Files
buzz/mobile/test/features/pairing/pairing_provider_test.dart
Wes 75854111b8 fix(mobile): retain invite keys and reject incomplete onboarding (#8753)
Self-hosted invite claims retain the generated identity in secure
storage before the HTTP request and reuse it after a lost response or
restart. Saving or reopening an existing destination retires the
matching journal. Sign-out/removal deletes all matching pending key
copies before removing the saved community, preserving the community for
retry if cleanup fails.

Pairing verifies that relay authentication completed before
saving/activating a destination or reporting success. On iOS 16, hosted
entry permits recovery and reuse of backed-up identities, including
binding a recovered identity with a confirmed backup receipt. Paths
requiring a new secure backup explain the iOS 17 requirement before
generating or binding a new key. Self-hosted entry remains available.

### Validation

- Initial focused entry/recovery files: 83 passed, 1 skipped. Review-fix
focused storage, community, invite and hosted files: 82 passed, 1
skipped; extended invite journey: 17 passed, 1 skipped.
- Final hosted journey extension: 20 passed, including both bound and
unbound recovery with native sealing unavailable.
- Isolated mutations removing invite retention, pairing validation,
journal removal/re-entry cleanup or restoring the blanket platform gate
fail their intended regressions. Restored controls pass.
- iOS simulator build passed on the original integration base; final
native/device acceptance remains outstanding.
- Carl and three specialist reviewers found no source-review blockers at
`323cec6ea2`. `a55a246857` adds analyzer fixes, copy cleanup and the
recovered-unbound journey coverage. Reviewers did not run tests or the
app.

- Fixed a push-hook timeout in `4564b3562a`: idle serial queues now
release completed futures, avoiding scheduler retention across widget
tests while preserving in-flight ordering and failure isolation. The
existing dispatcher journey fails promptly before the fix and passes
afterward; Carl reviewed this delta with no blockers. Focused
dispatcher/invite/storage checks passed, and all 20 hosted journeys
passed with hosted auth enabled.

- Mandatory pre-push checks passed at `4564b3562a` (scope, branch skew,
file size, mobile analysis/tests and crypto package checks); GitHub head
verified at that commit.

### Remaining acceptance

Draft pending agent/device and human acceptance. Exercise interrupted
one-use invite claim and retry across restart, sign-out then reopen
without restoring the removed identity, rejected self-hosted pairing,
iOS 16 backed-up identity recovery (including binding), and iOS 16 new
setup blocked before key creation. Synthetic network/storage boundaries
do not prove native durability or live server behavior. Hosted CI
results are not claimed here.

Optional follow-ups remain outside this patch: pruning provably
unadmitted journals, malformed-record recovery, avoiding an iOS 16
dead-end device-key selection, and pre-existing removal/push-revocation
ordering.

This PR contains three existing-path fixes. The two organization-login
fixes depend on #8700 and remain separate: its stale parent conflicts
with main in unrelated relay code, and the required branch-skew hook
prevents publishing that stack unchanged. This PR does not refresh that
parent or change deployment policy.

---------

Signed-off-by: Wes <wesbillman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brain <1a02c72794dcd0f07058a353bc3a81f4028b8c77c92c87fce6d5c8b85970a20b@buzz.block.builderlab.xyz>
2026-10-30 10:38:24 -06:00

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import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_page.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/theme/theme.dart';
import 'package:flutter/material.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/community/paired_community_landing.dart';
import 'dart:async';
import 'dart:convert';
import 'package:flutter_test/flutter_test.dart';
import 'package:hooks_riverpod/hooks_riverpod.dart';
import 'package:local_auth/local_auth.dart';
import 'package:nostr/nostr.dart' as nostr;
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_crypto.dart';
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_provider.dart';
import 'package:buzz/features/pairing/pairing_socket.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/auth/auth.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/ecdh.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/crypto/nip44.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/relay/relay.dart';
import 'package:buzz/shared/security/sensitive_action_authorizer.dart';
/// Exercises payload validation, credential import, and cancellation across
/// pairing and credential-validation socket lifetimes.
void main() {
group('PairingNotifier', () {
late ProviderContainer container;
late FakeAuthNotifier fakeAuth;
ProviderContainer createContainer() {
fakeAuth = FakeAuthNotifier();
return ProviderContainer(
overrides: [authProvider.overrideWith(() => fakeAuth)],
);
}
tearDown(() => container.dispose());
test(
'reset closes legacy validation and rejects its late success',
() async {
final socket = _PendingValidationSocket();
final auth = FakeAuthNotifier();
final notifier = PairingNotifier(
validationSocketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required nsec,
required onMessage,
required onConnected,
required onDisconnected,
}) => socket,
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
authProvider.overrideWith(() => auth),
],
);
final input = base64Url.encode(
utf8.encode(
jsonEncode({
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.example',
'nsec': 'pending-key',
}),
),
);
final pending = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(input);
notifier.reset();
expect(socket.disposed, isTrue);
socket.connection.complete();
await pending;
expect(auth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
},
);
test(
'legacy validation rejects failed connection before saving, then retries',
() async {
final auth = FakeAuthNotifier();
var connected = false;
final notifier = PairingNotifier(
validationSocketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required nsec,
required onMessage,
required onConnected,
required onDisconnected,
}) => _ValidationOutcomeSocket(() => connected),
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
authProvider.overrideWith(() => auth),
],
);
final input = base64Url.encode(
utf8.encode(
jsonEncode({
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.example',
'nsec': nostr.Keys.generate().nsec,
}),
),
);
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(input);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(auth.lastCommunity, isNull);
connected = true;
await notifier.pair(input);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.success);
expect(auth.lastCommunity, isNotNull);
},
);
test('starts in idle state', () {
container = createContainer();
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(state.errorMessage, isNull);
});
test(
'disconnect during connect does not null-dereference the socket',
() async {
final notifier = PairingNotifier(
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required void Function(Object? error) onDisconnected,
}) => _DisconnectingSocket(disconnectCallback: onDisconnected),
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier)],
);
const code =
'nostrpair://62287897da61e3fa294b4570575f7db8bea147d6631150f2e4656714c645fb1e'
'?secret=abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1';
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
contains('Lost connection to pairing relay'),
);
},
);
test('payload missing nsec errors before contacting relay', () async {
container = createContainer();
// Valid payload shape but no nsec — provider should refuse without
// attempting any network call.
final code = _encodePairingCode();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('missing nsec'));
expect(fakeAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
});
test('accepts buzz scheme prefix', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = 'buzz://${_encodePairingCode()}';
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('missing nsec'));
expect(fakeAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
});
test('invalid base64 sets format error', () async {
container = createContainer();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('not-valid!!!');
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Invalid pairing code'));
});
test('base64 with valid JSON but missing fields errors', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode({'foo': 'bar'})));
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Missing relayUrl'));
});
test('empty input errors', () async {
container = createContainer();
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('');
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
});
test('rejects private IP relay URLs (SSRF)', () async {
container = createContainer();
for (final ip in [
'10.0.0.1',
'172.16.0.1',
'192.168.1.1',
'169.254.169.254',
]) {
final code = _encodePairingCode(relayUrl: 'http://$ip:3000');
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error, reason: 'should reject $ip');
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('private network'));
container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).reset();
}
});
test('rejects non-http/https schemes', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = _encodePairingCode(relayUrl: 'file:///etc/passwd');
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Invalid pairing code'));
});
test('rejects JSON array payload', () async {
container = createContainer();
final code = base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode([1, 2, 3])));
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair(code);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('not a JSON object'));
});
test('reset returns to idle from error state', () async {
container = createContainer();
// Trigger an error.
await container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).pair('not-valid!!!');
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
container.read(pairingProvider.notifier).reset();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
});
group('identity import protection', () {
const sourceSecret =
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506';
const sessionSecretHex =
'abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789';
late _ControllableSocket socket;
late PairingNotifier notifier;
late FakeAuthNotifier importAuth;
late _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer authorizer;
late Completer<void> validation;
late String pairingCode;
setUp(() {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
pairingCode =
'nostrpair://${source.public}'
'?secret=$sessionSecretHex'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1';
validation = Completer<void>();
importAuth = FakeAuthNotifier();
authorizer = _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer();
notifier = PairingNotifier(
credentialValidator:
({required String relayUrl, required String? nsec}) =>
validation.future,
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required onDisconnected,
}) {
socket = _ControllableSocket(
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
return socket;
},
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
authProvider.overrideWith(() => importAuth),
sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider.overrideWithValue(authorizer),
],
);
container.read(pairingProvider);
notifier = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier);
});
Future<void> beginImport({required bool protected}) async {
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(protected);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
if (protected && authorizer.result != DeviceAuthResult.success) return;
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'payload',
'payload_type': 'credentials',
'payload': jsonEncode({
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.test',
'pubkey': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).public,
'nsec': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).nsec,
}),
},
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.storing);
}
testWidgets('early input is submitted when desktop negotiation arrives', (
tester,
) async {
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await pairing;
await tester.pumpWidget(
UncontrolledProviderScope(
container: container,
child: MaterialApp(
theme: AppTheme.light(),
home: const PairingPage(),
),
),
);
final localCode = container.read(pairingProvider).sasCode;
final code = localCode == '111111' ? '222222' : '111111';
await tester.enterText(
find.byKey(const Key('pairing-code-input')),
code,
);
await tester.pump();
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
isEmpty,
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump();
final submissions = socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit')
.toList();
expect(submissions, hasLength(1));
expect(submissions.single['code'], code);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await tester.pump();
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsNothing);
expect(find.text('Protect your identity'), findsOneWidget);
notifier.reset();
await tester.pumpWidget(const SizedBox.shrink());
});
testWidgets(
'delayed desktop responses retain one attempt and leave code entry',
(tester) async {
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await pairing;
expect(socket.published.single['tags'], hasLength(1));
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.single['confirmation'],
'desktop-code-v1',
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).requiresDesktopCode, isTrue);
final wrong = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111');
final first = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).last;
expect(first['type'], 'code-submit');
expect(first['code'], '111111');
bool? wrongResult;
unawaited(wrong.then((value) => wrongResult = value));
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
expect(wrongResult, isNull);
expect(await notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111'), isFalse);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
hasLength(1),
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'code-rejected',
'request_id': first['request_id'],
'remaining_attempts': 4,
},
);
expect(await wrong, isFalse);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
await tester.pumpWidget(
UncontrolledProviderScope(
container: container,
child: MaterialApp(
theme: AppTheme.light(),
home: const PairingPage(),
),
),
);
await tester.enterText(
find.byKey(const Key('pairing-code-input')),
'222222',
);
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsOneWidget);
expect(
find.text('Couldn’t check the code. Try again.'),
findsNothing,
);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'code-submit'),
hasLength(2),
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'payload',
'payload_type': 'credentials',
'payload': jsonEncode({
'relayUrl': 'https://relay.test',
'pubkey': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).public,
'nsec': nostr.Keys(sourceSecret).nsec,
}),
},
);
await tester.pump();
expect(find.text('Enter pairing code'), findsNothing);
expect(find.text('Protect your identity'), findsOneWidget);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(false);
notifier.confirmSas();
await tester.pump();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.storing);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((m) => m['type'] == 'sas-confirm'),
isEmpty,
);
notifier.reset();
await tester.pumpWidget(const SizedBox.shrink());
},
);
testWidgets(
'delayed final rejection exits the session and reset cancels pending verification',
(tester) async {
final pairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await pairing;
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
final result = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('111111');
final request = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).last;
await tester.pump(const Duration(seconds: 11));
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {
'type': 'code-rejected',
'request_id': request['request_id'],
'remaining_attempts': 0,
},
);
expect(await result, isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
notifier.reset();
final nextPairing = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await tester.pump();
await tester.pump(const Duration(milliseconds: 500));
await nextPairing;
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'desktop-code'},
);
final pending = notifier.verifyDesktopCode('222222');
notifier.reset();
expect(await pending, isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
},
);
test(
'a rejected offer exits code entry instead of silently waiting',
() async {
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
socket.relayMessageCallback([
'OK',
socket.published.single['id'],
false,
'event must have exactly one p tag',
]);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
contains('Scan a new desktop QR code'),
);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
},
);
test('admission rejection never reports a successful transfer', () async {
importAuth.authentication = Completer<void>();
importAuth.entered = Completer<void>();
final finished = Completer<void>();
container.listen(pairingProvider, (_, next) {
if (next.status == PairingStatus.error && !finished.isCompleted) {
finished.complete();
}
});
await beginImport(protected: false);
validation.complete();
await importAuth.entered!.future;
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isEmpty,
);
importAuth.authentication!.completeError(
StateError('Admission refused'),
);
await finished.future;
final completions = socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.where((message) => message['type'] == 'complete')
.toList();
expect(completions, hasLength(1));
expect(completions.single['success'], isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider), isNull);
});
test('unchecked protection persists on a successful import', () async {
await beginImport(protected: false);
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
importAuth.lastCommunity?.sensitiveActionPolicy,
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.success);
expect(
container.read(pairedCommunityLandingProvider),
importAuth.lastCommunity,
);
});
test('checked protection persists on a successful import', () async {
await beginImport(protected: true);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
importAuth.lastCommunity?.sensitiveActionPolicy,
SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled,
);
});
test('unenrolled biometrics prevent a protected import', () async {
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.unavailable;
await beginImport(protected: true);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('Enroll Face ID or biometrics'));
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isFalse,
);
});
test('reset during NIP-AB connection retires its continuation', () async {
final pending = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
notifier.reset();
await pending;
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
expect(socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret), isEmpty);
});
test('reset during NIP-AB offer delay prevents a late offer', () async {
final pending = notifier.pair(pairingCode);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
notifier.reset();
await pending;
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
expect(socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret), isEmpty);
});
test('stale biometric approval cannot advance a reset import', () async {
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
await notifier.pair(pairingCode);
notifier.setProtectSensitiveActions(true);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
notifier.reset();
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isFalse,
);
});
test('reset invalidates pending authentication persistence', () async {
importAuth.authentication = Completer<void>();
await beginImport(protected: false);
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNotNull);
notifier.reset();
importAuth.authentication!.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(
container.read(authProvider).value!.status,
AuthStatus.unauthenticated,
);
expect(socket.isConnected, isFalse);
});
test('reset invalidates pending credential validation', () async {
await beginImport(protected: false);
notifier.reset();
validation.complete();
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(importAuth.lastCommunity, isNull);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'complete'),
isFalse,
);
});
});
group('desktop identity recovery', () {
const sourceSecret =
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506';
const sessionSecretHex =
'abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789';
late _ControllableSocket socket;
late PairingNotifier notifier;
late String recoveryCode;
late _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer authorizer;
late DateTime now;
setUp(() async {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
recoveryCode =
'nostrpair://${source.public}'
'?secret=$sessionSecretHex'
'&relay=wss%3A%2F%2Fpairing.buzz.xyz&v=1&mode=recover';
authorizer = _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer();
now = DateTime.utc(2026, 8, 6);
notifier = PairingNotifier(
socketFactory:
({
required wsUrl,
required ephemeralPrivkey,
required onMessage,
required onDisconnected,
}) {
socket = _ControllableSocket(
ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey,
onMessage: onMessage,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
);
return socket;
},
);
container = ProviderContainer(
overrides: [
pairingProvider.overrideWith(() => notifier),
relayConfigProvider.overrideWith(_RecoveryRelayConfig.new),
sensitiveActionAuthorizerProvider.overrideWithValue(authorizer),
identityExportClockProvider.overrideWithValue(() => now),
],
);
container.read(pairingProvider);
notifier = container.read(pairingProvider.notifier);
});
test('recovery authorization honors biometric protection', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled),
),
isTrue,
);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isTrue);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.sendsIdentityToDesktop, isTrue);
expect(
socket.published.first['tags'],
isNot(contains(equals(['confirmation', 'code-entry']))),
);
notifier.confirmSas();
expect(
socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret).map((m) => m['type']),
['offer'],
);
expect(state.sasCode, hasLength(6));
});
test('reset invalidates pending preflight authorization', () async {
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
final authorization = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).authorizationInProgress, isTrue);
notifier.reset();
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
expect(await authorization, isFalse);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
});
test('concurrent preflight requests start one authentication', () async {
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
final community = _exportCommunity(
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
);
final first = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community);
final second = notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community);
expect(await second, isFalse);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
expect(await first, isTrue);
});
test('unchecked protection allows device passcode fallback', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isFalse);
});
for (final padded in [false, true]) {
test(
'matching SAS exports normalized nsec (padded: $padded)',
() async {
final community =
_exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser).copyWith(
nsec: padded
? ' \n${_RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec}\t '
: _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec,
);
container
.read(relayConfigProvider.notifier)
.update(baseUrl: community.relayUrl, nsec: community.nsec);
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).userConfirmedSas, isTrue);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage, isNull);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
final sentMessages = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(
sourceSecret,
);
final payloads = sentMessages.where(
(message) => message['type'] == 'payload',
);
expect(payloads, hasLength(1));
expect(payloads.single['payload_type'], 'nsec');
expect(payloads.single['payload'], _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'complete', 'success': true},
);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.success,
);
},
);
}
test(
'malformed payload invalidates authorization before another session',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'payload', 'payload_type': 'nsec'},
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.error);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
final replacementSocket = socket;
notifier.confirmSas();
replacementSocket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(
replacementSocket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
},
);
test('skipped preflight authorization sends no identity', () async {
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(authorizer.calls, 0);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
});
test(
'failed transfer reauthorization publishes no identity payload',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.cancelled;
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('cancelled'));
final sentMessages = socket.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret);
expect(
sentMessages.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
},
);
test(
'stale authorization cannot advance a replacement pairing session',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
final firstSocket = socket;
final pendingAuthorization = Completer<DeviceAuthResult>();
authorizer.pending = pendingAuthorization;
notifier.confirmSas();
firstSocket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
notifier.reset();
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
final replacementSocket = socket;
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.confirmingSas,
);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
pendingAuthorization.complete(DeviceAuthResult.success);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
for (final pairingSocket in [firstSocket, replacementSocket]) {
final sentMessages = pairingSocket.decryptedPublishedMessages(
sourceSecret,
);
expect(
sentMessages.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
}
},
);
test('clock rollback invalidates the export authorization', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.subtract(const Duration(minutes: 1));
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
});
test(
'websocket relay origin remains bound after canonicalization',
() async {
final community = _exportCommunity(
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
).copyWith(relayUrl: 'wss://relay.test');
container
.read(relayConfigProvider.notifier)
.update(baseUrl: community.relayUrl, nsec: community.nsec);
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(community: community),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any(
(message) =>
message['type'] == 'payload' &&
message['payload'] == community.nsec,
),
isTrue,
);
},
);
for (final change in ['community', 'key']) {
for (final expired in [false, true]) {
test(
'$change switch aborts ${expired ? 'expired' : 'fresh'} export grant',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(
SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser,
),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
if (expired) now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
container
.read(relayConfigProvider.notifier)
.update(
baseUrl: change == 'community'
? 'https://other-relay.test'
: 'https://relay.test',
nsec: change == 'community'
? _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec
: nostr.Keys(
'2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222',
).nsec,
);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.confirmingSas);
expect(state.userConfirmedSas, isFalse);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('active community changed'));
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(
socket
.decryptedPublishedMessages(sourceSecret)
.any((message) => message['type'] == 'payload'),
isFalse,
);
},
);
}
}
test('expired biometric-only authorization preserves its mode', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.enabled),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isTrue);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
});
test(
'expired passcode-fallback authorization preserves its mode',
() async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
now = now.add(identityExportAuthorizationTtl);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
expect(authorizer.calls, 2);
expect(authorizer.lastIdentityBiometricOnly, isFalse);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).status,
PairingStatus.transferring,
);
},
);
test('cancelled authorization prevents pairing from starting', () async {
authorizer.result = DeviceAuthResult.cancelled;
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isFalse,
);
expect(authorizer.calls, 1);
expect(container.read(pairingProvider).status, PairingStatus.idle);
expect(
container.read(pairingProvider).errorMessage,
contains('cancelled'),
);
});
test('desktop storage failure surfaces an error', () async {
expect(
await notifier.authorizeIdentityExport(
community: _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy.disabledByUser),
),
isTrue,
);
await notifier.pair(recoveryCode);
notifier.confirmSas();
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'sas-confirm'},
includeTranscriptHash: true,
);
await Future<void>.delayed(Duration.zero);
socket.sendSourceMessage(
sourceSecret: sourceSecret,
sessionSecretHex: sessionSecretHex,
message: {'type': 'complete', 'success': false},
);
final state = container.read(pairingProvider);
expect(state.status, PairingStatus.error);
expect(state.errorMessage, contains('could not store'));
});
});
});
}
/// Encode a credentials payload the same way the desktop app would.
String _encodePairingCode({
String relayUrl = 'http://test:3000',
String? pubkey,
String? nsec,
}) {
final json = <String, dynamic>{
'relayUrl': relayUrl,
// ignore: use_null_aware_elements
if (pubkey != null) 'pubkey': pubkey,
// ignore: use_null_aware_elements
if (nsec != null) 'nsec': nsec,
};
return base64Url.encode(utf8.encode(jsonEncode(json)));
}
/// A fake [AuthNotifier] that records calls instead of touching secure storage.
class FakeAuthNotifier extends AsyncNotifier<AuthState>
implements AuthNotifier {
Community? lastCommunity;
Completer<void>? authentication;
Completer<void>? entered;
bool signedOut = false;
@override
Future<AuthState> build() async =>
const AuthState(status: AuthStatus.unauthenticated);
@override
Future<void> signOut() async {
signedOut = true;
state = const AsyncData(AuthState(status: AuthStatus.unauthenticated));
}
@override
Future<void> authenticateWithCommunity(
Community community, {
bool Function()? shouldContinue,
bool activate = true,
}) async {
if (shouldContinue != null && !shouldContinue()) return;
lastCommunity = community;
entered?.complete();
await authentication?.future;
if (shouldContinue != null && !shouldContinue()) return;
state = AsyncData(
AuthState(status: AuthStatus.authenticated, community: community),
);
}
}
class _DisconnectingSocket extends PairingSocket {
final void Function(Object? error) disconnectCallback;
_DisconnectingSocket({required this.disconnectCallback})
: super(
wsUrl: 'ws://unused',
ephemeralPrivkey:
'09b3065e3570a3a4054660dccd66e12774a99a904fdb0ca02dbc6c3136249506',
onMessage: (_) {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
@override
Future<void> connect() async {
disconnectCallback(Exception('Connection closed'));
}
}
Community _exportCommunity(SensitiveActionPolicy policy) => Community(
id: 'export-community',
name: 'Export',
relayUrl: 'https://relay.test',
nsec: _RecoveryRelayConfig.nsec,
sensitiveActionPolicy: policy,
addedAt: DateTime.utc(2026),
);
class _RecoveryRelayConfig extends RelayConfigNotifier {
static final nsec = nostr.Keys(
'1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111',
).nsec;
@override
RelayConfig build() => RelayConfig(baseUrl: 'https://relay.test', nsec: nsec);
}
class _FakeSensitiveActionAuthorizer implements SensitiveActionAuthorizer {
DeviceAuthResult result = DeviceAuthResult.success;
Completer<DeviceAuthResult>? pending;
int calls = 0;
bool? lastIdentityBiometricOnly;
@override
Future<DeviceAuthResult> authorizeIdentityAction({
required bool biometricOnly,
}) async {
calls++;
lastIdentityBiometricOnly = biometricOnly;
return pending?.future ?? result;
}
@override
Future<DeviceAuthResult> authorizeBiometricProtection() async {
calls++;
return pending?.future ?? result;
}
@override
Future<List<BiometricType>> enrolledBiometrics() async => const [];
}
class _ControllableSocket extends PairingSocket {
final String ephemeralPrivkey;
final void Function(List<dynamic> message) relayMessageCallback;
final List<Map<String, dynamic>> published = [];
bool _connected = false;
int _eventSequence = 0;
_ControllableSocket({
required this.ephemeralPrivkey,
required super.onMessage,
required super.onDisconnected,
}) : relayMessageCallback = onMessage,
super(wsUrl: 'ws://unused', ephemeralPrivkey: ephemeralPrivkey);
@override
bool get isConnected => _connected;
@override
Future<void> connect() async => _connected = true;
@override
void subscribe(String subId, int kind, String pubkeyHex) {}
@override
void publishEvent(Map<String, dynamic> event) => published.add(event);
@override
void dispose() => _connected = false;
List<Map<String, dynamic>> decryptedPublishedMessages(String sourceSecret) {
final key = getConversationKey(
sourceSecret,
nostr.Keys(ephemeralPrivkey).public,
);
return published
.map(
(event) =>
jsonDecode(nip44Decrypt(key, event['content'] as String))
as Map<String, dynamic>,
)
.toList();
}
void sendSourceMessage({
required String sourceSecret,
required String sessionSecretHex,
required Map<String, dynamic> message,
bool includeTranscriptHash = false,
}) {
final source = nostr.Keys(sourceSecret);
final targetPubkey = nostr.Keys(ephemeralPrivkey).public;
final sessionSecret = hexToBytes(sessionSecretHex);
final body = Map<String, dynamic>.from(message);
if (includeTranscriptHash) {
final shared = ecdhSharedSecret(sourceSecret, targetPubkey);
final (_, sasInput) = deriveSas(shared, sessionSecret);
body['transcript_hash'] = bytesToHex(
deriveTranscriptHash(
deriveSessionId(sessionSecret),
hexToBytes(source.public),
hexToBytes(targetPubkey),
sasInput,
sessionSecret,
),
);
}
final key = getConversationKey(sourceSecret, targetPubkey);
final event = nostr.Event.from(
kind: 24134,
content: nip44Encrypt(key, jsonEncode(body)),
tags: [
['p', targetPubkey],
],
secretKey: sourceSecret,
createdAt: 1_700_000_000 + _eventSequence++,
);
relayMessageCallback(['EVENT', 'pair', event.toMap()]);
}
}
class _PendingValidationSocket extends RelaySocket {
_PendingValidationSocket()
: super(
wsUrl: 'wss://relay.example',
nsec: null,
onMessage: (_) {},
onConnected: () {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
final connection = Completer<void>();
bool disposed = false;
@override
Future<void> connect() => connection.future;
@override
void dispose() => disposed = true;
@override
Future<void> disconnect() async => disposed = true;
}
class _ValidationOutcomeSocket extends RelaySocket {
_ValidationOutcomeSocket(this.connected)
: super(
wsUrl: 'wss://relay.example',
nsec: null,
onMessage: (_) {},
onConnected: () {},
onDisconnected: (_) {},
);
final bool Function() connected;
@override
SocketState get state =>
connected() ? SocketState.connected : SocketState.disconnected;
@override
Future<void> connect() async {}
@override
Future<void> disconnect() async {}
}