Files
buzz/mobile/lib/shared/push/push_lease_revocation_outbox.dart
Wes b6aa5539e3 feat(mobile): account onboarding, key recovery and hosted reconnect (#8375)
## Behavior

Adds optional mobile Builderlab sign-in, identity backup/recovery,
community discovery/creation, and account-aware reconnect. **Builderlab
features are disabled by default:** when `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS` is unset or
empty, account login, creation, backup/recovery, reconnect prompts, and
background account restoration are hidden/disabled. QR/code pairing,
links, and invites retain Nostr-only entry. Saved account state is
retained for later opt-in.


`--dart-define=BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS=communities.buzz.xyz,communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz`
opts those DNS domains and their subdomains into required account setup.
The same policy gates pairing, deep links, durable community admission,
and reconnect. A nonempty list enables Builderlab features;
`BUZZ_BUILDERLAB_URL` alone does not. Enabled flows still require their
backend services. Existing Nostr relay authentication remains mandatory.

`BUZZ_HOSTED_RELAY_AUTH=true` enables scoped relay assertions and
reconnect prompts only for configured authentication domains. Configure
assertion issuance and each community's issuer binding before enabling
assertions; enable relay enforcement last. Account credentials stay at
Builderlab. Wrong-account recovery preserves keys; failed writes are not
replayed; authentication is bounded by request deadlines.

Hosted flows preserve keys across cancellation/restart, reconcile
interrupted creation/invitation acceptance, and support manual nsec file
import/export. Account identities are scoped to backend and
authenticated subject; reusing an existing local key for an unbound
account requires an explicit selection. Recovery reconciles the
advertised and recovered inventories before automatic selection.
Successful self-hosted admission retires its pending key, and iOS
startup removes interrupted export files. Adds authenticated relay `GET
/operator/communities/joined` for the companion Builderlab membership
endpoint.

## Validation

- Follow-up review repair at `66a12ac92`: self-hosted entry presents
readable choices and import despite incomplete enumeration, while
generation still requires a complete empty inventory; explicit selection
uses exact-key lookup. Consuming a value-equal duplicate now advances
dispatch. Reconnect requires an existing account binding or a
subject-scoped backup receipt before signing an assertion, and pins the
subject inside the serialized account request. An empty different
account is refused without sending key proof. Focused checks: configured
domains 58 passed; default 49 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Separate
isolated mutations fail the incomplete-inventory sheet, exact-key reuse,
duplicate dispatch and reconnect journeys (including an
empty-account-only bypass); restored controls pass. Evidence uses
synthetic storage/network boundaries, not physical Android or live
backend association. All mandatory commit/push hooks passed; fresh
GitHub CI is pending.

- Bounded review repair at `d3cc0003f`: incomplete secure-storage
enumeration now blocks automatic identity generation while explicit
known-key reads retain their fallback; declined/failed onboarding links
release the queue; HTTP 429/5xx keeps Retry regardless of response
encoding. Default app-gate coverage exercises a bind link followed by
ordinary community entry. Focused checks: configured domains 47 passed;
default 38 passed, 9 hosted-only skips. Removing the three production
fixes in an isolated source/Git/build copy fails the
identity-resolution, declined/failed queue, and Retry journey
assertions; clean and restored controls pass. Storage and HTTP failures
are synthetic; physical Android and live outage behavior were not
exercised. Published after all mandatory commit/push hooks passed
(mobile analysis/tests, branch-skew and file-size gates); fresh GitHub
CI remains pending.

- Existing whole-PR source review cleared the reconnect defects at
`fb15d5b82`.
- Domain-policy increment: focused environment, entry, app-gate, pairing
and onboarding journeys pass with empty and configured domains. Existing
pairing provider/page tests pass. Changed Dart files analyze cleanly.
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation: forcing paired credentials through
hosted login fails the default-build journey; clean and restored
controls pass. CI now runs configured-domain journeys in addition to the
default-build suite.
- Integrated main through `5b433d929` at `0067c069c`, including its
pinned Flutter upgrade. Preserved the PR welcome UI with the updated
transition API and added Material surfaces around onboarding
selection/consent rows. Focused post-merge runs pass in both
configurations; all mandatory local push gates passed (mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch-skew and
file-size checks).

- Merge-review repair at `a315bce11`: focused identity/storage/admission
and widget journeys pass, including account switching with an empty or
already-bound second account, explicit reuse, and self-hosted
removal/rejoin with another key. Default-domain journeys pass too
(hosted-only cases intentionally skip there).
- Isolated source/Git/build mutation checks: bypassing account scoping,
reuse consent, pending-key retirement, or recovery inventory
reconciliation fails the relevant journey/invariant assertions; clean
and restored controls pass.
- Native `RunnerTests/IdentityFilePluginTests`: both tests pass on the
iPhone 18 Pro iOS 27 simulator with an isolated app identifier. At
`24a0dcaac`, the picker journey seeds residue in Library/Caches,
matching path_provider_foundation, and verifies plugin startup removes
it while preserving an unrelated file. The earlier tmp-only fixture did
not exercise the actual export location. This is synthetic native
cleanup/picker evidence, not a real terminated-share or live account
round trip.

- Follow-up: Caches and tmp cleanup; fallback to individually known
identity slots when Android bulk enumeration fails; explicit replacement
of a refused self-hosted key preserves its original before swapping the
retry slot. Configured-domain journeys/invariants: 34 passed; default:
31 passed, 3 hosted-only skips. Isolated enumeration/retry mutations
fail with passing controls. Bulk-read fallback preserves but cannot
enumerate arbitrary other-account slots until bulk reads recover.

- Configured-domain CI exposed a stale pairing-status assertion after
account scoping. The repaired test checks the admission mismatch,
preserved account/transfer keys, and no admitted community. The
configured-domain CI selection passes locally (56 tests); removing the
production mismatch guard fails the updated test, with clean/restored
controls passing. This is synthetic coordinator evidence, not physical
QR acceptance.

- Final review repair (`40e1e6101`): native iOS export creation uses
atomic complete file protection; normal and restart cleanup remain.
Account/policy/claim HTTP uses one 30-second total deadline with request
abort and body cancellation. Removed the unrelated NIP-FA spec edit.
- Focused account/admission/export tests: 25 pass; configured-domain
account/admission/onboarding journeys: 33 pass. Isolated deadline and
native-dispatch mutations fail, with passing clean/restored controls.
Native export/picker tests: 2 pass on iOS 27 simulator. The real
file-protection attribute assertion is physical-device-only because
simulator provides no Data Protection attribute; locked-device
protection and interrupted real sharing have not been observed.

- Opt-in UI: configured-domain CI selection passes (57 tests); default
selection passes (7 tests, 10 hosted-only skips); URL-only plus
whitespace/empty domains passes (6 tests, 9 hosted-only skips). Changed
Dart files analyze cleanly. Independent mutations that unconditionally
initialize the coordinator in the app gate, welcome entry, or link form
fail the default journey; clean/restored controls pass.
- Native welcome screens exercised on iPhone 18 Pro / iOS 27 simulator
in default and configured builds: default exposes community link / QR /
pairing code only; configured build additionally exposes Builderlab
connection and community creation. No live hosted login was exercised in
this check.

- Delivery at `e48fe73a9`: all mandatory push hooks passed (full mobile
analysis/tests, Rust tests, desktop-native checks, branch and file-size
checks). GitHub checks had not yet populated at the immediate post-push
snapshot.

## Review disposition

| Feedback | Disposition |
| --- | --- |
| Explicit self-hosted entry under unreadable inventory, duplicate
invite dispatch, reconnect cross-account binding
([entry](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421622),
[queue](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318421640),
[reconnect](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#discussion_r4318455512))
| Repaired at `66a12ac92`; evidence above. Reconnect refuses unproven
ownership rather than silently establishing a binding. |
| Incomplete Android identity inventory, stranded deep-link queue,
transient HTTP retry classification
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5576864143))
| All three repaired in `d3cc0003f`; focused journeys and isolated
mutation evidence above. |
| Account cross-link, incomplete recovery inventory, committed invite
checkpoint, pending local key retirement/replacement | Repaired in the
preceding commits; journey and mutation evidence above. |
| iOS interrupted key export
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575253252))
| Native cleanup plus complete protection at creation implemented.
Physical-device lock and real interrupted sharing acceptance remains
pending. |
| Trickle responses bypass idle timeout; unrelated NIP-FA edit
([review](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/8375#pullrequestreview-5575764556))
| Total request deadline/abort implemented; spec edit removed. |
| Production domains rejected | Ordinary entry now needs no Builderlab
configuration. Opt-in account-required domains must still use supported
community mappings. |
| Lost Android Keystore recovery | Backup exclusions prevent the
reviewed stale-restore scenario; genuine key loss still has no in-app
recovery/reset and remains deferred. |
| Native secp256k1 dependency question | Obsolete against the current
base: upstream C integration landed in #8398; no package diff remains
here. |
| Operator membership endpoint contract | Documentation now states the
operator chooses the pubkey; no end-user session binding is implied.
Additional handler-level coverage is optional follow-up. |
| Optional Android partial document cleanup/activity retention; local
work after backup cancellation | Follow-up hardening, not claimed
implemented. Cancellation prevents remote backup upload. |
| Semgrep crypto inventory notices | Informational inventory, not
demonstrated defects. |

## Remaining draft gates

Native QR/browser-return acceptance remains unverified for this
revision. Optional Builderlab onboarding still needs backend
backup-status and joined-community routes, recovery
policy/configuration, and real backup/recovery/reconnect acceptance. The
empty-domain build removes these services as prerequisites for ordinary
pairing; it does not make the optional hosted flows backend-ready. Human
acceptance and current CI are still required before merge.



Review dispositions retained: production auth-domain configuration must
use supported community mappings; enabling `builderlab.xyz` does not add
support for `buzz.block.builderlab.xyz`. Recovery after genuinely losing
an Android Keystore key remains a follow-up, not a newly implemented
capability.


Human acceptance steps: build once without `BUZZ_AUTH_DOMAINS`
(including with a previously saved account) and confirm no Builderlab
controls/restoration while ordinary link and QR/code entry work. Build
with supported domains and confirm connection/creation appear; exercise
browser return and live backup/recovery/reconnect. On physical iOS,
exercise export and interrupted sharing/locked-device protection. Record
results before marking review complete.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@wes.communities.public.builderlabstaging.xyz>
2026-10-19 15:46:58 -06:00

553 lines
18 KiB
Dart

import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:math';
import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
import 'package:flutter_secure_storage/flutter_secure_storage.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import '../storage/secure_storage.dart';
import '../community/community.dart';
import '../relay/signed_event_relay.dart';
import 'dev_push_lease.dart';
import 'push_bridge.dart';
const _maxSafeJsonInteger = 9007199254740991;
const _baseRetryDelay = Duration(seconds: 30);
const _maximumRetryDelay = Duration(hours: 6);
const _lowercaseHex64Pattern = r'^[0-9a-f]{64}$';
const _installationIdPattern = r'^[0-9a-f]{32}$';
typedef BuzzPushLeaseRevocationPublisher =
Future<void> Function(BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord record);
typedef BuzzPushLeaseRevocationClock = DateTime Function();
typedef BuzzPushLeaseRevocationJitter = double Function();
typedef BuzzPushLeaseRevocationErrorReporter =
void Function(Object error, StackTrace stackTrace);
typedef BuzzPushLeaseRevocationWakeScheduler =
void Function() Function(Duration delay, void Function() wake);
/// Durable state for retracting one precise NIP-PL lease address.
///
/// The signing key is intentionally retained in secure storage only until the
/// relay accepts the tombstone or the old endpoint grant expires.
@immutable
class BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord {
final String relayUrl;
final String relayOrigin;
final String memberPubkey;
final String nsec;
final String installationId;
/// Generation reserved for the next relay attempt.
final int generation;
final int expiresAt;
final int attemptCount;
final int nextAttemptAt;
BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord({
required this.relayUrl,
required this.relayOrigin,
required this.memberPubkey,
required this.nsec,
required this.installationId,
required this.generation,
required this.expiresAt,
required this.attemptCount,
required this.nextAttemptAt,
}) {
if (canonicalBuzzPushRelayOrigin(relayUrl) != relayOrigin) {
throw const FormatException(
'Push revocation relay URL and origin do not match.',
);
}
if (!RegExp(_lowercaseHex64Pattern).hasMatch(memberPubkey)) {
throw const FormatException(
'Push revocation member pubkey must be exact lowercase hex.',
);
}
final decoded = nostr.Nip19.decode(payload: nsec);
if (decoded.prefix != nostr.Nip19Prefix.nsec ||
decoded.data.length != 64 ||
nostr.Keys(decoded.data).public != memberPubkey) {
throw const FormatException(
'Push revocation signing key does not match its member pubkey.',
);
}
if (!RegExp(_installationIdPattern).hasMatch(installationId)) {
throw const FormatException(
'Push revocation installation id must be exact lowercase hex.',
);
}
if (generation <= 0 || generation > _maxSafeJsonInteger) {
throw const FormatException('Push revocation generation is invalid.');
}
if (expiresAt <= 0 || attemptCount < 0 || nextAttemptAt < 0) {
throw const FormatException('Push revocation retry state is invalid.');
}
}
String get leaseAddress => '$memberPubkey|$relayOrigin|$installationId';
BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord copyWith({
int? generation,
int? expiresAt,
int? attemptCount,
int? nextAttemptAt,
}) => BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord(
relayUrl: relayUrl,
relayOrigin: relayOrigin,
memberPubkey: memberPubkey,
nsec: nsec,
installationId: installationId,
generation: generation ?? this.generation,
expiresAt: expiresAt ?? this.expiresAt,
attemptCount: attemptCount ?? this.attemptCount,
nextAttemptAt: nextAttemptAt ?? this.nextAttemptAt,
);
Map<String, dynamic> toJson() => {
'version': 1,
'relayUrl': relayUrl,
'relayOrigin': relayOrigin,
'memberPubkey': memberPubkey,
'nsec': nsec,
'installationId': installationId,
'generation': generation,
'expiresAt': expiresAt,
'attemptCount': attemptCount,
'nextAttemptAt': nextAttemptAt,
};
factory BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord.fromJson(Map<String, dynamic> json) {
const keys = {
'version',
'relayUrl',
'relayOrigin',
'memberPubkey',
'nsec',
'installationId',
'generation',
'expiresAt',
'attemptCount',
'nextAttemptAt',
};
if (json.keys.toSet().difference(keys).isNotEmpty ||
keys.difference(json.keys.toSet()).isNotEmpty ||
json['version'] != 1 ||
json['relayUrl'] is! String ||
json['relayOrigin'] is! String ||
json['memberPubkey'] is! String ||
json['nsec'] is! String ||
json['installationId'] is! String ||
json['generation'] is! int ||
json['expiresAt'] is! int ||
json['attemptCount'] is! int ||
json['nextAttemptAt'] is! int) {
throw const FormatException('Invalid push revocation record.');
}
return BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord(
relayUrl: json['relayUrl'] as String,
relayOrigin: json['relayOrigin'] as String,
memberPubkey: json['memberPubkey'] as String,
nsec: json['nsec'] as String,
installationId: json['installationId'] as String,
generation: json['generation'] as int,
expiresAt: json['expiresAt'] as int,
attemptCount: json['attemptCount'] as int,
nextAttemptAt: json['nextAttemptAt'] as int,
);
}
}
class BuzzPushLeaseRevocationStorage {
static const _key = 'buzz_push_lease_revocations_v1';
final FlutterSecureStorage _secure;
BuzzPushLeaseRevocationStorage({FlutterSecureStorage? secure})
: _secure = secure ?? communitySecureStorage;
Future<List<BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord>> loadAll() async {
final raw = await _secure.read(key: _key);
if (raw == null) return <BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord>[];
final decoded = jsonDecode(raw);
if (decoded is! List<dynamic>) {
throw const FormatException('Push revocation outbox must be a list.');
}
final records = [
for (final value in decoded)
BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord.fromJson(
Map<String, dynamic>.from(value as Map),
),
];
final addresses = records.map((record) => record.leaseAddress).toSet();
if (addresses.length != records.length) {
throw const FormatException(
'Push revocation outbox contains duplicate lease addresses.',
);
}
return records;
}
Future<void> replaceAll(
Iterable<BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord> records,
) async {
final values = records.toList();
final addresses = values.map((record) => record.leaseAddress).toSet();
if (addresses.length != values.length) {
throw const FormatException(
'Push revocation outbox contains duplicate lease addresses.',
);
}
if (values.isEmpty) {
await _secure.delete(key: _key);
return;
}
await _secure.write(
key: _key,
value: jsonEncode([for (final record in values) record.toJson()]),
);
}
}
/// A durable, single-flight retry coordinator for removed-community leases.
///
/// Every attempt reserves its successor generation and retry time before
/// network I/O. A process death during an ambiguous publication therefore
/// cannot cause an immediate replay or reuse a generation the relay may have
/// accepted.
class BuzzPushLeaseRevocationOutbox {
BuzzPushLeaseRevocationOutbox({
required this.storage,
required this.publisher,
this.now = DateTime.now,
BuzzPushLeaseRevocationJitter? jitter,
this.reportError = reportPushLeaseCleanupError,
BuzzPushLeaseRevocationWakeScheduler? scheduleWake,
}) : jitter = jitter ?? Random.secure().nextDouble,
scheduleWake = scheduleWake ?? _scheduleTimer;
final BuzzPushLeaseRevocationStorage storage;
final BuzzPushLeaseRevocationPublisher publisher;
final BuzzPushLeaseRevocationClock now;
final BuzzPushLeaseRevocationJitter jitter;
final BuzzPushLeaseRevocationErrorReporter reportError;
final BuzzPushLeaseRevocationWakeScheduler scheduleWake;
Future<void> _storageTail = Future.value();
Future<void>? _drain;
int _wakeGeneration = 0;
void Function()? _cancelWake;
bool _started = false;
bool _disposed = false;
Future<T> _serialize<T>(Future<T> Function() operation) {
final result = _storageTail.then((_) => operation());
_storageTail = result.then<void>(
(_) {},
onError: (Object _, StackTrace _) {},
);
return result;
}
Future<void> enqueue(BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord record) async {
await _serialize(() async {
final records = await storage.loadAll();
final index = records.indexWhere(
(candidate) => candidate.leaseAddress == record.leaseAddress,
);
if (index >= 0) {
if (record.generation <= records[index].generation) return;
records[index] = record;
} else {
records.add(record);
}
await storage.replaceAll(records);
});
if (_started) _scheduleNextWake();
}
Future<bool> enqueueCommunity(
Community community, {
Future<List<BuzzPushEndpointGrant>> Function()? readGrants,
}) async {
final state = community.pushSubscriptionState;
final highestGeneration =
state.generationCursor ?? state.acceptedGeneration;
if (highestGeneration == null ||
(!community.pushNotificationsEnabled &&
state.pendingTombstoneGeneration == null)) {
return false;
}
final nsec = community.nsec;
if (nsec == null || nsec.isEmpty) {
throw StateError(
'Push lease revocation requires a community signing key.',
);
}
final decoded = nostr.Nip19.decode(payload: nsec);
final memberPubkey = community.pubkey ?? nostr.Keys(decoded.data).public;
final relayUrl = canonicalBuzzPushRelayHttpUrl(community.relayUrl);
final relayOrigin = canonicalBuzzPushRelayOrigin(relayUrl);
final grants = await (readGrants ?? readBuzzPushEndpointGrants)();
final matching = grants
.where((grant) => grant.relayOrigin == relayOrigin)
.toList();
if (matching.length != 1) {
throw StateError(
'Expected exactly one endpoint grant for push lease revocation.',
);
}
final currentSeconds = now().millisecondsSinceEpoch ~/ 1000;
final grant = matching.single;
if (grant.expiresAt <= currentSeconds) return false;
if (highestGeneration + 2 > _maxSafeJsonInteger) {
throw StateError('Push lease generation is exhausted.');
}
await enqueue(
BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord(
relayUrl: relayUrl,
relayOrigin: relayOrigin,
memberPubkey: memberPubkey,
nsec: nsec,
installationId:
community.pushLeaseInstallationId ?? grant.installationId,
generation: highestGeneration + 2,
expiresAt: grant.expiresAt,
attemptCount: 0,
nextAttemptAt: currentSeconds,
),
);
return true;
}
Future<void> start() async {
if (_disposed) throw StateError('Push revocation outbox is disposed.');
if (_started) return trigger();
_started = true;
await trigger();
}
Future<void> trigger() {
if (_disposed) return Future.value();
final active = _drain;
if (active != null) return active;
final drain = _drainDue();
_drain = drain;
void finish() {
if (identical(_drain, drain)) _drain = null;
if (!_disposed) _scheduleNextWake();
}
drain.then<void>((_) => finish(), onError: (_, _) => finish());
return drain;
}
Future<void> _drainDue() async {
while (!_disposed) {
final record = await _reserveNextDueAttempt();
if (record == null) return;
try {
await publisher(record);
await _removeAccepted(record);
pushLeaseCleanupError.value = null;
} catch (error, stackTrace) {
reportError(error, stackTrace);
}
}
}
Future<BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord?> _reserveNextDueAttempt() => _serialize(
() async {
final currentSeconds = now().millisecondsSinceEpoch ~/ 1000;
final records = await storage.loadAll();
final active = records
.where((record) => record.expiresAt > currentSeconds)
.toList();
final due =
active
.where((record) => record.nextAttemptAt <= currentSeconds)
.toList()
..sort((left, right) {
final schedule = left.nextAttemptAt.compareTo(
right.nextAttemptAt,
);
return schedule != 0
? schedule
: left.leaseAddress.compareTo(right.leaseAddress);
});
if (due.isEmpty) {
if (active.length != records.length) {
await storage.replaceAll(active);
}
return null;
}
final record = due.first;
if (record.generation >= _maxSafeJsonInteger) {
throw StateError('Push lease generation is exhausted.');
}
final reserved = record.copyWith(
generation: record.generation + 1,
attemptCount: record.attemptCount + 1,
nextAttemptAt: currentSeconds + _retryDelaySeconds(record.attemptCount),
);
final index = active.indexWhere(
(candidate) => candidate.leaseAddress == record.leaseAddress,
);
if (index < 0) {
throw StateError('Reserved push revocation record disappeared.');
}
active[index] = reserved;
await storage.replaceAll(active);
return record;
},
);
int _retryDelaySeconds(int priorAttempts) {
final exponent = min(priorAttempts, 20);
final factor = 1 << exponent;
final maximumSeconds = min(
_maximumRetryDelay.inSeconds,
_baseRetryDelay.inSeconds * factor,
);
final half = maximumSeconds ~/ 2;
return half + (jitter() * (maximumSeconds - half)).floor();
}
Future<void> _removeAccepted(BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord attempted) =>
_serialize(() async {
final records = await storage.loadAll();
records.removeWhere(
(record) =>
record.leaseAddress == attempted.leaseAddress &&
record.generation == attempted.generation + 1,
);
await storage.replaceAll(records);
});
void _scheduleNextWake() {
if (!_started || _disposed) return;
final generation = ++_wakeGeneration;
_cancelWake?.call();
_cancelWake = null;
unawaited(
_serialize(() async {
final currentSeconds = now().millisecondsSinceEpoch ~/ 1000;
final records = await storage.loadAll();
final active = records
.where((record) => record.expiresAt > currentSeconds)
.toList();
if (active.length != records.length) {
await storage.replaceAll(active);
}
if (active.isEmpty || generation != _wakeGeneration || _disposed) {
return;
}
final wakeAt = active
.map((record) => min(record.nextAttemptAt, record.expiresAt))
.reduce(min);
final delay = Duration(seconds: max(0, wakeAt - currentSeconds));
_cancelWake = scheduleWake(delay, () {
if (generation != _wakeGeneration || _disposed) return;
_cancelWake = null;
unawaited(trigger());
});
}),
);
}
void dispose() {
_disposed = true;
_wakeGeneration += 1;
_cancelWake?.call();
_cancelWake = null;
}
}
void Function() _scheduleTimer(Duration delay, void Function() wake) {
final timer = Timer(delay, wake);
return timer.cancel;
}
String canonicalBuzzPushRelayOrigin(String relayUrl) {
final uri = _buzzPushRelayUri(relayUrl);
final scheme = switch (uri.scheme) {
'https' || 'wss' => 'wss',
'http' || 'ws' => 'ws',
_ => throw StateError('Validated relay URL has an unsupported scheme.'),
};
return '$scheme://${uri.authority}';
}
String canonicalBuzzPushRelayHttpUrl(String relayUrl) {
final uri = _buzzPushRelayUri(relayUrl);
final scheme = switch (uri.scheme) {
'https' || 'wss' => 'https',
'http' || 'ws' => 'http',
_ => throw StateError('Validated relay URL has an unsupported scheme.'),
};
return uri.replace(scheme: scheme, path: '/').toString();
}
Uri _buzzPushRelayUri(String relayUrl) {
final uri = Uri.tryParse(relayUrl);
if (uri == null ||
!const {'http', 'https', 'ws', 'wss'}.contains(uri.scheme) ||
uri.host.isEmpty ||
uri.userInfo.isNotEmpty ||
(uri.path.isNotEmpty && uri.path != '/') ||
uri.hasQuery ||
uri.hasFragment) {
throw FormatException('Invalid relay URL for push revocation: $relayUrl');
}
return uri;
}
Future<void> publishBuzzPushLeaseRevocation(
BuzzPushLeaseRevocationRecord record,
) async {
final descriptor = await fetchBuzzPushLeaseDescriptor(record.relayUrl);
if (descriptor.origin != record.relayOrigin) {
throw StateError('Relay push origin changed while revocation was pending.');
}
final uri = Uri.parse(record.relayUrl);
final wsUrl = uri
.replace(scheme: uri.scheme == 'https' ? 'wss' : 'ws')
.toString();
await publishBuzzPushLeaseTombstone(
descriptor: descriptor,
installationId: record.installationId,
generation: record.generation,
nsec: record.nsec,
memberPubkey: record.memberPubkey,
submit: ({required kind, required content, required tags, createdAt}) =>
submitSignedEventOnce(
wsUrl: wsUrl,
nsec: record.nsec,
kind: kind,
content: content,
tags: tags,
createdAt: createdAt,
),
);
}
final buzzPushLeaseRevocationStorageProvider =
Provider<BuzzPushLeaseRevocationStorage>(
(ref) => BuzzPushLeaseRevocationStorage(),
);
final buzzPushLeaseRevocationOutboxProvider =
Provider<BuzzPushLeaseRevocationOutbox>((ref) {
final outbox = BuzzPushLeaseRevocationOutbox(
storage: ref.read(buzzPushLeaseRevocationStorageProvider),
publisher: publishBuzzPushLeaseRevocation,
);
ref.onDispose(outbox.dispose);
return outbox;
});