovered = await account.post('/v1/buzz/nsec-backups/recovery', {});
_sameAccount(subject);
final backups = recovered['backups'];
final failed = recovered['failed_backup_ids'];
if (recovered['error'] != null ||
backups is! List ||
failed is! List ||
failed.any((id) => id is! String)) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
if (failed.isNotEmpty) {
return const HostedIdentityResult(HostedIdentityState.recoveryBlocked);
}
if (backups.isEmpty) {
return HostedIdentityResult(
bound == null
? HostedIdentityState.needsAuthoritativeAbsence
: HostedIdentityState.recoveryBlocked,
);
}
// Validate the entire result before storing anything. Never trust its
// advertised pubkey without deriving it from the actual secret.
final candidates = <String, ({nostr.Keys keys, String backupId})>{};
try {
for (final backup in backups) {
if (backup is! Map<String, dynamic>) throw const FormatException();
final secret = backup['secret_key'];
final backupId = backup['backup_id'];
if (secret is! String ||
!RegExp(r'^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$').hasMatch(secret) ||
backupId is! String ||
backupId.isEmpty) {
throw const FormatException();
}
final bytes = base64Url.decode(base64Url.normalize(secret));
if (bytes.length != 32) throw const FormatException();
final hex = bytes
.map((b) => b.toRadixString(16).padLeft(2, '0'))
.join();
final keys = AccountIdentityStore.keysForHex(hex);
if (keys.public != _pubkey(backup['nostr_pubkey'])) {
throw const FormatException();
}
candidates.putIfAbsent(
keys.public,
() => (keys: keys, backupId: backupId),
);
}
} catch (_) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
if (bound == null &&
(statusKeys.length != candidates.length ||
!statusKeys.every(candidates.containsKey))) {
return const HostedIdentityResult(HostedIdentityState.recoveryBlocked);
}
// An account binding is authoritative even when older backups contain
// other keys. Without a binding, distinct keys require an explicit choice;
// never let response ordering choose the user's identity.
final chosen =
bound ??
selectedPubkey ??
(candidates.length == 1 ? candidates.keys.single : null);
final candidate = candidates[chosen];
if (candidate == null) {
if (bound != null) {
return const HostedIdentityResult(HostedIdentityState.mismatch);
}
return HostedIdentityResult(
HostedIdentityState.needsSelection,
choices: [
for (final pubkey in candidates.keys)
DeviceIdentityChoice(
pubkey,
'Use Builderlab identity',
fromCloud: true,
),
],
);
}
if (device.isNotEmpty &&
!device.any((item) => item.pubkey == candidate.keys.public) &&
selectedPubkey != candidate.keys.public) {
return HostedIdentityResult(
HostedIdentityState.needsSelection,
choices: [
DeviceIdentityChoice(
candidate.keys.public,
'Use Builderlab identity',
fromCloud: true,
),
],
);
}
_sameAccount(subject);
checkCurrent();
final saved = await store.create(
candidate.keys.nsec,
checkCurrent: () {
_sameAccount(subject);
checkCurrent();
},
recoveredBackup: BackupReceipt(
backend: BuilderlabAccountClient.origin.origin,
subject: subject,
pubkey: candidate.keys.public,
backupId: candidate.backupId,
),
);
_sameAccount(subject);
checkCurrent();
return _result(saved, bound, subject);
}
HostedIdentityResult _result(
AccountIdentitySnapshot local,
String? bound,
String subject,
) {
_sameAccount(subject);
if (bound != null && bound != local.pubkey) {
return HostedIdentityResult(
HostedIdentityState.mismatch,
pubkey: local.pubkey,
);
}
if (bound == null) {
return HostedIdentityResult(
HostedIdentityState.needsBinding,
pubkey: local.pubkey,
);
}
return HostedIdentityResult(
local.hasBackupFor(
backend: BuilderlabAccountClient.origin.origin,
subject: subject,
)
? HostedIdentityState.ready
: HostedIdentityState.needsBackup,
pubkey: local.pubkey,
);
}
void _sameAccount(String subject) {
if (account.account?.subject != subject) {
throw AccountFailure.differentAccount;
}
}
static String _pubkey(dynamic value) {
if (value is! String || !RegExp(r'^[a-fA-F0-9]{64}$').hasMatch(value)) {
throw AccountFailure.invalidResponse;
}
return value.toLowerCase();
}
}