mirror of
https://github.com/block/buzz.git
synced 2026-10-27 20:41:57 +00:00
Adds authenticated, role-based moderation to the relay admin API. On
`main` the admin API is read-only and gated only by `Host`/`Origin`
matching; this branch adds NIP-98 authentication, a two-tier
Operator/Moderator principal model, mutation and staffing endpoints, and
NIP-11 auto-discovery so clients never type the admin URL by hand.
## Authentication (`BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH`)
`BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` accepts `nip98` or `disabled`. Leaving it unset
defaults to `nip98` (fail-secure). Configuration fails closed: any other
value aborts startup, while a lingering `BUZZ_ADMIN_TOKEN` is ignored
with a startup warning — token (bearer) authentication is not supported.
`Host`/`Origin` matching is retained in every mode as defense-in-depth.
- **`nip98`** (default) — per-request signed NIP-98 (kind 27235) events,
resolved to an Operator or Moderator principal with per-person
attribution and individual revocability. Read-write per resolved
principal.
- **`disabled`** — no credential; relies entirely on network-layer
controls (reverse proxy, VPN, firewall) and logs a `WARN` on every boot.
Always read-only: `authorize()` resolves no principal, so mutation and
staffing routes always `403`.
## Roles
Buzz has two independent authority axes after this change.
**Relay-level** roles (new here) are deployment-global: they act across
every community on the relay, through the admin API. **Community-level**
roles (pre-existing, unchanged by this PR) are tenant-scoped: they act
inside one community, through signed Nostr moderation commands.
### Relay level (new)
| Role | Description |
|---|---|
| **Operator** | Full control of the deployment's moderation surface:
read all reports, feedback, and attachments across every community;
resolve reports with enforcement (`delete`/`kick`/`ban`/`timeout`) or
decisions (`dismiss`/`escalate`); reopen and cancel; update feedback
status; and manage the Operator/Moderator roster via the staffing
endpoints. |
| **Moderator** | Day-to-day triage: everything an Operator can do
except staffing — cannot view or change the roster. |
How a pubkey acquires a relay role (resolution order; config always
outranks DB):
1. Listed in `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` → **Operator** (source `config`)
2. Equals `RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY` while `RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` is empty →
**Operator** (source `owner_fallback`, a break-glass grant for
self-hosters that deactivates once any operator is configured)
3. Row in the `relay_operators` table → **Operator** or **Moderator**
(source `db`, managed via the staffing endpoints)
4. No match → `403`
### Community level (pre-existing, unchanged)
| Role | Description |
|---|---|
| **Owner** (community) | Full authority within their community: every
moderation action (delete, kick, ban/unban, timeout/untimeout, resolve
reports, view queue) plus member, role, and invite management. No guard
rails. |
| **Admin** (community) | Same community-wide moderation capabilities as
owner, except an admin cannot ban or time out the owner or a fellow
admin — only the owner may action an admin. Manages members and invites;
only the owner grants the admin role. |
| **Member** (community) | Standard participant; no moderation
capability. |
| **Owner / Admin** (channel) | Channel-local authority only: delete
messages and kick users within their own channel. |
| **Member / Guest / Bot** (channel) | No moderation authority. |
There is no community-level Moderator tier in v1; relay-level Moderator
is the only role by that name.
## Escalation scoping
The operator report queue is an escalation backstop, not the community's
day-to-day triage surface (per `VISION_MODERATION`, the severe class is
the platform's to review rather than the community's). Two rules enforce
that:
- **Escalated-by-default listing.** `GET /reports` with no `status`
parameter returns only `escalated` reports. An explicit
`status=<open|resolved|dismissed|escalated>` filter is always honored as
given, and full visibility across every status stays available for
platform-safety and legal review via `scope=all` (which lists reports
regardless of status). `scope` accepts only `all` and is ignored when an
explicit `status` is present.
- **Auto-escalated `illegal` reports.** Member reports whose category is
`illegal` are ingested with `status=escalated` rather than `open`, so
the severe class reaches the operator backstop without waiting for a
community admin to forward it. Every other category still lands `open`.
Auto-escalation only sets the queue status — it records no moderator
decision and stamps no resolver, so an auto-escalated report is
indistinguishable downstream from an admin-escalated one: the reopen
route returns it to `open` on the same terms, keyed only on status,
never on how the report became escalated.
## Principal resolution and NIP-98 admission
`resolve_admin_principal()` returns `AdminPrincipal { pubkey, role,
source }` per the resolution order above; `None` never falls through as
a role. Admission is ordered so the replay guard is a privilege, not a
public surface: signature/URL/method/payload-hash verification first,
roster check second, and only then is the deployment-scoped replay id
atomically consumed — a validly-signing but unrostered key never
allocates a replay slot. Redis failure fails closed.
## Report resolution, recovery, and enforcement provenance
`POST /reports/{id}/resolve` is a crash-safe enforcement state machine:
decision-only outcomes (`dismiss`/`escalate`) are a single
CAS-plus-audit transaction; enforcement
(`delete`/`kick`/`ban`/`timeout`) claims the report
(`open`→`processing`), runs the durable mutation, then finalizes — a
re-drive resumes at the step marker and converges to exactly-one
enforcement, fenced by a lease and an outbox claim token.
Person-directed enforcement on an `event`-kind report derives its target
from the stored event's author (server-owned truth, never the reporter's
`p` tag) via a single `derive_enforcement_target` shared by the HTTP
driver and the recovery worker. If the reported event was purged before
its author could be read, person-directed actions are rejected pre-claim
and the report stays `open`; `delete` needs only the event id and is
exempt.
`GET /reports/{id}` and the resolve response carry an `activeAction`
field surfacing the enforcement that actually executed — a report
dismissed after a reopen still reports the ban that ran. `POST
/reports/{id}/reopen` returns a terminal report to `open` (idempotent on
`requestId`). `POST /reports/{id}/cancel` is the sole recovery path for
a pre-mutation `failed` action, attributed via
`relay_admin_actions.cancelled_by`.
## Feedback
`GET /feedback` and `/feedback/{id}` survive a tenant purge: provenance
columns are severed to `NULL` rather than cascade-deleted, and the
attachment path fails closed to `404` on a severed row. `PATCH
/feedback/{id}` updates lifecycle `status`
(`new`/`reviewed`/`archived`).
## Staffing and probe
`GET/PUT/DELETE /operators/{pubkey}` are Operator-only; mutating a
config-backed pubkey returns `409 Conflict`. `GET /operators` returns
the union of config and DB principals with per-entry `source`. `GET
/probe` reports auth mode, role, source, `canAct`, and `canStaff` for
the desktop console.
## NIP-11 auto-discovery
The NIP-11 relay-information document gains an optional `admin_api`
field carrying the canonical admin origin (`scheme://host[:port]`, no
path), present iff `BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` is set and omitted otherwise. The
scheme follows the same loopback rule as NIP-98 `u`-tag verification via
a shared `scheme_for_host` helper, so the advertised origin and the
origin the relay verifies against can never diverge.
## Operator API origin decoupling
`RELAY_OPERATOR_API_ORIGIN` is no longer required at boot when
`RELAY_OPERATOR_PUBKEYS` is set — it is used only by the
community-provisioning endpoints, which fail closed at request time
(with a boot-time `WARN`) until it is set. The admin console needs no
origin.
## Admin-web adaptation
The standalone `admin-web` dashboard signs each request as a NIP-98
event via a NIP-07 browser extension, discovers the auth mode with a
single unauthenticated probe (`200` → `disabled`, anything else →
`nip98`, fail-secure), and carries no token entry surface. Playwright
coverage exercises the NIP-98 and CSP paths.
## Security hardening
Three findings from security review are folded in:
- **Append-only roster audit.** `PUT`/`DELETE /operators/{pubkey}`
mutate the deployment-wide root of trust, but the upsert overwrites
`role`/`added_by` in place and the delete removes the only row — so a
grant→revoke sequence left no trace of who was ever granted or by whom.
Each mutation now writes an `relay_operator_audit` row (actor, target,
`grant`/`revoke`, pre-image `prev_role`, `new_role`, timestamp) inside
the same transaction as the mutation. A per-target transaction-scoped
advisory lock serializes concurrent mutations of the same pubkey before
the pre-image read, so the recorded `prev_role` is always the true
predecessor even under a concurrent-grant race. Chronology is keyed on a
`BIGINT GENERATED ALWAYS AS IDENTITY` `seq` column, not the wall clock:
the serializing lock guarantees insertion order and `seq` captures it,
so ordered reads (`ORDER BY seq`) follow the true privilege chain even
across a backward NTP step that a `clock_timestamp()` ordering would
invert. `created_at` (`clock_timestamp()`) is retained as informational
occurrence time only. Append-only by construction — no `UPDATE`/`DELETE`
path and no API surface. A no-op delete writes nothing.
- **`expirationSecs` overflow.** The timeout path built `Utc::now() +
Duration::seconds(secs as i64)` from an attacker-controlled `u64`:
`i64::MAX` panicked the handler, and a wrapped-negative magnitude minted
a *past* expiry that still passed validation. `compute_timeout_until`
now rejects zero, rejects magnitudes above a documented
`MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS` (365 days), and uses checked
`try_seconds`/`checked_add_signed` so no input can panic or produce a
past expiry — over-cap, zero, `i64::MAX`, and wrapping-negative inputs
all return a clean `4xx`.
- **Uppercase-hex config-backed bypass.** Config pubkeys are lowercased
at parse, but the `409` immutability check raw-string-compared the path
param while `decode_hex_pubkey` accepted uppercase — so `PUT
/operators/{UPPERCASE}` skipped the guard and wrote a shadow row for the
same 32 bytes. The validated param is now canonicalized (lowercased)
before the `409` check, DB write, `DELETE`, and response body.
## Migrations
- `0035_relay_operators.sql` — `relay_operators` roster table
(deployment-global), `actor_authority` on `moderation_actions`,
`processing` status plus `active_action_id` on `moderation_reports`,
`status` on `product_feedback`.
- `0036_relay_admin_actions.sql` — enforcement-action table with a
`request_id` idempotency key, a `step_marker` for crash recovery, and a
`cancelled_by` attribution column.
- `0037_relay_admin_action_lease.sql` — lease fencing for the action
worker.
- `0038_relay_admin_outbox_claim_token.sql` — fenced claim token on the
outbox worker.
- `0039_relay_operator_audit.sql` — append-only `relay_operator_audit`
trail for roster mutations (see Security hardening).
`docs/admin/README.md` documents the full principal model, NIP-98 event
requirements, capabilities by role, the startup error matrix, and the
discovery field.
## Production blast radius
A relay without `BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` is completely unaffected — the admin
surface stays disabled and `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` is ignored; a lingering
`BUZZ_ADMIN_TOKEN` logs a startup warning and must be removed. Where
`BUZZ_ADMIN_HOST` **is** set, unset `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH` defaults to
`nip98` (per-person signed auth); `BUZZ_ADMIN_AUTH=disabled` reproduces
`main`'s prior `Host`/`Origin`-only gating but is read-only (mutation
routes `403`). The five migrations add tables and columns without
touching existing data.
---
Related: [block/buzz#4768](https://github.com/block/buzz/pull/4768)
(desktop admin console consuming the `admin_api` field),
[squareup/bb-public#339](https://github.com/squareup/bb-public/pull/339)
(Phase 4 rollout config)
---------
Signed-off-by: Will Pfleger <pfleger.will@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
Co-authored-by: Duncan <dcfd242e557282d7a1e2cf2e6877522682f1e5c6156dc92ca7d90eaedd3b0f95@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
359 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
359 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript
import { expect, type Page, test } from "@playwright/test";
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/// Injects a minimal window.nostr stub so a test can drive nip98 mode without
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/// a real NIP-07 extension. It echoes the tags it signed (including the
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/// `payload` tag added for body-bearing requests) so a test can assert the
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/// credential committed to the exact body bytes.
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async function seedNip98(page: Page) {
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await page.addInitScript(() => {
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(window as Window & { nostr?: unknown }).nostr = {
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signEvent: async (event: {
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kind: number;
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created_at: number;
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tags: string[][];
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content: string;
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}) => {
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const serialized = JSON.stringify([
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event.kind,
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event.created_at,
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event.tags,
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event.content,
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]);
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let h = 0;
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for (let i = 0; i < serialized.length; i++) {
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h = (Math.imul(31, h) + serialized.charCodeAt(i)) | 0;
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}
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const id = (h >>> 0).toString(16).padStart(8, "0").repeat(8);
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return {
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...event,
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id,
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pubkey: "b".repeat(64),
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sig: "c".repeat(128),
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};
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},
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};
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});
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}
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function decodeNostrHeader(header: string): { tags: string[][] } {
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return JSON.parse(atob(header.replace(/^Nostr /, "")));
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}
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async function sha256Hex(text: string): Promise<string> {
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const digest = await crypto.subtle.digest(
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"SHA-256",
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new TextEncoder().encode(text),
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);
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return Array.from(new Uint8Array(digest), (b) =>
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b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"),
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).join("");
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}
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const FEEDBACK_ONE = "11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111";
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function summary(overrides: Record<string, unknown>) {
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return {
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id: FEEDBACK_ONE,
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communityId: "6d474feb-c50a-44e4-a0b5-f30532df49bc",
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communityHost: "design.buzz.xyz",
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submitterPubkey: "21".repeat(32),
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category: "bug",
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bodySummary: "Composer froze on paste.",
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status: "new",
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receivedAt: "2026-07-17T17:30:00Z",
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...overrides,
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};
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}
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test("nip98 mode: changing status PATCHes the relay with a payload-bound credential", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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await seedNip98(page);
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const patches: { method: string; body: string; authorization?: string }[] =
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[];
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await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/feedback", async (route) => {
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// The list load is authenticated (probe already resolved nip98 mode).
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await route.fulfill({
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contentType: "application/json",
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body: JSON.stringify([summary({ status: "new" })]),
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});
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});
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await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/reports**", (route) => {
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// Probe: reject unauthenticated so the SPA resolves nip98 mode.
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if (!route.request().headers().authorization) {
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route.fulfill({
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status: 401,
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headers: { "www-authenticate": "Nostr" },
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contentType: "application/json",
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body: JSON.stringify({ error: { code: "unauthorized", message: "x" } }),
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});
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return;
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}
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route.fulfill({ contentType: "application/json", body: "[]" });
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});
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await page.route(
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`**/api/admin/v1/feedback/${FEEDBACK_ONE}`,
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async (route) => {
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const request = route.request();
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patches.push({
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method: request.method(),
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body: request.postData() ?? "",
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authorization: request.headers().authorization,
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});
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await route.fulfill({
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contentType: "application/json",
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body: JSON.stringify({ status: "reviewed" }),
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});
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},
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);
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await page.goto("/feedback");
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await expect(page.getByRole("heading", { name: "Feedback" })).toBeVisible();
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await page.getByRole("combobox").last().selectOption("reviewed");
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await expect.poll(() => patches.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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const patch = patches[0];
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expect(patch.method).toBe("PATCH");
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expect(JSON.parse(patch.body)).toEqual({ status: "reviewed" });
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// The credential is a NIP-98 event whose payload tag is the SHA-256 of the
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// exact body bytes the request sent.
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expect(patch.authorization).toMatch(/^Nostr /);
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const { tags } = decodeNostrHeader(patch.authorization as string);
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const payload = tags.find((t) => t[0] === "payload")?.[1];
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expect(payload).toBe(await sha256Hex(patch.body));
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// The row adopts the status from the PATCH response.
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await expect(page.getByRole("combobox").last()).toHaveValue("reviewed");
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});
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test("nip98 mode: a failed PATCH surfaces an error and does not lie about the status", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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await seedNip98(page);
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await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/feedback", (route) =>
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route.fulfill({
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contentType: "application/json",
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body: JSON.stringify([summary({ status: "new" })]),
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}),
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);
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await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/reports**", (route) => {
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if (!route.request().headers().authorization) {
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route.fulfill({
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status: 401,
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headers: { "www-authenticate": "Nostr" },
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contentType: "application/json",
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body: JSON.stringify({ error: { code: "unauthorized", message: "x" } }),
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});
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return;
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}
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route.fulfill({ contentType: "application/json", body: "[]" });
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});
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// Gate the failing PATCH so the test can observe the in-flight (pending)
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// state before the 500 lands.
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let releasePatch: () => void = () => {};
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const patchInFlight = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
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releasePatch = resolve;
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});
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await page.route(
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`**/api/admin/v1/feedback/${FEEDBACK_ONE}`,
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async (route) => {
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await patchInFlight;
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await route.fulfill({
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status: 500,
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contentType: "application/json",
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body: JSON.stringify({ error: { code: "internal", message: "boom" } }),
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});
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},
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);
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await page.goto("/feedback");
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const control = page.getByRole("combobox").last();
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await control.selectOption("archived");
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// While the PATCH is in flight the control is disabled, shows no error, and
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// still reads the original server status — an optimistic set (even one that
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// rolls back on failure) would surface the unpersisted value here.
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await expect(control).toBeDisabled();
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await expect(control).toHaveValue("new");
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await expect(page.getByRole("alert")).toHaveCount(0);
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releasePatch();
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// The failed write surfaces an error and leaves the control at the original
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// server status — it never optimistically adopts the requested value.
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await expect(page.getByRole("alert")).toHaveText("Update failed");
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await expect(control).toHaveValue("new");
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await expect(control).toBeEnabled();
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});
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test("disabled mode: the status control is a read-only badge with no write affordance", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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// Probe returns 200 → disabled mode. No mutation must be offered.
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await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/reports**", (route) =>
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route.fulfill({ contentType: "application/json", body: "[]" }),
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);
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await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/feedback", (route) =>
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route.fulfill({
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contentType: "application/json",
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body: JSON.stringify([summary({ status: "reviewed" })]),
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}),
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);
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let patched = false;
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await page.route(`**/api/admin/v1/feedback/${FEEDBACK_ONE}`, (route) => {
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patched = true;
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route.fulfill({ contentType: "application/json", body: "{}" });
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});
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await page.goto("/feedback");
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await expect(page.getByRole("heading", { name: "Feedback" })).toBeVisible();
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// Authoritative status is shown as a badge; the only combobox on the page is
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// the status filter, not a per-row write control.
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await expect(page.getByText("Reviewed").last()).toBeVisible();
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await expect(page.getByRole("combobox")).toHaveCount(3);
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await page.waitForTimeout(200);
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expect(patched).toBe(false);
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});
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test("a purged feedback row (null provenance) renders without crashing search or attachments", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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// Disabled mode keeps the test focused on nullable-host handling.
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await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/reports**", (route) =>
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route.fulfill({ contentType: "application/json", body: "[]" }),
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);
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await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/feedback", (route) =>
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route.fulfill({
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contentType: "application/json",
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body: JSON.stringify([
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summary({ communityId: null, communityHost: null, status: "new" }),
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]),
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}),
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);
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await page.goto("/feedback");
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await expect(page.getByText("Community unavailable").first()).toBeVisible();
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// Search a term that only matches the submitter pubkey (index 3) — the
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// filter must evaluate the null host (index 1) on the way there without
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// throwing. "2121" is present in the pubkey but not the body summary.
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await page.getByPlaceholder("Search feedback").fill("2121");
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await expect(page.getByText("Composer froze on paste.")).toBeVisible();
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await expect(page.getByText("1 of 1 submissions")).toBeVisible();
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});
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test("a purged feedback detail derives no attachments from an absent host", async ({
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page,
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}) => {
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const imageHash = "a".repeat(64);
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await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/reports**", (route) =>
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route.fulfill({ contentType: "application/json", body: "[]" }),
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);
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await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/feedback", (route) =>
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route.fulfill({ contentType: "application/json", body: "[]" }),
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);
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let attachmentRequested = false;
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await page.route(
|
|
`**/api/admin/v1/feedback/${FEEDBACK_ONE}/attachments/**`,
|
|
(route) => {
|
|
attachmentRequested = true;
|
|
route.fulfill({ contentType: "application/octet-stream", body: "x" });
|
|
},
|
|
);
|
|
await page.route(`**/api/admin/v1/feedback/${FEEDBACK_ONE}`, (route) =>
|
|
route.fulfill({
|
|
contentType: "application/json",
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({
|
|
id: FEEDBACK_ONE,
|
|
communityId: null,
|
|
communityHost: null,
|
|
eventId: "31".repeat(32),
|
|
submitterPubkey: "21".repeat(32),
|
|
category: "bug",
|
|
body: "Broken.\n\n",
|
|
tags: [
|
|
[
|
|
"imeta",
|
|
"url https://design.buzz.xyz/media/x.png",
|
|
"m image/png",
|
|
`x ${imageHash}`,
|
|
"filename shot.png",
|
|
],
|
|
],
|
|
status: "new",
|
|
eventCreatedAt: "2026-07-17T17:25:00Z",
|
|
receivedAt: "2026-07-17T17:30:00Z",
|
|
}),
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
await page.goto(`/feedback/${FEEDBACK_ONE}`);
|
|
await expect(page.getByText("Community unavailable").first()).toBeVisible();
|
|
await expect(page.getByText("Attachments")).toHaveCount(0);
|
|
await page.waitForTimeout(200);
|
|
// The authoritative host is absent, so no attachment fetch is derived.
|
|
expect(attachmentRequested).toBe(false);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
test("a hostile attachment served as octet-stream is download-only, never a navigable typed document", async ({
|
|
page,
|
|
}) => {
|
|
// The reporter's imeta claims image/png, but the relay sniffs the stored
|
|
// bytes and forces application/octet-stream for anything that is not a
|
|
// verified passive raster image (e.g. an HTML/SVG payload). The client must
|
|
// trust the served type, so this attachment renders as a download link — no
|
|
// <img>, no target="_blank" navigation to a typed document on the admin
|
|
// origin.
|
|
const hash = "a".repeat(64);
|
|
await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/reports**", (route) =>
|
|
route.fulfill({ contentType: "application/json", body: "[]" }),
|
|
);
|
|
await page.route("**/api/admin/v1/feedback", (route) =>
|
|
route.fulfill({ contentType: "application/json", body: "[]" }),
|
|
);
|
|
await page.route(
|
|
`**/api/admin/v1/feedback/${FEEDBACK_ONE}/attachments/**`,
|
|
(route) =>
|
|
route.fulfill({
|
|
contentType: "application/octet-stream",
|
|
body: "<script>alert(1)</script>",
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
await page.route(`**/api/admin/v1/feedback/${FEEDBACK_ONE}`, (route) =>
|
|
route.fulfill({
|
|
contentType: "application/json",
|
|
body: JSON.stringify({
|
|
id: FEEDBACK_ONE,
|
|
communityId: "6d474feb-c50a-44e4-a0b5-f30532df49bc",
|
|
communityHost: "design.buzz.xyz",
|
|
eventId: "31".repeat(32),
|
|
submitterPubkey: "21".repeat(32),
|
|
category: "bug",
|
|
body: "Broken.\n\n",
|
|
tags: [
|
|
[
|
|
"imeta",
|
|
"url https://design.buzz.xyz/media/x.png",
|
|
"m image/png",
|
|
`x ${hash}`,
|
|
"filename shot.png",
|
|
],
|
|
],
|
|
status: "new",
|
|
eventCreatedAt: "2026-07-17T17:25:00Z",
|
|
receivedAt: "2026-07-17T17:30:00Z",
|
|
}),
|
|
}),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
await page.goto(`/feedback/${FEEDBACK_ONE}`);
|
|
const link = page.getByRole("link", { name: /shot\.png/ });
|
|
await expect(link).toBeVisible();
|
|
await expect(link).toHaveAttribute("download", "shot.png");
|
|
await expect(link).not.toHaveAttribute("target", "_blank");
|
|
// The hostile payload is never rendered as an inline image.
|
|
await expect(page.locator("figure.image-attachment img")).toHaveCount(0);
|
|
});
|