Files
buzz/mobile/lib/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart
Wes 75854111b8 fix(mobile): retain invite keys and reject incomplete onboarding (#8753)
Self-hosted invite claims retain the generated identity in secure
storage before the HTTP request and reuse it after a lost response or
restart. Saving or reopening an existing destination retires the
matching journal. Sign-out/removal deletes all matching pending key
copies before removing the saved community, preserving the community for
retry if cleanup fails.

Pairing verifies that relay authentication completed before
saving/activating a destination or reporting success. On iOS 16, hosted
entry permits recovery and reuse of backed-up identities, including
binding a recovered identity with a confirmed backup receipt. Paths
requiring a new secure backup explain the iOS 17 requirement before
generating or binding a new key. Self-hosted entry remains available.

### Validation

- Initial focused entry/recovery files: 83 passed, 1 skipped. Review-fix
focused storage, community, invite and hosted files: 82 passed, 1
skipped; extended invite journey: 17 passed, 1 skipped.
- Final hosted journey extension: 20 passed, including both bound and
unbound recovery with native sealing unavailable.
- Isolated mutations removing invite retention, pairing validation,
journal removal/re-entry cleanup or restoring the blanket platform gate
fail their intended regressions. Restored controls pass.
- iOS simulator build passed on the original integration base; final
native/device acceptance remains outstanding.
- Carl and three specialist reviewers found no source-review blockers at
`323cec6ea2`. `a55a246857` adds analyzer fixes, copy cleanup and the
recovered-unbound journey coverage. Reviewers did not run tests or the
app.

- Fixed a push-hook timeout in `4564b3562a`: idle serial queues now
release completed futures, avoiding scheduler retention across widget
tests while preserving in-flight ordering and failure isolation. The
existing dispatcher journey fails promptly before the fix and passes
afterward; Carl reviewed this delta with no blockers. Focused
dispatcher/invite/storage checks passed, and all 20 hosted journeys
passed with hosted auth enabled.

- Mandatory pre-push checks passed at `4564b3562a` (scope, branch skew,
file size, mobile analysis/tests and crypto package checks); GitHub head
verified at that commit.

### Remaining acceptance

Draft pending agent/device and human acceptance. Exercise interrupted
one-use invite claim and retry across restart, sign-out then reopen
without restoring the removed identity, rejected self-hosted pairing,
iOS 16 backed-up identity recovery (including binding), and iOS 16 new
setup blocked before key creation. Synthetic network/storage boundaries
do not prove native durability or live server behavior. Hosted CI
results are not claimed here.

Optional follow-ups remain outside this patch: pruning provably
unadmitted journals, malformed-record recovery, avoiding an iOS 16
dead-end device-key selection, and pre-existing removal/push-revocation
ordering.

This PR contains three existing-path fixes. The two organization-login
fixes depend on #8700 and remain separate: its stale parent conflicts
with main in unrelated relay code, and the required branch-skew hook
prevents publishing that stack unchanged. This PR does not refresh that
parent or change deployment policy.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-10-30 10:38:24 -06:00

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import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'dart:math' as math;
import 'package:flutter/foundation.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:http/http.dart' as http;
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import '../../shared/auth/auth.dart';
import '../../shared/hosted/hosted_flow_provider.dart';
import '../../shared/hosted/hosted_environment.dart';
import '../../shared/community/paired_community_landing.dart';
import '../../shared/crypto/ecdh.dart';
import '../../shared/crypto/nip44.dart';
import '../../shared/relay/relay.dart';
import '../../shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart';
import 'pairing_crypto.dart';
import 'pairing_socket.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/event_signing.dart';
part 'pairing_provider_helpers.dart';
part 'pairing_state.dart';
/// HTTP client used by [PairingNotifier] for the validation request.
final pairingHttpClientProvider = Provider<http.Client>((ref) {
final client = http.Client();
ref.onDispose(client.close);
return client;
});
typedef PairingSocketFactory =
PairingSocket Function({
required String wsUrl,
required String ephemeralPrivkey,
required void Function(List<dynamic> message) onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
});
typedef PairingCredentialValidator =
Future<void> Function({required String relayUrl, required String? nsec});
const identityExportAuthorizationTtl = Duration(minutes: 2);
final identityExportClockProvider = Provider<DateTime Function()>((ref) {
return DateTime.now;
});
class PairingNotifier extends Notifier<PairingState> {
final PairingSocketFactory _socketFactory;
final PairingCredentialValidator? _credentialValidator;
final RelaySocketFactory _validationSocketFactory;
RelaySocket? _validationSocket;
PairingSocket? _socket;
Timer? _sessionTimeout;
Completer<bool>? _codeResult;
String? _codeRequestId;
int _codeRequestSequence = 0;
Community? _identityExportCommunity;
bool _identityExportBiometricOnly = false;
PairingNotifier({
PairingSocketFactory? socketFactory,
PairingCredentialValidator? credentialValidator,
RelaySocketFactory validationSocketFactory = RelaySocket.new,
}) : _socketFactory = socketFactory ?? _createPairingSocket,
_credentialValidator = credentialValidator,
_validationSocketFactory = validationSocketFactory;
static PairingSocket _createPairingSocket({
required String wsUrl,
required String ephemeralPrivkey,
required void Function(List<dynamic> message) onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
}) => PairingSocket(
wsUrl: wsUrl,
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
@override
PairingState build() {
ref.onDispose(_cleanup);
return const PairingState();
}
Future<void> pair(String rawInput) async {
if (state.status == PairingStatus.connecting ||
state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.status == PairingStatus.transferring) {
return;
}
final trimmed = rawInput.trim();
if (trimmed.startsWith('nostrpair://')) {
return _pairNipAb(trimmed);
}
// Legacy buzz:// flow.
return _pairLegacy(trimmed);
}
Future<bool> authorizeIdentityExport({required Community community}) async {
if (state.authorizationInProgress) return false;
final biometricOnly =
community.sensitiveActionPolicy == SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled;
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(
authorizationInProgress: true,
clearErrorMessage: true,
);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizationSessionProvider)
.authorize(biometricOnly: biometricOnly);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration) return false;
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
state = state.copyWith(
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _authorizationError(result),
);
return false;
}
// Keep the authorized snapshot and exported payload in the same key
// representation used by RelayConfig for authentication.
_identityExportCommunity = community.copyWith(nsec: community.nsec?.trim());
_identityExportBiometricOnly = biometricOnly;
_identityExportAuthorizedAt = ref.read(identityExportClockProvider)();
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: false);
return true;
}
/// Confirm that the SAS code matches. Called by the UI after user approval.
void confirmSas() {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
_userConfirmedSas = true;
state = state.copyWith(userConfirmedSas: true);
if (_sasConfirmReceived) unawaited(_continueAfterSas());
}
/// Check user input with the source; never compare a QR-derived SAS when the
/// source has negotiated an independent desktop-only code.
Future<bool> verifyDesktopCode(String code) async {
if (!state.requiresDesktopCode ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
_codeResult != null ||
!RegExp(r'^\d{6}$').hasMatch(code)) {
return false;
}
final result = Completer<bool>();
_codeResult = result;
_codeRequestId = '${++_codeRequestSequence}';
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: _encryptMessage({
'type': 'code-submit',
'code': code,
'request_id': _codeRequestId,
}),
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
try {
// Keep this logical attempt pending until its response or session cleanup.
// A local deadline cannot undo a guess already consumed by the source.
return await result.future;
} finally {
if (identical(_codeResult, result)) {
_codeResult = null;
_codeRequestId = null;
}
}
}
void setProtectSensitiveActions(bool value) {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.sendsIdentityToDesktop ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
state = state.copyWith(protectSensitiveActions: value);
}
Future<void> _continueAfterSas() async {
if (!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (_sendIdentityToSource && !_exportIdentityIsCurrent()) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
errorMessage:
'The active community changed. Start identity export again.',
);
return;
}
final authorizedAt = _identityExportAuthorizedAt;
final elapsed = authorizedAt == null
? null
: ref.read(identityExportClockProvider)().difference(authorizedAt);
final hasFreshExportAuthorization =
elapsed != null &&
!elapsed.isNegative &&
elapsed < identityExportAuthorizationTtl;
if (_sendIdentityToSource && !hasFreshExportAuthorization) {
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: true);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizationSessionProvider)
.authorize(biometricOnly: _identityExportBiometricOnly);
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
!state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _authorizationError(result),
);
return;
}
} else if (!_sendIdentityToSource && state.protectSensitiveActions) {
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
state = state.copyWith(authorizationInProgress: true);
final result = await ref
.read(sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider)
.authorizeBiometricProtection();
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
!_userConfirmedSas ||
!_sasConfirmReceived ||
state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas ||
!state.authorizationInProgress) {
return;
}
if (result != DeviceAuthResult.success) {
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
userConfirmedSas: false,
authorizationInProgress: false,
errorMessage: _biometricProtectionError(result),
);
return;
}
}
_userConfirmedSas = false;
state = state.copyWith(
status: PairingStatus.transferring,
authorizationInProgress: false,
);
if (_sendIdentityToSource) {
_sendIdentityPayload();
} else {
final pending = _pendingPayload;
if (pending != null) {
_pendingPayload = null;
_handlePayload(pending);
}
}
}
static String _biometricProtectionError(
DeviceAuthResult result,
) => switch (result) {
DeviceAuthResult.cancelled =>
'Biometric setup was cancelled. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.unavailable =>
'Biometrics are unavailable. Enroll Face ID or biometrics and try again, or turn this option off.',
DeviceAuthResult.lockedOut =>
'Biometrics are locked. Unlock them in system settings and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.failed =>
'Biometric confirmation failed. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.success => '',
};
static String _authorizationError(
DeviceAuthResult result,
) => switch (result) {
DeviceAuthResult.cancelled =>
'Identity confirmation was cancelled. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.unavailable =>
'Device authentication is unavailable. Configure a device passcode or biometrics and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.lockedOut =>
'Device authentication is locked. Unlock it in system settings and try again.',
DeviceAuthResult.failed =>
'Identity confirmation failed. Nothing was transferred.',
DeviceAuthResult.success => '',
};
/// Deny the SAS code. Send abort and terminate.
void denySas() {
_sendAbort('sas_mismatch');
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'SAS code mismatch — pairing cancelled for security.',
);
}
void reset() {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState();
}
void _cleanup() {
if (_codeResult?.isCompleted == false) _codeResult!.complete(false);
_codeResult = null;
_codeRequestId = null;
_pairingGeneration++;
_validationSocket?.dispose();
_validationSocket = null;
_sessionTimeout?.cancel();
_sessionTimeout = null;
_socket?.dispose();
_socket = null;
_processedEventIds.clear();
_publishedEventIds.clear();
_sasConfirmReceived = false;
_userConfirmedSas = false;
_pendingPayload = null;
_sendIdentityToSource = false;
_identityExportCommunity = null;
_identityExportBiometricOnly = false;
_identityExportAuthorizedAt = null;
}
// ── NIP-AB pairing flow ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Session state kept between steps.
String? _ephemeralPrivkey;
String? _ephemeralPubkey;
Uint8List? _sessionSecret;
String? _sourcePubkey;
Uint8List? _sessionId;
Uint8List? _sasInput;
Uint8List? _conversationKey;
bool _sasConfirmReceived = false;
bool _userConfirmedSas = false;
bool _sendIdentityToSource = false;
int _pairingGeneration = 0;
DateTime? _identityExportAuthorizedAt;
Map<String, dynamic>? _pendingPayload; // buffered until user confirms SAS
final Set<String> _publishedEventIds = {};
final Set<String> _processedEventIds = {}; // NIP-AB §Duplicate Event Handling
Future<void> _pairNipAb(String uri) async {
final generation = _pairingGeneration;
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.connecting);
try {
// 1. Parse the nostrpair:// URI.
final qr = parseNostrpairUri(uri);
_sourcePubkey = qr.sourcePubkey;
_sessionSecret = qr.sessionSecret;
_sendIdentityToSource =
Uri.parse(uri).queryParameters['mode'] == 'recover';
final relayWsUrl = qr.relays.first;
// 2. Generate ephemeral keypair.
final keychain = nostr.Keys.generate();
_ephemeralPrivkey = keychain.secret;
_ephemeralPubkey = keychain.public;
// 3. Derive session ID and SAS immediately (we know source pubkey from QR).
_sessionId = deriveSessionId(qr.sessionSecret);
final ecdhShared = ecdhSharedSecret(_ephemeralPrivkey!, qr.sourcePubkey);
final (sasCode, sasInput) = deriveSas(ecdhShared, qr.sessionSecret);
_sasInput = sasInput;
// Pre-compute NIP-44 conversation key for encrypting events.
_conversationKey = getConversationKey(
_ephemeralPrivkey!,
qr.sourcePubkey,
);
// 4. Connect to relay with ephemeral keys.
final socket = _socketFactory(
wsUrl: relayWsUrl,
ephemeralPrivkey: _ephemeralPrivkey!,
onMessage: (message) {
if (generation == _pairingGeneration) _handleRelayMessage(message);
},
onDisconnected: (error) {
if (generation == _pairingGeneration) _handleDisconnected(error);
},
);
_socket = socket;
await socket.connect();
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
if (!socket.isConnected) {
throw StateError('Pairing socket did not reach the connected state');
}
// 5. Subscribe for kind:24134 events tagged to our ephemeral pubkey.
socket.subscribe('pair', 24134, _ephemeralPubkey!);
// 6. Wait briefly for EOSE, then send offer.
// (In practice, we send the offer immediately — the relay will buffer it.)
await Future.delayed(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
// 7. Build and send the offer event.
final offerContent = _encryptMessage({
'type': 'offer',
if (!_sendIdentityToSource) 'confirmation': 'desktop-code-v1',
'version': 1,
'session_id': bytesToHex(_sessionId!),
});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: offerContent,
tags: [
['p', qr.sourcePubkey],
],
);
// 8. Display SAS code and wait for sas-confirm from source.
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
sasCode: formatSas(sasCode),
sendsIdentityToDesktop: _sendIdentityToSource,
protectSensitiveActions: ref.read(relayConfigProvider).nsec == null,
);
// 9. Start 120s session timeout.
_sessionTimeout = Timer(const Duration(seconds: 120), () {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.success &&
state.status != PairingStatus.error) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Pairing session timed out.',
);
}
});
} on FormatException catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Invalid pairing code: ${e.message}',
);
} catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
debugPrint('Pairing connection error: $e');
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: _friendlyErrorMessage(e),
);
}
}
void _handleRelayMessage(List<dynamic> data) {
if (data.isEmpty) return;
final type = data[0] as String;
final rejected =
type == 'OK' &&
data.length >= 3 &&
_publishedEventIds.remove(data[1]) &&
data[2] == false;
final closed = type == 'CLOSED' && data.length >= 2 && data[1] == 'pair';
if ((rejected || closed) &&
state.status != PairingStatus.success &&
state.status != PairingStatus.error) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Pairing couldn’t continue. Scan a new desktop QR code and try again.',
);
return;
}
if (type == 'EVENT' && data.length >= 3) {
final eventJson = data[2] as Map<String, dynamic>;
_handlePairingEvent(eventJson);
}
// Ignore EOSE, NOTICE, etc.
}
void _handlePairingEvent(Map<String, dynamic> eventJson) {
try {
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: validate kind.
final kind = eventJson['kind'] as int?;
if (kind != 24134) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: validate pubkey is from expected source.
final eventPubkey = eventJson['pubkey'] as String?;
if (eventPubkey == null) return;
if (_sourcePubkey != null && eventPubkey != _sourcePubkey) return;
// NIP-AB §Duplicate Event Handling: discard already-processed events.
final eventId = eventJson['id'] as String?;
if (eventId == null) return;
if (_processedEventIds.contains(eventId)) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: check p-tag points to us.
final tags = (eventJson['tags'] as List<dynamic>?) ?? [];
final hasOurPTag = tags.any((t) {
if (t is List && t.length >= 2) {
return t[0] == 'p' && t[1] == _ephemeralPubkey;
}
return false;
});
if (!hasOurPTag) return;
// NIP-AB §Event Validation: verify event signature (NIP-01).
// The nostr package's Event.fromJson verifies id + sig on construction.
try {
final event = verifiedNostrEventFromJson(jsonEncode(eventJson));
if (event.id != eventId) return; // id mismatch
} catch (_) {
return; // invalid signature or malformed event
}
// Decrypt NIP-44 content.
final content = eventJson['content'] as String?;
if (content == null || content.isEmpty) return;
final decryptKey = getConversationKey(_ephemeralPrivkey!, eventPubkey);
final decrypted = nip44Decrypt(decryptKey, content);
final msg = jsonDecode(decrypted) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final msgType = msg['type'] as String?;
switch (msgType) {
case 'desktop-code':
if (!_sendIdentityToSource &&
state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas &&
!_sasConfirmReceived) {
state = state.copyWith(requiresDesktopCode: true);
}
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'code-rejected':
if (state.requiresDesktopCode &&
msg['request_id'] == _codeRequestId &&
_codeResult?.isCompleted == false) {
_codeResult!.complete(false);
if (msg['remaining_attempts'] == 0) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Too many incorrect codes. Scan a new desktop QR code and try again.',
);
}
}
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'sas-confirm':
_handleSasConfirm(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId); // record after successful processing
case 'payload':
_handlePayload(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'abort':
_handleAbort(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
case 'complete':
_handleComplete(msg);
_processedEventIds.add(eventId);
}
} catch (e) {
// Silently discard invalid events per NIP-AB §Event Validation.
}
}
void _handleSasConfirm(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
if (state.status != PairingStatus.confirmingSas) return;
final receivedHash = msg['transcript_hash'] as String?;
if (receivedHash == null) return;
// Verify transcript hash.
final expectedHash = deriveTranscriptHash(
_sessionId!,
hexToBytes(_sourcePubkey!),
hexToBytes(_ephemeralPubkey!),
_sasInput!,
_sessionSecret!,
);
final receivedBytes = hexToBytes(receivedHash);
if (!constantTimeEquals(receivedBytes, expectedHash)) {
// NIP-AB §Step 3: target MUST send abort with reason "sas_mismatch".
_sendAbort('sas_mismatch');
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Security verification failed — possible attack. Pairing aborted.',
);
return;
}
_sasConfirmReceived = true;
if (state.requiresDesktopCode && _codeResult?.isCompleted == false) {
_codeResult!.complete(true);
}
// If the user already tapped "Codes Match", complete the transition now
// that the transcript hash is verified.
if (_userConfirmedSas) {
unawaited(_continueAfterSas());
}
// Otherwise stay in confirmingSas — user must still confirm via confirmSas().
}
bool _exportIdentityIsCurrent() {
final authorizedCommunity = _identityExportCommunity;
final currentConfig = ref.read(relayConfigProvider);
return authorizedCommunity != null &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec != null &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec!.isNotEmpty &&
authorizedCommunity.nsec == currentConfig.nsec &&
authorizedCommunity.relayUrl == currentConfig.storedOrigin;
}
void _sendIdentityPayload() {
if (!_exportIdentityIsCurrent()) {
_sendAbort('identity_changed');
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'The active community changed. Start identity export again.',
);
return;
}
final nsec = _identityExportCommunity!.nsec!;
final content = _encryptMessage({
'type': 'payload',
'payload_type': 'nsec',
'payload': nsec,
});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
}
void _handlePayload(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
// Only accept payload after the transcript hash was verified.
if (!_sasConfirmReceived) return;
// If the user hasn't confirmed SAS yet, buffer the payload.
// It will be processed when confirmSas() is called.
if (state.status == PairingStatus.confirmingSas) {
_pendingPayload = msg;
return;
}
if (state.status != PairingStatus.transferring) return;
state = state.copyWith(status: PairingStatus.storing);
final payloadType = msg['payload_type'] as String?;
final payload = msg['payload'] as String?;
if (payload == null) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Received empty payload from source.',
);
return;
}
final pairingGeneration = _pairingGeneration;
final protectSensitiveActions = state.protectSensitiveActions;
unawaited(
_processPayload(
payloadType,
payload,
pairingGeneration: pairingGeneration,
protectSensitiveActions: protectSensitiveActions,
),
);
}
void _handleComplete(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
if (!_sendIdentityToSource || state.status != PairingStatus.transferring) {
return;
}
if (msg['success'] != true) {
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Desktop could not store the identity.',
);
return;
}
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.success);
}
void _handleAbort(Map<String, dynamic> msg) {
final reason = msg['reason'] as String? ?? 'unknown';
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Source device aborted pairing: $reason',
);
}
Future<void> _processPayload(
String? payloadType,
String payload, {
required int pairingGeneration,
required bool protectSensitiveActions,
}) async {
try {
// Parse the custom payload.
final data = jsonDecode(payload) as Map<String, dynamic>;
final relayUrl = data['relayUrl'] as String?;
final pubkey = data['pubkey'] as String?;
final nsec = data['nsec'] as String?;
if (relayUrl == null) {
throw const FormatException('Missing relayUrl in payload');
}
// Validate relay URL to prevent SSRF via private network addresses.
_validateRelayUrl(relayUrl);
state = state.copyWith(destinationRelayUrl: relayUrl);
final community = Community.create(
name: Community.nameFromUrl(relayUrl),
relayUrl: relayUrl,
pubkey: pubkey,
nsec: nsec,
sensitiveActionPolicy: protectSensitiveActions
? SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled
: SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
bool current() =>
pairingGeneration == _pairingGeneration &&
state.status == PairingStatus.storing &&
!_sendIdentityToSource;
if (HostedEnvironment.requiresAuth(Uri.parse(relayUrl).host)) {
final flow = ref.read(hostedFlowProvider);
await flow.stagePairedCommunity(community, isCurrent: current);
if (!current()) return;
// NIP-AB complete acknowledges durable transfer, not hosted admission.
_sendComplete(true);
_cleanup();
state = const PairingState();
unawaited(flow.retry());
return;
}
final credentialValidator = _credentialValidator ?? _validateCredentials;
await credentialValidator(relayUrl: relayUrl, nsec: nsec);
if (!current()) return;
await ref
.read(authProvider.notifier)
.authenticateWithCommunity(community, shouldContinue: current);
if (!current()) return;
// A validated transfer is not successful admission until storage succeeds.
_sendComplete(true);
_cleanup();
state = state.copyWith(status: PairingStatus.success);
ref.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider.notifier).request(community);
} catch (e) {
if (pairingGeneration != _pairingGeneration ||
state.status != PairingStatus.storing ||
_sendIdentityToSource) {
return;
}
_sendComplete(false);
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Failed to import credentials: $e',
);
}
}
void _sendAbort(String reason) {
try {
final content = _encryptMessage({'type': 'abort', 'reason': reason});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
} catch (_) {
// Best-effort.
}
}
void _sendComplete(bool success) {
try {
final content = _encryptMessage({'type': 'complete', 'success': success});
_publishEvent(
kind: 24134,
content: content,
tags: [
['p', _sourcePubkey!],
],
);
} catch (_) {
// Best-effort — complete is advisory per NIP-AB.
}
}
/// Encrypt a message using NIP-44 with the ephemeral conversation key.
String _encryptMessage(Map<String, dynamic> message) {
final plaintext = jsonEncode(message);
return nip44Encrypt(_conversationKey!, plaintext);
}
/// Build and publish a kind:24134 event signed with ephemeral keys.
void _publishEvent({
required int kind,
required String content,
required List<List<String>> tags,
}) {
// Add timestamp jitter (0-30s) for metadata privacy.
final jitter = math.Random.secure().nextInt(31);
final createdAt = (DateTime.now().millisecondsSinceEpoch ~/ 1000) - jitter;
final event = signNostrEvent(
kind: kind,
content: content,
tags: tags,
secretKey: _ephemeralPrivkey!,
createdAt: createdAt,
);
_publishedEventIds.add(event.id);
_socket?.publishEvent(event.toMap());
}
void _handleDisconnected(Object? error) {
if (state.status == PairingStatus.success ||
state.status == PairingStatus.error) {
return;
}
_cleanup();
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Lost connection to pairing relay.',
);
}
// ── Legacy buzz:// flow ───────────────────────────────────────────────
Future<void> _pairLegacy(String rawInput) async {
final generation = _pairingGeneration;
state = const PairingState(status: PairingStatus.connecting);
try {
final community = _parseLegacyInput(rawInput);
if (HostedEnvironment.requiresAuth(Uri.parse(community.relayUrl).host)) {
final flow = ref.read(hostedFlowProvider);
await flow.stagePairedCommunity(
community,
isCurrent: () => generation == _pairingGeneration,
);
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = const PairingState();
unawaited(flow.retry());
return;
}
final validator = _credentialValidator ?? _validateCredentials;
await validator(relayUrl: community.relayUrl, nsec: community.nsec);
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
await ref
.read(authProvider.notifier)
.authenticateWithCommunity(
community,
shouldContinue: () => generation == _pairingGeneration,
);
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.success,
destinationRelayUrl: community.relayUrl,
);
ref.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider.notifier).request(community);
} on FormatException catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage: 'Invalid pairing code: ${e.message}',
);
} on RelayException catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Could not connect to relay (${e.statusCode}). '
'Check that the pairing code is valid.',
);
} catch (e) {
if (generation != _pairingGeneration) return;
state = PairingState(
status: PairingStatus.error,
errorMessage:
'Connection failed. Make sure your device can reach the '
'relay server.',
);
}
}
Future<void> _validateCredentials({
required String relayUrl,
required String? nsec,
}) async {
if (nsec == null || nsec.isEmpty) {
throw const FormatException('Pairing payload missing nsec');
}
final uri = Uri.parse(relayUrl);
final scheme = uri.scheme == 'https' ? 'wss' : 'ws';
final wsUrl = uri.replace(scheme: scheme).toString();
final socket = _validationSocketFactory(
wsUrl: wsUrl,
nsec: nsec,
onMessage: (_) {},
onConnected: () {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
_validationSocket = socket;
try {
await socket.connect().timeout(const Duration(seconds: 8));
if (socket.state != SocketState.connected) {
throw StateError('Relay did not authenticate the paired identity');
}
} finally {
if (identical(_validationSocket, socket)) _validationSocket = null;
await socket.disconnect();
}
}
Community _parseLegacyInput(String raw) {
var payload = raw.trim();
if (payload.startsWith('buzz://')) {
payload = payload.substring('buzz://'.length);
}
final normalized = base64Url.normalize(payload);
final jsonStr = utf8.decode(base64Url.decode(normalized));
final decoded = jsonDecode(jsonStr);
if (decoded is! Map<String, dynamic>) {
throw const FormatException('Pairing payload is not a JSON object');
}
final relayUrl = decoded['relayUrl'] as String?;
if (relayUrl == null) {
throw const FormatException('Missing relayUrl in payload');
}
_validateRelayUrl(relayUrl);
return Community.create(
name: Community.nameFromUrl(relayUrl),
relayUrl: relayUrl,
pubkey: decoded['pubkey'] as String?,
nsec: decoded['nsec'] as String?,
sensitiveActionPolicy: SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
}
}
final pairingProvider = NotifierProvider<PairingNotifier, PairingState>(
PairingNotifier.new,
);